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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. D.V.
1920 2009-62 JUN 12
2

WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT THE CHINESE ARMY.

From H. A. M.I.B. O.C.S. JUN 1 1920 COMBAT.

No. 2499 Date April 9th, 1920. 19

Replying to No. 2009 - 62 M.I.2 Date April 9th 1920. 19

14 --- COMPOSITION.

The follwoing is from data obtained from various confidential reports and is believed to be as accurate as any obtainable. The present political condition in China makes it impossible for absolutely accurate information to be obtained.

1. What is the number of Division on peace footing? On authorized war strength? According to the Imperial Edict of October 1907 the army was to be composed of 36 Divisions. Thirty four of these were organized but the constant internal strife has prevented the completion of this plan. The various provincial governors recruit indescriminately within their own districts and it is impossible to obtain the actual strength since many have been known to draw pay for troops that exist on paper only.

2. Numerical strength, enlisted and commissioned, authorized war strength? Accurate figures are impossible. A close estimate is 1300000. The independence of the provincial governors makes it impossible for even the War Department to know exactly how many troops they have. Nosuch thing as an authorized war strength exists. In an emergency, there are avaiable a considerable amount of partially trained men and about 15 million untrained but physically fit men.

3. What is the arm of the Infantry? Name, calibre, range? What number are available on a peace footing? Authorized war strength?
The following is a list of the arms used in the infantry:-
6.8 Mauser made at the Hanyang Arsenal Model 13
7.9 Mauser and carbines 1888 pattern
6.5 Japanese carbines of the 30th. year of Michi.
6.5 Manlicher refles and carbines
7.9 Japanese rifles of the 38th. year of Michi
Mauser rifles made in the year 1888
Japanese Arisak rifles of the 36th. year of Michi
Japanese rifles of the 20th and the 28th year of Michi and the 22nd yeqr of Murata.
Russian three line rifles
rifles of the model of 1888
It is impossible to determine the range of these various types but none are known to be sighted to over 1400 meters. All the equipment is very old and in poor condition.

Every soldier is supposed to be equipped with a rifle and amunition but it is believed that 800000 is the maximum number that are really to be had. None are known to be in storage and there is no set number for peace or authorized war strength.

4. What field artillery pieces are used? Number, calibre, and range of each class? How many are available now with troops, in depots and what can be supplied in case of emergancy?
The following is a list of the artillery pieces used in the Chinese army:

75mm/

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75mm Krupp field guns, last model	353
75mm Krupp Mountain guns, last model	157
57mm Krupp Mountain guns, last model	148
53mm Krupp Mountain guns, last model	6
9mm Krupp Mountain guns, last model	9
55mm Krupp Mountain guns, last model	9
75mm Ariska field guns	36
75mm Ariska mountain guns	12
75mm Schneider Creusot mountain guns	8
75mm Schneider Creusot field guns	36
15mm Schneider Creusot Mountain guns	3

The above that are listed as Krupp products are not all, that to be products of the Krupp factories but to be Chinese imitations of the German models. They are known to have made a certain few field pieces and mountain guns after German and other foreign models but the exact number is not known.
It is impossible to determine the ranges of these various types. All of the above are with troops. None are known to be in storage. The various arsenals could produce about 120 guns of all types in a year in case of emergency.

5. Locate divisions and name division commanders.

Distribution of the Chinese Regular Army

Chihli, Paotingfu, Tuchun Tsao Kun.
3rd Division, Wu Pei-fu, Commander, at Hengchow, Hunan.
1st Chihli Mixed Brigade, Wang Ch'eng-pin, commander, at Yehling, Hunan.
2nd Chihli Mixed Brigade, Yen Hsiang-wen, commander, at T'iaoling, Hunan.
3rd Chihli Mixed Brigade, Hsiao Yueh-nan, commander, at Hengshan, Hunan.
4th Chihli Mixed Brigade, Tss'ao Ying, commander, at Laiyang, Hunan.
5th Chihli Mixed Brigade, ShangTeh-ch'uan, commander, at Ch'iyang, Hunan.

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Metropolitan District, Peking.

8th Division, Wang Ju-ch'in, commander, at Paotingfu, Chihli.
9th Division, Wei Hai-lou, commander, at Nanyuan (Peking).
15th Division (Imperial Guard) Liu Hsun, commander, at Nanyuan.
13th Division, Li Chin-ts'ai, commander, at Hsiyuan (Summer Palace).
20th Division, Fan Kuo-chang, commander, at Yuehchow, Hunan.
11th Division, Li Ku'ei-yuan, commander, at Changsha, Hunan.
16th Mixed Brigade, Feng Yü-shiang, commander, at Changteh, Hunan.
8th Mixed Brigade, Chin Yun-ao, commander, at Kung-hsien, Honan.

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Shengking, Fengt'ien (Moukden) Tuchun Chang Tso-lin.

27th Mukden Division, Chang Tso-hsiang, commander, at Peitakuan, Fengt'ien.
28th MuRden Division, Chi Chin-t'an, commander, at Chinchow, Fengt'ien.
29th Mukden Division, Wu Tsun-sheng, commander, at Hsinmint'un, Fengt'ien.
1st "Tsan Pien" Division, Chang Ching-huei, Fukien.
1st Mixed Brigade of Fengt'ien Army, Liang Ch'ao-tung, Changsha, Hunan.
2nd Mixed Brigade of Fengt'ien Army, Chang Tien-sheng, Ts'angt'ufu.
3rd Mixed Brigade of Fengt'ien Army, Ts'ai Pen-p'ing, in Honan.
4th Mixed Brigade of Fengt'ien Army, Hsu Lan-chou, Hsingpling, Shensi.
5th Mixed Brigade of Fengt'ien Army, Wang Liang-ch'en, Hanch'uan, (On Szech'uan-Shensi-Hupeh borders)
1st Regiment Infantry and
1st Regiment Cavalry Fengt'ien Army, Miao Chin-fang, Ichow.
2nd Cavalry Regiment Fengt'ien Army, Chang Yung-hsing, Tungchow, Kirin.
Of the Fengt'ien Army, Constabulary (Hsun Fang Tui) 12 batallions Infantry, 4 Batallions Cavalry, Ma Lung-t'an commander, at Feng Huang-ch'eng, Fengt'ien.
1st Division "New Fengt'ien Army, Wang Hsi-p'in, in Outer Mongolia.
1st Brigade "New Fengt'ien Army, "Reserves," Liu Hsiang-chiu, Heilung-chiang.
1st Mixed Cavalry (New Army), Hsi Hai-feng, Manchow.
1st Brigade of Fengt'ien troops under the command of Paotehshan, has been returned from Shihchia-chuang and other places Moukden (for re-organization)

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Chilin (Kirin), Tuchun Pao Kuei-ching.

1st Kirin Division, Pei Ch'i-hsun, at Ch'angch'un, Kirin.
1st Kirin Mixed Brigade, Ch'eng Ming, at Hsuangch'engtze, Kirin.
2nd Kirin Mixed Brigade, Kao Feng-ch'en, at Hueich'un, Kirin.
3rd Kirin Mixed Brigade, Yao Hsiang-kuei, at Ch'uanch'ang, Kirin.
4th Kirin Mixed Brigade, Chao Yuan-p'ei, Lungch'uanchen, Kirin.
5th Kirin Mixed Brigade, Yao P'ei-chen, Harbin.
Constabulary and Defense Troops (Hsun Fang Tui and Yu Chi Tui), 10 Batallions, Wu Keng-T'ien, commander, at Hsinch'eng.

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Heilungkiang, Tuchun Sun Lieh-ch'en.

1st Heilungkiang Division, Sun Lieh-ch'en, Tsitsihar (Lungkiangchen)
16th Mixed Brigade, Pa ----, commander, along the railways.
1st Heilungkiang Mixed Brigade, Li Ch'ing-lu commander, Suihuacheng.

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2nd Heilungkiang Mixed Brigade, Chang Ming-chiu, Manchouli Station.
1st Heilungkiang Mixed Cavalry Brigade, Yuan Ch'ing-en at Tailai-chen.
2nd Heilungkiang Cavalry Brigade, Chang Kuei-wu, at Chinghsingchen.
1st Heilungkiang Mixed Regiment, Wu Shih-chien, at Heiho.
2nd Heilungkiang Mixed Regiment, Li Shao-po, at Holan.

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Shantung, Tuchun T'ien Chung-yü.

5th Division, T'ien Chung-yü, Tsinan.
1st New Shantung Division, Wang Shih-tsung, at ?
1st Shantung Mixed Brigade, Chang K'o-yao,
2nd Shantung Mixed Brigade, Chu Pao-tsao,
3rd Shantung Mixed Brigade, Chang P'ei-jung,
4th Shantung Mixed Brigade, Chang Shan-yi,
5th Shantung Mixed Brigade, Li Sen,
1st Brigade New Army, Ho Feng-yü reorganized one new Mixed Brigade called 6th Mixed Brigade of Shantung.
11 Regiment, commander, Wu Tsun-ching.
12 Regiment, commander, Ho Tien-ting.
7th Mixed Brigade, Sun Tsung-hsien.
1st Brigade Reserves, Ch'en Pao-lung.
2nd Brigade Reserves, Chang Huai-pin.
18th Mixed Brigade, T'ang T'ien-hsi, Yenchow Garrison Commissioner.
47th Mixed Brigade, Su Chun.

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Honan, Tuchun Chao T'i.

1st Mixed Brigade (Provincial), Ch'eng Shen, Yellow River guard.
2nd Mixed Brigade (Provincial), Ts'ai Teh-kuei, North of Yellow R.
Constabulary, Infantry, 3 Batallions
Constabulary, Cavalry, 4 Batallions, Wu Ch'ing-t'ung, garrision commissioner for Nanyang, at Yuhua-chen.
Constabulary, Infantry 10 Batallions, Cavalry 3 batallions, from the "I Chun", name commonly applied to Chiang Kuei-t'i's troops, Wu Ch'ing-t'ung commander.
"Left Road" Constabulary, Infantry 9 batallions, Cavalry 2 batallions, Ma Chih-min commander, at Loyang (Honanfu).
"Advance Guard" Constabulary, 8 batallions infantry, 1 batallion artillery, T'ien Tsolin commander, at Kaifengfu.
"Hung Wei" Army (old troops not yet reorganized as part of regular army) 6 batallions infantry, 1 batallion cavalry, 1 batallion of artillery, T'ien Wen-tze commander, at Yehhsien.
Precautionary troops (Yu Chi Tui) 3 batallions, Yuan Pu-huang commander, at Kaifengfu.
"South Road" Precautionary Troops, 3 batallions, Yuan Chia-yi at Hsin-yang.

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Shansi, Tuchun Yen Hsi-san.

1st Shansi Mixed Brigade, Shang Chen, commander, at T'aiyuan.
2nd Shansi Mixed Brigade, Ma K'ai-sung commander, at Sohsien.
3rd Shansi Mixed Brigade, K'ung Fan-yu commander, at Tat'ungfu.
4th Shansi Mixed Brigade, Chao Tai-wen commander, at Yunch'enghsien.
5th Shansi Mixed Brigade,)
1st Mixed Regiment,)Kao Kuan commander, at South of Tat'ung-fu.
2nd Mixed Shansi Regiment, Shih Huan Ying commander, at Linfenhsien.

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Shensi, Tuchun Ch'en Shu-fan.

1st Shensi Mixed Brigade, Liu Shih-lung commander, Talihsien.
2nd Shansi Mixed Brigade, Tseng Chi-hsien, Feng-chuanchen.
3rd Shansi Mixed Brigade, Chang Pao-lin, T'ungkuan.
4th Shansi Mixed Brigade, Wang Fei-hu, Hsianfu.
5th Shansi Mixed Brigade, Han Ch'ing-shou, P'uch'eng.
6th Shansi Mixed Brigade, Pai Hung-yi, Fengch'uanchen.
1st Regiment Cavalry, Chang Fan, Hsianfu.
2nd Regiment Cavalry, Ts'ao Wei-k'ang, P'uch'eng.
3rd Regiment Cavalry, Chiang Hung-mo, P'uch'eng.
4th Regiment Cavalry, Ch'en Chien-ta, Li Wei Hsien(north).
New regiment of unequipped recruits, Ch'en-Chien-ta, at Liweihsien.
Precautionary Troops at Tuchun's office, 4 companies(old style).

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Anhui, Tuchun Ni Shih-chung.

"anwu Army"
"Seventh Road" 37 batallions infantry, 4 batallions artillery,
Ni Shih-chung commander, mostly stationed at Wuhu.
Of the "Anwu Army" 20 batallions commander by Chang Wen-sheng are at Hsuchowfu, Kiangsu Province. Another, Ma Lien-cha, with the title of Commander in Chief, has twenty batallions which are now divide between Ch'inchow, Kiangsi and Hunan.

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Hupeh. Tuchun Wang Chan-yuan.

2nd Division, Wang Chan-yuan, at Wuchang.
17th Mixed Brigade, Chang Lien-sheng, Yuanyang.
18th Mixed Brigade, Chao Jung-hua, at Hsiang-yang.
13th Mixed Brigade, Li Ping-tse, Patung.
21st Mixed Brigade, Sun Ch'uan-fang, Ichang.
27th Mixed Brigade, Chu Ts'ai-huang, Shashih.

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Office of the Commander in Chief in Charge of the Protection of the Yang-tze. Commander in Chief, Wu Kuang-hsin.

26th Mixed Brigade, Chang Ting-hsun, at Hsuchow (Kiangsu), at Hsin-yangchow (Hupeh), and at various places in Honan.
2nd Brigade of Reserve, Infantry,
1 Batallion of Mountain guns, Wu Kuang-hsin commander.
1 batallion of body guards,
4 companies machine guns divided between Ich'ang and
1 batallion transport,
1 batallion engineers, Chingchow.

Hunan, Tuchun Chang Ching-yao.

7th Division, Chang Chin-yao, Changsha.
1st Hunan Mixed Brigade, Chang Chin-t'ang, Changsha.
3rd Hunan Mixed Brigade, Wu Hsin-tien,
5th Hunan Mixed Brigade, Chiang Tung-an, northwest and southwest of Changsha.

18th Division, Wang Mao-sheng, at Ich'ang, Hupeh.

Kiangsi, Tuchun Ch'en Kuang-yuan.

12th Division, Ch'en Kuang-yuan, Nanchangfu.
3rd Kiangsi(?) Mixed Brigade, Ch'eh Kuang-lu, at Chinan.
9th Mixed Brigade, Ting Hsiao-lam, Ta-Yu.
1st Kiangsi Infantry Regiment, Li Ting-k'uei, Chiuchiang. (Kiukiang)
"Kiangfang" 1st Regiment, Liu Tien-chun, Chouhua.
" 2nd " , Sung Huan-ts'ai, Ch'ienhan.
" 3rd " , Hao Hsien-lin, Kanhsien.
" 4th " , Hsu Shih-fa, Kiukiang.
2nd Kiangsi Brigade, Wang Hsien-t'ing, Kanhsien.

Fukien, Tuchun Li Hou-chi.

1st Division, Yao Chien-p'ing, Fuchow. (Provincial troops)
2nd " , Tsang Chih-p'ing, Amoy. (" ")
16th Mixed Brigade, T'ang Kuo-mo, Hsiungchow, Hainan. ?
12th " " , Wang Ch'i-fu, Huangkang.

Kansu, Tuchun Chang-Kuang-chien.

"Left Army" 5 batallions infantry, 1 batallion cavalry, 1 batallion.

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artillery, Chang Kuang-chien commander, Lanchowfu.
"Right Army", 6 batallions infantry, 1 batallion cavalry, Wu Yu-kuei, at P'ingliangfu.
"Ch'in Chun" 1 batallion infantry, 1 company cavalry, Wu Tung-jen, Taohsien.
3 batallions constabulary attached to Tuchun's office, Hu Li-ch'ang commander, now at Ch'inchow.
1 batallion cavalry constabulary, 3 batallions infantry constabulary, Yang Shu-teh commander, at T'ienshuikuan.
Constabulary 4 batallions cavalry, Chang Ho-hsun, Hsiaochow.
Constabulary - 2 batallions infantry, 1 batallion cavalry, Chang Ting-pang commander, Hochow.
13 Batallions infantry, 2 batallions constabulary, Ma Fu-hsiang commander, Ninghsia.
"Wei Wu Chun" - 6 batallions infantry, 4 batallions cavalry, Lu Hung-T'ao, at Hsining and Lungtung.

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Hsinchiang (Sinkiang) Tuchun Yang Tseng-hsin.

1st Hsinchiang Mixed Brigade, Kiang Sung-lin, Hami.
2nd " " " , Yang Fei-hsia, Ili. (Garrison Commissioner).
Constabulary 10 batallions infantry, 6 batallions cavalry, 1 batallion artillery, Ma Fu-hsing, Ch'inhsien.
"Left Road" Army", Constabulary, 2 batallions infantry, 2 batallions cavalry, 1 company artillery, T'an Ti-sheng commander, Aksu.
"Right Road Army", constabulary, 1 batallion infantry, 1 company cavalry, gendarmerie 1 company, Ma Fu-ming, T'a-ch'eng.
"Rear Army" constabykart 1 batallion infantry, 1 company cavalry, military police 1 company, Yang Ch'un-yung, Tou-liang.
"Advance Army", constaculary, 7 batallions infantry, cavalry 6 batallions, ? Chiench'eng.

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Chekiang, Tuchun Lu Jung-hsiang.

1@ Division, Lu Jung-hsiang, Hangchow.
1st Chekiang Division, Wang Tsun-feng, at Hsiamenk'ou.
2nd " " , Chang Tai-yang, Hangchow.
4th Division, Lu Jung-hsiang, Lunghua, Shanghai.
2 batallions Tuchun's bodyguard, Chou Chin-ch'ang, Hangchow.

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Kiangsu, Tuchun Li Hsun.

6th Division, Ch'i Pien-yuan, Puchen and vicinities.
2nd Kiangsu Division, Chu Hsi, Suchow.

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19th Division, Yang Chun-p'u, Chenkiang, Kiangyin, Suchang & vicinities.
1st Kiangsu Mixed Brigade, Ma Yü-jen, Huai Yang.
74th Mixed Brigade, Ch'en Tiao-yuan, Fu-ming and vicinities.
76th Mixed Brigade, Chang Jen-kuei, Yangchow.
4 regiments infantry reserved to fill up depleted ranks, 1 batallion artillery, cavalry 1 batallion, Pai Pao-shan, Haichow.
1st Reserved brigade, Huang Chen-kuei, at Yangchow.
2nd " " , Li Tien-chen, at Nanking & Tingchiachiao.
3rd " " , Wu Heng-tsan, at San Pai-lo, Nanking.
Gendarmerie, Wang Chien-fei, at Lu Cheng P'ai Lo.
Bodyguard of Tuchun's Yamen, Wang-yi, at Tuchun's Yamen.
Military Police, Chen Yu-chen, at Yachow, Kao-pao & vinicities.
" " , Yü Yu-fu, at Yachow and vinicities.

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Jehol, Tuchun Chiang Kuei T'I

1st Mixed Brigade, Ch'en Wen-yuan, Tsuitzeshan.
"Middle Road" constabulary, 5 batallions infantry, 2 batallions cavalry, Yuan Kuang-chen, Fentingchen.
"East Road", constabulary, 5 batallions infantry, 1 batallion cavalry, 1 company artillery, Li Chan-yuan, P'ing Ch'uan-chen.
"North Road, constabulary, 5 batallions infantry, 4 batallions cavalry, Liu T'ien-sheng, Wutan.

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Chahar (Kalgan) Tut'ung Wang T'ing-chen.

16th Division, Wang T'ing-chen, Kalgan.
1st Mixed Brigade, Tien Yu-wang, Kalgan.
2nd " " , Hu Yü-ju, Dolon-nor-.
"Huai Chun" 4 Batallions infantry, T8iang Ch'i-yao, Chichikuan.
1st constabulary cavalry, 4 batallions, Chiao Chien Tsau, Fengchen.
2nd " " , 3 batallions,
3nd " infantry , 4 " Ting Chang-fa, T'ao-lin.
3rd " cavalry , 3 " , Wang Ming-chiang, Pat'ai.

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Suiyuan Tut'ung Ts'ai Ch'eng-hsun.

1st Division, Ts'ai Ch'eng-hsun, Suiyuan, (Kueihuach'eng.)
Constabulary, cavalry, 4 batallions, infantry 6 batallions.
1st Suiyuan Mixed Brigade.
Mounted Military Police 6 batallions.
Gendarmerie 6 batallions.
Constabulary, infantry, 8 batallions.

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SUBJECT THE CHINESE ARMY.

From H. A. COMBAT.

No. 2492 Date April 9th, 1920.

Replying to No. 2002 - 62 M.I. 2 Date April 9th, 1920.

Soldiers attached to the North West Frontier Defense Office under the General direction of Tuan Ch'i Jui.

1st Division (Frontier Defense Army), Chu T'ung-feng, Peiyuan, Peking.
2nd Division (Frontier Defense Army), Ma Liang, Tsinan, Shantung.
3rd Division (Frontier Defense Army), Ch'en Wen-yun, Paotingfu, T'ungchow and Langfang.
1st Mixed Brigade " " "), Sung Yu-feng, T'ientsin, Yang-liu-ching and Chinghaihsien.
2nd " " " " "), Ch'u Hsin-ch'uan, Mongolia.

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14 men make a P'eng, 3 P'eng a P'ai, 3 P'ai a lien, & lien a ying, 3 ying a t'uan, 2 t'uan a lü, 2 lü a shih.

In a division (shih) are 3 ying artillery, 3 ying cavalry, 12 ying infantry hospital and medical corps 1 ying, 1 ying engineers, transport 1 ying, 1 ying machine guns.

In the cavalry 56 men in a company, 4 companies in a batallion.

In the artillery, 126 men in a company, 3 companies in a batallin, 16 guns to the batallion.

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6. What supplies of amunition, small arms and artillery, are on hand? What reserve is available?
There are no supplies of smallarms amunition or artillery amunition on hand now and no reserves exist.

7. What are the principal fortified places? What is their garrison and armenment?
No modern fortified places exist in China.

8. What is the location and capacity of depots for reserve amunition? Locat arsenals, giving capacity in manufacture of arms and amunition?
No depots for reserve amunition exist.
Location of Arsenals

Location	S.A. amunition	Rifles	Field guns
Teachow	500000		
Hanyuan	1000000	100	20
Shanghai	500000	30	100
Szechuan	300000	50	
Canton	300000	50	
Nanking	300000	(per day)	(per year)
Fukien	200000 (per month)		

SUBJECT THE CHINESE ARMY.

From M. A. COMBAT

No. 24 99 Date April 9th, 1920., 19

Replying to No. 2002-62 M.I.2 Date April 9th 1920., 19

9. What are the mobilization centers? What are their capacity? Length of time to mobilize?
No mobilization centers exist.

10. What is the number of airplanes, all classes, on peace footing and authorized war strength?
List of airplanes:
18 French planes old models -- under military control
2 Japanese planes, old models -- under military control
12 Chinese copies of Japanese models with American moters under military control
There are a small number of other planes of up-to-date types that are not under military control. A large number of other planes have been contracted for by both the northern and the southern governments. No real military air service exists though there is reported to be an organization under way. From a military point of view, the Chinese military are not yet to be considered as in the air service game at all. (See report this office 2426)

11. What is the enlisted and commissioned personnel of aviation on peace footing and authorized war strength? How organized?
There are none except at the air school at Nanyuan, near Peking, which has graduated about 150 men, all officers, and has about the same number of students there at present.

12. Tank Corps, Number, class and armenment of tanks, both in peace and war? What is the personnel and organization both on peace footing and authorized war strength?
No tanks or Tank Corps exists in China.

Binding Margin.

Major Thompson
MID
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

2009-62
W. I. 2

2009-62 1

OCT 15

WAR DEPARTMENT

October 8, 1919.

From: Director of Military Intelligence.

To: American Military Attache, Peking, China.

Subject: Information Requested.

1. The following information is requested at once regarding the Army of China:-

(1) What is the number of Divisions on peace footing? On authorized war strength?

(2) Numerical strength, enlisted and commissioned, authorized war strength?

(3) What is the Arm of the Infantry? Name, calibre, range? What number are available on peace footing? Authorized war strength?

(4) What field artillery pieces are used? Number, calibre and range of each class? How many are available now, with troops, in depots, and what can be supplied in case of war?

(5) Locate divisions and name division commanders. Also higher units and commanders.

(6) What supplies of ammunition, small arms and artillery are on hand? What reserve is available?

(7) What are the principal fortified places? What is their garrison and armament?

(8) What is the location and capacity of depots for reserve ammunition? Locate arsenals, giving capacity in manufacture of arms and ammunition.

(9) What are the mobilization centers? What are their capacity? Length of time to mobilize?

(10) What is the number of airplanes, all classes, on peace footing and authorized war strength?

(11) What is the enlisted and commissioned personnel of aviation on peace footing and authorized war strength? How organized?

MAJOR THOMPSON
MID

(12) Tank Corps. Number, class and armament of tanks both in peace and in war? What is the personnel and organization both on peace footing and authorized war strength?

2. It is realized that the answers to some of these questions may be difficult to obtain. However, they are arranged in the general order of their present desirability. It is requested that information readily obtained be forwarded immediately.

3. This information is all pertinent to an intelligent preparation of situation monographs on the several countries and intelligent work cannot be put forth without such data.

M CHURCHILL
Brigadier General, General Staff

By:

SHERMAN MILES
Colonel, General Staff

MAILED, M.I.B., G.S. OCT 9 1919

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
Executive Division
Mil. Int. Branch.

2009-64

WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT.....CHINESE EXPEDITION TO MONGOLIA.....

From.....H.A.....REC'D, M. I. B., O. C. S. SEP 27 1919.....

No.....2172.....Date..August 14, 1919.....19

Replying to No.....Date.....19

It is impossible to obtain reliable and definite information from Chinese officials as to the strength of the Expeditionary Force which is being sent to Mongolia, and I have not been able to extract a more explicit statement than that given me by the Chief of the forces in the field, to the effect that the numbers of troops to be despatched will depend on circumstances, and are, therefore, not yet definitely decided on. All available evidence, however, points to the composition of the Expeditionary Force being one Mixed Brigade of the newly organized troops of General Hsü Shu-cheng which General Hsü expects to recruit to 7,000 men.

The object of the expedition, as was stated by General Chu, Commander of the expedition(second in command to General Hsü) is to strengthen the Chinese garrison at Urga and on the Siberian frontier, and there seems little doubt that this statement is correct, the military preparations now under way on its frontier being in reality intended to reestablish the Chinese position at least as strongly as it existed before the Revolution of 1911.

It will be remembered that the period between the Russo-Japanese War and the Revolution of 1911 was a period in which the Chinese extended their military hold over the outlying provinces of Mongolia, Hsinchiang and Tibet by the despatch of forces of newly organized troops trained on Japanese lines. During this period, Japanese influence in military matters was comparatively strong. The garrison of Mongolia before the Revolution consisted of one Battalion Infantry and one squadron Cavalry at Urga, and of small detachments in Western Mongolia. New barracks were built at Urga, and an increase of the garrison was contemplated. The revolution of 1911-12, however, resulted in a set back to this militaristic policy, and most of the outlying garrisons either mutinied, or were broken up. Russia's collapse and the threats of Bolshevik inroads into Mongolia have now given the Chinese a chance to reassert their position in spite of their Convention with Russia and Mongolia, and it is only a question how far the military party in China intends to go.

It may be worth while examining the motives of General Hsü Shu-cheng, Commanding the Expeditionary Force. This officer is evidently hoping to obtain the appointment of War Minister, now held by Chin Yün-p'eng,whose resignation

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From H.A.

No. 2172 Date_____, 19

Replying to No._____Date_____, 19

is, before very long likely to occur owing to difficulties with the Minister of Finance. Pending his appointment as successor to the present War Minister, Hsü Shu-cheng has to endeavor to retain in his hands an adequate military force. The retention of the four Mixed Brigades now under his command can only be justified by their utilization for the purposes for which they in theory exist, namely the defence of the Northwest frontier, and hence, the despatch of an expeditionary force to Mongolia is a necessity. It is therefore likely that he will make as great a show of strength as is practicable, and it is possible that portions of all four brigades will be sent in order to give the impression that all his troops are to be employed.

Hsü, however, is hardly likely to take up his quarters on the frontier, much less to proceed himself to Urga. His appointment of Commissioner for the Northwest frontier, which makes him the senior officer in Mongolia, and on the frontier is in fact bound to clash with the interests of the Military Governors of Chahar and Jehol, and with those of the Director of the Peking-Suiyuan Railway, Major-General Ting Shih-yuan. It might, therefore, be concluded that the Expedition to Urga would be a secondary item in Hsü Shu-cheng's interests for the moment. Possibly this is so, but the temptation to seize the opportunity to reassert China's military supremacy in outlying districts is strong in Chinese military circles, and there is little doubt that this expedition is a part of this general policy.

It is difficult to say how far the Japanese military party is behind the policy of regaining Chinese military supremacy. If this party really hopes that the programme of Group V of the Twenty-One Demands of 1915 is ever to be realized, it would be to its interest that Chinese garrisons should be located in Mongolia, Hsinchiang and Tibet, as Japan would then, through her military advisers and by the terms of the Military Agreement have considerable influence in these districts, if not virtual control. Though the realization of this hope may perhaps be in a somewhat distant future, the idea cannot be altogether dismissed as a motive actuating Japanese policy with regard to Hsü Shu-cheng's expedition.

On the other hand, though the Chief of the Japanese General Staff may declare that it is not in Japanese interest

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to support the project attributed to Semeonoff, of forming an independent Outer Mongolia, there is nothing to prevent Japanese unofficial agents from supporting certain Buriats in opposing the Chinese. It is known that their agents are active in Mongolia, and it is not unreasonable to assume that the Japanese military are carrying out the policy they are believed to have adopted in China and Russia of supporting both sides. There is a strong probability that the Japanese did actually support the scheme for Mongolian independence, though this is not easy to prove. At the time the "conference" took place, the Japanese military were apparently supporting Semeonoff in his refusal to submit to Admiral Kolchak. The policy of the Japanese military party has always been to support the idea of a semi-independent Far Eastern Siberia, as opposed to a strong centralized Russian Government, and the idea of a semi-independent Far East might be understood to imply the abandonment of the imperial policy of a Russian protectorate over Mongolia. As therefore, Mongolia cannot stand alone, Japan would have a fair chance of succeeding to Russia's position as protector of Mongolian autonomy against Chinese aggression, and it would not be difficult to understand her giving support to the Buriat "Conference".

A distinct change can however be seen in Japan's policy in the spring of this year, as compared with her policy last autumn and winter, and her opposition to a strong centralized government in Russia now seems to have weakened. It is not necessary here to inquire what arrangements were come to with Admiral Kolchak, or with those of his military entourage who are looking for a larger measure of military support than they are likely to get from England and America - but it is hardly likely that the idea of a semi-independent Far East has been given up, and it is quite possible that a compromise with Admiral Kolchak Government has been come to on this. The change in policy however makes it impossible to countenance openly any movement that adversely affects Russia's treaty rights in Mongolia, and any support that may be given to the disbanded Buriats of Semeonoff's forces must be given by secret agents.

Opportunities for intrigue with the Mongol princes must of course be abundant. General Chu, second in command to General Hsü Shu-cheng, assured me that he had reliable information as to the attitude of all the influential Mongol leaders being in favor of a Chinese expedition, but of course, his statement was necessarily en parte, and he was unable to give asatisfactory answer to the question against what enemy this expedition was required to protect the Mongols. He stated that the Conference of Mongol Princes, said to have been summoned

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by Semeonoff in the early part of the year, was a bogus conference, the "representatives" having been unimportant persons who, he hinted, had been bribed to attend. He said that the Mongolian leaders were afraid of the proposal attributed to Semeonoff as they suspected the Japanese of being behind them.

It is hardly to be supposed that the Mongol Princes are really in favor of Chinese troops coming to Urga, as their previous experience of the latter has not been altogether encouraging. But they are in this difficulty, that if they wish to oppose the Chinese, they can hardly avoid joining the " "Semeonoff party", and the latter evil, being unknown, may seem to them the greater. The "Semeonoff party" is probably largely composed of disbanded soldiers of Semeonoff's forces. The latter, as originally raised, contained very few pure Russians, the main part consisting of Chinese mercenaries with a sprinkling of Buriats and inhabitants of Barga.

As regards Semeonoff's own part in the Mongolian movement, there was a time last winter when his position was very insecure. His dismissal by order of Admiral Kolchak had been published, and Admiral Kolchak had despatched troops to Chita to insure that the order was carried out. It was Japanese support alone that saved him, and he was made to feel that he owed his position to Japan.

Under these circumstances, it would not have been difficult to persuade a man of Semeonoff's education and temperament that Mongolia offered an opening for an independent careeer. Semeonoff seems to have fallen into the trap, but once the Mongolian independence movement had been well started and opportunities thus given for trouble between China and Mongolia, Semeonoff's utility ended. It would be too compromising for the Japanese military who are supporting Semeonoff if the latter were to be associated with the Mongolian independence movement, and the Japanese have accordingly disavowed him and warned him against further connection with the movement.

The Chinese troops in Urga and at Kiakhta are stated by eye witnesses to amount to about 2,500. This estimate may be excessive, as inexperienced observers invariably over estimate numbers of Chinese troops on account of numerous coolies, servants, and other non-combatants that always accompany these troops. Of this force, 200 are sanctioned by the 1915 Convention

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as escort to the Chinese representative at Urga. A force of 500 Cavalry with two machine guns was despatched to Urga via Kalgan last summer when the frontier was threatened by Bolsheviks, and a detachment has been despatched to the Trans Baikal frontier at Kiakhta. Of the Mixed Brigade under Hsü Shu-cheng's orders, about 200 Infantry had reached Urga at the 1st of July, and another 1,400 were en route from Kalgan, but it is not certain how many of these troops have now reached Urga. The motor cars are constantly breaking down, and the officer in charge of transportation arrangements for this force estimated that it would not be possible to transport more than 1,200 men per month across the desert. The Chinese are not finding transportation arrangements for an expeditionary force a very simple matter, and the Chinese officers have good reason for saying that the strength of the expeditionary force would depend on circumstances. Probably the beginning of winter will see half the Mixed Brigade at Urga, and the remainder in reserve at Kalgan and on the line of communication. This, however, may be rather too liberalan estimate for the force which may reach Urga.

I am informed that the Chinese are busy constructing additional barracks at Urga, and that a new wireless station is completed and in operation.

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
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NOTED
E.W.B.
M.I.D. 2009-66

WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT: FRACAS BETWEEN CHINESE AND JAPANESE SOLDIERS AT CHANGCHUN, CHINA.

From: M.A.

REC'D M.I.D., O.C.S. OCT 20 1919

No. 2179 Date: September 3, 1919.

Replying to No. Date: 19

1. The following is a copy of a report from a reliable source regarding the above subject:

"Harbin, July 26, 1919.

As the result of personal investigations on the spot, the following report of the fracas between Japanese and Chinese soldiers near the Kwanchengtze Railway Station on July 19th is submitted.

It appears that a petty employee of the South Manchuria Railway - a Japanese - who had received a cut on the head, appealed to the Japanese military authorities at Changchun to punish the persons who inflicted the injury, who, he said, were Chinese soldiers at Kwanchengtze. A Japanese officer ordered out about thirty soldiers and led them under arms to Kwanchengtze. Upon approaching the Chinese barracks at that place, he halted his men and himself went forward with another officer and two of three soldiers and entered the barracks. He demanded of the Chinese that they give up the persons who had beaten the Japanese, who, he stated, were hiding in the barracks. The Chinese said they knew nothing about the affair, but would investigate.

While this conversation was going on two shots were heard it appears uncertain which side fired them, and then firing began from both sides, while the conferees rushed out of the barrack. The firing of rifles continued for something like half an hour, and eighteen Japanese and about ten Chinese were killed. Further fighting was prevented by the arrival of higher Japanese and Chinese officers.

It should be noted that the evidence as to how the Japanese received the wound on the head is very weak. Cases of assault are usually referred to the Consul and by him to the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. No attempt to do this was made, I am assured by the Tao Yin, who happened to be in the Japanese Consulate at the time that the fight occurred, and who was still present when the telephonic report of it came from the Japanese Police to the Consulate.

Since the decision of the Allied Commission at Vladivostok that the Chinese soldiers should guard the C.E.Ry. to Chang Chun inclusive, Japanese troops have no clear right in the Ry. zone, so that their marching under arms to the Kwanchengtze Railway settlement can only be regarded as an attempt to precipitate trouble. So also the fact that a part of them entered the Chinese barracks instead of waiting for the Chinese to come out and confer in the open, may be regarded as an indication of the intentions of the Japanese.

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Later, the Japanese presented a list of demands (published in Manila Daily News of July 28rd), the most important of which was that all Chinese soldiers and police should be withdrawn from the Kwan-chengtse Station. The rebellious Major-General Kao Shih-Pin agreed to these demands, obviously to strengthen his own personal position. I myself noted that no Chinese were guarding the Station, but only Japanese, who, in an attitude described by Lt. Col. Davis of the Tokyo Embassy, who accompanied me from Chang Chun to Harbin, as clearly that of the conqueror looking for further trouble, boarded the train with bayonets fixed, and took off anyone wearing a Chinese uniform. On the train there were only two Chinese Policemen returning to Harbin, and one soldier accompanying an officer back to Kanchuria Station. They all produced permits from the Japanese Consul, Chang Chun, and so were allowed to proceed on the train. The Japanese officer in command at the Station was accompanied by a bugler, which would indicate that he anticipated a possible necessity for summoning assistance.

Certainly the Chinese have a very strong case if they have the ability to use it. I should note that I gave the Consul Jenkins a hasty verbal account of my investigations, with the suggestion that he telegraph it to the Legation. I find that his telegram is a little misleading in one or two points, and should be supplemented by this more complete report."

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COPY OF ARTICLE IN

THE PEKING LEADER, AUgust 13, 1919.

"

THE CHANGCHUN AFFAIR.

-):O:(-

CHinese Government intends to settle it locally.

The Original Japan Demands.

"As the Central Government originally desired to settle the Sino-Japanese Changchun fracas locally, the Taoyin of the Ki-Chang Circuit was instructed to conduct negotiations with the Japanese Consul according to the precedent of the Changli incident. The Taoyin, Mr. Tao, did so; but he found the Japanese Consul's demands too exorbitant. Therefore he telegraphed to the Government recently stating that under the circumstances, the matter might better be settled in Peking between

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From H.A.

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the Waichiao Pu and the Japanese Minister. This request was rejected, and the Government has again instructed the Taoyin to continue the negotiations with the Japanese Consul at Changchun and do things at his direction.

Shortly after the incident, it was learnt that the Japanese Consular Representative at Changchun had presented three demands to the Chinese authorities. According to latest reports there were five instead of three demands. These were considered as provisional measures for the maintenance of the situation and signed by both parties on the 20th ult. They were as follows: -

(1)

Since the Chinese police stationed at the Erh-tackow station have not been on friendly terms with the Japanese soldiers, these Chinese policemen, twenty in number, should all be withdrawn.

(2)

The Battalion of Chinese artillery troops stationed at Nanling should be immediately withdrawn thirty li from the neighborhood of Erh-tackow.

(3)

All the Chinese infantry and cavalry troops within thirty li of the neighborhood of Erh-tackow should all be withdrawn within a specified time excepting the two hundred and fifty soldiers under the command of Pei Chi-hsun who might be allowed to remain at their original posts.

(4)

The Artillery stationed at Nanling should be withdrawn on July 21st; the majority of the infantry and cavalry troops should be withdrawn on July 22nd; and the rest should be wholly withdrawn on July 24th.

(5)

No Chinese troops should be stationed within thirty li of the neighborhood of Erh-tackow. If any small number of Chinese troops has to pass the territory within thirty li of the place, the Japanese Consul must be consulted, and they can only pass the place with the latter's consent. "

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JAN 8 1920

2009-71
NOTED:
H.W.R.
M.I.-10a.

WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT REVISED REPORT ON MONGOLIAN EXPEDITION.

From H.A. - Combat.

No. 2217 Date October 16 1919, 19

Replying to No. , 19

REC'D, M.I.D., W.D. NOV 15 1919

"49 - Territorial".

(Report of October 16):

Information from observers recently returning from Urga, Outer Mongolia, permits us to coordinate rather conflicting reports heretofore received regarding Mongolia.

Present reports show that the Chinese troops actually in Urga or its immediate vicinity, number about 3,000, composed of Infantry, Cavalry, Machine Guns, and probably one Six-Gun Battery of Mountain Artillery. The exact number of Cavalry is unknown, but it is estimated to be about 600. The exact number of machine guns are estimated to be two or three machine gun companies. These troops are all a part of the 3rd Mixed Brigade of the Northwest Frontier Defense Bureau, under the personal command of General Chu, who is Brigade Commander, and actually accompanied the troops to Urga.

General Chu's Brigade is a part of the Northwest Defense troops, under command of the notorious General Hsu Shih Cheng, commonly known as "Little Hsu".

Our informant, who left Urga during the latter part of September, stated that there were at least 3,000 Chinese troops in Urga; that about 175 miles from Kalgan he passed a caravan with 275 camels, supposed to be loaded with ammunition, and some few machine guns, accompanied by three hundred Infantry and several groups of Cavalry; that he met another column of thirty Infantry and one group of Cavalry about twenty-five miles from Urga. He stated that all these troops were well equipped and clothed, and that they had been paid up to a quite recent date; that at Urga the Chinese were building four very large new barracks, which he estimated would accommodate about 3,000 men; that the old Russian barracks had been partly destroyed by the Mongolians, but the Chinese were getting these barracks in shape for use of their own troops. He was informed by the Chinese officers accompanying these troops that it was the expectation of General Hsu to put six thousand Chinese troops in Urga; some of these ultimately to be despatched to Kobdo, Uliassutai and Kiakhta.

As far as is known, the Mongolians have offered no official protest to the despatching of the Chinese

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SUBJECT

From M.A.

No. 2217 Date , 19

Replying to No. Date , 19

expedition to Outer Mongolia, and it is believed that the Mongolians are incapable of offering material resistance to such an expedition at this time. The Mongolians at one time feared an invasion by Russian Buriats under Semeonoff, who was planning an independent Mongolian Government, and it is believed that the Mongols, although unfriendly to the entry of Chinese troops into Mongolia, preferred Chinese to the Russian Buriats. From the Chinese point of view, there is little doubt but that this expedition is a forerunner of a peaceful penetration of Mongolia, and that the Chinese expect to regain their control, lost several years ago to the Russians. The Russians who were once the most powerful element in Mongolia and virtually controlled the Mongolian Government, have now lost their power, and are constantly abused by the Mongols who are taking this opportunity to assert their independence.

Observers fail to report any Japanese activities at Urga. There is one Japanese army officer, a Lieutenant-Colonel, stationed at Urga as an observer. This officer sends frequent reports in code to the Japanese Legation, but apparently exercises no influence, and frequently is refused an audience by the Prime Minister. The Mongolians are said to be very anti-Japanese, and would prefer either Russians or Chinese to Japanese.

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
Executive Division
Mil. Int. Branch.
APR 14 2009-87 1920
WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT: THE FORCES OF ATAMAN SEMIONOV.

From: M. I. A. COMBAT

No. 2344 Date: January 22nd, 1920., 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

41 --- Personnel

R.S.D. M.I.B. O.C.S. APR 6 1920

This report was received at American Legation from a reliable source in Harbin dated January 10th.

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THE FORCES OF ATAMAN SEMIONOV.

Harbin, January 14, 1920. The forces of Ataman Semionov are partly concentrated in the region of the Transbaikalian railway and partly are taking part in the operations against the Bolsheviks on the territory between the towns Nerchinsk and Srjetensk and the railway. The total number of Semionov's men reaches about 20,000, but is not ascertained exactly. According to the chief of military staff of Semionov, 8,000 men out of this sum are fully equipped, while only 4,000 can be considered as reliable. Before the mobilization, the Semionov forces amounted to about 5,000 of volunteers. 20,000 men being due to mobilization were registered, but many of them did not appear at all, and many of them made their escape among the Bolsheviks, so that the number 20,000 seems to be too high.

The most reliable troops are: The 1st and the 2nd Manchurian Ataman Semionov's regiments - about 2,700 men in 6 battalions; the military school in Chita, -about 400 cadets, protecting order and supporting Semionov in his residence; the Cossack detachment- about 400 men; Semionov's bodyguards - about 100 men ; the first and second Ataman Semionov Cavalry regiment, together 4 divisions, about 500 men; one division of field artillery, 10 guns, 3 inch., about 150 men; one division of heavy artillery, 3 guns, 6 inch, and 3 guns, 8 inch., about 100 men.

Other troops:/

SUBJECT THE FORCES OF ATAMAN SEMIONOV.

From H. A. COMBAT

No. 2344 Date January 22nd, 1920., 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

41 --- Personnel

Other troops: At the station Dauria there is the "Local Manchurian Division" under the command of Baron Unger von Sternberg, the "Combined Manchurian Division, under the command of Colonel Tierbach, whose place during the fighting is in the staff at the station Borza, the division of armoured trained, with its staff at the station Adrianovka. There are eleven armoured trained, with two more in work. The trains are of two types. The first one, for instance, "Istrebitel Bezposcadny" has guns, 3 inch, twelve machine-guns, and 85-120 men. The second one is weaker, having only two guns.
Servian Detachment: Numbers about 90 men, coming from the former Servian regiment. The command is in the hands of a certain Piskulich, a secret austrofil. 40 Servians more are members of the Semionov's body-guards. The rest of the Servians are carrying on the "Field Police Service". There was also formed a Jugo-Slavian regiment, the number of volunteers reached 120 men. Agitators were sent abroad westwards and eastwards to recruit volunteers. According to the reports not yet confirmed, there were about 500 men ready to enter this regiment. Further formation was prohibited by the Jugo-Slavian Consul in Harbin.

Equipment. Armament. Supplying.

There are 8,000 men fully equipped. Anyhow, it seems that Semionov is lacking rifles. Armament is excellent; supplies are estimated to suffice for several months, providing foodstuffs and other necessities are under the care of the Chief Intendency in Dauria. As a consequence of the violent manner in which the Semionov's men are requisitioning provisions, the population is hostile to Semionov. Financially, Semionov is well provided for . He is the owner of at least 3,000 pounds of gold, besides an unascertained amount of gold exported to Mongolia.

Discipline and Spirit of the Soldiers.

The intellectual level of the commanding corps is very low. The average of its actions distinguishes itself by rudeness and by lack of interlligence. Among the higher officers prevails the pro-german orientation, which is supported by the numerous officers

of German/

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SUBJECT THE FORCES OF ATAMAN SEMIONOV.

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of German and Austrian origin. They come from the Baltic provinces. And by German and Austrian officers former war prisoners - who occupy even some places in Semionov's staff. The true and honest Russian officers left Semionov, or ware dismissed by the mean: of violence. Number of such "unhappy cases" or "suicides", as they are officially called among the Semionov's officers reached many tens. There is an absolutely deficiency of any internal unity whatsoever. The mobilised men serve most unwillingly.

The forces are composed of local Cossacks, Buriats, Kirkises, etc., of Austrian and German war-prisoners and of former soldiers of the Red army. In a military sense, almost all theseparts are unreliable. For during the fighting against the Bolsheviks, near Nerchinsk, the first Cossack regiment over in its full number. Its commander was afterwards chosen by the mutineers their commander-in-chief. Many deserters from Semenov are attacking the railway line and are cooperating with the local insurgents. At the station Dauria a part of the mobilised Burjats mutineered, captured a Semionov armoured train, and after a long fight were defeated and "liquidated". All these numerous cases show the lack of discipline and reliance among the troops. Semionov tried to improve the soldiers' spirits by transfering them.. So he sent about 1,500 men from Chita to Habarovsk, and on the contrary, but without any result. Amd so there are not more than 4,000 men absolutely reliable.

Attitude towards Japanese.

The attitude towards the Japanese cannot be defined as a friendly one. The Japanese, being well aware of Semionv's weak side, treat him categorically. On the other hand, Semionov immediately fulfils all their wishes and demands. Along the Transbaikalian railway their are the parts of the 5th Japanese division with its staff in Chita. In this town there are about 2,500 men quartered just opposite to Semionov's barracks.

Attitude towards Czecho-Slovaks.

The attitide towards the Czecho-Slovaks became worse after the issuing of the Czecho-Slovak memorandum, The local papers are carrying on propaganda against/

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SUBJECT THE FORCES OF ATAMAN SEMIONOV.

From H. A. COMBAT.

No. 2344 Date January 22nd, 1920., 19

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41 --- Personnel

against the Czecho-Slovaks. Certain members of Semionov's staff and of high command endeavored to cause an open conflict with the passing Czecho-Slovak echelons. A certain professor works for the idea of German-Russian-Japanese alliance.

Attitude towards Population.

The attitude towards the population may be characterized as a hostile one. The lower and middle classes strongly oppose Semionov's policy and especially his military conduct. The railway people say they suffer from the lack of provisions, and are horrified by the lawlessness of Semionov's activity. Thus Semionov does not enjoy any popularity among population, except a small part of western refugees, mostly speculators and pro-Germans, who find a safe escape under the Atamen's protection.

SUMMARY.

In military respect, Semionov's forces mean very little. While a great part of his troops are engaged in operations against the rioters and for the sake of guarding the railway line, but a small part can be used for other purposes. About 5,500 men are ready for immediate operative purpose, and 5 or 7 armoured trains. Politically, they are more significant, but in this they completely depend, the more or less favorable attitude of the Japanese.

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
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APR 17 2009-84 1920

WAR DEPARTMENT

NOTED: M. I. D.

SUBJECT: Estimate of the military situation in China.

From: M. A.

No. 2352 Date: February 3rd, 1920., 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

M.I.D. O.C.S. APR 6 1920

The following Estimate of the Military Situation in China has been received from the naval attache who states with a certainty that it is Japanese.

C H I N A

Estimate of the Military Situation.

STRENGTH

Present Strength

Northern Forces	648,500
Southern Forces	304,000
Total.....	952,500

(These figures are estimates)

Future Strength

Dependent on the organization of a stable centralized government for all China.

ORGANIZATION

China has an efficient plan of organization but the Chinese Army is so demoralized that it cannot now be considered as organized or competent fighting force. Both Northern and Southern forces are made up of independent armies, each acknowledging only the command of the immediate leader. Officers as well as personnel are untrained and inefficient. If the leader is friendly to the government, his army is called a Government or Northern Army: if unfriendly, a Revolutionist or Southern Army.

Japanese influences are now at work attempting to maintain the organization of what is known as the War Participation Bureau Army. The formation of the War Participation Bureau, Headed by Tuan Chi Jui, is obscure. It negotiated a 20,000,000 yen loan from Japan when China wanted to send troops to Siberia, of which 3,000,000 yen has already been expended. This made possible the organization, equipment and instruction by Japanese

officers/

SUBJECT Estimate of the military situation in China.

From H. A.

No. 2352 Date February 3rd, 1920., 19

Replying to No. Date , 19

officers of the War Participation Army. The abolishment of this Bureau and its Army and the return of the loan are demands of the Southern Revolutionary party at the Internal Peace Conference. This is proving difficult because of the opportunity it already affords Japan in obtaining military supremacy in China and because of Japahese influence with Tuan Chi Jui.

DISTRIBUTION

China Proper:	Northern Forces	Southern Forces
Northern and N. Eastern Prov.	416,000	
Central Provinces	149,000	162,000
Southern and S. Eastern Prov.		142,000
Manchuria and Siberia	83,500	

The small detachment of troops in Siberia is co-operating with the Allies in guarding the Amur Railway north of Vladivostok.

Action on part of troops of Northern or Southern Forces is presumably held in abeyance pending the result of the Interal Peace Conference.

EFFICIENCY

With the majority of the leaders there is no proper discipline: troops are easily swayed and frequently transfer their allegiance; commanders are apt to be mercenary. However, such leaders as Chang Tso Lin in Fengtien and Li Shun in Kiangsu maintain organization and discipline among their troops. Both of these men received part of their military training under Yuan Shih-kai, and the troops of both are from the divisions of the former Regular Chinese Army.

Equipment

In the main material is old, equipment poor and methods out of date. A few of the provincial leaders have small amounts of modern equipment.

GENERAL

China will not have an organized army until a central

government/

Binding Margin.

SUBJECT Estimate of the military situation in China.

From H. A.

No. 2252 Date [illegible] 3rd, 1920. 19

Replying to No. Date 19

government is established which will gain ascendency over the chaotic civil conditions and, more specifically, control or do away with the militaristic provincial governors.

Because of her territorial aggression, support of the northern military party and influence in maintaining civil strife, Japan is regarded with hostile suspeicion. This feeling will be intensified unless there is a radical change in Japan's attitude for China is affected by Japanese influence not only at Peking but in the endeavor of Mongolia to set up an independent government.

CHINA

Estimate of the Economic Situation.

Internationally the most important aspect of China is its present political weakness which is giving Japan an opportunity to enhance her own prosperity at the expense of China. An encouraging outlook for the future is that the Allies, By loaning China large sums of money which are to be supervised by them, are giving her an opportunity for reorganization, recognising that the possibilities of China are limitless.

FOOD

China is an agricultural country and the crops are chiefly consumed where they are produced. The Chinese food supply will continue good, for there is plenty of all kinds except rice on which there is an embargo. China is rapidly increasing exports of soya beans to the United States. The United States Government supplies the Philippines with Shantung beef. The vast north western plains of Mongolia could be developed as a source of a world supply of meat were transportaion accessuble.

RAW MATERIALS

China is rich in minerals producing 50% of the world production of antimony, 7% of the tin. Coal, either anthracite or bituminous, exists in nearly every province. The Japanese have gained control of the largest field. Large resources of iron are availaboe for modern furnace working, tho at the present but little is used. The Japanese have taken over the

petroleum/

Binding Margin.

SUBJECT Estimate of the military situation in China.

From H. A.

No. 8352 Date January 3rd, 1920., 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

petroleum concessions forfeited by the Standard Oil Company.

Efforts are being made to improve the quality of cotton, most of which is consumed locally. Exports of jute will increase in prominence this year because of the shortage in India. The United States imports 90% of the Chinese wool production.

MAN POWER

The population of China cannot be accurately estimated, but in China proper, exclusive of Manchuria and Tibet, there are probably 425,000,000. The population of Manchuria is about 20,000,000. The concentration of population is from 206 to 247 per square mile in China and 41 per square mile in Manchuria. China can be considered a source of unskilled labor supply not only for Asia, but also for the western world where they have been used successfully.

TRANSPORTATION

The waterways of China are the chief means of traffic as the great rivers flowing from west to east are navigable for hundreds of miles inlands, and supplementary canals abound. There are almost no roads in the modern sense. The principal railroads run from north to south, Peking being the center. Railwoad construction is being carried forward in the western part of China. All roads have been financed by foreign powers and have had an important place in connection with the "spheres of influence". It is the present desire of Japan to gain control of the "Chinese Eastern". The railroads of Manchuria are Japanese and Russian owned.

The tremendous shipping of China is 40% British and 24% Japanese.

COMMUNICATIONS

In addition to the Government wireless stations, the French, British, American and Japanese have stations. The Marconi Company has contracted for three new stations to be erected under British supervision. The present Japanese Telegraph Loan of $3,000,000 will include the erection of 5 new stations.

The Chinese Government has cables along the coast, and the A. & C. Telegraph Company (English) has private cables. The American Commercial Pacific Company has a line from Hongkong to Manila. There is a Danish cable and a German cable now

controlled/

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SUBJECT Estimate of the military situation of China

From 2352 M. A.

No. 2352 Date January 3rd, 1920., 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

Controoled by the Japanese. Telegraphic communications connect China with Tibet, Siberia and Burma.

FINANCE

The financial situation is chaotic, The encouraging feature is that the the country is on a silver basis and the current very high price of silver has been a great advantage to Chinese trade and industry. But practically all the national resources are gypothecated for foreign loans. One half of the total income is devoted to military purposes. The 19 Japanese loans to China have been used to incur a favorable attitude toward Japan. A new consortium to include Japan, Great Britain and France has been formed by financial interests of the United States for the purpose of loaning China a large sum to carry out reorganization. Customs revenues are falling behind.

MUNITIONS

Industry in China is just starting to develop. The utilization of cheap labor, Chinese raw materials by foreign capital and control promises to be one of the most revolutionary development of modern times.

Note: For full detailed information on this subject see data on file in the Economic Section of Military Intelligence Division.

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OFFICE C... MIL. ...

1920 2009-86 MAR 20

WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT MILITARY AFFAIRS IN SHANTUNG PROVINCE.

From H.A. COMBAT

No. 2464. Date March 30, 1920., 19

Replying to No. Date , 19

REC'D, M. I. B., O. C. S. MAY 7 1920

19 - TRAINING

The following are observations made on a recent trip to the Province of Shantung:

A previous report No. 2323 has been previously submitted covering the attitude of the Civil Governor, the Military Governor, and also the leading military figure, General Ma Liang. It is not necessary to add any additional comment upon these individuals. Their attitude and friendly feeling toward America was shown me in many different ways during my stay in Tsinanfu.

At the invitation of General Ma Liang, commanding the 2nd Division, Frontier Defense Troops and also a mixed brigade, I visited the camp of his 2nd Division, Frontier Defense Troops at Tsinanfu. An excellent programme was arranged for our benefit and every courtesy shown us.

SITUATION

The Military Post is on the outskirts of Tsinanfu to the west of the city, probably about three miles from the center of town. An automobile road leads out to the Post, which is also along side of the tracks of the Tientsin-Pukow Railroad and close to the workshops of that line. The 5th Division, commanded by the Military Governor, has its camp adjoining that of General Ma's Division. The country in this vicinity is very level and the drill ground is ample for the use of any one or two divisions. The attached snapshot will give some idea of the size of the drill ground which is nearly a mile long and a half mile wide. The white dots shown in the distance being a part of the barracks of the 5th Division. This drill field would be an admirable landing place for aeroplanes.

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SUBJECT MILITARY AFFAIRS IN SHANTUNG PROVINCE.

From H.A. COMBAT

No. 2464. Date March 30, 1920., 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

19 - TRAINING

INFANTRY DRILL

The more one sees of the Chinese soldiers, the more one sees the influence of the German methods of training and drill. Apparently the Chinese lend themselves particularly to precision of movement; at any rate the Infantry Company which was drilled for our benefit gave an exhibition of close order drills, the precision of which I have never seen equalled in our Army or at West Point. Every movement was exact and decidedly mechanical. Very little was attempted in the way of extended order, a deployment was made however, and an advance to attack. The situation or outline of the movement was not given us so that I cannot criticise the execution fairly. The deployment was made fairly quickly and in good order, the intervals being about 4 yards between skirmishes. There were no signals given at any time so far as I could see, neither by whistles, arms or otherwise. There was considerable jamming, opening and closing along the skirmish line. No flank protection was provided for; the rushes in the advances were decidedly long. In brief, the Infantry showed excellent training in close order drill, but indicated deficiency in the matter of field training. The Chief of Staff of the Division informed me that the Infantry held target practive four times each year and that the rifle range was out in the hills several miles away, and that in addition to individual target practive some collective firing was held. The Chief of Staff did not go into detail as to the target course prescribed for each soldier, the number of rounds each soldier was allowed, etc., and I am inclined to believe that the instruction is decidedly deficient along those lines, particularly at the present time with the embargo on importation of materials of war into China, prevents their home supply of cartridges being increased by purchases from abroad.

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SUBJECT MILITARY AFFAIRS IN SHANTUNG PROVINCE.

From M.A. COMBAT

No. 2464. Date March 30, 1920., 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

19 - TRAINING

CAVALRY

Photos No. 2 and 3, show a part of a troop of Chinese Cavalry. This Division being one of the Frontier Defense Divisions formerly a War Participant Buresu Division, was equipped under the terms of the Sino-Japanese agreement by funds furnished by the Japanese. Naturally most of the equipment is of Japanese make, although some is Chinese. The cavalry troop gave a very credible exhibition of close order cavalry drill, no attempt being made to show anything spectacular and no attempt being made to work out any portion of a field problem. The troop was mounted on the usual army type of Mongolian pony. These ponies are from 12.1 to 13 hands in height, being smaller than those purchased by the foreigners in China who of course pay higher prices than the Chinese Army. These ponies are remarkable for their strength and stamina. They endure the terrific cold of Mongolia in a way which no foreign horse could possibly do. These particular ponies are well kept and in good condition, judging from appearances, it being still early in the spring their hair was very shaggy. The personel equipment of the Chinese soldier is decidedly cheap and flimsy in its appearance, the caps and chin straps, boots and all leather material, in fact every article of the equipment is decidedly cheap and must become unserviceable in a very short time if used on a campaign in the field. The winter coats and trousers as will be noted on the soldiers in the pictures, are of quilted cotton, this undoubtedly is quite warm but is very bulky and must be of rather short life. In connection with these remarks on cavalry, I might state that it is doubtful if foreign horses could be used to any extent in a campaign in China; while oats, corn and bran can be obtained in the large cities, it would be extremely difficult to obtain any whatsoever in the interior. The China or Mongol pony is fed upon chopped millet straw in lieu of hay mixed with bran, beans and gaoliang seed instead of foreign grain. The 15th Infantry of Tientsin has recently been furnished its allowance of foreign horses. It is believed that this is a mistake and that these should be replaced by native ponies.



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SUBJECT MILITARY AFFAIRS IN SHANTUNG PROVINCE.

From H.A. COMBAT

No. 2464 Date March 30, 1920., 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

19 - TRAINING

ARTILLERY

One battery of 4 guns without caisons was drilled for our benefit. Our information regarding the make of these guns was conflicting; one Chinese Officer telling us they were made at the Chinese Arsenal at Shantung, another informing us thay they were Krupp, and our own opinion being that they were very likely Japanese, as the 2nd Division is Japanese equipped. The composition of the Artillery Brigade in the Chinese Divisions varies. In this particular Division we were informed there were thirty-six guns, twenty-four 75 cm. and twelve mountain guns. We were informed that there was a caison for each field piece. In this battery which we saw unlimbered for action, the horses were totally detached from the limber and the limber was drawn up beside the field piece in lieu of a casion as formerly in our service. I was informed that this limber contains 60 rounds of ammunition. The guns were mule drawn instead of horse drawn, 6 mules drawing a gun, the mules being approximately 13 hands hight. The harness and other equipment looked to be in very good condition. We were not invited to inspect the guns closely and I was unable to get a snapshot of any part of the battery. Breast straps were used instead of collars on the harness of the mules.

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SUBJECT MILITARY AFFAIRS IN SHANTUNG PROVINCE.

From H.A. COMBAT

No. 2464 Date March 30, 1920., 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

19 - TRAINING

PHYSICAL TRAINING.

The 2nd Division, Frontier Defense Troops appears to be particularly well developed physically. This should be so, as its commander, General Ma Liang has devoted a great part of his life to developing and promoting Chinese athletics, another report on which will accompany this.

Following the Artillery drill, various detachments gave exhibitions of Chinese callisthenics, which like the Infantry drill was notably precise and accurate in execution. In addition to the callisthenics, some simple apparatus was used in other demonstrations. Photos 4, 5, and 6 illustrates some of these movements which are considered here as a matter of interest and information. No. 4 shows a long horizontal bar which can be raised and handled similar to the bar of the jumping standard. The exercises performed on this are not particularly worthy of mention. No. 5 shows in addition to the men jumping on the bar, two soldiers with fore arms in the vertical position, being required to walk on a narrow wooden rail on inverted benches, the idea being no doubt, to teach them balance and to preserve their equilibrium. No. 6 shows the same benches right side up, and one squad of soldiers doing bending exercises, while the next squad is holding them in proper position.

Following the exhibition of callisthenics we were conducted to another portion of the camp where demonstrations were given on the horizontal bar, parallel bars, etc. Following this, we were taken into one of the Chinese squad rooms. This room was decidedly small for the number of troops quartered therein, one platoon - about 40 men. In place of iron beds as used by foreigners, the Chinese soldiers sleep on a continuous built-in bed. When very cold a fire is built underneath this bed, otherwise there is no other heat in the room unless small portable stoves are brought in. There is a small store-room in the center of each platoon room which contains the field equipment for that platoon. This room is also the office and sleeping room for the senior non commissioned officer of that platoon. The room as well as the ground about the barracks and the parade grounds were all very clean.

No Japanese officers or instructors were seen and it was denied that any were on duty with the Division. An effort was made to answer the questions which we asked and it is believed that no attempt was made to conceal any thing from us or to give us any misinformation. Such description as that about the make of Field Artillery Guns was due to their desire to give us what they thought was correct, and was due to lack of information rather than a deliberate attempt to misinform us.

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1920 2009-90 MAY 20

WAR DEPT

SUBJECT CHINESE PHYSICAL TRAINING.

From M.A. REC'D, M. I. B., O. C. S. MAY 7 1920 COMBAT. 2009-10

No. 2480. Date April 2, 1920., 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

19 - TRAINING

The following small photographs illustrate certain phases of physical training as developed by General Ma Liang, in command of the 2nd Frontier Defense Division stationed at Tsinanfu. General Ma recently gave a demonstration of various contests and other methods of physical training which he teaches in a school for that purpose in Tsinan. From this school, graduates are sent to various military organizations and schools throughout China to act as instructors. The phases of the demonstrations included certain forms of setting-up exercises which correspond to those used in our service. A special point was evidently made of the precision and unison of execution. I was informed by the General that these callisthenic drills were a preliminary instruction to the Chinese wrestling which he evidently considered of paramount importance in the development of his soldiers.

The object of Chinese wrestling is for one contestant to throw the other off his balance and thereby causing him to fall to the ground. A strong padded cotton loose coat is worn tied by a cloth belt around the waist. It is permitted to grab hold of your opponents clothing, catch him at any point of his body and kick his feet from under him, in fact apparently all rules are much like those used in our country except that the man who falls to the ground looses the contest. General Ma evidently has made a considerable study of the wrestling game. The main point he was always mentioning in his explanation was that of the center of gravity of the contestants. It is believed that this form of wrestling would be both interesting and valuable to the American soldier. The bouts are very short ordinarly and there is plenty of action. Such contests should train a soldier to become more agile, and to coordinate the working of his mind and body. Photographs 1, 2, 3, and 4 shows various phases of the wrestling bouts.

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SUBJECT CHINESE PHYSICAL TRAINING.

From H.A. COMBAT.

No. 2490. Date April 2, 1920., 19

Replying to No. Date , 19

REC'D, M. I. B., C. C. S. MAY 7 1920.

19 - TRAINING.

General Ma is very anxious to have his system of athletics introduced into America. He is constantly bringing that point up in conversation when ever he is talking with Americans. His men are certainly well trained and well developed physically, but outside of the wrestling there is little to my mind, worth while for us to consider. The following pictures, however, will illustrate to some extent some of the other phases of the demonstrations which were given.

Picture No. 5 shows a fencing bout between two men using quarter staffs. No. 6 - a fencing bout between a man armed with a spear and another armed with two swords. No. 7 - a bout between two men armed with spears and one man armed with two swords. These fencing bouts add a great deal of action, as will be noticed, no mask or other protection was worn and yet the swords and spears used were real swords and spears. The real object in this fencing was to come as close to the opponent as possible without actually hitting him. A mis-calculation by either the attacker or defender would lead to serious injury. No. 8 shows a man in one position in what the Chinese would probably call shadow boxing, which is pretty much of a cross between our ides of shadow boxing and aesthetic dancing.

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SUBJECT CHINESE PHYSICAL TRAINING.

From H.A. COMBAT.

No. 2490. Date April 2, 1920., 19

Replying to No. Date , 19

19 - TRAINING

No. 9 shows the Chinese instructor who is over 60 years old, in one pose - a so called monkey dance. No. 10, 11 and 12 shows a strong man and his feats of strength. No. 13 shows an unusual demonstration of one soldier breaking bricks on the head of another soldier, two ordinary Chinese bricks were placed on the head of the soldier lying down; the soldier who can be seen standing, struck these two bricks with the two he held in his hand, breaking the four which can be seen flying in the picture. In picture No. 10 will be seen two large pieces of flat stone lying on the ground. These were originally a single stone placed upon the back of a soldier, and while he was holding the stone in that position, the stone was struck with a sledge hammer in the hands of another soldier and the stone broken in two. The stone was probably 6 inches thick, 12 inches in width and 24 inches in length.

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SUBJECT CHINESE PHYSICAL TRAINING.

From H.A. COMBAT.

No. 2490. Date April 2, 1920., 19

Replying to No. Date , 19

19 - TRAINING.

The small broken bits that can be seen in the lower left hand corner of picture No. 11, are broken pieces of tile, probably about 1/2 inch in thickness which were broken on the bare head of the Chinese soldier. These last feats are given, demonstrating so General Ma Liang states, the powers of resistance of an individual if he holds his breath and forces himself to meet the blow which he knows is coming.

It is believed that the wrestling should be given consideration by our Army. The remainder of the report is simply sent in as a matter of interest.

END.

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

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1920 2009-93 JUN 22

WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT COMBAT FIRING EXERCISES BY THE FIRST DIVISION FRONTIER DEFENSE TROOPS.

From H.A. COMBAT.

No. 2539. Date APRIL 29, 1920. 19

Replying to No. Date 19

REC'D M.I.D., G.S. JUN 21 1920

19 - TRAINING

On April 24th the Military Attaches in Peking, together with a few other guests, were invited to witness a field firing exercise by troops of the First Frontier Defense Division, commanded by General Chu Tung-feng.

2009-78

A report No. 2297 was submitted December 17, 1919, on a maneuver of this Division which was observed by a representative of this office and by several officers from the 15th U. S. Infantry at Tientsin.

The same criticisms that were made at that time could be made on the problem of April 24th. Owing to the fact that the artillery, machine guns and infantry, all fired at targets, the following additional comments are made:

THE PROBLEM

The troops engaged in the problem, were 1 battery (4 guns) field artillery, 1 machine gun company (4 guns), 1 battalion of infantry (4 companies), 1 company being selected from each of the four regiments of infantry included in the Division. The general situation was that information was received by the Detachment Commander at PAI SHAN TSUN that hostile troops were on the southern slope of CHIU LI SHAN. These positions indicated in red on the attached map. The commanding officer of the detachment was directed to attack the hostile troops in their position and he issued the necessary orders, which however, we were not given an opportunity to see or hear. Prior to the advance of the infantry, the artillery took up a position just north of the village LIANG KE CHUANG at the point marked 1-A on map. The artillery opened fire, first upon the artillery target in the hills at the position shown on map and after a few rounds, changed target to the infantry skirmish line also shown in red on the map. The idea of course being to silence or destroy the hostile artillery and then to attack the infantry skirmish line with shrapnel. The infantry and machine guns in due course of time deployed north of the village SHIH TZE YING as indicated on the map. The machine gun company being split into two sections, each section between companies rather than on the flanks of the infantry line. From the position indicated on the map, the infantry and machine guns advanced by rushes until within about 200 yards of the infantry targets, when cease firing was blown.

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COMBAT FIRING EXERCISES BY THE FIRST DIVISION FRONTIER DEFENSE TROOPS. (continued)

The following comments are made on the problem:

ARTILLERY

The four guns with limbers which furnished the ammunition, took up their positions in an open field in plain sight of every one, no attempt being made to obtain either protection or concealment for the guns and gun crews. No battery commanders' telescopes or other instruments were observed other than an ordinary pair of field glasses. Very little effort was made to obtain the exact range and it is doubtful if a single target was hit by the artillery, there were certainly only a very few of the infantry targets, if any, which had been hit by shrapnel. All firing was direct. The extreme range to the artillery was about 2000 yards, and to the skirmish line about 1500 yards. Commands were given by the battalion commander, by voice only. No signals of any sort were observed in lieu of commands. The gun crews seemed to be well trained, performing their duties with precision and snap.

MACHINE GUNS

Jams were observed on both guns of one section, none were observed on the other section.

The machine gun used by the Chinese is a Japanese made gun designed along the lines of the Hotchkiss Machine Rifle. It is a model that the Japanese now consider second class and that they, themselves, are replacing as fast as possible with a heavier, but at the same time, air-cooled type. It has the Hotchkiss front sight, gas cylinder, breech mechanism and radiator. The trigger mechanism is the same as that of the Maxim except that it is the finger pull type and not the thumb pressing type. ("I had a chance to look at one of these guns very closely at the Japanese Barracks in February last and partially stripped one. There is nothing particularly new about them. They are built along the same general lines, although heavier, as the Benet Mercier Machine Rifle formerly used in our service".) It feeds with a brass strip that holds twenty-eight rounds.

The tripod is equipped with long curved legs that are adjustable to any position. The trail leg has a gunner's seat and the legs have a pronounced outward curve that allows it to be carried easily by them.

The guns were carried on pack mules, the tripod and gun on one mule and the ammunition and tool kits on the other. mule in the section. Two guns made a section and there was a section to each company of infantry. The pack equipment was rather crude and there was a noticeable lack of leather equipment. There were no entrenching tools carried on the packs.

On going into action the guns were mounted under cover and the men advanced with them to the firing point carrying them on their shoulders when under cover by the legs and in a low position when in the open. Three and sometimes four men were used for this. The remaining men of the squad carried the other equipment.

During the maneuvers the guns were always in the firing line of the infantry and not near a flank. Thus the only type of fire that was used was direct fire, there being no attempt to lay overhead fire over the advancing infantry and no attempt to enfilade the enemy line from the flanks.

This/

This latter could have been easily done. In the actual handling of the guns the gun crews showed a great lack of training. There was little or no attempt to keep the guns on the targets and a great deal of the firing was random work. I noticed one gunner fire strip after strip with his gun aimed above and far to the left of his target. There was little attempt at control on the part of the officers and a complete lack of instruments.

The guns functioned quite well. However, none of them were fired more than a hundred times, and that not continuously, so that it was not possible to make an accurate judgment of them as they were at no time heated to any extent.

One interesting fact that was noted about the construction of the guns was that they had no cover over the gas cylinder. In a country like they were used in on this particular day, which is typical country, I do not believe that they could have fired for any great length of time on account of the dust that would be drawn up.

During the action the guns were fired in a prone position and moved forward with the infantry advance at all times.

INFANTRY

As stated in previous reports, the Chinese are trained according to old pre-war Japanese and German principles. Consequently, the troops on the firing line, and in making their rushes, are in a dense formation, the normal interval being as close as the men on the firing line could conveniently be to each other. In sending forward sections of the firing line there was a lack of precision. The battalion and company commanders almost lost entire control of their troops as soon as the fire was opened on the target, as no signals were used, and it was impossible to give commands by voice between the battalion and company and the firing lines. Everything pertaining to the advance of the infantry line was ragged, men did not keep their alignment as advances were made by rushes, they did not fire promptly having taken up their position on the new line, and they were slow in executing cease firing, prior to making the next advance. Sometimes the advance started from the center of the skirmish line and sometimes from a flank. The selection of position for the skirmish line as it moved forward was fair.

The poorest part of the exhibition, however, was in the actual mechanism of firing by the individual soldiers. They showed that they had received practically no good instruction in handling their rifles. Each rifle has a sling, but evidently the Chinese troops have not been instructed to make use of this in shooting, as I saw no soldier who was taking advantage of it.

The position of the left hand on the stock was poor. In practically every case the soldier was holding his gun with his thumb and index finger and resting the stock on the other three fingers. When firing from a standing trench, many soldiers took the standing position without taking advantage of resting the rifle on the edge of the trench; others rested the left elbow on the edge of the trench and held the right arm in the air. Practically all soldiers acted as though they were afraid of their guns and without doubt flinched badly and jerked the trigger.

No/

No attempt was made by the infantry officers or non-commissioned officers to steady the men on the firing line and to cause them to change their range. Practically no commands were given to direct the fire at any part of the infantry target. The officers simply seemed to start soldiers shooting in the general direction in the line of targets and then seemed to feel that there was nothing more which they could do. It was easy to see in following the skirmish line that the soldiers were shooting very poorly as a great many of the bullets hit in the ground not more than half way up to the target. This proved to be true upon examination of the infantry targets at the conclusion of the exercises, when it was found that very few of the targets had been hit.

However, there were about a dozen black pigs which had been intentionally tied about 4 yards in the rear of the infantry target which were practically all dead and most of them with several wounds. I gathered from the conversation that the soldiers were informed that if they killed the pigs they would get the meat as food, but if the pigs were not killed they lost out on their pork. As meat is a rarity for the soldiers in the Chinese army, they no doubt concentrated their fire upon these unfortunate beasts.

GENERAL OBSERVATION

Having seen this division twice in field problems and the 2nd Division Frontier Defense Troops once, I am convinced that the Frontier Defense army which is supposed to be trained by Japanese instructors is inefficient, primarily because of either the inability of the instructors to train the officers of this force or, the deliberate and intentional failure of the instructors to perform their full duty towards the Chinese.

I believe the Chinese soldier under properly trained and efficient officers could be made a very good fighting man. The first essential in developing an efficient army in China is to develope an efficient corps of trained officers. The worst deficiencies I have noticed at any time have all been due to lack of intelligence, lack of knowledge by, or lack of instruction by the officers.

END.

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Translation of Directions for the Maneuver furnished Unit Commanders.

GENERAL SCHEME OF OPERATIONS

A detachment of the 1st Division of the Frontier Defense Army including one battalion of infantry, a machine gun company, and a section of engineers took up a position south of the village of Po Shan Tsun. The commander of the detachment, after a careful reconnaissance of the disposition of the enemy, reported:-

> "The defensive line of the infantry of the enemy is from Mian Shan Tsun to Hsia Hsin Feng and the enemy's artillery is on Chiu Li Shan mountain."

QUESTIONS INVOLVED IN THE ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION.

What orders should the detachment commander issue to his command when fired upon by the enemy at 10.00 A.M.?

What should be the method of advance for the infantry under the enemy's artillery fire?

Disposition of detachment's artillery?

Time for the opening of fire upon enemy's artillery and infantry?

What should be the objective of the attack?

What should be the fire orders issued by the company and section officers as regards estimating of distance, estimating of angle of tangent sight, and disposition of objective amongst units.

PRECAUSTIONS TO BE EXERCISED BY THE INFANTRY COMMANDERS

The line of deployment should be parallel with the enemy's line.

Within the firing line the section commanders and the non-commissioned officers must exercise strict control of their men's aiming and firing.

When advancing in deployed line rifles must be locked.

When sections of the skirmish line advance, fire from the remaining units must be directed away from the flanks of the advancing section.

END.

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1920 2009-95

OCT 6

WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT OBSERVATION TRIP AT PAOTINGFU

With the troops of Gen. Wu Pei Fu - July 9th to 22nd, 1920.

From H.A.

No. 2609. *Date* August 3, 1920. 2009-95, *19*

Replying to No. *Date*, 19

The following is a report by Maj. Philcox on his observations, Jul. 9th-22nd during the recent fighting along the Peking-Hankow R.R. between the Chihli troops under Wu Pei Fu and the Anfu Troops:

Briefly, my itinerary was as follows:

Proceeding to Tientsin on July 9th, arrangements were made on July 10th with the Quartermaster General for Tso Kun, Tuchun of Chihli Province, for me to proceed at once to Paotingfu in one of the Tuchuns automobiles over the new Military Road recently constructed by the Tuchun, from Tientsin to Paotingfu. A separate report on this road was submitted.

Arriving at Paotingfu on the evening of July 10th the Tuchun's Staff together with General Wu Pei Fu, met me at the Yamen and together with the Tuchun we discussed Chinese affairs for several hours. My request to go to the front was not granted until the night of Thursday, July 15th. I was informed that I would be permitted to go forward when the action started, consequently I was in Paotingfu from July 10th until the night of July 15th. With an American interpreter, Mr. R. W. Clack of the Paotingfu Y.M.C.A., I went forward to General Wu Pei Fu's headquarters on his railroad train at Sunglintien. The General very kindly gave us two chairs in a compartment on his train and from that time until Thursday July 22nd, when we were furnished a special train to Peking, we were constantly in touch with events at his headquarters.

WU PEI FU

At a conference held in Paotingfu on the night of July 10th, date of my arrival, nothing occurred which has not passed into history at this time.

The Chinese officials were apparently all very glad to see a representative of the American Legation, and everything possible during my entire stay was done for me.

The outstanding personality among the Chihli leaders is Wu Pei Fu. Each time I have seen him I have become more impressed with the man. The association with his friends, advisors, Staff Officers, officers and soldiers of his command, and also reports by Americans on statements he has made in public to the Chinese and foreigners, have all convinced me that his actions are those of a real patriot, working for the good of his country, rather than for his own personal gain. General Wu is a small man about 45 years of age, with a quick penetrating eye. He says very little but when he has something to say there is no wasting of words or talking in riddles. He is apparently very democratic, his soldiers have both great respect and great love for him. He has filled them also with patriotism.

They were/

Binding Margin.

They were constantly telling us that it did not matter if they were tired, hungry, sleepy, wounded or even killed - they were fighting for their country. I believe that a man who can so successfully put such a spirit into his troops must have the same spirit himself.

I do not believe that General Wu has any ambition to become a high official in Peking or else where. It is possible, however, that eventually he may accept some position if he feels that it is his patriotic duty to do so. He informed me that he considered his duty lay outside of Peking. A Staff Officer to General Wu who is very close to him, informed me that the General had waited for a long time for some one else to start this movement against the Anfu officials in Peking but that he had given up in despair of finding a leader to whom he could give his support, and had started the movement himself, even though he did not consider himself an efficient executive and political leader.

General Wu is very outspoken against the Japanese. His troops all stated that they were fighting for their country against a few corrupt officials who were controlled by Japan. My interpreter heard him while talking to the Battalion of Anfu troops which had recently voluntairly surrendered to him, tell these soldiers that they had been fighting under leaders who had mislead them, that these leaders were under the influence of a foreign power, that this trouble would be over in a few days and that if they would follow along with him until it was over then they would all start preparing to fight their real enemy - Japan.

At an interview which I had with Gen. Wu Pei Fu during the fighting, he told me that when China started fighting Japan, China could furnish the soldiers but he hoped America would furnish the money and Navy.

General Wu believes in the abolishment of the Tuchun system and the centralizing of all military authority under the Ministry of War of the Central Government. He informed me that it would take some time to accomplish that, several years. His ideals are so much higher than those of his personal backers Tsao Kun, Li Hsun and Chang Tso Lin, that eventually there may arise further trouble within their combination. At the present however, I believe Wu Pei Fu will simply step back out of the spot light and quietly build up his following of patriotic Chinese.

THEATER OF OPERATIONS

The operations conducted by Gen. Wu Pei Fu and his troops against the Anfu troops were all within a few miles of the Peking-Hankow Railway Line. At the opening of hostilities, Wu Pei Fu's advance base was at Kaupeitien - the Anfu base being at Cho Chow. The right of Wu Pei Fu's line never crossed the Yung Tin Ho until after the Anfu troops had been captured or dispersed. The left of the line probably skirted the edge of the hills from 5 to 10 miles west of the railway. The country is flat and at the present time entirely under cultivation. The small streams and rivers have a general west to east direction. These stream banks together with humerous sunken roads and dirt walled villages afforded numerous strong defensive positions.

Practically all fighting took place between a line running at right angles to the railway at Sunglintien and another similar line at Liu Li Ho about 30 miles from Peking and about 20 miles from Sunglintien. Mud walled villages are numerous in this section of China. The only town of any importance is Cho Chow which has a population of about 40,000 and a brick wall about 20 feet high surrounding it. This town was held at the start by the 1st Frontier Defense Division, Anfu troops.

TROOPS

The troops of Tso Kun, Tuchun of Chihli Province, consisted of one Division - the 3rd whose Commander is Wu Pei Fu. The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th Chihli Mixed Brigades, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Reserve Brigades and one Brigade of body guards. Not all of these troops were on the so-called Western Front. General Wu Pei Fu was in command of all troops on the Western Front.

At Tientsin was the 4th Mixed Brigade under Tso Jin, brother of Tso Kun, together with 20 "Militia" Battalions at half strength.

At Techow in the North of Shantung Province on the Tientsin-Pukow Railway was the 5th Mixed Brigade under General Schang who was sent down there to seize the Arsenal.

At Loyang in Honan Province near Honanfu was the 5th Brigade of the 3rd Division. This Brigade was held there instead of being sent North in order to hold in check the Northwest Frontier Defense Brigades situated in that vicinity.

At Cheng Chow also in Honan Province were the 1st and 2nd Chihli Mixed Brigades. Undoubtedly some of these troops were guarding the Yellow River bridge.

As the troop movement of Wu Pei Fu's forces during the fighting developed, their positions were as follows:

On the left flank, the 6th Brigade of the 3rd Division under General Chang Fu Lai.

The left center, 2nd Chihli Reserve Brigade with a part of the Tuchun's body guard, all under the command of General Li.

The center - the 1st Chihli Reserve Brigade and part of the Tuchun's body guard and a detachment of volunteers, all under General Wang.

The right center - the 1st Brigade of the 1st Fengtien Division under General Chao. A Mixed Brigade of Fengtien troops, Commander unknown. Also the 3rd Reserve Brigade, Chihli troops, under General Peng.

The right flank - the 3rd Chihli Mixed Brigade under General Schao.

A great many of these Chihli troops were recruits. The officers of the Reserve Brigades were formerly non-commissioned officers who had seen service in Hunan and Szechwan. While many of the recruits did not have the bearing of the older soldiers, nevertheless they were all filled with the same idea of patriotism and stood the test of hardship and fighting in an excellent manner.

The Fengtien troops (Chang Tso-lin's) came up from Honan and while they were not as well disciplined and under as good control as the Chihli troops, nevertheless fought well. There was some feeling between the Fengtien and the Chihli officers, the former being very reluctant apparently to take orders from the Chihli people. The Fengtien troops however, arrived at the time when Wu Pei Fu needed them badly to strengthen his center and they lost no time in getting out into the fight. General Wu held out practically no reserves.

The total of troops under Wu Pei Fu's command was about 30,000 - opposed to him were the 1st and 3rd Frontier Defense Division, the 15th Division; a part of the 13th Division, a force at least equal in numbers to Wu Pei Fu's troops and probably exceeding them by several thousand. The 1st Frontier Defense Division seems to have occupied the right of the line including the section near the railroad. The right was apparently held by the 3rd Frontier Defense Division. The 15th Division seems to have been in the center, but east of the railroad.

These Anfu troops were better equipped than those of Wu Pei Fu. Their transportation should have been better. They possessed many times more ammunition, much more artillery and artillery ammunition and more modern and larger caliber guns. They also had on their side all that there was of the Chinese Air Service.

MILITARY OPERATIONS

At the opening of hostilities on July 15th, the Anfu troops held a line shaped liked a horse shoe, the flanks being in advance of the center. The center being near Tang-pu-tschw about four miles south of Cho-chow.

There were Anfu Reserves at Liuliho of parts of the 13th and 3rd Anfu Frontier Defense Divisions. Whether the hostilities were actually opened by the Anfu or Chihli troops is not known by me but at the end of the first days fighting the Chihli troops had won some of the Anfu positions and the horse-shoe had been turned so that now the Chihli flanks were advanced, in other words both Anfu flanks had been driven back by the veteran Brigades of Wu which he had placed on the flanks, holding the center with the Reserve Brigades of the new troops. The casualties were many although it is impossible to obtain accurate figures.

This bending back of the flanks of the Anfu troops was the start of the encircling movements by Wu's veteran Brigades. The 6th Brigade of the 3rd Division continued to move forward around the Anfu right flank, the 3rd Mixed Brigade continued to move forward around the left flank - the objective of both being Liuliho on the railroad which place they were orderd to reach on Saturday the 17th. This they failed to do however, probably on account of the terrific down pour of rain on Friday night. They eventually did get together however, on Monday the 19th or possibley on the 18th. On Friday the 16th Wu's flanks continued their advance while the center of the line stood fast. There were heavy casualties in the center caused by an advance of Wu's troops thinking that the opposing Anfu troops had retired. The Chihli troops eventually fell back to their original positions with fairly heavy losses. During this day one Brigade and one Regiment of another Brigade of Fengtien troops arrived and were without any delay moved off into the line. There were practically no troops held in reserve by Wu Pei Fu, and had the center of the Anfu lines attacked particularly at the time when the Chihli center had advanced and been forced to retire, Wu would have been in very serious difficulties.

On the morning of July 17th I visited General Wang's Brigade headquarters in the center of the line and met there a Chinese Catholic Priest, Fr. Li Jacques who was the bearer of a letter from General Chu Tung Feng, commanding the 1st Frontier Defense Division to General Wu, asking for terms under which he might surrender himself and his Division. Shortly after the arrival of the Priest an armistice was declared in the center of the line and all firing ceased.

Before noon of that day the Priest returned to Chu Tung Feng with Wu's answer. The armistice continued in force throughout the day and also the following day when the surrender was actually accomplished. The armistice apparently did not effect the movement of troops, supplies, preparation of positions, etc. as Wu's flanks continued to advance, reinforcements continued to arrive and to be sent forward. On this day a Brigade Commander of the 15th Division Anfu troops was pointed out to me at General Wu's headquarters.

I was informed by one of Wu's Staff Officers that this man had come to make the necessary arrangements for the turning over to the Chihli side of his Brigade. These men were ready to fight for that side but not for the Anfus. It was arranged that this Brigade would come over on the night of July 17 - 18th, that they would go behind the lines and if desired by General Wu, later, they would serve under him.

General Wu informed me on the evening of the 17th that his flanking groups had both reached Liuliho. I am inclined to believe however, that he had ordered them to be there at that time but that they found it physically impossible to get there. Communication was not good. At any rate on the night of the 18th when General Wu's train reached Liuliho, no evidence could be found of these troops and no villager would say that he had seen them.

On the 18th instant at about noon, General Chu, Commanding the 1st Frontier Defense Division came to General Wu's headquarters as a prisoner of war, surrendering himself, his Division and all materiel. In the afternoon General Wu's train went forward to Cho-chow where this surrendered equipment had been turned in to the Chihli troops who had gone forward at day light that morning to attack if case the surrender did not take place. After inspecting the equipment, General Wu continued with his train to Liuliho where he expected to find his two Brigades which had gone around the Anfu flanks, the 6th Brigade of the 3rd Division and the 3rd Mixed Brigade.

About 3 miles south of liuliho as his train was passing a village, armed troops came swarming out, rushing towards the train, holding their rifles over their heads. As they gave evidence that they had no intention of fighting, the strong train guard which Wu had with him made no attempt to open fire, but as the train stopped, they rushed out and took the arms and ammunition away from what proved to be a Battalion of Engineers of the 13th Division.

Upon hearing the whistle of Wu's train these men rushed out of the village with the intention of surrendering. They had had nothing to eat for at least two days and when General Wu learned this he ordered that they be supplied with food from his train. After they had been fed, General Wu talked to them and in the end appointed one of his Staff Officers as their Battalion Commander, promised to look after them, gave them back their rifles and had them doing guard duty for him at Liuliho that night.

When the train arrived in Liuliho as stated above, no information could be obtained as to the whereabouts of the two Brigades which were supposed to have reached there 24 hours before. Later, upon our return to Liliuho we learned from the villagers that on Sunday evening the Chihli troops had not arrived but were expected by the Anfu troops occupying the town who had taken up positions to hold them back on the flanks while artillery, ammunition and other war materiel was evacuated via the railroad. However, when these troops who were evidently in a state bordering on panic, having learned that Cho-chow had surrendered and that their flanks were threatened, heard the whistle of Wu Pei Fu's train, they felt that they were lost and without a moments hesitation all jumped out of their positions - yelling "Dont shoot! Dont Shoot!" and ran in the direction of Peking, leaving hats, shoes and various kinds of equipment scattered about. To say nothing of the car loads of ammunition, artillery, etc. etc. abandoned in the Railway Yards.

It is probable that if Wu Pei Fu's train had not stopped to take over the surrendered Battalion of the 13th Division he would have actually run into Anfu troops in the Station Yard at Liuliho. The surrender of the Battalion consumed more than an hour and this permitted the Anfu troops to get well out of the way before Wu arrived.

There were no further hostilities on this front.

Chihli troops gradually moved forward until on the 21st they occupied all the country west of Hung Ting Ho and had a cavalry detachment on the Peking side of the Railroad and cart road bridges at Lu Kuo Chiao.

General Wu furnished me a train on which to come to Peking on the morning of the 22nd. During this trip into the city from General Wu's headquarters, not an Anfu soldier was seen.

In seven days General Wu's troops had captured the 1st Frontier Defense Division practically complete, had received the voluntary surrender of one brigade of the 15th Division and one battalion of the 13th Division. They had captured more ammunition and artillery than they had when they started the campaign and had so demoralized the rest of the Anfu troops that all resistance had vanished.

MORALE OF TROOPS

The success of the Chihli side can be attributed to two causes. First: Superior generalship on the part of Gen. Wu Pei Fu. Second: Superior morale of the Chihli troops.

As previously stated, Wu's troops were poorly armed and equipped. Scattered through Wu's organizations were however, a great many old soldiers who had seen fighting in Hunan and Szechwan. Also Wu made it a point to show his men what they were fighting for. Every one of the large number with whom my interpreter talked, was filled with a spirit of patriotism. They all felt that they were fighting for their country against its enemies, in the shape of traitorous officials working in the interests of a foreign power. Sacrifices on their part for their country were made cheerfully and willingly.

The troops of the opposing side including a great many of the officers were not in sympathy with their leaders. The fact that at least one Brigade of the 15th Division, one Battalion of the 13th Division and after two days of hard fighting practically the entire First Division voluntairly surrendered to Wu Pei Fu, shows that they lacked the morale and feeling that they were fighting on the right side.

There is reason to suppose also that there were a great many students among Wu Pei Fu's troops. There was also serving under him, a Detachment of not less than 150 volunteers, young men who came forward and offered their services to General Wu for this emergency. I noticed a considerable number of old soldiers among Wu's men, men with grey hair and others of mature years who must have been with him for a long time. I have never seen in any other organizations in China, any soldiers who had the appearance of veterans.

FOOD

Supplying a Chinese army with food is a very simple matter compared to our own problem. The rations of the CHinese soldiers consist of large pieces of Chinese bread, (occasionally hard tack as an emergency ration in place of the bread), and rice, and apparently for the officers a few sweet potatoes.

The Chinese soldier never receives meat. I saw nothing except the articles mentioned above issued to the troops, but apparently the men themselves gathered a few vegetables in the fields or bought them from the neighboring villages. The bread was baked in Paotingfu, sent up in wicker baskets to the railroad station nearest the front and there issued out to the collies or cart carriers to be sent out to the organizations along the front. During the first day or two of the fighting there was apparently some difficulty in getting food to the front but after that there was plenty of food on hand for the soldiers whenever they desired it.

EQUIPMENT

1 - Artillery and Small Arms
2 - Soldiers individual equipment

1 - As stated above, Wu Pei Fu's troops were poorly armed and equipped. Their arms were old and there was not an over abundance of ammunition, particularly for the artillery. I am sure the artillery was obliged to remain almost silent in order not to waste what little ammunition they did have. The Battery of artillery which I saw was a Krupp battery, 1903 model, 75 m.m. caliber. The ammunition for the same was also German make. There was also Mountain Artillery which I did not get an opportunity to inspect.

The Anfu troops had at least one battery of Austrian 75 m.m., some Chinese 75's and probably some Japanese guns of the same caliber, as the Frontier Defense Divisions were Japanese trained and equipped. They also had some guns of about 4.7 inch caliber, as I saw several shells which had been fired from these guns, in the vicinity of Wu Pei Fu's line.

Damage done by the artillery was practically negligible. In one hospital in Paotingfu containing 60 wounded, only one man was hit by shrapnel. The artillery ammunition of the Anfu troops was apparently of poor quality as the shrapnel-cases in most instances failed to be blown to pieces.

The lack of uniformity in rifles and rifle ammunition is well illustrated by the following :

While sitting on the station platform in Liuliho, I noticed a small hole in the concrete between my feet. In this small hole were six rifle cartridges. I took them up and found them to be for three different calibers of guns - 2 cartridges with sharp pointed bullets were of Chinese make, 3 with pointed bullets were of foreign make and one with blunt pointed bullets of foreign make. No two of the cartridge cases had the same markings on the bases.

In the equipment of the 1st Frontier Defense Division, probably the only article out of the ordinary was one, 36 inch portable Italian Search Light with one Fiat automobile truck containing the electric generator for the Search Light. This equipment looked very new. It was used on the night of July 15 - 16th but its service was of no value. The only name I could find on the Search Light that looked like that of the manufacturer was - Officine Galillo Firenze -.

2 - Soldiers Individual Equipment:

Each soldier carries a rifle and bayonet of course, the rifle may be of Chinese, Japanese, Austrian or German make. Each soldier armed with rifle carries a long cotton belt which holds 300 or possibly 350 rounds of ammunition. This belt he winds over his shoulders and around his waist, to suit his convenience in the matter of adjustment.

Soldiers Individual Equipment
(continued)

General Wu's soldiers had not blankets, only cloth shoes, usually an ordinary earthen bowl for a mess pan and of course chop-sticks. Only a few soldiers had first-aid packets, although it is prescribed that they should be issued to all troops.

General Wu Pei Fu's men had no individual tent equipment, no haversacks or knapsacks in fact their equipment usually consisted of the clothes they wore on their backs, an extra pair of cotton shoes, their rifle, bayonet and ammunition and with a rice bowl and chop-sticks. The coats, trousers and caps were made of a very cheap cotton material, incapable of withstanding a hard campaign of any duration.

TRANSPORTATION

With the exception of a few pack saddles and pack mules used as a part of the equipment of the Mounted Batteries, I saw no pack animals in service. Practically all the transportation of supplies and ammunition was by the two wheeled cart which is so commonly used in North China. For short distances the usual Chinese coolie was forced into service. The two wheeled Chinese cart can of course turn about on the crooked Chinese roads with much more ease than could our own four wheeled escort wagons. The carts with their drivers and the coolies used for carrying ammunition and supplies and bringing in wounded, had been for the most part impressed into service, and it was necessary to have a soldier accompany each cart or group of coolies, to prevent them from deserting.

CARE AND TREATMENT OF WOUNDED

Although the provisions for the care and treatment of wounded were at times inadequate, nevertheless certain provisions were made for this work and with the limited personnel I should say that the work functioned very well. A Doctor in General Wu Pei Fu's organization informed me that one Doctor and two assistants, corresponding to our Hospital Corps men, are authorized for each Battalion, that no other personnel is authorized for Dressing Stations, Field Hospitals, etc. Consequently when a Doctor or his assistants belonging to a certain Battalion were attending to wounded at the Dressing Station which was established at the rail-head, those same persons could not be doing duty on the field with the wounded in their Battalion. The result was that the Doctors usually stayed at the Dressing Station at the rail-head. The wounded being brought in from the front on litters carried by coolies and each litter accompanied by one of the Battalion Hospital Corps assistants who had been obliged to go out to the Battalion Headquarters to get the wounded men and give them First-Aid treatment before bringing them in to the Dressing Station.

This necessity for the Hospital Corps assistants to go back and forth between the Front Line and the rail-head caused much waste of time for them.

Upon the arrival of the wounded at the Dressing Station they were given a hypodermic and such other temporary treatment as was deemed best, before sending them by train to the Hospitals in Paotingfu. An American Mission Doctor in Paotingfu who received 60 of these wounded in his Hospital, informed me that the temporary treatment given these men was on the whole, very good.

MILITARY PUNISHMENTS

During the afternoon of July 17th I saw a soldier being hurriedly dragged along the road in front of General Wu Pei Fu's headquarters to his execution. I was informed by the Division Judge Advocate that he had been tried and convicted of bringing in false information for which offence he was shot. The same Judge Advocate who had been with General Wu about five years stated that the most common offences among General Wu's troops were those of drinking and gambling. The most common form of punishment for these minor offences was whipping. This form of punishment was not used so much to inflict pain upon the recipient, but the punishment was administered in a public place in front of the soldiers friends and comrades, which caused him to lose face in his organization. For more serious offences, imprisonment and the death penalty were inflicted.

SANITATION

The Chinese Army has no idea whatsoever of sanitation. They are apparently immune from the majority of the diseases which are likely to play havoc with foreign troops. It is very rare indeed that you will see a Chinese soldier drinking cold water, if he cannot obtain hot tea he will take hot water. As to food he is not so fastidious. Practically no attempt is made to keep flies away from food, the bread may be moldy and have been exposed to the flies for several days. The rice after it is cooked in a large kettle, may be left with the cover off, hours before eating - no attempt being made to keep the flies away.

No such a thing as a latrine is known apparently in the Chinese Army. To obey a call of nature a soldier simply steps to one side, out of the path of the passers by, and relieves himself. This may be on the edge of a well from which the troops are getting water, it may be near the rice kettle of his company, it may be from his car platform which is at a siding for perhaps weeks at a time. Naturally no care is taken in the disposal of food that is left over, - melon rinds, etc. etc. With all this lack of sanitary precaution such as we know, I was informed by one of the Surgeons that there was practically no sickness among the troops. - I certainly saw none.

RAIL COMMUNICATIONS

The weakest point probably in Wu Pei Fu's organization was the handling of the railroad traffic. The railroad line between his base at Paotingfu and his rail-head was one track only, with few small sidings at the villages along the line. General Wu failed to assign officers with competent authority and the necessary amount of energy to handle the traffic at the more important stations. The result was that on one day the congestion was such that food for the army was delayed in coming forward. On another day the arrival of artillery ammunitiin was prevented or at least greatly delayed, on another day a railroad accident to General Wu's own train caused him many hours of delay and annoyance. The importance of well organized railroad service was impressed upon me.

CONDITIONS ALONG THE FRONT

I made two trips to the actual front line, one while fighting was in progress and the second one while troops were in position but during an armistice. The sections were not particularly well organized, trenches of a sort were dug at intervals where necessary.

The distance between the opposing line, I was told, was about 800 meters. The soldiers did not seem to have a very clear idea of where their opponents were and they did not hesitate to expose themselves. There was evidently some scheme in effect of supports for the firing line but judging from the appearences, I should say that the scheme was rather crude.

The Brigade Commander informed me that his men had had practically no sleep for three days and nights which would not have been the case of course had his supports been properly organized. I believe there was no hand-to-hand fighting whatsoever. I have heard of no case of a soldier being wounded by bayonet. Whether or not General Wu's troops would have stood the test of bayonet fighting, I cannot say.

As stated elsewhere, the Artillery, so far as I have observed it, with all Chinese troops is invariably put in the front line. There are no battery commander's telescopes or any other instruments by means of which the battery commander may observe, adjust and control his fire. The Austrian Battery captured from the Anfu troops had Zeiss sights.

CONCLUSION

Foreigners, long time residents of China, had almost without exception told me that the Chinese soldier would not fight. My observation during this past week with General Wu Pei Fu's troops, has convinced me otherwise. A CHinese is not by nature a fighter, but given the proper motive and the proper leader, he will fight. General Wu's troops felt that they were fighting for China. This point came out over and over again when my interpreter was talking with the enlisted men. The men were not well equipped, they knew none of the fine points of military training, but they had confidence in their leaders and they were certain in their own minds that they were fighting for a cause which was worth giving their lives for, if necessary.

General Wu himself, and his officers are not highly trained in military affairs. They have much natural ability along these lines. They are natural leaders and throughout the entire organization there is an atmosphere of sincerity and devotion to patriotic duty.

I am more convinced than ever that with proper selection and training of Chinese officers, with a modern military equipment and with a truly patriotic cause, the Chinese Army can be made to fight on equal terms with any other.

END.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT: MILITARY OPERATIONS IN HUNAN PROVINCE.

From: M.A.

No. 2595. Date: July 3, 1920., 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

REC'D M.I.D., G.S. OCT 21 1920

The following is a report of Major Philcox, Assistant Military Attache, on the military operations in Hunan Province during June 1920, following a trip of investigation to Changsha.

The fighting in Hunan could in brief be termed a local revolution. For two years and more Hunan has had a Northern Anfu Military Governor, a notoriously corrupt and cruel official. His record and the record of his equally notorious 7th Division were made not only in Hunan but in Szechwan, Anhwei and Shantung Provinces. The people of Hunan are Southern in sympathy. Their own Hunanese troops were driven South out of the Province by General Wu Pei-fu, Commander of the 3rd Northern Division during the last previous fighting between the North and South. General Wu Pei-fu occupied Southern Hunan, and has been more or less openly hostile to the universally hated Military Governor Chang Chin-yao and has been in sympathy with the Southern troops opposite him.

After negotiations between Wu Pei-fu and Southern officials which lasted several months, Wu Pei-fu finally decided to bring his troops which belonged in Chihli Province, back nearer their homes and undoubtedly he received financial assistance from the South for this movement.

At the time Wu Pei-fu started North there were in Hunan Province the following Northern troops:

Commanded by Wu Pei-fu;

The 3rd Division (Chihli troops)
" 1st, 2nd and 3rd Mixed Brigades (Chihli troops)
" 8th Mixed Regiment (Chihli troops)

Commanded by the Military Governor, Chang Chin-yao;

The 7th Division, recruited chiefly in Shantung, Anhwei and Honan.

Commanded by General Li Kuei Yuan;

The 11th Division.

Commanded by General Feng Yu Hsiang (A Christian General);

The 16th Mixed Brigade at Changteh, Northwestern Hunan.

Commanded by General Fan Kuo-Chang;

The 20th Division.

Binding Margin.

None of the other Northern troops or commanders were in sympathy with the Military Governor and his 7th Division. When fighting broke out all of the other troops refused to fight against the South.

The Southern Military leaders stated that their troops consisted of one Division, one Mixed Brigade and a few auxiliary troops - in all about 20,000 men. Although there were a few soldiers from other provinces, practically every man who joined in the fighting was a Hunanese. It was simply a case of fighting to get back home. The Southerners were poorly armed and equipped. Practically every soldier was barefooted, only about every other man had a rifle and there was very little, if any, artillery. The Southerners started North in the wake of Wu Pei-fu as he withdrew his troops en route to Honan and Chihli. Troops of the Military Governor were encountered at Paoking and Hengchowfu, and according to reports of the Southern leaders, after severe fighting the Northerners were put to flight. After these battles practically little resistance was encountered by the South, their advance North being a constant series of flank movements; the result was that Chang Chin-yao and his 7th Division offered practically no resistance. The advance of the Southern troops was so rapid that the 7th Division had no time for looting until they got to Yochow in the extreme northeast of the Province. The advance of the Southern troops had been so rapid and their supplies so limited that it was necessary for them to halt their advance after the occupation of Changsha, the Provincial Capital. During the operations including the occupation of Changsha the Southerners captured more arms and ammunitiin than they possessed when they started. The captured supplies included ten or twelve thousand rifles, about eighty machine guns, about thirty pieces of artillery, together with a fair supply of ammunition and military stores.

With the advance of the Southern forces the 11th Division left Hunan immediately by Chinese junks and other water transportation for the Yangtze River - probably stopping at Sinti, Hupeh Province. So far as we can learn these troops were never within sight of the advancing Southerners. The 20th Division also withdrew simultaneously with the advance of Southern forces but a portion of these came in contact with the Southern troops. However, their sympathy was with the South against Chang Chin-yao and they withdrew in the face of the "enemy" without fighting or gave themselves up to the conquering Southerners. The troops all reached northeast Hunan and from there moved down the Yangtze to Sinti, Hupeh Province. During the occupation of Yochow by the 7th Division, a detachment of 300, 20th Division troops guarded the two American Mission Compounds. This was not done, however, until sometime after the murder of the American Missionary at Yochow by an officer of the 7th Division.

About a week after occupying Changsha, Southern troops moved forward on Yochow where Chang Chin-yao and what was left of his troops were located. During their occupation of Yochow, Chang Chin-yao and his troops looted the city of everything, killed many of the inhabitants, drove all the others outside the city or to take refuge in the Mission Compound, and murdered one American Missionary. With the advance of the Southern forces on Yochow, Chang Chin-yao and his followers withdrew beyond the boundary of Hunan which is all that the Southerners desired.

The Southern leaders informed us that they had no desire to extend their operations outside Hunan Province. Their movements were directed solely against Chang Chin-yao and they simply desired to drive him and his followers out of the Province and would do nothing beyond the boundaries of Hunan unless the Northerners attempted to drive them back out of their Province.

At the present time the only Northern troops left in Hunan are those of General Feng Yu Hsiang at Changteh. General Feng has always been more or less in sympathy with the South and the Southern leaders informed us that they had no desire to force General Feng out of the Province. It is probable that General Feng will, however, withdraw his troops to Shasi or some other place on the Yangtze River, north of Changteh.

SUMMARY

The past events and the present situation can be summarized as follows:

The Southern advances were made after a complete understanding with General Wu Pei-fu, and were directed entirely against a corrupt and cruel Governor by soldiers who were fighting to get back to their own homes. The victorious troops took possession of the various cities and towns in an orderly manner with no looting or taking of life except when they caught soldiers of the 7th Division. All Northern troops withdrew after very little fighting, - the 11th and 20th Divisions because their sympathies were with the South, the 7th Division because they have for years been nothing but an undisciplined mob, composed largely of bandits and outlaws. The only looting, etc. of consequence was by the 7th Division in and around Yochow.

The people in Hunan Province are at the present time probably the happiest and most peaceful of any province in China. The Southern leader in Hunan, Tang Yen Kai, is a Changsha man who is very popular in the Province because of his scholarly ability, his honesty and fairmindedness. Soldiers occupying Hunan are all Hunanese, many of them in Changsha can be seen working in their own stores and shops or in their own homes.

At the present time there are no Northern troops in Hunan except possibly those of the 16th Mixed Brigade of General Feng Yu Hsiang at Changteh. The Southern troops occupying the Province are the First Hunan Division, the First Hunan Mixed Brigade and some auxiliary troops.

Unless the Central Government starts a movement to re-occupy Hunan, peace will settle upon Hunan and its borders.

This little action in Hunan is linked with the present political struggle in Peking through Wu Pei-fu and possibly through an agreement between the Anti-Anfu faction in the North and certain leaders in the South in sympathy with the Hunanese.

END.

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1920

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Minister of War	Lu Chun Tsung Chang	陸軍總長
General Staff	Tsan Mou Peng Pu	參謀部
Chief of Staff	Tsan Mao Tsung Chang	參謀總長
National Army	Lu Chun	陸軍
Provincial Forces	Hsün-fang tui	巡防隊
Infantry	Pu Ping	步兵
Cavalry	Ch'i Ping	騎兵
Artillery	Pa'o Ping	炮兵
Engineers	Kung Ping	工兵
Transport Corps	Tsu Chung	輜重兵
Intendance Department	Ching Li Pu	經理部
Army Medical Department	Chun I Pu	軍醫部
Veterinary Department	Shou I Pu	獸醫部
Gendarmerie, Peking.	Hsien Ping	憲兵
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1920 2009-100 NOV 3

WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT: CHANGES IN COMBAT MONOGRAPH - CHINA.

NOTED: M.I.D.

From: H.A. — COMBAT.

No. 2651 Date: September 18, 1920., 19

Replying to No. Date: , 19

REC'D M.I.D., G.S. OCT 30 1920

Request following be added to Combat Monograph - China:

CHINA

(41) Personnel. — Combat.

The Yi Shih Pao (probably the most reliable vernacular newspaper of Peking) in its issue of September 6, 1920, states that the Joint War and General Staff Board has announced that there were prior to June 1, 1920, - 1,275,000 soldiers in the country. These together with various irregular provincial forces make a grand total corresponding to 120 divisions which consume 75% of the annual revenue of the country.

In studying plans for demobilization, the same source announces that since June 1st the following troops have been demobilized:

Chang Chin-yao's Hunanese troops	-	39,000
7th Division (Luchun)		
1st Hunan Mixed Brigade.		
3rd " " "		
5th " " "		
Wu Kwang-sin's troops for the protection of the Yangtze.	-	30,000
Four of his five Mixed Brigades.		
Metropolitan District		
15th Division	-	10,000
13th Division added to the Peking Gendarmerie.		
Frontier Defense Troops		
1st, 2nd, and 3rd Frontier Defense Divisions, except one Brigade under Sing Tseng-kang in Shantung.		30,000
Northwestern Frontier Defense Troops		
1st, 2nd, 4th and 5th Mixed Brigades		10,000
The 3rd Mixed Brigade remaining in Mongolia under Chu-Chi-hsiang.		

Binding Margin.

(41) Personnel Cont'd. Combat.

According to the same report the Central authorities are determined to carry out the demobilization policy and limit the army of the whole country to 50 divisions.

While it is to be hoped that such a plan may be carried out it is also considered unlikely in the near future.

It is generally believed that a large proportion of the demobilized Frontier Defense and Metropolitan troops have been taken into the organizations of General Chang Tsao-lin and Wu Pei-fu, these generals heading factions that most foreigners expect to see fighting each other at some time in the future. Wu Pei-fu is now reorganizing his troops and those of his staunchest followers probably preparing for action against Chang Tsao-lin in case the latter fails to make the necessary efforts to bring about the promised reforms in Peking. Wu Pei-fu believes in a stronger Central Government with all military forces under its control. Chang Tsao-lin, the most powerful Tuchun naturally is likely to oppose any dimimution of his power. Hence the actions of both in recruiting, equipping and reorganizing their forces.

(Personages) General Wu Pei-fu

The following notes on Gen. Wu Pei-fu, in whom so many hopes are centred, are of interest. Gen. Wu stands for a Citizens' Convention, representative of all classes and independent of military control, to settle the future governance of China. He is utterly opposed to any makeshift cabinet, which would offer little hope of improvement on its predecessors.

General Wu Pei-fu is 47 years of age and was born about 50 miles from Chefoo in Penglai Hsien. He pursued his studies in his home with a view to taking the official examinations and at the age of 21 he passed as a "hsiu-tsai." When he was 25 he decided upon a military career and shortly afterwards entered upon a course of study at the Kaiping (Chihli) military school. He was first commissioned as a sub-battalion commander in the 3rd Division and with this organization he has been associated ever since. He became commander of the 6th Brigade, 3rd Division, while campaigning for Yuan Shih-kai in Szechuan in 1916. He was still a brigade commander when the 3rd Division came to Peking in 1917 to overthrow Chang Hsun.

General Wu was appointed division commander of the 3rd Division and was given the title of Chiangchun (Marshal) on Tuan Chi-jui's second expedition into Hunan after Fu Liang-tso's flight from Changsha. For more than two years his force, in the extreme south of Hunan, acted as a buffer for Chang Chin-yao against Tan Yen-kai's Hunanese troops.

During the last year of his sojourn in Hunan Wu Pei-fu bombarded Peking with telegrams criticizing the administration in the frankest terms, until in May of this year, when it was apparent that the Anfu clique could obtain little more financial support from the Japanese, he determined to return to the north and do what he could to right things. What he had done and what he is doing are parts of current history.

(Personages)

Cont'd.

Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang ("The Christian General")

As in all probability General Feng Yu-hsiang will be very closely associated with Gen. Wu Pei-fu in all his future military activities, it is desirable to associate the two in this report.

All reports from Chinese and foreigners alike are unanimous in commending General Feng and his troops which are now at WuChang.

General Feng commands the 16th Mixed Brigade of Luchun. This brigade has been reinforced however, so that it may be considered as the equal of a division. A recent report stated that Gen. Feng had disarmed the 7th Division (Chang Ching-yao's) Artillery which means that Gen. Feng has materiel for practically two regiments of artillery.

General Feng Yu-hsiang reached the provincial Capital at Wuchang on July 31st. His men are upholding the excellent reputation they have borne whever they have been stationed and the inhabitants of the Wu Han cities appear to be quite pleased to have them in their midst.

As is well known, General Feng expects his men to learn some trade so that when they leave the army they may not be dependent on brigandage for their means of subsistence, and soon after his arrival in Wuchang the commander sent Tuchun Wang a present of 100 rattan chairs and tables that had been made by his own men. Besides paying calls on the Tuchun and the Civil Governor, General Feng has showed his interest in the spread of Christianity by attending services in various churches in this centre.

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1920 2009-101 NOV 3

WAR DEPARTMENT

NOTED M.I.

SUBJECT: CHANGES IN COMBAT MONOGRAPH - TIBET.

From: H.A. COMBAT.

No. 2652 Date: September 18, 1920., 19

Replying to No. Date: , 19

REC'D M.I.D., G.S. OCT 30 1920

It is requested that the attached replace the present Combat Factor of the Situation Monograph of Tibet.

Enc.

Binding Margin.

(14) Composition

(41) Personnel.

Tibet like Mongolia has no paid Army.

(42) 1st Line.

All Tibetans live much in the open and have many war-like qualities.

Tibet has no regular army. In time of need Tibetans volunteer for service and serve without pay, bringing with them their own mounts, arms and ammunition.

(43) Reserves.

Tibet has a population of approximately 2,000,000. About 300,000 of these might be available for military service. Due to the inaccessability of great areas of Tibet and the universal difficulties of transportation, certainly not more than one tenth of this number could be counted on.

(15) Organization.

(44) Peace.

There is no proper organization of Tibetan forces.

(45) War.

Where ever the ground permitted it all Tibetan movements would be mounted.

(46) Mobilization.

Tibet is very sparsely settled. There are no large cities and few towns of any size. A force of 10,000 could be mobilized only with great difficulty and after the elapse of a considerable space of time. Any mobilization would be largely one of volunteers.

(16) Distribution.

(47) Strategic.

None.

The semi-independent tribes along the eastern border of Tibet are in a general way prepared to resist invasion by Chinese forces.

(16) Distribution Cont'd. Combat.

(48) Tactical.

None.

(49) Territorial.

None.

(17) Discipline.

(50) Individual.

The Tibetan is like the Mongolian, largely controlled by his religion - Buddhism. The living Buddha at Lasa is the head of both spiritual and temporal power, although there are many semi-independent tribes chiefly in the east.

(51) Unit.

None.

(52) Commanders.

None.

(18) Morale.

(53) Sentiment.

A hardy out-of-door race but not naturally a war-like race.

(54) Elan.

(55) Stamina.

Viril and capable of undergoing great hardships.

(19) Training.

(56) Individual.

Their lives are spent in the open tending their flocks and herds or hunting.

(57) Unit.

None.

(58) Staff.

None.

(20) Individual

(59) Arms.

All Tibetans possess and are skilful in the use of fire arms. These arms are however, in general very old and crude.

(20) Individual Combat.
Cont'd.

(60) Clothing.

No military uniforms. Inhabitants wear sheepskins and a few woll and cotton garments.

(61) Accoutrements.

None.

(21) Orginization.

(62) Equipage.

None.
Tibetan soldiers would care for themselves, furnishing their own mounts, arms, etc.

(63) Transport.

None.

(64) Communications.

None, other than horses and persons.

(22) National.

(65) Munitions.

All munitions, etc. must be imported.

(66) Fortifications.

None.

(67) Secrets.

None (Probable support of Great Britain against China.)

(3) Naval Power

Tibet being several hundred miles from the sea, has no Navy.

GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION

(32) Mobilization

(95) Methods.

Any mobilization of Tibetans would without much doubt be close to the Chinese border and along one of the two principal east and west roads.

(96) Time Table. - None.

(97) Strength.

A force of only a few thousand could be raised. 10,000 men would be a very large army for Tibet, although it might be possible to raise a larger force.

(33) Defense

(98) Frontier.

Tibet is a country of natural obstacles to invasion. With practically no roads, thousands of square miles of barren plateaus, mountainous borders, hostile invasion would be difficult.

The southern boundary roughly coincides with the summit line of the Himalayas; the northern boundary similarly approximates to the main ridge of the Kwen Lun range.

The western boundary is also mountainous, only two or three primitive roads furnishing a means of entrance and exit.

Entrance over the eastern boundary leads one across the vast barren plateau.

(99) Interior.

Tibet may be conveniently divided into two regions: (a) A narrow trench 800 miles long by about 200 miles wide, forming the basins and sources of three great Indian rivers, the Indus, Sutlej and Brahmaputra.

(b) A barren plateau over 1,000 miles long and 400 miles wide, regarding which the world is in possession of very meagre information.

Lack of communications: Extreme altitudes are in themselves sufficient defenses were such necessary.

(100) Critical points.

All roads into Tibet must pass through numerous mountain passes.

(34) Invasion.

(101) Frontier Crossings.

The communications of Tibet are primitive in the extreme, the roads being few and bad, and there being nothing but rope bridges for crossing rivers and torrents. The main roads from China into Tibet are:

(1) The official (Postal) route from Tatsienlu via Batang and Chiamdo. This route is very rocky and precipitous.

(2) From Tatsienlu by easier gradients over the undulating downs of Drango and Derge, and then strikes southwest to Lhasa. This is the caravan route.

(3) Via Sining in Kansu, Koko-nor and Tsaidam region, then across the Chang Tang to Lhasa. From the north the principal entry is via Ladakh, the Kwen Lun presenting an almost impassable barrier. From the south the two principal means of ingress are the roads through the Chumbi Valley, Southwest of Lhasa via Sarpuba La and Darjiling, and through eleven passes to the west. (See Newe Atlas and Commercial Gazetteer of China, Page 87.)

There is an important road passing along the southern trench in which lie the upper courses of the Indus, Sutley and Brahmaputra. It follows the whole valley from Tashikong (Tashigong) and Gartok through the Kailas and Mausarowar districts, where it reaches its highest level, and then follows the Tsangpo (Sanpo) or Upper Brahmaputra through the Kalh Pass, throwing off an important branch to Shigatze, Gyangtze and the Clumbi Valley, thence to Darjiling, the main road passing on to Lhasa.

(34) Invasion. Cont'd. — Combat.

(102) Routes of Penetration.

By China - Via Tatsienlu, Batang, Chiamdo (Chamdo) to Lhasa.
(2) Via Tatsienlu, northwest along the Nya Chu river to Dwinda, then westerly through Kanze, Derge to Chiamdo (Chamdo), thence to Lhasa.

By Great Britain: From Darjiling up the Chumbi Valley to Serpuba La, Gyangtse, Shigatse and Lhasa.

(103) Critical Points.

China - Tatsienlu
Great Britain - Darjiling.

(35) Points D'Appui

(104) Location.

Numerous mountain strongholds along all roads entering Tibet.

(105) Type -

(106) Capacity -

(107) Frontier Crossings.

To invade China - (1) Via Chaiamdo, Derge and southeast to Tatsienlu.
(2) Via Chiamdo, Batang, Litang to Tatsienlu.
To invade India - Hardly conceivable but if so via Shigatse, Gyangtse, Chumbi Valley to Darjiling.

(108) Routes of Penetration.

As indicated in (107) above.

(109) Critical Points.

Against China - Chiamdo.
Against Gt. Britain - Gyangtse.

(37) Defense.

(110) Frontier.

Resistance at numerous mountain passes.

(111) Interior.

Travel is possible only on a very few rough roads and trails.

(112) Critical Points.

The numerous steam crossings and mountain passes.

TIBET

Combat.

(38) Ocean

(113 - 115)

Tibet is many hundreds of miles away from the ocean.

(39) Land

(116) Strategic aspect.

The lack of communications and mountainous frontier together with the vast barren interior makes Tibet all but safe from invasion.

(117) Tactical Aspect.

(118) Seasonal Aspect.

During certain seasons practically all the routes leading into Tibet are closed to travel.

(40) Politico-Economic.

(119) Strategic Aspect. (39) cont. Present Status of Boundary Disputes

Chang The dispute of long standing between China and Tibet is chiefly over the boundary between the two countries arising from the fact that no surveys or accurate maps have ever been made of the territory in question. Consequently some maps show certain territory as Chinese which is shown on other maps as Tibetan. No agreement can be reached as to which map shall be used in determining the boundary. Furthermore the names of streams, mountains, etc. are so frequently repeated that this method of determining location without an actual survey cannot be used. At present although a large part of Szechwan west of Tatsienlu is occupied by Tibetans, ~~At present~~ Batang on the south road and Kanze on the north road are occupied by Chinese troops. Derge on the north road and Chiangha (Chankow) by Lhasa Tibetans.

An Anglo-Chinese-Tibetan conference was held at Simla in Oct. 1913, but no agreement was reached. In 1917 fighting between Chinese and Tibetans broke out which resulted in the capture of Chamdo by Tibetans. An armstice was entered into in Oct. 1918, to last one year and in the meanwhile negotiations between the British Minister at Peking and the Chinese Government were opened. The armistice expired in Oct. 1919 and has not been renewed but there is a tacit understanding between the Central Government and the Lhasa Government, that the boundary, as at present defined, shall stand for the time being, and no hostilities be undertaken by either side until the final settlement has been effected in Peking.

Great Britain is greatly interested in the Sino-Tibetan controversy. Having entered into agreements with the Tibetans, Great Britain acknowledges the suzerainty of China but refuses to admit that China has any administrative power in Tibet.

It is more than likely too, that the question of the Sino-Tibetan border is of interest to Great Britain as the same indefinite boundaries exist between certain parts of Burma and China as exist between Tibet and China.

W/O China # 2652 - Sept. 18-'20.

TIBET

Combat.

(59) Court-General-

Agreements concerning Tibet.

Agreement (Anglo-Chinese-Tibetan) signed at Peking, April 27, 1906, together with the Convention between United Kingdom and Tibet, signed at Lhasa, September 7, 1904.

Arrangement between Great Britain and Russia, concerning Tibet, August 1907.

The Tibet-Sikkim Convention, 1890.

The Mongol-Tibetan Treaty, 1913.

Anglo-Chinese-Tibetan Conference, October 1913.

See reports 2469, March 29, 1920, and 2645, September 14, 1920, and "The China Year Book" 1919-1920, pages 614 - 623.

m/a China # 2652 - Sept. 14-20.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

NOTED: M.I.2.

SUBJECT CHANGES IN COMBAT MONOGRAPH - MONGOLIA.

From H.A. COMBAT.

No. 2653 Date September 18, 1920., 19

Replying to No. Date , 19

REC'D M.I.D., G.S. OCT 30 1920

It is requested that the attached replace the present Combat Factor of the Situation Monograph of Mongolia.

Enc.

Binding Margin.

The following is submitted for the Combat Factor, Situation Monograph of Mongolia:

(14) COMPOSITION.

Mongolia has no paid Regular Army. The Mongolians are not a war-like people. They are semi-nomads depending upon their flocks and herds for food, and live in rough felt tents. The Mongolian pony is a part of the life of the Mongol. Spending his life in the open, on the wide Mongolian Plateau the Mongol possesses many military traits and has on a few occasions shown that he still has when sufficiently aroused, the war-like nature of his ancestors, Genghiz Kahn and his Tartar tribes.

(41) Personnel.

No Regular Army.

(42) 1st Line.

None.

(43) Reserves.

Living as they do, a life similar in many respects to that of the American Indians of the Western Plains, they have many of the same characteristics valuable to a soldier.

(15) ORGANIZATION.

(44) Peace.

None.

(45) War.

None.

(46) Mobilization.

Any mobilization of Mongols would be simply a call for volunteers, each one of whom would bring his individual rifle, ammunition, pony, etc. with him. For service against the Chinese, provided the Mongols were properly aroused, a force of about 5000 might be raised. Scattered as the Mongols are over the thousands of miles of plain with no means of communication, a large force could be organized only with difficulty.

(15) Organization.
Cont'd.

(47) Strategic.

None.

(48) Tactical.

None.

(49) Territorial.

None.

(6) Efficiency.

(17) DISCIPLINE.

(50) Individual. - None.

(51) Unit. - None.

(52) Commanders - None.

(18) MORALE.

(53) Sentiment - No remarks.

(54) Elan.

The Mongols are frank to admit that they do not care for self government and that they are peace-loving. Nevertheless they have been known to band themselves together, turn on the Chinese soldiers and practically annihilate a superior force. This would only be done after they had been forced to it by the harsh over-bearing treatment of the Chinese.

(55) Stamina.

"The Mongols are men of exceptional virility and hardihood". Letter R. C. Andrews to Colonel Miles - 5/11/20.

They somewhat resemble in their features as well as in their mode of life the American Indian of the Northwestern plains. They live in their felt tents and can wander with their flocks of sheep and herds of cattle, Mongolian ponies and camels, from one end of Mongolia to the other. They are nearly always in the open air and of course possess all the qualities that such a life develops. At the same time their weakness are similar to those of the American Indians, - laziness, filth, love for alcohol.

(19) TRAINING

(56) - Individual. None.

(57) - Unit. None.

(58) - Staff. None.

(20) INDIVIDUAL

(59) - Arms.

Although the Chinese occupation garrison of Urga has endeavored to force the Mongols to give up their arms, it is probable that practically every Mongol who is not a Lama (Priest) can produce some sort of a gun and ammunition.

(60) - Clothing.

No uniforms.

(61) - Accoutrements.

None.

(21) ORGANIZATION

(62) - Equipage. None.

(63) - Transport. None.

(64) - Communications. None.

(22) NATIONAL

(65) - Munitions. None.

(66) - Fortifications. None.

(67) - Secrets. None.

NAVAL POWER

No Navy.

GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION.

(32) Mobilization.

(95) - Methods.

Any mobilization of Mongols would be in the nature of a voluntary uprising to revenge the persecutions of over-bearing Chinese officials.

(96) - Time Tables.

None.

(32) Mobilization
Cont'd.

(97) - Strength.

The population of Mongolia averages 2 per square mile with a total of 2,580,000 about 38,700 might be considered available.

Due to the peaceful nature of the people and the extreme difficulties in the way of transportation, it would be very difficult to raise a force of more than 5,000 men.

(33) DEFENSE

(98) - Frontier.

There are no obstacles to prevent a hostile force from entering Mongolia.

(99) - Interior.

1 - Intense cold in winter.
2 - The lack of Communications.

There are no railroads in Mongolia. The distances between the few larger towns is covered by unimproved roads and tracks across the flat country. A hostile army in Mongolia would require a large force to keep open its line of communications.

(100) - Critical points.

None.

(34) - INVASION

(101) - Frontier Crossings.

Chinese entry into Mongolia is chiefly through Kalgan. Entry can also be made from numerous places in Manchuria, Shansi and Kansu. From Siberia entry is usually made south from Verkhne-Udinsk through Kiakhta to Urga or south from NovoNikolayevsk to Semipalatinsk and east to Kobdo in western Mongolia.

(102) - Routes of Penetration.

All routes in an invasion of Mongolia would lead to Urga, the largest town, the seat of the government which is both temporal and secular. Urga is about 600 miles from Kalgan and 150 miles from Kiakhta.

(103) - Critical Points.

For the Chinese - Kalgan.

For the Russians - Kiakhta.

(35) - POINTS D'APPUI

(104) - Location.

No definite points. Efforts would be made to cut off supplies after invading forces had gotten well into Mongolia.

(35) - Points D'Appui
Cont'd.

(105) - Type.

(106) - Capacity.

(36) - INVASION.

It is useless to consider this as the Mongols have neither the desire or ability to attempt an invasion of any outside territory.

(107) - Frontier Crossings.

(108) - Routes of Penetration.

(109) - Critical Points.

(37) - DEFENSE.

Not necessary. See (36).

(38) - OCEAN

Mongolia is several hundred miles from any ocean.

(113 - 115)

(39) - LAND.

(116) - Strategic Aspect.

Mongolia is one huge pasture land of 1,076,000 square miles with no railroads, few rivers and few cart roads.

Urga is more than 600 miles from Kalgan, the nearest railroad base in China. There is a road across the Gobi Desert between these two towns which has been covered by motor car in $3\frac{1}{4}$ days. Caravans of camels which are the usual means of transport require at least 30 days for the trip, so that any force stationed at Urga is beyond quick support from China.

(117) - Tactical Aspect.

For the most part Mongolia is quite flat, rendering movements of troops easy except for lack of communications.

(118) - Seasonal Aspect.

Mongolia is exceedingly cold in winter. There is some snow and wind. However motor cars make the trip from Urga to Kalgan at practically all seasons of the year. Chinese soldiers marching to Urga are sometimes frozen to death in the winter.

(40) - POLITICO-ECONOMIC

(119) - Strategic Aspect.

The Mongols require little from the outside world. They import cotton cloth, trinkets, etc. and export wool, hides, Mongolian ponies and furs. All munitions used are imported.

Treaties: Russo-Chinese Agreement of Nov. 5, 1913.

Sino-Russo-Mongolian Agreement, Oct. 23, 1913.

Mongol-Tibetan Agreement, Jan. 11, 1913.

Russo-Mongolian Agreement, Nov. 3, 1912.
- See China Year Book (1919-1920)

By the Sino-Russo-Mongolian Agreement of Oct. 23, 1913, Outer Mongolia recognizes the suzerainty of China. China and Russia recognize the autonomy of Outer Mongolia forming part of Chinese territory.

During the fall of 1919 the Mongols surrendered their autonomy, due largely to force, on the part of Hsu Shu Tseng, "Little Shu", in Urga.

(120) - Seasonal Aspect.

Practically no grain or other crops are raised. The cattle, ponies and sheep have some difficulty in finding food through the long cold winters but are inured to the severe cold.

The Mongols also are capable of withstanding the severe cold.

(121) - Time Element.

The time element does not exist in Mongolia.

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
DEC 14 1920

3-1 2009-104

WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT CHANGES IN COMBAT MONOGRAPH - MONGOLIA.

- Monograph Report -

From H.A. Combat.

No. 2686 Date November 5, 1920., 19

Replying to No. Date , 19

REC'D M.I.D.,G.S. DEC 14 1920

Request the following be added to Combat Monograph - Mongolia:

(55) Stamina
(ADD)

Venerial disease especially syphilis is very prevalent among the Mongols. A missionary doctor who has been among the Mongols for many years states that the percentage of those affected is very large and constantly increasing. He states also that he believes about 50% of the women are sterile. He also believes the Mongols as a race are dying out.

Mongols are capable of withstanding severe extremes of cold without apparent discomfort.

(59) Arms
(ADD)

The fire arms for the most part used by the Mongols are extremely antiquated. Flint-locks, and breech loaders of all sorts are still the chief weapons of the Mongol fur hunters, etc. A modern fire arm is rarely to be seen except in the hands of foreigners. Since the surrender of their autonomy by the Mongolians, the Chinese have prevented the importation of arms and ammunition into Mongolia and have taken away from the Mongols a large part of the arms and ammunition formerly in their possession.

Prior to the surrender of their autonomy the Mongols had four pieces of artillery and employed a Russian officer as an artillery instructor. These guns have been taken over by the Chinese.

(101) Frontier Crossings
(ADD)

There is a much traveled caravan route between Urga (Mongolia) and Hailar (Manchuria).

These routes, Kalgan to Urga, Kihkta - Urga and Hailar - Urga are traveled regularly by automobiles carrying passengers. Due to excessive cost of gasoline, bulkiness of cargoes, etc. freight transportation by auto has not yet been attempted.

Binding Margin.

Changes in Combat Monograph - Mongolia.
#2686
(Continued)

(102) Routes of Penetration
(ADD)

Chinese: Kalgan - Urga
Hailar - Urga

Russian: Verkhne Udinsk - Kiakhta - Urga.

Kalgan is on the Peking-Suiyuan Railroad Line.
Hailar " " " Chinese Eastern Railroad.
Verkhne Udinsk is on the Trans-Siberian Railroad.
There is no railroad between Verkhne Udinsk and Kiakhta as is commonly believed.

(103) Critical Points
(ADD)

(Also) For the Chinese-Hailar.)

(116) Strategic aspect
(REPLACE)

Mongolia is one huge pasture land of 1,076,000 Sq. miles with no railroads, few rivers and few cart roads.

Urga is 650 miles from Kalgan (Chihli Province) and about the same distance from Hailar (Manchuria). Roads which are used by autos as well as caravans lead from these latter towns to Urga. Kalgan is on the Peking-Suiyuan standard guage Railroad. Hailar is on the Chinese Eastern Railroad.

The nearest Siberian rail connection is Verkhne Udinsk on the Trans-Siberian Railroad. A caravan route traveled also by autos runs from Verkhne Udinsk to Kiakhta, Maimaichen and Urga.

(Telegraphs)

The Chinese telegraph line runs from Peking to Kalgan, thence to Urga and Maimaichen (Chinese town on Mongolian side of border opposite Kiakhta) and Kiakhta.

At Kiakhta the Northern Telegraph Co. (Danish) connects with the above line and in normal times furnishes service through Verkhne Udinsk to Europe. Between Kalgan and Urga the Chinese Telegraph line manitains stations at:

Bang Kiang	155	miles	by	wire	from	Kalgan.
Ude	147	"	"	"	"	Bang Kiang.
Tuerin	168	"	"	"	"	Ude.
Urga	140	"	"	"	"	Tuerin
Total -	610	miles	by	telegraph	wire.	

There are no other telegraph offices in Mongolia except at Maimaichen between Urga and Kiakhta as mentioned above.

Changes in Combat Monograph - Mongolia.
#2666
(Continued)

(Wireless)

The Chinese National Wireless Company (Chinese Government and Marconi Co.) have just completed a large wireless station at Urga. Two others are to be constructed in Urumitishi and Kashgar (Chinese Turkestan). The Urga station is of the latest Marconi type. It has three built up steel masts 300 feet high. A 50 h.p. gasoline engine furnishes power but owing to the difficulty and expense ($3.00 - $4.00 per gal.) of obtaining this fuel, steam power is to be installed. The wave length is 4,000 - 5,000 meters, 25 K.W., the normal range, two thousand miles at night, 1000 miles by day.

(Roads)

Caravan routes cover all Mongolia and owing to the nature of the country it is not difficult for autos to follow these routes.

There are three main routes between Kalgan and Urga. The shortest route follows closely the telegraph line. The caravans take the route along which the grazing is the best. The usual time for camel caravans between Kalgan and Urga is 30 days, ox caravans 60 days, automobiles 3 - 6 days. The road used by autos follows the telegraph line roughly, the line being practically always within sight.

Along the caravan routes there are wells on an average of every 10 miles. In some of these the water is brachish or a bit salty. For the most part however, the water is good. There are Chinese settlements for about seventy miles north of Urga. The Chinese are cultivating the soil. Beyond that, there is no cultivation. Caravans and autoists carry their food with them. There is some grazing for animals, the amount varying with the season of the year.

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1921 2009-105 JAN 7
CONFIDENTIAL WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT [redacted] ARMY

- Service Report -

From M.A.

No. 2696 [redacted] Date November 24, 1920., 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

REC'D M.I.D., G.S. JAN 6 1921

It is probable that this is as accurate in general and as complete in detail as any report that can be obtained from any source covering the Chinese Army.

Wade System of Romanization is used.

Changes in Combat Monograph in accordance with this report will be made and forwarded to Milstaff as soon as possible.

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Binding Margin.

No improvement on the conditions detailed in the Changsa Report for 1917-1918-1919 has taken place during the past year.

The Central Administration exercises even less control over the troops in the Provinces than it did a year ago, and the Chinese Army may now be said to be split up into several armies, each under a Military Governor or "Inspector-General" over whom the War Office exercises virtually no control.

The disturbances which have taken place during the year under review in Chihli, Szechuan, Hunan, and Kwangtung have accentuated the division of the Army into groups of miscellaneous formations under leaders who are making a bid for political distinction, and there is small prospect of a National Army eventuating with a more or less uniform system of organisation, training and equipment, until a Central Government exists whose authority is recognised in the Provinces.

2. The remarks as to Reserves, Mobilisation, Munition etc. on page 2 of the Changsa Report for 1917-1919 still hold good. Mobilisation during the recent disturbances in North China consisted in the formation of additional so-called "reserve" formations of recruits hastily enlisted, and of the hire of coolies for transport work. There is no direct evidence that "reserve" units are disbanded when normal conditions are resumed, but the hired coolies are allowed to return to their ordinary work.

3. The most significant feature is the steady increase in

the/

the strength of the armed forces in China, in spite of repeated exhibitions and promises of disbandment. The following is a table showing the increase which has taken place since the revolution of 1911-1912:-

Year.	Total strength. (approximate)
1912	500,000
1913	600,000
1914, 1915	No figures available.
1916	700,000
1917, 1918	No figures available.
1919	1,250,000
1920	1,369,000

Thus the armed forces of China have been increased by 169% since the revolution.

6. As a result of the defeat of the Anfu party in July and August, the War Participation Bureau under Tuan Ch'i-jui has been abolished by Hamioto. It was also announced that the following formations were to be disbanded or reduced:-

Frontier Defence Force (Pien-fang Chun)

1st Division.
2nd " (to be reduced to a Mixed Brigade).
3 "

North Western Defence Force (Hsi-pei Chun).

1st Mixed Brigade.
2nd " "
4th " "

[illegible]

7th Division.
15th "

Some/

Some of the more worthless elements of these formations have been disbanded, but a large proportion of personnel has undoubtedly been re-enlisted into other formations, and guns and ammunition have been divided by the two Commanders, Chang Hsu-liu and Su'so Kun. These nominally disbanded formations are therefore still shown in Appendix II so far the time being it is only by this means that an approximately true estimate of the number of guns, machine guns and rifles available can be obtained.

5. The Anti-Japanese boycott and the defeat of the Anfu party have greatly weakened Japanese influence, and under present conditions it is doubtful whether Japan will ever be able to recover the position she held in the military forces of China during the years of the European War.

6. The continual disturbances, involving constant moves, and attempts in some provinces such as Chiangsu, and Honan at reorganization inevitably render an estimate of the strength and distribution of the military forces of China only an approximation, but until the Chinese authorities are willing and able to publish an official Army List, foreign estimates are bound to be only approximate.

7. This report follows the lines of recent Changes Reports, except that Parts 2 and 3 of the Changes Report 1917-1919 have been combined in one Appendix. A column has also been added showing as far as information is available the number of machine guns with formations, as these appear to have been greatly increased in recent years.

The frontier territories of Jehol, Chahar and Sui-yuan have in previous Changes Reports been included, in the case of Jehol and Chahar

under/

under Chihli, and in the case of Sui-yüan under Shensi. As these territories now form separate administrations they are shown in this Changes Report separately under the heading of "Frontier Territories".

A column showing "number of guns" has been substituted for that showing batteries, as the number of guns with a battery frequently varies.

5. Changes are included up to 31st August so far as information is available.

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APPENDIX I.

Summary of Changes in Chinese Armed Forces from September 1919 to August 1920.

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1. ANHUI.

The old Anwan Chun have been reorganised into five Mixed Brigades.

2. CHEKIANG.

The 1st (Chechiang) Division which was moved to Fu-chien Province in 1918 is reported to have returned to Che-chiang during the summer of 1920. The division is, however, still shown under Fu-chien, in Appendix II so there is no definite information of the move having been completed.

3. CHIANGSU.

The temporary Mixed Brigade formed from units of the 19th (Chiang-su) Division which was sent to Chienghai in 1918 returned to Chiang-su in April 1920, and was reabsorbed in the 19th (Chiang-su) Division at Chin-kiang.

The 8th Mixed Brigade raised for service in Hunan by Chang Tsung-ch'ang left Hunan in the Summer of 1920, and is reported to be in Chiang-hai. It is now sometimes called the 1st (temporarily organised) Division.

4. CHEKIANG.

Paper reorganisation involving repeated change in the designation of formations, and the enlistment of additional recruits has taken place during 1920 in Chiang-su Province.

The 2nd and 19th (Chiang-su) Divisions were reduced to Mixed Brigades from the 1st May 1920, but the divisional cadres and designations still remain.

The/

The units of the 19th (Chiang-su) Division despatched to Chiang-hsi in 1919 returned to Chinking in April 1920.

A new regiment was recruited in Nanking in 1920 and despatched to Hsu-chou Fu to replace troops of the 76th Mixed Brigade the last named part of Chang Tsung-ch'ang's forces to leave.

Changes in designation of Chiang-su formations have taken place during the summer as follows:-

Former Designation	New Designation.
1st (Chiang-su) Mixed Brigade	No change.
1st Reserve Brigade	2nd (Chiang-su) Mixed Brigade.
2nd " "	3rd " " "
3rd " "	4th " " "
76th (Chiang-su) Mixed Brigade	5th " " "

It is stated in Consular reports from Nanking that the 1st and 5th (Chiang-su) Mixed Brigades and Pei Pao-chen's troops at Hsi-chou are to be reorganised as the 1st, 3rd and 2nd (Chiang-su) temporary Divisions respectively.

A 6th Mixed Brigade was formed in June from the 6th Brigade of the 4th Division, and was stationed in the Shanghai (Kiang-nan) Arsenal.

The 6th (Lu-chun) Division was sent from Chiang-su to Chahar and Peking in February 1920.

5. CHIHLI.

The struggle between the Chihli and Anfu factions resulting in the defeat of the Anfu party has led to considerable change in the distribution of troops in Chihli Provinces.

In June and July Wu P'ei-fu's force consisting of the 3rd (Lu-chun) Division and the 1st, 2nd and 3rd (Chihli) Mixed Brigades were moved from the Southern front in Hunan up the Peking-Hankow Railway. The 3rd Division and 3rd Chihli Mixed Brigade were brought to South Chihli ready for the attack on the Anfu formations. The 1st and 2nd (Chihli) Mixed Brigades were left in Honan.

The 1st, 2nd and 3rd (Chihli) Reserve Brigades have also been formed by General Wu Pei-fu during the year and are now located in Chihli.

The War Participation Bureau and the formations under it, with the exception of the 3rd and 5th (Hsi-pei Chun) Mixed Brigades, have been officially abolished. Much of the personnel, however, remains and has been absorbed either in Chang Tso-lin's or in Tsao Kun's formations. The same applies to the 15th (Lu-chun) Division, the remnants of which are now in Paotingfu where it is said they will be reformed into a division under a new designation.

The formation of the 5th (Hsi-pei Chun) Mixed Brigade was only commenced in April of this year. It and the 3rd (Hsi-pei Chun) Mixed Brigade will perhaps be retained on the plea of frontier defence. Their designations will however probably be changed.

The following troops were despatched to Chihli by Chang Tso-lin in July and August and were stationed near Peking:-

27th and 28th (Lu-chun) Divisions from Manchuria.

1st (Mukden) Division (returned to Manchuria from Honan in 1919).

1st (Mukden) Reserve Brigade, a portion of Hsu Lan-chou's Command brought from Honan in July 1920.

The 27th and 28th Division have now returned to Manchuria.

The 16th (Lu-chun) Mixed Brigade was brought from Honan in August and September and stationed at Paotingfu. It is stated that it is now to be reorganized as a division.

The 16th (Lu-chun) Division was moved from Chiang-su to Chihli in February 1920.

6. FRONTIER TERRITORIES.

The Frontier Territories of Chahar, Sui-yuan and Jehol have been separate administrations since the Revolution and troops in these territories are now shown in this report separately from Chihli and Shen-hsi.

A Chahar Mixed Brigade was formed in February 1920 from Chahar Hsun Fang Tui.

The 1st (Inshun) Division located in the Sui-yuan district was during the July/August disturbances together with the 1st Sui-yuan Mixed Regiment, organized in three detachments as follows, and sent to Feng-shan and Kan-k'ou:-

1st detachment to Kan-k'ou.

1 squadron cavalry.

1 battery mountain artillery.

6 battalions

1 machine gun company.

2 companies engineers.

2nd detachment to Feng-shan

2 squadrons cavalry

1 section field artillery (2 guns).

1 battalion infantry.

3rd detachment to Kan-k'ou

1st (Sui-yuan) Mixed Regiment.

1 battalion.

The detachments are now said to have returned to their original stations.

7. FUCHIEN.

The 14th Mixed Brigade has been reorganised as the 2nd (Fuchien) Division. The 10 battalions of reserve troops referred to in the Changes Report for 1919 have not yet been absorbed into the new formation.

The 1st (Chenhiang) Division was reported to have moved back to Chu-chiang during the summer, but in the absence of confirmation it is shown under Fu-chien.

The Southern Revolutionary troops under Ch'en Ch'iung-ming have been operating in Kuang-tung during the recent disturbances there.

8. [redacted].

A reorganisation of Ho-nan local troops took place in the spring of 1920 under a mandate dated 1st May 1920.

The 1st (Honan) temporarily organised Division has been formed from the 1st (Honan) Mixed Brigade and Ho-nan Home-fang Tui. The 2nd (Ho-nan) temporarily organised Division from the 2nd (Ho-nan) Mixed Brigade, the Ho-nan Reserve Regiment and Ho-nan Home-fang Tui.

The 1st and 2nd (Chihli) Mixed Brigade were brought by Wu P'ei-fu from Honan in June and July and stationed at and near Chang Chun where they command the junction of the Lung-Hai and Kin-Han Railways and the Yellow River Bridge.

The 1st and 4th (Hsi-pei Chun) Mixed Brigades at Lo-yang are supposed to be disbanded, but the formations remain, and are, it is said, being reformed by Wu P'ei-fu who is now Assistant Inspector-General of Chih-li, Shantung and Ho-nan with his Headquarters at Lo-yang.

9. [redacted] AND OUTER MONGOLIA.

The expeditionary force of the 3rd (Hsi-pei Chun) Mixed Brigade referred to in the Changes Report for 1919 was despatched to Urga and has remained there since. It was only some 750 strong.

The detachments at Kiachta, Kobdo, Uliassutai and Urianklai are given on the authority of the "Shun-tien Shih Pao", a newspaper in Japanese pay, which usually gives accurate information on such matters. It has not yet been possible to confirm the information.

10. [redacted].

A complete reorganisation of the Ho-nan troops is now reported to be taking place. As far as information is available the 1st (Honanese) Division, which took the chief part in T'an Yen-K'ai's attack on the Northern troops in June, has been increased to three brigades located in the Changsha district.

The mixed formations of Ho Chi Tui and Shen Pei Tui which also formed part of T'an Yen-K'ai's force have been reorganised in 12 districts (Ch'u).

The 1st (Shihlien) Division and 1st Mobile Mixed Brigade were withdrawn from Hunan at the end of 1919 or beginning of 1920.

Wu P'ei-Fu's troops, consisting of the 3rd Division, and 1st, 2nd and 3rd Chihli Mixed Brigades were withdrawn to Honan and Chihli in May and June 1920.

The 9th, 11th and 20th Divisions were left in Hunan to withstand T'an Yen-K'ai's attack and withdrew in a more or less indisciplined state into Hupei after T'an Yen-K'ai's first success. The 16th Mixed Brigade which was stationed at Ch'ang-te took no part in the fighting. It was moved to Chihli in August and September.

Ho Chi's Kuang-hsi troops are reported in the native press to have left Hunan for Kwangtung at the end of August.

The Hupei An-wu Chun are reported to have been brought back to Hu-pei, but this is not confirmed.

It is probable that few Kuang-hsi and Yunnan troops now remain in South Hunan, since the operations in Kuang-tung and Szechuan have doubtless led to their being withdrawn to these two provinces respectively.

11. HUNAN.

The struggle in Hunan in June between the Northern troops under Chang Chih-yao and the Kwangsi troops, culminating in the reoccupation of Hunan by the Kwangsi resulted in Hupei becoming a dumping ground for the defeated northern formations.

The Hupei troops maintained their discipline, and under the orders of the Military Governor disarmed such of the Northern troops from Hunan as were not under proper control.

In this way the 11th Division retreated in June in a fair state of discipline to Wu-ch'ang, but was despatched at once by the Military Governor to Yung-cheng in the South of the Province. It was moved from Hupei to Chihli in August. The 30th Division retreated into Hupei from Hunan and was collected in the district of Hsin-t'i where it now is. The 7th Division was in a completely disorganized state, and the men drifted into Hupei in undisciplined bands. They were collected at various centres, and many of the men have since been dismissed, but have doubtless found their way into other formations. The remnants of the division still exists in Hupei.

The formations collected in west Hupei under Wu Kuang-hsin still remain, under various commanders, but Wu Kuang-hsin himself has been dismissed.

12. KANSUH.

No changes of importance in this province are reported. A bodyguard to the Military Governor consisting of infantry, cavalry, and artillery exists, which will probably be organized later as a Mixed Brigade.

13. KWANGSI.

The 1st (Kuang-hsi) Division is still believed to be in South Hunan. Large numbers of Kuang-hsi men are included in the forces in Kuang-tung known as the Kuang-hsi party, i.e. the Canton Government party, under Ho Jung-hsin.

14. [redacted].

The formations shown are according to available information as they existed prior to the disturbances which still continue in Hsing-ting. Numerous temporary organisations appear to have come into existence during the disturbances, but many of these will doubtless be broken up when normal conditions are restored. Locations are not given as the unsettled conditions have led to constant change.

The 3rd (Yunnan) Division is reported to have left Hsing-ting and joined the Yunnan Expeditionary force in Szechuan.

15. [redacted].

Part of the 2nd (Kuei-chou) Division which has been recently organised is said to be in South Hunan.

16. MANCHURIA.

(i) [redacted].

Details regarding Feng-tien troops despatched to Chihli province in July and August are given under Chihli in this Appendix. The 1st Mukden Mixed Brigade and the 1st (Mukden) Division were brought back from Hunan in 1919.

(ii) KIRIN.

The 53rd Infantry Regiment of the 9th Division forming the Chinese Expeditionary Force in Siberia has now moved from Vladivostok to Kirin.

The Kirin Mixed Regiment has been organised from the Military Governor's Bodyguard.

(iii) [redacted].

The Military Governor's Bodyguard at Tsi-tsi-har has been increased, and will probably in the near furture be organized as an Independent Mixed Regiment or Mixed Brigade.

1000 men of the 3rd Tsi-tsi-har Mixed Brigade are said to have gone over to the Red Forces on the Amur.

16. [illegible].

The formation of the two Mixed Brigades from the two Shen-hsi Mixed Regiments has been carried out, as forecasted in the Changes Report for 1917.

The 12th Mixed Brigade is still so-called, but it will probably be renamed the 3rd (Shen-hsi) Mixed Brigade, as this number has been omitted in allotting numbers to the provincial Mixed Brigades.

18. [illegible].

As a result of the Chih-li Anfu struggle the 3rd (Pien-fang Chun) Division was disbanded in August under a Mandate. A new Mixed Brigade to be named the 7th Shen-tung Mixed Brigade is, however, being formed from selected personnel of the disbanded division to replace it, and General Sung Chen-keng, Director of the Te Chou Arsenal has been appointed Brigade Commander. It is said that General Shih Ts'ung-pin, who has held an appointment about the President is to be appointed to replace General Ma Liang as Brigade Commander 47th Brigade.

The 1st Shantung Brigade was disbanded in February 1920, owing to a mutiny. A new Mixed Brigade the 6th (Shantung) Mixed Brigade was however at once formed to replace it, from selected personnel of the disbanded brigade and newly enlisted men.

The 2nd (Shantung) Reserve Brigade was disbanded towards the end of 1920.

19. [illegible].

Four new provincial Mixed Brigades have been formed in Shenhsi, three of them at present consisting of infantry only. The three Shenhsi Mixed Regiments have been expanded to Mixed Brigades, but information is lacking as to the origin of the fourth new Mixed Brigade.

Two of Wan Lee-chun's Hubian formations, viz: his personal troops amounting to about a mixed brigade and the 4th Hubian Reserve Brigade, are still in Shanhai, where they were sent to deal with the Revolutionary forces which had invaded the province from Hupei, Szechuan, Yunnan and Kansu. His remaining formation the 1st Hubian Reserve Brigade was transferred to Chihli in July and August 1920. It is proposed to concentrate all Wan Lee-chun's troops at Hsiao-chan, East of Tientsin.

The Chao-hsun Chun are from Honan Province. The Chun Kuo Chun from Szechuan, Yunnan and Hupei. They moved into the province after the revolution, and are virtually brigands.

They are organised in six independent detachments as follows:-

1st Detachment.

One Brigade of Hupei troops.

2nd Detachment.

One brigade of Hupei troops.

3rd Detachment.

One brigade of Hupei troops.

4th Detachment.

One regiment of Szechuan troops.

5th Detachment.

One division Yunnan troops.

6th Detachment.

Seven battalions of Kansu troops.

The 1st and 2nd Detachments have now joined Wan Lee-chun.

20. SZECHUAN.

South Szechuan has been the theatre of almost continuous conflict between Szechuan and Yunnan during the year under review. The fighting at times has been reported as heavy and casualties numerous. The fons et origo of the struggle is the anxiety of Yunnan to expand into the rich plains of Szechuan and control some of the revenues of that province, that most coveted being the salt revenue.

In consequence information as to distribution of troops more especially on the Yunnan side is scanty, and at times conflicting.

The Yunnan expeditionary force in Szechuan appears to consist of some 40,000 men, and it has recently been increased by two detachments of approximately the strength of mixed brigades, called the 1st and 2nd Tsung-tui (縱隊) Ching-kuo Lien Chun composed for the most part of recruits. They are said to have machine and mountain guns, but details are lacking.

A force of Kwei-chow troops is also stated to be in the S.E. of Szechuan, but no detailed information is available.

The organisation of the Szechuan troops into so-called divisions has taken place during the year, but five of them are weak.

21. YUNNAN.

The operations against Szechuan have been a heavy drain on Yunnan and formations are much below strength. Recruits for formations in Szechuan have been brought from districts as far away as Sze-mao.

APPENDIX II.

Tables showing strength and distribution of troops by provinces. Totals are estimated in round numbers and are approximate.

Non-combatants are not included.

Formation, &c	Name of Commander	Location	Bn.	Sq.	Mtn Bty	Fd. Bty	Guns	Rank & File	Strength Horses	Total Strength Rifles	Sword	Remarks
ANHUI.												
Model detachment	-	An-ching	1	½	-	-	-	-	500	-		
1st(Anhui) Mix.Bde.	Ma Lien-chia	Wu'-hu & Ta-t'ung	8	1	-	-	-	4	3700	-		
2nd " " "	Li Ch'uan-yeh	P'eng-pu	7	-	-	-	-	4	3100	-		
3rd " " "	Wang P'u	Wu-yi, & Chu-chow	7	-	-	-	4	4	3100	-		
4th " " "	Chiu Ch'ang-chin.	Nan-hsu-chou	7	-	-	-	4	4	3100	-		
5th " " "	Shih Chun-yu	An-ch'ing	8	-	-	-	4	4	3500	-		
Mil.Govr's Guard	-	P'eng-p'u	3	-	-	-	-	-	1500			
Gendarmerie	-	Fu-li-ch'i & along Ry.	5	-	-	-	-	-	[illegible]	2500		
An Wu Chun	Yin Kung-hsien	P'eng-p'u & along Ry.	13	-	-	-	-	-	[illegible]	6000	1800	800
CHECHIANG.												
2nd(Chechiang)Div.	Chang Tsai-yang	Hang-chou Ning-po	12	-	-	-	-	-	6000	-		
1st " Mix.Bde.	Ch'en Chiang	Hang-chou	6	-	-	-	-	-	3000	-		
2nd " " "	Chen ping-yun	"	7	1	-	-	-	-	3700	-		
Yu Chi Tui	-	Scattered	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2100		
Ching Pei Tui	-	"	36	-	-	-	-	-	-	10800		
Fortress Troops	-	Chin-hai, Ting-hai &c	33	-	-	-	-	-	-	9600		
Shou-pei T'uan	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	900		
Troops from other Provinces.												Remainder of 2d in Chekiang.
4th(Luchun) Div.	Ch'en Le-shan	Hang Chou	12	1	4	4	48	8	7900	-		
10th " "	Lu yung-hsiang	"	5	-	-	-	-	4	2580	-	[illegible]	[illegible]

Formation, &c.	Name of Commander	Location	Bn.	Sq.	Bn. Tr. Coy	Co.	Guns	Mach Guns	Strength	Rifles
CHIANGSHI.										
1st(Chianghsi)Div.	-	Kiukiang	12	-	-	-	-	-	6100	-
3rd(Luchun)Mix.Bde.	Ch'en Kuang-ku'ei	Kan Chou	6	-	-	-	18	-	3410	-
Shang Fang Tuan	-	Scattered (H.Q.)	12	-	-	-	12	6	-	6500
Ching Pei Tui	Chang Tsung-liang	Nanchang	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	1500
Mil.Govr's Guard	-	Nanch'ang	1	½	-	-	-	-	-	400
Yu Chi Tui	-	Scattered	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	6000
River Police	-	"	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	2000
Troops from other provinces.										
9th(Luchun)Mix.Bde.	Chao Hsueh-s'ao	Kan Chou	6	---	2	1	6	8	3540	-
12th(Luchun) Div.	Ch'en Kuang-yuan	Nan-ch'ang	12	3	4	4	54	8	9000	-
6th(Chiangsu)Mix. Brigade	Chang Tsung-Ching	"	12	1	1	1	4	--	5100	-
									27350	16200
CHIANGSU.										
2nd(Chiangsu) Div.	Chu Hsi	Soochow	12	1	2	2	12	6	7200	-
19th " "	Yang Ch'un p'u	Chin-kiang	12	½	1	1	24	-	7000	-
1st " Mix. Bde.	Ma Yu-jen	Huai-an yu	9	-	-	2	-	4	4860	-
2nd " " "	Huang Chen-k'uai	Yang Chou	6	-	-	-	-	--	2500	
3rd " " "	Li Tien-ch'en	Nanking	6	-	-	-	-	8	2600	-
4th " " "	Wu Heng-tsan	"	9	-	-	-	-	-	3500	
5th " " "	Ch'en Tiao-yuan	Hsu Chou	6	-	2	2	18	4	3720	-
76th Mix. Bde.	Chang Hen-kuei	Tung-chou	7	½	1	1	6	12	4160	-
Mil. Govr's Guard	-	Nanking	5	--	-	-	-	-	600	

Formation, &c.	Name of Command	Location	Bn.	Sq.	Bn. Tr. Co.	Co.	Guns	Each Rifle	Total Strength Rifles	Other	Total Fighting Rifles	Other	Remarks
CHIANGSU(continued)													
Gendarmerie	-	Shanghai	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	120	-		
River Police	-	-	-	41	-	-	-	-	-	-	11000		
Tao Yin's Guard	-	Hsu Chou & Huai-an	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	600		
Ching Pei Tui	-	Chang Chou, Yang Chou	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	2000		
Hsun Chi Tui	Lu Ku-hsiang	Yang Chou	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	9000		
An Yu Chun	Pai Pao-shan	Hai Chou & district	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	4000		
An Yu Chun	Ch'en Te-hsiu	Hsu Chou & district	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	4000		
Salt Gabelle troops	-	Scattered	-	21	-	-	-	-	-	-	10000		
1st(Chiangsu) Fortress Infantry	-	Nanking, Chinkiang	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	1200	-		
Wu-sung Fortress Infantry	-	Kiangyin. Wu-sung	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	1500	-		
Troops from other provinces.													
6th(Luchun) Div.	Ch'i Hsieh-yuan	Nanking & P'u-chen	12		1	4	4	54	24	8820	-		
10th " "	Lu Yung-hsiang	Shanghai & Wu-sung	7		1	4	4	54	12	5090	-		Remainder of division in Chechiang.
Independent Regt. attached 10th Division	-	Wu-sung	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	1500	-		
6th(Luchun) Mix.Bde.	Ho Feng-lin	Shanghai Arsenal	-	6	-	-	-	-	8	3150	-	18520	40600

Formation, &c.	Commander	Location	Rn. Tr. Bn.	Sq.	Co.	Co.	Guns	Rifles	Strength	Remarks.
CHIHLI.										
1st(Tien Yang Chun) Division	-	-	12	3	4	4	48	24	8000	-
(I) 2nd ditto.	-	Peking	1	-	-	-	-	-	700	- (I) Remainder of Division in Shantung.
3rd ditto.	-		12½	3	4	4	48	24	9070	-
2nd(Hsi Pei Chun) Mixed Brigade	-	-	9	3	1	1	18	24	6050	-
3rd ditto.	Chu Ch'i hsien	Hsuan-hua Fu	3	3	1	1	12	6	2600	-
Chihli Military Governor's Body Guard	-	Pao-ting Fu	3	1	-	-	10	20	2260	-
1st(Chihli) Reserve Brigade	Wang Yung-chung	Pao-ting Fu	6	-	-	-	-	4	3080	-
2nd ditto.	Kung An-chih		6	-	-	-	-	8	3150	-
3rd ditto.	Peng Shu-hsien	South of Tientsin	3	-	-	-	-	-	1500	-
(II) 7th(Luchun) Div.	-	Peking	-	1	-	-	-	-	250	- (II) Remainder of Division in Hupeh
(III) 8th " "	Wang Ju-ch'in		6	-	-	-	-	8	3150	- (III) Ditto.
(IV) 9th " "	Lu Chin	Peking	3	3	1	1	46	8	4580	- (IV) Ditto, in Kirin & Fu-chien.
11th " "	Li K'uei-yuan	Ho-chien & Kao-yang	12	3	4	4	54	-	9100	-
12th " "	Ch'en Kuang-yuan	Peking	-	3	-	-	-	-	680	-
13th " "	Wang Huai-ching	Hsi-yuan (Peking); 1 Regt. in Pei-yuan	9	3	4	4	30	12	7040	-

Formation, &c.	Name of Commander	Location	Bn.	Sq.	Mtn. Co.	Fr. Co.	Guns	Machine guns	Total Strength	Total Rifles	Remarks
CHIHLI.(continued)											
15th(Luchun) Div.	-	-	12	3	4	4	34	16	9250	-	
16th " "	Wang T'ing chen	Peking	6	3	1	-	18	12	4400	-	
3rd " "	Wu Pei-fu	Paotingfu	16	3	4	4	36	16	11000	-	
16th " Mix.Bde.	Feng Yu-hsiang	"	9	1	4	4	36	16	6700	-	
3rd(Chihli)" "	HHsiao Yao-nan	Shunte Fu., Chengting-fu	6	1	-	-	18	8	3750	-	
4th " " "	Ts'ao Ying	Ma-ch'ang	6	1	-	-	18	8	3760	-	
5th " " "	Shang Te Ch'uan	Peking (Nanyuen)	2	-	-	-	-	8	1240	-	
1st " Res.Regt.	-	Nan Chia-shu	3	-	-	-	-	-	1000	-	
Gendarmerie	Chen Hsin-ya	Peking	-	2	-	-	-	-	450	-	
President's Guard	Lu Chin-ling	"	1	4	-	-	-	-	700	-	
Various Body Guard	-	"	5	1	4	-	4	10	2530	-	
Pu Chun	Wang Huai-ching	"	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	4000	
Police	-	"	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	20000	
Ching Pei Tui	Wang Ta	" District	6	2	-	-	-	-	-	2000	
Shou Pei Tui	-	Scattered	28	12	-	-	-	-	-	10400	
Yi Chun	Chiang Kuei T'i	Peking	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	300	
Salt Gabelle Troops	Sun Hin-shan	T'ang-ku	2½	1	-	-	-	-	-	1570	
Troops from other Provinces.											Remainder of Div. in Hupei.
20th(Luchun) Div.	Fan Kuo-chang	Ping-hsiang & Yangts'un	-	2	-	2	36	-	1460	-	
Independent Hukden Cavalry	-	?	-	1	-	-	-	-	250	-	
Chen Wu Chun	Lung Chi Kuang	Hsiao-chan	8	-	-	-	-	-		5200	
1st(Hukden) Div.	Chang Ching-hui	Peking(Nan-yuan) and Tung Chou	12	3	4	4	18	24	6820	-	
1st(Hukden) Reserve Brigade	Hsu Lan-chou	Tung Chou & Langfang	6	-	-	-	-	8	3000	-	
										117,740	42,470

Formation, &c.	Name of Commander	Location	Bns	Sq.	Gns	Co.	Mch Guns	Total Strength Rifles	Total Strength Other Arms	Remarks
FRONTIER TERRITORIES.										
(i) JEHOL.										
Jehol mixed Brigade	Shu He-chun	Jehol	6	5	-	-	18	12	4270	-
" Hsun Fang Tui	-	" (H.Q.)	11	8	-	-	12	-	-	5000
Troops from other Provinces.										
Yi chun	Chiang Kuei T'i	" District.	24	5	-	-	21	24	-	9200
									4270	14400
(ii) CHARHAR.										
Charhar Mix. Brigade	T'an Ch'ing-lin	Charhar District	6	1	-	-	18	4	3700	-
Independent Charhar Cavalry Regiment	Yuan T'an-hsüan	Kalgan	-	3	-	-	-	-	680	-
Tu-t'ung's Body-Guard	"	"	½	½	-	-	-	-	200	-
Charhar Hsun-fang-tui.	-	Scattered	-	12	-	-	-	-	-	1440
Ching Pei Tui	-	"	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	240
Railway Police	-	Along Sui-yuan Rly.	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	400
Guard to remount establishment	Kuo Chen-piao	T'aipu Sau	1	---	-	-	-	-	-	120
Troops from other Provinces.										
15th(Luchun) Div.	Wang Huai-ching	Feng-chen	3	-	-	-	-	-	1740-	-
16th " "	Wang Ting-chen	Kalgan	7	5½	3	4	36	12	6100	-
5th(Chihli)Mix.Bd.	-	"	-	1	-	-	-	-	220	-
Chihli Hsunfangtui	-	Scattered	4	6	-	-	12	-	-	3000
5th(Hsi-pei Chun) Mixed Brigade	?	Kalgan	?	?	?	?	?	?	4000	-
									16,640	5,200

Remainder of division in Chihli.

Formation, &c.	Name of Commander	Location	Bns.	Sq.	Bns. Bat.	Pr. Gp.	Guns	Mach guns	Total Strength Inside	Total Strength Outside	Remarks
FRONTIER TERRITORIES (continued)											
(iii) SUI-YUAN.											
1st Sui-yuan Mix. Brigade.	Wang Lin-ch'ing	Kuei-hua-cheng	3	1	-	-	6	4	1950	-	
2nd Sui-yuan Mix. Brigade.	Ni Yun-fa	Saratse	3	1	-	-	18	4	2200	-	
3rd Sui-yuan Mix. Brigade.	Cheng Chin-sheng.	Pao-t'ou	3	1	-	-	18	4	2200	-	
Sui-yuan Cavalry Regiment	Ts'ai Yung-hsun	Kuei-hua	-	3	-	-	-	-	670	-	
Sui-yuan Reserve Regiment	-	"	1	-	-	-	-	--	500	-	
Sui-yuan Mixed Banner Regt.	-	Sui-yuan-cheng.	3	1	-	-	18	-	2200	-	
Sui-yuan Hsun fang-tui.	-	Scattered	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	1000	
Ching Pei Tui	-	Pao-t'ou	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	1000	
Troops from other Provinces.											
1st (Luchun) Div.	Ts'ai Ch'eng-hsun.	Sui-yuan	12	3	4	4	42	16	8000	-	18600 2000
Total Frontier Territories											

Formation, &c.	Name of Commander	Location	Bn.	Sq.	Mtn. Gun Co.	Fr. Gun Co.	Guns	Machine guns	Rifles	Swords	Remarks
FUCHIEN.											
1st(Fuchien) Div.	Yao Chien Ping	Foochow	12	3	4	4	34	16	9200	-	
2nd " "	Tsang Chi Ping	Amoy	6	-	-	-	18	8	3550	-	
1st " Mix.Bde.	Chou Jung-kuei	Foochow	6	-	-	-	-	-	3000	-	
2nd " " "	T'ang Kuo-ma	S.of Province.	6	-	-	-	-	-	3000	-	
11th Mixed Bde.	Wang Ch'i	Foochow	4	-	1	1	15	8	2670	-	
10th " "	Chia Wen hsiang	Amoy	6	-	-	-	-	6	3000	-	
Ching Pei Tui.	Hsu Shao-an	Foochow (H.Q.) Chuanchow &c	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	1800	
Salt Gabelle Troops	Yang Tsu-shen	Foochow(H.Q.)	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	900	
River police	-	Min River	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	500	
Mil.Gover's Guard	-	Foochow	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	800	
Troops from other Provinces.											
Reserve Battalions) 14th Mixed Bde.)	Chan Chih-pin	Foochow	10	-	-	-	-	-	4000	-	
(i)9th(Luchun) Div. (34th Regiment)	-	"	3	-	-	-	4	4	1700	-	(i) Remainder of Division in Chihli and Kirin
24th(Luchun)Mix.Bd.	Wang Yung-Ch'uan.	"	6	-	-	-	6	8	3280	-	
Chen Wu Chun	Lung Chi-kuang.	Amoy	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	1000	
(ii)1st(Chechiang) Div.	Pan Kuo-kang	"	12	1	4	4	34	12	8200	-	(ii) Reported as moving back to Chechiang.
Southern Revolutionary Troops.											
Hsun Fang Tui(Kuang-tung troops)	Ch'en Chiung -ming	South of province	75	-	-	-	34	40	-	41200	
Hsun Fang Tui 'Fu-	-	"	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	1800	
										43 560	48000

Formation, &c.	Name of Commander	Location	No.	No. Sp. Co.	No. Pr. Co.	Guns	Machine guns	Rifles	Swords	Remarks
1st (Honan) Div.	Cheng Shen	Hsin-yang Chen	12	3	4	4	54	16	5250	-
2nd " "	Pao Te-ch'uan	Kai-feng	12	3	4	4	-	16	5000	-
Hsun Fang Tui	-	Scattered	6	2	-	-	-	-	-	2000
Hsun Fang Tui(Police)	Wu Ch'ing-t'ung	Nan-yang	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	4750
Mil. Govr's Guard	Chao Tso	Kai-feng	5	2	-	-	-	-	2100	-
Salt Gabelle Troops	-	-	4	4	-	-	-	-	-	120
Troops from other Provinces.										
8th(Luchun) Mix.Bde.	Chin Yun-o	Cheng chou	7	-	-	-	-	-	3500	-
1st(Hsi-pei Chun) Mixed Brigade	Sung Pang-han	Lo-yang	9	3	1	1	18	28	6200	-
4th. do do.	Chang Ying-hsun	"	9	3	1	1	18	24	6200	-
Yi Chun	Chiang Kuei-t'i	Scattered	4	1	-	-	12	-	[illegible]	1800
3rd(Luchun) Div.	Wu P'ei-fu	Lo-yang	3	-	-	-	-	-	1500	-
1st(Chihli)Mix.Bde.	Wang Ch'eng-pin	Cheng Chou	7	1	1	1	18	8	5250	-
2nd " "	Yen Hsiang-wen	"	6	1	-	-	18	8	3750	-
									44650	9920
HSINCHIANG & OUTER MONGOLIA.										
III Mixed Regiment	Wang Pei-hsiang	Kuldja	6	6	-	-	16	-	4370	-
Altai Luchun	?	Sharasume	-	3	-	-	12	4	1000	-
Tarbagatai Luchun	Wang Fu-tuan	Ta-chen	1	1	-	-	-	-	550	-
Kli-kashgar Mix.Regt.	Ma Fu-hsin	Han-shen	3	-	-	-	-	-	1500	-
Hsun Fang Tui	?	Kashgar								
		Yarkand &c.	17	10½	-	-	-	-	-	6360
Ching Pei Ti	Yang Chin Chung	Urumtchi	8½	16½	-	-	-	-	-	3300
3rd(Hsi Pei Chun) Mixed Brigade	Chu Chi-hsien	Urga	1	½	-	-	6	6	750	-
Kiacta Detachment	Kao Tsai-t'ien	Kiakhta	3	½	1	-	6	-	1200	-
Kobdo "	-	Kobdo	1	½	-	-	4	-	620	-
Uliasutai "	-	Uliasutai	2	½	-	-	12	-	1200	-
Uriankhai "	-	Uriankhai	1	1	1	-	4	-	800	-
									11990	9660

Formation, &c.	Name of Commander	Location	Bn.	Sq.	Bn. Gr. Co.	Bn. Hv. Co.	Guns	Machine guns	Rifles	Pistols	Remarks
HUNAN.											
1st (Hunan) Div.	Chao Heng-t'i	Changsha, Hsiang-yin, Yang-lou-ssu, Ye-chou	18	-	4	4	54	?	12000	-	
Military Governor's Guard	-	Changsha	3	1	-	-	18	4	2180	-	
Reorganised Shou	-	Scattered	47	-	-	-	-	-	-	14,000	
River Police	-	"	16	-	-	-	-	-	-	5,840	
Troops from other Provinces.											
5th Mixed Brigade	Chu Tse-huang	?	6	1	-	-	18	-	3620	-	
1st(Kuanghsi) Div.	Lu Yu-kuang	S. Hunan	12	3	4	4	18	8	8250	-	
An-wu Chun (from Hu-pei)	-	Scattered	10	-	-	-	-	4	-	4,200	
Detachment of Ma Chi.	Ma Chi	S. Hunan	24	-	4	4	36	8	13900	-	
										39,950	22,140

Formation, &c.	Name of Commander	Location	Bn.	Sq.	Bn. Gr. Co.	Sq. Gr. Co.	Guns	Machine guns	Total Strength	Total Rifles	Remarks.
HUPEH.											
1st(Hupei)Division	Han-Yuan-chao	Wu-ch'ang	12	-	-	-	-	8	6000	-	
3rd " Mix. Bde.	Lu Chin-shan	Hsin-t'i	6	-	1	1	18	6	3750	-	
4th " " "	Liu Tso-lung	Pei-an	6	½	-	-	18	6	3750	-	
Milit.Govr's Guard	-	Wu-ch'ang	3	1	-	-	-	-	1750	-	
Hankow Hsun Chi Tui	Hankow "Defence Commissioner"	Hankow	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	900	
Hupei Model Battn.	-	Wu-chang	1	-	-	-	-	-	500	-	
"Instructor's " " (Chiao Lien Ying)	-	"	1	-	-	-	-	-	1200	-	
Mixed Regiment	Hankow "Defence Commissioner"	Hankow	3	½	1	-	6	6	2000	-	
Sheng yang Chun	-	Wu-chang &c	6	1	-	2	-	-	3250	-	
Gendarmerie	-	Wu-ch'ang	-	1	-	-	-	-	500	-	
Troops formerly under Wu Kuang-hsin	-	Ching Chou & scattered	24	-	8	-	18	16	12000	-	
Shou Pei Tui	Hsiang-yang "Def. Commissioner"	Hsiang-yang & scattered	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	2400	
Ching Pei Tui	-	Scattered	1½	-	-	-	-	-	-	400	
Hsun Chi Tui	-	Wu-ch'ang	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	600	
Troops from other Provinces.											
2nd (Luchun) Div.	Wang Chan-yuan	Wu-ch'ang	14	2	4	4	30	12	9700	-	Remainder of Division in Chihli.
8th " "	Wang Ju-ch'in	Ching Chou	9	1	4	4	54	16	7500	-	
18th " "	Wang Mou-sheng	Hankow	12	1	4	4	54	8	9000	-	
7th " "	Wu Hsin-t'ien (acting)	Wu-ch'ang Yang-lo &c	12	3	4	4	36	7	9000	-	
20th " "	Fan Kuo-chang	Hsin-t'i & District	14	2	4	4	18	16	9000	-	
2nd " Mix.Bde.	Liu Yueh-lung	Hankow District	3	½	1	1	18	4	240	-	
15th " " "	Chang Chi-shan	Wu-ch'ang	6	½	-	-	12	8	5500	-	
17th " " "	Chang Lien-sheng	Lao-Ho-kou	6	1	-	-	18	-	3500	-	
18th " " "	Chao Jung-hua	Fang-chen	6	-	-	-	18	-	3400	-	
21st " " "	Sun Ch'uan-fang	Wu-ch'ang	6	1	1	1	18	6	3980	-	
										96050	4300

Formation &c.	Name of Commander	Location	Bn.	Sq.	Mn. Co.	Tr. Co.	Guns	Mach guns			Total Strength	Total Fighting	Remarks
KANSU.													
Kansu Old Style troops (Lu Ying)	-	Scattered	48	14	-	-	-	-	-		17000		
Military Governor's Guard	Kung Fang-chin	Lan-chou	8	1	-	-	18	-	-		2600		
Hsin Shou Pei Tui	-	Scattered	11	2	-	-	18	-	-		4100		
												23700	
KUANGHSI.													
2nd(Kuanghsi) Div.	T'an Hao-ming	Ho-chih	12	3	-	-	-	-	6750	-			
River police	-	Scattered	8	-	-	-	-	-	-		2400		
Jung Tsu Chun	Ch'en Pin-kuan	Kuei-lin (H.Q.)	20	-	-	-	-	-	-		6000		
Yu Chi Tui	-	Scattered	50	-	-	-	6	4	-		15200		
												6750	23600

Formation, &c.	Name of Commander	Location	Bn.	Sq.	Bn. Gc.	Sr. Gc.	Guns	Mach guns	Total Strength	Total Rifles	Remarks.
KUANGTUNG.											
1st(Kuangtung) Div.	Ch'en K'un-p'ei		12	1	4	4	24	12	8400	-	
2nd " Mix.Bde.	Mo Jung-hsin		6	-	4	4	36	8	4900	-	
1st Independent Kuangtung Mix.Bde.	Huan Hsin-t'ai		4	-	-	-	-	-	2500	-	
2nd ditto. ditto.	Wei Pan-pin		6	-	-	-	-	-	3000	-	
Hu-men Fortress Troops		Bocca-tigris	1	-	-	-	-	-	150	-	
Chin Wei Chun		Han-nan	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	2700	
Ch'ao-yang Chin Wei Chun	Ch'ao-yang "Def. Commissioner"	Ch'ao-yang	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	5400	
Pao-shang Wei Tui		Canton	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	600	
Salt Gabelle troops		-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	300	
Chen Yu Chun	Ling Chi-kuang	-	25	-	-	-	-	-	-	7500	
Old Chun Wei Chun		Scattered	41	-	-	-	-	-	-	12300	
New " " "			5	-	-	-	-	-	-	1500	
Old Yu Chi Tui	Mo Jung-hsin	-	63	-	-	-	24	12	-	19400	
New " " "	?	-	23	-	-	-	18	8	-	7400	
Mil. Governor's Guard	-	Canton	4	-	-	-	-	8	-	1500	
Troops from other Provinces.											
4th(Yunnan)Division	Fang Shen-tou	-	6	-	-	-	8	-	5200	-	
- " Mix. Bde.	Yang Yi-chien	-	6	-	-	-	12	8	5460	-	
- " " "	Wu Lin-hui	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	3000	-	
2nd Brigade,Ching Kuo Chun of Yunnan	Lu Chun-hsieh	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	2400	
Yu Chi Tui of Yunnan	Cha pin-huan	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	900	
A Mixed Brigade of Chechiang Troops	Ch'en Chao-ying		6	-	-	-	6	4	5200		
									52040	61600	

Formation, &c.	Name of Commander	Location	Bn.	Sq.	Bn. Co.	Tr. Co..	Guns	Mach guns	Total Strength	Total Transport	Remarks.
KUEICHOU.											
1st temporarily organised Kuei-chou Division	Wang Wen-hua	Kuei-yang	12	3	4	4	12	-	8000	-	Part of the Division in Szechuan.
2nd ditto.	Lu Ho-hsiao	?	9	-	-	-	12	-	4500	-	Part of the Division in S. Hu-nan.
1st (Kuei-chou) Mixed Brigade	Li Yang-pin	Shih-tsien	3	-	1	-	-	-	1640	-	
Ching Pei Tui	Lu Shan-shih	Kuei-yang (H.Q.)	40	-	-	-	-	-	-	10000	
Troops from other Provinces.											
Reserve Brigade Yunnan troops	Lu Yueh-tsu	?	6	-	-	-	-	-	3000	-	
									17140	10000	

Formation, &c.	Name of Commander	Location	Bns.	Sq.	Bns Gn.	Tr. Gn.	Guns	Machine guns	Total Strength	Total Rifles	Remarks.
MANCHURIA.											
(1) FENGTIEN.											
27th(Tsitsihar) Div.	Chang Tso-hsiang	Mukden	12	4	4	4	54	54	9000	-	
28th " "	Chi Chin-shan	" District	12	4	4	4	54	54	9000	-	
29th(1) " "	Wu Chun-sheng	Tao-nan Fu	6	-	-	-	8	4	3000	-	
2nd(Mukden)M.Bde.	[illegible]	"	6	-	-	-	8	4	3000	-	(1) Remainder of division in Heilung chiang.
3rd(Mukden) temp. organised M. Bde.	Chang Hsueh-liang	Mukden	6	1	1	1	-	16	3550	-	
5th ditto. ditto.	Ch'i En-ming	Fengtien-Kirin Border	6	-	-	-	-	-	3020	-	
Arsenal Guard	-	Mukden	/	-	-	-	-	-	550	-	
Fengtien Indep. Cavalry Regt.	Chang Jung	Hsin-min Fu	-	3	-	-	-	-	680	-	
Other Troops.											
Hsun Fang Tui	-	-	5	2	-	-	-	-	-	2850	
Ching Pei Tui	-	-	1	10	-	-	-	-	-	2100	
									[illegible]	4950	
(ii) KIRIN.											
1st(Kirin) Mix. Bde.	Chang Chin-ch'ing	Ch'ang Chun	6	2	-	-	36	6	4550	-	
2nd " " "	Hu Wen-ts'ao	Harbin	6	3	4	-	18	6	4680	-	
3rd " " "	Ch'ang Ming	"	6	3	-	4	-	6	4300	-	
4th " " "	Li Meng-keng	Kirin, Harbin &c.	6	3	-	4	-	6	4500	-	
5th " " "	Li Ch'ing-lu	Manchouli	5	3	-	-	-	6	3280	-	
6th " " "	Kao Feng-ch'eng	Nung-an Hs.	6	3	-	-	-	6	3800	-	
Kirin Independent Mixed Regiment	-	Kirin	6	-	4	4	36	-	4790	-	
Troops from other Provinces.											
(2) 19th(Luchun) Mix. Brigade	Chang Huan-hsiang	Harbin	6	1	4	4	18	12	4820	-	(2) Remainder of division in Chihli and Fushien.
9th(Luchun) Div. (33rd Regt.)	Lu-chin	Kirin	3	-	-	-	-	8	2000	-	
									[illegible]	-	

Formation, &c	Name of Commander	Location	Bn.	Sq.	Bn. Gc.	Sr. Gc.	Guns	Mach. guns	[illegible]	[illegible]	Remarks
MANCHURIA.(continued)											
HEILUNGCHIANG.											
Military Governor's Guard	C.S.O. to Mil. Governor	Tsi-tsi-har	2	1½	4	4	32	10	3720	-	
1st (Tsi-tsi-har) Mixed Brigade	Ying Shun	Hu-lan	6	3	-	-	4	4	3890	-	
2nd (Tsi-tsi-har) Mixed Brigade	Chang Ming-chiu	Tsitsihar	3	3	-	-	-	-	2290	-	
3rd (Tsi-tsi-har) Mixed Brigade	Pa Ying-e	Hei-ho	3	3	-	-	4	4	2480	-	
1st (Tsi-tsi-har) Cavy. Brigade	Yuan Ch'ing-en	Anda	-	6	-	-	-	4	1400	-	
2nd (Tsi-tsi-har) Cavy. Brigade	Chang K'uei-wu	Hailar	-	6	-	-	4	6	1570	-	
Troops from other Provinces.											
29th(Luchun) Div.	Wu Chun-sheng	Manchouli	6	3	4	4	48	18	6850	-	Remainder of Division in Fengtien.
2nd(Mukden) temp. organized Mixed Brigade	Cheng Tien-sheng	T'ai-lai	6	-	1	1	6	6	3500	-	
4th(Mukden) temp. organized Mixed Brigade.	[illegible]	Puliardi	6	-	1	1	6	-	3400	-	
									28,380	-	
									98,170	4950	

Total Manchurian Provinces

Formation, &c.	Name of Commander	Location	Bns	Sq.	Bn. Co.	Tr. Co.	Guns	Machine guns		
SHANSI.										
1st(Shansi)Mix.Bde.	Shang Chen	T'ai-yuan Fu	6	1	-	-	18	-	[illegible]	-
2nd " " "	Ma K'ai-sung		6	-	-	-	-	-	[illegible]	-
4th " " "	Chao T'ai-wen	Ho-tun	6	-	-	-	-	-	[illegible]	-
5th " " "	?	Yu-t'ung yu	5	2	-	-	18	4	[illegible]	-
Mil.Govr's Guard	-	T'ai-yuan Fu	1	1	-	-	-	-	120	-
Ching Pei Tui	Chin Yung	Scattered	22	2	-	-	-	-	-	[illegible]
Salt Gabelle Troops	-	Salt Districts	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	[illegible]
12th(Luchun)Mix.Bd.	Kung Feng-yu	Ta-t'ung Fu	6	2½	4	4	16	8	[illegible]	-
SHANTUNG.										
5th(Luchun) Div.	Cheng Shih-chi	Wei Hsien &c.	12	3	3	3	36	16	8700	-
2nd(Pien-fang Chun) Division	Ma Liang	Chi-nan Fu, & T'eng Hsien	12	2	4	4	48	24	8500	-
1st(Luchun) Mix.Bde.	P'an Hung-chun	Huang Hsien	6	3	-	-	18	-	4080	-
" Shantung " "	Chang K'o-yao	Chinan-fu	6	1	-	-	18	8	3780	-
2nd " " "	Chu P'an-tsao	Chefoo	6	1	-	-	18	4	3700	-
3rd " " "	Chang Pei-yang	Ts'ao Chou Fu	6	1	-	-	18	4	3700	-
4th " " "	Chang Shen-yi	Tung Ch'ang "	6	1	-	-	4	-	3580	-
5th " " "	Li Sung	Yi Hsien	6	1	-	-	6	-	3400	-
6th " " "	Ho Feng-yu	Yen-tai	6	1	-	-	6	-	3400	-
47th Brigade	Ma Liang	Chi-nan Fu	6	-	-	-	4	-	3100	-
1st(Shantung)Res."	Ch'en Pao-lung	" District	6	-	-	-	8	-	3150	-
Mil.Govr's Guard	-	Chi-nan Fu	2	-	-	-	4	-	1070	-
Temp.Orgnd.Res.Regt.	-	Wu-ting Fu	3	-	-	-	-	-	1060	-
Navy Model Battalion	-	Yentai(Chefoo)	1	-	-	-	-	-	500	-
Civ.Govr's Bodyguard	-	Chi-nan Fu	½	-	-	-	-	-	-	160
Ching Pei Tui	-	"	½	-	-	-	-	-	-	200
Tsin Pu Rly.Guard	-	on railway	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	2000
Yu Chi Tui	-	Chefoo	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	600
Salt Gabelle Troops	-	SaltDistricts	5	½	-	-	-	-	-	1200
Troops from other Provinces.										
7th(Luchun)Mix.Bde.	Cheng Shih-ch'i	Yen-chou Fu	8	1	-	-	6	4	4450	-
20th " " "	Wu Ch'ang-chih	Chi-ning Chou	6	1	-	-	6	8	3500	-
5th(Chihli) " "	Shang Te-ch'uan	Te Chou	5	1	-	-	18	-	2320	-
Yi Chun	Chiang Kuei-t'i	Scattered	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	1700
									[illegible]	5860

Formation, &c.	Name of Commander	Location	Bn.	Sq.	Co.	Co.	Guns	guns		
SHENHSI.										
1st(Shenhsi)Mix. Bde.	Liu Shih-lung	Ta-li (N. Shen-hsi)	6	1	-	-	-	-	3850	-
2nd " " "	Chang Chin-ying	Li-ch'uan	6	1	-	-	18	8	3550	-
3rd " " "	Chan Pao-lin	T'ung-kuan	6	-	-	-	-	-	3050	-
4th " " "	Wan Fei-lu	Hsi-an Fu	6	1	-	-	18	-	3800	-
5th " " "	HanChin-shou	P'u-cheng	6	-	-	-	-	-	3050	-
6th " " "	Pai Hung-yi	Li-ch'uan	6	-	-	-	-	-	3050	-
1st " Cavy.Regt	-	Hsi-an Fu	-	5	-	-	-	-		
2nd " " "	-	"	-	5	-	-	-	-		
3rd " " "	-	P'u-cheng	-	5	-	-	-	-	4800	-
4th " " "	-	"	-	5	-	-	-	-		
Shenhsi Cavy. Bde.	-	Yen-an	-	6	-	-	-	-		
1st(Shenhsi) Mix.Rgt.	Chang Hung-yuan	Lin Yu	3	-	-	-	-	-	1500	-
Model Battalion	Chen Chien	Ta-li (N. Shenhsi)	2	-	-	-	-	-	500	-
15th(Luchun)Mix.Bd.	Kuan Chin-chu	Han-chung	6	1	-	-	12	4	3570	-
Mil. Govr's Guard	-	Hsi-an Fu	1	1	-	-	-	-	700	-
Troops from other Provinces.										
4th(Luchun)Mix.Bde.	Chang Hsi-yuan	Wei-nan	6	-	-	-	6	8	3270	-
Hsu Lan-chou's Troops										
Personal Troops (1 Bde.)	-	?	6	2	-	-	-	8	3600	-
4th (Mukden)Res.Bde.	Sung Yi-tsun	?	6	-	-	-	-	8	3250	-
Szuchuan Exp. Force.										
21st Division	Liu Ts'un-hou	Han-chung	12	3	-	-	18	-	6100	-
22nd "	Chung T'i-tao	Ning-kiang	6	3	-	-	-	-	3700	-
Chen Hsun-chun	Liu gui	Hsi-an fu	6	3	-	-	15	-	-	3600
Chen Kuo Chun	-	Scattered	33	12	4	4	54	12	58000	-
									108,360	3,600

Formation, &c.	Name of Commander	Location	Bn.	Sq.	Bn. Co.	Tr. Co.	Guns	Mach guns	Total Rifles	Total Swords	Remarks.
SZECHUAN.											
1st(Szechuan) Div.	Tan Mou-hsin	Ch'eng-tu	9	1	4	4	54	4	7000	-	
2nd " "	Liu Hsiang	Ko-chou & district	12	1	4	4	18	8	7000	-	
3rd " "	Hsiang Ch'uan-yi	Jen-shou & district	6	-	-	-	-	-	3000	-	
4th " "	Liu yu-chiu	Ning-yuan	12	-	4	2	18	8	7200	-	
5th " "	Lu Ch'ao	Mien-chou	12	-	4	2	-	8	6000	-	
6th " "	Shih Ch'ing-yang	Shun-ning	6	-	1	1	18	8	4760	-	
7th " "	Yen Te-chi	Sui-ting	6	-	1	1	18	4	3970	-	
8th " "	Ch'en Fu-wu	Chia-ting	6	-	-	-	-	-	3000	-	
Frontier Force	Ch'en Hsia-ling	Ya chou(H.Q.)	6	-	-	-	-	-	3000	-	
1st Independent Szechuan Mix.Bde.	Tang Hsi-hou	Ch'eng-tu	6	-	-	-	-	-	3000	-	
Model Battalion	-	"	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	500	
Salt Gabelle Troops	-	Scattered	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	1080	
Troops from other Provinces.											
1st(Yunnan) Div.	Ku Pin-chen	Tse-chou	12	4	4	4	54	25	9500	-	
(i) 3rd " "	Chao Yu-hsin	Lu-chow	12	-	4	4	18	8	7580	-	
1st " Mix. Bde.	Ma Chun	Yung-ch'uan	6	-	-	-	-	-	3000	-	
2nd " " "	Kan Chi-hsi	Jung-ch'ang	6	-	-	-	-	-	3000	-	
3rd " " "	Chu Te	Lu Chou	6	-	-	--	-	-	3000	-	
4th " " "	?	?	6	-	-	-	-	-	3000	-	
Independent Yunnan Mixed Brigade	Hu Che-yu	Sui Fu	6	-	-	-	2	-	5100	-	
Independent Yunnan Mixed Regiment	Hua Meng-ko	Hsei-li Chou	3	-	-	-	2	-	1500	-	
Reserve Yunnan Troops	Ho Kuo Chun	Na-chi	3	-	-	-	-	-	1000	-	
Ching Kuo Lien Chun (Yunnan)											
1st Detachment	Teng T'ai-chung	S. Szechuan	?	-	-	-	?	?	3000	-	
2nd "	Yang Chen	" "	?	-	-	-	?	?	3000	-	
									90070	1580	

(i) Part of Division is in Ho-nan.

Formation, &c.	Name of Commander	Location	Bn.	Sq.	Bt.	Co.	Guns					
YUNNAN.												
2nd(Yunnan) Div.	Liu Tzu-wu	Yunnan Fu	12	-	4	2	10	16	7440	-		
5th " Mix.Bde.	Li Yu-hsun	Ta-li Fu	6	-	1	-	6	-	3330	-		
6th " " "	Hiu Chia-shou	Kwang-nan	6	-	1	-	2	2	3000	-		
7th " " "	Huan Yung-she	Yunnan Fu	6	-	1	-	6	4	3330	-		
8th " " "	Yang Fa-yuan	Suan-wei	6	-	1	-	6	4	3330	-		
9th " " "	Tai Wei-shan	Chu-yuan	6	-	1	-	6	4	3330	-		
Chin Wei Chun	T'ang Ch'i-yao	Yun-nan Fu (H.Q.)	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	6400	23990	6400

APPENDIX III.

Summary of Chinese Armed Forces by Provinces.

Province	Bns.	Sq.	Regt. Gun.	Fr. Gun.	Guns	Machine guns	Strength Ku-chun	Strength Other	Total Strength
An-hui	69	1½	--	-	21	20	18,500	8,500	27,000
Chen-chiang	121	2	4	4	48	12	23,180	23,400	46,580
Chiang-hsi	96	4½	6	6	94	22	27,350	16,200	43,550
Chiang-su	280	4½	14	16	168	78	57,520	40,600	98,120
Chih-li	204½	61½	36	37	504	364	117,740	41,470	159,210
Frontier Territories	97½	55	7	8	219	80	39,510	21,600	61,110
Fu-chien	168	4	9	9	163	102	41,560	48,000	89,560
Ho-nan	87½	21	11	11	138	96	46,630	9,920	56,550
Hsin-chiang Hsi-chiang and Outer Mongolia	43½	38½	2	-	60	10	11,990	9,660	21,650
Hu-nan	63	5	12	12	144	20	39,950	22,140	62,090
Hu-pei	160½	15½	32	25	336	112	96,030	4,300	100,330
Kan-su	63	17	-	-	38	-	-	23,700	23,700
Kuang-hsi	99	3	-	-	6	4	6,750	23,600	30,350
Kuang-tung	251	1	8	8	158	55	32,040	61,600	93,640
Kuei-chou	64	3	5	4	24	6	17,640	10,000	27,140
Manchuria	157	67½	31	35	312	182	91,170	4,950	103,126
Shan-hsi	52	7½	4	4	52	12	18,230	6,250	24,530
Shan-tung	117½	18	7	7	218	68	61,590	5,860	67,450
Shen-hsi	122	46	4	4	129	48	108,560	3,600	112,160
Szu-chuan	141	5½	27	22	202	73	90,070	1,580	91,650
Yun-nan	62	-	9	2	44	30	23,990	6,400	30,390
Total	2,459½	381	228	214	3,076	1,394	976,550	393,330	1,369,880

APPENDIX IV.

Reference to Division and Brigade Formations.

(References to Provincial Headings in Appendices I & II.)

A. National Divisions (in order).

1st Division .....Frontier Territories (Sui-yuan).
2nd " .....Hu-pei
3rd " .....Chih-li, Hu-nan, Ho-nan.
4th " .....Che-chiang.
5th " .....Shan-tung.
6th " .....Chiang-su.
7th " .....Chih-li, Hu-pei, Hu-nan.
8th " .....Chih-li, Hu-pei.
9th " .....Chih-li, Fu-chien, Kirin.
10th " .....Chiang-su.
11th " .....Chih-li, Hu-nan.
12th " .....Chiang-hai, Chih-li.
13th " .....Chih-li, Frontier Territories (Chaher).
(14th " .....Number not allotted.)
15th " .....Chih-li.
16th " .....Chih-li, Frontier Territories (Chaher)
(17th " .....Number not allotted.)
18th " .....Hu-pei.
19th " .....Chiang-su.
20th " .....Chih-li, Hu-pei, Hu-nan.
21st " .....Shan-hsi.
22nd " .....Shan-hsi.
23rd " .....Feng-tien.
24th " .....Feng-tien.
25th " .....Hei-lung-chiang.
1st (Pien-fang Chun) Division Chih-li.
2nd " " Shan-tung. Chih-li.
3rd " " Chih-li

B. Provincial Divisions.

1st. (Che-chiang) Division....Fu-chien, Che-chiang.
2nd " " ....Che-chiang.
1st (Chiang-hai) " ....Chiang-hai.
1st (Chiang-su) " ....Chiang-su.
2nd " " ....Chiang-su.
1st (Ho-nan) " ....Ho-nan.
2nd " " ....Ho-nan.
1st (Hu-nan) " ....Hu-nan.
1st (Hu-pei) " ....Hu-pei.
1st (Kuang-hsi) " ....Hu-nan.
2nd " " ....Kuang-hsi.
1st (Kuang-tung) " ....Kuang-tung.
1st (Kuei-chou) " ....Kuei-chou.
2nd " " ....Kuei-chou.
1st (Kuhsien) " ....Chih-li.
1st (Fu-chien) " ....Fu-chien.
2nd " " ....Fu-chien.
1st (Szuchuan) " ....Szu-chuan.
2nd " " .... "
3rd " " .... "

[illegible] (Hsuchow Division) ..... Shantung,
[illegible] " " ..... "
[illegible] " " ..... "
[illegible] " " ..... "
[illegible] (Tsinan) " ..... Tsinan
[illegible] " " .....
[illegible] " " ..... Kwantung,
[illegible] " " ..... Kwangsi.

5. [illegible] Mixed Brigade.

1st Mixed Brigade ..... Shan-tung,
2nd " " ..... Honan,
3rd " " ..... Chiang-hsi,
4th " " ..... Shan-hsi,
5th " " ..... Honan,
6th " " ..... Chiangsu,
7th " " ..... Shan-tung,
8th " " ..... Honan,
9th " " ..... Chiang-si,
10th " " ..... Fu-chien,
11th " " ..... Fu-chien,
12th " " ..... Shan-hsi,
13th " " ..... Honan,
14th " " ..... Fu-chien,
15th " " ..... Shan-hsi,
16th " " ..... Chih-li, Ho-nan,
17th " " ..... Hu-pei,
18th " " ..... Hu-pei,
19th " " ..... Kirin,
20th " " ..... Shan-tung,
21st " " ..... Fu-chien,
47th " " ..... Shan-tung,
74th " " ..... Chiang-su,
76th " " ..... Chiang-su,
1st (Hai-pei Chun) Mixed Brigade Ho-nan,
2nd " " " Chihli,
3rd " " " Chih-li, Mongolia,
4th " " " Honan,
5th " " " Frontier Territories (Chahar).

6. Provincial Mixed Brigades.

1st (An-hui) Mixed Brigade ..... An-hui,
2nd " " " ..... An-hui,
3rd " " " ..... An-hui,
4th " " " ..... An-hui,
5th " " " ..... An-hui,
Chahar Mixed Brigade ..... Frontier Territories (Chahar).
1st (Che-chiang) Mixed Brigade ..... Che-chiang,
2nd " " " " "
1st (Chiang-su) Mixed Brigade ..... Chiang-su,
2nd " " " ..... "
3rd " " " ..... "
4th " " " ..... "
5th " " " ..... "
6th " " " ..... Chiang-su, Chiang-su,
1st (Chihli) Mixed Brigade ..... Ho-nan,
2nd " " " ..... "
3rd " " " ..... Chih-li,
4th " " " ..... "
5th " " " ..... "
1st (Fu-chien) " " ..... Fuchien,
2nd " " " ..... "
3rd (Hu-pei) Mixed Brigade ..... Hu-pei,

(illegible) Mixed Brigade.....Hupeh,
(illegible) Mixed Brigade.....Frontier Territories (Jehol),
(illegible) Mixed Brigade.....Kiangsi,
Kiangsi,
(illegible) Mixed Brigade.....Anhui-chow,
(illegible) Mixed Brigade.....Kirin,
Kirin,
(illegible) Mixed Brigade.....Fengtien,
Hsi-lingchiang,
Fengtien,
Hsilingchiang,
Fengtien,
(illegible) Mixed Brigade.....Shensi,
(Shantung) Mixed Brigade.....Shantung,
(Shensi) Mixed Brigade.....Shensi,
1st (Sui-yuan) Mixed Brigade.....Frontier Territories (Sui-yuan),
2nd .....Frontier Territories
1st (Sou-chuan) .....Sou-Chuan,
1st (Tsi-tsi-har) Mixed Brigade.....Hei-lung-chiang,
2nd
1st (Tun-nan) Mixed Brigade.....Sou-chuan,
2nd
3rd
4th
5th .....Tun-nan,
6th
7th
8th
9th
Indep.
Indep. .....Sou-chuan,
Kuang-tung,
Kuang-tung,

E. Reserve Brigades.

1st (Chih-li) Reserve Brigade.....Chih-li,
2nd
3rd
1st (Mukden) Reserve Brigade.....Chih-li,
4th .....Shen-hei,
1st (Shan-tung) .....Shan-tung,

F. Cavalry Brigade.

1st (Tsi-tsi-har) Cavalry Brigade....Hei-lung-chiang,
2nd
Shen-hsi Cavalry Brigade.....Shen-hei,

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
MAR 14 1921
2009-10

3-3

1st Indorsement.

WAR DEPARTMENT

Office of the Military Attache, Peking, China, February 2, 1921.—
To The Director of Military Intelligence Division.

Returned to M.I.D. with one copy of combined revised Combat Monograph attached to letters of October 27 and December 15, 1920.

5 Incs.

W. S. Drysdale,
Major, U.S. Infantry,
Military Attache.

RECD M.I.D., U.S. MAR 10 1921

REPLACE

Encl

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

1-1 1921 9009-108 MAR 14

WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA

(14) Composition

COMBAT

(41) Personnel

PERSONALITIES

Minister of War, General Chin Yun-p'eng.

Chief of Staff, Chang Huai-chih.

For list of other War Dept. Officials, see report M.A.China, #2189.

(Source: M.A.China, #2189--9/15/19)
(HA 2640, 9/9/20. R.S. 2009-99)

The Military Forces of China.

It is absolutely impossible to obtain complete information upon the strength of the Military Forces of China, due to the entire absence of control by the Central Government over the Provincial Military Governors (Tuchuns) and other independent Military Commanders.

The following is believed to be a fair estimate of the present size of the military force:

No. of officers	-	55,000
" " E.M.	-	1,000,000

Strength of Artillery:

No. of officers	-	6,500
" " E.M.	-	100,000

Strength of Air Forces:

No. of officers (Pilots)	-	150 (Maximum estimate)
" " E.M.		400
" " Observers		150 (" ")

Strength of Cavalry:

No. of officers	-	6,500
" " E.M.	-	100,000

Engineers:

No. of officers	-	2,000
" " E.M.	-	25,000

Infantry Personnel:

No. of officers	-	45,000
" " E.M.	-	700,000

Strength of Machine Gun Personnel:

No. of officers	-	2,000
" " E.M.	-	30,000

Strength of Signal Personnel, officers and enlisted men:

The duties of the Signal Corps in the Chinese Army are performed by the Engineers, one company of each battalion being a telegraph company. It is probable that about 400 officers and 7000 enlisted men have had some training in the duties of the Signal Corps.

Strength of miscellaneous services: - Transport, Sanitary, Medical, etc.

No. of officers	-	3,000
" " E.M.	-	45,000

(HA 2640, 9/9/20 R.S. 2009-99)

REPLACE

CHINA

(14) Composition

(41) Personnel (cont'd)

COMBAT

Foreigners in Chinese Service.

The Chinese Aeronautical Department have on duty with them for the Period of two years, Lieut. Col. F.V.Holt, C.M.G., D.S.O., British Air Service. Col. Holt is loaned to the Chinese Aeronautical Department to act as an Aviation Advisor. During the period for which Col. Holt is loaned to the Chinese Government, he receives all pay and allowances from them. At the expiration of the two years agreement he returns to his proper rank and station in the British Air Service. Col. Holt assumed his duties in China about April 1, 1920.

The Chinese Ministry of War have one British officer, Lt. F.E. Robinson, Navy, on duty as an advisor and instructor in wireless telegraphy and telephony. His contract is for two years in China, beginning about Oct. 1, 1919. It is not yet known whether his contract will be renewed.

A force of about 1000 Chinese (Police to "Keep Peace and Quiet") organised into three battalions of Infantry, do duty in Peking under the command of General Hunthe (Norwegian) who has two Danish Assistants.

With the destruction of the power of the Anfu Club, Marshal Tuan Chi-jui and the frontier Defense Bureau, resulting in the demobilizing of the Frontier Defense Troops as such, the Japanese officers and enlisted men originally employed as instructors by the Frontier Defense Troops, no longer perform those duties.

Japanese

See Reports 2376 and 2377, Jan. 31st and Feb. 10th, 1920.

The foreigner having the most influence over the Chinese Ministry of War is Brig. Gen. Banzai or Pan Hsi ( ) a Japanese officer who has been connected in some way with the Chinese Army since the days of Yuan Shi Kai. He is the only Japanese officer who has become well known among the Chinese. He is said to preside at many of the Councils of the General Staff, to the great annoyance of the majority of the Chinese officers who attend such conferences. General Banzai has been called Director of Military Intelligence of the Frontier Defense troops under Marshal Tuan Chi-jui. He has apparently had much to do with the training of the Frontier Defense Troops. With the downfall of the Anfu party and Tuan Chi-jui and the disbandment of the Frontier Defense troops, General Banzai's influence has been greatly diminished. His long service in China will undoubtedly cause him to be retained in some capacity by the Ministry of War. General Banzai has a very attractive personality, speaks Chinese, English, German and some Russian.

Aoki The President of China employs a Japanese Military Advisor, General Aoki ( ). He apparently does not take an important part in military affairs and is not known to many Chinese or foreigners except by name.

There are on duty at a Military School in Peking, maintained by the General Staff (See Report 2376, Jan.30, 1920) the following foreign instructors (all Japanese):

REPLACE

CHINA

(14) Composition

COMBAT ✓ (41) Personnel (cont

Japanese(cont'd)

Yanagawa	Liu Ch'uan Ping Chu	( )	Col. of Cavalry
Yshijitsu	Ke Shih Fu	( )	Capt. of Infantry
Nakajima	Chung Tao Wan Yi	( )	Capt. of Engineer
Takahashi	Shang Ch'iao Cheng Hsung	( )	Capt. of Artillery
Yamaguchi	Shan K'ou	( )	Teach of Japanese language and of Horsemanship.

(HA 2640 9/9/20. R.S. 2009-99)

SECRET

Subject (16) Competition

(61) Personnel (Cont'd)

The Japanese employed by the Chinese Government have been frequent visitors at the offices of the Minister of War, General Staff, and to General Headquarters, and some these participate in the councils of the highest military authorities. Some of them were directly employed by the Ministry or by the General Staff, with the exception of the teachers in the military school which is under the direction of the General Staff. All of the Japanese who were formally employed and paid by the Chinese Government were attached to the office of the Northeastern Frontier Defense Army, and were given their appointment under the terms of what is commonly described as the nine-Japanese military pact. None of these is given the title of adviser but each is listed under a Chinese title which is the equivalent of director. It is possible that there are many other advisers privately employed by high officials whose names would be known only to their employers.

TOTAL JAPANESE OFFICERS AND NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.

	Director Brig.Gen.	Col.	Major	Capt.	Lt.Insp.	Total Com.	N.C.O.	Aggregate
Director	1					1		1
Inspector					1	1		1
Surgeon				1		1		1
Engineers			1	1		2	3	5
Artillery			1	1		2	4	6
Infantry		1	2		1	4	7	11
TOTAL	1	1	4	3	1	11	14	25

(Source: M/A, China, #2377, 2/10/20).

Chief among Japanese officers engaged in training Chinese were Major Gen. Banzai and Col.Matsui.

In the revolt of July, 1920, Banzai is reported to have favored Wu Pei-fu and Matsui, Gen. Tuan. Japanese trained troops were defeated and generally disbanded.

(Source: M.A. #2609 - R.S. 2009-95, Oct.9,1920)

REPLACE

CHINA

(14) Composition

COMBAT (42) 1st Line

The present army is the result of an Imperial Edict issued in October 1907, for the forming of 36 Divisions. The personnel was to be volunteer with provisions for a limited conscription if it became necessary, and physical and moral qualifications were such as to have produced a splendid personnel. Service was to be for three years with the colors, three in the 1st Reserve and four in the 2nd Reserve.

The Revolution, and continued internal dissension and graft have caused the failure of this plan. Thirty-four Divisions have been organized but many of them as at present organized are composed largely of bandits under inefficient and illiterate leaders. Estimates of strength are difficult as the Tuchuns or Provincial Military Governors have been known to collect pay for 10,000 men when their commands actually consisted of less than 1,000.

(a) Regular Army (Luchun)

If in speaking of the Regular Army, one means only those troops subject to the orders of the Central Government, there is practically no Regular Army in China. Those troops at the present time which would obey the orders of the President, the Minister of War, or the Chief of Staff are only those troops which look to those individuals personally regardless of their position in the Government, for food and pay. The number of troops in the Regular Army under those conditions is at the present practically negligible. The number of troops actually under arms today is variously estimated from 800,000 to 1,400,000. It is believed that 1,000,000 is a fair estimate. Of these probably 350,000 are Luchun or National Army. The remaining 650,000 are Provincial Troops (Hsun Fang-Tui).

(b) Militia

There is no Militia provided for in China.

(c) Classes subject to call to colors.

None.

(HA 2640 9/9/20 R.S.2009-99)

REPLACE

CHINA

(14) Composition

COMBAT ✓ (43) Reserves

(a) Trained Reserves.

There are thousands of former soldiers scattered throughout China, but owing to the inefficiency of the Chinese Army, these men can hardly be called Trained Reserves.

(b) Untrained Reserves.

China with a population of approximately 400,000,000 people has an almost unlimited number of untrained males who could be drafted into Military Service if necessary. It is estimated that there are about 15,000,000 men untrained but physically able to bear arms in China.

There are no plans for calling either trained or untrained Reserves into active service.

(Source: MA 2640. 9/9/20 R.S. 2009-99)

REPLACE

CHINA

(15) Organization

COMBAT (44) Peace

The theoretical organization of the Army Administration is given below, but in actual practice the General Staff and War Office are largely engaged in unimportant paper work. The men look only to their Tuchun or Provincial Governor for orders and the Tuchun's attitude toward the Minister of War depends entirely on his political aspirations and entanglements.

By official decree, promulgated on August 31, 1912, the supreme control of the Army is vested in the General Staff (Tsan Mou Peng Pu) and in the Ministry of War (Luchumpu). The President is Commander-in-Chief, and is assisted in this portion of his duties by a Generalissimo's Bureau attached to his office. In February 1916, it was announced that a special Military Council had been established at the Palace. The Departments of this Council were as follows:

1. General Staff
2. Yunnan Expedition
3. Kueichow Expedition
4. River Defenses
5. Military Supplies
6. Mongolian Expedition

The practical administration of military detail, however, is largely in the hands of the Minister of War, whose office operated under the following departments:

1. Military Administration
2. Military Affairs
3. Ordnance
4. Military Education
5. Commissariat
6. Medical
7. Military Law
8. Remount

The functions, briefly, of the above departments is as follows:

1. The Military Administrative Department is in charge of: Officer and civilian personnel, investigation, service records, pensions (similar to U.S. Adjutant General).

2. The Department of Military Affairs is in charge of: Organization, distribution, war plans, N.C.O. personnel, military communication, fortifications. (Similar to War Plans Div. P.S.& T., and Chief of Coast Artillery in U.S.Army.)

3. The Ordnance Department (Similar to U.S.A. Ordnance Dept.)

4. Military Education Department in charge of military schools, etc.

5. The Commissariat Department, (Similar to Q.M.C., U.S.Army)

6. The Medical Department, (Similar to U.S.Army Med. Corps)

7. The Military Law Department (Similar to U.S.Army Judge Advocate General's Dept.)

8. The Army Remount Department (Similar to U.S.Army Remount Service).

(Source: HA 2640 9/9/20 R.S.2009-99)

CHINA

(15) Organization

COMBAT ✓ (44) Peace (cont'd)

Army Corps do not exist at present although the pay table proscribes the pay of a Corps Commander.

A division under a Lt. General should consist of:

Divisional Staff
2 Brigades of Inf. of 2 regiments each
1 Regt. Cavalry
1 " Artillery
1 Battalion Machine Guns
1 " Engineers
1 " Army Service Corps
1 Band
1 Sanitary Detachment

Peace footing - 12,368 to 12,512 officers and men.
War footing - 20,900 officers and men.

A Mixed Brigade generally consists of:

1 Brigade of Infantry
1 Battalion Artillery
1 Squadron Cavalry
1 Company Machine Guns
1 Company Engineers
1 " Army Service Corps

Total, about 5000 men.

Infantry

A Brigade consists of 2 Regiments
Regiment " " 3 Battalions
Battalion " " 4 Companies
Company " " 3 Sections or platoons
Section " " 3 squads
A Regiment should contain 60 officers and 1512 men (combatants.
" Company " " 5 " " 142 " besides 12 non-
" Squad " " 14 " .

Cavalry

A Regiment contains 3 squadrons
Squadron " 4 troops
Troop " 2 sections or platoons
Platoon " 2 squads
A Regiment consists of 48officers, 816 men, also 192 non-combatants with 720 horses.
A Troop consists of 4 officers, 68 men, 16 non-combatants and 65 horses.
Horses are scarce in the Chinese Army. Not all the Cavalry is mounted.

Artillery

A Regiment contains 2 battalions
Battalion " 3 batteries
Each battery consists of 4 officers, 137 men, 38 non-combatants, 17 riding and 76 draft horses, 90 pack horses, 6 guns, 3 ammunition wagons and 120 ammunition boxes. This organization does not hold in the case of many divisions and Mixed Brigades. Guns, ammunition and horses are scarce in the Chinese Army.

(Source: HA 2640 9/9/20. R.S.2009-99)

CHINA

(15) Organization

COMBAT

(44) Peace (cont'd)

Engineers

A battalion consists of a Major, Staff and 4 companies as follows:
1 Bridging Company
1 Telegraph "
1 Entrenching "
1 Mining "
Each company is divided into 3 sections. Each company consists of 4 combatant and 2 non-combatant officers, 140 men and 2 non-combatants.

Transport

A battalion consists of a Major, Staff and 4 companies. Each company is divided into 3 sections. A company consists of 4 combatant and 2 non-combatant officers, 140 men, 26 riding horses, 54 mules and 16 wagons.

Intendence Department)
Army Medical Department) Small detachments of each are attached to
Veterinary Department) each division.

One Doctor and two Assistants (enlisted men) are allowed for each battalion.

Machine Guns

A battalion consists of 4 companies.
A company contains 4 guns.

Aviation

There is no aviationunder the Ministry of War. All aeroplanes of the Chinese Government are under the Aeronautical Department (A sub-Ministry separate from any other) ~~or under the Ministry of Communications~~. There is no Air Service table of organizations at present N.O.P.

Coast Artillery

Chinese coast defenses are all obsolete. This applies to both defenses and material.

Chemical Warfare Service.

None.

Signal

One telegraph company in each Engineer Battalion.

Tanks

None.

(Source: HA 2640 9/9/20 R.S. 2009-99)

REPLACE

CHINA

(15) Organization

COMBAT ✓ (44) Peace (cont'd)

Metropolitan Guard

The Metropolitan Guards (Gendarmerie) have the same organization as other divisions with the addition of a communications battalion.

Administration and Staff

Chinese organizations are deficient in numbers and training of staff officers. Very little attention is paid to this.

(Source: HA 2640 9/9/20 R.S. 2009-99)

ADD

CHINA

(15) Organization

COMBAT

(44) Pacification

Combatant Officers of Chinese Army are divided into three classes, each class being subdivided into three grades.

LIST OF CHINESE MILITARY RANKS

Combatant Officers (General Officers, and Officers of the Gendarmerie, Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, Engineers, and Transport).

Class 1.	(Shang Teng)	General Officers	(Chiang Kuan)
	1st Grade	. General	. (Shang Chiang)
	2nd "	. Lieut.-General	. (Chung Chiang)
	3rd "	. Major-General	. (Shao Chiang)
Class 2.	(Chung Teng)	. Field Officers	. (Hsiao Kuan)
	1st Grade	. Colonel	. (Shang Hsiao)
	2nd "	. Lieut. Colonel	. (Chung Hsiao)
	3rd "	. Major .	. (Shao Hsiao)
Class 3.	(Ch'u Teng)	. Company Officers	. (Yu Kuan)
	1st Grade	. Captain	. (Shang Yu)
	2nd "	. Lieutenant	. (Chung Yu)
	3rd "	. 2nd Lieutenant	. (Shao Yu)

The class in which an officer or enlisted man belongs is distinguished on his uniform by the ground work of his shoulder straps as follows:

Officers:	(1st Class	- Ground work all gold.	
	(2nd "	- " "	gold with a silver stripe.
	(3rd "	- " "	Silver with gold stripe.
	N.C.O.	- " "	Red cloth with narrow gold stripe.
	Privates	- " "	Red cloth.

The grades of officers and N.C.O.'s and privates is indicated by the number of stars on each shoulder strap.

1st Grade	-	3 stars
2nd "	-	2 stars
3rd "	-	1 star

(Source: HA 2640 9/9/20 R.S.2009-99)

REPLACE

CHINA

(15) Organization

COMBAT ✓(45) War.

No change from Peace for War, except increase of members. As there are no reserve supplies to speak of on hand and practically all war materials must come from abroad, there can be no increase in military strength.

Theoretical War strength of a division is 20,900 officers and men.

(Source: HA 2640 9/9/20 R.S.2009-99)

ADD

CHINA

(15) Organisation

COMBAT (46) Mobilisation

Under the original plan the personnel of the Army was to volunteer with a provision for a limited conscription if it became necessary and physical and moral qualifications were such as to have produced a splendid personnel. Service was to be for 3 years with the colors, 3 in the first reserve and 4 in the second reserve. This plan has never been tested.

There are no plans for mobilization in time of war to organize new forces or to increase the strength of the old organization. It would become necessary to formulate plans and go out and get the men by force or otherwise.

It is easy to mobilize men in China due to the great population, long hours of work and poor pay. A very large part of the soldiers in China come from Shantung, Chihli, and Honan Provinces, that are over-crowded.

(Source: HA 2640. 9/9/20 R.S.2009-99)

ADD

CHINA

(16) Distribution

COMBAT

V (47) Strategic

The distribution of troops in China depends upon the disposition desired by the Provincial Tuchuns or other troop commanders. There is absolutely no distribution to resist or initiate invasion. The individual Military leaders and leaders combined together to form various parties, do have to some extent, a strategic distribution of their troops. For example: At the present time General Wu Pei Fu commanding the 3rd Division and now the Military leader for Tsao Kun, Tuchun of Chihli Province, has stationed practically all of the Chihli troops along the Peking-Hankow Railroad from Peking to Cheng Chow, in Honan Province. South of Cheng Chow are other troops allied with those of Wu Pei Fu, and under his control. These troops extend South practically to Hankow in Hupeh Province, where the Tuchun, General Wang is more or less luke warm in sympathy with General Wu and the reforms for which he stands. Still farther South is the Province of Hunan with Tang Yen Kai as Tuchun. This Tuchun, his troops and all the people of his Province are very friendly to General Wu Pei Fu. This Province is now under southern control, Tang Yen Kai and his troops being Southern in sympathy and receiving support from the Canton Government. Thus it will be seen that General Wu Pei Fu and his followers hold a central artery of China from Peking south to Canton itself. By holding this line, should he desire to force a change in the Peking Government, he is in a position to move his troops to Peking without much resistance along the line.

There are other less important examples of strategic distribution of troops by Military leaders to control cities, railroads, bandit infested areas, etc.

The Frontier Defense troops and the Northwest Frontier Defense troops were raised under the pretext that it was necessary to defend the Chinese Frontier and Manchuria and Mongolia. With the exception of one brigade of Northwest Frontier Defense troops, none of these organizations were ever sent anywhere near the Frontier of China. They were held in the center of China for use by Tuan Chi-jui and his Anfu followers for political purposes. With the complete defeat of the Anfu troops in July 1920, these troops have been ordered disbanded.

(Source: HA 2640 9/9/20 R.S.2009-99)

REPLACE

CHINA

(16) Distribution

COMBAT (47) Strategic.

For the most part the Chinese troops are stationed along the main arteries of communications, not only in order to control the population but also in many cases to levy their own taxes to provide funds for the troops.

Distribution of foreign troops at present stationed in China in pursuance to agreement reached following Boxer Uprising.

United States: 14 Off., 286 E.M. at Peking
38 Off., 910 E.M. at Tientsin
6 Off., 130 E.M. at Tongshan
4 Off., 143 E.M. at Leichuang.

Total: 62 Officers, and 1469 E.M.

Belgian: 1 Officer and 19 E.M. at Peking.

British: 7 Off., and 169 E.M. (Wiltshires) at Peking.
24 Off., and 764 E.M. at Tientsin and small (Indian) detachment at Chinwangtao, Shanhaikuan, Pengtai, Loafa and Weihaiwei, of Indian troops.

Total: 31 Officers, 180 White and 764 Indian E.M.

French: 4 Off., and 105 E.M. at Peking
20 Off., and 945 E.M. at Tientsin and small detachments at Chinwangtao, Shanhaikuan, and Tong Kou.

Total: 24 Officers, 280 Europeans, 770 Annamites

Italian: 1 Off., and 35 E.M. at Peking.

Japanese: 14 Off;, and 272 E.M. at Peking.
45 Off., and 810 E.M. at Tientsin, with small detachments at Chinwangtao, Shanhaikuan, Yangtsun, Tangku, and Lanchow.

Total: 59 Officers, and 1082 E.M.

Holland: 1 Off., and 76 E.M. at Peking.

Russian: 1 Off., and 2 E.M. at Peking.

These troops are stationed in China for the purpose of keeping the Peking-Mukden Railroad open in time of trouble between the coast (Shanhaikuan) and Peking. Each nation is assigned a certain section of the line to protect and keep open. As will be seen most of the troops are in tientsin except for the Legation Guards in Peking.

(Source: MA 2640 9/9/20 P.S. 2009-99)

CHINA

(16) Distribution

COMBAT ✓ (47) Strategic (cont'd)

Additional Japanese Troops

In addition to the above, the Japanese have other troops stationed in China as follows:

Hankow - About a battalion of 600 men.

Shantung - Four battalions of Infantry of 544 rifles each and 200 gendarmes.

One battalion of the 18th Div. being in Tsingtao.
" " " " 11th " in Tsinanfu
" " " " 15th " and one battalion of the 1st Division being distributed along the railroad line between Tsinanfu and Tsingtao; the most important points being Fangtze, Chengtien and Weihsien. (M.A. 3/24/20) These are being relieved by a battalion each from the 4th, 1st, 3rd and 17th Divisions, Sept. 20, 1920.

Manchuria - Chinese Eastern Railroad.

There are also about 5000 Japanese troops along the Chinese Eastern Railroad. At the important stations the numbers approximate the following:

Changchun	-	400 - 18th Inf.
Harbin	-	1000 - Also Artillery Park and Hospital.
Tsitsihar	-	200
Pu K'o T'u	-	200
Hilar	-	200
Manchuli	-	300 - Of 42nd Inf. Also Brig. Gen. Hosano.
Imienpo	-	300 - Of the 53rd Regt.
Hong Tai Tze	-	200 - (M.A. 5/31/20)

South Manchurian Railroad

A Japanese division headquarters, Gen. Bito, is at Kung Chu Ling. The troops of this division are scattered along the Railroad. (M.A. 5/31/20)

Chinese troops along the Chinese Eastern Railroad

Changchun - Harbin	19	Mixed	Brig.	Luchun	
Harbin	6th	"	"		
	Part of 2nd	Heilung Chang	Mixed	Brig.	
Harbin - Pu Ko T'u	2nd	"	"	"	"
Hailar	4th	"	"	"	"
Manchuli	1st	"	"	"	"

Imienpo and vicinity (Bandit infested country)
3rd Kirin Mixed Brigade
1st Fengtien " "

Mongolia

The 3rd Mixed Brigade of the Northwest Frontier Defense force is stationed at Urga and vicinity.

(Source: HA 2640 9/9/20 R.S.2009-99)

ADD

CHINA

(16) Distribution

COMBAT

(48) Tactical

(a) Stations of large elements.
These stations have practically no tactical significance.

(b) Important Arsenals, depots, etc.
There are practically no depots for reserve ammunition, etc., the supply from abroad being cut off by embargo and the Chinese Arsenals being incapable of supplying the demands of all troops.

THIBETAN BORDER

The number of government troops in Szechwan Province is as follows:

2 Cos.	of infantry	under command	Chen Shia-lin
3 b'ns.	" Hanchun trps."	"	Liu Chan-ting
3 b'ns.	" frontier "	"	Pang Jih-sun
6 b'ns.	" Kansu "	"	Ma Yu-yi
1 div.	" Szechwan "	"	Liu-chen-hsun
5 b'ns.	" Yunnan "	"	Hua-Twe-Ko

On account of pressure of Thibetan rebels on the borders of Szechwan, 5 b'ns. of infantry were sent to Ya Kiang, Hokow and other places and 5 battalions to Teh-Yung, Hsiang-cheng, Yen-shing, etc.

(Source: HA 2640 9/9/20 R.S. 2009-99)

ABD

CHINA

(16) Distribution

Combat

(49) Territorial

Distribution of the Chinese Regular Army

Chihli, Paotingfu, Tuchun Tsao Kun.
3rd Division, Wu Pei-fu, commander, at Peking.
9th Brigade at Loyang-Honan.

1st Chihli Mixed Brigade, Wang Ch'eng-pin, commander, at Cheng Chow, Honan.
2nd Chihli Mixed Brigade, Yen Hsiang-wen, commander, at Cheng Chow, Honan.
3rd Chihli Mixed Brigade, Hsiao Yueh-nan, commander, at Peking.
4th Chihli Mixed Brigade, Ts'ao Ying, commander, at Tientsin, Chili.
5th Chihli Mixed Brigade, Shang-ch'uan, commander, at Teshow, Shanting.
1st Chihli Reserve Brigade, Gen. Wang, Peking.
2nd Chihli Reserve Brigade, Gen. Li, Peking.
3rd Chihli Rescue Brigade, Gen. Peng, Peking.

Metropolitan District, Peking.

9th Division, Wang Ju'ch'in, commander, at Paotingfu, Chihli.
9th Division, Wei Hai-lou, commander, at Nanyuan (Peking).
15 Division (Imperial Guard) Liu Hsun, commander, at Nanyuan.
12th Division, Li Chin-ts'ai, commander, at Hsiyuan (Summer Palace).
20th Division, Fan Kuo-chang, commander, at Yuchehow, Honan.
11th Division, Li Ku'ei-yuan, commander, at Changsha, Honan.
16th Mixed Brigade, Feng Yu-shiang, commander, at Changsha, Honan.
8th Mixed Brigade, Chin Yun-ao, commander, at Kung-hsien, Honan.

Shengking, Fengt'ien (Moukden) Tuchun Chang Tso-lin.
27th Mukden Division, Chang Tso-hsiang, commander, at Peitakuan, Fengt'ien
28th Mukden Division, Chi Chin-t'un, commander, at Chinchow, Fengt'ien.
29th Mukden Division, Wu Tsun-sheng, commander, at Hsinmint'un, Fengt'ien
1st "Tsan Pien" Division, Chang Ching-hsei, Fukien.
1st Mixed Brigade of Fengt'ien Army, Liang Ch'ao-tung, Chili.
2nd Mixed Brigade of Fengt'ien Army, Chang Tien-sheng, Ts'angt'ufu.
3rd Mixed Brigade of Fengt'ien Army, Ts'ai Pen-p'ing, in Honan.
4th Mixed Brigade of Fengt'ien Army, Hsu Lan-chow, Hsingp'ing, Shensi.
5th Mixed Brigade of Fengt'ien Army, Wang Liang-ch'en, Kanch'uan, (On Szech'uan-Shensi-Hupeh borders)
1st Regiment Infantry and
1st Regiment Cavalry Fengt'ien Army Miao Chin-tang, Ichow.
2nd Cavalry Regiment Fengt'ien Army, Chang Yung-hsing, Tungchow, Kirin.

Of the Fengt'ien Army, Constabulary (Hsun Fang Tui) 12 battalions Infantry, 4 battalions Cavalry, Ma Lung-t'an, commander, at Fong Huang-ch'eng, Fengt'ien.
1st Division "New Fengt'ien Army, Wang Hsi-p'in, in Outer Mongolia.
1st Brigade "New Fengt'ien Army," Reserves", Liu Hsiang-chiu, Heilung-chiang
1st Mixed Cavalry (New Army), Hsi Hai-feng, Manchoo.
1st Brigade of Fengt'ien troops under the command of Paotshshan, has been returned from Shihchia-chuang and other places Moukden (for re-organisatio

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AMD

CHINA

(16) Distribution

Combat

(49) Territorial

Distribution of the Chinese Regular Army (Cont'd)

Chilin (Kirin). Tuchun Pao Kuei-ching.

1st Kirin Division, Pei Ch'i-hsun, at Ch'angch'un, Kirin.
1st Kirin Mixed Brigade, Ch'eng Ming, at Hsiungch'engtzu, Kirin.
2nd Kirin Mixed Brigade, Kao Feng-ch'en, at Hsiehch'eng Kirin.
3rd Kirin Mixed Brigade, Yao Hsiang-kuei at Ch'uanch'eng, Kirin.
4th Kirin Mixed Brigade, Chao Yuan-p'ei, Lungch'uanshan, Kirin.
5th Kirin Mixed Brigade, Yen P'ei-chen, Harbin.
Constabulary and Defense Troops (Hsun Fang Tui and Yu Chi Tui)
10 Battalions, Wu Keng-T'ien, commander, at Hsinch'eng.

Heilungkiang. Tuchun Sun Lieh-ch'en.

1st Heilungkiang Division, Sun Lieh-ch'en, Tsitsihar(Lungkiangchen)
16th Mixed Brigade, Pa ----, commander, along the railways.
1st Heilungkiang Mixed Brigade, Li Ch'ing-lu commander, Suihuacheng.
2nd Heilungkiang Mixed Brigade, Chang Ming-chiu, Manchouli Station.
1st Heilungkiang Mixed Cavalry Brigade, Yuan Ch'ing-en at Tailai-chen
2nd Heilungkiang Cavalry Brigade, Chang Kuei-wu, at Chinghsingchen.
1st Heilungkiang Mixed Regiment, Wu Shih-chien, at Heiho.
2nd Heilungkiang Mixed Regiment, Li Shao-po, at Helan.

Shantung. Tuchun T'ien Chung-yu.

5th Division, T'ien Chung-yu, Tsinan.
1st New Shantung Division, Wang Shih-tsung, at
1st Shantung Mixed Brigade, Chang K'o-yao,
2nd Shantung Mixed Brigade, Chu Pao-tsao,
3rd Shantung Mixed Brigade, Chang P'ei-jung,
4th Shantung Mixed Brigade, Chang Shan-yi,
5th Shantung Mixed Brigade, Li Sen,
1st Brigade, "New Army: Ho Feng-yu", reorganised one new Mixed Brigade called 6th Mixed Brigade of Shantung.
11 Regiment, commander, Wu Tsun-ching.
12 Regiment, commander, Ho Tien-ting.
7th Mixed Brigade, Sun Tsung-hsien.
1st Brigade Reserves, Ch'en Pao-lung.
2nd Brigade Reserves, Chang Huai-pin.
18th Mixed Brigade, T'ang T'ien-hsi, Yenchow Garrison Commissioner.
47th Mixed Brigade, Su Chun.

Honan. Tuchun Chao T'i.

1st Mixed Brigade (Provincial), Ch'eng Shen, Yellow River guard.
2nd Mixed Brigade (Provincial), Ts'ai Teh-kuei, North of Yellow River.
Constabulary, Infantry, 3 Battalions.
Constabulary, Cavalry, 4 Battalions, Wu Ch'ing-t'ung, garrison commissioner for Nanyang, at Yuhuan-chen.
Constabulary Infantry 10 Battalions, Cavalry 3 Battalions, from the "I Chun", name commonly applied to Chiang Kuei-t'i's troops, Wu Ch'ing-t'ung commander.

ADD

CHINA

(16) Distribution

Combat

(40) Territorial

Distribution of the Chinese Regular Army (Cont'd)

"Left Road" Constabulary, Infantry 9 Battalions, Cavalry 3 Battalions, Ma Chih-min commander, at Loyang (Honanfu).
"Advance Guard" Constabulary, 3 Battalions infantry, 1 Battalion artillery, T'ien Tsolin commander, at Kaifengfu.
"Hung Wei" Army (old troops not yet reorganised as part of regular army) 6 Battalions infantry, 1 Battalion Cavalry, 1 Battalion of artillery, T'ien Wen-tsu commander, at Yohsien.
Precautionary troops (Yu Chi Tui) 3 Battalions, Yuan Pu-hsung commander, at Kaifengfu.
"South Road" Precautionary Troops, 3 Battalions, Yuan Chia-yi at Hsin-yang

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Shansi Tuchun Yen Hsi-san.

1st Shansi Mixed Brigade, Shang Chen, commander, at T'aiyuan.
2nd Shansi Mixed Brigade, Ma K'ai-sung, commander, at Sohsien.
3rd Shansi Mixed Brigade, K'ung Fan-yu, commander, at Tat'ungfu.
4th Shansi Mixed Brigade, Chao Tai-wen commander, at Yunch'enghsien.
5th Shansi Mixed Brigade,
1st Mixed Regiment, } Kao Kuan, commander, at South of Tat'ungfu.
2nd Mixed Shansi Regiment, Shih Huan Ying, commander, at Linfenhsien.

Shensi. Tuchun Ch'en Shu-fan.

1st Shensi Mixed Brigade, Liu Shih-lung, commander, Talihsien.
2nd Shensi Mixed Brigade, Teeng Chi-hsien, Feng-chuanchen.
3rd Shensi Mixed Brigade, Chang Pao-lin, T'ungkuan.
4th Shensi Mixed Brigade, Wang Fei-hu, Hsianfu.
5th Shensi Mixed Brigade, Han Ch'ing-shan, P'uch'eng.
6th Shensi Mixed Brigade, Pai Hung-yi, Fengch'uanchen.
1st Regiment Cavalry, Chang Fan, Hsianfu.
2nd Regiment Cavalry, Ts'ao Wei-k'ang, P'uch'eng.
3rd Regiment Cavalry, Chiang Hung-mo, P'uch'eng.
4th Regiment Cavalry, Ch'en Chien-ta, Li Wei Hsien (north).
New Regiment of unequipped recruits, Ch'en-Chien, at Liweihsien.
Precautionary Troops at Tuchun's office, 4 companies (old style).

Anhui. Tuchun Ni Shih-chung.

"Anwu Army"
"Seventh Road" 37 Battalions infantry, 4 Battalions artillery, Ni Shih-chung, commander, mostly stationed at Wuhu.
Of the "Anwu Army" 20 Battalions commanded by Chang Wen-sheng are at Hsuchowfu, Kiangsu Province. Another, Ma Lien-cha, with the title of Commander in Chief, has twenty Battalions which are now divided between Ch'inchow, Kiangsi, and Honan.

Distribution of the Chinese Regular Army (Cont'd)

Hunan. Tuchun Wang Chan-yuan.

3rd Division, Wang Chan-yuan, at Wuchang.
17th Mixed Brigade, Chang Lien-sheng, Yuanyang.
18th Mixed Brigade, Chao Jung-hua, at Hsiang-yang.
19th Mixed Brigade, Li Ping-tse, Patung.
21st Mixed Brigade, Sun Ch'uan-fang, Ichang.
27th Mixed Brigade, Chu Ts'ai-huang, Shashih.

Office of the Commander in Chief in charge of the Protection of the Yangtze. Commander in Chief, Wu Kuang-hsin.

26th Mixed Brigade, Chang Ting-hsun, at Hsuchow (Kiangsu), at Hsin-Yangchow Hupeh), and at various places in Honan.
2nd Brigade of Reserves, Infantry,
1 Battalion of Mountain guns, Wu Kuang-hsin commander.
1 Battalion of body guards,
4 companies machine guns divided between Ich'ang and
1 Battalion transport,
1 Battalion engineers, Chingchow.

Honan. Tuchun Chang Ching-yao.

7th Division, Chang Chin-yao, Changsha.
1st Honan Mixed Brigade, Chang Chin-t'ang, Changsha.
3rd Honan Mixed Brigade, Wu Hsin-tien.
5th Honan Mixed Brigade, Chiang Tung-an, northwest and southwest of Changsha.
18th Division, Wang Mao-sheng, at Ich'ang, Hupeh.

Kiangsi. Tuchun Ch'en Kuang-yuan.

12th Division, Ch'en Kuang-yuan, Nanchangfu.
3rd Kiangsi(?) Mixed Brigade, Ch'en Kuang-lu, at Chinan.
9th Mixed Brigade, Ting Hsiao-lan, Ta-Yu.
1st Kiangsi Infantry Regiment, Li Ting-k'uei, Chiuchiang. (Kiukiang)
"Kiangfang" 1st Regiment, Liu Tien-chun, Chouhua.
" 2nd " , Sung Huan-te'ai, Ch'ienshan.
" 3rd " , Hao Hsien-lin, Kanhsien.
" 4th " , Hsu Shih-fa, Kiukiang.
2nd Kiangsi Brigade, Wang Hsien-t'ing, Kanhsien.

Fukien. Tuchun Li Hou-chi.

1st Division, Yao Chien-p'ing, Fuchow (Provincial troops)
2nd " , Tsang Chih-p'ing, Amoy. (" ")
16th Mixed Brigade, T'ang Kuo-mo, Hsiangchow, Hainan.
12th " " , Wang Ch'i-fu, Huangkang.

CHINA

Combat

(16) Distribution

(40) Territorial

Distribution of the Chinese Regular Army, (Cont'd)

Kansu, Tuchun Chang-Kuang-chien.

"Left Army" 5 Battalions Infantry, 1 Battalion Cavalry, 1 Battalion artillery, Chang Kuang-chien, commander, Lanchowfu/
"Right Army", 6 Battalions Infantry, 1 Battalion Cavalry, Wu Yu-kuei, at P'inglingfu.
"Ch'in Chun" 1 Battalion Infantry, 1 company Cavalry, Wu Tung-jen, Taohsien.
3 Battalions constabulary attached to Tuchun's office, Hu Li-ch'eng, Commander, now at Ch'ingchow.
1 Battalion cavalry constabulary, 3 Battalions Infantry constabulary, Yang Shu-ieh commander, at T'iensuikuan.
Constabulary 4 Battalions Cavalry, Chang Ho-hsun, Hsinchow.
Constabulary - 2 Battalions Infantry, 1 Battalion Cavalry, Chang Ting-pang, commander, Hochow.
13 Battalions Infantry, 2 Battalions constabulary, Ma Fu-hsiang, commander, Ninghsia.
"Wei Wu Chun" - 6 Battalions Infantry, 4 Battalions Cavalry, Lu Hung-T'ao, at Hsining and Lungtung.

Hsinchiang (Sinkiang) Tuchun Yang Tseng-hsin.

1st Hsinchiang Mixed Brigade, Kiang Sung-lin, Hami.
2nd " " " , Yang Fei-hsia, Ili. (Garrison Commissioner).
Constabulary 10 Battalions Infantry, 6 Battalions Cavalry, 1 Battalion Artillery, Ma Fu-hsing, Ch'inhsien.
"Left Road" Army", Constabulary, 2 Battalions Infantry, 2 Battalions Cavalry, 1 company Artillery, T'an Ti-sheng, commander, Aksu.
"Right Road Army", constabulary, 1 Battalion Infantry, 1 company Cavalry, gendarmerie 1 company, Ma Fu-ming, T'a-ch'eng.
"Rear Army" constabulary 1 Battalion Infantry, 1 company Cavalry, military police 1 company, Yang Ch'un-yung, Tou-liang.
"Advance Army", constabulary, 7 Battalions Infantry, Cavalry 6 Battalions. Chiench'eng.

Chekiang, Tuchun Lu Jung-hsiang.

10 Division, Lu Jung-hsiang, Hangchow.
1st Chekiang Division, Wang Tsun-feng, at Hsiamenk'ou.
2nd " " , Chang Tai-jang, Hangchow.
4th Division, Lu Jung-hsiang, Lunghua, Shanghai.
2 Battalions Tuchun's bodyguard, Chou Chin-ch'eng, Hangchow.

Kiangsu, Tuchun Li Hsun.

6th Division, Ch'i Pien-yuan, Puchen and vicinities.
2nd Kiangsu Division, Chu Hsi, Suchow.
19th Division, Yang Chun-p'u, Chenkiang, Kiangyin, Suchang and vicinities.
1st Kiangsu Mixed Brigade, Ma Yu-jen, Huai Yang.
74th Mixed Brigade, Ch'en Tiao-yuan, Fu-ming and vicinities.
76th Mixed Brigade, Chang Jen-kuei, Yangchow.

Distribution of the Chinese Regular Army (Cont'd)

4 regiments Infantry reserved to fill up depleted ranks, 1 Battalion Artillery, Cavalry 1 Battalion, Pai Pao-chan, Haichow.
1st Reserve brigade, Huang Chen-kuei, at Yangchow.
2nd " " , Li Tien-chen, at Nanking and Tingchiachiao.
3rd " " , Wu Hung-tsun, at San Pai-lo, Nanking.
Gendarmerie, Wang Chien-fei, at Lu Chang, P'ai-lo.
Bodyguard of Tuchun's Yamen, Wang-yi, at Tuchun's Yamen.
Military Police, Chen Yu-chen, at Taohow, Kao-pao and vicinities.
" " , Yu Yu-fu, at Taohow and vicinities.

Jehol, Tuchun Chiang Kuei T'i.

1st Mixed Brigade, Ch'en Wen-yuan, Tsuitzeshan.
"Middle Road" constabulary, 5 Battalions Infantry, 2 Battalions Cavalry, Yuan Kuang-chen, Fengtingchen.
"East Road, constabulary, 5 Battalions Infantry, 1 Battalion Cavalry, 1 company Artillery, Li Chan-yuan, P'ing Ch'uan-chen.
"North Road" constabulary, 5 Battalions Infantry, 4 Battalions Cavalry, Liu T'ien-sheng, Wutun.

Chahar (Kalgan) Tut'ung Wang T'ing-chen.

16 Division, Wang T'ing-chen, Kalgan.
1st Mixed Brigade, Tien Yu-wang, Kalgan.
2nd " " , Hu Yu-ju, Dolen-nor-.
"Huai Chun" 4 Battalions Infantry, T'iang Ch'i-yao, Chichikuan.
1st constabulary Cavalry, 4 Battalions, Chiao Chien Tsau, Fengchen.
2nd " " , 3 Battalions,
2nd " Infantry, 4 Battalions, Ting Chang-fa, T'ao-lin.
3rd " Cavalry, 3 " , Wang Ming-chiang, Pat'ai.

Suiyuan Tut'ung Ts'ai Ch'eng-hsun.

1st Division, Ts'ai Ch'eng-hsun, Suiyuan, (Kueihuach'eng.)
Constabulary, Cavalry 4 Battalions, Infantry 6 Battalions.
1st Suiyuan Mixed Brigade.
Mounted Military Police 6 Battalions.
Gendarmerie 6 Battalions.
Constabulary, Infantry, 8 Battalions.

Soldiers attached to the North West Frontier Defense Office under the general direction of Tuan Ch'i Jui.

1st Division (Frontier Defense Army), Chu T'ung-seng, Peiyuan, Peking.
2nd Division (Frontier Defense Army), Ma Liang, Tsinan, Shantung.
3rd Division (Frontier Defense Army), Ch'en Wen-yun, Paotingfu, T'ungchow and Kangfangchien.
1st Mixed Brigade, " " "), Sung Yu-feng, T'ientsin, Yang-liu-ching and Chinghaihsien.
2nd " " " " "), Ch'u Hsin-ch'uan, Mongolia.

(Source: M.A. 2499-4/9/20 and R.S. 2009-95, Oct.9,1920.)

REPLACE

CHINA

(16) Distribution

COMBAT (49) Territorial

Province		Capital	Military - Southern	Strength Northern
Metropolitan Dist.		Peking		42,000
Anhwei		Pengpu (Res. of Military Governor		35,000
Chahar		Kalgan		15,000
Chekiang		Hangchow		32,000
Chihli		Paotingfu		50,000
Fukien		Foochow	30,000	30,000
Honan		Kaifeng		31,000
Hunan		Changsha	30,000	
Hupeh		Wuchang		44,000
Jehol		Hehol		14,000
Kansu		Lanchow		28,000
Kiangsi		Nanchang		24,000
Kiangsu		Nanking		52,000
Kueichow		Kweiyang	25,000	
Kwangsi		Kweilin	42,500	
Kwantung		Canton	93,000	
Manchuria	(Fengtien	Mukden		88,000
	(Heilungkiang	Tsitsihar		29,000
	(Kirin	Kirin		20,000
Shansi		Taiyuan		16,000
Shantung		Tsinanfu		60,000
Shensi		Sian		32,000
Sinkiang	(Turkestan)	Kashgar Urumchi		12,000
Suiyuan		Suiyuan		19,000
Szechwan		Chengtu	80,000	
Yunan		Yunan	26,500	
		Total -	327,000	673,000
				327,000
				1,000,000

The above is only a very rough estimate. The War Ministry cannot tell how many troops there are in China. Probably no military Governor (Tuchun) can tell the exact number of actual soldiers in his Command. It is common practice among most military leaders to certify to and draw pay for many more men than they have in their Commands.

(Source: MA 2640 9/9/20 R.S. 2009-99)

REPLACE

CHINA

(16) Distribution

COMBAT

(49) Territorial (cont'd)

The Chinese army numbers 1,250,000 against 667,000 in 1915. Armed brigands bring number under arms to 1,500,000.

Army groups are as follows:-

(a) Manchuria group 3 provinces	81,000 men	good fighting men
(b) North China group 11 provinces	486,000 men	
(c) Central China group 4 provinces	295,000 men	
(d) South China group 5 provinces	385,000 men	
Total	1,247,000	

(Chinese armies French Bulletin - 4/20/20)

CHINA

COMBAT

(49) Territorial

STRENGTH & DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN TROOPS IN NORTH CHINA
Spring of 1920.

		U.S.	Bel-gian	Brit-ish	French	Ital-ian	Japan-ese	Nether-lands.	Russ-ian	Total
PEKING	Off.	14	1	7	4	1	14	1	1	43
	E.M.	270	19	169	105	35	272	76	2	949
	M.G.	12	10	Lewis 20	4	2	2	4	0	52
	Art.	6-3"	0	2-12pdr	2-37mm	0	0	2-37mm	0	12
TIENTSIN	Off.	38	0	17	19	0	37	0	0	111
	E.M.	910	0	606	801	0	578	0	0	2895
	M.G.	16	0	Lewis 4	14	0	12	0	0	46
	Art.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
CHINWANG-TAO	Off.	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	3
	E.M.	0	0	19	38	0	50	0	0	107
	M.G.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Art.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SHANHAI-KWAN	Off.	0	0	1	1	0	4	0	0	6
	E.M.	0	0	30	91	0	127	0	0	248
	M.G.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Art.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SHANGHAI	Off.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	00	0
	E.M.	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	4
	M.G.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Art.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TUNGSHAN	Off.	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
	E.M.	130	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	130
	M.G.	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
	Art.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
LIAUCHWANG Target Range	Off.	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
	E.M.	142	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	142
	M.G.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Art.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
KENTAI	Off.	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
	E.M.	0	0	40	0	0	0	0	0	40
LOAFA	Off.	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
	E.M.	0	0	20	0	0	0	0	0	20
	Off.	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	3
WEIHAIWEI	E.M.	0	0	60	0	0	0	0	0	60
	M.G.	0	0	(1.303 (2 Lewis	3	0	0	0	0	3
	Art.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
YANGTSUN	Off.	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
	E.M.	0	0	0	0	0	30	0	0	30
	Off.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TANGKU	E.M.	0	0	0	35	0	5	0	0	40
	Art.	0	0	0	4-80mm Mt. 2-80mm Fld.	0	0	0	0	6
	Off.	62	1	31	24	1	59	1	1	168
TOTALS	E.M.	1469	19	934	1074	35	1082	76	2	4527
	M.G.	26	1	27	16	2	16	4	0	92
	Art.	6-3"	0	2-12pdr	(2-37mm (6-80mm	0	0	2-37mm	0	

Off. Officers, E.M. Enlisted Men, M.G. Machine Guns, Art. Artillery.

ADDITIONAL JAPANESE TROOPS

Hankow 1 Battalion

[redacted]

COMBAT

(49) Territorial (cont'd)

ADDITIONAL JAPANESE TROOPS (cont'd)

Shantung		4 Battalions plus 200 Gendarmes
Manchuria	(Along South Manchuria R.R.)	1 Division - Headquarters at Kung Chu Ling
"	(" Chinese Eastern R.R.)	~~5000~~ 10,000 men - approximately.

(Source: HA 2640 9/9/20 R.S.2009-99)

Replace

[redacted]

Combat

(17) Discipline

(80) Individual

For national defense, the Chinese Army is utterly useless. The more soldiers - the more disorder; the more soldiers - the less trade; the more soldiers - the more bandits; the more soldiers - the more opium and vice; the more soldiers - the poorer accommodations and means of transport for travellers. The arrival of soldiers in a community marks the end of peace and prosperity. The inns, schools and temples are filled with disorderly bullies who are never more than half paid and who never more than half pay for anything. They are notorious thieves, robbers, etc.

(Source: M/A, #2058 - 5/19/19).

There is a deplorable lack of discipline resulting in an almost complete lack of control over the individuals.

(Source: M/A, China, #2052 - 5/14/19).

The Chinaman is a strong individualist, but Yuan - Shi - Kai and others have demonstrated that, if properly led, he makes an excellent soldier.

(Source: McCreskey - Observer China).

Much discipline is exceedingly poor of the troops in the interior districts.

(M/A, China, #2052 - 5/14/19).

There are many reports of Chinese troops acting in a disorderly manner towards foreigners, showing a lack of discipline rather than anti-foreign feeling.

(M/A, China, #2232 - 11/4/18).

Combat

(17) Discipline

(50) Individual (Cont'd)

I am more convinced than ever that with proper selection and training of Chinese officers, with modern military equipment and a truly patriotic cause, the Chinese Army can be made to fight on equal terms with any other.

(Source: M.A. #2609. - R.S. 2009-95, Oct.9,1920)

(b) How [redacted] The most common form of punishment for minor offenses is whipping. This is administered in a public place in front of soldier friends and comrades which cause him to lose face in his organization. For serious offenses imprisonment and the death penalty are inflicted.

(Source: M.A. #2609 - R.S. 2009-95, Oct.9,1920).

CHINA

Combat

(19) Training

(38) Staff

MEDICAL

The Chinese army has no idea whatever of sanitation. The Chinese soldiers must be immune to any diseases which would quickly destroy foreign troops. Flies are every where, bread is moldy, rice is cooked and left exposed for hours. No such thing as a latrine exists. Sanitary precautions are not taken, but there is practically no sickness among the troops. They drink hot water or tea however. There are one doctor and two assistants (Medical corps men) to each battalion.

In action doctors usually stay at the dressing stations and the wounded are brought in on litters. Coolies are pressed into service to carry the wounded and put under guards to keep them from running away. First aid is done by the assistants and is fairly good work. Much time is lost in getting wounded men to the stations.

(Source: M.A. #2609 - R.S. 2009-95, Oct.9,1920.)

Replace

CHINA

Combat

(20) Individual

(29) Arms

On May 3,1919, at a meeting of the Diplomatic Body at Peking, the members received instructions from their respective governments, "To prohibit the import of arms and ammunition into China".

(Source: M/A, China, May 28 - R.S. #2265-I-5).

Infantry Arms.

6.8 m/m. Mausers made in Hanyang factory, model 1913.
7.9 m.m. Mauser rifles, and carbines 1888 pattern.
6.5 m.m. Japanese carbines of 30th yr. of Meichi.
6.5 m.m. Manlicher rifles and carbines.
Japanese rifles of 22th yr. of Meichi.
7.9 m.m. rifles of 38th yr. of Kuangksu,
Japanese Arisak rifle 36th yr. of Meichi.
Mauser 9 shot repeating guns Model 1888.
Japanese rifle 28th and 29th yr. of Meichi & 22nd yr. of Murata
Russian 3 lines rifles.
German rifle year 1888.

(Source: M/A, China, #2064 - 5/20/19 & #2156 - 8/5/19).

The infantrymen of the 1st Division carry Japanese rifles, a sword type bayonet, ammunition in two leather pouches on the belt and extra bandeliers. No automatic rifles, riple grenades were carried at recent review.

(Source: M/A, China, R.S. 2009-78, 12/17/19).

The rifle may be of Chinese, Japanese, Austrian or German make. In a long cotton belt he carries 300 to 350 rounds of ammunition. The great variety of models is a distinct handicap.

(Source: R.S. 2009-95, Oct.9,1920 - M.A. #2609)

Cavalry Arms

6.5 m.m. Japanese carbines of 30th yr. of Meichi.
7.9 m.m. Mauser carbines model 1888.
6.5 m/m. Manlicher carbines.
6.8 m.m. carbines and rifles of Hanyang factory.
Japanese 1 shot carbines.

(Source: M/A, China, #2064 - 5/20/19 and #2156-8/5/19.)

Replace

CHINA

(20) Individual

Combat

(30) Arms

On May 3,1919, at a meeting of the Diplomatic Body at Peking, the members received instructions from their respective governments, "To prohibit the import of arms and ammunition into China".

(Source: M/A, China, May 28 - R.S. #2365-I-5).

Infantry Arms.

6.8 m/m. Mausers made in Hanyang factory, model 1913.
7.9 m.m. Mauser rifles, and carbines 1888 pattern.
6.5 m.m. Japanese carbines of 30th yr. of Meichi.
6.5 m.m. Manlicher rifles and carbines.
Japanese rifles of 30th yr. of Meichi.
7.9 m.m. rifles of 38th yr. of Kuangksu,
Japanese Arisak rifle 36th yr. of Meichi.
Mauser 9 shot repeating guns Model 1888.
Japanese rifle 28th and 29th yr. of Meichi & 22nd yr. of Murata
Russian 3 lines rifles.
German rifle year 1888.

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(Source: R.S. 2009-95, Oct.9,1920 - M.A. #2609)

Cavalry Arms

6.5 m.m. Japanese carbines of 30th yr. of Meichi.
7.9 m.m. Mauser carbines model 1888.
6.5 m/m. Manlicher carbines.
6.8 m.m. carbines and rifles of Hanyang factory.
Japanese 1 shot carbines.

(Source: M/A, China, #2064 - 5/20/19 and #2156-8/5/19.)

SHINA

Combat

(30) Individual

(39) Arms (Cont'd)

Machine Guns

7.9 m.m.
Maxim machine guns.
German pack machine guns.
Hotchkiss machine guns.
"Nest" type made at Canton factory.

(Source: M/A, China, #2064 - 5/20/19 and #2136-8/5/19)

The machine guns of the 1st Division are Japanese make, looking much like the Bennet Mercier only heavier. They are air cooled and have the same recoil adjustment as the Bennet Mercier. The feed is by brass clips containing about 30 cartridges. The machine guns and ammunition when carried on ponies appear to be well packed.

(Source: M/A, China, R.S. 2009-78 - 12/17/19)

Replace

SECRET

(20) Individual

Combat

(60) Clothing

The following was noted at recent manoeuvers of 1st Division:

The uniforms were of bluish gray color and made of heavy quilted material. They were warm and allowed free movement of the body. Long trousers were worn held in place below the knee by wrapped leggins of a light canvas material the same color as the blouse and trousers. Leather shoes were worn but these were cut low, resembling the American Oxford shoe. They were broad at the toe and would make a comfortable marching shoe if it were not for their low cut. The leggins did not reach down to the tops of the shoes, leaving a few inches of the leg and ankle unprotected, except for cotton socks and in some cases only a wrapping of cotton cloth. Caps resemble those of U.S. soldier, overcoats of same material as blouses and lined with fur were furnished each man. The uniforms were in excellent condition and the shoes were all new. The appearance of the whole Division was excellent and very neat. The equipment is practically all of Japanese make.

(Source: M/A, China, R.S. 2009-78, 12/17/19)

(Information on clothing of other organizations is lacking)

The anti-Anfu troops in the revolution of July 1920 were coats, trousers and caps of very cheap cotton material, incapable of withstanding a hard campaign of any duration.

(Source: M.A. #2609 - R.S. 2009-98, Oct.9,1920)

Replace

CHINA

Combat

(20) Individual

(61) Accoutrements

The following was noted at recent review of 1st Division:

The entrenching tools are carried on the pack and are very much like those of U.S. equipment. About six men out of every ten carry shovels, two picks and two axes. The pack is neat but quite small. The blanket is carried rolled around three sides of the haver-sack and mess-kit; a raincoat or cape is carried in a horizontal role just below the top roll of the blanket and is used as a shelter-tent. On the right hip is hung a cloth pouch of good size, used to carry anything that can be gotten into it. The mess equipment consists of a leather covered can, worn in the center of the pack and strapped beneath the shelter-half. A sort of bread made of a mixture of glutinous rice and ground meat was carried as an emergency ration. The equipment is practically all Japanese.

(Source: M/A, China, R.S. 2009-78, 12/17/19)

(Information on accoutrements of other organizations is lacking).

The anti-Anfu troops in the revolution of July,1920, had no blankets. They had cloth shoes, an ordinary earthen bowl for a mess pan, chop sticks, and in some cases a first aid packet. They had no haversack, knapsack or individual tent.

(Source: M.A. #2609 - R.S. 2009-95, Oct.9,1920)

CHINA

(29) Organization

Content

(61) Equipage

Artillery

In the revolution of July,1920, the Anfu troops had at least one battery of Austrian 75 m.m.,Some Chinese 75's, and probably some Japanese guns. They had some 4.7 in. guns also. The ammunition used was very poor.

The anti-Anfu troops had at least one Krupp battery, 1903 model, 75 m.m. using German ammunition. They also had some mountain artillery which resembles the Japanese, but was not closely inspected.

(Source: M.A. #2609 - R.S. 2009-95, Oct.9,1920)

Searchlight

In the revolution of July, 1920 a 36 inch new portable Station searchlight with Fiat auto-truck carrying a generator was captured by the anti-Anfu troops.

(M.A. #2609 - R.S. 2009-95, Oct.9,1920.)

CHINA

(22) National

CONTRAT (65) Munitions

The following, chiefly from British sources, under date of January 1, 1918, is the most complete information at hand:

ARSENALS

Canton — Canton Arsenal. Machinery of British and German make, the British portion being about 20 years old. Output is said to be:

20 Rifles 6.8 mm. per diem.
15 Rifles 7.9 mm. per diem.
5 Machine Guns.
25,000 Cartridges 6.8 mm. per diem.
25,000 Cartridges 7.9 mm. per diem.
10,000 Machine Gun Cartridges.

Chengtu — Two Arsenals, one inside and one outside the City. Output varies, estimated at 20 Rifles and 40,000 rounds Ammunition per diem and one Field Gun per month.

Powder Factory included.

German machinery and formerly German management.

Foochow — Pagoda Arsenal, Foochow. Started in 1866 and has been utilised entirely for Naval Shipbuilding and general Dockyard Work.

One foreigner is employed at the Arsenal, a young Frenchman by name Chapron. He is a Naval Architect and engineer and teaches in the French Naval Engineering School where he has over 100 pupils.

The Naval College with about 250 Cadets is under the direction of Mr. Wang Tung, a naval Engineer Captain. He formerly studied in the Greenwich Naval College whence he passed out with considerable distinction. He has also served in the British Navy.

The machinery at the Arsenal is for the most part of rather old type but apparently quite effective for any work required of it.

If the Director is able to eventually carry out his reputed ambition to produce Torpedo Boat Destroyers and Submarines he must undoubtedly very materially and specifically increase the Plant.

Kaifengfu Arsenal. Employs about 400 men. Output 40 Machine guns, 700,000 Cartridges per annum.

The Works contain some 13 British Machines, 9 German and 8 Chinese. Some of the Plant is over 20 years old.

CHINA

(22) National

COMBAT ✓ (65) Munitions (cont'd)

HSIANFU ARSENAL: Situated at Kung Hsien. This Arsenal will not be ready for work for a year at least.

Machinery is of American, British, Danish and German manufacture. Output is expected to be:
60 Rifles (Mauser pattern) per diem.
20 7½ centimetre guns per fortnight.

The Buildings were supervised by a German but are now being supervised by a Dane. The cost of the Arsenal is expected to amount to Tls. 2,000,000.

SIANFU AND LANCHOWFU ARSENALS. Details of these establishments are not yet to hand.

HANYANG ARSENAL. Attached to Hanyang Ironworks. Plant: German. Output:
60 Rifles per diem
26,000 Cartridges per diem
4 Guns per mensem
100 5.87 diameter Shells per diem.

There is also a Powder Factory attached to the Arsenal.

Nanking Nanking Arsenal. Est. 1863. Employs over 300 men. Most of the machinery is German.

Manufactures Machine Guns and Revolvers and ammunition for same

Shanghai Kiangnan Arsenal. Shanghai. Est. 1867. Since the fall of the Manchus five years ago this Arsenal has been managed exclusively by Chinese, most of whom have been educated in Germany. No work of any magnitude has been done during the past five years.

For the past two years the workmen have been employed making field guns after the Krupp pattern. There is no authentic information as to the exact number made, but it is probable that at least 100 Field Guns have been turned out during the period mentioned.

Large Gun Factory. The whole of this plant which is extensive for China (although of little consequence to first class Powers) was originally imported from Great Britain. The plant has manufactured 9" guns but has not been used for about 15 years. Minor plant from Germany has been added in recent years.

Small Arms Factory. The Machinery in this department is all of German make designed for the manufacture of the Chinese Service Rifle, i.e., German Snider 1898 pattern.

Steel Furnaces. Siemen-Martins Process and Rolling Mill. This plant is all British.

Hematite Iron Ore has to be imported, although Hematite is procurable in China it cannot be delivered at Shanghai cheap enough to compete with the imported article.

CHINA

(22) National

COMBAT (65) Munitions (cont'd)

Tsinanfu — Tsinanfu Arsenal. Is situated at Hsin Cheng, Tsinanfu. The machinery (8 years old) is British and German. Formerly both rifles and cartridges were made, but of recent years only cartridges.

Techow Arsenal. This Arsenal though situated in Shantung is under the Chihli Government. Old Machinery from West Arsenal, Tientsin, has been installed.

Yunnanfu — Yunnanfu Arsenal. Was erected for the Government by the German firm of Carlowitz & Co. The machinery and plant are now obsolete, being neglected and for the most part ruined.

Cartridge making plant is in poor condition but is worked and reported to be able to produce 80,000 rounds per month. The Arsenal also produces a certain number of bombs similar in pattern to the hand grenades used on the Western Front. The Director of the Arsenal has been trained in Japan.

Changsha — Changsha Arsenal. No details at hand. It is known that automatic pistols and Machine Guns have been made here.

Paotingfu — There is an Arsenal at Paotingfu which is used to repair rifles and guns. Further details not at hand.

Mukden — No details at hand.

Production of rifles, machine guns, artillery and ammunition in Chinese Arsenals.

	Rifle Amm. per day	Rifles	M.G.	M.G. Amm.	Art.	Art. Amm.
Canton	50,000 (d)	20 (d)	3 (d)	10,000 (d)		
Chengtu	40,000 (d)	20 (d)			1 (m)	
Kaifengu			1 (d)	2,000 (d)		
Hunanfu		80 (d)			40 (m) ?	
Sianfu						
Lanchowfu					4 (m)	100 (d)
Hanyang	30,000 (d)	60 (d)				
Nanking						
Kiangnan	10,000 (d)	50 (d)			4 (m)	
Tsinanfu						
Techow	30,000					
Yunnanfu	2,500 (d)	Also bombs similar to hand grenades.				
Changsha						
Paotingfu						
	162,500 (d)	230 (d)	4 (d)	12,000 (d)	49 (m)	100 (d)

(d) Daily
(m) Monthly

(Source: HA 2640 9/9/20 R.S. 2009-99)

[redacted]

[redacted]

(22) [redacted]

(65) [redacted]

(f) [redacted]

Supplying food to a Chinese army is a very simple matter compared to our own problems. His ration consists chiefly of large pieces of Chinese bread (hard-tack consistency) and rice and especially for the officers, a few sweet potatoes. No meat. - A few vegetables. Not much or not.

(Source: M.A. #2409 - R.S. 2005-05, Oct.9,1920)

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
WAR DEPARTMENT

NO OBJECTION TO PUBLICATION
M.I.S. [illegible]

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SUBJECT Additions to Combat Section of Monograph.

- Monograph Report -

M.I.9

From China.

No. [redacted] 2749 Date February 16, 1921., 19

Replying to No. Date REC'D M.I.D., G.S. APR 9 1921, 19

(61) Accouterments
(A)

China
Combat

The great majority of Chinese soldiers have practically no accouterments issued to them. The Japanese-equipped Divisions organized to participate in the European War and later called frontier defense divisions possessed all the accouterments of Japanese troops. With their disbandment as a result of the Anfu defeat in July, 1920, this equipment was scattered amongst the troops of Chang Tso-lin and Tsao Kun.

The best equipped troops in China are those of Chang Tso-lin. Not all of these, however, are properly equipped with haversacks, mess outfits, etc.

The ordinary ration of the Chinese soldier is boiled rice, boiled vegetables and steamed or fried bread. Consequently the mess outfit of the average Chinese soldier is a wooden or earthen bowl for his rice or vegetable soup and a pair of chop sticks. The former he carries in his coat or shirt and the latter are stuck down inside of his legging.

Except for the Japanese equipped troops there are no haversacks. Most Chinese troops carry a large canvass bag suspended by a strap or rope from the right shoulder. This canvas bag contains the extra canvas shoes and clothing, stockings of the soldier, together with any extra ration which may have been issued to him.

Blankets, if issued, are of very cheap quality. They are carried over the left shoulder and under the right arm in a manner similar to that in which the American blanket roll was carried.

Chinese entrenchment tools are practically the same as those of our own troops and are issued in practically the same ratio of picks to axes to shovels. Very few soldiers have rain coats. It is a common sight in South China, however, to see the soldiers marching in the rain or in the hot sun protecting themselves with their paper umbrellas.

In place of identification tags the Chinese soldier wears a cloth badge about three inches wide and five inches long bent over his left breast coat pocket. This cloth has written upon it the soldier's name, rank, organization, etc. In peace times it may have even his conduct grade thereon. During the Anfu-Chili fighting in July, 1920, the troops under Wu Pei Fu all wore a band of red cotton cloth around their sleeve between the elbow and shoulder. The troops fighting under Chang Tso-lin, who was allied with Wu Pei Fu against the Anfu forces, wore a similar white band.

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SUBJECT Additions to Combat Section of Monograph.

- Monograph Report -

From China.

No. 2749 *Date* February 16, 1921. *19*

Replying to No. *Date* , 19

(61) (A) Accouterments — China Combat

Cartridge Boxes and other means of carrying ammunition:- Japanese equipped troops have at their waist a leather cartridge box which will hold twenty or perhaps thirty rounds of ammunition. All Chinese troops have a long cotton belt which can be wound around the body two or three times or would over each shoulder and under the arm. This belt will hold from 300 to 350 rounds of ammunition.

(61) (B) Weight carried by Soldiers.

The weight carried by the Chinese soldier is not much, except for his belt containing 350 rounds of ammunition, his rifle with bayonet and intrenching tools.

(C) Weight carried by animals.

As a large portion of the Chinese transport is dependent upon the animals and vehicles that can be found in the country where the troops are operating, there is no prescribed weight allowance which animals will carry. Chinese ponies, donkeys and mules are all sturdy beasts capable of carrying what look to foreigners to be excessive loads.

(D) Reserve Stocks:

There are no reserve stocks of accouterments in China.

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SUBJECT Additions to Combat Section of Monograph

- Monograph Report -

From China

No. 2749 Date February 16, 1921., 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

(62) EQUIPAGE. CHINA COMBAT.

(A) ENGINEERS:

Some Engineer troops have ~~Shantung~~ pontoon equipment. In the Chinese Army at the present time the engineers perform the duties of the Signal Corps stringing the field telephone lines wherever there are such In peace times the engineer troops seem to perform mainly the duties of Infantry soldiers.

(B) MEDICAL:

The Chinese Army has little in the way of hospital equipment. During the fight in July, 1920, the wounded, when picked up on the battlefield were carried by coolies on litters or on improvised litters to dressing stations along the railroad line. Here they were given hypodermics and temporary relief treatment, then sent by train to the hospitals in Peking or Paoting-fu.

(C) ORDINANCE:

In the Chinese Language "Artillery" is divided into three classes, Mountain, Field and Heavy. Most Divisions of troops have both Mountain and Field guns. There are practically no Heavy guns, however, in China although there a few batteries of 4.7's.

The Artillery harness is for the most part made of inferior leather with a liberal supply of ropes used in place of leather. Breast straps in place of collars are the rule.

Artillery ammunition may be of German, Japanese or Chinese manufacture. Small arms ammunition may be of Chinese, Japanese, or American manufacture. There is a shortage of all types of ammunition.

(D) TENTAGE:

The tentage is of poor quality. The tents are pyramidal type but made of a very light weight canvas.

The transportation pertaining the Chinese Army consists of two-wheel Chinese carts. In some sections of Manchuria four-wheel carts are common. Most transportation, however, is commandeered when operations are necessary.

(E) SIGNAL:

One 36-Inch portable searchlight with Fiat auto truck carrying a generator was captured by General Wu Pei Fu from the First Frontier Division in July, 1920. It is doubtful if there are any more of these in China although the other two Frontier Defense Divisions might each have had one.

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SUBJECT Additions to Combat Section of Monograph.

- Monograph Report -

From China.

No. 2749 *Date* February 16, 1921. *19*

Replying to No. *Date* 19

(62) EQUIPAGE. China Combat

(F) OTHER SERVICES:-

There are in the Chinese Army no gas, tank, or other modern equipment which has come into existence during the European War. The Chinese Army is short of all kinds of equipage as well as of arms and accouterments.

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SUBJECT Additions to Combat Section of Monograph.

- Monograph Report -

From China.

No. 2749 *Date* February 16, 1921. *19*

Replying to No. *Date* , 19

(63) Transport. CHINA COMBAT.

(A) Ammunition Trains:-

There are no especially designed ammunition trains in the Chinese Army. The ordinary Chinese carts (two-wheel or four-wheel,) depending on the part of the Country in which the troops are supplied) are used to carry ammunition and all other necessary supplies. Pack animals, mules, donkeys and ponies are all used as well.
Wheelbarrows would be used in Shantung.

(B) Supply Trains:—

See "A".

(C) Railway Troops:—

THere are no especially designated railway troops in the Chinese Army. During the fighting in July, 1920, between the Anfu and Chili factions the confusion and congestion of traffic and inefficiency of those in charge of the railway service on both sides was apparent to all.

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SUBJECT Additions to Combat Section of Monograph.

- Monograph Report -

From China.

No. 2749 *Date* February 16, 1921. *19*

Replying to No. *Date* 19

(64) Communications: CHINA COMBAT

The Chinese Army is deficient in all forms of communications.

(A) Telephone Equipment:

The Chinese War Department has a comparatively few sets of field telephone equipment of an old type. It is doubtful if their average would be ~~two~~ one set per Division.

(B) Wireless Sets:

The exact number of field wireless sets owned by the Chinese War Department is not known. None have been seen at maneuvres.

(C) Visual Signal Equipment.

The Chinese buglers in each company are equiped as in with other armies with signal flags and are trained in their use. They are also trained in using lanterns for signal purposes at night; their equipment for this purpose is very meager, however.

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SUBJECT Additions to Combat Monograph

Monograph Report

From China

No. 2749 *Date* February 16, 1921. *19*

Replying to No. *Date* 19

CHINESE RAILWAYS.

(116) Strategic Aspect

Combat
China

(C) · System of Communications -
Adequacy of Railroads.

It is requested that the following, showing mileage open to traffic and under construction of all railways of China, be added to the Combat Monograph:--

Railway.	Chinese Designation	Date of opening to traffic	Milage open	Under constrn.
1. Peking-Mukden				
(Peking, Tientsin, Shan-hai-kuan, Hsin-min-tun, Mukden)	Ching-Feng	1903	525	
Branches:				
(a) Peking to Tung-chou			14	
(b) Feng-t'ai to Lu-kou-ch'iao			4	
(c) Tang-ho to Chin-wang-tao			6	
(d) Lien-shan to Hulu-tao			7	
(e) Kou-pang-tzu to Ying-k'ou (Newchwang)			57	
(f) Tientsin to Hsi-ku			3	
2. Peking-Hankow.				
(a) Liang-haiang to Tu-li			12	
(b) Liu-li-ho to Chou-kuei-chuang			10	
(c) Kao-yi Hsien to Lin-ch'eng			18	
(d) Pao-ting Fu Branch			3	
(e) Kao-Pei-tien to Liang-ko-chuang-			26	
3. Tientsin-Pukou.	Tsin-Pu	1912	629	
Branches.				
(a) Chen-tang-chuang to Liang-wang-chuang			16	
(b) Lin-cheng to Tsao-chuang			19	
(c) Yen-chou to Chi-ning			19½	
(d) Te-chou to Grand Canal			2½	
(e) Lu-k'ou to Huang-tsi-ch'iao			5½	
4. Peking-Suiyuan.	Pei-Sui			
(a) Feng-t'ai to Kalgan		1909	114	
(b) Kalgan, Ta-tung-fu, Feng-chen, Sui-yuan		1915 (as far as) (Feng-chen)	203	59
Branch.				
Peking to Men-t'ou-kou				16½

NO OBJECTION TO PUBLICATION
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SUBJECT Additions to Combat Section of Monograph

- MONOGRAPH REPORT *

From China

No. 2749 Date February 16, 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

(116) (C) Continued.

RAILWAY	CHINESE DESIGNATION	Date of Opening to Traffic	Mileage Open	Under Constr
5. Shanghai-Nanking.	Hu-Ning	1908	193	
Branch Shanghai to Wu-sung		1898	10	
6. Shanghai-Ningpo.	Hu-Hang-Yung			
Branches. (a) Shanghai to Hang-chou		1908	118	
(b) Hang-chow to Ning-po			53 Open to Peikuan	
(c) Junction between Hu-ning and Hu-Hang-Yung Lines at Shanghai		1916	8	
7. Shan-hai (Shih-chia-chuang to T'ai-yuan) (Metre gauge)	Chang-T'ai	1907	151	
8. Peking Syndicate Railway. (Tao-kou to Ching-hua-chen)	Tao-Ching	1904	93	
9. Lung-Hai Railway. (Hai-chou to Lanchou) (Open from Hsu-chou Fu to Kuan-y in-tang.)	Lung-Hai		365	190
10. Kirin-changchun Railway. (Operated as a branch of Southern Manchurian Ry)	Chi-Ch'ang	1912	80	
11. Ch'u-chou - Ping-haiang Railway		1902	65	
12. Canton-Kowloon Ry. (a) Canton - Shum-chun (Chinese)		1911	89½	
(b) Shum-chun - Kowloon (British)		1910	22½	
13. Chang-chou - Amoy.				18
14. Szu-ping-kai - Tao-nan-fu. (Operated as branch of Southern Manchurian Ry.)		1917 Open to Chen-Chia-tun	52	130
15. Canton-Hankow				

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SUBJECT Additions to Combat Section of Monograph.

- MONOGRAPH REPORT -

From China

No. 2749 *Date* February 16, 1921. *19*

Replying to No. *Date* 19

(116) Continued
(0)

RAILWAY	CHINESE DESIGNATION	Date of opening to tfc.	China Combat Milage Open	under co
15. Canton-Hankow.	Yueh-Han			
SECTIONS.				
(a) Wu-ch'ang to Yo-chou		1917	160	
(b) Yo-chou to Ch'ang-sha		1918	120	
(c) Chang-sha to Heng-chou		Open to Ch'u-chou	33	
(d) Heng-chou to Shao-chou				
(e) Shao-chou to Canton		1911	140	
16. Canton-Samsui.		1904	32	

B. Provincial and Private Railways.

17. Kiukiang-Nanchang	Nan-Hsun		86
18. San-kap-hoi - Kong-moon (Sun-ning Railway)			63½
19. Swatow- Chao-chou-fu	Chao-Shan	1906	26½
20. Ta-yeh Mines Ry (Hupei). (Tien-shan-pu to Huang-shih-kang)			17
21. Tsao-chuang to Tsi-erh-chuang. (Colliery Railway)			

C. Concessions.

22. Chinese Eastern Ry. (5 ft. Gauge)			
Sections.			
(a) Manchouli to Sui-fen-ho			921
(b) Harbin to Kuan-ch'eng-tzu			152
Branch.			
Angangki to Tsitsihar (Meter Gauge)		1907	17
23. South Manchurian.			
Kuan-ch'eng-tzu to Dairen (Chang-chun)			439
Branches.			
(a) Kuan-ch'eng-tzu to Kirin (Chang-chun - see #10)	Chi-Ch'ang	1912	80
(b) Mukden to An-tung			189
(c) Su-chia-tun to Fu-shun (Colliery Line)			39
(d) Ta-shih-ch'iao to Ying-k'ou (Newchwang)			13½
(e) Chou-shui-tzu to Port Arthur			28½
(f) Ssu-ping-kai to Cheng-chia-tun (See #14)			52

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SUBJECT Additions to Combat Section of Monograph.

- MONOGRAPH REPORT -

From China

No. 2749 Date February 16, 1921., 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

(116)
(C) Continued.

China
Combat

RAILWAY	CHINESE DESIGNATION	Date of Opening to Tfc.	Mileage Open	Mileage Under Constr.
24. Shantung Railway.	Chiao-Chi	1904	256	
Tsingtao to Chi-nan Fu				
Branch. Chang-tien to Po-shan			28	
25. Yunnan Fu Railway. (Yunnan Fu to Lao-Kai) (Metre Gauge)		1910	289	

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...DIST CHIEF OF STAFF
...INTEL. DIV.

M61 7009-109 M-3748

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M.I.2.

Additions to Combat Monograph

Monograph Report

China
2749

February 16, 1921.

CHINESE RAILWAYS.

(116) Strategic Aspect

(C) System of Communications - Adequacy of Railroads. Combat China

It is requested that the following, showing mileage open to traffic and under construction of all railways of China, be added to the Combat Monographs--

Railway.	Chinese Designation	Date of opening to traffic	Milage open	Under constrn.
1. Peking-Mukden (Peking, Tientsin, Shen-hai-kuan, Hsin-min-tun, Mukden)	Ching-Feng	1903	525	
Branches:				
(a) Peking to Tung-chou			14	
(b) Feng-t'ai to Lu-kou-ch'iao			4	
(c) Tang-ho to Chin-wang-tao			6	
(d) Lien-chen to Hulu-tao			7	
(e) Kou-pang-tzu to Ying-k'ou (Newchwang)			57	
(f) Tientsin to Hsi-ku			3	
2. Peking-Hankow to Tu-li			12	
(b) Lin-li-ho to Chou-kuei-chuang			10	
(c) Kao-yi Hsien to Lin-ch'eng			15	
(d) Pao-ting Fu Branch			3	
(e) Kao-Pei-tien to Liang-ko-chuang-			6	
3. Tientsin-Pukow.	Tsin-Pu	1912	629	
Branches.				
(a) Chen-tang-chuang to Liang-wang-chuang			16	
(b) Lin-cheng to Tsao-chuang			19	
(c) Yen-chou to Chi-ning			19½	
(d) Te-chou to Grand Canal			2½	
(e) Lu-k'ou to Huang-tsai-ch'iao			5½	
4. Peking-Suiyuan.	Pei-Sui			
(a) Feng-t'ai to Kalgan		1909	114	
(b) Kalgan, Ta-tung-fu, Feng-chen, Sui-yuan		1915 (as far as) (Feng-chen)	203	89
Branch.				
Peking to Men-t'ou-kou				16½

NO OBJECTION TO PUBLICATION
IN SERVICE JOURNALS.

Additions to Combat Section of Monograph

- MONOGRAPH REPORT -

China

2749

February 16

(116) (C) Continued.

RAILWAY	CHINESE DESIGNATION	Date of Opening to Traffic	Mileage Open	Under Constr
5. Shanghai-Nanking.	Hu-Ning	1908	193	
Branch Shanghai to Wu-sung		1898	10	
6. Shanghai-Ningpo.	Hu-Hang-Yung			
Branches. (a) Shanghai to Hang-chow		1908	118	
(b) Hang-chow to Ning-po			53	
			Open to Paikuan	
(c) Junction between Hu-ning and Hu-Hang-Yung Lines at Shanghai		1916	8	
7. Shun-hai (Shih-chia-chuang to T'ai-yuan) (Metre gauge)	Cheng-T'ai	1907	151	
8. Peking Syndicate Railway. (Tao-kou to Ching-hua-chen)	Tao-Ching	1904	93	
9. Lung-Hai Railway. (Hai-chou to Lanchou) (Open from Hsu-chou Fu to Kuan-y in-tang.)	Lung-Hai		365	190
10. Kirin-changchun Railway. (Operated as a branch of Southern Manchurian Ry)	Chi-Ch'ang	1912	80	
11. Ch'u-chou - Ping-hsiang Railway		1902	65	
12. Canton-Kowloon Ry.				
(a) Canton - Shum-chun (Chinese)		1911	89½	
(b) Shum-chun - Kowloon (British)		1910	22½	
13. Chang-chou - Amoy.				18
14. Sze-ping-kai - Tao-nan-fu. (Operated as branch of Southern Manchurian Ry.)		1917 Open to Chen-Chia-tun	52	130
15. Canton-Hankow				

NO OBJECTION TO PUBLICATION
IN SERVICE JOURNALS.

Additions to Combat Section of Monograph.

- MONOGRAPH REPORT -

China

2749

February 16, 1921.

(116) (C) Continued RAILWAY	CHINESE DESIGNATION	Date of opening to tfc.	China Combat Milage Open	under co
15. Canton-Hankow.	Yueh-Han			
SECTIONS.				
(a) Wu-ch'ang to Yo-chou		1917	160	
(b) Yo-chou to Ch'ang-sha		1918	120	
(c) Chang-sha to Heng-chou		Open to Ch'u-chou	33	
(d) Heng-chou to Shao-chou				
(e) Shao-chou to Canton		1911	140	
16. Canton-Samui.		1904	32	
B. Provincial and Private Railways.				
17. Kiukiang-Nanchang	Nan-Hsun		86	
18. San-hap-hoi - Kang-moon (Sun-ning Railway)			63½	
19. Swatow- Chao-chow-fu	Chao-Shan	1906	26½	
20. Ta-yeh Mines Ry (Hupei). (Tien-shan-pu to Huang-shih-kang)			17	
21. Tsao-chuang to Tsai-erh-chuang. (Colliery Railway)				
C. Concessions.				
22. Chinese Eastern Ry. (5 ft. Gauge)				
Sections.				
(a) Manchouli to Sui-fen-ho			921	
(b) Harbin to Kuan-ch'ang-tzu			152	
Branch.				
Angangki to Tsitsihar (Meter Gauge)		1907	17	
23. South Manchurian.				
Kuan-ch'ang-tzu to Dairen (Chang-chun)			439	
Branches.				
(a) Kuan-ch'ang-tzu to Kirin (Chang-chun - see #10)	Chi-Ch'ang	1912	80	
(b) Mukden to An-tung			189	
(c) Su-chia-tun to Fu-shun (Colliery Line)			39	
(d) Ta-shih-ch'iao to Ying-k'ou (Newchwang)			13½	
(e) Chou-shui-tzu to Port Arthur			28½	
(f) Szu-ping-kai to Cheng-chia-tun (See #14)			52	

NO OBJECTION TO PUBLICATION
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Additions to Combat Section of Monograph.

- MONOGRAPH REPORT -

China

2749

February 16, 1921.

(116)
(C) Continued.

China
Combat

RAILWAY	CHINESE DESIGNATION	Date of Opening to Tfc.	Open	Mileage Under Constr.
24. Shantung Railway.	Chiao-Chi	1904	256	
Tsingtao to Chi-nan Fu				
Branch. Chang-tien to Po-shan			28	
25. Yunnan Fu Railway. (Yunnan Fu to Lao-Kai) (Metre Gauge)		1910	289	

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF

[illegible]

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Additions to Combat Section of Monograph.

- Monograph Report -

China.

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February 16, 1921.

REC'D M.I.D., G.S. APR 9 1921

(61) Accoutrements — China
(A) — Combat

The great majority of Chinese soldiers have practically no accoutrements issued to them. The Japanese-equipped Divisions organized to participate in the European War [illegible] later called frontier defense divisions possessed all the accoutrements of Japanese troops. With their disbandment as a result of the Anfu defeat in July, 1920, this equipment was scattered amongst the troops of Chang Tso-lin and Tsao Kun.

The best equipped troops in China are those of Chang Tso-lin. Not all of these, however, are properly equipped with haversacks, mess outfits, etc.

The ordinary ration of the Chinese soldier is boiled rice, boiled vegetables and steamed or fried bread. Consequently the mess outfit of the average Chinese soldier is a wooden or earthen bowl for his rice or vegetable soup and a pair of chop sticks. The former he carries in his coat or shirt and the latter are stuck down inside of his legging.

Except for the Japanese equipped troops there are no haversacks. Most Chinese troops carry a large canvass bag suspended by a strap or rope from the right shoulder. This canvas bag contains the extra canvas shoes and clothing, stockings of the soldier, together with any extra ration which may have been issued to him.

Blankets, if issued, are of very cheap quality. They are carried over the left should er and under the right arm in a manner similar to that in which the American blanket roll was carried.

Chinese intrenchment tools are practically the same as those of our own troops and are issued in practically the same ratio of picks to axes to shovels. Very few soldiers have rain coats. It is a common sight in South China, however, to see the soldiers marching in the rain or in the hot sun protecting themselves with their paper umbrellas.

In place of identification tags the Chinese soldier wears a cloth badge about three inches wide and five inches long bent over his left breast coat pocket. This cloth has written upon it the soldiers name, rank, organization, etc. In peace times it may have even his conduct grade thereon. During the Anfu-Chili fighting in July, 1920, the troops under Wu Pei Fu all wore a band of red cotton cloth around their sleeve between the elbow and shoulder. The troops fighting under Chang Tso-lin, who was allied with Wu Pei Fu against the Anfu forces, wore a similar white band.

NO OBJECTION TO PUBLICATION
IN SERVICE JOURNALS.

Additions to Combat Section of Monograph.

- Monograph Report -

China.

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February 16, 1921.

(61) (A) **Accouterments** — **China Combat**

Cartridge Boxes and other means of carrying ammunition:- Japanese equipped troops have at their waist a leather cartridge box which will hold twenty or perhaps thirty rounds of ammunition. All Chinese troops have a long cotton belt which can be wound around the body two or three times or worn over each shoulder + under opposite arm. This belt will hold from 300 to 350 rounds of ammunition.

(61) (B) **Weight carried by Soldiers.**

The weight carried by the Chinese soldier is not much, except for his belt containing 350 rounds of ammunition, his rifle with bayonet and intrenching tools.

(C) **Weight carried by animals.**

As a large portion of the Chinese transport is dependent upon the animals and vehicles that can be found in the country where the troops are operating, there is no prescribed weight allowance which animals will carry. Chinese ponies, donkeys and mules are all sturdy beasts capable of carrying what look to foreigners to be excessive loads.

(D) **Reserve Stocks:**

There are no reserve stocks of accoutrements in China.

NO OBJECTION TO PUBLICATION
IN SERVICE JOURNALS.

Additions to Combat Section of Monograph

- Monograph Report -

China.

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February 16, 1921.

(42) MOUNTAIN. CHINA
COMBAT.

(A) ENGINEERS:

Some Engineer troops have Shenbung pontoon equipment. In the Chinese Army at the present time the engineers perform the duties of the Signal Corps stringing the field telephone lines wherever there are such. In peace times the engineer troops seem to perform mainly the duties of infantry soldiers.

(B) MEDICAL:

The Chinese Army has little in the way of hospital equipment. During the fight in July, 1920, the wounded, when picked up on the battlefield were carried by coolies on litters or on improvised litters to dressing stations along the railroad line. Here they were given hypodermics and temporary relief treatment, then sent by train to the hospitals in Peking or Paoting-fu.

(C) ORDNANCE:

In the Chinese Language "Artillery" is divided into three classes, Mountain, Field and Heavy. Most Divisions of troops have both Mountain and Field guns. There are practically no Heavy guns, however, in China although there a few batteries of 4.7's.

The Artillery harness is for the most part made of inferior leather with a liberal supply of ropes used in place of leather. Breast straps in place of collars are the rule.

Artillery ammunition may be of German, Japanese or Chinese manufacture. Small arms ammunition may be of Chinese, Japanese, or American manufacture. There is a shortage of all types of ammunition.

(D) TENTAGE:

The tentage is of poor quality. The tents are pyramidal type but made of a very light weight canvas.

The transportation pertaining the Chinese Army consists of two-wheel Chinese carts. In some sections of Manchuria four-wheel carts are common. Most transportation, however, is commandeered when operations are necessary.

(E) SIGNAL:

One 36-Inch portable searchlight with Fiat auto truck carrying a generator was captured by General Wu Pei Fu from the First Frontier Division in July, 1920. It is doubtful if there are any more of these in China although the other two Frontier Defense Divisions might each have had one.

NO OBJECTION TO PUBLICATION
IN SERVICE JOURNALS.

Additions to Combat Section of Monograph.

- Monograph Report -

China.

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February 16, 1921.

(E) EQUIPAGE. China Combat

(F) OTHER SERVICES:-

There are in the Chinese Army no gas, tank, or other modern equipment which has come into existence during the European War. The Chinese Army is short of all kinds of equipage as well as of arms and accoutrements.

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IN SERVICE JOURNALS.

Additions to Combat Section of Monograph.

- Monograph Report -

China.
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February 16, 1921.

(6S) Transport. CHINA COMBAT.

(A) Ammunition Trains:-

There are no especially designed ammunition trains in the Chinese Army. The ordinary Chinese carts (two-wheel or four-wheel,) depending on the part of the Country in which the troops are supplied) are used to carry ammunition and all other necessary supplies. Pack animals, mules, donkeys and ponies are all used as well.
Wheelbarrows would be used in Shantung.

(B) Supply Trains:—

See "A".

(C) Railway Troops:—

THere are no especially designated railway troops in the Chinese Army. During the fighting in July, 1920, between the Anfu and Chili factions the confusion and congestion of traffic and inefficiency of those in charge of the railway service on both sides was apparent to all.

NO OBJECTION TO PUBLICATION
IN SERVICE JOURNALS.

Additions to Combat Section of Monograph.

- Monograph Report -

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February 16, 1921.

CHINA
COMBAT

(64) Communications:

The Chinese Army is deficient in all forms of communications.

(A) Telephone Equipment:

The Chinese War Department has a comparatively few sets of field telephone equipment of an old type. It is doubtful if their average would be two sets per Division.

one

(B) Wireless Sets:

The exact number of field wireless sets owned by the Chinese War Department is not known. None have been seen at maneuvres.

(C) Visual Signal Equipment.

The Chinese buglers in each company are equiped as in with other armies with signal flags and are trained in their use. They are also trained in using lanterns for signal purposes at night; their equipment for this purpose is very meager, however.

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NO OBJECTION TO PUBLICATION
IN SERVICE JOURNALS.

Additions to Combat Monograph

Monograph Report

China

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February 16, 1921.

CHINESE RAILWAYS.

(116) Strategic Aspect — **Combat China**

(C) System of Communications - Adequacy of Railroads.

It is requested that the following, showing mileage open to traffic and under construction of all railways of China, be added to the Combat Monograph:--

Railway.	Chinese Designation	Date of opening to traffic	Milage open	Under constrn.
1. Peking-Mukden (Peking, Tientsin, Shan-hai-kuan, Hsin-min-tun, Mukden)	Ching-Feng	1903	525	
Branches:				
(a) Peking to Tung-chou			14	
(b) Feng-t'ai to Lu-kou-ch'iao			4	
(c) Tang-ho to Chin-wang-tao			6	
(d) Lien-shan to Hulu-tao			7	
(e) Kou-pang-tzu to Ying-k'ou (Newchwang)			57	
(f) Tientsin to Hsi-ku			3	
2. Peking-Hankow				
(a) [illegible]ng to Tu-li			12	
(b) Liu-li-ho to Chou-kuei-chuang			10	
(c) Kao-yi Hsien to Lin-ch'eng			18	
(d) Pao-ting Fu Branch			3	
(e) Kao-Pei-tien to Liang-ko-chuang-			36	
3. Tientsin-Pukow	Tsin-Pu	1912	629	
Branches.				
(a) Chen-tang-chuang to Liang-wang-chuang			16	
(b) Lin-cheng to Tsao-chuang			19	
(c) Yen-chou to Chi-ning			19½	
(d) Te-chou to Grand Canal			2½	
(e) Lu-k'ou to Huang-tai-ch'iao			5½	
4. Peking-Suiyuan	Pei-Sui			
(a) Feng-t'ai to Kalgan		1909	114	
(b) Kalgan, Te-tung-fu, Feng-chen, Sui-yuan		1915 (as far as) (Feng-chen)	203	59
Branch.				
Peking to Men-t'ou-kou				16½

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IN SERVICE JOURNALS.

Additions to Combat Section of Monograph

- MONOGRAPH REPORT -

China

2749

February 16

(116) (C) Continued.

RAILWAY	CHINESE DESIGNATION	Date of Opening to Traffic	Mileage Open	Mileage Under Constr
5. Shanghai-Nanking.	Hu-Ning	1908	195	
Branch Shanghai to Wu-sung		1898	10	
6. Shanghai-Nimpo.	Hu-Hang-Yung			
Branches. (a) Shanghai to Hang-chou		1908	118	
(b) Hang-chow to Ning-po			53 Open to Paikuan	
(c) Junction between Hu-ning and Hu-Hang-Yung Lines at Shanghai		1916	8	
7. Shan-hai (Shih-chia-chuang to T'ai-yuan) (Metre gauge)	Cheng-T'ai	1907	151	
8. Peking Syndicate Railway. (Tao-kou to Ching-hua-chen)	Tao-Ching	1904	93	
9. Lung-Hai Railway. (Hai-chou to Lanchou) (Open from Hsu-chou Fu to Kuan-y in-tang.)	Lung-Hai		365	190
10. Kirin-changchun Railway. (Operated as a branch of Southern Manchurian Ry)	Chi-Ch'ang	1912	80	
11. Ch'u-chou - Ping-hsiang Railway		1902	65	
12. Canton-Kowloon Ry. (a) Canton - Shum-chun (Chinese)		1911	89½	
(b) Shum-chun - Kowloon (British)		1910	23½	
13. Chang-chou - Amoy.				18
14. Sam-ping-hsi - Tao-nan-fu. (Operated as branch of Southern Manchurian Ry.)		1917 Open to Chen-Chia-tun	52	130
15. Canton-Hankow				

NO OBJECTION TO PUBLICATION
IN SERVICE JOURNALS.

Additions to Combat Section of Monograph.

- MONOGRAPH REPORT -

China

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February 16, 1921.

(116) 0	Continued	CHINESE DESIGNATION	Date of opening to tfc.	China Combat Milage open	under co
RAILWAY					
15. Canton-Hankow.					
SECTIONS.					
(a)	Wu-ch'ang to Yo-chou		1917	160	
(b)	Yo-chou to Ch'ang-sha		1918	130	
(c)	Chang-sha to Heng-chou		Open to Ch'u-chou	33	
(d)	Heng-chou to Shao-chou		1911	140	
(e)	Shao-chou to Canton				
16. Canton-Samui.			1904	82	
B. Provincial and Private Railways.					
17. Kiukiang-Nanchang		Nan-Hsun		86	
18. San-hap-hoi - Kong-moon (Sun-ning Railway)				63½	
19. Suetsu- Chao-chow-fu		Chao-Shan	1906	26½	
20. Ta-yeh Hiang Ry (Hupei). (Tien-shen-pu to Huang-shih-kang)				17	
21. Tsao-chuang to Tai-erh-chuang. (Colliery Railway)					
C. Concessions.					
22. Chinese Eastern Ry. (5 ft. Gauge)					
Section.					
(a)	Manchouli to Sui-fen-ho			921	
(b)	Harbin to Kuan-ch'ang-tzu			152	
Branch.					
Angenki to Tsitsihar (Meter Gauge)			1907	17	
23. South Manchurian.				439	
Kuan-ch'ang-tzu to Dairen (Chang-chun)					
Branches.					
(a)	Kuan-ch'ang-tzu to Kirin (Chang-chun - see #10)	Chi-Ch'ang	1912	80	
(b)	Mukden to An-tung			189	
(c)	Su-chia-tun to Pu-shun (Colliery Line)			39	
(d)	Ta-shih-ch'iao to Ying-k'ou (Newchwang)			13½	
(e)	Chou-shui-tzu to Port Arthur			28½	
(f)	Sau-ping-kai to Cheng-chia-tun (See #14)			52	

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Additions to Combat Section of Monograph.

- MONOGRAPH REPORT, -

China

2749

February 16, 1921.

(116)
(C) Continued.

China Combat

RAILWAY	CHINESE DESIGNATION	Date of Opening to Tfc.	Open	Mileage Under Constr.
24. Shantung Railway.	Chiao-Chi	1904	256	
Tsingtao to Chi-nan Fu				
Branch.				
Chang-tien to Po-shan			28	
25. Yunnan Fu Railway.				
(Yunnan Fu to Lao-Kai)		1910	289	
(Metre Gauge)				

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SUBJECT Additions to Combat Monograph of China.

Monograph Report

From China

No. 2856 Date June 25, 1921. , 19

Replying to No. Date , 19

REC'D, M. I. D., G. S AUG 9 1921

(41) Personnel
Add

The Tuchun System

The Chiangchun Fu.

(8) copies to M.I.D.
(1) Tientsin & Manila

Binding Margin.

Combat Monograph

CHINA. (41) Personnel
Add

The Tuchun System:

Without an understanding of what has come to be known as the Tuchun system it is impossible either to comprehend or to explain the existing preeminence of the military caste in China, the decentralization of military authority, the lack of all standardization in equipment, arms, and the like, and the lack in most organizations of discipline, of training and of efficiency.

The Revolution of 1911-12 was decidedly popular in the South and in some of the Northern provinces and the military leaders who initiated the various revolts against Manchu authority became popular heroes and were permitted to assume civil offices and powers which by tradition were jealously guarded for the literary caste. At the same time in the North the Manchus, in their last desperate effort to save themselves were forced to resign all their powers to Yuan Shih-kai, who was essentially militaristic, and to his closely organized following of military followers. In both the North and the south therefore the military acquired a hold upon administrative affairs which they have never relaxed.

The first Military Government of the provinces, appointed during and after the Revolution, were given the title of Tutuh ( ), and were entrusted with all the powers of civil and military officialdom combined. From the beginning of this new regime the provincial Civil Governor was virtually the subordinate of the Military Governor and then as now a military man frequently functioned in both capacities. Yuan Shih-kai altered the title at one time to Chiangchun ( ), and after his death in 1916, it was again changed to Tuchun ( ), the present designation.

As the authority of the Central Government has gradually broken down through conspiracy and civil war, the strength of the Tuchuns has grown until now their positions in their provinces are much like those of feudal barons in their semi-independent baronies and counties. Each regards the units of the army stationed in his province as his personal following and in the struggle for ascendency each spends a large proportion of the provincial funds upon the recruiting and equipment of larger and larger armies and without consulting the Central Government, and sometimes without even advising Peking of the increases. Like feudal barons the Tuchuns do not hesitate to make war upon one another or upon the Central Government and also to unite occasionally in groups to dictate national policy to Peking. The more powerful Tuchuns exert a dominating influence over the affairs of their weaker neighbours and when their hegemony over several provinces is firmly established, receive from the Central Government the title of Inspectors General, and are facetiously described in the press as Super Tuchuns.

Under pressure of popular opinion, which is strongly opposed to these military dictatorships, the abolition of the Tuchunate is advocated by many of the Tuchuns themselves and in one instance at least the title has been abolished and that of Provisional Director of Military Affairs adopted in its stead. This change of title of course works no improvement in conditions. The artificial inflation of the provincial armies has gone on steadily for some years, keeping pace with the ambitions of the Military Governors, and the army has at the same time been losing steadily in efficiency, morale and discipline.

The Chiangchun Fu:

The Chiangchun Fu ( ), or College of Marshals, is nominally council of high military officials, upon whom the rank of Marshal has been bestowed, whose duty it is to act in an advisory capacity to the Government. This organ was modelled after the Japanese Genro, or council of elder statesmen, but at present it constitutes little more than a roll of honour, since the members never meet and never unite to direct the Government's policy, upon which roll are inscribed the names of high military officials who have been removed from their posts by some turn of the political wheel and whom the Government wishes to retire gracefully. Nominally a generous stipend goes with this honour, but officers on active service never draw it. According to a list published at the end of March, 1921, there are 68 names on the roll, including those of a number of persons who are in active rebellion against the Government.

The present chief of this council is Marshal Chiang Kui-t'i ( ), Tut'ung of Jehol.

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SUBJECT: Addition to Gen[illegible]'s Kaogreugh of China.

MESSAGE REPORT

From: CHINA

No. 8078 Date: July 9th 1921, 19

Replying to No. Date: , 19

REC'D, M. I. D., G. S. AUG 11 1921

(47) STRATEGIC-

REC'D, M. I. D., G. S. AUG 11 1921

PROVINCIAL TROOPS SZECHWAN

Copies to :

5 M.I.D.
I Tientsin & Manila
2 File

Binding Margin

MILITARY FORCES IN SZECHWAN.

The U.S.Consul at Chungking,Szechwan,on June 20,1921 reports as follows:

The local Chinese press contains a statement of the results of a recent officail investigation into the number of troops in Szechwan. This shows that Szechwan is supporting 107,150 men, 96,400 of whom are armed with repeating rifles(magazine rifles), and 10,750 with single shot rifles.These troops are divided into 10 divisions,9 mixed brigades,and several independent units,the River Defense,the Northern ######## Frontier Defense,the Northwestern Frontier Defense and the Tibetan Frontier Defense.The strength of the Tibetan Frontier Defense is not included in the above but is estimated at about 4,000 men.The regular divisions and mixed brigades are grouped into three armies,the makeup of which is as follows:

First Army. Commander Tan Mou Hsing.
Made up of three Divisions,the 1st,5th,and 6th, and one mixed brigade,the 2nd.Total strength 27,300 men.

Second Army. Commander Liu Hsiang.
Made up of five Divisions,2nd,3rd,4th,9th and 22nd and 4 Mixed Brigades,the ### 1st,3rd,4th and 6th. Total strength 41,330,.

Third Army. Commander Liu Yu Chiu.
Made up of two Divisions,the 7th and 8th,and four Mixed Brigades,the 5th,7th,8th and 9th. Total strength 23,510.

A summary of the various organizations and their strength is given below,together with their approximate locations:

Unit	Commander	Strength	Station.
1st Div.	Yu Pei-ti	4,700	Suining & vic.
2nd "	Tang Shih-tsu	6,100	Along Yangtse in Wanhsien and vicinity.
3rd "	Teng Hsi-hou	6,100	Paoningfu.
4th "	Pan Wen-hua	4,900	Lunganfu.
5th "	Ho Kwang-lieh	5,100	Shungking and vicinity.
6th Div.and River Guards.	Yu Chi-tang	13,000	Suitingfu and vicinity and along Yangtse east of Chungking.
7th Div.	Chen Kuo-tung	5,000	On Big Road between Chungking and Chengtu
8th "	Chen Hung-fan	5,510	Chiating and vicinity.
9th "	Yang Sen	8,100	Luchow and vicinity.
22nd "	Tang Ting-mu	4,740	In and about Tzechow.
1st Mixed Brig.	Liu Wen-hui	2,500	Suifu,etc.
2nd " "	Chang Chung	4,500	Kweifu,etc.
3rd " "	Li Shu-hsun	2,800	Chiangpei and Hochow.
4th " "	Yuan Pin	3,800	Near Chungking.
5th " "	Chang Cheng-hsiao	2,600	Chengtu.
6th " "	Liu Ping-hsun	2,300	Wanhsien and Liang-shan.
7th " "	Lan Shih-cheng	1,800	Chengtu and Kwanhsien.

8th Mixed Brig.	Tien Tsung-6ao	4,100	Paoningfu
9th " "	Liu Pin	4,500	Do.
Northern Szech. Frontier Defense	Lai Hsin-Hui Comdr.	3,000	Lunganfu and Mienchow.
Do.	Wang Hung-an Vice Comdr.	2,000	Kwang Yuan etc.
3rd Army Mixed Corps	Chen Yu-sung	2,00	Chengtu.
Northwest Frontier Defense	Chang Pang-peng	3,000	Sung Pan, Li Fan Ting.
Mobile Army	Peng Kwang-lieh	3,000	Chengtu.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

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1922 2009-125 FEB 3

SUBJECT COMBAT - MONGOLIA (G-2 REPORT)

From CHINA Mongolia - Combat.

No. 5007 Date December 19, 1921., 19

Replying to No. Date , 19

GEORGE L. O'CONNOR
Capt, Inf., U.S.A.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. FEB 2 1922

41. Personnel.

Omit sentence, "Mongolia has no paid Regular Army."

Add: There is one representative of the Far Eastern Republic employed as a military instructor by the Mongols.

(Authority, Mr. Larson.)

The Soviet troops in Mongolia are under Soviet leaders who really control for the present the Mongol government.

42. First Line (Change).

There are about 3000 Mongolian Cavalry and a battery of Mongolian artillery trained largely by Russian officers. Armed men could be quickly collected to the number of perhaps 5,000 if service was to be made against the Chinese.
(Mr. Larson and Mr. Williams.)

48. Tactical. (Change)

In June and July, 1921, the forces of Baron Ungern were decisively defeated by those of the Soviet government and the Far Eastern Republic, Ungern himself being finally captured, taken to Soviet Russia and put to death.
(Authority - Mr. Hodoroff, Dalta News Agcy.)

The present forces in Mongolia are:

1500	Mongol soldiers	at	Ude (Midway between Kalgan and Urga)
250	" "	" Zain Chabi	~~Zain Chalu~~ (S.W. of Urga)
600	" "	" Kerulin	~~Kerulin~~ (About midway between Urga & Manchuli)
1500	" "	"	Urga
600	Russian (Soviet) soldiers	"	Urga

200 of these are effective cossacks, the remainder are inefficient infantry. The Commander's body guard has 5 machine guns.
(Authority - Mr. Williams, Mongolian Trad'g Co.)

In Soviet Russia between Kiakhta (on the Mongolian frontier and Verkhne Udinsk there are 10,000 Soviet troops.

(Authority - Mr. Williams - Mongolian Trad'g Co.)

The Chinese detachments that formerly occupied Pang Kiang, 155 miles from Kalgan on the Kalgan-Urga road,

(48) (Continued).

have melted away until there are now only about one Company. These troops for the most part probably still remain in Inner Mongolia but have withdrawn to the Chinese villages which extend from Kalgan about 100 miles along the road to Urga. In these villages they can force the people to care for them.

(Authority - Travellers from Urga.)

Of the estimated 28 pieces of Artillery
24 machine guns
10,000 rifles (chiefly old models)
and rifle and artillery ammunition

belonging to the Ungern-Mongol force, it is believed that the largest part is now in the hands of the Soviet troops north of the Mongolian frontier.

Perhaps the Soviet troops in Urga and the Mongols together might have 10 pieces of artillery
5 machine guns
5,000 rifles (chiefly old models)
and a limited supply of rifle and artillery ammunition.

(Authority - Major Philoon after conversation with various travellers from Mongolia)

54. Elan (Add).

The Chinese soldier and officer is as a class afraid of the Mongol when campaigning in Mongolia. The "Indian method" of fighting used by the Mongols on the plains of Mongolia causes the Chinese soldier to lose his nerve.

(Authority - Chinese ex-officer.)

67. Secrets (Add).

The conclusion of the above agreement is doubted for the following reasons:

1. Prior to October, 1920, the Mongols had refrained from seeking outside assistance hoping that an American or British consulate would be established in Urga which would cause the Chinese to stop their oppression. (Statement of representative, Living Buddha to Mr. Larson & Maj. Philoon in Oct., 1920.)

2. Russians have organized and are training the Mongols. (Mr. Larson, Dec., 1921.)

3. Japanese are not safe in Urga at the present time. (Mr. Larson, Dec., 1921.)

4. No Japanese supplies are known to have been furnished the Mongols, certainly no arms and ammunition. (Authority - Military Attache's Office.)

116. Strategic Aspect (Add).

Telegraphs.

As a result of the fighting in Mongolia the telegraph line from Kalgan to Urga is not working north of a paint about 100 miles north of Pang Kiang, a total of 255 miles from Kalgan. A survey of the damage done has just been made. It is found that 2000 poles and one wire are missing. The problem of transporting the poles to replace those destroyed is considerable. Plans are now being made to repair the line. The Urga-Kiakhta-Verkhne Udinsk line is working. (Authority - Mr. Albertsen, Supt., Chinese Teleg. Adm., Peking.)

Wireless.

The wireless station in Urga is receiving messages but owing to a lack of gasoline to run the generator messages can not be sent.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT: STATION LISTS OF OPPOSING FORCES AS OF FEB. 15,1922.

(G-2 Report).

From: GENERAL COMBAT

No. 2960 Date: March 2, 1922, 19

Replying to No. Date 19

RECEIVED 6/2 M2 APR 3 1922

(16) DISTRIBUTION. Add:

STATION LISTS:

The attached Station Lists, one for each province or territorial division, showing:

Formation, Etc.,	Inf. Bn.	Cav. Sq.	Art. Bn.	Eng. Co.	Tr. Co.	Guns	Mach. Guns	Total Strength Luchun	Total Other.

consist of revisions of data now in Monograph under

(42) First Line
(44) Peace
(47) Strategic
(48) Tactical
(49) Territorial.

It is suggested that the sheets under above headings, hereby corrected, be withdrawn and a remark such as "See Station List under (16) Distribution" be substituted therefor.

Copy to I. O. Manila.

Encl 1
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2009-12
3-1
22
WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINESE ARMED FORCES, as of Feb. 15, 1942

									TOTAL STRENGTH	
									NORTHERN — SOUTHERN	TOTAL, CO
[illegible]	N.	74	1½	2			16	20	30,300	
[illegible]	N.	94	3	4	8	8	82	24	45,200	
[illegible]	N.	186½	39½	20½ 23½	30	30	312	214	124,270	
PROVINCIAL FORCES:										
(1) Anhwei	N.	50	15	8	4	4	96	60	26,550	
(2) Chahar	N.	37	34½	6	4	4	105	22	19,780	
(3) Suiyuan	"	26	6	3			84	20	12,420	
FUKIEN	N.	66	15	11	9	9	150	140	44,600	
"	S.	6								1,800
HONAN (HUNAN)	N.	83	22	12	5	5	140	72	45,250	
HUNAN	N.	110	20½	11	17	16	162	44	71,165	
HUPEH	N.	118	16	20	21	21	336	82	80,720	
KANSU	N.	63	17	2			36		23,700	
KIANGSI	N.	83	3½	6	5	5	90	22	42,650	
KIANGSU	N.	143	7½	10	13	14	168	72	69,030	
KWANGSI	S.	24	4	5			36	6		45,000
"	N.								8,000	
KWANGTUNG	S.	114		11	12	11	128	56		64,800
KWEICHOW	S.	70	1	1	1	1	24			25,500
MANCHURIA	N.:									
(1) Fengtien		50	21	8	9	9	132	64	35,080	
(2) Kirin		54	17	8	12	18	132	62	38,760	
(3) Heilung-kiang		29	24½	10	11	10	154	50	27,595	
SHANSI	N.	42½	4½	2			30		17,445	
SHANTUNG	N.	91½	14	11½	3	3	130	30	49,260	
SHENSI Shensi/	N.	83	15	15	13	13	204	94	55,580	
SINKIANG	N.	42½	39½	1	1		45		20,635	
SZECHUAN	N.	204	11½	12	25	21	108	36	~~118,150~~ (113,150)	
YUNNAN	N.								45,825	
TOTALS:	N.	1801½	333½	167½	170	170	2420	1046	946,665	
	S.	214	5	17	13	12	188	62	137	137,100
TOGETHER		2015½	338½	184½	183	182	2608	1108		1,083,765

Provinces marked "N" are Northern, indicating Bns., Sqs., etc., on that line are nominally Northern or of the Central Government while those marked "S" are Southern. Figures include all Luchun, Provincial or other troops detailed on the accompanying Station Lists.

O.I.
0104

ANHWEI.

FORMATION, & Etc.		NAME OF COMMANDER	LOCATION.
Model detachment			Anching
"Old Anwu" -- "Fairly well officered and equipped". More loyal to			
"OLD ANWU"	1st (Anhwei) Mix. Brig.	Ma Lien Ch'a	Wuhu and Ta-tung
	2d " " "	Li Ch'uan-yeh	P'eng-pu
	3d " " "	Wang P'u	Wu-yi,& Chu-chow
	4th " " "	Chia Chiang-chin.	Nan Hsu-chow
	5th " " "	Shih-Chun-yu	Anking
Military Governor's Guard			P'eng-pu
Gendarmerie			Fu Li-chi & along R.R.
"New Anwu" -- Remnants of Chang Hsun's forces commanded by Tuchun			
5 Mixed brigades --			Feng-pu & along R.R.

Totals . . . . . .

No troops from other provinces.

No troops in other provinces.

O.K.

DESIGNATION, & Etc.	NAME OF COMMANDER.	LOCATION.	Inf. Bn.
1st Chekiang Div. (temporary)	Pan Kuo-kang	Hangchow	12
2d " " "	Chang Tsai-yang	Ning Po	12
1st " Mix.Brig.	Ch'en Chiang	Hangchow	6
2d " " "	Chen Ping-yun	"	7
Yu Chi-Tui (Police)		scattered	
Ching Pei Tui (Police)		"	36
Fortress troops		Chin-hai	1
Shou-pei Regt. (Guard)			3
Troops from other provinces:			
4th Luchun Div.	Ch'en Lo-shan	Hangchow	12
10th " "	Lu Yung-hsiang	"	5
Totals			94

No Chekiang troops in other provinces.

CHEKIANG.

Inf. Bn.	Cav. Sq.	Bn. Art.	Bn. Co.	Tr. Co.	Guns	Mach. guns.	Total Strength Luchun	Other	TOTAL.
12	1	3	4	4	34	12	8000		8000
12	3	3	4	4	54	12	6000	?	6000
6							3000		3000
7	1						3700		3700
							[illegible]	2100	2100
36								10800	10800
1								200	200
3								900	900
12	1	3	4	4	48	8	7900		7900
5						4	2600*		2600

*Remainder around Shanghai

94	3	6	8	8	82	24	31200	14000	45200

CHIHLI.

FORMATION, Etc.	NAME OF COMMANDER	LOCATION	INF. BN.	CAV. SQ.	ART. BN.	EN. CO.	TR. CO.	GUNS	MACH. GUNS	TOTAL STRENGTH LOCHUN CORPS	TOTAL	
15th Mix. Brig. (Tuchun's Bodyguard)	Sun Yueh	Paotingfu	6	1	1	1	1	10	20	1500	1500	
1st Chihli Reserve Regt.	Sung Hsi-chun	Chochow	3	½	½			4	4	800	800	
2nd " " "	Liu Chin-yi	Shuntefu	3	½	½			4	4	800	800	
3rd " " "	Niu ,	Lin Li-ho	3	½	½			4	4	800	800	
4th " " "	Liu Hsi-ling	Chengtingfu	3	½	½			4	4	800	800	
9th Luchun Division	Lu Chin	Peking (Pei Yuan)	12	3	3	4	4	48	24	9000	9000	(?)Probably not complete.
13th " "	Wang Huai-ching	" (Hsi Yuan)	12	3	3	4	4	48	24	9000	9000	President's.
16th " "	Tsou Fen,	" & Kalgan	9			3	3		18	6000	6000	*
23rd " "	Wang Ch'eng-pin	Paotingfu	12	3	3	4	4	48	24	9000	9000	Tsao Kun's
26th " "	Tsao Ying	Ma Chang	12	3	3	4	4	48	24	9000	9000	Tsao Kun's
Peking Gendarmerie	Chen Hsin-ya	Peking		2						450	450	
President's Guard	Lu Chin-ling	Peking	1	½				4	10	2530	2530	
Other Bodyguards		Peking	5	½	½			4	10	2530	4000	4000
Pu Chun	Wang Huai-ching	Peking	7							4000	4000	
Police	Yin Hung-shou	Peking	20							20000	20000	Under Wang Huai-Ching.
Ching Pei-Tui	Wang Ta	Peking	6	2						2000	2000	
Shou Pei Tui		Scattered	28	12						10400	10400	
Yi Chun	Wang Huai-ching	Peking	1							300	300	
Salt Gabelle Troops	Sun Min-shan	T'angku	2½	1						1570	1570	

*Note:--1 Regt. Inf. & Cav. & Art. in Chahar - Chang Tso-lin's.

TROOPS FROM OTHER PROVINCES:

(Continued)

CHIHLI (Continued).

FORMATION, Etc.	NAME OF COMMANDER	LOCATION	INF. BN.	CAV. SQ.	ART. BTY.	EN. CO.	TR. CO.	GUNS	MACH. GUNS	TOTAL STRENGTH OFFICERS	TOTAL STRENGTH OTHER RANKS	TOTAL	
TROOPS IN OTHER PROVINCES:													
1st Fengtien Div.	Chang Ching-hui	Peking (Nan Yuan)	12	3		3	4	4	18	24	9820	9820	
6th " M.B.	Pao Te-shan	Lanfang	6	1		1	1	1	18	24	4000	4000	
7th " " "	Li Chun-lin	Lanfang	6	1		1	1	1	18	24	4000	4000	
2nd " " "	Cheng Tsao-shen	Peking Nanyuan	6	1		1	1	1	12	12	4000	4000	
que " " "	Wei Ching-fu	Tungchow	6	1		1	1	1	12	12	4000	4000	
1st Luchun Div	At Peking Under	T'sai Cheng-hsun	12	3		3	4	4	42	16	9000	9000	Some units still in Suiyuan.
Military Police	Chin Hua	Peking	5								2500	2500	
Totals			~~100~~ 186½	~~30~~ 39½	~~21~~ 22¼	~~32~~ 30	~~32~~ 30	~~100~~ 312	~~202~~ 214	~~82700~~ 86700		~~120,270~~ 126,270	

FRONTIER TERRITORIES.

(I) JEHOL. (II) CHAHAR. (III) SUI YUAN.

FORMATION &C.	NAME OF COMMANDER	LOCATION.	INF. BN.	CAV. SQ.	ART. BN.	EN. CO.	TR. CO.	GUNS	MACH. GUNS	TOTAL STRENGTH LOCHUN		TOTAL.
(1) Jehol.												
1st Jehol Mixed Brig.	Shu He-chun	Jehol	3	4	3			36	12	3150		3150
Hsun Fang Tui		Hq. at	11	3	1			12			5000	5000
Troops from other provinces.												
28th Div.	Hsi Chin-chun	Jehol	12	3	3	4	4	36	24	9000	[illegible]	9000
Yi Chun	Wang Huai-ching	scattered, Jehol-Peking.	24	5	1		[illegible]	12	24		9400	9400(?) Between Peking and Jehol.
	Totals.		50	15	8	4	4	96	60	12150	14400	26.550
(II) Chahar. - Kalgan.												
1st Temporary Mix. Brig.	Ch'en Hsi-wu	Chahar District	6	1	1			18	4	3700		3700
Tutung's Bodyguard		Kalgan	½	½						200		200
Independent Chahar Cav. Regt.	Yuan Tien-Shun	"		3						680		680
Chahar Hsun Fant-Tui	?	scattered		12							1440	1440
Ching Pei Tui		scattered		2							240	240
Railway police		along R. R.		2							400	400
Guard to remount establishment.	Kuo Chen-piao	T'ai pu Ssu		1							120	120

(Continued) Troops from other Provinces.

FRONTIER TERRITORIES (Continued)

FORMATION & Etc.	NAME OF COMMANDER	LOCATION.	INF. BN.	CAV. SQ.	ART. BN.	MR. CO.	TR. CO.	GUNS	MACH. GUNS	TOTAL [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	REMARKS
(II) Chahar - Kalgan (Continued).													
TROOPS FROM OTHER PROVINCES.													
16th Division	Tsou Fen		3	3	3	4	4	54	18		3000	3000	remainder in Peking.
Chihli Hsun Fang Tui			4	6	1			12			3000	3000	
25th Luchun Mixed Brig.	Chi Chan Chin	Kalgan	3 [illegible]	1	1			9			1000	1000	Lost heavily in Urga in 1921
Yichun	Wang Huai-ching	scattered	21	3	1						6000	6000	
Totals, ...			37½	34½	6	4	4	105	22	4580	15200	19780	
(III) Suiyuan.													
1st Mixed Suiyuan Brig.	Li Huan-chang	Kwei Hua Cheng	6	1	1			24	8	3500		3500	(1)This may be two of the mixed regts. below.
1st Mixed Regt.	Wang Lin-Ch'ing	"	3	1				6	4	1500		1500	
2nd " "	Ni Yin-fu	Saratse	3	1	1			18	4	1500		1500	
3rd " "	Cheng Chin-cheng	Pao T'eu	3	3				18	4	1500		1500	
Suiyuan Temporary Cav. Regt.	Li Hsi-feng	Kwei-Hua Cheng		3						670			
Mixed Banner Regt. (Suiyuan)		Suiyuan	3	1	1			18		1750			
Suiyuan Hsun Fang Tui		scattered	4								1000		
Suiyuan Ching Pei Tui		Pao T'eu	4								1000		
Troops from other Provinces.													
1st Luchun Div.	Ts'ai Ch'eng-hsun	Suiyuan											
Totals, ...			26	8	3	—	—	84	20	10420	2000	12420	Practically all in Peking.

FUKIEN. NORTHERN TROOPS:

FORMATION, ETC.	NAME OF COMMANDER	LOCATION.	INF. BN.	CAV. SQ.	ART. BN.	EN. CO.	TR. CO.	GUNS (ART.)	MACH. GUNS	TOTAL STRENGTH LUCHUN	TOTAL STRENGTH OTHER	TOTAL	
2ND Temporary Div.	Tsang Chi Ping	Chang Chow	12	3	2	2	2	30	24	10500		10500	
1st Fukien Mix. Brig.	Chang Ch'ing-ju	Foochow	6	2	2	1	1	30	24	5000		5000	
2nd " " "	Chia Wen-hsiang	S. of Province	6	2	2	1	1	12	24	4500		4500	
10th Luchun " "	T'ang Kuo-mu	Chuan Chow	6	2	1	1	1	18	24	4500		4500	
11th " " "	Wang Chi	Foochow	6	3	2	1	1	30	20	5000		5000	
24th " " "	Wang Yung-Ch'uan	near Yenping	12	3	2	3	3	30	24	10000		10000	Chang Tso-lin's
Chin Pei Tuid	Hsu Shao-an	Hq. at Foo-chow, Chuan Chow, etc.	6								1800	1800	
Chen Wu Chun	Lung Chi-kuang	Amoy	3								1000	1000	
River Police	Shih Fing-yang	Min River	4								1000	1000	
Military Governer's Guard		Foochow	2								800	800	
	TROOPS FROM OTHER PROVINCES:												
"Medel Army" Regt.	Kong (?)	Hankong	3								(?)	1800 (Southern)	
	Totals (Northern troops)		66	15	11	9	9	150	140	40,000	4600	44,600	
	SOUTHERN TROOPS												
Hsun Fang Tui		South of Province	6										
	Totals. . .(Southern)		6									1800 (Southern).	

HONAN.

FORMATION, ETC.	NAME OF COMMANDER.	LOCATION.	INF. BN.	CAV. SQ.	ART. BN.	EN. CO.	TR. CO.	GUNS	MACH. GUNS.	TOTAL STRENGTH LOCAL	TOTAL OTHER	TOTAL	
1st Honan Div.	Ch'ao Chieh	scattered, hq. at Kaifeng	12	3	3	1	1	54	16	9150		9150	
2nd " "	Pao Teh Chuan	scattered, hq. at Shangshui	19	5	2			36	16	9000		9000	Apparently the 2nd Honan Div. is composed of the 1st and 3rd Honan Mix. Brigades of irregular organization.
1st " Mixed Brig.	Yueh Hsien-yu	Kaifeng	6	1	1			4		3000			
Liu Yu Hsien Feng Tui		scattered, Hq. at Nanyang	4	1	1			12 (?)	16		1800	1800	1° Regt. 2 Inf. 1 Cav. bn. 2° " " 1 Art. bn.
Left Wing troops		scattered, Hq. at Nanyang	6								1800	1800	
Right " "		scattered	6								1800	1800	
West Honan Border Defense		" Hq. at Kaifeng	7	2							2700	2700	
Hsin Lien Hsun Feng Tui		Kaifeng	3								900	900	
Yi Chun Shing Ying Yi Tuan	Wang Huai-shing		5	5	2						3000	3000	1 Cav. Sq. included is actually over the border in Hunan Prov. ; 2 inf. Bns included are actually over border in Anhwei Prov.
Tuchun's Bodyguard			3	2							2100	2100	
TROOPS FROM OTHER PROVINCES.													
3#RD Luchun Division	Wu Pei-fu	Loyang	12	3	3	4	4	54	24	10000		10000	6th Inf. Brig. in Hupeh temporarily.
	Totals		83	22	12	5	5	160	72	33250	12000	45,250	

HUNAN.

FORMATION, ETC.	NAME OF COMMANDER.	LOCATION.	INF. BN.	CAV. SQ.	ART. BN.	EN. CO.	TR. CO.	GUNS	MACH. GUNS	TOTAL RIFLES, ETC.	TOTAL	
1st Hunan Div.	Sung Hoo-ken	Changsha	12	2	2	4	4	18	4	8985	8985	Included in Provincial Army of 25000
2nd " "	Lu Tiao-p'ing	"	12		1	2	2	18	4	7568	7568	" "
1st " M.B.	Yeh Kai-shiu	Changsha	7	1	1	1		18	4	4281	4281	" "
3rd " " "	Hsieh Kuo-kuang	Changsha	6					18	4	3020	3020	" "
5th " " "	Wu Chien-hsueh	Paoting	6½			1	1			3279	3279	
6th " " "	Chen Cha-ye	Chengchow	6	½	½	1	1			3671	3671	
7th " " "	Lea Kuang-kai	Liu Yang and Changsha	6			1	1			2322	2322	
8th " " "	Tang Jung-Yang	Lichow	6			1	1			2496	2496	
9th "(CAV)"	Liu Hsu-yi	Shenchow		6	½					2390	2390	
10th " " "	Tien Chen-pan	Hunkiang		6	½					2316	2316	
13th Section, 2nd Sub-section,		Tayung	6(?)							2578	2578	
Gendarmerie	Wang Teh-ching	Changsha	1							279	279	
" Hupeh"Troops	Hsia Tao-yin	Changsha	3(?)							1000	1000	Largely Hunanese
Totals.			71	15½	5	11	10	72	16	44865	44865	
FROM TROOPS IN OTHER PROVINCES:												
"Kwangsi" troops	Shun Hung-yin	Pingkiang	15(?)		1(?)					10000	10000	Nearly all "
24th Luchun Div.	Chang Fu-lai	Yochow	12	3	3	4	4	54	16	9700	9700	Tuan Kun's troops
1st Shantung M.B.	Chang Ke-Yao	Yochow	6	1	1	1	1	18	6	3600	3600	" " "
14th Luchun M.B.	P'eng Shou-hsin	Yochow	6	1	1	1	1	18	6	3600	3600	Mutiny Feb. 1922.
Totals.			39	5	6	6	6	90	28	26900	26900	
Grand Total			110	20½	11	17	16	162	44	71165	71165	

1

KANSU.

FORMATION, ETC.	NAME OF COMMANDER	LOCATION.	INF. BN.	CAV. SQ.	ART. BN.	EN. CO.	TR. CO.	GUNS.	MACH. GUNS.	RIFLES.	TOTAL.
Kansu Old Style troops	(?)	scattered	48	14							
Tushun's Body Guard	Kung Yang-Chin	Lanchow	4	1	1					17000	17000
Hsin Shou Pei Tui		scattered	11	2	1			18		2600	2600
								18		4100	4100
			63	17	2			36		23700	23700

HUPEH.

FORMATION, ETC.	NAME OF COMMANDER	LOCATION	INF. BN.	CAV. SQ.	ART. BN.	EN. CO.	TR. CO.	GUNS.	MACH. GUNS	TOTAL [illegible]	[illegible]	TOTAL	
1st Hupeh Inf. Brig.	Yin Tung-yü	Wu-sueh	6							2200		2200	
2nd " " "	K'ou Ying-chieh	"	6							2200		2200	
3rd Hupeh M.B.	Sung Ta-pai	Hsin-ti (?)	6		1	1	1	18	6	3750		3750	
4th " " "	Liu Tso-lung	Hsiao-kan (?)	6	½	1			18	6	3870		3870	
Hankow-Hsun Chi Tui	Hankow Defense Com.	Hankow	3								1100	1100	
Tuchun's Bodyguard		Wuchang	1							500		500	
Gendarmerie	Chia Ch'i-hao	"		1						300		300	
	TROOPS FROM OTHER PROVINCES:												
2d Luchun Div.	(?)	Wuchang	12	2	3	4	4	30	12	7000		7000	Formerly Wang Chung-yün's
8th " "	Wang Ju-chin	Shasi	12	3	3	4	4	54	16	9000		9000	
18th " "	Sun Ch'uan-fang	Ichang	12	3	3	4	4	54	8	9000		9000	
25th " "	Hsiao Yueh-nan	Wuchang	12	3	3	4	4	54	16	9000		9000	
2nd Mixed Brigade	Liu Yueh-lung	Hankow	6	1	1	1	1	18	4	3500		3500	
12th " "	Kao Hsu-pin	Hankow	6	1	1	1	1	18	4	3500		3500	
13th " "	Ting Cheng-kuo	Yang Lo-tung	6	1	1	1	1	18	4	3500		3500	
8th " "	CHIN YUN-AO	Wuchang	7							3500		3500	
17th " " (LUCHUN)	Chang Lien-sheng	Yunyang	6	1	1			18		3500		3500	
18th Luchun M.B.	Chao Yung-hua	Shih-nan	6	1	1			18		3500		3500	
21st " " "	Wang Tu-ching	Shih-nan	6	1	1	1	1	18	6	2000		2000	Located Wuh-ang 6-1-21.
	Totals.		117	16	20	21	21	336	82	69620	1100	80720	

KIANGSI.

FORMATION, ETC.	NAME OF COMMANDER	LOCATION	INF. BN.	CAV. SQ.	ART. BN.	EN. CO.	SR. CO.	GUNS	MACH. GUNS	TOTAL STRENGTH LUCHUN	TOTAL STRENGTH OTHER	TOTAL
# 3rd (Luchun) Mix. Brig.	Chang Lin	Nanchang	6		1			18		3410		3410
Sheng Fang Tui		scattered	12		1			12	6		6300	6300
Ching Pei Tui	Chang Tsung Liang	Nanchang	5								1500	1500
Tuchun's Bodyguard		Nanchang	1	½							400	400
Yu Chi Tui		scattered	20								6000	6000
River Police		scattered									2000	2000
TROOPS FROM OTHER PROVINCES:												
9th Luchun Mix. Brig.	Chen Kuang Kwei	Ta Yu	6		1	1	1	6	8	3540		3540
12th " Div.	Chen Kuang Yuan	Nanchang	12	3	3	4	4	54	8	9000		9000
Also:												
2nd Kiangsi Inf. Brig.	Lin Yu-kun	Hanchow	6							3000		3000
Five " " Regts.		One at Kiukiang	15							7500		7500
Totals			83	3½	6	5	5	90	22	~~26450~~ (26450)	16200	42650

Kiangsu.

FORMATION, ETC.	NAME OF COMMANDER	LOCATION	INF. BN.	CAV. SQ.	ART. BN.	EN. CO.	TR. CO.	GUNS	MACH. GUNS	TOTAL STRENGTH. RIFLES	OTHERS	TOTAL	
2ND Kiangsu Div.	Chu Hsi	See Chow	12	1	1	2	2	18	8	7200		7200	
1st Kiangsu M. B.	Ma Yu-jen	Tsing Kiangpu	9				1		4	4860		4860	
2nd " " "	Hwang Chen Kwei	Yang Chow	6							2500		2500	
3rd " " "	Li Tien-Chen	Nanking	6						8	2600		2600	
4th " " "	Wu Heng Tsau	"	9							3500		3500	
5th " " "	Chen Tiao-yuan	Hsuchowfu	6		1	2	2	18	4	3720		3720	Formerly the 7th M. B.
6th " " "	Chang Jen-kuei	Tung Chow	7	½	1	1	1	6	12	4160		4160	
Gendarmerie		Shanghai		½							120	120	
River Police & Salt Police			41								11000	11000	
Tao yin's Guard			2								600	600	
Ching Pei Tui	Pai Pao Shan (?)	Hanchow(?)	8								3200	3200	
Hsun Chi Tui	Ma (?)	(?)	3								1200	1200	
TROOPS FROM OTHER PROVINCES.													
6th Luchun Division	Ch'i Hsieh Yuan	Nanking	12	3	3	4	4	54	24	8820		8820	
19th " "	Yang Chun Pu	Chinkiang	6		1			24		4500		4500	
10th " "	Lu Ying-hsiang	Shanghai & Wu-sung,	7	3	3	4	4	54	12	6400		6400	Remainder of Div. in Chekiang
Independent Regt. attached to 10th Div.		Wusung	3							1500		1500	
6th Luchun M. B.	He Feng-ling	Shanghai	6						2	3150		3150	
	Totals		143	7½	10	13	14	168	72	52910	16,120	69,030	

KWANGSI

FORMATION, ETC.	NAME OF COMMANDER.	LOCATION.	INF. BN.	CAV. SQ.	ART. BN.	EN. CO.	TR. CO.	GUNS	MACH. GUNS	TOTAL STRENGTH LEADERS OTHER	TOTAL.	
SOUTHERN.												
Kwangsi troops	(?)	(?)									4000	(?) Sun Yat-sen's
YUNNAN TROOPS:												
Miscellaneous troops	Lee Yao-Hsun	(?)									2000	Position unknown.
5th Yunnan M.B.	Hu Ye Yü	(?)									2000	
4th " " "	Yang Yi Chien	(?)	6	1	1	1		6	6		3500	
(?)	Chu Pai Teh	(?)									3500	
KWEICHOW TROOPS:												
1st Kweichow M.B.	Ku Cheng-lun	(?)	6		1			6			2000	
3rd KWANGTUNG Div.	Wei Pang P'ing	(?)	12	3	3			24			11000	
FUKIEN TROOPS	Hsu Ch'ing-Chih	With Sun Yat-sen.									16000	
			24	4	5			36	6		45000	(Estimated)
		Total, Southern troops,										
NORTHERN.												
Kwangsi	(?)	scattered									8000	(estimated)
		" Northern "										
Totals			24	4	5			36	6		53000	

(Information on Kwangsi Military Forces since the fighting in 1921 is very meager.)

KWANGTUNG (Southern)

FORMATION, ETC.	NAME OF COMMANDER	LOCATION	Inf. BN.	CAV. SQ.	ART. BN.	MR. CO.	TR. CO.	GUNS	MACH. GUNS	TOTAL STRENGTH OTHER	TOTAL
1st Kwangtung Div.	Teng Keng	Canton	12					24		11000	11000
2nd " "	Hung Chao-lin	Swatow District, Canton	12		3	4	4	24		9000	9000
1st " M.B.	Li Ping-jung	Waichow	6		1	2	2	8	3	7000	7000
2nd " " "	Hsung-Lo	Tseng-shin	6		1	2	2	8	3	7000	7000
3rd " " "	Teng Pen-yin	Hainan	6		1	1	1	8	3	7000	7000
4th " " "	Kuan Kuo-hsiung	Shin Chow	6		1	1	1	8	3	7000	7000
5th [illegible]	Chen Te-chun	Kongmoon	6							6000	6000
6th " " "	Wung Shih-liang	Canton	6		1	1	1	8	3	7000	7000
2nd Lü (District Detach.)	Ch'en Chiung-kuang	Limchow	8		1			8	6	2500	2500
3rd " " "	Liu Chun-ting	Fa Chow	3						3	1000	1000
4th " " "	Huang Ming-tang	Kochow	3						3	1000	1000
5th " " "	Chung Ching-tang	Kochow (Kochow)	6		1			8	3	2000	2000
Military Gov's Bodyguard		Canton	4						3	1200	1200
1st Ching Pei-Tui	Yang Kun-ju	Shiu Ling	12					8	6	4500	4500
2nd " " "	Lu Lan Chung	Kochow	6						3	2000	2000
34d " " "	Chen Shao-yu	Yan-p'ing	6					8	6	2000	2000
Troops of Li Lieh Chun											
	TROOPS FROMOTHER PROVINCES:										
Yunnan Mixed Brigade	Chao Te Yü	Liu Chow	6		1	1	1	8	3	6000	6000
Totals			114		11	12	11	128	56	64,800	9500	74,300

KWEICHOW (Southern)

FORMATION, ETC.	NAME OF COMMANDER	LOCATION	BN. INF.	CAV. SQ.	ART. BN.	EN. CO.	TR. CO.	GUNS	MACH. GUNS	[illegible]	[illegible]	TOTAL
2nd Kweichow M.B.	Hu Yung	Kwei Yang	6					6		[illegible]		[illegible]
3rd " " "	[illegible] Chang Chun-p'u	Tsun-yi	6					6		[illegible]		[illegible]
4th Kweichow M.B.	Teu Ch'u-jen	T'ung-jen	6					6		3000		[illegible]
5th " " "	He Ying-Chin	Kwei Yang	6					6		3000		3000
Chung Pei Tui	Lu Shan Shih	Kwei Yang (Hq.)	40								10000	10000
	TROOPS FROM OTHER PROVINCES:											
10th Yunnan M.B.	Chang Hwai-[illegible]	(?)	6	1	1	1	1			3500		3500
			70	1	1	1	1	24		15500	10000	25500

MANCHURIA: (1) FENGTIEN.

FORMATION, ETC.	NAME OF COMMANDER.	LOCATION.	BN. INF.	CAV. SQ.	ART. BN.	EN. CO.	TR. CO.	GUNS	MACH. GUNS.	TOTAL STRENGTH LUCHUN	TOTAL STRENGTH OTHER	TOTAL.
27th Luchun Div.	Chang Tso-hsiang	Mukden	12	3	3	4	4	54	24	9500		9500
29th Luchun Div.	Wu Chun-sheng	Taenan-fu	12	3	3	4	4	54	24	9500		9500-Border Inner Mongolia.
5th Fengtien M.B.	Chi En-ming	Kirin-Fengtien border	6	1	1			6		3400		3400
8th Fengtien M.B.	Kue Sung-ling	Mukden	6	1	1	1	1	18	16	3550		3550 (Acting Brig. Art is 4.7 guns
10th " " "	Kue Ying Cheu	Mukden District	6							3000		3000
11th " " "	Tang Yu-lin	Mukden	6							3000		3000
Arsenal Guard	(?)	Mukden	1							350		350
Fengtien Independent Cav. Regt.	Chang Jung	Hsin Min-fu		3						680		680
Chang Pei Tui	(?)	" " "	1	10						[illegible]	2100	2100
Totals			50	21	8	9	9	132	64	32980	2100	35,080.

MANCHURIA (2) KIRIN.

FORMATION, ETC.	NAME OF COMMANDER.	LOCATION.	INF. BN.	CAV. SQ.	ART. BN.	EN. CO.	TR. CO.	GUNS	MACH. GUNS	TOTAL STRENGTH LOCAL	TOTAL STRENGTH OTHER	TOTAL.	
1st Kirin M.B.	Hu Yung-kuei	Hunchun	6"	2	2			36	6	4850		4350	
2nd " " "	Chang Chin-Ching	Yenchi	6	3	1	4	1	18	6	4680		4680	
3rd " " "	Ch'ang Ming	Harbin and Imienpo	6	3			4		6	4300		4300	
4th " " "	Liu Hsiang-chin	Kirin, Harbin	6	3			4		6	4300		4300	
6th " " "	Kao Feng-Ch'eng	Harbin	6	3					6	3800		[illegible]	
Kirin Independent M.B., Regiment,	(?)	Kirin	6		2	4	4	36		4790		4790	
TROOPS FROM OTHER PROVINCES.													
19th Luchun M.B.	Chang Huan-hsiang	Harbin	6	1	1	4	4	18	12	4820		4820	Along C.E.R. between Harbin & Changchun.
1st Fengtien M.B.	Kan Ch'ao hsi	Kirin & Imienpo	6	1	1	1	1	6	4	3620		3620	
3rd " " " (Bodyguard Brig.)	Chang Hsueh-liang	Harbin & Imienpo	6	1	1			18	16	4100		4100	
TOTALS.			54	17	8	13	18	132	62	38760		38760	

MANCHURIA (3) HEILUNGKIANG.

FORMATION, ETC.	NAME OF COMMANDER	LOCATION.	INF. BN.	SQ. CAV.	ART. BN.	EN. CO.	TR. CO.	GUNS	MACH. GUNS.	TOTAL STRENGTH Lushun	Other.	TOTAL	
Tuchun's Bodyguard		Tsitsihar	2	1½	2	4	4	32	10	3720		3720	
1st Heilungkiang M.B.	Shih Te Shan	Hulan	6	2	1			4	4	2220		2220	
2nd " " "	Chang Ming-chiu	Tsitsihar	3	2						2220		2220	
3rd " " "	Pa Ying-O	Hei-ho	3	2		1		4	4	2480		2480	
4th " " "	Chang Hai-feng	Hailar & Mancheuli, Etc.	6	1	1	1	1	18	12	3500		3500	Formerly a part of 29th Div
1st Heilungkiang Cav. Brigade	Ma Jui-lu	Anda		6					4	1400		1400	
2nd "	Chang K'uei-wu	Hailar		6	1			4	6	1570		1570	
Heilungkiang Art. Regt.	Chao Kuang-li				3			54		1125		1125	
" Police Bn.			1							500		500	
Tuchun's Bodyguard			2	1½	2	4	4	32	10	3720		3720	
TROOPS FROM OTHER PROVINCES.													
4th Fengtien M.B.	(?)	Hailar, Etc.,	6		1	1	1	6		2400		2400	
Totals.			29	24½	10	11	10	154	50	27585		27585	

SHANSI.

FORMATION, Etc.	NAME OF COMMANDER.	LOCATION	INF. BN.	CAV. SQ.	ART. BN.	EN. CO.	TR. CO.	GUNS	MACH. GUNS	Total Strength Ranks	Other	TOTAL	REMARKS.
1st Shansi M. B.	Shang Chen	Taiyuanfu	6	1	1			12		3640		3640	
2nd Shansi M. B.	Ma K'ai-sung	Tat'ung fu	6							3030		3030	
1st Shansi Mix. Regt.	~~Li Min~~ Kao Shang Chen	(?)	3	1	1			18		2100		2100	
2nd " " "	Li Tzu-ling	(?)	3	1						1725		1725	
1st Inf. Bn. (Shansi)	Tsai Jung-shou		1							500		500	
2nd Shansi Inf. Bn.	Wang Tsan-hsü		1							500		500	
Tuchun's Bodyguard (Ching Pei Tui)	Chin Yang	Taiyuan-fu scattered	½ 2½	½ 2						200	5750	200 5750	
Totals.			42½	4½	2			30	(?)	11695	5750	17,445.	

2

SHANTUNG

FORMATION, ETC.	NAME OF COMMANDER.	LOCATION.	INF. BN.	CAV. SQ.	ART. BN.	EN. CO.	TR. CO.	GUNS	MACH. GUNS	TOTAL STRENGTH OFFICERS	TOTAL STRENGTH MEN	TOTAL
[illegible] Brigade	Shih Tsung-pin	Tsinan & Fushan	½		½			4		100		3100
2nd Shantung M. B.	Chang Huai-pin	Chefoo	6	1	1			18	4	3700		3700
3rd " " "	Chang Pei-yang	Ts'ao Chow-fu	6	1	1			18	4	[illegible]		[illegible] (3700)
4th " " "	Chang Chien-kung	[illegible] Tsung Ch'ang-fu	6	1	1			6	4	3380		33800
5th " " "	Li Sen	Ichow	6	1	1			6		3400		3400
6th " " "	He Feng-yu	Yenchow	6	1	1			6		3400		3400
1st Reserve Brig.	Ch'en Pao-lung	Ping Yuan district	6		1			8		3150		3150
1st Central Brig. (Chung Yang Yi Lü)	(?)	Tsining, Yutai and Shan hsien.	6							2500		2500
1st Mixed Regt.	(?)	Yi hsien	3	½						1000		1000
2nd " "	½ (?)	Tsiming Chow	3	½						1000		1000
Shou Pei Tui	(?)	Hui Miu, Pin Hsien, Lao-ling and Shang-ho	3	1						1200		1200
Tuchun's Bodyguard	(?)	Tsinanfu	2½	½						1230		1230
Navy Model Bn.	(?)	Yentai (Chefoo)	1							500		500
Tsin Pu R. R. Guard	(?)	Along R. R.	5							[illegible]	2000	2000
Chan Pei Tui	(?)	Tsinanfu	½	½							200	200
Yu Chi Tui	(?)	Chefoo	2								600	600

TROOPS FROM OTHER PROVINCES:

(Continued on next page)

SHANTUNG (CONTINUED).

FORMATION, ETC.	NAME OF COMMANDER	LOCATION	Inf. Bn.	Cav. Sq.	Art. Bn.	En. Co.	Sv. Co.	Guns	Mach. Guns	Total Strength Luchun	Other	TOTAL
5th Luchün Division	Cheng Shih-Ch'i	Tsinan-fu & Wei-hsien.	12	3	3	3	3	36	16	8700		8700
20th " M.B.	Wu Ch'ang-Chih	Teng hsien	6	1	1			6	8	2500		2500
1st Luchun " "	P'an Hung-Chun	Tsining	6	3	1			18		4000		4000
	Totals.		91½	14	11½	3	3	120	30	46,460	2800	49,260

SHENSI.

FORMATION, ETC.	NAME OF COMMANDER.	LOCATION.	Inf. BN.	CAV. SQ.	ART. BN.	EN. CO.	TR. CO.	GUNS	MACH. GUNS.	TOTAL STRENGTH LOCHUN	TOTAL STRENGTH OTHER.	TOTAL.	
(Shensi provincial organizations have greatly changed since June, 1921. Present organizations, commanders, strength, etc., unknown.) These herewith are shown in the Gov't Civil List of 1932.)													
1st Shensi Div.		Hu Ching-yi	(?)	12	1	1	1	1	18	6	8000		8000 (estimated)
1st " M.B.		Liu Shih-lung	North Shensi	6	1						3250		3250
2nd " " "		Chang Chin-ying	Li Ch'uan	6	1	1			18	8	3530		3530
1st " Mix. Regt.		Chang Hung-yuan	(?)	3	1	1			6	4	1500		1500
3rd " " "		Wang Hung-en	(?)	3	1	1			6	4	1200		1200
4th " " "		LO Yü-shan	(?)	3	1	1			6	4	1200		1200
TROOPS FROM OTHER PROVINCES.													
7th Luchun Div.		Wu Hsin-tien	South Shensi	12	3	3	4	4	54	16	9000		9000
11th " "		Feng Yü-hsiang	Sianfu	12	3	3	4	4	54	24	10000		10000 Formerly 16th Luchun M.B.
20th " "		(?)	"	14	2	2	4	4	18	16	9010		9010
4th Luchun M.B.		Chang Hsi-yuan	Weinan	6		1			6	8	3270		3270
5th " " "		Chu Tse-huang	Huajung	6	1	1			18		3620		3620
Totals.				84 (83)	15	15	13	13	204	94	55,580		55,580

SINKIANG.

FORMATION, ETC.	NAME OF COMMANDER.	LOCATION.	INF. BN.	CAV. SQ.	ART. BN.	EN. CO.	TR. CO.	GUNS	MACH. GUNS.	TOTAL STRENGTH LUCHUN	TOTAL STRENGTH OTHER	TOTAL.
1st Sinkiang Mix. Brig.	Chiang Sun-lin	(?)	4	3	1			24		3425		3425
19th Cav. Regt. (Altai Luchun)	Feng Liang	Sharasume		3				12		1000		1000
										1500		1500
Ili Kashgar Mix. Regt.	Ma Fu Hsin	Kashgar Dist.	3							500		500
1st T'a Cheng Inf. Bn.	Le Chan-piao	Ta Chen	1							50		50
1st Ta Cheng Cav. Sq.	Chu K'e-Kuei	Ta Chen		¼								
Hsun Fang Tui	(?)	Kashgar, Yarkand - Etc.,	17	10½							6360	6360
											3300	3300
Ching Pei Tui	Wang Chin Chung			8½	16½							
Kashgar Detachment		at Kashgar, Saranol and Yarkand	9	3				9		4500		4500
	Totals											
			42½	39½	1	—	—	45		10,975	9660	20,635
	Totals											

YUNNAN.

FORMATION, ETC.	NAME OF COMMANDER.	LOCATION.	INF. BN.	CAV. SQ.	ART. BN.	EN. CO.	TR. CO.	Art GUNS	MACH. GUNS	TOTAL STRENGTH RIFLES	TOTAL STRENGTH OTHER	TOTAL
1st Yunnan Mixed Brig.	Keng Chin-hsi	Hsuan wei	6		1			18	6	3000		3000
2nd " " "	Chin Hsu-ting	" "	6		1			18	6	3000		3000
3rd " " "	~~(?)~~ Yang Ti-chen	(?)								probably non existent		
4th " " "	Yang Yi Chien	In Kwangsi										
5th " " "	Hu Je-Yu	In Kwangsi										
6th " " "	Li Hsuan-ting	Kai-wha	6	1	1			6	6	3000		3000
7th " " "	Chiang Kuang-liang	Chao-tang	6	1	1			6	6	3000		3000
8th " " "	Chou Tsung Chien	Tali (probably non-existent)	3					6	6	1500		1500
9th " " "	Hua Feng Kue	Yui-li	6	1	1			6	6	1500		1500
10th " " "	Chang Huai Hsin	In Kweichow or non existent.										
Independent Mixed Regt.	Yang Hsi-min	Hsuan-Wei	3	1	(Under G.O.C. Eastern Def.)					1500		1500
1st Detachment	Teng Tai-chung	Hsuan Wei-Ma-lung	5							2500		2500
2nd "	Yang Chen	" " " "	5							2500		2500
8th Army(?)	Yeh Chuan	Chaotung	4							2000		3000
~~Ching~~ Wei Chun	Cheng Hsi-wen	Yunnan	6	1	1			18	6		3000	3000
Ting Chin Chun	Chin Chu-hsien	Yung-pei (Yang Tien-fu's & Wu Hsueh-hsien's robbers, /5/									2500	2500
1st Wei Shu	He Hsi-ching	Talifu	6								3000	3000
3rd " "	(?)	Yunnan	12					18	6		6000	6000
Sheng Fang	Chin Kuang-ti	"	2								900	900
Hsien Ping	Li Tien Pao	"	2								600	600

YUNNAN

FORMATION, ETC.	NAME OF COMMANDER	LOCATION.	INF. BN.	CAV. SQ.	ART. BN.	ENGR. CO.	TR. CO.	ART. GUNS	MACH. GUNS	TOTAL STRENGTH OFFICERS	TOTAL STRENGTH OTHER RANKS	TOTAL
Independent Western Def. Force,		Chung-tien									750	750
" Kechin Bn.		Kechin									500	500
" Chiang Wei		Talang									500	500
Pu Fang-Chih Pien		Puerh Frontier									1500	1500
Yu Chi Tui		Scattered.									2775	2775
											23,500	28,[illegible]52
		Totals.									23,500	[illegible]
											28022	45,525

SZECHWAN.

FORMATION, ETC.	NAME LOCATION OF COMMANDER	LOCATION	INF. BN.	CAV. SQ.	ART. BN.	ENGR. CO.	TR. CO.	GUNS MACH. GUNS	GUNS HOWITZERS	STRENGTH OTHER	TOTAL
Generalissimo General Liu Hsiang with no troops. 2d & 3d Armies loyal.											
1st Army doubtful.											
1st ARMY:											
1st Szechwan Div.	Yu Pei-ti	(?)	9	1	3	4	4	54	4	4700	
5th " "	He Kwang-lieh		12			4	2		8	5100	
6th " " and River Guards	Yu Chi-tang		24	3	3	4	4	18	8	13000	
2nd Szechwan M.B.	Chang Chun		6	1	1	1	1			4500	27,300 1st ARMY
2nd ARMY: →		← (Gen. Yang Sheng (Yang Tzu-hui) stationed at Chungking & neighborhood)									
2nd Szechwan Div.	Tang Shih-tsu		12	½	1	4	4	18	8	6100	
3rd " "	Tang Hsi-heu		12							6100	
4th " "	Pan Wen-hua		12		1	4	2	18	8	4900	
9th " "	Yang Sen		12	3	3	4	4			8100	
22nd Div.	Tang Ting-mu		6	3						4740	
1st Szechw. M.B.	Liu Wen-hui		6							2500	
3rd " " "	Li Shu-hsun		6							2800	
4th " " "	Yuan Pin		6							3800	
6th " " "	Liu Ping-hsun		6							2300	41,340 2nd ARMY
											68,640 1st & 2d Armies.
3rd ARMY: Gen. Liu Yu-Chiu, - stationed at Chengtu and vicinity.											
7th Szechwan Div.	Chen Kue-tung		12							5000	
8th " "	Chên Hung-fan		12							5518	

(continued)

SZECHWAN 2.

FORMATION, ETC.	NAME OF COMMANDER.	LOCATION.	INF. BN.	CAV. SQ.	ART. BN.	EN. CO.	TR. CO.	GUNS	MACH. GUNS.	TOTAL STRENGTH LOCHUN	OTHER	TOTAL	
3rd ARMY (carried from Page 1).										(Total fen., 1st & 3d Armies, br. fwd.		88,660	
7th Szechwan Div.	Chen Kuo-tung		12							5000			
8th " "	Chen Hung-fan		12							5510		10510	(carried fr. Page1
5th " M.B.	Chang Chang-hsiao		6							2600			
7th " M.B.	~~Tsen Tsung Tao~~ Lan Shih-chang		6							1800			
8th " " "	Tien Tsung Tao		6							4100			
9th " " "	L iu Pin		6							4500	15000		
3rd Army Mixed Corps	Chen Yu-sung	Chengtu	1							~~15000~~ 3000		24,510	Third Army
										Total fen., 3 Armies,			93,150
No. Szechwan Frontier Def.	Lai Hsin-hui	Lungan-fu & Mienchow	6							3000			
N.W. " " "	Chang Pang-peng	Sung Pan, Li Fan Ting	6							3000			
Mobile Army	Peng Kwang-lieh,	Chengtu	6							3000			
										Total fen., 3 Armies,			104,150
Tibetan Frontier Defense	Ch'en Hsia- ling (?)	Tibetan Frontier	8							4000			4 4,000
TROOPS FROM OTHER PROVINCES;													
Shensi, Organizations of Chen Shu-fan										5000			5,000
TOTALS			204	11½	12	25	21	108	36				113,150

ANNEX.

Art.	Mtn. Art.	Mtn. Co.	Sr. Co.	Guns	Mach. guns.	Total Strength Indian	Other.	TOTAL
						300		300

...s them to the Military Governor.

1				4	3700		3700
	½		4	4	3100		3100
	½		4	4	3100		3100
	½		4	4	3100		3100
	½		4	4	3500	800	4300
						2500	2500

Chang Wan-sheng

	—	1(?)	—	—	—	10200	10200
	1½	2(?)	16	20	16800	18,500	30,300

3-1
OPERATIONS DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT
Binding Margin
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2009-132
2

SUBJECT COMBAT MONOGRAPH OF CHINA. (G-2 Report).

From CHINA COMBAT

No. 4042 Date June 15, 1922. 19

Replying to No. Date 19

(14) COMPOSITION
(41) PERSONNEL

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JUL 28 1922

ADD:
FOREIGNERS:

General Li Lieh-shun, CHief of Staff of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Northern expedition and Commander of one of the bodies of troops composing the expedition , has a Japanese Chief of Staff and two or three other Japanese officers in his command.

(48) TACTICAL

ADD:
CHINESE AND MONGOLIA:

At present, June 12,1922, there are no Chinese troops in Mongolia beyond Pang Kiang, 165 miles north of Kalgan. The number has been steadily dwindling until there are only a very few beyond Kalgan itself.

In the "Soviet Republic of Mongolia" there are about 600 Russian Soviet troops and several hundred Mongol irregulars. The first detachment of these is found at Ude halfway between Kalgan and Urga where are stationed a large proportion of both the Bolshevik and Mongol forces. There are said to be others farther west at Uliasitai and Kobdo.

(50) INDIVIDUAL

ADD:

The last test of discipline among Chinese troops as among others is their reaction under defeat. There are few divisions that could be held together under defeat. The majority of Chinese troops after a few days of fighting get enough of it and are ready to quit on the slightest excuse. When they quit they are likely to forget all ideas of discipline and simply vanish into the country, perhaps appearing some time later as an organization or perhaps appearing as bands of robbers terrorizing the country.

Probably 49,000 of Chang Tso-lin's troops unable to withdraw by train, the quicker way of getting out, after Chang's reverse west of Peking in May,1922, took to their heels, to carts, mules or anything else they could find to get away. Many units kept together as organizations. The 16th Division, the 25th Mixed Brigade, the 1st Fengtien Mixed Brigade, the 2nd Heilungkiang Cavalry Brigade surrendered almost intact to the neutral troops and police around Peking and Tientsin while many individuals and small bodies surrendered from time to time. The total number who surrendered peacefully was about 25,000. About 24,000 more withdrew from the fighting in haste and disappeared into the country northeast of the Peking-Tientsin railroad. Some of these

/troops

troops later regained their courage and joined Chang Tso-lin at Lwanchow. Others continued to retire looting villages and small cities as they made their way back to Manchuria.

The chief reason for such a route is the lack of discipline, leadership and sincerity of purpose on the part of the officers.

The 35,000 of Chang's troops who retreated through Tientsin by train were orderly but they seemed to be without officers.

(17) DISCIPLINE.
(50) Individual.

ADD:

TROOPS OF SOUTH CHINA GOVERNMENT:

There are some well disciplined organizations in the South but for the most part they are not up to those of north China, where due to the annual campaigns of Wu Pei-fu which have involved more and more troops each year, the general standard of discipline has been improving.

(51) Unit.

The state of discipline in units of the Chinese Army largely refelcts the character of the commander. Thus the acknowledged two best disciplined divisions in China are the 3rd and 11th divisions commanded by Wu Pei-fu and Feng Yu-hsiang who are considered honest, patriotic and possessing qualities of military leadership. These commanders have been able to keep their organizations loyal and well under control in spite of the fact that they never have sufficient funds to pay them up to date.

The other divisions and brigades that Wu Pei-fu has had in his command during the past three years have shown general improvement in their discipline. Any outbreak indicating a lack of discipline of an organization under Wu leads to the prompt disbandment and reorganization of that unit.

The following Chihli troops have recently fought under Wu Pei-fu in Chihli province or under Feng Yu-hsiang in Honan:

Unit	Discipline	Unit	Discipline	(1 -Excellent
3rd Div.	Excellent	25th Div.	Good	(2 -Very good
8th Div.	Good	26th Div.	Very poor	(3 -Good
11th Div.	Excellent	4th Mix. Brig.	Good	(4 -Poor
23rd Div.	Very good	12th " "	"	(5 -Very poor
24th Div.	Poor	13th " "	"	
		14th " "	"	
		15th " "	"	
		1st Shensi Div.	Very poor	
		1st Shantung Mix. Brig.	Good	
		8th Mixed Brigade	"	
		21st " "	"	

The following Chang Tso-lin troops have been identified as having been in the fighting of May, 1922, against Wu Pei-fu:

Unit	Discipline	Unit	Discipline	(as above)
16th Div.	Poor	2nd Fengtien MB	Good	
27th Div.	Poor	6th " "	Good	
28th Div.	Good	8th " "	"	
25th Mix. Brig.	Poor	9th " "	Poor	
1st Fengtien MB	"	5th Kirin M.B.	good	
1st Fengtien Div	Good	1st Heilungkiang Cav. Brig.	Good	
		2nd " " "	"	

?The following troops

The following troops stationed in and around Peking were neutral:

Unit	Discipline	Unit	Discipline
1st Div.	Poor	9th Div.	Good
13th Div.	Good		

(1 - Excellent
(2 - Very good
(3 - Good
(4 - Poor
(5 - Very poor

Of the other troops in North and Central China the following might be mentioned:

Unit	Stationed in	Discipline (As above)
5th Division	Shantung	Good
6th Division	Nanking	Very good
10th Division	Chekiang	Good

All troops of North and Central China not mentioned might safely be classed from very poor to good, only a few being entitled to the latter rating.

In South China (Kwangtung) the ratings should be certainly no higher than in the North. There are no units there whose behavior causes them to warrant a rating of Excellent. The 1st and 3rd Kwangtung Divisions might be rated as Very good, several units as Good and many including the troops of Li Lieh-chun, the aspirant for the position of tuchun of Kiangsi, as very poor.

(52) COMMANDERS.

There is the same reflection of the commander in the discipline, etc., of his troops, in China as elsewhere.

Wu Pei-fu and Feng Yu-hsiang stand out in China as disciplined men who are working unselfishly for their country. They go to great pains to have their soldiers understand this. Consequently they are able to hold loyal their own divisions and the other organizations that become associated with them. Furthermore, in battle their troops win because they feel that they are fighting for a principle and for their country and not for extra pay for themselves and additional power for their leader.

The two, causes of Wu Pei-fu's victories over his opponents are:

1st - The better morale of his soldiers due to his efforts to show them that they are fighting for China and that the people believe in their cause.

2nd - The use of enveloping movements against opponents who fail to make proper dispositions to protect their flanks.

Probably no military commander in the world has had more field experience than Wu Pei-fu who has been for about 24 years constantly with the 3rd Division passing through the various grades from company officer to commander. There have been few summers during those 24 years when he has not been in a military campaign. During the last five years he has been conducting military campaigns, each year using more troops and the problems more complicated. Naturally a soldier's morale is raised, more particularly in China, when he finds he is fighting under Wu Pei-fu, the man who always wins, who is fighting for China, who always finds a way to feed his soldiers and who pays them when he has any money.

(18) MORALE
(53) SENTIMENT.

The morale of practically all troops in China is low. The best of Chinese troops would not stand long under concentrated shell fire. In the recent campaigns in China it has been the superior morale that has had most to do with victory. The troops that have the people with them win. The other troops may be better equipped, paid, etc., and

fighting for greater personal gain but after a give and take encounter for about four days, weariness, loss of sleep and perhaps hunger make them all think, "What is the use!" - "A few extra dollars is poor pay for this work. I'm ready to quit." Consequently the troops who feel that their countrymen are behind them last the longer and win. The northern soldier has always defeated the southerner.

In the Anfu-Wu Pei-fu fighting in 1920 and in the Chang Tso-lin--Wu Pei-fu fighting in 1922, certain subordinate commanders on the Anfu and Chang Tso-lin sides surrendered with hardly a show at fighting.

(54) ELAN. Replace.

The Chinese soldier resembels in a great many ways the negro soldier of the United States. Properly officered and led by officers who look after his welfare he shows considerable spirit. When poorly officered, nothing can be expected of them.

(55) STAMINA Replace.

Continuous fighting for several days and nights with the consequent loss of sleep and lack of sufficient food weaken the elan of the Chinese soldier.

The Southern soldier is smaller in statue and more poorly developed physically than the Northern soldier. He also looks less intelligent than the northerner.

During the three summer campaigns that the writer has followed in China ,he has found no evidence of a hospital case caused by a bayonet wound.

(19) TRAINING.

(56) INDIVIDUAL. Replace.

There is a growing interest in athletics among the Chinese Basket ball, soccer,foot ball, and track athletics are popular at all schools and Y. M. C. A.'s.

Chinese forms of wrestling, boxing, fencing together with certain gymnasium exercises are given attention at all the better garrisons.

(57) UNIT REPLACE.

Most Chinese units devote their time to garrison training.

The divisions and brigades under Wu Pei-fu during the past five years have been getting their field training by actual combat. Each year they show an improvement in their regulation of transportation problems, entraining, detraining, taking up their positions in line, evacuation of wounded, etc., etc.

The fighting of May,1922, was Chang Tso-lin's first effort at a big action. His staff anticipated all supplies and rewards of money, etc., necessary for the soldiers to celebrate his victory, but they failed in some sections of the line to bring up sufficient ammunition, protect their flanks suffidently, Etc.

The technical troops have little technical equipment to work with. Engineers are used as infantry. The Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin forces have a few portable wireless telephone and telegraph sets while Chang Tso-lin has some field telephone sets. Observers on both sides in the 1922 campaign have failed to report any extensive use of these instruments.

/(59) ARMS.

ADD: (59) ARMS.

CANTON GOVERNMENT:

The Kwangtung soldier is armed with a Canton Arsenal made Mauser rifle. The chances are that it is old and rusty. The South, having no cavalry, has no carbines. Pistols are usually the German Lugt although a good business is reported to be done by Chinese ships crews in smuggling in Colt automatics.

The Kwangtung Aeronautical Bureau is supposed to have some American sub-? machine guns. The Southern Army has some Rex type machine guns and some Maxims. They are short on machine guns and without mobile artillery except for a few small mountain guns.

(60) CLOTHING.

CANTON GOVERNMENT:

The distinguishing marks of branch of service in the south are the same as in the north. It is very unusual to see a southern soldier with the metal numerals on the gorget patches on the front of his collar to show his company number and organization.

The insignia of rank in the south is the same as in the north. Enlisted men rarely wear the shoulder straps consequently it is impossible for the uninitiated to distinguish the private from the N.C.O.

The clothing of the Canton soldier, what there is of it, corresponds for the most part to that of the northern soldier in the summer time. The cap, blouse and trousers are the same. His shoes are merely straw snadals held on by thongs around the ankles. The best dressed have cotton spiral leggins the color of the uniforms while a very few indulge in socks. In lieu of a rain coat, sun shade, Etc., the southern soldier carries on his back when not in use a large straw hat; its diameter corresponds to the width of the man between the tips of his shoulders. The hat is made water proof and serves as either sunshade or umbrella.

Troops in Central China usually carry an oiled paper umbrella as a part of their equipment. This affords protection from sun or rain.

(61) ACCOUTERMENTS.

A very small percentage of the Canton soldiers have Japanese made haversacks.

(62) EQUIPAGE.

MEDICAL:

As a result of the use made of X-ray machines from the Rockefeller hospital in Peking at the missionary hospitals in Paoting-fu and Kaifeng in caring for wounded soldiers in 1922, Generals Wu Pei-fu and Feng Yu-hsiang have donated funds to buy X-ray equipments for those hospitals.

During the 1922 fighting General Feng Yu-hsiang with the aid of a foreigner had constructed from an ordinary freight car a hospital car containing 24 cots, an operating table, supplies, etc. This is the first attempt of this sort in China (blueprint and report on this car already submitted).

ADD: (c)

There are several armored cars on the Chinese Eastern Railroad similar to those described as being on the Peking-Hankow Line.

/(63) Transport.

ADD: (63) TRANSPORT

In most of China south of the Yangtze river, except in Yunnan, boats play a more important part as a means of transport than anything else. There are few railroads and roads. All of the latter are more paths. Consequently all heavy articles are transported by boats, large or small, depending upon the depth of water in the rivers. For instance, when Sun Yat-sen selected Kweilin in Kwangsi as a base for his Northern expedition all his troops, supplies, etc., had to go by boat from Canton to Wuchow via the West River thence by small boat up the Fu River to Kweilin. From Kweilin there is a practically all water route into Hunan province and to the Yangtze. When Sun changed his base to Shuichow, Kwangtung, he did so because it could be reached from Canton by rail in a few hours and by water in a few days. From Shiuchow practically all water routes lead north into Hunan and to the Yangtze; one route takes a northeasterly direction through Kiangsi to the Yangtze.

(64) COMMUNICATIONS

Telephone systems have been installed in practically all the important cities of China. There are very few long distance services, however, the one between Peking and Tientsin being the most important that is maintained by the Chinese.

For further information on Wireless Stations, see Economic Monograph.

The Japanese wireless station at Hankow:

Installation - Old type built 6 or 7 years ago. Modification of German Telefunken quenched spark set. Built in Japan. Initial power from 120H.P. Diesel engine operating a belt driven generator which furnishes electricity for storage battery of 120 lead cells and for motor generator of the radio installation. In addition to main driven generator there is a smaller or stand-by unit driven by a smaller Diesel engine.

Wave length - 800 meters for short distances
2000 " " long "
Set very broadly tuned and there is interference practically over the entire range of wave lengths. No modern appliances for sharp tuning, and interferes with other installations in neighborhood.

Power units - Two complete, one 75K.W., one 25K.W. used according to distance covered maximum of which is 2,000 miles.

Autenna - Umbrella shaped on series of 5 masts, one in center and 4 others at each side of square. Unique construction of armored concrete and additionally supported by wire rope stays. Center mast 240 feet high, others about 170.

The station is worked simplex and is therefore very inefficient. There are fairly modern receivers with bulbs and amplifiers but up to date methods are not used and hand sending only is used.

(Report of Commander Yangtze Patrol on visit Feb. 6, 1922)

ADD: (39) LAND)
(116) STRATEGIC ASPECT.

DATA ON WATER ROUTES:

Cheng lin, Hunan, to Wuchow, Kwangsi Province; Kiukiang, Kiangsi, to Nanan-fu, Kiangsi: See data furnished to Capt. Constant, Assistant to A.C. of S., G-2, Phil. Dept., By Socony Representative with understanding that it would be regarded as confidential.

/Copy to Manila.

3-1

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CHIEF OF STAFF
INTEL. D.

2009-133

AUG 26

SUBJECT THE CHIHLI - FENGTIEN FIGHT of 1922

(Service Report)

From China

No. 4062 Date June 26th, 1922

Replying to No. Date Pass RECEIVED G/2 W.D./ AUG 25 1922, 19

In summarising the Chihli-Fengtien fighting of 1922 one must first of all deal with the two leaders, Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin.

Wu Pei-fu

Wu Pei-fu, 48 years of age, has a Chinese B.A. degree and received his military training at Chinese military schools. He has worked up through the company officer grades to his present position because of his success in handling his various commands. He has campaigned in the provinces of Shansi, Szechuan, Hunan, Hupeh, Honan and Chihli. He has participated in more active military operations than any other man in China. During all this time he has been in or in command of the 3rd Division of which he is still the Division Commander.

Wu Pei-fu became more active politically in 1920 when he withdrew his troops from southern Hunan to Honan and Chihli. In making this change of station he was instrumental in helping the Hunanese drive the rotten Tuchun Chang Chin-yao from the province. Later the same summer Wu took matters in his own hands again and fought the Anfu troops south of Peking driving the Anfu clique, Tuan Chi-jui, and his followers from their predominant position in Peking official circles. (See M. A. Report 2609 - Aug. 3, 1920.)

With his victory complete and with no opposing troops between him and Peking Wu in 1920 refused to enter the city. He contented himself with having driven from power a group that, as he expressed it to his soldiers, were not working for China but for Japan. Wu returned to Loyang and devoted his time to training his own 3rd Division.

In 1921 Wu strengthened his position and became a political figure by frustrating the attempts of the Szechuanese and Hunanese, the latter led by a group of fortune hunters, from getting control of Hupeh. Wu gained control of the Hanyang Arsenal, became Inspector General of Hunan and Hupeh which together with his position as Assistant Inspector of Chihli, Shantung and Honan where he dominated his nominal superior Tsao Kun, gave him control of all troops from the Kwangtung border to the Yangtze River and the territory along the entire Peking-Hankow Railway line. As Chang Tso-lin exerted a predonderate influence in Peking Wu in spite of his stronger position found great difficulty in obtaining funds to pay his greatly increased command. Hupeh was forced to pay for its delivery from the hands of Chang Tso-pin. Wu since his arrival in Honan had always forced Tuchun Chao Ti to furnish some funds for his troops. Now the same thing was done in Hupeh, the receipts of the Hankow Chengchow section of the Peking-Hankow Railway were taken as well as postal, telegraph and certain salt revenues. Chang Tso-lin continued to draw millions from the Peking Government while Wu was forced to shift for himself.

During the spring of 1921 at Wu's insistance Chihli troops were sent into Shensi and the notorious Tuchun Chen Shu-fan was driven out. In due time Feng Yu-hsiang, the Christian General, became Tuchun of Shensi. As Feng had always been a supporter of Wu this gave Wu another province to his credit.

In the autumn of 1921 the Chihli Cabinet of the then Premier Chin Yung-peng went on the rocks. Chang Tso-lin was invited by the President to come to Peking to assist in selecting a new cabinet. In due course of time Liang Shih-yi, a leader of the "Old Communications clique" (Chiaotung clique) was made Premier. Chang Tso-lin and the Chiaotung clique were in control. These political financiers lost no time in laying plans to restore the credit of the Banks of China and Communications controlled by the Communications clique. The old Anfu crowd were pardoned their offenses in return for their financial assistance.

Wu Pei-fu threw the Communications crowd into a panic by issuing numerous circular telegrams accusing Liang Shih-yi of working with the Japanese in settling the Shantung question and in pardoning the Anfu offenders whom he had driven from office. The outcome of it all was that Wu forced Liang Shih-yi to take a "sick leave" in Tientsin. Wu also turned his telegraph batteries on the Ministers of Communications and Finance who were of the Chang Tso-lin - Liang Shih-yi group. They too gave up their jobs.

Naturally Chang Tso-lin, Liang Shih-yi, etc. became rather peeved at Wu. In addition they quite naturally were sore at President Hsu Shih-chang for with Wu's outspoken opposition, the President adopted his usual method of playing both ends against the middle. Hsu's military power was nil outside of Peking so the real problem was to get rid of Wu Pei-fu.

The old Anfu crowd were called in, Tuan Chi-jui was persuaded to leave Peking for Tientsin. Thus the Anfu group, the Communications groups and Chang Tso-lin in the North were combined to eliminate Wu Pei-fu while in the South Sun Yat-sen and his followers wished for Wu's destruction as it was his troops south of the Yangtze that were sure to oppose the advance of any "Northern expedition".

With the above groups controlling the Peking Government, the banks of the country and more troops than Wu Pei-fu, Wu found himself in danger of being squeezed out of China.

Wu has always had the reputation for being a fighter. For driving the Anfu group out of Peking he received the approval of the Chinese people. The results of his 1921 campaign increased his military prestige but lost him much popular support in the Yangtze valley. He has always made it a point to confide in his subordinates and has always made his soldiers feel that they were fighting for their country as well as for him and that although they were never paid up to date they would get their money when he received any.

Chang Tso-lin

Chang Tso-lin is about Wu Pei-fu's age (49). He received no education in his youth, became a bandit leader in Manchuria and fought with his bandits for Japan in the Russo-Japanese war. After the war he surrendered at the request of Japan to the Chinese Government and received quick promotion. He became Military Government of Fengtien (Mukden) province in 1911. The size of his military command constantly increased until in 1921 he commanded well over a 100,000 men, had absolute control of all Manchuria, was also Inspector General of Inner and Outer Mongolia and the military districts of

Suiyuan. He was in 1920 and 1921 the largest factor in dictating the politics of the Peking Government. He was able to force the Central Government to furnish him practically all of the funds allotted to the military. He supported Yuan Shih-kai until the latters collapse, assisted Tuan Chi-jui in putting down Chang Hsun's attempt to restore the monarchy and sent some brigades to assist Wu Pei-fu in defeating the Anfuites in 1920. Prior to 1922 he had never attempted to carry on a campaign on a large scale. With his political success Chang Had become one of the financial powers of China. He had established an apparently sound financial system in Manchuria. By playing a give and take game with the Japanese he was able to obtain from them the assistance, support and materials he needed by giving them concessions, etc. that they desired. He has been accused of being a tool of the Japanese. His ambition for power has certainly forced him to deal with them beyond the point that he would if he were working only for the interests of his country. This same ambition has caused him to turn his attention, Peking-ward rather than in the opposite direction where banditry has always been rife in Northern Manchuria and where the Chinese Eastern Railway, the life line of his two Northern Provinces has needed his support.

As stated above Wu Pei-fu's telegrams which led to Liang Shih-yi's departure from Peking in January, 1922, spoiled Chang Tso-lin's game and led to Chang and Liang Shih-yi being double crossed by President Hsu. So Chang Tso-lin, Liang Shih-yi and his Communications group, the Anfuites and the Canton Government were all against Wu as representing the military force that opposed them. They also were incensed against President Hsu but in this respect they did not differ from Wu Pei-fu.

In February, 1922, there was much scheming by Wu's enemies as to the best means to get rid of him. Chang Tso-lin sent a delegate to Canton to get in touch with the Canton Government. C. C. Wu, son of Dr. Wu Ting-fang, went from Canton to Mukden to return the visit and is reported to have returned to Canton with three million dollars furnished by Chang and other enmies of Wu. The Southern Government propagandists all spoke of the Northern expedition of Sun Yat-sen. Dr. Sun has stated that this expedition was supposed to start north early in the spring in order to draw Wu Pei-fu's attention to the south so that Chang would find Wu's forces divided. For very good reasons the expedition never left Kweilin in Kwangsi.

Thus at the beginning of March, 1922, we find the opposition to Wu Pei-fu very pronounced among the political leaders who belonged to or could be influenced by Chang, or any of the groups whom Wu had ever opposed. In addition to these in Peking, Tientsin, Manchuria and South China were the Chekiang, Anhwei and Honan officials. Shantung was inclined to be neutral. Kiangsu inclined toward Wu Pei-fu but not to the point of coming out openly in his favor. Money was plentiful among the anti-Wu crowd, while Wu, with little money in his pockets was obliged to use other means to hold his supporters. Having held actual command of large numbers of troops during the past years the commanders of these troops were in a position to know him thoroughly, his military ability and his motives. He on the other hand knew them intimately, knew whom he could trust and the military efficiency of each leader and his organization. Early in March it was announced that Feng Yu-hsiang, "Christian General", Tuchun of Shensi, had left his province with a large force and was marching to Wu's assistance. Feng with two divisions and one mixed brigade, 25,000 troops, arrived at the rail head just in time to be forwarded and play an important part in the outcome.

Campaign of 1922

Chang Tso-lin started moving troops into Chihli province from Manchuria early in April. Whether he really expected to fight is doubtful.

His dispositions were such that apparently his main idea was to surround Peking and maintain his line of communications thereto from Manchuria in order that he and his associates might force President Hsu from office and dictate to a new government as they might choose. So Chang's motives for fighting were to secure unhindered control of the Peking Government and in so doing eliminate the disturber, Wu Pei-fu. Wu's motives might be considered equally personal. Failing to fight he ceased to play any part in Peking politics. He would get nothing from the Government and gradually his followers would slip away from him. If for either personal or patriotic reasons he expected to continue to play a part in Chinese affairs he must fight. Chinese and foreigners alike who have ever known Wu believe he is a patriot and that his efforts are for patriotic rather than for personal reasons.

As to resources Chang Tso-lin had a well organized and united Manchuria behind him with 140,000 troops of whom about 30,000 were already in Chihli. The Honan Tuchun, Chao Ti, with his bandit army of 25,000 men was ready to join with any one who could get rid of Wu Pei-fu. Chang had plenty of funds, military equipment and credit. Wu's forces were scattered from Peking to Hankow and from there to Yochow in Hunan. Wu had more or less directly under his command available for service

in Chihli	province	22,700	troops	
" Honan	"	10,000	"	
" Hunan	"	13,900	"	
" Shensi	"	40,000	"	under Tuchun Feng Yu-hsiang
" Hupeh	"	70,000	"	" " Hsiao Yao-nan
		156,600		

Of the troops in Shensi and Hupeh not more than 50% could be counted upon as available for service elsewhere. So that Wu Pei-fu had for active service about 101,000 men, the most of whom had seen active service under Wu Pei-fu during the past two years. With these troops Wu must fight Chang Tso-lin, fight if necessary Chao Ti in Honan, and protect the Yellow River bridge north of Chengchow. The Northern Expedition of Sun Yat-sen apparently gave him no concern.

Battle of the Hun-ho

Chang's troops moving down from Manchuria,took up a position across the Tientsin-Pukow line at Machang and extended this line in a general north westerly direction through Liu li ho on the Peking-Hankow line. Chang's troops were south of the Hun-ho. The bulk of his troops were sent to his position along the Peking-Hankow and Tientsin-Pukow railroads. His flanks were supposedly protected by cavalry, at least it was stationed there. Chang made no effort to attck Wu but having taken up his position covering Peking and his rail communications his troops rested, apparently confident that Wu would not attack.

Wu outside of preventing Chang's further advance south by either the Tientsin-Pukow or Peking-Hankow railroads did not interfere with Chang's movements. Chang having made his dispositions Wu deliberately brought up his own troops.

It might be pointed out here that all of Chang's troops were untried under battle conditions while many of Wu's divisions and brigades had been through several campaigns under Wu during the past few years.

Wu evidently considered he must drive the Manchurian troops from around Peking to prevent Chang Tso-lin from dictating the policy of the Peking Government. Furthermore as the Peking-Hankow Railway line was Wu's line of communications he must protect it. He therefore decided to attack Chang's right flank. Wu placed some troops of doubtful military value on the Tientsin-Pukow line but on their left (the right center of his line) he placed his own 3rd Division, probably the best in China. As Wu has been with this Division for more than twenty years he has implicit faith in its ability and loyalty. Its position was such that were it to attack successfully it might reach Tientsin and cut the railroad behind Chang's line. In the center and on the left of the 3rd Division was a brigade of the 26th Division, of little value except to fill up the line, still further to the left (the left center) was the fairly reliable 23rd Division of Wang Ch'eng-pin, Wu's second in command. On Wu's left flank through which ran the Peking-Hankow Railway and to which he gave his personal attention during the fighting were the 13 th, 14th, 15th Luchun and 4th Honan Mixed Brigades, while one brigade of the 11th Division of Feng Yu-hsiang came up from the south to make the turning movement which caused the stampede of the Chang Tso-lin forces. From the incomplete information available it appears that Chang Tso-lin had four divisions, nine mixed brigades and three cavalry brigades either in line or held close behind the line as reserves, about 84,000 men. Wu Pei-fu had four divisions, two brigades and five mixed brigades, about 64,000 men.

Fighting opened on April 28th along both railroads. The 26th Division troops (Chihli) near Machang on the Tientsin-Pukow line, were practically annihilated. Other troops came up to replace them so that Chang's troops were held at Machang. A short distance west of Machang the Chihli troops were vistreious but the victory was not pressed. The further fighting on this flank had no bearing on the result of the campaign.

On the Peking-Hankow line the skirmish of April 28th was indecisive but it was followed by a serious attack by Wu Pei-fu's troops on the 30th. Chang's forces retired slightly to a strong position around Changhsintien, an important railroad town, the holding of which secured the bridge head over the Hun-ho.

From April 30th through May 3rd the severe fighting seems to have been confined largely to the vicinity of Changhsintien with Wu using his poorer troops unable to force Chang from his strong position. On the afternoon of May 3rd one brigade of Feng Yu-hsiang's 11th Division showed itself on Chang's right flank. Due to the usual lack of flank protection by the Chinese (A tactical weakness that Wu Pei-fu has taken advantage of in all of his campaigns of the past three years.) this brigade was able to get well around behind Chang's right flank. An attack was made by this brigade at midnight in conjunction with a frontal attack on the Changhsintien position by two other brigades of Wu's. The result was the hasty withdrawal of Chang's forces on his right flank. They withdrew with little fighting back across the Hun-ho. The 16th Division, the 25th Mixed Brigade, the cavalry and other troops on the extreme right flank were with few exceptions unable to find rolling stock to carry them away or else had no desire to get away. All idea of resistance dissappeared and the troops that did not get away on trains or horses surrendered within twenty four hours to Wu's forces or to the neutral 1st, 9th and 13th Divisions, stationed in and around Peking. The brigade of the 11th Division that turned Chang's right flank did so with practically no loss.

The route at Changhsintien spread to the 1st Fengtien Division to the left of the troops above mentioned. As this Division was close to the railroad with headquarters at the railroad junction at Fengtai they with practically all the other troops in that vicinity were able to board waiting troop trains and withdraw towards Tientsin. The stampede spread from right to left along the Tientsin-Pukow Railway. From the night of May 4, for thirty six hours trains packed with tired, dirty and hungry Fengtien soldiers poured through Tientsin. The railroad officials did their utmost to pass all troops through Tientsin as quickly as possible to minimize the danger of disturbances in the city. The foreign troops and the British and American volunteer companies occupied the lines in accordance with the defense plans of the foreign concessions. No trouble occurred although the Tientsin police received the surrender of ever ~~about~~ 7,000 Fengtien soldiers including the 2nd Heilungkiang Cavalry Brigade. Thousands of the Chang Tso-lin soldiers were unable to find trains on which to retire. Of the estimated 84,000 men who were in the line or in close proximity thereto

about 25,000 surrendered
" 35,000 withdrew by train
" 24,000 fled on foot, in carts, etc.

Of the 24,000 a large proportion eventually made their way back to Chang Tso-lin's lines after he had halted east of Tangshan.

There is no evidence that Chang's troops were hurried by Wu in their withdrawal except on the extreme right and at Fengtai. It is true that all along the line great quantities of forage, food, ammunition and supplies of all sorts were abandoned but this was the result of fright rather than pressure from their rear.

As all rolling stock was taken Wu found no means of following Chang's fugitives until his own trains from the Peking-Hankow line could be brought over. As a matter of fact Wu Pei-fu seems to have been inclined throughout to give Chang the opportunity to withdraw without fighting. However Wu did follow Chang's troops to Tientsin arriving there on the night May 6th - 7th preceeded by several thousand troops. Chang's forces seemed to catch their breath at Luanchow, about half way between Tientsin and Shan Hai-kuan. Here they took up a strong position with advanced positions at Kuyeh and Kaiping. These latter were in the American sector of the railroad and in the Kailan Mining Administration's (British) mining area and had fighting broken out there great damage might have resulted to the mining property. Wu's troops, moving forward very deliberately again threatened Chang's right flank and he retired without fighting to Shan Hai-kuan just within the great Wall, with outposts in advance, which outposts he gradually withdrew upon the advance of Wu's forces.

It is remarkable that with all the military operations practically no damage was done to the railroad. With Chang's withdrawal he took 90% of the rolling stock of the Peking-Mukden Railway but with the exception of the removal of a few rails and the partial destruction of a few small bridges no damage was done. This was no doubt due to the stress laid by the military commanders of both sides on the necessity of avoiding interference with foreign life and property.

From Wu Pei-fu's headquarters the following statement has been received as to captured supplies, prisoners, etc., during the fighting along the Hun-ho:

Prisoners	30,000	including 1,600 officers (This includes those who surrendered to the neutral troops and police.)
Horses	3,000	
Field pieces, various sizes	200	
Machine guns	230	
Rifles	10,700	
Ammunition and grain	Uncounted	
Casualties, Chihli	3,000	
" Fengtien	10,000	

These figures are no doubt somewhat excessive, particularly the prisoners and Fengtien casualties.

It is interesting to note the effect ~~of~~ the defeat on right flank caused by Chang's line of communications running behind and paralell to his front. Although many of the Fengtien troops were never engaged and none seriously defeated the moral effect was the same as though they had all been badly beaten. No attempt was made to withdraw a flank, hold the railroad, or fight a rear guard action. Soldiers and officers had had enough of "war". This panic was carried from the right of the line to the left as the train loads of fleeing troops moved along from right to left, allowing several hours for the news of the reverse to get from the railroad line forward to the front.

As this chapter on the Chang - Wu fight in Chihli closed another interesting one developed in Honan which, had it not been anticipated by Wu Pei-fu, might have seriously handicapped him.

The Honan Fight.

Mention has previously been made of Chao Ti who had been the usual type of Tuchun in Honan since 1916. Chao Ti and his brother Chao Chieh had been more or less held in suppression by Wu Pei-fu since the latter's arrival in Honan in 1920. Naturally the Chaos were willing to side with Chang Tso-lin if the chances of his sucess were good. The Chao brothers had about 25,000 poor troops with headquarters at Kaifeng, the provincial capital, on the Lunghai railroad.

Evidently the false telegram reporting the death of Wu Pei-fu caused the Chaos to decide to act so that they might be in the good graces of Chang Tso-lin at the finish. Consequently they sent troops to Chengchow, the junction of the Lunghai and Peking-Hankow Railways, a most important point for Wu. They also sent a force north to hold or destroy the Yellow River bridge, 25 miles north of Chengchow, an even more important point for Wu to hold.

Anticipating trouble from this source Wu had ordered Feng Yu-hsiang upon his arrival from Shensi to remain at Loyang, Wu's headquarters 130 miles west of Chengchow with the 1st Shensi Division and one brigade of Feng's 11th Division, sending only one brigade of the 11th Division to Wu's assistance in the North.

...the Peking-Hankow line were ...Mixed Brigade and the 24th Division, ...reliable. On May 4th Feng went to Chengchow to inspect conditions and was assured that things were peaceful. However after a private investigation he found that the Chao brothers had sent troops to take Cheng chow. Hastily returning to Leyang he brought up the 1st Shensi Division and his remaining brigade of the 11th Division and after some fairly severe fighting finally drove Chao Ti, Chao Chieh and their troops from the Peking-Hankow and Lunghai lines. Many of these troops have returned to their former occupation of banditry. Due probably to treachery of the Chao Ti commander rather than to the bravery of the defenders the Yellow River bridge was not damaged.

With the flight of Chao Ti and his following Feng Yu-hsiang proceeded to occupy the yamen and to be appointed Tuchun of Honan, a position more to be desired than that of Tuchun of Shensi and certainly a position where he can play a much more important part in the future events in China.

Fighting at Shanhaikuan.

After much talk of an armistice and after it was generally supposed that Chang Hsueh-liang with two foreigners had arranged an armistice with General P'eng Sheu-hsin, Commander of the Chihli advance guard, fighting broke out on June 10th all along a five mile front, the flanks of both armies resting on the sea to the south and in the hills to the north. The contraction of the fronts from approximately 100 miles in the Hun river battle to five miles at Shanhaikuan naturally caused a greater concentration of troops. The Chihli forces pressed the attack and although held to insignificant gains on the flat ground between the railroad and the sea started another enveloping movement around Chang's right flank. Although defeated once and forced to withdraw a second time due to lack of protection of his right flank, Chang again failed to make the necessary dispositions to defeat the obvious attack. Chihli reinforcements of artillery and infantry as they arrived were all sent to assist in the enveloping movement which was never stopped and which eventually would have caused the surrender or hasty flight of the Fengtien troops at Shanhaikuan had not an armistice been signed on June 18th on board the British gunboat Curlew. By the terms of the armistice Chang Tso-lin withdrew beyond the Great Wall within five days. Probably the total casualties for both sides in this fight amounted to about 5,000 in killed and wounded.

Another Chihli column had been advancing for many days over the old Manchu road through Jehol to Manchuria. At the time of the signing of the armistice this force is said to have reached Chao-yang and where they again threatened Chang's rear.

There is little of military value to a westerner to be learned from the fighting. The force which had the better discipline and the offensive spirit was successful.

FOOD.

As has been pointed out in previous reports on the military operations of the Chinese, the rationing of troops is a very simple matter, so simple in fact that inferior officers often neglect it entirely. The ignorant soldiers are then cursed and blamed for looting food shops, etc. These are by no means the only occasions when the Chinese soldiers loot but undoubtedly there are a great many times when the proper attention to their duties by the officers would prevent looting. To return to rationing the soldiers, with rice, an occasional vegetable, some Chinese bread, a bit of tea the soldiers will go on indefinitely. Meat is almost never a part of the Chinese soldier's ration.

There was nothing new shown in the way of arms and equipment. Nearly all of Wu Pei-fu's arms and ammunition was Chinese made while a large part of Chang Tso-lin's was Japanese or German. A large part of the German ammunition was apparently very old. One type of paste-board carton which had held cartridge clips picked up after Chang's retreat had the date 1890 on it. Quantities of other types of German made artillery and small arms ammunition were in evidence. In some instances Chang Tso-lin's officers and men complained about the quality of their ammunition.

RAIL ROAD TRANSPORTATION

As to rail transportation, had it not been for the work of the British members of the staff of the Peking-Mukden Railway Chang Tso-lin would have been unable to get his troops and supplies from Manchuria to Chihli province to fight. Certainly if it had not been for these same Britishers who stuck to their posts regardless of the war, Chang would have been unable to move out any considerable number of troops at the time of his withdrawal. This would very likely have resulted in the destruction of a large amount of rolling stock and road bed. As it was the Railroad functioned so well that with Chang Tso-lin's withdrawal there was withdrawn also 90% of the rolling stock and engines of the entire Peking-Mukden line.

Two years ago south of Peking during the Anfu trouble Wu Pei-fu had great difficulty with his one track railroad transportation line. Trains loads of troops and supplies were delayed for hours because a proper system of despatching was not adhered to. Military officers would take no orders from railroad officials. This year Wu Pei-fu placed all train movements on the Peking-Hankow Railway under a French man, Perretti, an old employee of the line. Movements were made without apparent difficulty on the Peking-Hankow but after Chang's retreat and Wu's advance along the Peking-Mukden his transportation difficulties became evident. Engineers and train crews from the Peking-Hankow line trained to operate under the French system caused difficulties for themselves and for every body else when they tried to operate on the Peking-Mukden line, an English system. The Chihli officers were distrustful of the Peking-Mukden officials, both Chinese and foreign.

FIELD TRANSPORTATION

In the field in North China, while pack mules, camels, donkeys, ponies, coolies, wheelbarrows, etc. can all be used, the most common and most dependable means of transportation is the two wheeled Chinese cart usually with one pony or mule in the shafts and one or two more ahead of him. The Chinese military leader commandeers carts and coolies generally during operations. At the close of a campaign they are permitted to return home.

COMMUNICATIONS

Chang Tso-lin had a field wireless station erected at his headquarters at Chun Liang-cheng and another at Ch'anghsintien. Fengtien officers at the latter place stated that the station there would not work. An observer on Wu Pei-fu's side has reported that Wu had one station a few miles south of Changhsintien which was used solely to worry Chang Tso-lin's stations. No reports have come in of the use of wireless telephone sets by either side although both have such sets and are supposed to have trained personnel to use them. Chang had at least one field telephone line in operation.

were in the air frequently. Chang Tso-lin had at the start about a dozen planes but only one or two pilots. One of his pilots was killed in a smash. Wu had only two or three planes but plenty of pilots. Wu's planes bombed the Fengtien lines, dumps, etc. daily but without effect. Apparently neither side attempted aerial observation and neither side wished to engage in aerial combat. The bombs used were said to weigh about 150 lbs. Aeroplane observation was apparently nil.

CARE OF WOUNDED AND SANITATION

The care of the wounded and sanitation in Chinese campaign are largely conspicuous by their absence. The Chinese nature is such that these things mean little to them. A Chinese soldier who is wounded just feels that he is out of luck, expects no symphathy from others and is usually not surprised by getting any. There are so many defects in Chinese organizations that one must expect these to be among them. Never in their houses having known what sanitation is they cannot be expected to think of it in the field.

The wounded man is usually picked up sooner or later, carried on a stretcher or an improvised stretcher usually made of a house door by impressed coolies to a rough dressing station where a much overworked Chinese military surgeon with military assistants make a rough dressing and administer a hypodermic. As the opportunity presents itself, the wounded are then forwarded by train to a hospital. The wounded are usually placed on the floors of freight cars where they may remain for many hours and perhaps several days before reaching the hospital.

TRENCHES

Shelter trenches and standing trenches were dug by both sides at various places during the campaign. These gave protection from frontal fire but for the most part no attempt was made to avoid a flank fire enfilading the entire trench system.

USE OF ARTILLERY

Use of artillery was very poor except in a few isolated cases. Reports indicate that the Fengtien artillery technique was better than that of the Chihli artillerists. No B.C. telescopes, range finders, etc. or other instruments except field glasses were used. As a rule direct fire was used at targets from positions in the open. Guns were practically independent of each other. Ranges were estimated, fuses set and adjustments made by guess work. Poor use was made of <u>cavalry</u> by both sides. Chang Tso-lin with a great superiority of mounted men, overlooked a wonderful opportunity to circle around either of Wu's flanks of the Hun river position and damage his communications.

MORALE

The Infantry formations in the field are crude. When their morale is good the Chinese are indifferent to danger, and are willing to needlessly expose themselves to danger to show their bravery. To seek shelter from fire even while resting or when held in reserve would be to "loose face" among the brave.

Gen. Wang Ch'eng-pin, was in command of troops in the field. Outside of his failure to get the best result out of the railroad he did very well, his dispositions and troop movements worked out excellently. By a flank movement he was able without fighting to force Chang from a strong position behind the Luan river.

At Shanhai-kuan Gen. P'eng Shou-hsin, Commander of the 14th Mixed Brigade was in command at the front. Again the flank of Chang Tso-lin was tried and found vulnerable.

The fighting of 1922 has demonstrated again that the Chinese methods of fighting are still crude. Judging by American standards all the organizations are very poorly trained and equipped. Chinese officers with very few exceptions practice little of the techinque of even 1914 warfare. The training and instruction supposed to have been given by the many Japanese officres who have been instructors in various Chinese military schools for several years up to 1920 and advisors to various Chinese officers has either been deficient or the lessons have not been adsorbed. Certain it is that the officer whose success is pre-eminent received his instruction in Chinese military schools prior to Japan's having attained her dominating position therein. No Chinese officer of the many who have received training abroad has stood out either as a leader or as a strategist. The Anfu commanders, equipped, trained and advised by Japanese officers, in 1920 failed to carry out perhaps the first rule of warfare - flank protection. In 1922 Chang Tso-lin's troops also largely equipped, trained and advised by Japanese officres, failed to successfully protect their flanks, not only once but three successive times. Incidentally many of the officers fighting for Chang Tso-lin this year fought against Wu Pei-fu in 1920.

The chief deficiency of the Chinese armies is the ignorance, inefficiency, lack of the qualities of leadership, lack of "guts" and of patriotism of the officers. If properly officered the Chinese soldier will go far. After three years service commanding or on duty with Negro soldiers and after an equal period of close observation of Chinese soldiers the writer is more and more struck with the similarity between the Negro soldier and his yellow brother at arms.

Information contained herein was obtained from:

Reports of Maj. Lackey, I.O. China Expedition, Tientsin
" L.P. Horsfall, C.A.C.
" Kroner, Inf.
Capt. Fisken, F.A.
" Woodbridge, F.A.
and personal observations of writer.

Copies to :
1 Manila
1 Tientsin
1 Tokyo
1 American Legation.

SUBJECT Supplementary Report re ~~Fengtien~~
(Chihli -Mengtien fight of 1922) SERVICE REPORT

From China

No. ~~4062~~ 4062 Date July 13th 1922, 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

Chang Tso-lin's troops have all withdrawn north of the great Wall at Shan Hai-kuan. Chang is reported to be busily engaged reorganizing his army for another campaign in Chihli province. Judging from the reports of banditry in Manchuria Chang has sent few troops north of Mukden.

Wu Pei-fu's troops have been largely withdrawn from the Peking-Mukden line and gone to permanent stations. Wu and his 3rd Division have returned to Loyang, Honan.

Binding Margin

TO KALGAN

PEKING

TUNGCHOW

CHANG HSIN TIEN

FENG TAI

NUANG TSUN

LIULIHO

CHAO PAI HO

LAN FANG

DFA

KUAN

HUN HO

TO TANKOW

YUNG CHING

YANG TSUN

TIENTSIN

TACHING HO LAKE

HEI LUNG CHIANG

GRAND CANAL

MACHANG CANAL

MOTOR ROAD

TO PAO TING FU

TO PUKOW

TANGKU

KUTAI

KUYEH

KAIPING

TANGSHAN

YUNG PING FU

LYANCHOW

LYAN HO

CHANG LI

MOUNTA

GULF OF CHIHLI.

RAIL ROAD
MOTOR ROAD
CART ROAD
RIVER

TRACING
OF
PART OF CHIHLI PRO
SCALE
1.014 inches = 16 MI

WAR DEPT. GENERAL STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

1922 2009-133 2 SEP 22

3-1

OBJECTION TO PUBLICATION
IN SERVICE JOURNALS.

SUBJECT QUOTATIONS FROM REPORTS IN CRITICISM OF VARIOUS POINTS IN THE CHIHLI FENGTIEN-FIGHTING OF MAY/JUNE, 1922.

From CHINA G-2 Report

No. 4076 Date August 14, 1922, 19

Replying to No. Date RECEIVED G/2 W.D./ SEP 21 1922, 19

C = Chihli F = Fengtien C & F = Chihli & Fengtien

C & F 1. The military value of these troops would not be high if they were facing a foreign army. It would take very little time, however, under foreign supervision, to make them first-class soldiers. Owing to the lack of funds these troops have had practically no target practice with service ammunition, and officers and men alike are ignorant of the capabilities and limitations of their weapons.

C & F 2. The majority of the troops have not much spirit, some of the Manchurian Cavalry Regiments and the Shensi troops being outstanding exceptions.

C & F 3. The enlisted man is a good worker, a good marcher, and when well led, a good fighter.

C & F 4. The Chinese soldier will stand a lot of hardship and keep going.--They will stand a battle of several days provided they have confidence in their officers.

C & F 5. That education most obviously neglected is target practice.

C & F 6. In case of internal disturbance the "Army" is generally loyal to that particular general who is paying them.

C & F 7. No observation planes were observed.

C & F 8. The wounded receive very promitive attention.

F. 9. The only evidences of panic were among very young boys, which every organization seems to have. Their presence was explained to me by a staff officer, who informed me that it was customary for nearly all organizations to pad the pay-roll heavily. When ordered into active service it was necessary to turn out the number of men for which the disbursing officer had been drawing pay, and the boys were the only ones who could be persuaded to enlist at such a time.

R. 10. I saw no field telephones or wireless sets.

C & F 11. The marksmanship of the average Chinese soldier was very poor, the amount of target practice they had had was negligible.

C & F 12. Discipline. Good when winning, bad when losing.

Binding Margin

C & F 13. Self-reliance, - generally poor in emergencies and rather listless without leaders.

F. 14. Report of Wu Pei-fu's attempt to turn their right flank brought forth no decisive efforts to prevent the movement; cavalry though in appreciable numbers were kept well behind the right front without its being used to get inxtouch with the enemy to determine his movement in force, direction and something of his plans.

F. 15. No cavalry or infantry patrols observed, information of enemy intentions brought back by wounded from the front was principal source of information.

F. 16. A regiment of infantry and two batteries of artillery were directed across the front to meet the flanking movement of enemy, very little formation in depth - the regiment going toward the front practically at one time.

F. 17. No reserve noticed even though there was no definite information of enemy.

F. 18. Artillery. Only direct fire was employed. Stopped firing while army was still coming out of sunken roads and while friendly infantry was still some 500 yards from contact with enemy.

F. 19. Cavalry was finally employed after artillery had caused enemy to deploy and was trotted out on right flank without patrols or advance groups of any kind --two troops moving in this manner, the Cavalry closed in to left and seemed to surprise enemy and the advance detachment of Chihli flanking group was captured without infantry action or rifle fire by cavalry, Action of Fengtien troops after this was such as to indicate that they considered the full work had been done and they could withdraw in safety and comfort for the night -- this action taking place between 6:45 p.m. and 7:30 p.m.

NOTE: The successful flank attack which led to Wu Pei-fu's victory and was made at midnight that same night doubtless as a part of the above bluff.

F. 20. Lack of any defense in depth of the Fengtien position readily explains their sudden departure when their front was heavily assailed and their rear was emphatically threatened.

F. 21. Fengtien - No effort made at rear guard action of any kind and no attempt made to destroy their wagon or railway bridge across the Hunho upon their withdrawal.

C. 22. The Chihli forces moved promptly after the retreating Fengtien forces, but made little or no attempt to press or annoy the retreat.

C & F. 23. Transportation. -Both sides took advantage of knowledge of station traffic men of the railway lines, but these men were frequently over-ridden and threatened with injury when not able to secure rapid and frequent movement of trains, there was a great waste of rolling stock of all kinds especially locomotives; railway traffic was best organized at Fengtai for there a strong minded Britisher, who was the local traffic inspector, bluffed the two armies into thinking he had unlimited powers; the efforts of the highest railway officials were powerless to simplify the transportation tangle that resulted from after Chang Tso-lin had passed in retreat through Tientsin and Wu Pei-fu had come through in pursuit, it is pure luck that any troops got through and so few accidents happened.

A Y 24. Aeroplane observation - nil.

25. Artillery- There was no evidence of any means of communication between higher commanders and the battery or to an observation post or command post or that there was an observation post; one or two aiming stakes were out, but the guns were not laid on them.

B 26. Infantry - All troops were entrenched, mostly in lengths of about 75 yards, with no traverses, zigzags or head cover. The men were very reckless in exposing themselves even though there were frequent small arms bullets flying about.

C. 27. Discipline. Careless exposure of person in trenches and about gun positions; loitering about in careless and shiftless manner; tendency to mix units and men without any apparent reason; little notice paid to officers.

C & F 28. It seems to boil down into the matter of how the troops are officered and led - the troops seem to be about on a par.

C. 29. 36th Division. The troops were poorly trained and badly demoralized.

F. 30. All works are right up on the sky line, the artillery having the most prominent place.

F. 31. Chang's left rests on the sea while his right rests on the end of the ridge near the head of the river, leaving the hills further to the north and higher up practically unoccupied. This has been the Fengtien commander's fault in every battle during the war. His preparations were to meet a straight forward attack with little or no attention to his flanks. And in each fight Wu has turned him out of his defenses at will.

C. 32 Artillery. All guns were in the open where clear view could be had to the front. Internals were great, little attention paid to fire control in most places. Artillery officers were numerous, sometimes three at each gun, especially the three inch pieces. The senior artillery officer present would occasionally give orders that were carried along the line of guns, but in most cases the firing was conducted by each gun separately. No instruments, etc. were on hand -- battery commander's telescopes, range finders, signallers, advance observation posts or the like. Each gunner laid direct on his fancied target, estimated the range, experimented with the fuse setters for each shot and blazed away. Each shot in the early stages of the opening fire was watched by all present, officers had field glasses, mostly prismatic, but none had mil scales or other measuring devices. One officer used a Chinese foot-fuler without cord, and seemed to give out considerable advice at his particular gun. A debate would always ensue during the adjustment of fire and when firing became general, or fire for effect, every gun was apparently independent. Lateral communication was of little consequence and usually done by an officer strolling from one gun to another in his immediate vicinity.

C & F 33. Many villages were fired by the Fengtien troops all along their front and while this illumination aided the enemy to some extent it caused a waste of ammunition and unnecessary flurry along both front lines until about midnight when it abated.

F. 34. The Fengtien artillery fire was exceedingly high, the shrapnel bursts being at times about 200 feet in the air, others bursting on impact, short and over, while some were effective by luck.

C. 35. The reserves (Chihli) brought up during the night and located in villages or secluded spots, caught many wild artillery bursts while breakfasting or while curiously watching their own artillery firing. Little or no instruction seemed to be given with regard to

cover or in placing reserves where they might be in line with firing batteries. All seemed unconcerned -- in spite of the fact that one battalion had twenty-one casualties while looking on that same morning.

C & F 36. On the beach, the Fengtien cavalry became very aggressive and were met by opposing cavalry support by two-inch guns. Considerable galloping around and firing from horseback was indulged in by both sides, the flat marsh land and sand dunes affording a good field for that kind of fighting, but as they gradually withdrew each to his respective side, few dead were left in sight on the field.

C. 37. About 8 p.m. to the consternation and embarrassment of the Chihli troops, the Fengtien line produced a large powerful search light and began flashing it about over the horizon and entire front. The fact of one side having such a glaring advantage over the other caused every Chihli unit to begin furiously and spasmodically firing everywhere, trying to hit the light. This firing developed into a continuous roar and kept up an unabated bedlam until about midnight, when it gradually died down either for shortage of ammunition at hand or the exhaustion of the men.

C. 38. The envelopment of the Fengtien right flank was started and never stopped. Apparently the movement was nearly completed when the armistice was signed, permitting the return to Manchuria of large quantities of war material that would shortly have been captured or abandoned. It also permitted Chang Tso-lin to return to Manchuria and create among the people there the impression that he was victorious at Shanhaikuan.

C & F 39. A proper staff organization is unknown at Chinese military headquarters. In Chinese campaigns false information is rife.

C. 40. The utter disregard of the Chihli officers for the necessity of maintaining a proper system of train despatching during the operation between Tientsin and Shanhaikuan came near causing a disaster to the Chihli forces by preventing the adequate supply of troops, ammunition, supplies, etc.

C & F. 41. A real cavalry leader on either side might have changed the history of the campaign. Chang's cavalry was superior in numbers but apparently made no effort to circle Wu's flank, Similarly, Wu with a small but determined mounted force might have been able to smash Chang's line of communication at numerous times and places.

C & F 42. Hand grenades, rifle grenades, trench mortars, gas, liquid fire, etc. weapons developed during the European war were not used by either side.

C & F 43. The greatest weakness of the Chinese Army at the present time is the quality of its officers. With honest, intelligent and patriotic leaders, the Chinese soldiers conduct themselves very well both on and off the battle field as demonstrated by the 3rd and 11th Divisions. The President of China, Gen. Li Yuan-hung, recently told Gen. Wm. M. Wright, U.S.A. that the greatest weakness of the Chinese Army was in its officers. The average Chinese officer today lacks the intelligence, the patriotism, the honesty, the courage and the quality of leadership which an officer should possess, not to mention his ignorance of the duties of his office. When an officer possesses the above qualities his troops reflect them in China as elsewhere. To make the Chinese army efficient the first problem is to eliminate the officers who lack the proper qualifications and replace them so far as possible by others who do. (The quality of leadership is possessed by very few Chinese people.) Having improved the officer material the use of modern weapons, modern methods, etc can be learned through

the employment of foreign instructors.

NOTE: At this writing, August 14, 1922, Chang Tso-lin is reported to be eliminating those officers who lack education or other qualifications and promoting those who have shown ability to command. He is reducing the number of his forces having come to the conclusion that efficiency rather than numbers counts. He is employing former Russian officers, of whom there are hundreds in Harbin without employment, to train his artillery. It is reported that he is also employing Japanese to assist in training his reorganized forces.

All the above criticisms are by officers of the American Army.

COMBAT. (97) STRENGTH.
(A) IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE.

The following summarizes the military strength of various military and political leaders in China as of September 20, 1922. This summary is subject to a daily change.

RATINGS OF ORGANIZATIONS.

(These ratings are based for the most part on very little information.)

A - Excellent for Chinese organizations.
B - Above the average, Chinese organizations.
C - Average, Chinese organizations.
D - Below Average, Chinese organizations.

		CHIHLI PARTY Other Leaders	CHIHLI PARTY Wu Pei-fu	CHANG TSO-LIN	TUAN CHI-JUI	WANG HUAI-CHING	SUN YAT-sen	CHEN CHIUNG MING	INDEPENDENT OR NEUTRAL
DIVISIONS	Lu-chun A-B	2	5	2					
	Lu-chun A-B	1#	5#	2#					
	Lu-chun C-D	6			2	2			5
	" C-D	5#				2#			3#
	Provincial A-B			1					
	Provincial A-B			1#					
	Provincial C-D	2	1		5		3+④	⑥	5+ ②
	Provincial C-D		1#				3#+④#	6#	3#+ 2#
	TOTAL...	10	6	3	7	2	3+④	⑥	10 ②
	.....	6#	6#	3#		2#	3#+④#	6#	6# 2#
BRIGADES	Lu-chun A-B		4						
	Lu-chun A-B		4#						
	Lu-chun C-D	4		2	3				7
	Lu-chun C-D								
	Provincial A-B			7					
	Provincial A-B			7#					
	Provincial C-D	18	4	9	10		9	①	35+ ⑳
	Provincial C-D		2#	7#			6#	1#	11#
	TOTAL. . .	22	8	18	13		9	①	42 ⑳
	.....		6#	14#			6#	1#	11#

- Organizations have engaged in active military operations in 1920,1921,or 1922. These organizations are in each case included in the figures shown on the line above.

Figures with ○ - thus ⑥ - indicate Southern troops in provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Kweichow, or Yunnan.

DIVISIONS will have an average strength of 8,500 men, those rated A or B would probably average 9,500 men.

(continued)

(27) Strength
(A) Immediately Available
(Continued)

BRIGADES will have an average strength of 3,500 men, these rated A or B would probably average 4,200 men.

APPROXIMATE NUMBER OF TROOPS.

	CHIHLI PARTY, Other Leaders	Wu Pei-fu	CHANG TSO-LIN	TUAN CHI-JUI	WANG HUAI-CHING	SUN YAT-SEN	CHEN CHIUNG MING	INDEPENDENT OR NEUTRAL
A-B:	19000	64300	57900					
C-B:	145000	22500	38500	105000	19000	57000		232,000
C-B:						(34000)	(54500)	(87,000)
TOTAL:	164000	86,800	96,400	105000	19,000	57000		232,000
TOTAL SOUTHERN (Approx.)						(34000)	(54500)	(87,000)

Total of all troops listed above (approx.) . . . . . .924,700.

China is usually charged with having more than a million soldiers. This is probably correct as shown in our Station List, but many of them perform police duties only and are not available at any time for military operations. As a matter of fact several hundred thousand of the troops shown above could not be moved from their present stations to other provinces to take part in a civil war.

The troops listed as controled by Wu Pei-fu are not the only ones that he would have available in the event of hostilities between himself and any leader outside the Chihli Party. Many of these listed under "Other Leaders" of the Chihli Party would be placed under his command as they were during the 1922 fighting. Many of these listed as Neutral would take sides also.

Any attempt such as this one to place organizations as supporting particular leaders is bound to be inaccurate and is subject to change from day to day as pollitical allignments change.

Under the Chihli Party - "Other Leaders" are included Hsiao Yao-nan, tuchun of Hupeh; Chih Hsi-yuan, tuchun of Kiangsu; Ts'ai Ch'eng-hsun, military commander in Kiangsi. The tuchun of Shantung, Tien Chung-yu, while having slight leanings perhaps towards the Chihli party, is listed as neutral as are the troops in Shantung province. It is quite certain that some of these troops however would support the Chihli Party at the present time. Some other commanders have been placed as neutral because of the isolated positions of their troops who otherwise might be placed under one of the above leaders.

A - Excellent for Chinese
B - Above Average "
C- Average for Chinese
D- Below Average "

LUCHUN DIVISIONS.

Organization	Efficiency	Commander	Province	Supporter of
LUCHUN				
1st Div.	C #	Ts'ai Ch'eng-hsun	Kiangsi	Chihli Party
2nd "	C #	Sun Chuan-fang	Hupeh	" "
3rd "	A #	Wu Pei-fu	Honan	Wu Pei-fu
4th "	C	Ch'en Le-shan	Chekiang	Tuan Chi-jui (?)
5th "	C	Cheng Shih-ch'i	Shantung	Neutral
6th "	B(?)	Ch'i Hsieh-yuan	Kiangsu	Chihli Party
7th "	C #	Wu Hsin-tien	Shansi	Neutral
8th "	C	Wang Ju-ch'in	Hupeh	"
9th "	C #	Lu Chin	Chihli	Wang Huai-ching (?)
10th "	C	Lu Yung-hsiang	Chekiang	Tuan Chi-jui (?)
11th "	A #	Feng Yu-hsiang	Honan	Wu Pei-fu

LUCHUN DIVISIONS (Cont'd)

Organization	Efficiency	Commander	Province	Supporter of
LUCHUN				
13th Div.	D #	Chen Kuang-yuan	Kiangsi	Neutral
14th "	C #	Wang Huai-ching	Chihli	Wang Huai-ching
15th "	D #	Chin Yun-ao	Honan	Chihli Party
16th "	B #	Peng Shou-hsin	Chihli	Wu Pei-fu
17th "	Disbanded 1922.			
18th "	Non existent			
19th "	C #	Lu Chin-shan	Hupeh	Chihli Party
20th "	C	Yang Ch'un-pu	Kiangsu	Chihli Party
21st "	C #	?	Shensi	Neutral
21st "		Szechwanese Provincial Organization		
22d "		Szechwanese Provincial Organization		
23d "	B #	Wang Ching-pin	Chihli	Wu Pei-fu
24th "	B #	Chang Fu-tai	Honan	Wu Pei-fu
25th "	B #	Hsiao Yueh-man	Hupeh	Chihli Party
26th "	D #	Tsao Ying	Chihli	Chihli Party
27th "	B #	Chang Tso-hsiang	Manchuria	Chang Tso-lin
28th "	Disbanded			
29th "	B(?) #	Wu Chun-shung	Manchuria	Chang Tso-lin (?)

MISCELLANEOUS TROOPS

YICHUN				
2 Brigades	C	Mi Chen-piao	Chihli & Jehol	Chihli Party (?)
1 "	D	Shang Teh-sheng	Kiangsi	Chihli Party (?)

LUCHUN MIXED BRIGADES.

LUCHUN				
1st M.B.	C	P'an Hung-chun	Shantung	Neutral (?)
2nd "	C	Hu Nien-hsien	Hupeh	Neutral (?)
3rd "	D	Chang Lin	Kiangsi	Chihli Party (?)
4th "	B #	Chang Hsi-yuan	Chahar	Wu Pei-fu
5th "		Does not exist		
6th "	C	He Feng-lin	Shanghai	Tuan Chi-jui
7th "		Non existent		
8th "		Reorganized in 1922 into 14th Div.		
9th "	D	Chen Kuang-kuei	Kiangsi	Neutral
10th"	C	Tang Kuo-mo	Fukien	Tuan Chi-jui
11th"	C	Wang Ch'i	Fukien	Tuan Chi-jui
12th"	B #	Wang Yung-ching	Chihli	Wu Pei-fu
13th"	B #	Ting Cheng-kuo	Chihli	Wu Pei-fu
14th"		Reorganized in 1922 into 15th Division		
15th"	B #	Sun Yueh	Chihli	Wu Pei-fu
16th"		Reorganized, 1921, into 11th Division		
17th"	C	Chang Lien-sheng	Hupeh	Neutral (?)
18th"	C	Chao Yung-hua	Hupeh	" (?)
19th"	C	Chang Huan - hsiang	Manchuria	Chang Tso-lin
20th"	C	Wu Ch'ang-chih	Shantung	Neutral (?)
21st"	C	Wang Tu-ching	Hupeh	Neutral (?)
22d "		Non existent		
23d "	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] NON EXISTENT
24th"	C	Wang Yung-ch'uan	Fukien	Chang Tso-lin
25th"		Disbanded 1922		

PROVINCIAL TROOPS of possible value in a civil war in China.

Organization	Eff.	Commander	Controlled by	Supporter of
ANHWEI PROV.				
5 M.B. Old Anwa	D		Ma Lien Ch'a	Chihli Party
5 M.B. New Anwa	D		Chang Wen-shang	Tuan Chi-jui

PROVINCIAL TROOPS of possible value in a civil war in China. (Cont'd from page 3.)

Organization	Eff.	Commander	Controlled by	Supporter of
CHEKIANG PROVINCE				
2 Chekiang Divs.	C		Lu Yung-hsiang	Tuan Chi-jui
2 " M.B.s	C		Lu Yung-hsiang	Tuan Chi-jui
CHIHLI PROVINCE				
Paoting District Police & Gendarmerie, 4 Brig.	C	Wang Huai-ching		Neutral
FRONTIER TERRITORIES:				
1st Jehol M.B.	D	Shu He-chun	Wang Huai-ching	Neutral
1st Chahar M.B.	D	Tang Ching-lin	Tang Ching-lin	Chihli Party
1st Suiyuan M.B.	D	Li Huan-chang	Ma Fu-hsiang	Neutral
HONAN PROVINCE				
3 Brigades	C	?	Feng Yu-hsiang	Wu Pei-fu
1st Shensi Div.	C#	Hu Lieh-sheng	Feng Yu-hsiang	Wu Pei-fu
HUNAN PROVINCE				
2 Hunanese Divisions	C#		Chao Heng-ti	Neutral (?)
6 Hunan M.B.s	CAD #		" "	"
1 Brig. "Hupeh" troops	C #		" "	"
HUPEH				
4 Brigades	C & D		Hsiao Yueh-nan	Chihli Party
KANSU				
approx. 4 Brigades	D		?	Neutral
KIANGSI				
1 Brigades	D #			Neutral
1 " "Kwangsi" troops	C #	Shun Hung-yin		Wu Pei-fu
KIANGSU				
2 Kiangsu Divs.	C		Chi Hsieh-yuan	Chihli Party
6 " M.B.s	C		" " "	" "
MANCHURIA				
1st Fengtien Div.	B #	Li Ching-ling	Chang Tso-lin	Chang Tso-lin
1st Feng. M.B.	B #	K'an Chao-hsi	" "	" "
3rd " "	A #	Chang Hsueh-liang	" "	" "
4th " "	D #	Chang Tien-sheng	" "	" "
5th " "	B #	Chi En-ming	" "	" "
8th " "	A(?) #	Chu Yung (?)	" "	" "
9th " "	B #	Niu Yung-fu	" "	" "
10th " "	B #	Chao En-chin	" "	" "
11th " "	B #	Tang Yu-lin	" "	" "
1ST Kirin "	C #	Yu Chia-tan	" "	" "
2d " "	C #	Ting Chao	" "	" "
4th " "	C #	Liu Hsiang-chin	" "	" "
5th " "	C #	Li Chin-liu	" "	" "
1st Heilungkiang MB	C	Shih Te-shan	Chang Tso-lin	Chang Tso-lin
2d " "	C	Chang Ming-chin	" "	" "
3d " "	C	Pa Ying-O	" "	" "
1st " Cav. B.	C	Ma Jui-lu	" "	" "
SHANTUNG				

PROVINCIAL TROOPS of possible value
in a civil war in China (Cont'd from page 4)

Organization	Eff.	Commander	Controlled by	Supporter of
SHANTUNG				
8 Shangtung M.B.'s	C-D		Divided - Tien Chung-yu (?)	Divided - (6) neutral (2) Chihli P.
SHANSI				
3 Shansi M.B.s			Yen Hsi-shan	Neutral
SHENSI				
3 Shensi M.B.'s			Divided - independent.	Divided - Neutral
SINKIANG				
2 Prov. Brigades			Independent	Neutral
SZECHWAN				
1st Army (3 Divs. & 1) M.B.:	C #	Tan Mou-hsin	Hsiung K'o Wu	Neutral
2nd " (3 Divs. & 6 MBs:	C #	Liu Cheng-hsun	Liu Cheng-hsun	Sun Yat-sen
Three Brigades, "Bandit Suppression troops	D	Shih Ching-yang	Shih Ching-yang	Sun Yat-sen
Two Divs. & 2 MBs Northern Defense troops	D	Liu Tsun-hou	Liu Tsun-hou	Tuan Chi-jui
SOUTHERN PROVINCES:				
KWANGSI				
1 Brig. of 4,500 Kwangtung troops	C #	Kuan Kue-hsiung		Chen Chiung-ming
1 Div. 6,000 Yunnan & Kweichow troops	C #	Liu Tao		Sun Yat-sen
2 Divs., 10,000-15,000 Kwangsi troops	D #	Sin Chen-ting and others	Divided	Divided.
KWANGTUNG				
6 Divs., 50,000-70,000 (estimate)	C #	Many	Chen Chiung-ming	Chen Chiung-ming
3 Divs. 10,000-20,000 (estimate)	C #	"	Sun Yat-sen	Sun Yat-sen
KWEICHOW				
Four M.B.'s	D		(outside Kweichow)	Neutral
YUNNAN				
12 Brigs. (23 regts) Regulars,	D		Tang Chi-Yao and others	Neutral (outside Yunnan)
4 Brigs. (& 8 Brigs. regts.) Irregulars (Bandits)	D		"	"

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

3-1 2009-141

RHL

WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT Station List of Chinese Forces as of Feb. 15, 1923.

(G-2 Report)

From CHINA

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. APR 30 1923

No. 2113. Date March 29, 1923., 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

(6180) Distribution of Troops.

It will be noted upon further examination of this report that accurate and detailed information is lacking in several provinces. At best, such a report can be only an approximation. Military units are organized, personnel maintained, etc., without support from or even knowledge of the Central Government.

Undoubtedly the strength of many organizations is overestimated while there are probably a few instances where the strength is underestimated. However, there are probably many thousands of provincial troops scattered throughout China that are not included in the figures submitted. While they are practically negligible as far as military value is concerned they do count as far as numbers are concerned.

It is the opinion of this office however that the number of troops is generally overestimated and that the total figure given herewith, if the truth were known, would be found to be nearly correct.

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
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3-4 1923 2009-141

CHINA

(6180) Distribution of Troops.

WAR DEPARTMENT

SUMMARY OF CHINESE ARMED FORCES as of Feb. 15, 1923.

Anhwei.		20,500
Chekiang.		45,200
Chihli - Metropolitan Distr..	51,000	
" Outside " " ..	45,000	96,000
Frontier Forces:		
(I) Jehol	8,150	
(II) Chahar	14,280	
(III) Suiyuan	10,000	32,430
Fukien.		46,500
Honan		42,200
Hunan		51,200
Hupeh		70,400
Kansu		49,600
Kiangsi		50,700
Kiangsu		54,600
Kwangsi		50,000
Kwangtung		63,800
Kweichow		11,380
Manchuria:		
(I) Fengtien.	41,400	
(II) Kirin	27,600	
(III) Heilungkiang . . .	29,900	98,900
Shansi.		16,100
Shantung.		70,900
Shensi.		31,800
Sinkiang.		7,760
Szechwan		99,600
Yunnan.		46,000
Total.		1,055,570

(M/A China 5113, 2-15-23.)

ANHWEI PROVINCE. - NO TUCHUN - MILITARY LEADER, MA LIEN-CH'A, Chihli Party and subordinate to Tuchun Chi Hsieh-yuan of Kiangsu. (6180)

Organization	Station	Commander	Battalions Inf	Cav	Art	Guns	M.G.	Strength	Remarks.
Old Anwu(- Fairly well officered and equipped)									
Anhwei 1ST/M.B.	Wuhu & An-king	Ma Lien Ch'a	6	1	1	18	4	3,000	
2d Anhwei MB	Suchowfu	Li Ch'uan-yeh	6		1		4	3,000	
3d " "	Ying Chowfu & Feng Yang	Wang P'u	6				4	3,000	
4th " "	Chihchow & Kwangteh	Kao Shih-yang	6				4	3,000	
5th " "	Hueichow & Linhuo	Shih Chun-yu	6				4	3,000	
New Anwu	North Anhwei	Ying Kung-hsien	?					3,000	
Gendarmerie	Fu Li-chi & along the R.R.	?	5					2,500	
								Total Strength	20,500

(M/A China 5113, 2-15-23.)

CHEKIANG PROVINCE. TUCHUN LU YUNG-HSIANG - Anfu or Chang Tso-lin man. Opposed politically to Chihli Party but not to the point of taking up arms.

Organization	Station.	Commander	Battalions Inf.	Cav	Art	Guns	M.G.	Strength	Remarks.
1st Chekiang Div (Temporary)	Hangchow	Pan Kuo-kang	12	1	2	34	12	8,000	
2d Chekiang Div (Temporary)	Ning Po	Chang Tsai-yang	12					6,000	
1st Chekiang MB	Hangchow	Ch'en Chiang	6					3,000	
2nd " "	"	Chen Ping-yun	7	1				3,700	
Yu Chi-Tui (Police)	Scattered							2,100	
Ching Pei Tui (Police)	Scattered		36					10,800	
Fortress troops	Chin-hai		1					200	
Shou-Pei Regt (Guard)			3					900	
Troops from other Provinces:									
4th Luchun Div	Hangchow	Chen Le-shan	18	1	3	48	8	7,900	
10th " "	Hangchow	Lu Yung-hsiang	5				4	2,600	Remainder around Shanghai.

Total Strength. 45,200

No Chekiang troops in other provinces.

(M/A China 5113, 2-15-23.)

PEKING - METROPOLITAN DISTRICT - CHIHLI PROVINCE.

Organisation	Station	Commander	Battalions Inf	Cav	Art	Guns	M.G.	Strength	Remarks.
Peking Police	Peking	Hsueh Chih-heng	20?					10,000	
Pu Chun (Gendarmeris)	Peking	Mieh Hsien-fan	14					7,000	
President's Gd.	"	Lu Chin Ling	1/4	1/4				200	
Military Police	"	Ch'u Ch'ing-yun	5					2,500	
Student Regt.	"	Feng Yu-hsiang	3	1	1			1,000	Student Volunteers of Feng Yu-hsiang.
Peking Garrison Cmd'rs Guard	"	Wang Huai-ching	4	1	1			2,300	
11th Div.	Nan Yuan	Feng Yu-hsiang	12	3	3	28	24	10,000	Excellent Chines Troops.
8th M.B.	" "	" " " ?	6	1	1			3,000	Newly Organized by Feng Y-hs
25th M.B.	" "	" "	6	1	1			3,000	" " " "
7th M.B.	Tungchow	Chang Chih-chang	6	1	1			3,000	" " " "
13th Div.	Hai Yuan	Wang Huai-ching	6	1	1	24	12	3,000	Div.not complete
9th Div.	Pei Yuan	Lu Chin(Chin)	6	1	1	24	12	3,000	" " "
Chang Pei-Tui	Peking District.	Lin Meng-keng	6	2				2,000	" "
Imperial City Protection Corps	Peking	Fu Lien-jui	2					1,000	
			Total Strength					51,000	

(M/A China 5113, February 15, 1923.)

CHIHLI PROVINCE (PEKING - METROPOLITAN AREA EXCLUDED). TUCHUN TSAO KUN.

Organization	Station	Commander	Battalions Inf	Cav	Art	Guns	M.G.	Strength	Remarks.
23rd Div.	Machang	Wang Ch'eng-pin	12	3	3	36	24	6,000	
26th "	Techow	Chang Kue-jung	12	3	3	12	8	6,000	
15th "	Lanchow	Peng Shou-hsin	12?	1?	1?	36?	24?	5,000	Organized from 14th M.B.
12th M.B.	Lanfang	Kue Shu-ping	6	1	1	18	6	3,500	
13th M.B.	Lu-tai	Tung Cheng-kue	6	1	1	18	6	3,500	
14th M.B.	Liu Li-ho	Shih Chuan-sheng	6	1	1	[illegible]	4	3,000	(3,500)
15th M.B.	P aoting-fu	Sun Ye	6	1	1	18	20	3,000	
Shou Pei-Tui	Scattered		28	12				10,500	
Yi Chun	Tung Chow District	Mi Chen-piao	13	1				4,000	(Jehol.) Between Peking &

Total 45,000
Metropolitan Area 51,000
Total Strength, troops in Chihli Province. . 96,000

(M/A China 5113, 2-15-23.)

FRONTIER TERRITORIES

I JEHOL - TUTUNG WANG HUAI-CHING (Neutral)

Organisation	Station	Commander	Battalions Inf	Cav	Art	Guns	M.G.	Strength	Remarks.
1st Jehol M.B.	Jehol	Shu Hs-chun	3	4	2	36	12	3,150	
Hsun Fang Tui	Hq. Jehol		11	3	1	12		5,000	
					Total Strength			8,150	

II CHAHAR - KALGAN - TUTUNG CHANG HSI-YUAN, Chihli Party.

1° Chahar M.B.	Chahar Dist.	Chen Hsi-wu	5(6)1				4	3,700
2° " Cav. Brig.	" "	Ting Ch'ang-fei	6					1,350
Tutung's Bodyguard	Kalgan		1/4	1/4				200
Indep. Chahar Cav Regt.	Kalgan	Yuan Tien-shun		3				680
Chahar Hsun Fang Tui	Scattered		12					1,440
Chang Pei Tui	"		2					240
Railway Police	Along R.R.		2					400
Chihli Hsun Fang Tui	scattered		4	6	1	12		3,000
4th Luchun M.B.	Kalgan	Chang Hsi-yuan	6	1	1	6		3,270
			Total Strength . . .					14,280

III SUIYUAN - TUTUNG MA FU-HSIANG, Mohammedan, Best known of his creed in China.

5th Luchun M.B.	Suiyuan	Ma Fu-hsiang	6	1	1	18		3,500	
1° Suiyuan M.B.	Kwei-Hwa-cheng	Li Huan-chang	6	3	1	18		3,500	
Suiyuan Cav. Regt.	"	Li Hsi-feng		4				1,000	
Suiyuan Hsun Fang Tui	scattered		4					1,000	Total for the
" Ching Pei Tui	"		4					1,000	3 districts,
			Total Strength. . .					10,000	32,420.

(M/A China 5113, 2-15-28.)

FUKIEN PROVINCE. Very incomplete - Conditions disturbed. Detailed or accurate information impossible to obtain.

Organization	Station	Commander	Battalions Inf	Cav	Art	Guns	M.G.	Strength	Remarks
Kwangtroops, 6 Brigades	CHuan Chow	Hsu Cheng Chih	36	3	70	16		20,000	Followers of Sun Yat-sen.
One Brig.	Foochow	Chiang Kuo-pin	6					13,000	Troops of Hsu Cheng-chih
Self Govt. Troops	"	Huang Chan-yun	6					3,000?	Allied to Sun Yat-sen
24th M.B.	"	Wang Yung-ch'uan	6					3,500	
Marines	"	" "	6					3,500	
Troops of	Amoy	Tsang Chi-ping						10,000	
	Shang hang	Wang Hsiang-chen							
11th M.B.		Wang Chi	6	1	1	18	24	3,500	
		Total Strength						46,500	

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HONAN PROVINCE - TUCHUN CHANG FU-LAI - A Wu Pei-fu man.

Organisation	Station	Commander	Battalions Inf	Cav	Art	Guns	M.G.	Strength.	Remarks.
Honan Feng Tui	Scattered	?	7	1	1			2,700	
3rd Div.	Wu Pei-fu	Loyang	6	3	3	54	24	10,000	
14th "	Cheng Chow	Chin Yun-ao	6	1	1	18	4	3,500	Formed in 1922 from 8th M.B.
24th "	Kaifeng	Chang Fu-lai	12	3	2	36	16	8,000	
1st Shensi Div.	Changteh	Hu Lieh-sheng	12	1	1	18	6	5,000	
1st Honan M.B.	Wu Sheng Kuan	Lin Chi-peng	6	2	1	24	8	3,000	
One Inf.Brig.		Ma Ch'an-lin	6					1 ,000	
" " "		Ma Chih-min	6					1,000	
" " "		Li Chih-yun	6					2,000	
" " "		Tien Wei Ch'in	6					2,000	
" " "		Ts'ao Shih-ying	6					2,000	
" " "		Ting Hsiang-ling	6					2,000	
					Total Strength			42,200	

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[redacted] PROVINCE - TUCHUN CHAO HUNG-TI - Neutral though controlled in some measure by Wu Pei-fu

Organisation	Station	Commander	Battalions Inf	Cav	Art	Guns	M.G.	Strength	Remarks.
1st Hunan Div.	Changsha	Sung Ho-k en	12	2	2	18	4	9,000	
2° " "	Changsha	Liu Tsze-ping	12	2	2	18	4	7,600	
1° " M.B.	Chenchow	Yeh Kai-shin	7	1	1	18	4	5,400	
3° " "	Hengchow	Hsieh Kuo-kwang	6		1	18	4	3,000	Doubtful loyalty.
5° " "	Paoking	Wu Chien-hsueh	6					3,000	
4[illegible] " "	Yung Chow	Le Hsien-kai	6					2,300	Doubtful loyalty.
9° " "	Hung Kiang	Liu Hsu-yi	6		1/4			2,400	Controlled by Tsai
10° " "	Shenchow	Tien Chen-pan	6		1/ 4			2,300	Chu-yi
~~8° " "~~	~~Feng-hwang~~	~~Tien Ying-tsze~~	~~3~~						
6° " "	S. Hunan	Chen Cha-yao	6	1/2	1/2			3,000	Sun Yat-sen followers
W.Hunan Def.Troops	Feng-hwang	Tien Ying-tsze	3					1,600	
Bodyguard	Changsha	Chang Chu-chu	3					1,000	
Gendarmes	Changsha	Wang Teh-ching	1					300	
Hupeh Troops	Yu Hsien	Hsia Tao-yin	3					1,000	
Hsu Pei-tui		Scattered	20					10,000	
		Total Strength. . . .						51,200	

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HUPEH PROVINCE - TUCHUN HSIAO YUEH-NAN, Chihli Party and Wu Pei-fu Man.

Organisation	Station	Commander	Inf Battalions	Cav	Art	Guns	M.G.	Strength	Remarks
1° Hupeh M.B.	Wuchang P'an	Shau-cheng	6					2,200	
2° " "	Hsien-Ning	K'ou Ying Chieh	6					2,200	
4° " "	Wuchang	Liu Tse-ling	6	1	1	18	6	3,900	
3° " "	Pating	Sung Ta-pai	6		1	18	6	3,800	
5th " "	Ichang	Chang Yung-ming	6				6	3,000	
Hsun Chi Tui	Hankow	Tu Hsi-chun	3					1,100	
Body Guard	Wuchang	Sung Yung-an	3					1,500	
18th Div.	Pating	Liu Ching-shan	12		3	54	16	7,000	Troops of Yang Sen to attack Szechwan
25th Div.	Wuchang	Hsiao Yueh-nan	12	3	2	36	16	9,000	
2nd M.B.	Ch'ung Yang	Hu Nien-hsien	6	1	1	18	4	3,500	
17th M.B.	Hsiang Yang	Chang Lien-sheng	6		1	18	4	3,500	
21st M.B.	Hsin-ti	Wang Tu-ching	6		1	18	4	~~2,500~~ 2,000	
8th Div.	Shihnanfu	Wang Ju-shin	12	3	3	36	16	9,000	Troops of Yang Sen to attack Szechwan
16th Div.	"	Yang Sen	12	3	3	18	16	9,000	" " "
19th M.B.	"	Chao Yung-hwa	6	1	1	18	4	3,000	" " "

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(6180)

HUPEH PROVINCE (Continued)

Organization	Station	Commander	Battalions Inf	Cav	Art	Guns	M.G.	Strength	Remarks
1st Shantung M.B.	Wu Hsueh	Chang K'o-yao	6	1	1	18	4	3,000	
Hupeh Indep.Def.Br.	Hanyang		6					3,000	
Hupeh Indep. Cav.Regt	Wuchang			3				700	
				Total Strength				70,400	

(6188) KANSU PROVINCE - TUCHUN LU HUNG-t'ao, W u Pei-fu man.

Organisation	Station	Commander	Battalions Inf	Cav	Art	Guns M.G.	Strength	Remarks
Hsin Chien Chun/Ti-tao		Sung Tao-feng	6	1		18	4,000	
" " "	Chinchow	K'ung Fan-chin	28				10,000	
Fang Chun	Lanchow	Lu Hung-tao	12	1		18	3,000	Guns are old
"	Pingliang	Chang -	28				10,000	
	Suchowfu	Wu Tung-jen	6				2,000	
	Ningsia	Ma Hung-pin	14				4,000	Mohammedans
	Kanchow	Ma Lin	6				1,800	"
	Liang Chow	Ma T'ing-hsiang	6				1,800	"
	Sining	Ma Chi	26				9,000	"
	Ho Chow	Ma -	10	4			4,000	"
		Total Strength					49,600	

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(6180) KIANGSI PROVINCE - MO TUCHUN - COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF TSAI CHENG-HSUN, Chihli Party.

Organization	Station	Commander	Battalions Inf	Cav	Art	Guns	M.G.	Strength	Remarks.
3° Luchun M.B.	Chang Shu	Chang Lin	6		1	18		3,400	
9° " "	P inghsiang	Teng Mo	6		1	6	8	3,500	
1° " Div.	Nanchang	Tsai Cheng-hsun	12	3	3	36	16	8,000	Chihli Party
12° " "	Nanchang District	Chou Yin-jen	12	3	3	36	8	6,000	
Yichun, or 1°Honan Div.	Nanchang	Chang Teh-sheng	(6					3,000	
8° Luchun Div.	Fuchow	Sun Chuan-fang	12		3	30	12	7,000	Wu Pei-fu supporter
Sheng Fang Tui	Scattered	?	12		1	12	6	6,300	
Ching Pei Tui	Nanchang	Chang Tsung-liang	5					1,500	
Yu Chi Tui	Scattered	?	20					6,000	
1° Kiangsi Inf Brig.	Kiukiang	?	6		1	12		3,000	
2° " " "	Kanchow	Li Hung-sheng	6					3,000	
			Total Strength					50,700	

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(6180) KIANGSU PROVINCE - TUCHUN CHI HSIEH-YUAN - Chihli Party.

Organization	Station	Commander	Battalions Inf	Cav	Art	Guns	M.G.	Strength	Remarks
6th Luchun Div.	Nanking	Chi Hsieh-yuan	12	3	3	54	24	8,000	"Well equipped & trusted."
10th " "	Shanghai	Lu Yung-hsiang	10	3	3	54	12	7,900	Commander is tu-chun of Chekiang.
19th " "	Chinkiang	Yang Chuen-fu	11	1	1	24		3,000	
6th " M.B.	Shanghai	Ho Feng-ling	6				2	3,200	Defense & guard of Shanghai.
1st Kiangsu Div.	Haichow	Pai Pao-shan	12	3	1	4	4	4,000	
2nd " "	Seechow	Chu Hsi	12		1	12	6	4,000	
3rd " "	Tsing Kiang-fu pu	Ma Yu-jen	12					4,000	Formerly 1st Kiangsu M.B.
2nd " M.B.	Yangchow	Hwang Chen-kwei	6		1	12		3,000	Well equipped and trusted.
3rd " "	Nanking & Hwaianfu	Li Tien-chen	6		1	12	8	3,000	Well equipped and trusted.
4th " "	Nanking	Wu Heng-tsan	6		1	12		3,000	
5th " "	Hsuchowfu	Chen Tiao-yuan	6		1	12	4	3,000	
16th " "	Nantungchow	Chang Jen-kwei	6				12	1,500	Sometimes called 6th M.B.
Gendarmes	Nanking	Wang Chien-fu	3					1,500	
Police Force	Nanking	Wang Kwei-lin	5					2,500	
Reserve Corps	various hsiens	Civil Governor	6					3,000	
		Total Strength						54,600	

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(6180)
KWANGSI PROVINCE - Conditions greatly disturbed - Impossible to obtain details or accurate information.

Organisation	Station	Commander	Battalions	Guns	M.G.	Strength.	Remarks.
"Self Governing Army"	Nanning	Lin Chun-ting (Li Hsun-ti)				10,000	Seeking support of Wu Pei-fu.
Numerous semi-military, semi-bandit organizations						40,000	Estimated (?)
					Total	50,000 (?)	

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(6180) KWANGTUNG PROVINCE - Conditions disturbed - Impossible to obtain detailed or accurate information.

Organization	Location	Commander	Battalions Inf.	Strength	Remarks
Kwangsi troops	North River & Canton Arsenal	Shen Hung-ying		8,000	Has received assistance from Wu Pei-fu.
1° Army		Li Yung-pin			
2° "		Wong Hung-yan			
3° "		Kee Yat-kwong			
4° "		Shen Wing-kwong			
Yunnan Troops		Chang Kwa°chu (Chang Kai-ju) (Cheng Hsi-yu) (3 spellings,1 name)		4,000 (?)	
	Sam shui	Chu Pei-tah		5,000	
Kwangtung Troops 1°Kwang.Div.	Kaying	Lin Hu	60	15,000(?)	Forces of Chen Chiung-ming.
	"	Ch'en Chung-kwang			
2° " "	Lan Lung or Hsing Ning	Chun Chin-tang			
Kwangtung Troops	Swatow	Hung Shao-lin and (or) Li Lieh-chun		8,000	
Kwangsi troops	West River	Lan Chun Wang (Lin Chin-kuan) (Lin Cheng-huan) (3 spellings,1 name)		5,000	Opposed to Shen Hung-ying, pro-Sun Yat-sen.
One Div. of Yunnan Troops	Canton(?)	Yan Hsi-min (Yung Sek Hi Man)		4,000(?)	Yunnanese leader, pro-Sun Yat-sen.
Kwangtung Div.		Liang Hung-kai		1,000	
?	Canton	Lau Chan-wan		2,000	Poorly equipped
?	"	Chan Tin-tai		800	
Kwangsi troops	West River	Lu Ch'ung-jung (Liu Chang-wing)		5,000	Estimated.
1°Kwangtung M.B.	?	Huang Yeh-hsing		3,000(?)	
2° " "	?	Wang Ting-hua		3,000	
		Total Strength		63,800	

(6180) KWEICHOW PROVINCE - Civ. Gov. & Commander in Chief, Yuan Tsu-ming.

Organisation	Station	Commander	Battalions Inf	Cav	Art	Guns	M.G.	Strength.
1st Kweichow Div.	Kweiyang-fu	Yuan Tsu-ming	8		1	12	12	4,500
2st " M.B.	Western Kweichow	Ku Cheng-lin	6		1	6	6	2,500
2nd " " "	Eastern "	Wang Tien-pei	6		1	6	6	2,350
Ching Pei-tui	Scattered	Yuan Ta-tsai	3					1,000
Ching Pei-tui	"	Wang Ke-chao	3					1,000
					Total Strength			11,300

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MANCHUKIA - FENGTIEN PROVINCE - Tuchun Chang Tso-lin.

INSPECTOR GENERAL (C.In.C.) OF THREE MANCHURIAN PROVINCES - CHANG TSO-LIN.

Organisation	Station	Commander	Battalions Inf	Cav	Art	Guns	M.G.	Strength	Remarks.
27th Luchun Div	Chinchow	Chang Tso-hsiang	12	3	3	54	24	7,000 ?	
1° Fengtien "	Suicheng	Li Ching-lin	12	3	3	54	24	6,000 ?	
1° " M.B.	Mukden	K'an Ch'ao-hsi	6		1	6	4	3,500	
3° " "	Mukden	Chang Hsueh-liang	9	1	1	18	6	5,000	
4° " "	(In Heilungkiang Province)								
5° " "	Ch'i En-ming at Hsing Cheng		6		1	6		3,500	
8° " "	Mukden	Kuo Sung-ling	9		1	6		5,000	
9° " "	Along P.M.R.R.	Yang Te- sheng	6					2,500	
10° " "	Antung	Chao En-chin	6	1	1	18		3,500	
11° " "	Hsin-yen(?)	Tang Yu-lin	6	1	1	18			Chientao Dist.Kirin?
1° " Cav.Brig.		Chang Jung		6				1,400	
1° " Indep.Cav. Regt.	Hsin Min-fu	Chu Yi-ch'ing		3				700	
2° " " " "	Mukden	Sun Yu-shu		3				700	
Military Police	"			1				500	
Tung Hsin Tui	Scattered		1	10				2,100	
		Total Strength						41,400	

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(6180) KIRIN PROVINCE - MANCHURIA. TUCHUN - SUN -

Organization	Station	Commander	Battalions Inf	Cav	Art	Guns	M.G.	Strength	Remarks.
19th Luchun M.B.	Chang Huan-hsiang at Harbin		6	1	1	18	12	5,000	
1° Kirin M.B.	Changchun-Kirin	Hu Yung-kuei	6	2	1	6	32	4,500	
2° " "	Harbin	Tung Chao	6	3			6	4,200	
4° " "	Kirin	Li Meng-keng	6				6	[illegible] 3,100	
5° " "	Omoso, Imienpo	Tsai Yung-chen	6	3			6	3,800	
Kirin Indep. Mixed Regt.	Kirin Dist.		6		1	36		5,000	
Guards Regt.	Kirin		3					1,500	
Military Police		Chu Jung	1					500	
		Total Strength						27,600	

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(6180) HEILUNGKIANG - MANCHURIA. TUCHUN WU TSUN-SHENG.

Organisation	Station	Commander	Battalions Inf	Cav	Art	Guns	M.G.	Strength.
29th Luchun Div.	Tsitsihar	Wu Chun-sheng	6	9	3	54	24	9,500
1° Heilungkiang MB	Hulan	Shih Te-shan	3	3			4	2,500
2° " "	Tsitsihar	Chang Ming-chin	3	3			4	2,500
3° " "	Aigun	P a Ying-e	3	3			4	2,500
4° " "	Hailar-Manchuli	Chang Hai-peng	6				4	3,000 ~~2,500~~
1° " Cav. Brig.	Anda	Yuan Ch'ing-en						
Hei. Art. Regt.		Chi Heing			3	54		1,100
Guards Regt.	at . . . . .Tsitsihar)		3					1,500
Mil. Police		Sung Yun-fu	1					500
Mil. Gov's Body-Guard	Tsitsihar		2	1	2			3,500
44h Fengtien M.B.	Hailar & Peuketsu	Tsai Ping-pen	6	1	1	6		3,400
						Total Strength		29,900

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(6180) SHANSI TUCHUN YEN HSI-SHAN & Independent.

ORGANIZATION	Station	Commander	Battalions Inf	Cav	Art	Guns	M.G.	Strength
1st Shansi M.B.	Taiyuanfu	Shang Chen	6	1	1	12		3,~~640~~ 700
1st Shansi [redacted] Mixed Regt.	Ta T'ung fu	Li Min	3	1	1	28(18)4		2,100
2nd " " "	Ping Yan-fu	Li Tzu-ling	2	1				1,800
3rd " " "	Ta T'ung-fu	?						1,500
1st Inf.Bn.(Shansi)		Tsai Jung-shou	1					500
2nd Shansi Inf.Bn.		Wang Tsan-hsü	1					500
Tuchun's Bodyguard	Tai Yuan-fu	?		1/4	1/4			200
.....Ching Pei-tui	scattered	Chin Yung	22		2			5,800
								16,100

Total Strength. 16,100

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(6180) SHANTUNG PROVINCE - TUCHUN TIEN CHUNG-YU - Chihli Party but not to the point of fighting.

Organization	Station	Commander	Battalions Inf.	Cav	Art	Guns	M.G.	Strength.
47th Brigade	Tsinan & Fushan	Shih Tsung-pin	9		1			4,600
2nd Shantung M.B.	Chefoo	Chang Huai-pin	6				4	3,700
3rd " "	Ts'ao Chow-fu	Chang Pei-yang	6				4	3,700
4th " "	Tsung Ch'ang-pu	Chang Chien-kung	6				4	3,400
5th " "	Ichow	Li Sen	6					3,400
6th " "	Yenchow	He Feng-yu	6	1				3,400
7th " "	Yu Cheng	Hu Yi-ju	9	1	1	12	8	4,000
Tuchun's Bodyguard	Tsinanfu		2 1/4	1/4		4		500
Navy Model Bn.	Yentai(Chefoo)		1					500
Tsin Pu R.R.Guard	Along R.R.		5					2,000
Chin Pei Tui	Scattered	Kao Yen-wen						25,000
Yu Chi Tui	Shantung-RR.	?						500
Shantung R.R. Police	Shantung R.R.							1,000
5th Luchun Div.	Tsinan-fu & Wei-hsien	Cheng Shih-sh'i	12	3	3	36	16	8,700
20th Luchun M.B.	Chiningchow	Wu Chang-chih	6					2,500
1st Luchun M.B.	Lin Ch'eng	P'an Hung-chun	6					4,000
					Total Strength			70,900

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(6180) SHENSI PROVINCE - TUCHUN LIU CHEN-HWA

Organization	Station	Commander	Battalions Inf.	Cav	Art	Guns	M.G.	Strength	
1st Shensi M.B.	Tung Chao	Liu Shih-ling	4		1			3,300	
2nd " M.B.	Li Chuan	Tao Shih-ying	6				8	3,500	
3rd " "	?	?	6	1	1	6	12	3,500	
Gendarmes	scattered		2					500	
7th Tuchun Div	Han Chung-fu	Wu Hsin-tien	12	3	3	36	16	7,000	
20th " "	Tungkwan	?	12	3	3	18	16	7,000	Wu Pei (fu's followers and independent (of Tuchun.)
Chen Sung Chun	Sianfu	Liu Chen-hwa	14	3	1	12		7,000	
					Total Strength			31,800	

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o Chihli Party because he doesn't dare to be otherwise.

(6180) SINKIANG PROVINCE - TUCHUN YANG TSENG - HSIN.

General Location	Guns	M.G.	Strength Inf.	Cav.	Total	Remarks.
Kashgar Distr.	32		746	428	1184	Old fashioned breech loading guns -no ammunition.
Sarikol "			204	75	279	
Zangihissar "			170	91	261	
Yarkand "	4		320	70	390	Old muzzle loaders
Karghalik "			72	53	125	
Khotan "	6		335	159	494	" " "
Aksu "	30		327	515	842	Small breech loaders.
Urumchi "	7	10	950	200	1150	Taken from Russians in 1921.
Ku cheng "			850	90	940	
Hami "			770	75	845	
Chuguchak "			980	160	1140	
Shara Sume "			50	60	110	
Totals	79	10			7,760	

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(6180) SZECHWAN PROVINCE - CIVIL GOVERNOR AND GENERALISSIMO LIU CHENG-HSUN, a neutral.

Organization	Station	Commander	Battalions Inf	Cav	Art	Guns	M.G.	Strength	Remarks
1° Szechw. Div.	Wan hsien	Yu Pei-ti	9	1	3	36	4	4,700	(1)
2° " "	Non-existent								
3° " "	Chungking	Teng Hsi-hou	12					6,000	(1)
4° " "	Kweichowfu	?	12		1	18	8	6,000	
5° " "	Shunching	He Kwang-lieh	12				8	8,000	(1)
6° " " & River Guards	Suitang	Yu Chi-tang	24	3	3	18	8	13,000	(1)
7° Szechw. Div.	Cheng-tu(?)	Ch'en Hung-fan	12					5,000	(3)
8° " "	Cheng-tu(?)	Ch'en Kuo-teng	12					5,500	(3)
9° " "	Non-existent.								
10° " "	Mienchow	Lin Ping	12					4,500	(2)
11° " "	Suining	Tien Sung-yao	6					4,100	(2)
1° Szechw. M.B.	Wan hsien	Chang Yao-kwang	6					2,500	(1)
2° " " "	Yaochow	Chow Hsi-chen	6	1	1			4,500	
3° " " "	Suining	Wang Li-chung	6					2,800	
4° " " "	?	Yuan Pin	6					3,800	
5° " " "	?	Chang Chang-hsiao	6					2,600	
6° " " "	Chang Shou	Wang Ling-chi	6					2,300	
7° " " "	?	Lan Shih-chang	6					1,800	
Eastern Frontier Def.Brigade	Wan-hsien	Tang Tzu-mu	6					3,000	(3)
Northern Frontier Def. Brigade	Suchow	Sai Hsin-hui	6					3,000	(1)
Shensi troops	Paoning	Chi Shao-yu	6		1			2,000	(3) Independent, (formerly Chen Shu-fan's.)
Tibetan Frontier Def.	Tachienlu	Ch'en Hsia-ling	12	3	3			5,000	(3)
Mixed Force	Fuchow, etc	Shih Ch'ing-yang	12					4,000	ex(?)-bandits
Mobile Army	Ning Yuan	Peng Kwang-lieh	6					3,000	
3° Army Mixed Corps.	Cheng-tu	Chen Yu-sung	1					500	
Force of	Shensi border	Liu Tsen-hou	6					2,000	Formerly Civ. Gov'nor (of Szechwan.
Independent M.B.	Kweichowfu	Chang Ch'ing						3,000(?)	(1)
		Total Strength						~~99,000~~ 99,600	

(6180) SZECHWAN PROVINCE (Continued.)

THE REAL MILITARY LEADERS OF SZECHWAN ARE:

(1) (Hsung Ke-wu and Tang Mou-hsin) Kuomingtang, who advocate an independent Szechwan.

(2) Teng Hsi-hou who advocates subordination to the Peking Government.

(3) Liu Ch'eng-hsun who is always "on the fence".

These unit commanders known to be in favor of any one of the above policies are marked (1), (2) or (3) in the column of remarks.

Another Szechwan leader to be considered is Yang Sen who was driven into Hupeh in 1922 but will attempt to return to Szechwan in 1923.

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(6180) YUNNAN PROVINCE - TUCHUN TANG CHI-YAO - At outs with Sun Yat-sen and Wu Pei-fu.

TROOPS IN YUNNAN ARE:			Total Strength
Regulars - 24 regts. of 3 bns. each, strength of each regt.,		1500	36,000
Irregulars - (largely bandits) - about			10,000
			46,000

DISTRIBUTION OF ABOVE :

On Kwangsi-Kweichow border between Kwang-nan and Seping:					
12 regts	regulars	Commanders(?)	Strength	18,000	
1 regt.	"	Gen. Hu Kuo-hsin	"	1,500	Returned from Kweichow.
				19,500	
In Yunnan-fu:					
9 regts.	(Chin Wei-chun) regulars		"	13,500	13,500
In Other Parts of Province:					
2 regts	regulars		"	3,000	
Irregulars				10,000	13,000
					46,000

(M/A China 5113, 2-15-23.)

Binding Margin.

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

3-1 1923 2009-143

WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT---TROOPS FOR A FENGTIEN-CHIHLI WAR (G-2 Report).

2009

From CHINA

No. 5123 *Date* April 18, 1923., *19*

Replying to No.---------- *Date* RECEIVED G/2 W.D. MAY 24 1923, *19*

CHIHLI TROOPS:--As now located, that would undoubtedly be used in event of such a war.

(Chihli Prov.)

Lanchow-Shanhaikuan	15th Luchun Division - Gen.Peng Shou-hsin. This Divn. has been organized from the 14th M.B. which fought well in 1922 against Fengtien troops.	5,000
Lutai	13th Luchun M.B. - Gen. Tung Cheng-kuo Fought ag. Fengtien troops in 1922.	3,500
Lanfang	12th Luchun M.B. - Kuo Shu-ping Fought ag.Fengtien troops in 1922.	3,500

(Chihli) Troops of Feng Yu-hsiang around Peking.

Nan Yuan	11th Div. - Gen.Feng Yu-hsiang One of the two best divns. in China.	10,000
"	8th Luchun M.B. ? Newly organized by Gen.Feng.	3,000
"	25th Luchun M.B. ? Newly organized by Gen.Feng.	3,000
Tungchow	7th Luchun M.B. Gen.Chang Chih-chang Newly organized by Gen.Feng.	3,000

(Chihli Prov.) ALONG Tientsin-Pukow Railroad.

Machang	23d Div. - Gen. Wang Ch'eng-pin Gen. Wang was the Commander in the Field in 1922 for Wu Pei-fu for all movements beyond Tientsin. Gen.Wang & his division both fought well in 1922.	6,000

(Shantung Prov.)

Techow	26th Div. - Gen. Chang Kuo-jung This division did not fight well in 1922 and would probably be used by Gen. Wu for "canon fodder" only.	6,000

(Chihli) TROOPS along or near the Peking-Hankow R.R.

Liu Li-ho	14th Luchun M.B. - Gen. Shih Chuan-sheng Newly ogganized.	3,500

(Chihli)	**Troops along or near the Peking-Hankow R.R.** (Continued)	
Paoting-fu	15th Luchun M.B. - General Sun Yo Participated in 1922 operations.	3,000
(Honan Prov.)		
Cheng Chow	14th Div. - Gen. Chin Yun-ao Formed from 8th M.B. in 1922. Not considered an efficient organization. Probably would not play an important role.	3,500
Changteh	1st Shensi Div. - Gen. Hu Lieh-sheng Fought well in Honan against Chao Ti in 1922 under Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang.	5,000
Kaifeng	24th Div.-Gen. Chang Fu-lai Fought in Hupeh-Hunan conflict of 1921. About the average Chinese division.	8,000
Loyang	3rd Div. - Gen. Wu Pei-fu This division and the 11th Div. of Feng Yu-hsiang are probably the two best in China.	10,000
	Troops along Peking-Suiyuan Railroad.	
(Chahar Territory)		
Kalgan	4th Luchun M.B. - Gen. Chang Hsi-yuan Participated in operations of 1922	3,000
	Total	79,000

There are other troops that would be available for Wu Pei-fu but few if any of them would be used in active operations either because they would be needed at or near their present stations to "sit on the lid", guard lines of communications, or because they would not be of sufficient military value.

Such troops would include those in Shantung, Hupeh and the 20th Division in Shensi, the 13th Div. at Jehol, the 9th Div. at Peiyuan (Peking), and the Yichun scattered between Peking and Jehol.

The above listed organizations, probably recruited to a total strength of about 100,000 constitute Wu Pei-fu's mobile troops.

FENGTIEN TROOPS - Details of organization and station of Chang Tso-lin's troops ~~is~~ are not clearly known.

(Fengtien Prov.)	**Along Peking-Mukden Railroad.**	
Chinchow	27th Div. - Gen. Chang Tso-hsiang About half-way between Mukden & Shanhaikuan. Fought against Wu Pei-fu in 1922.	7,000
Along R.R.	9th Fengtien M.B. - Gen. Yang Te-sheng	2,500
Suicheng	1st Feng. Div.-Gen. Li Ching-lin	6,000
Sin ~~Suz~~ Min-fu (Hsin Min-fu)	5th Feng. M.B. - Gen. Chi En-ming	3,500
"	1° Feng. Indep. Cav. Regt. - Gen. Chu Yi-ch'ing	700
	Stationed at or near Mukden.	
Mukden	3° Feng. M.B. - Gen. Chang Hsueh-liang	5,000
"	8° " " - Gen. Kuo Sung-ling	5,000
?	1° " Cav. Brig. - Gen. Chang Jung	1,400

FENGTIEN TROOPS

Stationed at or near Mukden (Cont'd)

Mukden	2° Feng. Indep. Cav. Regt. - Gen. Sun Yu-chu	700

South of Mukden on S.M.R.R. line to Dairen.

Liaoyang	1° Feng. M.B. Gen. K'an Ch'ao-hsi	3,500

East of Mukden on S.M.R.R. to Korea.

Antung	10° Feng. M.B. - Gen. Chao En-chiu	3,500
	Total in Fengtien Province.	38,800

Stationed in Kirin Province - North of S. M. Railroad.

Changchun & Kirin	1° Kirin M.B. - Gen. Hu Yung-kuei	4,500
Kirin	4° Kirin M.B. - Gen. Li Meng-kang	3,100
Harbin	19° Luchun M.B. - Gen. Chang Huan-hsiang	5,000
Harbin	2° Kirin M.B. Gen. Tung Chao	4,200
Kirin Distr.	Kirin Indep. Mixed Regt.	5,000
Imienpo & vicinity	5° Kirin M.B.- Gen. Tsai Yung-chen	3,800

Stationed in Heilungkiang Province - West of Harbin.

Tsitsihar	29th Div. - Gen. Wu Tsun-sheng	9,500
"	2° Heilungkiang M.B. - Gen. Chang Ming-chiu	2,500
Hailar	4° Feng. M.B. - Gen. Tsai Ping-pen	3,400
Hailar & Manchuli	4° Heilungkiang M.B. - Gen. Chang Hai-peng	3,000
Hulan	1° Heilungkiang M.B. - Gen. Shih Te-shan	2,500
Aigun	3° " M.B. - Gen. Pa Ying-E	2,500
Anda	1° " Cav. Brig.	1,500
	Total for Manchuria.	89,300

It will be noted that only 38,800 of the troops listed hereon in Manchuria are south of the South Manchurian R.R. line (Japanese) running from Mukden to Changchun. Unless our information is very incomplete, it would seem that Chang Tso-lin does not have a sufficient number of troops in the southern part of Manchuria to take the initiative in a campaign south of the Great Wall. Troops can of course be brought south over the Japanese line but this will require time and will indicate openly that General Chang is preparing for hostilities.

Copies to Manila and Tientsin.

4-1

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2009-147

WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT GENDARMERIE, POLICE, ETC. FOR PRESERVING ORDER IN PEKING.
(G-2 Report.)

From M/A China. 2009

No. 5217. Date Dec. 13, 1923., 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JAN 19 1924

The following is a report of the inspection of one company of the Gendarmerie (Pao An Tui), made by the American Military Attache, and one assistant, on invitation of General Munthe, who commands the Gendarmerie.

(Refs. to Prev. Report M/A China. 5151, June 28, 1923. Index No. 6180.)

Binding Margin.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
WAR DEPARTMENT

4-1

CHINA. 6180.

D009-146

GENDARMERIE, POLICE, ETC. FOR PRESERVING ORDER IN PEKING.

On the 6th Instant the Military Attache, and one assistant, on invitation of General Munthe, accompanied the latter on an inspection of one company of the Gendarmerie referred to in paragraph (A) 2 of the M/A China 5151, June 28, 1923 -6180. Others in the party were the French Military Attache and a press representative.

At the barrack entrance a guard under an officer, and with excellent field music, rendered usual honors.

The barracks are of usual Chinese one-story type, in a series of rectangular buildings approximately 10' x 30', their long axes enclosing a quadrangle approximately 150 yards square.

Standing in line"at ease", in the quadrangle, was the company in three platoons, each 18 file front, double rank.

The Uniform (winter) is black. Well cut blouses and trousers. Flat brass buttons on former. Black caps,generally similar in shape to our own, with white bands. White leggins; black leather shoes. On the right shoulder the soldier's individual number; on the left, the name of the corps, both in brass Chinese characters. Each man had on his left sleeve the corps device, a white chevron piped with red. Additional chevrons were worn for non-commissioned rank. The material of the leggins is canvas and of the uniform cotton. The latter is no warmer than the summer uniform of Khaki colored cotton. However, most of the men wore padded cotton garments under their outer clothes. Every part of the uniform was neat and clean and brass well polished.

Officers wore black woolen uniforms and long trousers. On the left sleeve a gold chevron piped with red indicated both the corps and the rank of lieutenant; two, captain, three, major; four, colonel. Stars to denote rank, in the same relative numbers, were also worn on shoulder straps and collar. The officers did not make as smart an appearance as the men.

The company was called to attention and reports of attendance made by sergeants to platoon commanders and by them to the Company commander in brief, very loud words. The impression was distinctly German. A drill followed that was remarkable for precision, accuracy and immobility in ranks between movements. In rythm, cadence and finish it was the equal of the best drilled troops of any country.

Three marching steps were used, the quick step, "goose step", and double time. The latter is different from our's in being slower, with more than normal knee action and a distinct springing from foot to foot. Passage from one to another was without a single fault, and distances were accurately maintained. Column of fours was formed to the right only and as by the Germans. It may be that they also form to the left.

(. M. A. China. 5217, December 13, 1923).

Setting up exercises lost much of their physical value through perfect unity. Each twist, bend and turn of torso, each arm and leg flexion and extension being exactly alike throughout all ranks.

Bayonet exercise was full of grace and marked by exactitude of execution, but was without fire and individual dash. It was not a fighting drill.

Firing was from double rank; from one kneeling and one standing; and from both kneeling. It was a marvel of precision, all hammers falling so perfectly together as to leave some doubt if all triggers had been pulled. No extended order firing, nor from a prone position.

Inspection of individual equipment showed a cleanliness that in the case of the rifles would have caused one of our Inspector Generals anguish, and one of our company commanders many anxious moments of explanation. Each gun was polished to the point of gleaming nickel plate, including the bore, with not a drop of oil to catch the dust. They had the appearance of having been cleaned with emery paper and then buffed. In explanation of this it is said that the rifles (German bolt and magazine of ancient type) were, when issued, so badly rusted they could not be opened.

The mens' equipment consists of rifle, dagger bayonet, waist belt and two ammunition pouches, one on either side of the belt buckle. Belts and pouches are of an inferior grade of fair leather.

At the preparatory command for inspection, bolts were withdrawn from rifles and placed in the belt on the right side. When the inspecting officer approached the rifle was advanced by the right hand by the soldier. The officer took and inspected it, and then, returning it, inspected the bolt, and then the bayonet. The soldier then faced about and replaced the bolt. It is thought the separate inspection of the bolt was a sensible procedure.

Particularly notable was the fact that after the preparatory command for inspection, and the drawing of the bolts, all ranks stood "at ease", only the soldier actually being inspected standing at "attention". It is recommended that this practice be adopted in our Army. Our custom of requiring all ranks during inspection to remain at attention is very hard on the men, and while it may have a disciplinary value, the same results may be obtained as part of normal drill. No two inspections are ever quite alike as to time consumed, and the men of one company at rigid attention view with a distinct sense of personal injury the members of another that has been promptly inspected and marched off.

In the drill, the method of fixing bayonets was worthy of note. The command is divided so that it may be compared to a division of our command thus: " 1. Fix Bayo"-- 2"net". At the first command (the men being at "order arms") the muzzle of the rifle was carried to the left by the right hand, seized by the left hand, the bayonet drawn and fixed by the right

hand, which remained at the junction of barrel and bayonet. All heads were turned toward and eyes fixed on this same point. At the second command the gun muzzle was sharply returned by the left hand to the right side, the right hand dropped to its normal position at order arms, and the movement terminated by the smart return of the left hand from the gun muzzle to the left side. The whole movement took no more time than the execution of the same movement by our men, and in finish and precision was preferable to it.

Sleeping quarters were stone floored, white-washed, well lighted and heated by a single small stove. Beds were wooden trestles on which boards were laid, and on these a thin cotton mattress spread. Equipment stored on shelves. About fifteen men to one of the 10' x 30' buildings mentioned.

Mess rooms similiar in size, the funiture consisting of bare tables, stools and bowls.

The kitchen consisted of two Chinese cooking stoves (brick ranges) with a huge cauldron on each. Adjoining it was a small room in which water was kept hot at all times for tea. Every room had the invariable tea-pot and cups. Meals were served twice daily, at 10:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m.

The bathroom contained a series of square cement tanks, approximately 10' x 10' and 3 feet high. Across them were laid boards. Twice a week all the men are required to bathe here. They sit on the sides of the tanks and on the boards and are given a steam bath. No cold shower or plunge follows, nor does any sickness.

Hair is kept clipped close to the head, and the barber shop is always busy.

Everything and place about the barracks was scrupulously, remarkably clean. A cleanliness not of the day or for the occasion, but of constant scrubbing and attention. The French Military Attache remarked on it as the only clean place in China. This, however, is an unfair exaggeration. There are four other barracks of the Gendarmerie. His inquiry as to whether the men took their habits of cleanliness into their homes received no satisfactory answer.

Storerooms were clean, neat and well kept.

The base pay of a private is $8.00 (Mex) per month, which is only slightly increased for service and non-commissioned rank. Out of this he must pay for his own rations, which now cost him $2.80 (Mex) a month. As the men are five months in arrears in pay, they are dependent for their food on what money their commander can borrow for them.

Officers are seven months in arrears of pay. We were not shown their quarters. They are allowed to leave their duties one day a week.

(M.A. China. 5217. Dec. 13, 1923.)

CHINA. 6180.

GENDARMERIE, POLICE, ETC. FOR PRESERVING ORDER IN PEKING.

Page 14.

The Gendarmerie is a special corps, known as the "Pao An Tui" (Peace and Quiet) and has a present strength of 1038. It is trained by foreign officers, whose authority does not extend beyond that of instruction. The Commander in Chief has the title of Pu Chun T'ung Ling, with the rank of Marshal and the picturesque local name of General of the Nine Gates. Among foreigners he is known as the Chief of Police. The present incumbent is General Hieh Hsien-fan.

" In times of peace it concerns itself with patrolling the streets at night, guarding the city gates and policing the rural districts in the vicinity of the capital. In time of civil war the Gendarmerie close the gates, man the walls, and assume the responsibility of excluding the soldiery of all factions with the object of preventing street fighting and looting in the capital." (China Year Book -1923).

Lieutenant General John Wilhelm Norman Munthe is the foreign officer instructor. He was born in Norway and came to China in 1887, since which time he has had much military experience in the Chinese and briefly the Russian army. He is a great admirer of the German Army methods, a competent drill instructor, fair and just in his administration, and occupies a unique position in the capital. No one criticises or interferes with him and as an as an institution he seems as permanent as anything human can be. He speaks fluent English, French, German, Norwegian and Chinese and is an ardent Christian Scientist. His freedom from molestation by other aspirants for his position or by Chinese politicians is ascribed to the gratitude and and surprise of the Chinese in finding in their employ one foreigner who is not forever nagging at them to change this or that, or to increase his pay and responsibilities. If there are those who say that he is but a super-drill sergeant, at least all admit that he is a good one. Of two former foreign assistants, one has died and one is now otherwise engaged.

The Gendarmerie may be taken as a good example of what the Chinese may become under competent foreign instruction. They are cheerful, clean, obedient and well disciplined. Their wants are few, their endurance remarkable, their bodies sound and strong. General Munthe said that in all his thirty years experience he had had not one sulky or mutinous soldier. Arrayed against other Chinese soldiers there is no doubt but that they would do well. Against Japanese or Western soldiers, it is not thought that they would be of more than negligible value. In the case of the particular company inspected, the commander, a colonel performing the duties of a major, had been a soldier under General Munthe thirty years ago. He was a fat comfortable looking man, with a kindly manner, ready at once to break into a beaming golden toothed smile. He is a very good type of the senior officers. Stiffened with foreign officers as was the "Chinese" Gordon's "Ever Victorious Army" or the Wei Hai Wei Regiment and trained on more modern lines, with more of the spirit of combat, they would certainly make excellent soldiers.

(M. A. China. 5217. Nov. 13, 1923.)

IN REPLY REFER TO:
335.11

HEADQUARTERS, AMERICAN FORCES IN CHINA,
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER.

WDC/gmv
2 Encs

Tientsin, China.
June 4, 1924.

2009 1/4

Subject: Notes on visit to Marshal Wu Pei Fu's Hdqrs.

To: The Adjutant General,
Washington, D. C.

1. The enclosed notes on my recent visit to Marshal Wu Pei Fu's Headquarters at Loyang are forwarded to the War Department as containing matters of possible interest to G-2 Division, War Dept. General Staff.

2. There are also enclosed brief notes on interviews with Marshals Lu Yung Hsiang and Ch'i Hsueh Yuan, which I had the opportunity to secure during my recent visit to Southern China.

3. I consider it very desirable to establish contacts with the prominent men in both Military and Civil affairs, and with early visits contemplated to Marshal Chang Tso Lin and General Feng Yu-Hsiang, I will have completed the circle of the most prominent military leaders in China today, except those in the extreme South and Southwest. As these visits have been made or are contemplated to be made within a relatively short period, my impressions of their respective personalities are still fresh and enable me to make a closer and more comparative analysis of their types, characteristics, abilities, and ambitions than could be otherwise done, if long periods elapsed between visits.

13 Received A. G. O. JUL 10 1924

2 Incls--
1--Notes, Marshal Wu Pei Fu.
2--Notes, Marshals Lu and Ch'i.

RECEIVED
Wm. D. CONNOR,
Commanding. 4 10 PM
JUL 10 1924

MISCELLANEOUS DIV.
A.G.O.

E-1

2009-147

[redacted] MAY 13th to 14th, 1924:

[redacted] arrived in Loyang about 4.00 p.m., May 13th, and were received by [redacted] of the Marshal at the station. We were taken to his [redacted] where after an interview we were invited to remain for dinner, and [redacted] were put up at the guest house. Next morning we went out with [redacted] to watch the troops at drill and afterwards to look over the [redacted]. Then we had luncheon with him, visited the Chinese City of Loyang [redacted] is about two miles east of the garrison, which is referred to as the [redacted] Palace. From its location on the site of the ancient capital which [redacted] also so called. Next morning, May 14th, we went out with the Marshal to watch the drill of the Artillery and Cavalry, and then went to the Lung Men Caves, returning at 4.00 p.m., in time for a reception and dinner with the Field Officers and General Officers of the 3rd Division. Next morning we again watched the Artillery drill and left Loyang at 9.00 A.M. on our return to Tientsin. During all the intervals in the program given above we were with one or more of the Marshal's Staff who spoke English and who were quite assiduous in their attentions.

Marshal Wu is fifty-one years old, a native of Shantung. He is quiet in demeanor, a pleasant talker and was most agreeable and hospitable to us. He is interested in all things Chinese but apparently had no interest in, or curiosity about, foreign matters at this time, altho he stated that after China was reunited he desired to travel in the U. S. and Europe. He is a great believer in the possibilities and future of China which he says he thinks must be developed along lines of Chinese national methods and traditions. He said that the first great need of China was a more complete system of transportation and that in the development of the railroads China should and would look to foreign investors with advantage to both parties. Given the railway system, other developments such as roads and industries could and should be undertaken by the Chinese themselves.

As to the ultimate methods of government for China he said that with China's 4000 years of development, it should be able to find some form or method specially adapted to its people and that it hardly needed to look for Western models to copy nor could it so do with advantage.

He said that reunification was the first problem for China and that this should be brought about in less than five years, but not in much less time than that.

The brightness of his eyes and the way his face lights up when talking, gives one the impression that he is a great enthousiast and that his heart and soul are in the reunification of China. When thinking of this in connection with his campaign methods, it struck me that he was lacking in a concrete plan and in the characteristics essential to work out his ideals in a systematic and methodical way. He seems to have enthousiasm and bravery but lacks system and sustained aggressive powers. At times he has postponed action until conditions simply demanded that something be done instead of foreseeing events and forestalling serious results.

Many guests were at Loyang; representatives of certain provinces, representatives of the Departments of the Peking Government and old friends who seemed to be visiting him. From what I gathered in the course of our conversations, this is apparently a continual condition. There was every evidence that his interests were national and were not confined to local or provincial matters. He is greatly interested in reforestation and has tree nurseries in all the spare space about Loyang. He is encouraging this idea throughout Honan and is enforcing its advancement by regulations about tree planting.

Encl- 1

[illegible], shown on maps as Kenan-fu, lies in the beautiful valley of [illegible], a very intensely cultivated and densely populated part of [illegible], about 70 miles from Changchow on the Peking-Hankow railway.

The railroad from Changchow to Loyang is the "Lung Hai", a well constructed single track railway, with an excellent roadbed and what was certainly excellent rolling stock when first obtained.

The 2nd Division is garrisoned at Loyang and the 5th and 7th Divisions are in the same locality. A Cadet School for boys is located here, in which there are from 2000 to 3000 boys under instruction. It is also a recruit center.

We had no opportunity to observe anything except the ordinary garrison drills in the manual of arms, marching and athletics; there was no field training in progress. Some 700 recruits arrived the morning after we did and it seemed impossible that they could be converted into the relatively smart looking soldiers composing the rest of the garrison, yet we were told that they were an ordinary run of recruits. The Marshal personally inspected each one and summarily rejected about 50 on personal appearance, thus starting the others off with the idea that they had been picked out by him personally.

The manual of arms, the marching and the bayonet fencing, were very creditable and would have been so in one of our own organizations. The general appearance was very good considering their limited clothing and equipment, and was excellent for Chinese troops. No machine guns, automatic rifles or other auxilliary infantry weapons were seen with the troops and no extended order drill was noted. The number of drill evolutions was very limited even for the extent of drill ground available. After a certain amount of this elementary military training, the troops are given several months of athletic training to develop them physically. We evidently only saw the best of this class at work but even so the results were most surprisingly good and even if they were hand-picked, I doubt if an equal percentage of equally good athletes could be found in any foreign organization that I know of. The athletic equipment was most primitive while the performances were most advanced.

All the men are taught to sing patriotic songs and the impression created by several thousand men marching away from the drill fields at about half time, all singing at the tops of their voices, was very good.

The horses of the Cavalry and Artillery are Chinese ponies. The appearance of the Cavalry was not very good owing to poor equipment and small shaggy animals. Only one troop was drilling when we saw them. Some were doing Cossack riding stunts, another detachment was undergoing cutting and thrusting drill mounted. These performances were about mediocre. The riding seemed to be good but nothing to observe specially.

The material of the Artillery seemed to be kept in excellent contition. The parade ground drill of men and animals was very good, including the driving of the light artillery vehicles. There seemed to be very few men at the drills except the drivers on the two mornings that we watched them. Only one battery of light artillery was observed at drill and no unlimbering, occupation of positions, or standing gun drill was attempted. The battery was horsed by white Chinese ponies, but the color of the guns and carriages blended well with the brown sandy terrain. No close inspection of material was made. A mountain battery put on a few simple movements on the parade ground. The guns were drawn by one mule in shafts, but the gun and carriage are adapted for pack. Entire construction very light. The gun was longer than our 2.95mm., of slightly smaller calibre, slide block breach system, pole type trail with light spade, and limited elevation. Neither this mountain gun nor the field piece were equipped with telescopic or panoramic sights. Ammunition boxes are carried on ammunition carriers similar to those of our 75mm equipment.

The general impression as far as could be drawn from such a casual garrison inspection was very favorable. What their actual efficiency as a fighting unit would be could not be judged from such an inspection, except that they were alert, well disciplined and well developed physically.

The Cadet School is really an enlisted force including boys as young as six years old. These boys put up a very creditable drill and looked very well indeed. With them as with the soldiers, I was impressed with the difference between them and the ordinary Chinese boys of the streets from whom apparently they come. Their alertness, confidence and generally military appearance was most noticeable. These Cadets have about three hours military instruction and four hours of educational instruction daily, which is just the converse of what is given the older soldiers.

Loyang is also used as a school of application for Lieutenants. There were about 100 there undergoing a three months period of training in the methods of Marshal Wu. They then go back to their organizations and are succeeded by another group. These officers are organized into a company and are drilled in the evolutions and methods used for training soldiers.

If the objects of Marshal Wu could be condensed, I should say that his controlling idea was to instill confidence in his officers and men, and from what I saw I should think that he was undoubtedly succeeding, at least in so far as concerns the enlisted men and company officers. How he handles his field officers, general officers and staff I had no opportunity of observing. If he manages them with the same tact and judgement that he exercises elsewhere, I am convinced that he is building up a great group of officers who believe in him and his methods and over whom he has a tremendous hold. This to my mind is the test of his future. He is placing his own men in the important key positions all thru Central and Northern China and if he has gained such a hold on their loyalty and esteem that they will "stay put" as his men, he will soon have a strong skeleton on which to build his plans for the future. Several small things that I noticed rather lead me to think that this condition amongst the higher officers does not fully exist. I received the impression that he did things himself, short circuting his senior officers and to a considerable degree failed in the matter of delegating authority and looking to his senior officers for results only.

The barracks and other buildings of the Loyang garrison are built of brick. They were constructed by Yuan Shi K'ai about fifteen years ago. I did not go inside of them but the appearance of the barrack yards was excellent. There were quarters for one division at Loyang, composed of two brigades of infantry of two regiments each, one regiment of artillery, one regiment of cavalry, one company of engineers and the staff and service troops of the division. The barracks are laid out around the division headquarters on the far sides of two huge drill fields. The roads in the area are wide, straight and well laid out, but are not metalled and when we arrived were deep in mud, owing to recent rains. The entire site is well drained and soon recovers from even a heavy rain. The aviation service is represented by three machines. They have temporary hangars and a good landing field. The wireless plant was not quiet completed but when it is they expect to have communication with all important points in China. Experience in other radio plants of Chinese construction and operation leaves doubt as to whether these expectations will be fulfilled.

The impressions gained from my trip confirm those that I had formed from my observations of his operations. He is a high class Chinese and has the gift of organizing and leading men. I had no opportunity to judge as to his ability to "follow through" and take advantage of successes gained by the characteristics just mentioned.

My impression however of his character in this respect was more favorable than I had formed from the apparent lack of follow up or exploitation of success that has characterized his operations during the past few years. It may be that other outside forces prevented the proper exploitation of his successes or it may be that he makes a more favorable impression by his quiet forceful demeanor than his actual character justifies.

My impression of the soldiers of the 3rd Division was more favorable than that produced by any other Chinese soldiers that I have seen. They make me believe that discipline and training by competent officers can produce good soldiers from the Chinese. I believe that in this respect they are like the other soldiers of the world and that, contrary to the usual opinions on this subject, the ignorance and superstitions of the Chinese do not disqualify them from being good soldiers.

Given a few leaders like Marshal Wu Pei Fu, a reasonable system of communications, sufficient funds to obtain arms and equipment and a reunited peaceful China, all of which may come about within fifty years, I am of the opinion that the world, at no far distant day, may regret that China ever woke up.

Wm. D. CONNOR,
Brig. Genl., U. S. Army,
Comdg. A.F. in China.

Enc. 1.

Encl 1

2004-147

[redacted] AND MARSHAL CH'I HSIEH YUAN AFTER A [redacted] IN APRIL, 1926.

General Lu Yung Hsiang is a big upstanding Chinese, fifty-seven years old, a native of Shantung. He has a pleasant personality but seems to be a strict disciplinarian. He appeared friendly and interested in affairs. Public works in his province seemg to be receiving attention. I noted canal walls being repaired and public buildings being rebuilt. The city of Hangchow outside the walled city has good roads in good state of repair. He executes highwaymen promptly. His subordinates were polite and courteous, even without any admonition from his headquarters. He does not seem to be very bright and alert but was about on the average in this respect.

He is, or was, an Anfuite and is the only one of that party now governing a province. He has never recognized the election of Tsao K'un as legal. He regards Tuan Chi Jui as his chief altho the latter has no official position. He is a lone figure but, owing to the position of his province with inaccessible terrain to the south of it and an almost impassible terrain of lagoons and canals on its northern boundary, he would be hard to overcome. His troops looked pretty well. In addition to his own province of Chekiang, he has also held control of southern Kiangsu ever since he has been Governor of Chekiang. Under the Anfu regime he was Defence Commissioner of Shanghai and when promoted he put his own man, General Ho, in to succeed him as Defence Commissioner of Shanghai, thus keeping his grip on that rich city, and was able to keep it against the wishes of the Peking Party when they nominated a new Chief of Police for Shanghai on the death of the former one.

Marshal Ch'i, Governor of Kiangsu, naturally does not calmly acquiesce in this alienation of the richest city of his province from his own control and was starting to take it back by force when Wu Pei Fu interfered or interceded in the interests of peace. Thus Wu is in the position of a supporter of Lu against the members and interests of his own party. How much he accomplished by intercession and how much by interference is not known to the outside public, but it is certain that Ch'i chafes at the existing conditions and is planning to go after Shanghai when conditions favor such a step. Given a free hand he can probably accomplish his purpose. If this will satisfy him and does not then go on after General Lu in Chekiang there may be no great disturbance in this region. If he decides to attack General Lu, these two provinces will be the seat of prolonged disturbances for General Lu will be difficult to defeat in his own province.

I consider General Lu as a second class figure in Chinese affairs. He occupies a key position and will doubtless continue to be quite a power but owing to the decline of the Anfu Party he cannot rise much higher. He may continue to be a valuable lieutenant and useful adherent to some leader but he will not become a leader himself.

Encl 2

Marshal Ch'i Hsieh Yuan is very keen and alert, very live and jovial, and is a native of Chihli. He doesn't seem bent on accumulating money. I should say that he cared more for power than he does for wealth. He has bled his province plentifully but most of the proceeds have gone to finance military activities outside of Kiangsu. He is already Super Tuchun of Kiangsu, Kiangsi, and Anhuei and is a powerful factor in the Chihli Party. He is a classmate of Wang Chen Pin, and is highly educated according to Chinese standards. He and Wu Pei Fu are the only high ranking officers holding literary degrees. There is some talk of strong disaffection on his part against Wu and of a coalition of Marshals Ch'i, Feng Yu Hsiang, Lu Yung Hsiang, and Chang Tso Lin and others against him, but China is full of rumors at all times and I do not see that Ch'i would gain by a change in which he emerged not as a leader of the new group but as an acknowledged subordinate to some chief other than Wu, as for instance Chang Tso Lin, whereas in his present position he is not an acknowledged inferior to Wu Pei Fu, altho Wu's star is in the ascendant just at present. Many Chinese who dislike Wu Pei Fu for any reason are flocking to Marshal Ch'i's headquarters to ally themselves with the man that they consider Wu's most formidable competitor.

In Nanking, as in Hangchow (capital of Chekiang), the city outside of the old walled city is well laid out and the roads are in good repair, and here also there are evidences of a certain amount of maintenance of public works. These conditions are noticeable by their absence in Northern China.

On account of his youth and prominence Ch'i has excellent chances of rising to the head of affairs and to the highest position in China. Being eleven years younger than Wu Pei Fu he can wait for his time to come after Wu's. But on the other hand he used to be superior in rank to Wu and he does not impress me as one that would wait with any degree of patience.

Having seen both of them I think he would lose out in a clash with Wu unless he could bring about conditions, or conditions should be brought about, that would give him a chance to raise a popular outcry and he could come forward as the savior of China. If Wu Pei Fu were corrupt, that might give rise to such a condition but he is acknowledged as personally honest and there is small chance of an opportunity arising on this count. If he should seize and misuse arbitrary powers, that again might give Ch'i his opportunity. This last condition is far from improbable. Marshal Wu is an enthousiast and enthousiasm that will not brook opposition can easily lead to a misuse of power in a country like China. This condition, in my opinion, is one that may easily arise and is the only probable one in sight that would give Ch'i a chance to oppose Wu Successfully at anytime in the near future. Given such an opportunity Marshal Ch'i may become the leading figure in China before Wu rises higher and then leaves the stage in a regular program of rise and fall; without it I think he is a very probable successor to Wu if he does not fight with him. If he fights Wu, I think that Wu will defeat him

Wm. D. CONNOR
Commanding.

4-2 OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF MIL. INTEL. DIV. 1924 2009-149 JUL 30 WAR DEPARTMENT

MIL.

June 30, 1924.

Subject: Strength and Organization of the Chinese Army.

To: A. G. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JUL 28 1924

1. The report herewith is compiled from best available sources. It is impossible to get strengths of organizations from the Chinese who desire to keep these secret. In the main the strengths shown are taken from Consular reports. It is estimated that the total strength shown by the report is not more than 200,000 from the actual strength, and is probably under rather than over the actual. To the total strength shown should be added 200,000 organized bandits under arms.

2. By Lushun Divisions and Mixed Brigades must be understood a perpetuation of title only. These organizations are no longer a part of a National Army, but are under the authority shown in each case. Troops are supported by the Chiefs or parties under which they are serving.

3. Relative efficiency, where known, is indicated by the letters A, B, C and D. A being the highest, and the efficiency being that of Chinese troops and not as compared to foreign. An organization rated "A" is to be understood as one in which the discipline is good; arms, equipment and uniforms in good order; the close order drill excellent, and attention paid to physical development. Extended order drills, squad, section platoon and company leadership, target practice, battle exercises and maneuvers are practically unknown.

4. Grateful acknowledgment is made to the U. S. Consuls for valuable assistance rendered by them in securing data for this report.

J. H. BARNARD,
[illegible] Col., Field Artillery,
Assistant Military Attaché.

In the absence of the
Military Attaché.

1 inel in quad.

- R E C A P I T U L A T I O N -

Luchun Divisions		176,400
" Mixed Brigades		66,870
- Provincial Troops -		
Anhui		17,500
Chekiang		32,000
Chihli		14,500
" Metropelitan District		14,500
Chahar		10,130
Jehol		8,150
Suiyuan		6,500
Fukien		42,000
Honan		13,000
Hunan		41,200
Hupeh		26,600
Kansu		49,600
Kiangsi		19,800
Kiangsu		32,500
Kwangsi		14,000
Kwangtung (Sun Yat-sen)		44,800
" (Chen Chiung-ming)		48,000
Kweichow		11,600
Fengtien		73,000
Heilungkiang		18,600
Kirin		33,700
Shansi		16,040
Shantung		47,900
Shensi		23,500
Sinkiang		7,750
Szechuan 1st Army	28,000	
2nd "	48,500	
3rd "	9,700	
		86,200
Yunnan		45,000
		1,041,340

18,900

1921 2007-149 JUL 30 WAR DEPARTMENT

Luchun		Commander	Province	Strength	Battalions of Inf.	Cav.	Art.	Engrs.	Cannon	M. G.	Rel. Eff.	Political Affiliation
1	Div.	Tsai Cheng-hsun	Kiangsi	8,000	12	3			36	16		Chihli Party - Wu Pei-fu
2	"	Sun Chuan-fang	Fukien	10,000	20				30	12		" " " "
3	"	Wu Pei-fu	Honan	10,000	12	3	3		54	24	A	" " " "
4	"	Chen Le-shan	Chekiang	7,900	12	1	3		48	8	A	Former Anfu Party - Neutral. Possible connection with Chang Tso-lin.
5	"	Sung Tsung-hsien	Shantung	8,000	12	3	3		36	16		Chihli Party - Tientsin Clique - Wang Chen-ping.
6	"	Chi Hsieh-yuan	Kiangsu	8,000	12	3	3		54	24	A	" " Chi Hsieh-yuan
7	"	Wu Hsin-tien	Szechuan	7,000					36	16		" " Wu Pei-fu. Part of Szechuan 2nd Army.
8	"	Wang Ju-chin	Hupeh	9,000	12	3	3		36	16		" " " "
9	"	Tung Cheng-kuo	Chihli	3,000	6	1	1		24	12		" " Tientsin Clique
10	"	Lu Yung-hsiang	Chekiang	10,500	15	3	3		54	16	A	Same as 4th.
11	"	Feng Yu-hsiang	Chihli	10,000	12	3	3		28	24	A	Chihli Party - Feng Yu-hsiang
12	"	Chou Yin-jen	Fukien	10,000	20				36	8	A	" " Wu Pei-fu
13	"	Wang Huai-ching	Chihli	3,000	6	1	1		24	12	A	" " Tientsin Clique
14	"	Chin Yun-e	Honan	3,500	6	1	1		18	4		" " Wu Pei-fu
15	"	Peng Shou-hsing	Chihli	3,000	6	1	1		18	20		" " Tientsin Clique
16	"	Yang Sen	Szechuan	9,000	12	3	3		18	16	B	" " Wu Pei-fu. Part of Szechuan 2nd Army.
17	"	Sheng Hung-ying	Kwangtung									" " " "
18	"	Lu Chin-shan	Szechua n	7,000	12		3		54	16		" " " " Part of Szechuan 2nd Army.
19	"	Yang Chun-pu	Kiangsu	3,000	11	1	1		24			" " Chi Hsieh-yuan
20	"	Yen Chih-tang	Shensi	7,000	12	3	3	3	18	16		" " Tientsin Clique. Has had trouble with Wu Pei-fu. Is not an adherent of Tuchun.
21	"	Tien Sung-yao	Szechuan	6,500								Chihli Party - Wu Pei-fu. Part of Szechuan
22	"	Yang Ting-mu	"	4,000								" " " " " "
23	"	Wang Wei-cheng	Chihli	6,000	12	3	3		36	24	A	" " " "
24	"	Yang Ching-cheng	Honan	8,000	12	3	2		36	16	A	" " " "
25	"	Chen Chia-mu	Hupeh	9,000	12	3	2		36	16		" " " "
26	"	Tsao Ying	Chihli	6,000	12	3	3		12	8		" "
27	"	Chang Hsueh-liang	Manchuria									

10	"												
11	"	Yang [illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
12	"	Chen Yin-jen	Fukien	10,000	20				30	8			
13	"	Wang Huai-ching	Chihli	3,000	6	1	1		24	12	A	"	"
14	"	Chin Yun-e	Honan	3,500	6	1	1		18	4		"	"
15	"	Peng Shou-heing	Chihli	3,000	6	1	1		18	20		"	"
16	"	Yang Sen	Szechuan	9,000	12	3	3		18	16	B	"	"
17	"	Sheng Hung-ying	Kwangtung									"	"
18	"	Lu Chin-shan	Szechua n	7,000	12		3		54	16		"	"
19	"	Yang Chun-pu	Kiangsu	3,000	11	1	1		24			"	"
20	"	Yen Chih-tang	Shensi	7,000	12	3	3	5	18	16		"	"
21	"	Tien Sung-yao	Szechuan	6,500								"	"
22	"	Tang Ting-mu	"	4,000								"	"
23	"	Wang Wei-cheng	Chihli	6,000	12	3	3		36	24	A	"	"
24	"	Yang Ching-cheng	Honan	8,000	12	3	2		36	16	A	"	"
25	"	Chen Chia-mu	Hupeh	9,000	12	3	2		36	16		"	"
26	"	Tsao Ying	Chihli	6,000	12	3	3		12	8		"	"
27	"	Chang Hsueh-liang	Manchuria									Mukden	"
28	"	Hsi Chin-chun	"									"	"
29	"	Wu Chun-sheng	Heilungkiang									"	"
30	"	Teng Hsi-hou	Szechuan									Chihli	"
31	"	Chen Kuo-tung	"									"	"
32	"	Tang Shih-tsung	"									"	"
33	"	Pan Wen-hua	"									"	"
34	"	Yuan Tsu-ming	"									"	"
35	"	Han Yu-kun	"									"	"
				176,400									

- 3 - Tientsin Clique. Has had trouble with Wu Pei-fu. Is not an adherent of Tuchun.
- 4 - Chihli Party- Wu Pei-fu. Part of Szechuan Set Army.
- 5 - Chi Heich-yuan Tientsin Clique.
- 6 - Wu Pei-fu. Part of Szechuan Set Army.
- 7 - (Tsao Kun's brother) Tientsin Clique.
- 8 - No details available.
- 9 - 1924 - Newly organised for war in Szechuan. No details available. Part of Szechuan 2nd Army.

The total does not include the 17th and 27th to 35th Divisions inclusive, details of which are unobtainable. They may be assumed to have a strength of 6,000 each. On the other hand, there is doubt as to the existence of some of them.

	Luchun		Commander	Province	Strength	Battaliens of Inf.	Cav.	Art.	Engrs.	Cannon	M. G.	Rel.Eff.	Political Affiliation
1	M.Brig.		Pan Hung-chun	✓Kiangsi	4,000	6							Chihli Party - Wu Pei-fu
2	"	"	Hu Nien-hsien	✓Hupeh	3,500	6	1	1		18	4		" " " "
3	"	"	Tang Fu-shan	✓Kiangsi	3,400	6		1					" " " "
4	"	"	Chang Chin-piao	✓Chahar	3,270	6		1		18		B	" " Tientsin Clique
5	"	"	Ma Hung-kuei	✓Suiyuan	3,500	6	1	1		18		C	" " " "
6	"	"	He Feng-lin	✓Kiangsu	3,200	6					2	A	Adherent of Lu Yung-hsiang, Chekiang.
7	"	"	Chang Chih-kiang	✓Chihli Met.	3,000	6	1	1				A	Chihli Party - Feng Yu-hsiang
8	"	"	Li Ming-chung	✓ " Met.	3,000	6	1	1				A	" " " "
9	"	"	Teng Ju-cho	✓Kiangsi	3,500	6		1		6	8		" " Wu Pei-fu
10	"	"	Meng Shao-yueh	✓Fukien	2,000	6						B	" " but inclined toward independence.
11	"	"	Wang Chi	✓ "	1,500	3						B	" " " " " "
12	"	"	Ke Shu-ping	✓ Chihli	3,500	6	1	1		18	6		" " Tientsin Clique
13	"	"	Feng Yu-jung	✓ "	3,500	6	1	1		18	6		" " " "
14	"	"	Shih Chuan-sheng	✓ "	3,500	6	1	1			4		" " " "
15	"	"	Sun Yueh	✓ "	3,000	6	1	1		18	20		" " " "
16	"	"	Tsao Shih-chieh										
17	"	"	Chang Lien-sheng	✓Hupeh	2,500	6		1		18	4	B	Chihli Party - Wu Pei-fu. 1924 Prob.now in Szechuan
18	"	"	Yu Hsueh-chung	✓ "	3,000	6	1	1		18	4	B	" "
19	"	"	Chang Huan-hsiang	✓Kirin	5,000	6	1	1		18	12	C	Mukden "
20	"	"	Wu Chang-chih	✓Shantung	4,000	3 Troop	1	1 Batt.		2	6	C	Chihli Party - 1924 - Prob.now in Szechuan.Wu Pei-fu Against bandits Lin Cheng 1923.
21	"	"	Wang Tu-ching	✓Hupeh	2,000	6		1		18	4		" " Wu Pei-fu. 1924 Prob.now in Szechuan
22	"	"	Wang Hung-en										
23	"	"	Wang Ling-ching	✓Suiyuan								C	Chihli Party- Tientsin Clique
24	"	"	Chang Chun-feng	✓Fukien								B	" " Wu Pei-fu
25	"	"	Sung Che-yuan	✓Chihli	3,000	6	1	1				A	" " Feng Yu-hsiang
26	"	"	Tien Wei-chin	✓Shensi								C	" " Wu Pei-fu
27	"	"	Sun Chen										
					66,870								

6	"	"	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
7	"	"	Chang Chih-kiang	✓Chihli	3,000	6	1	1			A	Chihli Party - Wu Pei-fu	
8	"	"	Li Ming-cheng	✓ "	3,000	6	1	1			A	" "	" "
9	"	"	Tang Ju-cho	✓Kiangsi	3,500	6		1	6	8		" "	Wu Pei-fu
10	"	"	Meng Shao-yueh	✓Fukien	2,000	6					B	" "	Not inclined towards [illegible]
11	"	"	Wang Chi	✓ "	1,500	3					B	" "	" "
12	"	"	Ke Shu-ping	✓ Chihli	3,500	6	1	1	18	6		" "	Tientsin Clique
13	"	"	Feng Yu-jung	✓ "	3,500	6	1	1	18	6		" "	" "
14	"	"	Shih Chuan-sheng	✓ "	3,500	6	1	1		4		" "	" "
15	"	"	Sun Yueh	✓ "	3,000	6	1	1	18	20		" "	" "
16	"	"	Tsao Shih-chieh										
17	"	"	Chang Lien-sheng	✓Hupeh	2,500	6		1	18	4	B	Chihli Party - Wu Pei-fu. 1924 Prob.now in Szechuan	
18	"	"	Yu Hsueh-chung	✓ "	3,000	6	1	1	18	4	B	" "	
19	"	"	Chang Huan-hsiang	✓Kirin	5,000	6	1	1	18	12	C	Mukden "	
20	"	"	Wu Chang-chih	✓Shantung	4,000	3 Troop	1	1 Batt.	2	6	C	Chihli Party - 1924 - Prob.now in Szechuan.Wu Pei-fu against bandits Lin Cheng 1925.	
21	"	"	Wang Tu-ching	✓Hupeh	2,000	6		1	18	4		" "	Wu Pei-fu. 1924 Prob.now in Szechuan
22	"	"	Wang Hung-en										
23	"	"	Wang Ling-ching	✓Suiyuan							C	Chihli Party-	Tientsin Clique
24	"	"	Chang Chun-feng	✓Fukien							B	" "	Wu Pei-fu
25	"	"	Sung Che-yuan	✓Chihli	3,000	6	1	1			A	" "	Feng Yu-hsiang
26	"	"	Tien Wei-chin	✓Shensi							C	" "	Wu Pei-fu
27	"	"	Sun Chen										
					66,870								

The total does not include the 16th, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 26th and 27th, details of which are unobtainable. They might be assumed to have a strength of 3,000 each. On the other hand there is doubt as to the existence of some of them.

PROVINCIAL - TROOPS.

		Commander	Province	Strength	Battalions of Inf.	Cav.	Art.	Engrs.	Cannon	M. G.	Rel. Eff.	Political Affiliation
1	M.Brig.	Nieh Chao-jung	Anhui	3,000	6	1	1		18	14	A	Chihli Party - Chi Hsieh-yuan
2	" "	Li Chuan-yeh	"	3,000	6		1			4	A	" " " "
3	" "	Wang Pu	"	3,000	6					4	A	" " " "
4	" "	Kao Shih-tu	"	3,000	6					4	A	" " " "
5	" "	Shih Chun-yu	"	3,000	6					4	A	" " " "
		Gendarmerie	"	2,500	5							" " " "
				17,500								
				CHEKIANG								
1	Div.	Pam Kuo-kang	Chekiang	8,000	12	1	1		34	12	B	
2	"	Chang Tsai-yang	"	6,000	12						B	
1	M.Brig.	Ch'en Chiang	"	2,000	6						B	Chekiang Provincial troops are nominally loyal to the Tuchun, Lu Yung-hsiang. It is known, however, that in Dec.1923, the 1st and 2nd Divisions maintained representatives in Peking who endeavored to effect an understanding with the Chihli Party. The loyalty to Lu Yung-hsiang of all these troops is doubtful. Lu Yung-hsiang is an adherent of Tuan Chi-jui with possible understandings with Chang Tso-lin. He is a bitter enemy of Chi Hsieh-yuan.
2	" "	Chen Ping-yun	"	2,000	7	1					B	
Special Troops		Yu Chi Tui (Police)	"	2,100								
Special Troops		Ching Pei-Tui "	"	10,800	36							
Special Troops		Fortress Troops	"	200	1							
Special Troops		Shou Pei Regt.(Guard)	"	900	3							
				32,000								
				CHIHLI								
Special Troops		Shou Pei Tui(Police)	Chihli	10,500	28	12						Chihli Party
Special Troops		Yi Chun	"	4,000	13	1						" "
				14,500								
				- Chihli, Metropolitan District -								
		Model Regiment	Chihli M.D.	1,000	3	1	1				A	Chihli Party - Feng Yu-hsiang
		Gendarmerie	" "	6,000							B	" " In Peking and suburbs
		Police	" "	6,000							A	" " In Peking
		Pao An Tui	" "	1,500							A	" " " "
				14,500								

1	Div.	Pan Kuo-kang	Chekiang	8,000	12	1	1		34	12	B		
2	"	Chang Tsai-yang	"	6,000	12						B		
1	M.Brig.	Ch'en Shiang	"	2,000	6						B		
2	" "	Chen Ping-yun	"	2,000	7	1					B		
		Yu Chi Tui (Police)	"	2,100									
	Special Troops	Ching Pei-Tui "	"	10,800	36								
		Fortress Troops	"	200	1								
		Shou Pei Regt.(Guard)	"	900	3								
				32,000									

Chekiang Provincial troops [illegible] the [illegible] Lu Yung-hsiang [illegible] that in Dec.1925, the 1st and [illegible] trained representatives in Peking [illegible] to effect an understanding with the [illegible] The loyalty to Lu Yung-hsiang of all these [illegible] is doubtful.-Lu Yung-hsiang is an adherent of Tuan Chi-jui with possible understandings with Chang Tso-lin. He is a bitter enemy of Chi Hsieh-yuan.

CHIHLI

	Special Troops	Shou Pei Tui(Police)	Chihli	10,500	28	12						Chihli Party	
		Yi Chun	"	4,000	13	1						" "	
				14,500									

- Chihli, Metropolitan District -

		Model Regiment	Chihli M.D.	1,000	3	1	1				A	Chihli Party - Feng Yu-hsiang	
		Gendarmerie	" "	6,000							B	" "	In Peking and suburbs
		Police	" "	6,000							A	" "	In Peking
		Pao An Tui	" "	1,500							A	" "	" "
				14,500									

Three Frontier Administrative Areas; Chahar, Jehol and Suiyuan.

1	M.Brig.	Wang Tze-tung	Chahar	3,700	6	1				4	C	Chihli Party	
1	Cav."	Ch'iao Chien-ts'ai	"								C	" "	
2	" "	Ting Ch'ang-fei	"	1,350		6					C	" "	
		Police	"	5,080								" "	
				10,130									
1	M.Brig.	Chang Lin	Jehol	3,150	3	4	2		36	12	C	Chihli Party	
		Police	"	5,000	11	3	1		12		C	" "	
				8,150									

PROVINCIAL - TROOPS (Continued)

		Commander	Province	Strength	Battalions of Inf.	Cav.	Art.	Engrs.	Cannon	M. G.	Rel. Eff.	Political Affiliation
1	M.Brig.	Cheng Chin-sheng	Suiyuan	3,500	6	3	1		18		C	Chihli Party
1	M.Regt.	Ni Ying-fu	"								C	" "
	Cav."	Liu Tzu-cheng	"								C	" "
	Temporary Regt.	Li Hsi-feng	"	1,000		4						" "
		Police	"	2,000		8						" "
				6,500								
		FUKIEN: Conditions very disturbed. Accurate details impossible to obtain.										
3	Div.	Wang Hsien-cheng	Fukien	8,000	24						C	Chihli Party - Wu Pei-fu) April 1924 Have just de-
		Naval Marine Force	"	3,500	7							" " " ") feated and driven out forces of Wang Yung-chuan
		Remnants of Wang Yung-chuan's forces	"	7,500								(These compressed former 24th M.B., Wang's "1st Army" and allied brigade of Yang Hua-cheu. They have attempted to join Tsang Chih-ping's forces, in and around Amoy.
		"Chekiang Army"	"	8,000	16							Under Tsang Chih-ping in Amoy. Loyal to Lu Yung-hsiang.
		Min Chun or People's Army"		12,000								Independent brigand forces
		Kwangtung Army:										
One	brig.	Chang Yi	"	2,000	4							(Part of Chen Chiung-ming's anti Sun Yat-sen's
One	regt.	Lai Shih-huang	"	1,000	2							(forces.
				42,000								
		HONAN										
1	Div.	Chang Te-sheng	Kiangsi								B	Chihli Party - Wu Pei-fu. Reported 12/25/23 as serving in Kiangsi. Details unobtainable.
1	M.Brig.	Lin Chi-ping	Honan	3,000	6	2	1				A	Chihli Party - Wu Pei-fu
1	Inf."	Ma Ch'an-lin	"	1,000	6						A	" " " "
2	" "	Ma Chih-min	"	1,000	6						A	" " " "
3	" "	Li Chih-yun	"	2,000	6						A	" " " "
4	" "	Tien Wei-chin	"	2,000	6						A	" " " "
5	" "	Tsao Shih-ying	"	2,000	6						A	" " " "
6	" "	Ting Hsiang-ling	"	2,000	6						A	" " " "
				13,000								

		Naval Marine Force	"	3,500	27							
		Remnants of Wang Yung-chuan's forces	"	7,500								
		"Chekiang Army"	"	8,000	16							Under Tsang Chih-ping in Anhui.
		Min Chun or People's Army"		12,000								Independent brigand forces
		Kwangtung Army:										
One	brig.	Chang Yi	"	2,000	4							(Part of Chen Chiung-ming's anti Sun Yat-sen's
One	regt.	Lai Shih-huang	"	1,000	2							(forces.
				42,000								
				HONAN								
1	Div.	Chang Te-sheng	Kiangsi								B	Chihli Party - Wu Pei-fu. Reported 12/25/23 as serving in Kiangsi. Details unobtainable.
1	M.Brig.	Lin Chi-ping	Honan	3,000	6	2	1				A	Chihli Party - Wu Pei-fu
1	Inf."	Ma Ch'an-lin	"	1,000	6						A	" " " "
2	" "	Ma Chih-min	"	1,000	6						A	" " " "
3	" "	Li Chih-yun	"	2,000	6						A	" " " "
4	" "	Tien Wei-chin	"	2,000	6						A	" " " "
5	" "	Tsao Shih-ying	"	2,000	6						A	" " " "
6	" "	Ting Hsiang-ling	"	2,000	6						A	" " " "
				13,000								

HUNAN

This Province the scene of considerable fighting during 1923. Tan Yen-kai, from Canton, heading a revolt against Chao Heng-ti, the Tuchun. During the revolt which was for a while successful, many of the below listed troops joined Tan Yen-kai. Owing to need of Sun Yat-sen for reinforcements, following the loss of Shaklung, and through pressure of reinforcements sent Chao Heng-ti by Wu Pei-fu, Tan Yen-kai evacuated Hunan, taking with him 8,000 Hunanese troops. The revolt collapsed. The revolting troops and those that fled to Canton, have not been identified. They are probably some of those which as indicated below, were of doubtful loyalty to Chao Heng-ti, as outright loyalty to Sun Yat-sen.

1	Div.	Sung Ho-ken	Hunan	9,000	12	2	2	18	4		Chao Heng-ti, but of doubtful loyalty	
2	"	Liu Tiao-ping	"	7,600	12	2	2	18	4		" " " " " "	
1	M.Brig.	Yeh Kai-hsin	"	3,400	6	1	1	18	4		" "	In 1921 against Wu Pei-fu
3	" "	Hsieh Kuo-kuang	"	3,000	6		1	18	4		" "	but of doubtful loyalty
				23,000								

PROVINCIAL - TROOPS (Continued)

		Commander	Province	Strength	Battalions of Inf.	Cav.	Art.	Engrs	Cannon	M. G.	Rel. Eff.	Political Affiliation
		- Forward -		23,000								
5	M. Brig.	Wu Chien-hsueh	Hunan	3,300	6							Chao Heng-ti
6	" "	Chen Chia-yao	"	3,000	6	½	½					Supporter of Sun Yat-sen
7	" "	Lo Hsien-kai	"	2,300	6							Chao Heng-ti, but of doubtful loyalty.
9	" "	Liu Hsu-yu	"	2,400	6		½					These units under control of Tsai Chu-yu, the leader in Western Hunan, and the first to announce allegiance to Tan Yen-kai. On the retirement of the latter in Nov.23, to Canton, Tsai retired to Changteh, and is still opposed to Chao Heng-ti.
10	" "	Tien Chen-pan	"	2,300	6		½					
Artillery Regt.		Tai Yueh	"									Chao Heng-ti, but of doubtful loyalty. Details lacking.
Western Hunan Defence Troops		Tien Ying-tsao	"	1,600	3							" "
Tuchun's Body Guard.		Chang Chu-chu	"	1,000	3							" "
Gendarmes		Wang Teh-ching	"	300	1							" "
Shou Pei-Tui			"	1,000	20							" "
Hupeh Troops		Hsia Tao-yin	"	1,000	3							" " These troops mostly Hunanese.
				41,200								
			HUPEH									
1	M. Brig.	Sun Chien-yeh	Hupeh	2,200	6							Chihli Party - Wu Pei-fu
2	" "	K'ou Ying-chieh	"	2,200	6							" " " "
3	" "	Chang Jun-ming	"	6,000	6							" " " "
4	" "	Liu Tso-lung	"	3,900	6	1	1		18	6		" " " "
5	" "	Sung Ta-pei	"	6,000	6					6		" " " "
Hupeh Independent Cavalry Regiment.			"	700		3						" " " "
Hupeh Independent Defence Brigade.			"	3,000	6							" " " "
Hsu Chi Tui		Tu Hsi-chun	"	1,100	3							" " " "
Tuchun's Body Guard		Sung Yung-an	"	1,500	3							" " " "
				26,600								
			KANSU									
Troops of this Province largely Mohammedan, and practically independent. The organization of units is unknown.												
		Wu Tung-jen	Kansu	2,000	6						C	

Body Guard.	Chang Chu-chi											
Gendarmes	Wang Teh-ching	"	300	1								
Shou Pei-Tui		"	1,000	20								
Hupeh Troops	Hsia Tao-yin	"	1,000	3								
			41,200									

PROVINCIAL - TROOPS (Continued)

		Commander	Province	Strength	Battalions of Inf.	Cav.	Art.	Engrs.	Cannon	M. G.	Rel. Eff.	Political Affiliation
			KIANGSI									
1	Inf. Brig.		Kiangsi	3,000	6		1		12			Chihli Party -Wu Pei-fu (Existence of this brigade doubtful.
2	" "	Li Hung-ch'eng	"	3,000	6							
Sheng Fang Tui)												
Ching Pei ")			"	13,800	37				12	6		Chihli Party -Wu Pei-fu
Yu Chi "												
				19,800								
			KIANGSU									
1	Div.	Pai Pao-shan	Kiangsu	4,000	12	3	1		4	4	A	Chihli Party -Chi Hsieh-yuan (The Comd'r of this Div. has dealings with bandits many of whom are in the Div. Doubtful loyalty.
2	"	Chu Hsi	"	4,000	12		1		12	6	A	" " " "
1	M. Brig.	Ma Yu-jen	"	4,000	12						A	" " " "
2	" "	Huang Chan-kuei	"	3,000	6		1		12		A	" " " "
3	" "	Li Tien-chen	"	3,000	6		1		12	8	A	" " " "
4	" "	Wu Heng-tsan	"	3,000	6		1		12		A	" " " "
5	" "	Chen Tiao-yuan	"	3,000	6		1		12	4	A	" " " " (Did excellent work in negotiations for release of Lin Cheng prisoners, 1923.
74	" "											" " " "
76	" "	Chang Jen-kuei	"	1,500	6				12		A	" " " "
Reserve Corps			"	3,000	6							" " " " Commander is Civil Governer of Province.
Gendarmerie		Wang Chien-fu	"	1,500	3							" " " "
Police Force		Wang Kuei-lin	"	2,500	5							" " " "
				32,500								
			KWANGSI									
Self Government Army		Lin Chun-ting	Kwangsi	10,000								Chihli Party -Wu Pei-fu. Conditions in this Province greatly disturbed, and accurate details not obtainable.
Numerous Semi Military semi bandit organizations, estimated at				4,000								
				14,000								

2	"	Chu Hsi	"	[illegible]								
1	M. Brig.	Ma Wu-jen	"	4,000	12							
2	" "	Huang Chan-kuei	"	3,000	6	1	12		A	"	"	"
3	" "	Li Tien-chen	"	3,000	6	1	12	8	A	"	"	"
4	" "	Wu Heng-tsan	"	3,000	6	1	12		A	"	"	"
5	" "	Chen Tiao-yuan	"	3,000	6	1	12	4	A	"	"	"
74	" "									"	"	"
76	" "	Chang Jen-kuei	"	1,500	6		12		A	"	"	"
Reserve Corps			"	3,000	6					"	"	"
Gendarmerie		Wang Chien-fu	"	1,500	3					"	"	"
Police Force		Wang Kuei-lin	"	2,500	5					"	"	"
				32,500								

Commander is Civil Governor of Province.

KWANGSI

Government	Self Army	Lin Chun-ting	Kwangsi	10,000								
Numerous Semi Military semi bandit organizations, estimated at				4,000								
				14,000								

Chihli Party -Wu Pei-fu. Conditions in this Province greatly disturbed, and accurate details not obtainable.

KWANGTUNG

Forces of Sun Yat-sen. (Yang Hsi-ming, Commander in Chief)

Yunnanese Troops.

1	Div.	Chao Ch'eng-chieh	Kwangtung	2,900	10							
2	"	Liao Hsing-ch'ao	"	5,500	13							
Ind. Brig.		Chu Shih-kuei	"	1,300	5							
3	Div.	Yang Ting-pei	"	4,000	13							
Terr. Brig.		Sheng Jung-chao	"	3,200	6							
4	Div.	Wang Ch'eng-chun	"	2,800	11							
5	"	Hu Sze-shun	"	2,000	6							
6	"	Hu Sse-ching	"	2,600	9							
1	"	Wang Chun	"	2,500								
				26,800								

1st Army - Yang Hsi-ming

2nd Army - Fan Shih-sheng

3rd Army - Chiang Kuang-liang

1st Army under central direct control (probably reserve), Chu Pei-te.

	Commander	Province	Strength	Battalions Inf.	Cav.	Art.	Engrs.	Cannon	M. G.	Rel. Eff.	Political Affiliation
	- Forward -		26,800								
	Hsu Ch ung-chih	Kwangtung	5,000								Cantonese Troops
	Lin Chen-huan	"	3,000								Kwangsi "
	" "	"	2,000								Honanese "
	Tan Yen-kai	"	8,000								Hunanese "
			44,800								

The Yunnanese troops are well armed with modern rifles, machine guns and some light field pieces. They are the best troops. The Cantonese are not well equipped, are of low morale, and are not courageous.

Forces of Chen Chiung-ming - Receives support from Wu Pei-fu.

1	Div.	Chen Chiung-kuang	"									The strength of organizations is not known.
2	"	Chung Ching-tang	"									The total strength is estimated at 48,000
3	"	Hung Chao-ling	"									
4	"	Lu Tsung-yu	"									
5	"	Ying Chi	"									
6	"	Li Yun-fu	"									
7	"	Lai Shih-huang	"									
8	"	Su Shih-an	"									
9	"	Yang Kun-ju	"									
10	"	Wen Shih-liang	"									
1	M. Brig.	Huang Yeh-hsing	"									
2	" "	Wang Ting-hua	"									
3	" "	Li Ken-yun	"									
4	" "	Kuan Teng-fang	"									
			Total	48,000	Estimated							

KWEICHOW

1	Div.	Wang Tien-pei	Szechuan	4,800								Chihli Party - Wu Pei-fu. These Divisions form

The Yunnanese troops are well equipped.

the best troops. The Cantonese are not well equipped. Are of [illegible]

Forces of Chen Chiung-ming - Receives support from Wu Pei-fu.

1	Div.	Chen Chiung-kuang	"				The strength of organizations is not known.
2	"	Chung Ching-tang	"				The total strength is estimated at 48,000
3	"	Hung Chao-ling	"				
4	"	Lu Tsung-yu	"				
5	"	Ying Chi	"				
6	"	Li Yun-fu	"				
7	"	Lai Shih-huang	"				
8	"	Su Shih-an	"				
9	"	Yang Kun-ju	"				
10	"	Wen Shih-liang	"				
1	M. Brig.	Huang Yeh-hsing	"				
2	" "	Wang Ting-hua	"				
3	" "	Li Ken-yun	"				
4	" "	Kuan Teng-fang	"				
			Total	48,000	Estimated		

KWEICHOW

1	Div.	Wang Tien-pei	Szechuan	4,800			Chihli Party -Wu Pei-fu. These Divisions form
2	"	Peng Han-chang	"	4,800			part of Szechuan 2nd Army.
Ching Pei Tui		Yuan Ta-tsai	Kweichow	1,000	3		Chihli Party -Wu Pei-fu
"	" "	Wang Ko-chao	"	1,000	3		" " " "
				11,600			

MANCHURIA - Three Eastern Provinces - Chang Tso-lin, Tuchun. Mukden Party.

1	Inf.Brig.	Kan Ch'ao-hsi	Fengtien				3 Regiments
2	" "		"				3 " - Formerly commanded by Chang Tso-lin's son, Chang Hsueh-liang, now in command 27 Luchun Division.
4	" "	Chang Tso-t'ao	"				2 "
5	" "	Li Chen-sheng	"				2 "
6	" "	Kuo Sung-ling	"				3 "

PROVINCIAL - TROOPS (Continued)

		Commander	Province	Strength	Battalions of: Inf.	Cav.	Art.	Engrs.	Cannon	M. G.	Rel. Eff.	Political Affiliation
7	Inf. Brig.	Tang Yu-lin	Fengtien									2 Regiments
12	" "	Chao En-chen	"									2 "
14	" "	Yang Te-shang	"									2 " 1 Cav. Regt.
16	" "	Ch'i En-ming	"									2 "
19	" "	Kao Wei-yao	"									2 "
23	" "	Li Shuang-k'ai	"									2 "
24	" "	Hsing Shih-lien	"									2 "
1	Cav. "	Mu Tsui	"									2 " Cav.
3	" "	Su Hsi-lin	"									9 " "
				73,000	The strength of these units is unknown. The total strength of Chang Tso-lin's Mukden Party is conservatively estimated at 125,000 and of his troops in Fengtien at 73,000							
1	M. Brig.	Shih Te-shan	Heilungkiang	2,500	3	3				4		
2	" "	Chang Ming-chiu	"	2,500	3	3				4		
3	" "	Pa Ying-e	"	2,500	3	3				4		
4	" "	Chang Hai-ping	"	3,000	6					4		
1	Cav. "	Ma Jui-lu	"	1,500		6						Mukden Party
2	" "	Chang Kuei-wu	"	1,100			3		54			
Guard's Regt.			"	1,500	3							
Mil. Governer's Body Guard.			"	3,500	2	1	2					
Mil. Police		Sung Yung-fu	"	500	1							
				18,600								
1	M. Brig.	Chang Huan-hsing	Kirin	4,000								
2	" "	Yu Ching-chow	"	4,000								
3	" "	Li	"	4,000								
4	" "	Ting Chao										

1	M. Brig.	Shih Te-shan	Heilungkiang	2,500	3	3			4		
2	" "	Chang Ming-chiu	"	2,500	3	3			4		
3	" "	Pa Ying-e	"	2,500	3	3			4		
4	" "	Chang Hai-ping	"	3,000	6				4		
1	Cav. "	Ma Jui-lu	"	1,500		6					Mukden Party
2	" "	Chang Kuei-wu	"	1,100			3	54			
Guard's Regt.			"	1,500	3						
Mil. Governer's Body Guard.			"	3,500	2	1	2				
Mil.	Police	Sung Yung-fu	"	500	1						
				18,600							
1	M. Brig.	Chang Huan-hsing	Kirin	4,000							
2	" "	Yu Ching-chow	"	4,000							
3	" "	Li	"	4,000							
4	" "	Ting Chao	"	4,000							
5	" "	Liu	"	4,000							
6	" "	Chai (Tsai)?	"	4,000							Mukden Party
7	" "	Chang	"	4,000							
Two Ind. Regts.			"	3,600							
Four " Battns.			"	1,600							
Mil.	Police	Chu Yung	"	500	1						
				33,700							

PROVINCIAL - TROOPS (Continued)

		Commander	Province	Strength	Battalions of: Inf.	Cav.	Art.	Engrs.	Cannon	M. G.	Rel. Eff.	Political Affiliation
				SHANSI								
1	M. Brig.	Shang Chen	Shansi	3,640	6	1	1		12			Independent
1	" Regt.	Li Min	"	2,100	3	1	1		18	4		"
2	" "	Li Tzu-ling	"	1,800	2	1						"
3	" "		"	1,500								"
1	Inf. Bn.	Tsai Jung-shou	"	500	1							"
2	" "	Wang Tsan-hsu	"	500	1							"
Ching Pei Tui		Chin Yung	"	5,800	22	2						"
Tuchun's Body Guard			"	200								"
				16,040								
				SHANTUNG								
1	M. Brig.	Lei Chang-lu	Shantung	4,000	6	1	1					Shantung Troops under control of Chihli Party, Tientsin Clique. Wang Chen-ping, Civil Governor of Province, is head.
2	" "	Chang Hua-pin	"	4,000	6					4		
3	" "	Hsu Hung-ping	"	4,000	6					4		
4	" "	Chang Chien-kung	"	3,400	6					4		
5	" "	Li Sen	"	4,000	6						D	
6	" "	Chang Pei-jung	"	4,000	6	1					D	
7	" "	Hu Yu-ju	"	4,000	9	1	1		12	8		
47	Brig.	Shih Tsun-ping	"	4,000	9		1					
Tuchun's Body Guard			"	500	2	1 Troop	1 Btry.		4			
Navy Model Battalion			"	500	1							
R. R. Guards			"	3,000	5							
Chin Pei Tui		Kao Yen-wen	"	10,000								
Yu Chi Tui			"	500								
Pre Cautionary Force, Bandit Suppression		Liang Shih-chang	"	2,000								
				15,000								

SHANTUNG

1	M. Brig.	Lei Chang-lu	Shantung	4,000	6	1	1					Shantung Troops under control of Tientsin Clique. Wang Chen-ping, Civil Governor of Province, is head.
2	" "	Chang Hua-pin	"	4,000	6					4		
3	" "	Hsu Hung-ping	"	4,000	6					4		
4	" "	Chang Chien-kung	"	3,400	6					4		
5	" "	Li Sen	"	4,000	6						D	
6	" "	Chang Pei-jung	"	4,000	6	1					D	
7	" "	Hu Yu-ju	"	4,000	9	1	1		12	8		
47	Brig.	Shih Tsun-ping	"	4,000	9		1					
Tuchun's Body Guard			"	500	2	1 Troop	1 Btry.		4			
Navy Model Battalion			"	500	1							
R. R. Guards			"	3,000	5							
Chin Pei Tui		Kao Yen-wen	"	10,000								
Yu Chi Tui			"	500								
Pre Cautionary) Force, Bandit) Suppression)		Liang Shih-chang	"	2,000								
				47,900								

SHENSI

1	Div.	Hu Ching-yi	Honan Chihli	5,000	12	1	1		18	8		Shensi Troops are dominated by Wu Pei-fu.
1	M. Brig.	Liu Pao-shan	Szechuan	4,000	4		1					Part of Szechuan 2nd Army.
2	" "	Tao Shih-ying	Shensi	3,500	6					8		
3	" "		"	3,500	6	1	1		6	12		
Gendarmerie			"	500	2							
Cheng Sung Chun		*Liu Chen-hua	"	7,000	14	3	1		12			*Tuchun
				23,500								

Commander	Province	Strength	Battalions of Inf.	Cav.	Art.	Engrs.	Cannon	M. G.	Rel. Eff.	Political Affiliation
		SINKIANG								
These troops independent. They are located in numbers by Districts. Organizations unknown.										
		Inf. 5,774 / Cav. 1,976					79	10		
		SZECHUAN								
Szechuan Troops are roughly divided into three groups, known as the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armies. The 1st, under Hsung Ko-wu, is the force fighting for an independent Szechuan. It is composed wholly of Szechuanese. The 2nd, under Yang Sen, is the force attempting to forcibly unite Szechuan to the Chihli Party as a part of Wu Pei-fu's unification plan. It includes Kweichow, Shensi, Hupeh and Kansu Troops, and all Luchun organizations. The 3rd, under Liu Ch'eng-hsun, attempts a neutral attitude, acting however, in the interests of its leaders. During 1923 there was much fighting in Szechuan under direction of Wu Pei-fu, with varying fortunes. Shifting loyalties during the fighting make accurate estimates of forces impossible.									
		1st Army.								
5 Div.	He Wang-lieh	Szechuan	5,000	12				8		
6 "	Yen Te-chi	"	5,000							
River Guards	Yu Chi-tang	"	13,000	24	3	3	18	8		
Nor. Frontier Defence Force	Lai Hsun-hui	"	5,000	6						
			28,000							
		2nd Army								
Composed of following units elsewhere listed: 7th, 16th, 18th, 21st, 22nd, 30th to 35th inc. Luchun Divs. Hupeh 3rd & 5th M.B., Kansu Hsien Chien Chun, Kweichow 1st & 2nd Divs., and Shensi 1st M.B. Also of the following provincial troops:										
1 Div.	Lai Hsing-hui	Szechuan	4,700	9	1	1	36	4		Formerly in 1st Army
2 "	Li Shu-hsun	"	2,500							Only 2 regiments
3 "	Teng Hsi-hou	"	8,000							Formerly in 1st Army
4 "	Yang Ch'un-fang	"								

...ment, attempts a ... ...ing in Szechuan under direction of Wu Pei-fu, with ... ... curate estimates of forces impossible.

					1st Army.					
5	Div.	He Wang-lieh	Szechuan	5,000	12				8	
6	"	Yen Te-chi	"	5,000						
River Guards		Yu Chi-tang	"	13,000	24	3	3	18	8	
Nor. Frontier Defence Force		Lai Hsun-hui	"	5,000	6					
				28,000						
					2nd Army					
		Composed of following units elsewhere listed: 7th, 16th, 18th, 21st, 22nd, 30th to 35th inc. Luchun Divs. Hupeh								
	3rd & 5th	M.B., Kansu Hsien Chien Chun, Kweichow 1st & 2nd Divs., and Shensi 1st M.B. Also of the following provincial troops:								
1	Div.	Lai Hsing-hui	Szechuan	4,700	9	1	1	36	4	Formerly in 1st Army
2	"	Li Shu-hsun	"	2,500						Only 2 regiments
3	"	Teng Hsi-hou	"	8,000						Formerly in 1st Army
4	"	Yang Ch'un-fang	"							No details
7	"	Ch'en Kuo-tung	"	4,700						
9	"	Liu Wen-hui	"							No details
10	"	Liu Chuan-fan	"							" " Said to be temporary
1	M. Brig.	Kuo Ju-tung	"	2,500	6					Formerly in 1st Army
2	" "	Ho Chin-ao	"	4,500	6	1	1			" " " "
3	" "	Pai Chu	"	2,800	6					
4	" "	Wang Cheng-chun	"	3,800	6					
Frontier Command		Lai Hsing-hui (Concurrent)	"	7,500						3 brigades
Tun Chih (Soldier Colonists)		Chang Pang-pen	"	2,500						2 regiments
Asst. North Frontier Command.		Wang Hung-en	"	3,000						2 "
West Szechuan Pacific Force.		Peng Kuan-lieh	"	2,000						2 "
				48,500						

PROVINCIAL - TROOPS (Continued)

		Commander	Province	Strength	Battalions of Inf.	Cav.	Art.	Engrs.	Cannon	M. G.	Rel. Eff.	Political Affiliation
			Szechuan		3rd Army							
5	M. Brig.	Chang Ch'eng-hsiao	"	2,600	6							
6	" "	Lan Shih-yu	"	2,300	6							
7	" "	Lan Shih-chang	"	1,800	6							
East Frontier Defence Force		Shih Ch'ing-yang	"	3,000	6							
				9,700								
				YUNNAN								
		This Province seeks to maintain its independence under the Tuchun Tang Chi-yao.										
			(1st Div.	Yang Chih-sheng								
1st	Army	Yang Hsi-min	(2nd "	Liu Heng-chiu								
			(3rd "	Wang Ping-chun								
2nd	Army	Feng Shek-sang	(4th "	Wang Ping-kwan								
			(5th "	Hu Shi-hsun								
3rd	Army	Chang Kwang-leung	(6th "	Hu Shi-ching								
	Total	strength, Estimated.		45,000								

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
MAR
4-1 1925 2009-154-7
WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT ARMED FORCES IN CHINA. 7

From M. A. CHINA. 2009-154

No. 5313. Date Dec. 16, 1924., 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

RECEIVED G/2 W.D., MAR 3 1925

6180 - Distribution of Troops.

There is attached copy of report made to the Military Attache, British Legation, by Captain C. R. Spear, Indian Army, a language officer attached to the British Legation.

Binding Margin.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MI—INTEL. DIV.
MAR 2
2007-154

Military Report of information gained as the
[illegible] of a trip made through Shansi, Shensi, Kansu, Kokonor,
Tibet (Autonomous), and Ssu Ch'uan, between the months of
April and October 1924, by Captain C. R. Spear,
Indian Army.

DEPARTMENT

7

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Leaving Peking by the Peking-Hankow line, I changed trains at Chengchow, and from there travelled by the Pien - lo railway, passing through WU PEI FU'S headquarters at LAOYANG, to what was then railhead at KUAN YIN T'ANG, a train journey of some eight hours from Chengchow. Arrived at KUAN YIN TANG, I found the headquarters of the 78th Infantry located there. Beyond noting the poor clothing and equipment of these troops, they do not call for any special attention. All along the road between here and Hsian Fu, the capital of Shensi province, I was constantly in contact with large bodies of troops, and in some places practically no Inn accommodation was available on this account. The greater part of these troops was composed of boys, averaging about 16 or 17 years of age. At Wei Nan, 1½ day's march from Hsian Fu, I found the headquarters of two divisions, the only formations which I could locate being the 40th Mixed Brigade, and the 80th Regiment of Infantry. The soldiers here were of good physique, and were well clothed and equipped.

Hsian Fu was the Headquarters of the 35th Division, together with divisions of the Tuchun's (Liu Chen Hua) personal troops. I had an opportunity during my stay here of watching these troops on parade. Their youthful appearance was very noticeable, some of those in uniform being not more than 13 or 14 years of age. Their drill was good, and I was much impressed with the efficiency of their instructors. French, Italian and Chinese rifles were in evidence, whilst the machine guns were in the majority of German manufacture.

Some few days previous to my arrival at Hsian Fu, much excitement had been caused by the arrival of one of WU PEI FU'S aeroplanes from LOYANG. This was the first occasion on which an aeroplane under Chinese control had made the flight.

Leaving Hsian Fu, the first place where I came into contact with troops of the province of Kansu was P'ING LIANG. The physique, equipment and clothing of these troops was without doubt worse than that of any other soldiers which I met on my travels. From Ping Liang to Lanchow Fu there is a noticeable absence of troops, and it is not until one is within about 20 li of the walls of the latter place that soldiers are again seen. The Military Governor of Kansu has, nominally, 18 Ying (Battalions) under his command. Of these the greater part are stationed in Lanchow Fu and its environs, under the direct control of the Tuchun, (Military Governor). The troops which I saw here were well equipped, and well armed. They were infinitely superior to those whom I had met at P'ing Liang.

At Hsining (6 days march from Lanchow Fu), I met for the first time, bodies of Chinese Mahammedan soldiers. They are an exceedingly fine body of men, and are in a class of their own as far as the Chinese land

...s are concerned. They are under the command of the Defense Commissioner, General Ma Ch'i, an imposing looking individual, who stands about six feet in height and is well proportioned. I had been told previously that he was anti-British in feelings, and my first impression confirmed this report. Later on, however, I discovered that his attitude in my case was due to the fact that he thought I intended to travel to Lhassa. Having cleared up this misunderstanding, I found him much more agreeable, though I doubt if he would have given me all the help which he did, had it not been for the fact that he had received very definite instructions from the Tuchun at Lanchow Fu. Ma Ch'i is making a very determined effort to train a really efficient force, and from what I observed during my short stay at his headquarters, his efforts are being singularly successful. He was the only commander of Chinese troops with whom I came into contact who had made any effort to foster a spirit of competition by the inauguration of inter-platoon and inter-company competitions. These were in full swing when I was at Hsining, and the men entered into the spirit of the thing whole-heartedly. All these men were very well turned out. Their clothing was of good quality, their equipment in good condition, and their arms in a better state than one usually sees amongst Chinese soldiery. Their drill was good and they moved with smartness and precision. It is not surprising that the Mahommedans are held in such awe by the other Chinese in the province.

In addition to his post of Defense Commissioner, General Ma Ch'i holds the post of Chinese Amban of the Kokonor area. This post has been in his hands since the fourth year of the Chinese Republic (1915), and, as will be shown in these notes later, the Moslem officials are administering this territory with conspicuous ability. I was so fortunate as to time my arrival at Hsining to coincide with the departure of about 75 Chinese Mahommedan Cavalrymen, who were returning to their post at JYEKUNDO from leave. Ma Ch'i very kindly held up these troops until I was ready to leave, so as to ensure me a safe passage through Golok territory.

Leaving Tangar (the border town on the Kansu-Kokonor frontier) on the 25th June, I travelled with these troops for 17 marches until we arrived at JYEKUNDO. During this time I made the following notes concerning my escort:

1. Uniform was not worn by either officers or men during the time that we were travelling through Golok territory.

2. They are very good horsemen, and handle their animals admirably.

3. Their rifles are fitted with a bipod for use when in action. (This is almost essential at these high altitudes, as even slight exertion leaves the average individual very much out of breath).

4. With the exception of the last four marches, there was a complete lack of orders or march discipline. When camp was struck in the mornings the men moved off as they were ready. During the day's march, the order was "Go as you please", and the depth of the column was never under a mile.

The soldiers' mounts were superb, and in the pink of condition.

(M. A. China # 5313 , Dec. 16, 1924).

the horses came from the HOCHOW district in Western Kansu).

6. Their attitude towards me was very friendly, and I always found them very willing to render me every assistance.

7. They were very strict in the observance of the laws of their religion. All animals were "Halaled" in the prescribed manner, and no contaminated food was to be seen.

8. The men were of very good physique, and their stamina excellent. At the end of our longest day's march, which was over 40 miles, not a single man showed signs of undue fatigue.

At JYEKUNDO there is a military post consisting of one regiment of cavalry, and one battalion of infantry, whilst another battalion of Infantry is under orders to proceed from Kansu to reinforce the JYEKUNDO garrison. This will bring the total strength of this garrison to about 300 men. This Garrison furnishes a detachment of some 20 men at a place called BARMENDO, about 350 li South of JYEKUNDO. This detachment furnishes the personnel for two taxing stations, one of which is situated on the bank of the MEKONG About 2 miles from BARMENDO, and the other at the salt pans of BAITZU. Three short marches from BARMENDO one arrives at the Lamasery of Kanda Ssu, which is situated on the Southern border of the Kokonor area. Here the escort of two Chinese Mahommedan soldiers with which I had been provided when setting out from JYEKUNDO, left me, and on entering Autonomous Tibet I was escorted by Tibetan soldiers until reaching RONGBASTA, one day's march West of Kanze.

The Tibetan soldiers with whom I came into contact were of very good physique, standing between 5 ft. 11 inches and 6 feet in height. All of these soldiers whom I saw, were armed with British Lee Enfield rifles, dated 1903. One of my escort wore the Tunic of a Private in the British Army, with G. S. buttons, whilst many of them wore British ammunition boots. The appearance of such quantities of British equipment in the possession of Tibetan soldiers gives rise to much comment by the Chinese officials on the borders of the Kokonor and Chinese controlled Eastern Tibet. I was questioned on this point by the officials on more than one occasion, and I am very strongly of the opinion that the knowledge of these facts gives a very strong handle to the arguments of the agitators in China, who are endeavoring to stir the public opinion with fantastic stories about the ulterior aims of the British Government towards Tibet.

I never had the slightest trouble with my Tibetan escort, and they afforded me every possible assistance during the time that they were with me.

Travelling from CHAMDO (in the area administered by the Chieftan at CHAMDO), one returns to Chinese controlled Tibet at RONGBATSA, and the first post of Chinese troops is met at the point where the YALUNG river is crossed, about 20 li West of Kanze. From here to Tachienlu there are three military posts, composed entirely of infantry, with the exception of a section of guns at KANZE. All these troops are Ssuchuanese, and compare very favourably with the sturdy Mahommedans of the Kokonor area. They are

very badly clothed, and their equipment is in a very bad condition. At TAO FU HSIEN (5 marches South of KANZE), in addition to the post of Chinese soldiers, there are a certain number of locally raised Tibetan levies. (T'u Ping).

From TACHIENLU to YACHOW I was escorted by Ssuchuan soldiers, each of which, in addition to his ordinary equipment, carried an umbrella slung across his back when not in use. These men were no better equipped than those with whom I had come into contact since re-entering Chinese controlled territory at RONGBATSA. They were of very poor physique, and the majority of them very young. In one instance some of the soldiers forming my escort were so young that when they "Fixed Bayonets" the point of the bayonet came above the soldiers' head. Amongst these troops there was a complete lack of even the slightest semblance of discipline, and such a thing as care of arms was never considered. I would rate the fighting value of these soldiers very low.

At LU TING CH'IAO, I met the remnants of Ch'en Hsia Ling's forces. (The Chinese General who had recently been defeated by Liu Wei Chu in the fighting South of Tachienlu). They numbered five companies here, but as they had been without any pay for three months, they were quite ready to go over to the other side. On this account the escort which was provided for me from here, proceeded without arms. The boundary line between the two forces at that time (September) was the FU YUEH LIN, a pass of about 9000 feet, crossed on the second day's march from LU TING CH'IAO. The country to the south of this Pass is in the hands of Liu Wei Chu. At FU LIN to the south-west of this pass (on the T'ung Ho), there were at the same time, 7 T'uan belonging to Ch'en Hsia Ling. All of these troops were infantry. Liu Wei Chu's troops were in position on the opposite bank of the river.

Liu Wei Chu has a very bad reputation in the area under his command, and many were the complaints I heard when passing through this area. He has lately issued an order that one-third of the land under cultivation in this area shall be devoted to Poppy cultivation next year.

Ch'ing Chi Hsien (Three day's march from YACHOW FU), is the headquarters of the 4th Division, and 7th Mixed Brigade, all troops belonging to Liu Wei Chu. The strength of the garrison was approximately 2,000 of all arms. The area allotted to these forces extends to FU LIN in the South, and along the Yachow road for two days' march to Ma Liu Ch'ang.

Liu's troops are in possession of YACHOW FU, under the command of General Lan, who holds the post of Divisional Commander of the 4th Division. This individual is cordially disliked by Chinese and foreigners alike, and expressions of regret at the passing of Ch'en are heard on all sides.

In concluding this report, I would record the fact that during my six months' travels, I was always treated with the greatest courtesy and civility by all ranks of the Chinese Army, wherever I happened to come

into contact with them. Also, whereas the soldier of Ssu Ch'uan is a negligible quantity, as far as his fighting value is concerned, the Mahommedan soldier of Kansu is a factor that cannot be lost sight of, especially when it is remembered that his influence extends through the Kokonor to the border of Antonomous Tibet.

(M. A. China. # 5313., Dec. 16, 1924.).

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

4-1 1925 2009-155 2 Vols.

WAR DEPARTMENT
3

SUBJECT CHINESE ARMED FORCES.

From M. A. China. 2009-155

No. 5517. Date January 6, 1925., 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

RECEIVED G/2 W.D., MAR 3 1925

8180 - Distribution of Troops.

There is attached copy of report on Chinese Armed Forces as made to his Government by the British Military Attache, Peking. I was informed that it had been checked with British Consular Reports.

The term "National" in this report means the same as "Luchun" in reports rendered by this office.

There is much confusion in the Chinese Forces as a result of the war. Some units have disappeared; others are being reorganized; some new ones are being formed. This report is considered to be as accurate as possible under the circumstances.

Binding Margin

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
MAR
4-1 2009-155

Detail by Provinces of Divisions, Mixed Brigades, and Other Troops.

7

Formation.	Commander.	Location	Remarks.
ANHUI.			
1st (Anhui) Mix. Bde.	Ni Ch'ao-jung	P'eng-p'u, Wu-hu.	
2nd " "	Li Ch'uan-yeh	P'eng-p'u	
3rd " "	Wang P'u	Wu-yi & S.Anhui.	
4th " "	Kao Shih-tu	Funing, Yingchou.	
5th " "	Shih Chun-yü	Su-hsien, Anking.	
6th " "	T'ien Chin-chang.)	Anking	Newly organized; Also designated "Reserve" Bde.
Miscel. Troops.			
Yi Chun	Chiang Jui-hsin	Po-chou	3 ying - 1,200 men

Estimated total strength - 25,200

CHECHIANG.			
2nd(Nat.)Div.	Sun Ch'uan-fang	Hangchou.	
1st(Chechiang) Div.	Ch'en Yi (?)	Ningpo	
2nd do.	-	-	(Broke up during the (recent war (Oct.1924
10th(Nat.)M.B.	Meng Chao-yueh	-	(Existence doubtful Entered Chechiang from Fuchien recently with Sun Chuan-fang.
Miscel. Troops.			
Fortress Troops	-	Tinghai, &c.	
Ching Pei Tui (or) Precautionary(Force)	-	Scattered	
Shou Pei Tui (or) Protective (Force)	-	"	

Estimated total strength - 43,300

Formation	Commander	Location	Remarks
CHIANGHSI			
1st(Nat.) Div.	-	Nanchang	Commander expelled recently.
1st(Honan) "	Chang Te-sheng	Kanchou	
1st(Yunnan) "	Yang Sh'ih-sheng	"	
2nd " "	Yang Ju-hsuan	"	
3rd(Nat.) M.B.	T'ang Fu-shan	Changshu	
9th " "	Teng Ju-cho	Hsifeng	
23rd " "	Wang Lin-ching	Yu-shan	
1st(Shantung)M.B.	Lei Ch'ang-lu	Kanchou	
1st(Chianghsi) Infy.Bde:	Chiang Chen-ch'en	S.Chianghsi	
2nd do.do.	Li Hung-ch'eng	P'ing-hsiang	
3rd do.do.	Chang Ch'ing-chang	E.Chianghsi	
Miscel. Troops.			
Sheng Fang Tui (Provincial Defence Force)	-	Scattered	
Ching Pei Tui (Precautionary Force)	-	"	

Estimated total strength - 52.500

CHIANGSU.			
6th(Nat.) Div.	Kung Pang-to	Nanking	<New Commdr. Cheng Chun-yen.
10th " "		Haichou	
19th " "	Wei Ch'ao-yen	Shanghai	
1st(Chiangsu)Div.	Pai Pao-shan	Haichou	
2nd " "	Wu Heng-tsan	Soochow	
3rd " "	Ma Yu-jen	Tsingkiangpu	
4th " "	Ch'en Tiao-yuan	Hsuchou	
1st " M.B.	Yang Keng-ho	Kao-yu, Paoying	
2nd " "	Li Ch'i-yu	Yen-ch'eng	
3rd " "	Li Tien-ch'en	Nan T'ungchou (?)	
4th " "	-	Nanking	
5th " "	-	Hsuchou	
76th " "	Chang Jen-k'uei	Nan T'ungchou	
5th (Hupei) "	Chang Yun-ming	Shanghai	
Military Police	Sung Yu-feng	Nanking	
Miscel. Troops.			
Fortress Forces	Chao Hsueh-t'ao	(Chiao-shan, Woosung, (Nanking & Chinkiang.	
River Police	-	Scattered	
Ching Pei Tui (Precautionary Force)	Wang Chen-sheng and Chang Chi-hsun	Ch'angchou, Yangchou.	
Hsun Fang Tui (Police Patrols)	-	Yang-chou	
Salt Gabelle troops	-	Scattered.	

Estimated total strength - 96.100

Formation	Commander	Location	Remarks
CHIHLI.			
11th(Nat.) Div.	Feng Yu-hsiang	Peking	
7th " M.B.	Chang Chih-chiang	Langfang	
8th " "	Li Mingchung	Peking	
16th " "	Sun Yueh	Paoting Fu	
25th " "	Sung Che-yuan	Peking, Kupeikou	
Reserves	Feng Yu-hsiang	-	Collected mostly from other forces disbanded during the recent war, rest being new levies. They are to form additional units.
Do.	Sun Yueh	Peking, Paoting	
Military Police	-	Peking	
Various Guards	-	"	Including the Feng tien troops serving as guards to Marsh. Tuan Ch'i-jui.
Miscel. Troops.			
City Police	Wu Ping-hsiang	"	
Ching Pei Tui (Precautionary Force)	Wang Chih-hsiang	Peking District	
Shou-Pei-Tui (Protective Force)	-	Scattered.	
Salt Gabelle troops	-	"	

Estimated total strength - 114.500

FRONTIER TERRITORIES.

(1) **JEHOL.**

1st(Jehol) M.B.	Chang Lin	Chengte, Chaoyang	
Miscel. Troops.			
Yi Chun ("Resokute" Troops)	Mi Chen-piao	Scattered	
Hsun Fang Tui (Patrolling Force)	-	P'ing-ch'uan K'ai-lu, &c.	
Yu Chi Tui (Patrols)	-	Chien-p'ing, Suitung &c.	

Estimated total strength - 17,500

Formation.	Commander	Location	Remarks
FRONTIER TERRITORIES (Contd.)			
(2) **CHAHAR.**			
4th (Nat.) Mix.Bde.	Chang Chin-piao	Kalgan dist;	
1st(Chahar) do.	Wang Tze-tung	Chahar	
1st " Cav.Bde.	Ch'iao Chien-tsai	"	
2nd " do.	Ting Ch'ang-fa	"	
1 " Cav.Regt.	Yuan T'ien-shun	"	
Miscel. Troops.			
Hsun Fang Tui (Patrolling Force)	-	Scattered	
Ching Pei Tui ("Precautionary" Force")	-	"	
Chihli Hsun Fang Tui	-	"	

Estimated total strength - 17.300

(3) **SUIYUAN.**

5th (Nat.) Mix.Bde.	Ma Hung-k'uei	Suiyuan dist.	Tempy. in Chihli
1st(Suiyuan) do.	Cheng Chin-sheng	"	
Suiyuan Cav. Regt.	Li Hsi-feng	"	
Miscel. Troops.			
Hsun Fang Tui (Patrolling Force)	-	Scattered	
Ching Pei Tui (Precautionary Force)	-	"	

Estimated total strength - 15.900

Estimated total number of troops in Frontier Territories

50.700

	Commander	Location	Remarks.
FUKIEN.			
12th (Nat.) Div.	Chou Yin-jen	Foochow.	
1st(Fuchien) "	Chang Yi	T'ung-an	
2nd " "	Kao -	Amoy	
3rd " "	Li Feng-hsiang	Shang-hang	
11th(Nat.) M.B.	Wang Ch'i	Fu-ning, San-tu.	
24th " "	Chang Chun-feng	-	
Miscel-Troops.			
1 Naval Brigade	Yang Chih-chung	Ma-wei	
1 Bde. Canton Army	Huang Ta-wei	Chang-chou	
1 Regt.	Lai Shih-huang	Lung-yen	
Min Chün(Sc. Independents);-			
1'Brigade'	Chang Yi	T'ung-an	
1'Mixed Brigade'	Lu Hsing-pang	Yu-chi, Ta-t'ien	
1 " "	Yang Han-lieh	An-ch'i	
1 'Regiment'	Yang Hsueh-liang	Ch'uan-chou	
1 "	Wu Wei	Yang Chun	
1 "	Lin Kuei-ch'ing	An-ch'i	
1 "	Ch'en T'ieh-ch'ing	Ch'i-wei	
1 "	Ch'en Yu-sheng	An-ch'i	
1 "	Ch'en Liang	Nan-an	
1 "	Ch'en Kuo-hui	Hung-lai(Nan-an)	
1 'Battalion'	Ch'in Wang-shan	Nan-an	
1 "	Chuang Wen-chuan	An-ch'i	
1 "	Lin Huai-yu	Lo-chi	

Estimated total strength - 71.500

HONAN.			
1st(Shenhsi) Div.	Hu Chin-yi	(Chang-te, (Cheng-chou (Kai-feng.	
Reserves to the above	"	" & some in T'ung chou (Chihli)	Collected mostly from other forces disbanded during the recent war, rest being new levies. They are to form additional units.
1st (Honan) Mix.Bde.	Li Chih-yun	Nan-yang	
2nd " " "	Lin Ch'i-peng	Jung-yang	
3rd " " "	Ma Ch'an-lin	Chang-te	
1st " Mix.Regt	Ting Hsiang-ling	Shen-chou	
2nd " " "	Ma Chih-min	Nan-yang	
3rd " " "	Kuo Chen-ts'ai	K'ai-ho (?)	
4th " " "	Li Yu-ts'ai	Sha-ho	
5th " " "	Wu Wen-k'ai	Honan-Chihli Border.	
Military Police Bn.	Ma Chi	K'ai-feng	
Remnants of Wu P'ei-fu's troops(i.e.the 3rd 14th, 24th national Divisions,the 26th national Mix.Bde.etc.	-	South of Province	Some 15,000 men.
Miscel. Troops.			
Hsun Fang Tui (Patrols)	-	Scattered.	

Estimated total strength - 51.500

...tion.	Commander	Location	Remarks
HSINCHIANG.			
1(Hsinchiang) M.B.	Chiang Sung-lin	Ti-hua	
1 Cav. Bde.	Feng Liang	-	
1 Arty "	-	-	
1 Mixed Regiment	Yang Te-sheng	Kashgar	
1 Infy. Battalion	Lo Chan-piao	Ta-ch'eng	
1st. Cavy "	Chu Kuo-kuei	"	
2nd " "	-	-	
Miscel. Troops.			
Hsun Fang Tui (Patrolling Force)	-	Scattered	
Estimated total strength - 15.000			
HUNAN.			
1st (Hunan) Div.	Ho Yao-tsu	Hung-chiang	Consisting of: 1st Bde. at Hung-chiang. 7th Bde. at Hsu-P'u. 10th " " " 17th " " "
2nd " "	Liu Hsing	Changsha	Consisting of: 3rd Bde. at Changsha. 4th " " " 12th " " Nan-hsien.
3rd " "	Yeh K'ai-hsin	Hung-chiang	Consists of: 5th Bde. at Paoking. 6th " "Hungchiang. 11th " " " 14th " "Ninghsiang. 16th " "Hungchiang.
4th " "	T'ang Chih-sheng	Heng-yang	Consists of: 2nd Bde. at Yungchou 8th " " Pin-chou 9th " " " 13th " " Chang-te 15th " " Tz'u-li.
3 Regiments	Tsou Hsu-pin	Changsha.	
Military Governor's Guard Regt.	-	Changsha.	
Miscel. Troops.			
1 Detachment of "Hupei Army"	Hsia Tou-jen	(Changsha (Liu-yang, (P'ing-chiang	
Yochou Garrison (2 Regiments)	Tsou Yao-jen	(Changsha (Yochou.	
Hsun Fang Tui (Patrolling Force)	Ch'en Chu-chen	Scattered in West Hunan	
Estimated total strength - 67.200			

Formation.		Commander.	Location.	Remarks.
HUPEI.				
8th (Nat.)	Div.	Wang Ju-ch'in	Ichang.	
18th	"	Lu Chin-shan	Patung.	Tempy. in Ssuchuan.
25th	"	Ch'en Chia-mo	Wuchang	
2nd	M.B.	Hu Nien-hsien	Kung-an	Tempy. in Honan.
17th	"	Chang Lien-sheng	Hsiang-yang	
18th	"	Yu Hsueh-chung	Shih-nan	Tempy. in Ssuchuan.
21st	"	Wang Tu-ch'ing	Shase, Puchi.	
1st(Hupei)	"	Sun Chien-yeh	Hsiao-kan	
2nd	"	K'ou Ying-chieh	-	Tempy. in Honan.
3rd	"	Sung Ta-p'ei	Patung.	
4th	"	Liu Tso-lung	(Huang-chow, (& Wu-hsueh.	
Reserve Brigade		Yin Chi-lun	Wuchang	Reserves to the 25th (Nat.) Div.
Military Governor's Guards		Sung Yung-an	Wuchang	
Military Police Battalion		Chia Ch'i-ho	"	
Miscel. Troops.				
Hsun Fang Tui (Patrolling Force)		Tu Hsi-chun	Hankow	

Estimated total strength - 61.300

KANSU.

Hsin Chien Chun ("Newly-organised Army"i.e. regular forces) :-			Reports were once rife that the Provincial Authorities suggested to reorganise all the Kansu troops into Luchun Regular Army, but this has not been carried into effect as yet.
10	Battalions	Sung Tao-feng	Ti-tao
28	"	K'ung Fan-chin	Ch'in-chou
14	"	Lu Hung-t'ao	Lanchow
28	"	Chang Chao-chia	P'ing-liang
6	"	Wu T'ung-jen	Su-chou
Fang Chun (Defence Force, i.e. old-style troops)			
14	Battalions	Ma Hung-pin	Ning-hsia.
6	"	Ma Lin	Kan-chou
8	"	Ma T'ing-hsiang	Liang-chou
26	"	Ma Ch'i	Hsi-ning
10	"	Ma Ting-chuan(?)	Hochou
4	"	Tung Kung	Ku-yuan
4	"	P'ei Chien-chun	Ho-chow

Estimated total strength - 53.600

...tion.	Commander.	Location.	Remarks.
KUANGHSI.			
17th (Nat.) Div.	Shen Hung-ying	Kuei-lin, Ch'uan-chou.	
Miscel. Troops.			
"Self-Government" Army (Independent" Force)	Lin Chun-t'ing.	Scattered in South of Prov.	Owes no allegiance except to commander.
Yu Chi Tui (Patrolling Force)	-	do.	
Frontier Defence Force.	(Lu Yung-t'ing)	Nan-ning	

Estimated total strength - 52.000

KUANGTUNG.

(1) Sun Yat-sen's troops[X]			
1 Detachment	Chao Ch'eng-liang	Shao-chou	Yunnanese troops.
1 "	Chu P'ei-te	(Shiuchow)	" "
1 "	Fan Chung-hsiu	-	Honanese "
1 "	-	Shao-chou	Hunanese "
1 "	Ku	"	Shanghai Contingent
1 "	Po Wen-wei	"	Anhui men.
1 "	Chang Wen-ta	"	Cantonese
1 "	Wu T'ieh-ch'eng	"	"
1 "	-	Nan-hsiung	Kuanghsi troops.
1 "	"	"	Shenhsi "
1 "	-	"	Shanhsi "
1st(Kuanghsi)Div.	Liu Chen-huan	W.River dist.	N.B. The above detached forces formed the so-called Anti-North Expedition.
1 "Army"	Liu Yu-shan	"	Kuanghsi troops.
1 "	Fan Shih-sheng	Shekiung	Yunnanese "
1 "	Chiang Kuang-liang	"	" "
1 "	Yang Hsi-min	Canton	" "
1 "	T'an Yen-k'ai	N.E.of Prov.	Hunanese "

[X]Estimated total strength - 80.200

(2) Ch'en Chiung-ming's troops.			
1st(Kuangtung) Div.	Ch'en Chiung-kuang	-	Some of these troops went over from Sun Yat-sen's command to Ch'en Chiung-ming who was supposed to be a supporter to the North. The commanders of these so-called divisions & Mix.Bdes. were appointed by the North, and whether they accepted these appointments is doubtful.
2nd " "	Chung Ching-t'ang	"	
3rd " "	Hung Chao-lin	Hai-feng	
4th " "	Lu Tsung-yu	East of Prov.	
5th " "	Yin Ch'i	"	
6th " "	Li Yun-fu	"	
7th " "	Lai Shih-huang	Kuangtung-Fuchien	
8th " "	Su Shih-an	border do.	
9th " "	Yang Kun-ju	Wai-chou	
10th " "	Weng Shih-liang	E. of Prov.	
1st " M.B.	Huang Yeh-hsing	"	
2nd " "	Wang Ting-hua	"	
3rd " "	Li Ken-yuan	"	
4th " "	Kuan Ch'eng-fang	"	
1 Column	Teng Ben-yin	Kaochow, Leichow.	

Estimated total strength - 39.000

Formation	Commander.	Location.	Remarks.
KUANGTUNG (continued)			
(3) Independent.			
1 Army	Hsu Ch'ung-chih	Mei-hsien (?)	Also supporting Sun Yat-sen.
1st Independent (Kuangtung) Division	Li Chi-chen	Shao-ch'ing (Shiuhing)	
2nd do.	Cheng Jun-ch'i	Bamboo River	
3rd do.	Lu Ch'un-jung	Kong-moon	
1 'Division'	Liang Hung-k'ai	" Haoshan.	
1 Column	Li Fu-lin	Canton	
1 "	Shen Pao-fan	Kao-chou, Lei-chou.	

Estimated total strength - 30.000

Estimated Total Number of Troops in Province - 149.000

KUEICHOU.

3rd (Kueichou) Div.	Chou Hsi-ch'eng	Ch'ih-shui	
2 Regiments	T'ang Chi-yü	N. of Prov.	Yunnanese troops.
2 "	Hu Jo-yü	Ta-ting and W. of Province	" "
30 Battalions	Wu Hsien-hsueh	North of Prov.	(Each "Battalion" (consists of some (140 men.
9 "	Hsiang Wen-chia	Chen-yuan	Some 300 men each. Battalion.
3 "	Liao	-	do.
1 Column	Mo Ch'ang-p'u	Ch'ien-ch'ing chen	
2 Regiments	Liu Tun-wu	West of Prov.	
1 "	Liu Chien-wu	Kuei-yang	
1 "	Ch'en Hsu-ku	-	
1 "	Yi Hsiao-lan	Tating, Pichieh.	
2 Battalions	Liu Ju-yuan	Hsing-yi	300 men each Bn.
1 Column	Ts'ai Chü-yu	T'ung-jen	Hunanese troops, recently defeated by Mil. Governor of Hunan and retired to Kueichou border.

Estimated total strength - 28.000

...tion.		Commander.	Location.	Remarks.
MANCHURIA.				
(1) **FENGTIEN.**				
1st(Fengtien)	M.B.	K'an Chao-hsi	Cheng-chia-tun	
2nd	"	Kuo Sung-ling	Mukden	Temporarily in Chang
4th	"	P'ei Ch'un-sheng	Hsing-ch'eng	li in connection
5th×	"	Yu Chih-shan	Chin-chou	with the recent war
6th	"	Sung Chiu-ling	Mukden	do-
7th	"	T'ang Yu-lin	Feng-fang-ch'eng	do.
12th	"	Chao En-chin	Hsin-min	do.
14th	"	Yang Te-sheng	Chang-wu	
16th	"	Ch'i En-ming	Sui-chung	do.
19th×	"	Kao Wei-yueh	Chih-chou	do.
23rd◊	"	Li Shuang-k'ai	Pei-chen	do.
24th◊	"	Hsing Shih-lien	"	do.
25th	"	Ts'ai P'ing-pen	Li-shu	do.
27th	"	Wen Tsan-yu	-	do.
28th	"	Li Meng-keng	P.M.Ry. Line.	
1st	Cav.Bde.	Mu Ch'un	K'ang-p'ing	do.
3rd	" "	Su Hsi-lin	Mukden	do.
Guard Brigade		-	"	do.
Military Police		-	"	
Miscel. Troops.				
1st Yu Chi Tui (Patrolling Force")		Ch'eng Hai-feng	-	
3rd	do.	Chang Hai-p'eng	T'ao-nan	

×N.B. The 5th and 19th Mix.Bdes. together are sometimes called the 27th Division from which they were formed Divisional Commander Chang Hsueh-liang.

◊The 23rd and 24th Mix.Bdes. together are sometimes called the 1st Fengtien Div. from which they were formed. Divisional Commander Li Ching-lin.

Estimated total strength - 73.500

(2) **KIRIN.**

3rd(Kirin)	M.B.	Chang Tsung-ch'ang	Sui-fen	Temporarily in Chih-
8th	" "	Ting Ch'ao	Nung-an	li in connection with the recent war.
9th	" "	Ch'en Yu-kun	I-lan	
10th	" "	Yu Ch'en-chen	Kirin	
13th	" "	Chi Hsing	Chu-tzu-chieh	
18th	" "	Chang Huan-hsiang	Harbin	Formerly 19th (Nat.) Mixed Brigade.
20th	" "	Yang Yu-ch'un	Ho-lung	Temporarily in Chihli
21st	" "	Li Chen-sheng	Ninguta	in connection with the recent war.
26th	" "	Li Kuei-lin	Shuang-ch'eng-pu	
Guard Regiment		Chi Hsing	Kirin	
Independent Cav. Regiment		Wang Yung-ch'ing	Shuang-ch'eng	
Military Police Battalion		Chu Yung (?)	Kirin.	

Estimated total strength - 36.500

Formation.	Commander.	Location.	Remarks.
MANCHURIA(continued)			
(F) HEILUNGCHIANG.			
11th(H.L.C.) M.B.	Pa Ying-e	Hei-ho	
15th " "	Wang Fu-lin	Manchouli	Lately forming part of the 29th Div.
17th " "	Chang Ming-chiu	Harbin	
22nd " "	Shih Te-shan	Hu-lun	
2nd " Cav.Bde.	Chang K'uei-wu	Anda	
4th " " "	P'eng Chin-shan	T'ai-lai	
5th " " "	Ch'en Fu-sheng	Hai-lun	- ditto.
Guard Regiment	Fu Ch'un	Tsitsihar	
Military Police battalion			

Estimated total strength - 27.500

Estimated total number of troops in Manchuria - 137.500

SHANHSI.

1st(Shanhsi) M.B.	Shang Chen	T'ai-yuan, Chieh-hsiu, &c.	
2nd " "	Chang P'ei-mei	S. of Province.	Temporarily in Chihli in connection with the recent war.
3rd " "	K'ung Yun-sheng	Lung-chuan-kuan, Wu-t'ai-shan, &c.,	
4th " "	Chao Tai-wen	Taiyuan.	
5th " "	-	P'ing-ting-chou, Niang-tzu-kuan, &c.	
1st " Mixed Regt.	Li Min	-	
2nd " " "	Li Tso-lin	-	
North Shanhsi Mixed Regiment	Chang Shih-ch'ih	Ta-t'ung	
Military Police	Chang Ta-shan	Taiyuan.	
Miscel. Troops.			
Ching Pei Tui ("Patrolling Force")	-	Scattered	

Estimated total strength - 38.700

	Commander	Location	Remarks
SHANTUNG.			
8th (Nat.) Div.	Cheng Shih-ch'i	Tsi-nan, Hsin-chuang, &c.	
20th " M.B.	Wu Chang-chih	Chi-ning	
2nd(Shantung)M.B.	Chang Huai-pin	Chefoo	
3rd " "	Lu Hsiu-wen	T'sao-chou	
4th " "	Chang Chien-kung	Tung-ch'ang	
5th " "	Li Sen	Yi-chou	
6th " "	Chang P'ei-jung	Yen-chou	
7th " "	Hu Yi-ju	P'ing-yuan	
47th " Brigade	Shih Ts'ung-pin	Tsinan	
1st " Mix.Regt.	Liang Shih-ch'ang	Ch'u-fu, Fei-hsien	
1st " Inf. "	Fan Chu-chien	Fang-tzu	
Military Governor's Guard	-	Tsinan	
Military Police	-	"	
Miscel. Troops.			
Railway Guards	-	Tientsin-Pukow Ry.	
Yu Chi Tui(Patrols)	Sun Pai-wan	Kiaochow district	
Ching Pei Tui(Precautionary Force)	-	Scattered	
Naval Battalion	-	Chefoo.	
Estimated total strength - 60.200			
SHENHSI.			
7th (Nat.) Div.	Wu Hsin-t'ien	Hanchung	With a reserve Bde. formed from ex-Military Governor Ch'en Shu-fan's troops
Liu Chen-hua's troops *			Strength of Div.9000.
35th (Nat.) Div.	Han Yu-kun	Hsi-an, Tungkuan.	(Temporarily in (Honan.
2nd(Shenhsi) "	Chang Chien-kung	-	Now in Honan.
3rd " "	Ch'ai Yun-sheng	Hsi-an	
22nd(Nat.) M.B.	Wang Hung-en	-	(Temporarily in (Ssuchuan.
1st(Shenhsi) M.B.	Ma Jui-wa	Che-chieh	
2nd " "	Yen Chi-ming	Li Ch'uan	N.B. All these troops, except the 22nd Nat. M.Bde., were formed from the "Chen Sung Chun" i.e. Liu Chen-hua's Army.
3rd " "	Ma Yun-wen	Han-ch'eng	
4th " "	Li To	P'u-ch'eng	
5th " "	Lo Pao-chieh	Fenghsiang	
* Estimated total strength - 47.000			
Hu Ching-yi's troops.			
1 Mixed Brigade	T'ien Yu-chieh	San-yuan	N.B. Hu also has troops in Honan.
1 " Regiment	Ma Chin-wa	Chiao-kou	
1 " "	Feng Tzu-ming	Fu-p'ing	and some in Chihli.
1 " "	Hu Ching-ch'uan	Yueh Hsien	
1 " "	Yao Lin-yi	Ch'ien-chou	
1 " "	K'ang Chen-pang	P'u-cheng	
1 " "	Shih Hsiang-yi	Kao-ling	
Estimated total strength - 13.500			
OTHERS.			
1 Mix.Bde.	Kao Chun	Ho-yang, Wei-pei	
1 Cav. "	Ching Yueh-hsiu	Yu-lin(N.of Prov.)	
1 Mix. Regiment	Yu Hu-chen	Yu-lin.	
Estimated total strength - 5.500			

Estimated total number of troops in Province - 75.000

Formation	Commander	Location	Remarks
SSUCHUAN.			
16th (Nat.) Div.	Yang Sen	Chengtu	
21st " "	T'ien Sung-yao	Pao-ning	
22nd " "	T'ang T'ing-mu	N. of Prov.	
30th " "	Teng Hsi-hou	Chungking	
31st " "	Ch'en Kuo-tung	Chengtu	
32nd " "	T'ang Shih-tsun	Luchou	
33rd " "	P'an Wen-hua	Chengtu dist.	
34th " "	Yuan Tzu-ming	-	
1st(Ssuchuan) " "	Lai Hsin-hui	Tzuchou	
2nd " "	Li Shu-hsun	-	
4th " "	Yang Ch'un-fang	-	
5th " "	Ho Kuang-lieh	Shunking	
6th " "	Wei K'ai	-	
7th " "	Ch'en Nung-fang	-	
8th " "	Ch'eng Hung-fan	Kating	
9th " "	Liu Wen-hui	Hsu-fu, Fushun.	
10th " "	Liu Chuan-fan	P'eng Hsien	
11th " "	Tuan Yung-tsung	-	
27th(Nat.) Mix.Bde.	Sun Chen	-	
1st(Ssuchuan)do.	Kuo Ju-tung	-	
2nd " "	Ho Chin-ao	-	
3rd " "	Pai Chu	-	
4th " "	Wang Cheng-chun	-	
5th " "	-	(?)	
6th " "	Lo Tse-chou	Chungking	
9th " "	Chin Han-san	-	
1 Division	Yu P'ei-ti (?) (P'eng Yuan-yao)	Ssuchuan-Kuei-chou border	These forces are under direction of Hsiung K'o-wu who was recently defeated by Yang Sen & retired to Ssuchuan-Kueichou border.
1 "	Yu Chi-t'ang	do.	
1 "	Chang Ch'ung	do.	
1 Mixed Brigade	Cheng Ying	do.	
1 " "	Wang Li-chung	do.	
1 Division	Chang Ch'eng-hsiao	W.of Prov.	These troops are under Gen.Liu Ch'eng-hsun (alias Liu Yu-chiu), defeated by Yang Sen recently and retired to the west Ssuchuan border.
1 "	Lan Shih-cheng	do.	
1 Mix.Bde.	Liu Kuo-hsiao	do.	
1 " "	Lan Wen-ping	do.	
1 " "	Cheng Shih-ping	Kuan-hsien	
1 Mix.Bde	Sun Han	Ya-an	Under command of Ch'en Hsia-ling, (Garrison Commissioner of Ssuchuan Frontier, recently defeated by Liu Ch'eng hsun's troops, and is reported to be abouve finished.
1 " "	Chu Hsien-wen	K'ang-ting	
1 " "	Chao K'o-k'uan	"	
1 " "	Yang Ch'ing-ch'uan	Ma-lieh	
Miscel. Troops.			
Eastern Frontier Defence Force	Shih Ch'ing-yang	East of Prov.	
Salt Gabelle Troops	-	Scattered	

Estimated total strength - 171.700

(N.B. Other estimates give total between 200.000 & 250.000 men)

Formation.	Commander.	Location.	Remarks.
YUNNAN.			
1st Infantry Regt.	Ts'ai Tzu-te	Yunnan Prov.	
2nd " "	Yuan Ch'ang-jung	-	
3rd " "	Lu Han	-	
4th " "	Mao Hung-hsiang	-	Yunnan troops are not grouped in Div. or Bdes. Each Regiment is directly under the control of the C.I.C. - Marshal T'ang Chi-yao (Military Govern-or of Yunnan. A Regiment consists of 3 battalions of 400 men each, 1 machine rifle Company (120 men) and 1 engineer Company (120 men). The socalled "Yunnan Divisions" in other Provinces are now either independent or under control of other Provincial Governments.
5th " "	Ho Shih-hsiung	-	
6th " "	Chang Feng-ch'un	-	
7th " "	Yang Chan-yuan	-	
8th " "	Chang Te-sheng	-	
9th " "	Wang Kai-ming	-	
10th " "	Hsi Tzu-ch'eng	-	
11th " "	Chi Hsueh-chung	-	
12th " "	Hsu Shou-chung	-	
13th " "	Hsueh Chih-piao	-	
14th " "	Kuo Yu-luan	-	
15th " "	Yang Chi-pin	-	
16th " "	Ma Chien	-	
17th " "	Sun Tu	-	
18th " "	Kuan Chao-ying	-	
19th " "	Li Ho-sheng	-	
20th " "	Lin Feng-shan	-	
21st " "	Yang Yu-t'ang	-	
22nd " "	P'i Chung-ho	-	
23rd " "	Ch'ien Ping-chen	-	
24th " "	Ching Shih-k'uei	-	
25th " "	Li Wen-ming	-	
26th " "	Liu Cheng-lun	-	
27th " "	T'ien Chung-ku	-	
28th " "	Yu Fa-ch'i	-	
29th " "	T'ang Chi-lin	-	
30th " "	Chung Te-hsuan	-	
31st " "	Chu Hsü	-	
32nd " "	Pa Huai-yao	-	
1st Engineer Regt.	-	-	
2nd " "	Mao Lan-chieh	-	
3rd " "	Chou Lien	-	
4th " "	Tuan T'ing-tso	-	
1 Cavalry Regt.	Ch'en Shou-min	-	
2 Artillery Regts.	-	-	40 guns each.
2 " Battalions	-	-	12 guns in all.
2			

Miscel. Troops.

Yu Chi Tui (Patrolling Force)	-	-	6 "battalions" of some 360 men each.
Pao Shang Tui (Merchants' Protective Force)	-	-	

Estimated total strength - 51.800

Estimated Grand Total Number of Troops in China

1.466.500

APPENDIX I.

Location List of National and Provincial Troops.

1. National Divisions:		Location.
1st (National)	Division	Chiangsi Province.
2nd "	"	Chenhiang "
3rd "	"	Nil *
4th "	"	Nil
5th "	"	Shantung "
6th "	"	Chiangsu "
7th "	"	Shenhsi "
8th "	"	Hupei "
9th "	"	Nil *
10th "	"	Chiangsu "
11th "	"	Chihli "
12th "	"	Fuchien "
13th "	"	Nil *
14th "	"	Nil *
15th "	"	Nil *
16th "	"	Szechuan "
17th "	"	Kwanghsi "
18th "	"	Hupei "
19th "	"	Chiangsu "
20th "	"	Nil *
21st "	"	Szechuan "
22nd "	"	" "
23rd "	"	Nil *
24th "	"	Nil *
25th "	"	Hupei "
26th "	"	Nil *

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* Broke up during the Chihli-Fengtien War - November 1924.
Ordered to be abolished by a Mandate on 11.12.24.

1. National Divisions (continued)

	Location
27th (National) Division	Nil, See Fengtien Province (Manchuria).
28th " "	Nil.
29th " "	Nil, See Heilungchiang " "
30th " "	Ssuchuan "
31st " "	" "
32nd " "	" "
33rd " "	" "
34th " "	" "
35th " "	Shenhsi "

2. Provincial Divisions.
(Stationed out of their own Provinces)

1st (Honan) Division	Chianghsi Province
1st (Kuanghsi) "	Kuangtung "
1st (Kueichou) "	Ssuchuan "
2nd " "	" "
1st (Shenhsi) "	Honan "
1st (Yunnan) "	Chianghsi "
2nd " "	" "

3. National Mixed Brigades.

1st (National) Mixed Brigade	Nil *
2nd " " "	Hupei Province.
3rd " " "	Chianghsi "
4th " " "	Chahar (Frontier Territory)
5th " " "	Suiyuan " "
6th " " "	Nil
7th " " "	Chihli Province
8th " " "	" "
9th " " "	Chianghsi "

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* Broke up during the Chihli-Fengtien War, Nov. 1924, and ordered to be abolished by a Mandate 11.12.24.

3. National Mixed Brigades (Continued)				Location.
10th	(National)	Mixed	Brigade	Chechiang.
11th	"	"	"	Fuchien
12th	"	"	"	Nil *
13th	"	"	"	Nil *
14th	"	"	"	Nil *
15th	"	"	"	Chihli
16th	"	"	"	Nil *
17th	"	"	"	Hupei
18th	"	"	"	"
19th	"	"	"	Nil (became 18th Kirin M.B.)
20th	"	"	"	Shantung.
21st	"	"	"	Hupei
22nd	"	"	"	Shenhsi
23rd	"	"	"	Chianghsi.
24th	"	"	"	Fuchien
25th	"	"	"	Chihli
26th	"	"	"	Nil *
27th	"	"	"	Szechuan.

4. Provincial Mixed Brigades. (Stationed out of their own Provinces).

5th Hupei M. B.	Chiangsu Province.
1st Shantung M.B.	Chianghsi "

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* Broke up during the Chihli-Fengtien War - November 1924. Ordered to be abolished by a Mandate on 11.12.24.

2
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
1925 2009-156 SEP 15
11
325

AMERICAN LEGATION.
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE.
PEKING, CHINA.

August 5, 1925.

#5544.

RECEIVED G/2 WAR SEP 11 1925

Subject: Evaluation of Reports from Military Attache, Peking.

To: A. C. of S., G-2.

2009-156
5

1. Referring to your inquiry in evaluation, dated July 7, 1925, of Report #5450, I agree with you that there is no likelihood of major operations in the vicinity of Dolonor.

2. Control of northern China is the objective of Feng Yu-hsiang and Chang Tso-lin rather than Peking. As the situation is today, I think Feng could take Peking within three or four hours, but the conditions are not yet such as to insure to him party as well as physical control.

J. H. Barnard,
Lieut. Colonel, F. A.,
Military Attache.

elh

4-1 SC 2009-152
10

SUBJECT Military Situation and Distribution of Troops. (To be read in connection with reports M/A China Nos. 5530 and 5533).

From M/A China. 7657-D-289 7657-D-289

No. 5547 Date August 8, 1925. 19

Replying to No. Date 19

5189.

RECEIVED M/I WAR SEP 11 1925

Fengtien (Chang Tso-lin) forces NORTH of Great Wall:
(Strength about 90,000)

Principal concentration points are Jehol, Chinchow and Mukden.

3rd Div. General K'an Chao-hsi, at Jehol and vicinity.
7th " General Feng Huang-cheng, in S. E. Manchuria.
11th " " " " "
12th " " " " "
14th to 18th Divs. Permanent garrison in Manchuria.

Fengtien (Chang Tso-lin) forces SOUTH of Great Wall:
(Strength about 120,000).

Stationed from Shanhaikuan to Tientsin along the Peking-Mukden railway; to Shanghai along the Tientsin-Pukow and Nanking-Shanghai railways. Principal concentration points shown below:

1. Peking and vicinity:

Tungchow -- 2nd Mixed Brigade, Gen. Chin Yi, of the 3rd Defense Army (Gen. Wu Kuang-hsin, Minister of War).
Peiyuan -- 1st Mixed Brigade, Gen. Tang Chih-tao, of the 3rd Defense Army.

2. Along the Peking-Mukden Railway:

Fengtai -- 1000 men of 27th Mixed Brigade.

Langfang -- 27th Mixed Brigade (old 6th Mixed Brigade) of 4th Div., C. O. Brig. Gen. Sung Chiu-ling.
25th Inf. Regt.
26th Inf. "
48th " "
One Regt. (?) Engrs.
Two Regts. Artillery (not joined)
1 Troop Cavalry.

Machang -- 6th Div. Gen. Kuo Sung-ling.

Tientsin -- 30th Mixed Brigade (Chang Tso-lin's Bodyguard) C.O. Gen. Ch'i Chan-yuan.
Mukden Cadet Corps - Approx. 1000.
1st Div. Gen. Li Ching-lin (Governor of Chihli).

Chunliangch'eng	-- Hq. 4th Dv.., C.O. Gen. Chang Hsueh-liang. 19th Mixed Brigade of 4th Div.
Hsin Ho	-- One Regt. of Inf., 17th or 57th of 33rd Inf. Brig.
Lut'ai	-- Hq. 33rd Inf. Brig. C.O. Gen. Fan. 40th Inf. Regt of 33rd Inf. Brig.
Tang Shan	-- 92nd Inf. Regt. of 33rd Inf. Brig. All belonging to 5th Inf. Division.
K'ai P'ing	-- 13th(Cavalry) Div., composed of 2 Cav. brigades. 1 Bn. artillery.
Kuyeh (?)	-- One Inf. Regt. of 12th Inf. Brig.
Lanchou	-- Hq. 5th Inf. Div. C.O. Gen. Chao En-chen. 5th Divisional Artillery - One Bn. 5th Divisional Engineers - One Co. One Inf. Regt. (50th) of 12th Inf. Brig.
Anshan (?)	-- One Infantry Regiment of 12th Inf. Brig. All belonging to 4th Inf. Division.
Ch'ang Li	-- Hq. 37th Inf. Brig. 82nd Inf. Regt of 37th Inf. Brig.
Fu Ning	-- 9th Inf. " " " " "
Chinwangtao	-- Hq. 10th Div. Com.Off. Gen. Chi En-min 10th Divisional Artillery - One Bn. 10th " Engineers - One Co. 10th Inf. Regt. of 16th Inf. Brig.
Shanhaikwan	-- Hq. 16th Inf. Brig. C.O. Gen. Wen T'san Yu 22nd Inf. Regt. of 16th Inf. Brig. All belonging to 10th Inf. Division

3. Other points.

Tsinanfu	-- 2nd Div., Gen. Chang Tsung-chang (Gov. of Shantung).
Paotingfu	-- Part of 1st Div. Gen. Li Shuang-K'ai.
Tientsin-Pukow Ry	Garrison - 8th Div.
Shanghai	-- 2nd Div.
Tsingtao	-- Russian Legion.

Nine Province Alliance:

1. Forces of Feng Yu-hsiang, 1st National Army:

20,000 in vicinity of Peking, and 30,000 each in Chahar and Suiyuan areas.

a. Peking and vicinity:

Peking	-- 1st Div., Gen. Lu Chung-lin (Defense Commissioner).
Nanyuan	-- 1 Brigade, General Han. Replacements and recruits - total 4,000 men.
Hsiyuan	-- 25th Mixed Brigade, Gen. Sung Chan-yuan. 3rd Mixed Brigade, Gen. Cheng Hsi-hsien.

b. Along the Peking-Hankow Railway:

Peking Station -- One company student soldiers.

Chang Hsin Tien -- One Regt.of 3rd Div.

c. Along the Peking-Suiyuan Railway:

Nankow -- One Co. of 11th Div.
K'ang Chuang -- One Co. of 11th Div.-Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang.
Kalgan -- 7th Mixed Brig. Gen Chang Chih-chiang (Tutung of Chahar).
One Regt. Special Bodyguard troops for Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang from 11th Div.
Remainder of 11th Div. in vicinity.
Ping Ti-chuan -- 3rd Div. Gen. Cheng Chin-sheng.
Suiyuan -- 8th Mixed Brig.,Gen. Li Ming-chung (Tutung of Suiyuan).
2nd Div., Gen. Liu Yu-fen.,10,000 men.

2. Other forces in Nine Province Alliance:

Province.	Commander	Political Affiliation	Strength.
Chekiang	Sun Chuan-fang	Chihli	40,000
Fukien	Chou Ying-jen	Chihli	45,000
Anhui	Ni Tao-lang	Anfu	40,000
Honan	Yueh Wei-chun	Feng Yu-hsiang	75,000
Shensi	Sun Yueh	" " "	30,000
Hupeh	Hsiao Yao-nan	Chihli	60,000
Hunan	Chao Heng-ti	Chihli	40,000
Szechuan	Yang Sen	Chihli	60,000
Kweichow	Yuan Tsu-ming	Chihli	30,000
Mongolia	70,000 men - Russian trained.		

Provinces not included in above lists:

Chihli	Li Ching-lin	Fengtien	65,000
Shantung	Chang Tsung-chang	Fengtien	30,000
Kiangsu	Cheng Chien	Fengtien	30,000
Kiangsi	Fang Peng-jen	Chihli	35,000
Kwangtung	Hu Han-min	Kuomingtang	90,000
Yunnan	Tang Chi-yao	Chihli	70,000
Kansu	Lu Hung-t'ao	Chihli	25,000
Shansi	Yen Shi-shan	Neutral	55,000

Independent leaders controlling considerable bodies:

Leader	Location	Political Affiliations	Strength.
Liu Hsiang *	Szechuan	Anti-Yang Sen	20,000
Teng Hsi-hou *	"	" " "	25,000
Lai Hsin-hui *	"	" " "	20,000
Hsiung Ke-ming	Hunan	Anti-Chao Heng-ti	25,000
Ch'en Chiung-ming	Kwangtung borders	Anti-Kuomingtang	25,000

* Actively engaged in operations against Yang Sen.

Distribution:
4 MID
1 CGUSAFC
1 Tokyo
1 File.

5-1 2009-156 9 01

SUBJECT Mongolian Army

From M/A Peking

No. 5518 Date July 17,1925., 19

Replying to No. 200-a-156 (6) Date, 19

6120-Armies.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 17 192

1. The following has been received from a reliable source. (See also Report 5464)

2. "During the last month the Mongolian Army has been increased by 10,000 of cavalry, and now is numbered 70,000 men.

Having been during the last two years drilled by experienced Russian instructors this army represents now a very good fighting unit well armed and well disciplined."

Binding Margin.

Distribution:

4 MID
1 CGUSAFC
1 File.

WAR DEPARTMENT
4/1925 2009-156 8
AUG 18 37

SUBJECT: Distribution of Troops - Chinese, and Military Situation.

From: M/A Peking

No. 5504 Date: July 14, 1925.

Replying to No. Date:

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. AUG 17 1925

5180

Fengtien (Chang Tso-lin) forces NORTH of Great Wall
(Strength about 90,000)

Principal concentration points are Jehol, Chinchow, and Mukden.

3rd Division, Gen. K'an Ch'ao-hai, at Jehol and vicinity.
7th " , Gen. Feng Huang-cheng, in S. E. Manchuria.
11th " , " " "
12th " , " " "
14th to 18th , , Permanent garrison in Manchuria.

Fengtien (Chang Tso-lin) forces SOUTH of Great Wall
(Strength about 120,000)

Stationed from Shanhaikuan to Tientsin along the Peking-Mukden railway; to Shanghai along the Tientsin-Pukow and Nanking-Shanghai railways. Principal concentration points shown below:

1. **Peking and vicinity**

Tungchow — 2nd Mixed Brigade, Gen. Chin Yi, of the 3rd Defense Army (Gen. Wu Kuang-hsin, Minister of War).
Peiyuan — 1st Mixed Brigade, Gen. Tang Chih-tao, of the 3rd Defense Army.

2. **Along the Peking-Mukden Railway**

Fengtai — 1000 men of 27th Mixed Brigade.

Langfang— 27th Mixed Brigade (old 6th Mixed Brigade) of 4th Div., C.O., Brig. Genl. Sung Chiu-ling.
25th Inf. Regt.
26th " ".
48th " ".
One regt. (?) Engineers.
Two regts. Artillery (not joined).
1 Troop Cavalry.

MaChang— 6th Division, Gen. Kuo Sung-ling.

Tientsin— 30th Mixed Brigade (Chang Tso-lin's Bodyguard), C.O., Genl. Ch'i Chan-yuan.
Mukden Cadet Corps - Approx. 1000.
1st Division, Gen. Li Ching-lin (Governor of Chihli).

Binding Margin.

Chunliangch'eng---Hq. 4th Division; C.O., Gen. Chang Hsueh-liang.
19th Mixed Brigade of 4th Division.

Hsin Ho----------One regiment of infantry, 17th or 57th of 33rd Inf. Brigade.

Lut'ai----------Hq. 33rd Infantry Brigade, C.O., Gen. Han.
40th Inf. Regt. of 33rd Inf. Brigade.

Tang Shan--------92nd Inf. Regt. of 33rd Inf. Brigade.
All belonging to 5th Infantry Division.

K'ai P'ing-------15th (Cavalry) Division, composed of
2 Cavalry brigades
1 Bn. Artillery.

Kuyeh (?)--------One Infantry Regiment of 12th Inf. Brigade

Lanchou----------Hq. 5th Inf. Division, C.O. Gen. Chao En-chen
5th Divisional Artillery - One Bn.
5th Divisional Engineers - One Co.
One Infantry Regt. (50th) of 12th Inf. Brig.

Anshan (?)-------One Infantry Regiment of 12th Inf. Brigade
All belonging to 4th Infantry Division.

Ch'ang Li--------Hq. 57th Inf. Brigade.
82nd Inf. Regt. of 57th Inf. Brigade.
Fu Ning----------9th Infantry " " " " ".

Chinwangtao------Hq. 10th Div.; C.O. Gen. Ch'i En-min.
10th Divisional Artillery - One Bn.
10th " Engrs. - One Co.
10th Infantry Regt. of 16th Inf. Brigade.
Shanhaikuan------Hq. 16th Inf. Brigade, C.O., Gen. Wen T'san-yu.
22nd Infantry Regt. of 16th Inf. Brigade
All belonging to 10th Infantry Division.

3. Other points

Tsinanfu----------2nd Div., Gen. Chang Tsung-chang (Gov. of Shantung)
Paotingfu---------Part of 1st Div., Gen. Li Shuang-K'ai.
Tientsin-Pukow Railway Garrison---8th Div.
Shanghai----------About one brigade of the 8th Div.

Forces of Feng Yu-hsiang, 1st National Army

20,000 in vicinity of Peking, and 30,000 each in Chahar and Suiyuan areas.

1. Peking and vicinity

Peking-----1st Div., Gen. Lu Chung-lin (Defense Commissioner).
Nanyuan----2nd Div., Gen. Liu Yu-fen.
Hsiyuan----25th Mixed Brigade, Gen. Sung Chan-yuan.
3rd Mixed Brigade, Gen. Cheng Hsi-hsien.

2. Along the Peking-Hankow Railway

Peking station----1 Company student soldiers.
Chang Hsin-tien---1 Regt. of 3rd Division.

3. Along the Peking-Suiyuan Railway

Nankow------1 Co. of 11th Div.
K'ang Chuang------11th Div., Gen. Feng Yu-hsiang
Kalgan---------7th Mixed Brigade, Gen. Chang Chih-chiang (Tutung of Chahar).
1 Regt. of Special Bodyguard troops for Gen. Feng-yu-hsiang, from 11th Div. Remainder of 11th Div. in vicinity.
Ping Ti-chuan---3rd Div., Gen. Cheng Chin-Sheng
Suiyuan----------8th Mixed Brigade, Gen. Li Ming-Chung (Tutung of Suiyuan).

Forces allied with Feng Yu-hsiang

1. Yueh Wei-chun----2nd National Army (Honan) (strength 75,000) Formerly commanded by Hu Ching-yi. Concentrated on Lunghai Railway at Kaifeng, Kweiteh and Loyang, and on Peking-Hankow Railway south of junction with Lunghai R.R.

2. Sun Yueh---3rd National Army (strength 30,000). Concentrated at Chengchow and at arsenal at Kanghsin. Moving forces into Shensi.

Kuomintang forces in Kwangtung

General Hu Han-min has assumed office as Generalissimo of the Kuomintang Armies. These are the Cantonese Army under General Hsu Chung-tze, the Hunanese under General T'an Yen-k'ai, and the Yunnanese under General Chu Pei-teh. Much of the success of these forces in obtaining control of the province is reported due to the assistance given by Russian Soviet instructors.

Szechuan.

General Yang Sen still continues his operations against the opposing forces of Generals Yuan Tsu-ming (Kweichow), Liu Hsiang and Lai Hsin-hui, the outcome as yet being undecisive.

Distribution:

4 MID
1 CGUSAFC
1 Tokyo
1 File.

CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

4-1 1925 2009-156 7 25 TAT 57
WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT Concentration and mobility of Mongolian Army.

From M/A Peking.

No. 5478 Date June 19, 1925., 19

Replying to No. Date , 19

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JUL 24 1925

6000-Mobilization.

1. Under date of June 15 the American Consul, Kalgan, reports that he has information that 75% of the Mongolian Army is concentrated on the Chinese border. Camps have been established within 150 miles of each other and the troops at each camp are so well equipped with horses as to render the whole body of troops extremely mobile.

Each soldier has three horses which makes it possible to concentrate troops at any point within a radius of 150 miles within 24 hours.

2. This report is partly confirmatory of par. 9 (a) Report No. 5471.

2657-D-281
(37)

Distribution:

4 MID
1 OCUSAFC
1 File.

Binding Margin.

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
1925 2009-156 6 JUL 13 09

WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT: Mongolian Army, Composition of.

From: M/A Peking.

No. 5454 Date: June 5, 1925. 19

Replying to No. Date: 19

6170

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JUL 11 1925

Refer to Report 5458, paragraph "Organization of Army".

1. The following is from a source believed reliable:

"Composition of the Mongolian Army

Cavalry.—The Mongolian cavalry consists of three divisions (altogether about 36,000 men) with three brigades in each division and three regiments (4 - 6 squadrons) in each brigade. To each regiment a machine gun detachment, a sapper detachment and a liaison detachment are attached.

Besides that, two separate brigades (two regiments in each) are now in formation.

The cavalry is armed with rifles of various types apparently supplied from Russia out of stocks left after the war-time. Each squadron is armed with two light-type machine guns (of 50 cartridges) carried on horse-back. There are also machine guns of light-type with English cartridges.

There are no special barracks for the cavalry, which is scattered thru the whole country; the horses being fed on the green fodder.

Artillery.—3 divisions of horse-artillery. Each division contains three brigades. Each brigade consists of three batteries (of 4 guns).

One brigade of field artillery composed of three batteries (of 4 guns).

Infantry.—One brigade (about 10,000 men) composed of 3 regiments. Each regiment contains 3 battalions (of 3 companies each).

To each company a machine gun plateon is attached.

The infantry is distributed in Urga, Uliasutei, Kobdo and other less important places.

Engineer troops.—The engineer troops compose one division which contains -

One sapper company
One telegraph company
One telephone company
One pontoon company.

Binding Margin.

Air Force.—

The Mongolian air-force is composed of 2 squadrons of 8 aeroplanes each, stationed at Kosogol (about 400 Kms. to N.W. from Urga). Hasty supplementary formations of the Mongolian army are being carried on. The General staff of the army is in Urga. Colonel Heklindoff was lately appointed Chief of Staff of the Mongolian army and is expected soon to Urga from Moscow.

More detailed information will follow.

All commanding posts in the army are held by Russian military experts."

2. The same source reports that it is the intention to have cavalry form 80% of the Mongolian army.

3. While the above quoted report corrects the composition of the Mongolian army as outlined in Report 5458, it confirms its reported strength as 50,000. Other reports confirm the presence of 5000 instructors as noted in report 5458.

4. Another and a highly reliable source reports that by the fall of 1925 the Mongolian army will be 100,000 strong.

DISTRIBUTION-

4 MID
1 CGUSAFC
1 MA Tokyo.
1 File.

WAR DEPARTMENT
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
7-1925 2009-15 (3)
JUL 22 1925

SUBJECT Concentration of Chinese Garrisons scattered in Inner Mongolia. (See Report 5427)

From M/A Peking. 2009-15 (4)

No. 5450 Date May 25, 1925., 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

6180

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JUL 1- 1925

The American Consul, Kalgan, under date of May 6, 1925, reports to the Legation as follows:

"During the last few days there has been a wholesale commandeering of carts and camels by the military for the transportation of the arms and ammunition received from Mongolia, from Chang Pei Hsien, forty-five miles north east of Kalgan, to Dolonor on the Jehol-Chahar border.

"There appears to be something in the nature of a concentration both of troops and military supplies of all kinds at Dolonor, the logical scene in this region of a Feng-Chang clash, should it occur."

DISTRIBUTION:

4 MID
1 CGUSAFC
1 File.

Binding Margin.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JUN 8 1925

WAR DEPARTMENT

1-1 2009-756 1/

SUBJECT Concentration of Chinese Garrisons scattered in Inner Mongolia.

From M/A Peking

No. 5427 Date May 2, 1925., 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

6180

The Chinese garrisons scattered in Inner Mongolia are reported as being concentrated near Kalgan. These are the garrisons to which munitions of war from Russia are said to have been distributed during the winter. If the report of their concentration is correct it is confirmatory of Report No. 5425, M/A Peking, re Threatened Communistic and Anti-foreign movement.

2657-D-281

Distribution:

4 MID
1 CGUSAFC
1 File.

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
In replying refer to

2009-156

156

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
1925 JUN 1
2009-156
3
WAR DEPARTMENT

May 27, 1925

Subject: Military Attache Report.

To: Far Eastern Div., State Dept.

1. Enclosed herewith, for your information, is copy of military attache report as follows:

From	Date	No.	Subject
M/A China	4-23-25	5411	Distribution of troops in China and Military Situation.

2. Acknowledgment of receipt of this report is requested, together with your comments as to its value, by indorsement hereon.

3. It will not be necessary to return the report to this Division.

For the A. C. of S., G-2:

MAY 28 1925

N. E. MARGETTS,
Lieut. Colonel, General Staff,
Chief, M. I. 5.

4-1 1925 2009-156 2
MAY 26 1925
WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT: Distribution of troops in China and Military Situation.

From: M/A Peking.

No. 5411 Date: April 23, 1925.

Replying to No. Date:

6180

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. MAY 22 1925

Reference Report M.A. China, No. 5393, April 11, 1925.

Fengtien forces south of Great Wall.
(Strength 120,000)

No change, except TSUCHOWFU should be spelled HSU CHOW FU

1000 troops of Li Ching-lin have occupied Paoting Fu.

Fengtien forces north of Great Wall.
(Strength 90,000)

No change.

Forces of Feng Yu-hsiang or 1st National Army.
(Strength 70,000)

No change.

Forces allied with Feng Yu-hsiang.
Hu Ching-yi, 2nd National Army (Strength 75,000)

No change, except that Hu Ching-yi has died and his command is temporarily in the hands of Yueh Wei-chun, one of Hu's division commanders.

Sun Yueh, 3rd National Army (Strength 30,000)

No change, except that the force in Paoting Fu has been withdrawn, and that place occupied by Fengtien troops as noted above.

Yunnanese troops under Tang Chi-yao.
Affiliations unknown (Strength 7 divisions, probably about 25,000 total).

No change.

War in Szechuan.

General Yang Sen in control of the province is supposed to have 60,000 men. His headquarters have been at Ichang where he has a considerable financial income from the salt and opium revenues. He is opposed by Generals Liu Hsiang with 20,000 men, Lai Hsin-hui with 12,000 men and Yuan Tsu-ming with 20,000 men. Fighting has broken out in the vicinity of Chengtu.

Estimate. No change.

DISTRIBUTION- 4 MID
1 CGUSAFC
1 M/A Tokyo
1 Legation; 1 File.

Binding Margin.

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
4-1 1925 2009-137
MAY 15
WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT Distribution of troops in China and Military Situation, April 11, 1925.

From M/A China.

No. 5393. Date April 11, 1925., 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

6180 - Disposition of troops.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. MAY 13 1925

Fengtien forces south of Great Wall:
(Strength 120,000).

Stationed from Shanhaikwan to Shanghai along Tientsin-Pukow, Nanking-Shanghai railways. Principal concentration points are Shanhaikwan, Tientsin and Tsuchowfu.

Fengtien forces north of Great Wall:
(Strength 90,000).

Principal concentration points are Jehol, Chinchow and Mukden.

Forces of Feng Yu-hsiang, 1st National Army:
(Strength 70,000).

30,00 in vicinity of Peking, and 20,000 each in Chahar and Suiyuan.

Forces allied with Feng Yu-hsiang.:

Hu Ching-yi - 2nd National Army. (Strength 75,000). Concentrated on Lunghai Railway at Kaifeng, Kweiteh and Loyang, and on Peking-Hankow Railway south of junction with Lunghai Railway.

Sun Yueh - 3rd National Army. (Strength 30,000). Concentrated at Chengchow, at junction Lunghai and Peking-Hankow railways, and at arsenal at Kunghsin. Still holds Paotingfu and Tamingfu with small forces.

Fighting in Honan apparently over with defeat and dispersion of Shensi forces.

Yunnanese troops under Tang Chi-yao. Affiliations unknown.
(Strength 7 divisions - probably about 25,000 total).

Three divisions moving east into Kwangsi have come into collision at Kweihsin with mercenary Yunnanese troops under radical Kuomingtang leaders. Four divisions said to be moving north-east to Kweichow.

Some fighting in Hunan between rivals for local supremacy. Without present significance in general situation.

Binding Margin.

Kuomingtang forces in Kwangtung:
(Strength 65,000).

Largely mercenary Yunnanese, Hunanese and Kwangsi troops. Have just defeated forces of Chen Chiung-ming.

Concentrated principally about Swatow, Canton Shuichow and Wuchow.

Estimate:

Except for desultory fighting in the South without general significance, I believe there will be no warfare this spring.

Distribution:

4 MID
1 CG Tientsin
1 M/A Tokyo
1 File.

4-1 1925 2009-157

MAY 23

WAR DEPARTMENT

SUBJECT Military Organisations and General Conditions, Jehol.

From M/A Peking.

No. 5999 5999 Date April 20, 1925., 19

Replying to No. Date, 19

6100

RECEIVED G/2 W.D., MAY 22 192

The following is a report from an observer sent to Jehol to gain information as to new military organisations in that area, the general conditions, probability of war, etc. Separate G-2 Reports will be made on the special matters contained therein.

As hastily arranged by telephone on the evening of March 17, I started early the following morning for Jehol. Having unexpectedly secured a single seat in a crowded motor-car, I was unattended and carried only a small bedding roll for a few days' trip. Several days of snow and rain made the roads impassable for motor-cars, so that my return was delayed from day to day up to March 31, when again I was able to get passage in by motor, making the trip in one long day rather than the four or five which would have been necessary had I travelled by horse or mule-litter (the common conveyance between Peking and Jehol.)

Starting outside the Anting Men (eastern north gate of Peking), we traversed a fairly good earth road across the Peking plain and arrived at Ku Pei-K'ou, the mountainous pass in the Great Wall, at about three o'clock in the afternoon. The Great Wall here divides the Peking or Metropolitan District (included in though practically independent of Chihli Province) from the Special District of Jehol. It may be mentioned in passing that Jehol, and the other two Special Districts to the west of it, Chahar (Capital at Kalgan, or Chang Chia K'ou) and Suiyuan, (capitol at Sui Yuan or Kusi Hua Ch'eng), were formerly loosely organized military districts each under a Tartar General (Tutung), for defending the northern frontiers of Chihli and Shansi Provinces from the Mongols. In recent years, as they became more settled by Chinese farmers and colonists, they were reorganized as small Provinces, still under a Military Governor (Tutung), with no Civil Governor as nominal colleague as in the other Provinces. The two more western Districts of Chahar and Sui Yuan have two of General Feng Yu-Hsiang's men as Governors, he himself making his headquarters in the former place, as has also the Metropolitan District. The Governor of Jehol District, on the contrary is General K'an, one of General Chang Tso-lin's Manchurian officers, formerly Defense Commissioner at Chang Chow. Thus it will be seen that the spheres of influence of these two leaders meet here.

At Ku Pei K'ou, where we stopped for a considerable time both going and returning, I learned that there had been a real"rober-scare" a few days previously. A band of brigands, here reported as numbering some six hundred men (some Jehol reports later gave the figure from one to two thousand), largely composed of soldiers disbanded during the War last autumn, had approached to a distance of some five miles or so of Ku Pei K'ou. Defending this place, there was only "the Cavalry Regiment" of General Feng Yu-Hsiang's Eleventh Division. It is a newly recruited (largely local recruits about Ku Pei K'ou, I was told) and thus far unmounted "cavalry regiment", under a Colonel Han. These troops hastily dug a few trenches at the pass, and some forty motor-cars were commandeered in Peking - said to be two from each motor-car company's

Binding Margin.

garage. Filled with seasoned troops and rushed to Kou Pei K'ou (twenty-three cars, with about seven soldiers to each, occupied the inn where I stopped going and returning). These reinforcements remained for only a few days, however; as the robbers moved away to the north, they were sent back to Peking. Along the road between Peking and Ku Pei K'ou I could learn of no troop movements either going or coming, and the only soldiers I observed were some forty armed with Mauser automatic pistols and with huge heads-man's swords on their backs, leading a dozen camels, whom we overtook on the return journey. (At Ku Pei Kou strict watch is kept by the guards of passersby. The soldiers are tearing down parts of the Great Wall to build barracks with the bricks.)

From Ku Pei K'ou to Jehol, the road is very mountainous and the latter place was not reached till after nine o'clock at night. In proceeding some few miles from the Pass, the first Garrison of Jehol soldiers was observed - there is said to be about a battalion quartered in villages in this region. They were badly dressed and idling about the streets, in great contrast to the well set up, and busy soldiers observed inside the Wall at Ku Pei K'ou (Gen. Feng's troops). All along this road there were no indications whatever of any military activity. There are incoming flocks of greedy office-hunters from Manchuria, crowding the offices and inns at Kalgan, though many with whom I talked are disappointed at the barren unproductive appearance of the whole district as compared to their rich Manchuria! This is the usual "spoils system" prevalent in China; practically all the offices of any kind have been given to natives of Manchuria since General Feng Yu-Hsiang's troops withdrew last autumn and turned over the District to Mukden. The people long for the return of General Feng and his well-behaved soldiers, and it is said that the village militia, Police and all the non-Manchurian soldiers in the very mixed Jehol Army have an understanding that they are to shhot the hated robber-like Manchurian officers and soldiers as soon as any trouble breaks out! (Manchurian is applied to people coming from the three Provinces of Manchuria, and is not to be confused with the term Manchu which applies to persons descended from the Manchu conquerors of China.)

I was informed by officers and soldiers that large numbers of Manchurian soldiers in the Jehol Army, dissatisfied with having their pay kept many months in arrears, the poor living conditions, treatment and poor prospects for the future, had deserted, taking their rifles with them and either joining the other disbanded soldiers now robbers in Jehol or Manchuria, or else selling their rifles and going home. Many of these deserters have been caught and executed, but still the desertions continue in such serious numbers as to alarm the officers. It was reported that the same band of brigands, said to number two thousand more or less, part of which went to Ku Pei K'ou, approached to within twenty-five miles of Jehol and sent seven telegrams to the Military Governor K'an advising him to leave Jehol! They have now retired to the region of Liang Pu Fu, a hundred miles or so to the north of Jehol, but are still an active menace to the District.

As a matter of fact, this Military Governor K'an Ch'as-Hsi since he was appointed from Jukden last November, has spent only a few weeks in January and early February in Jehol, returning to Mukden for ~~Kung~~ General Chang Tso-lin's birthday celebrations, etc. He left with many cart-loads of valuables from the old Imperial Hunting Palace, occupied in recent years by the Governors and now pretty nearly bare of its former treasures. (It was here that the great Emperor Chien Lung received Lord Macartney about 1795, the first western diplomat to be received by a Chinese Emperor.) The Military Governor was reported to be starting back for Jehol from Mukden while I was there; he had telegraphed to enquire whether the motor road from Peking was passable, which would indicate nothing but pacific intentions at present. On being told the condition of the roads he decided to come overland from the east.

Military Governor K'an is said to have invested from thirty to fifty [illegible] dollars in the Motor-car Company which runs cars from Peking through [illegible] north as far as Chih Feng. It was started by some Jehol and Chihli business men about a year ago, but not well managed - it is now dominated by the General K'an, and the Jehol Chief of Police is also Director of the Company. They have a number of Dodge cars. Since the War last autumn the bank notes of the Jehol Government Bank have dropped to about 60% of their face value; the silver reserve has all disappeared, it seems, and practically nothing is in circulation but these depreciated dollar and copper (ten, twenty and fifty copper) notes. Bad harvests last year, the movements of the armies last autumn, the activities of brigands, depreciation of the currency, etc., in this at best poor district, are causing great suffering to the people. They are being encouraged to plant opium this year even more openly than during the past few years. I observed it being planted in the suburbs of Jehol itself. A tax of six dollars per Mou (1/6 of an acre) is said to be levied, half payable when the poppies are three inches high and the balance at the harvest. The other exactions are numerous, however; one farmer told one of the English Missionaries that he had been taxed nine different times on his opium fields and finally had had to buy opium to pay the exactions! An annual income of some six million dollars is said to be raised from the opium taxes, which is practically all that supports the Jehol Military establishment. Some of the farmers told me they would prefer to grow grain, which would provide them with food and relieve them from the extortions of the officials; that two or three years ago just when the poppies were ready for topping word was sent out that a foreign investigator was coming from Peking, and that the poppy fields all had to be dug up, so that nothing was secured from their season's labour!

No foreign travellers had come to Jehol since the War last autumn, apparently, and the new Manchurian Officials are evidently nervous. Police officials came several times to the inn where I was staying, to ask me questions, as they wanted to "protect" me, etc. I made an appointment to call on the Chief of Police at a time set by him, but he evidently had a scare at the last moment for I was received by a secretary who informed me that the Chief was suddenly called out on important business! I was afterward informed that he was in the next room, which I suspected at the time and spoke loudly enough for him to hear. I was then asked point-blank if I was in Jehol to investigate the opium planting. I replied that I was there to revisit the very interesting group of large temples which I had visited eleven years ago, and also to see some friends in the English Mission, but that I couldn't help noticing the great quantities of opium being planted in the suburbs of Jehol! I asked what was the official attitude toward this question, and the Secretary said of course it was to continue to suppress it! Little else transpired! A little activity soon on the part of the Anti-opium Societies could get this stopped in time to permit of grains being planted and food raised this year. On another occasion I was asked if I was not making a map, and again if I was the same foreigner who was there some months ago "peddling" Russian blankets.

The Russian refugees have penetrated even to this out of the way place, and just before I left two appeared in the streets with blankets and woolen materials on their backs for sale. Some thirty Russian soldiers were observed by an English Missionary mounted on camels as part of General Hu Ching-yi's army last Autumn during the War, at P'ing Ch'uan, north of Jehol. They had an anti-aircraft gun or two for defending this place from the Mukden air attacks which were made nearly every day. A handful of Russian soldiers of the Mukden (Manchurian) Army were captured at about this time, and this English Missionary was asked to interpret for them. He referred them to General Hu's camel-corps anti-aircraft Russians, and was later told that the prisoners were enrolled and amalgamated with the latter small unit! Thus goes the prestige of the white-race - the Russians admit that they are more Asiatic than European!

At this same time that General Hu Ching-yi was in Ping Chuan, he enlisted all who had rifles, making officers of those who could bring groups of armed recruits, mostly robbers or deserters - a common practice in Manchuria when the robbers become too troublesome. Hu was a friend of the former Military Governor Mi, of Jehol, and the latter has taken many of his old fashioned I Chun (troops) to Honan to join General Hu. The troops of both Mi and Hu left very bad reputations in Jehol, as being persecutors of the people.

Many of the old fashioned I Chun soldiers have been absorbed in the newly organised "First Division of the Jehol Army", which the Military Governor K'an has formed with himself as Division Commander and Commander-in-Chief. General K'an is said to have about a Brigade of Manchurian soldiers whom he brought with him, and has now divided into the two Brigades which at present are said to form the new Division. To them have been added old I Chun soldiers, whose blue uniforms may frequently be seen among the newer fashioned grey, and he is also recruiting country boys to fill up the ranks.

The Commander of the First Brigade, General Yuan Yung-Hsiang, makes his headquarters at Chih Feng, in the north of the Jehol District. The headquarters of General Liu Yang-Kao who commands the Second Brigade are at Jehol. Each Brigade is said to comprise three Regiments, and each Regiment three battalions, but the organisation is far from exact, and units of both these Brigades are scattered about the District in apparent confusion, though possibly to give the effect of greater numbers. The first and second Regiments of the Second Brigade, Colonels Feng and Kau, are stationed at Jehol, with about five Battalions of troops actually quartered there.

A few of the Manchurian soldiers talked with have a pretty good appearance. One said he though there must be more fighting sooner or later because the enmity between General Chang Tso-lin and Feng Hu-Hsiang was "too deep" to avoid it. He said Feng's soldiers were very good, however! Most were frank in expressing their dissatisfaction at having their pay much in arrears, poor food, poor leadership and treatment. They said that the fighting was merely for the personal ambitions of their leaders, not for any public interest, that all the officers above the rank of captain were becoming rich from the money "squeezed" from the soldiers pay and from the people! They talked of the numerous desertions, and the close guard kept at the barracks at night to prevent it, etc.

An interesting incident is the activity of a General TSan, formerly under the Chahar (Kalgan) Military Governor Chang, who has not accepted General Feng Yu-Hsiang's authority but has withdrawn north with his troops to the region of Dolonor and appears now to be bargaining with the Kalgan and Jehol Governors, to secure his new position in future. Some of the Jehol troops with some artillery are said to be moving northwest to Tsui Tze Shan, toward Dolonor, nominally to suppress the brigands but possibly to prevent any incursion of this General TIan's independent troops.

There is a rumour current at Jehol, that the Military Governor K'an is to be transferred as Military Governor of Heilungchiang Province in North Manchuria, and that General Wan who commanded the troops from that Province (Heilungchiang) which helped to occupy Jehol last Autumn, is selected to succeed him as Governor of Jehol.

A general feeling of uncertainty and uneasiness prevails in Jehol, as elsewhere in China, but I could see no indications of or preparations for approaching hostilities in that quarter. The extreme poverty of the country, the fewness and difficult nature of the mountainous roads, and the poor quality of the troops at present there, would make troop movements on a large scale slow and difficult, and anything in the nature of a surprise attack could scarcely be executed.

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4-1 1926 2009-164

G-2 Report 3790

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Chinese Personalities.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. FEB 11 1926

Name: Sun Chuan-fang.

Title: Marshal. Tupan of Chekiang Province and now (1926) in military control of Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhui, Kiangsi and Fukien.

Birthplace: Shantung.

Date of Birth: About 1884.

Languages and Dialects: Mandarin and southern dialect.

Political Party or Group: Anfu Party.

Historical Sketch: See page 1269, China Year Book, 1925.

Attitude towards America: Friendly. No known prejudices against any foreigners except as noted below in the case of Soviets.

Estimate of Character:

2009-164

1. The following remarks are taken from Despatch No. 3625, Dec. 19, 1925, to the Department of State from the Consul General, Shanghai:

"He is a young man of forty years, small in stature with a perfectly straight but slight figure .... a penetrating eye .... His entire make-up is attractive to an unusual degree.... A man of action.... an officer of reasonably sound judgment.... Today is regarded by Chinese and foreigners as the man of the hour in this part (Shanghai) of China and the most likely person who has appeared on the horizon for some years.... His military ascendancy has united under one head the control of Kiangsu and Chekiang, the two wealthiest provinces of China and the port at Shanghai, through which passes 43% of the trade of the country. In calling upon the principal foreign consular offices in Shanghai, Sun has attacked bolshevism, stating that he would punish by death any persons carrying on bolshevik propaganda or who were inciting strikes in the community. He left Shanghai December 17th, and just before leaving, as if to emphasize his anti-bolshevik remarks, caused the execution of Liu Hua, one of the most notorious labor leaders and strike instigators that Shanghai has had."

2. The Consul General comments upon the wonderful march made by the troops under Sun Chuan-fang in the southern part of Chekiang on September 18, 1924, terminating at Hanchow September 26th, in which his army of 5,000 men marched thirty miles per day, and the fact that with only one day's delay thereafter he proceeded to Sungkiang and participated in the fighting which resulted in the defeat of Lu Yung-hsiang.

3. In commenting upon Sun Chuan-fang the late Roy Anderson spoke of him as a man of much ability but a consummate rascal. It is to be recalled that in February, 1925, he deserted his then ally, Chi Hsieh-yuan, on the field of battle, throwing in his lot with Chang Tsung-chang. Chang's failure to sufficiently reward Sun for this act of treachery to his chief no doubt was mainly responsible for the recent hostilities which Sun initiated against Chang Tsung-chang.

From M/A, China. Report No. 5738 January 11, 1926.

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WAR DEPARTMENT

No. 3634

AMERICAN CONSULAR SERVICE

American Consulate-General,
Shanghai, China, December 19, 1925.

Subject: Sun Chuan-fang.
Visit to Shanghai, December 15th and 16th.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,

WASHINGTON.

Sir:

Marshal Sun Chuan-fang, Tupan of Chekiang Province and in military control of Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei, Kiangsi and Fukien, visited Shanghai for the first time on the 15th and 16th of December except for those occasions when, in transit, he spent less than two hours at the railway station. His meteoric ascendancy to power in this part of China has been a spectacle which has interested both foreigners and Chinese, therefore his visit was looked forward to with more than the usual interest.

All remember that wonderful march from the southern part of Chekiang Province, which started on September 18th and was concluded on September 26th at Hangchow, averaging over thirty miles per day with his army of five thousand men. We remember that with but one day's delay he immediately proceeded to Sungkiang and completed the victory which he had gained over Marshal Lu Yung-hsiang, at that time Tupan of Chekiang Province. We remember more recently his spectacular

declaration

Article by Sun Chuan-fang 2-1

declaration of war and quick movement of troops from Sungkiang to Shanghai, thence to Nanking and north to Hsuchowfu, driving before him the Fengtien forces until they were expelled from this province. His career during the last three years has been brilliant, it has contained many surprises, and it has confirmed in the minds of many that he is an officer who retains his own counsel to a remarkable degree and that he is a man of action. He is a young man of but forty years of age, small in stature, with a perfectly straight but slight figure. He has an eye that is as penetrating as a human eye can be. It has an expression of pleasure except at rare intervals when he takes on a puzzled appearance of deep thought, and his entire make-up is attractive to an unusual degree. He is a man of action without question and it is believed that he is an officer of reasonably sound judgment. He is the man of the hour in this part of China, and though tomorrow might see him superseded, today he is regarded by Chinese and foreigners as the most likely person who has appeared on the horizon in this section of the country for many years.

His military ascendancy has united under one hand the control of Kiangsu and Chekiang, the two wealthiest provinces of China, including the control of the port of Shanghai through which passes forty-three per cent of the trade of the country. It has given him the power to suppress or encourage the smuggling of illicit articles such as opium and other narcotics, arms and ammunition. In the past the former have been a source of considerable revenue to military officers who have been in control of this district, and whether he intends to make use of this illicit trade as a source of revenue is a

question

which interests many. It is hardly possible that he will make any change in this respect, although it is hoped that he may. He has made no announcements of a character which might guide one in any way in connection with this question.

During his stay in Shanghai he was the guest of honor at a dinner given on the 15th by the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, when all foreign and Chinese officials of importance were invited to meet him. He was the guest of honor on the 16th at a reception given by the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce and sixteen other organizations. On the night of the 16th a dinner was given in his honor by Mr. Fu Siao-en, a well known banker and shipping man of Shanghai. He is one of the Managing Directors of the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company. At none of these functions did Marshal Sun make an address except at the reception given by the various Chinese organizations. There is enclosed a copy of the address delivered on that occasion, as published in the NORTH CHINA
1/ DAILY NEWS (British) of December 17, 1925, believing it to be of possible interest. There is also enclosed an editorial
2/ appearing in THE SHANGHAI TIMES (British with Japanese sympathy) of December 18, 1925, under the title: "Real Sincerity," which comments upon the address.

During his stay on the 16th Marshal Sun called upon the principal foreign consular officers. He was very voluble and led the conversation in most instances. When calling upon me he exhausted the usual comments in regard to the two countries being great republics and the long existing friendship between them. He immediately thereafter began an attack upon Bolshevism which had the appearance of sincerity. He followed the same procedure in other Consulates-General. He was very

emphatic

emphatic in stating that he would punish by death any persons who were carrying on Bolshevik propaganda or who were inciting strikes in the community. During his calls his text was anti-Bolshevism. In his address before the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce and other organizations his text was anti-Bolshevism and his desire to be the representative of the people and establish a good government in the provinces which he controls. Of course there was much said which may be regarded as only oratorical, but the fact that on every occasion he emphasized his anti-Bolshevistic ideas leads one to hope that he will do something to counteract the rapidly increasing Bolshevik propaganda. It may be stated that he created in the minds of both Chinese and foreigners a very favorable impression. The future alone can determine his sincerity and his ability to carry out his doctrines.

One statement that is of possible interest was to the effect that he had despatched a telegram to Marshal Feng Yu-hsiang informing him that he had been accused of Bolshevistic tendencies and making a direct inquiry as to whether or not this accusation was true. He informed Marshal Feng that if it were true he must be regarded as his enemy, but if the contrary were true then they might be able to work together for the good of China. He also informed Feng that he should announce to the world his true position and that in the event he failed to do so, he would publish the correspondence.

Marshal Sun left Shanghai on the morning of December 17th and just before midnight, as if to emphasize his remarks.

Liu

Liu Hua (劉華), one of the most notorious labor leaders and strike instigators that Shanghai has had, was executed in the Chinese City.

It is a new policy for Chinese officials to desire to carry out the will of the people, but Marshal Sun has strengthened his statement that this is his wish by proceeding, en route to Nanking, to call at Nantungchow to see that very influential and well known Chinese, Chang Chien (張謇), who has become known as the model city builder due to the many reforms which he has instituted at Nantungchow.

These are instances which may be merely the result of chance but they have made an impression on the minds of some people. I have the honor to transmit the foregoing together with the enclosures as of possible interest to the Department and the Legation.

I have the honor to be,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,

Edwin S. Cunningham
American Consul-General

800
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In quintuplicate.
Copy to Legation.

Enclosures:
1/- News item from North China Daily News of December 17, 1925.
2/- Editorial from Shanghai Times of December 18, 1925.

G-2 Report

4-1 2009-166 6180

WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Armed Forces of the Kuomintang in Kwangtung.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. MAR 30 1926

1. The strength of these forces is estimated at about 200,000 men. Those under command of General Chiang Chang-cheng (Cheung Kai-shek), numbering some 60,000, are said to be communists in principle. The remainder of the forces are mercenaries. Probably half the number are good fighting men, the remainder being deficient in morale and equipment.

Organization	Commander	Location	Remarks
1st Army Corps	CHIANG CHANG-CHENG	-	Consisting of 6 Divs.
1st Division	Ho Ying-ch'in	Chao-chow, Swatow.	Ho is a schoolmate and a fellow-countryman of Chiang Chang-cheng.
2nd "	Wang Mou-kung	Canton	Chiang Chang-cheng's guards.
3rd "	Teng Shu-ch'ing	Mei Hsien	
1st Instructed Division	Wang Po-ling	Canton	Mostly Cantonese.
2nd "	Hu Yi-ch'ien	-	Mostly Chechiang men.
1st Independent Division	Feng Yi-fei	Chao-chow, Mei Hsien	
2nd Army Corps	T'AN YEN-K'AI	Shao-chow.	Hunanese troops.
1st Division	Lu Ti-p'ing	Nan-hsuing	Under strength.
2nd "	Ch'en Chia-yu	Pei-chiang	Under strength.
3rd "	Ts'ai Chu-yu	"	Some 10,000 men.
4th "	T'an Tao-yuan	Nan-hsiung	Under strength.
5th "	Tai Yueh	Shao-kuan	
6th "	Chang Hui-tsan	Border of Kuangtung & Chianghsi	
3rd Army Corps	CHU PEI-TE	Ch'ing-yuan	Yunnanese.
7th Division	Wang Chun	Hua Hsien	Under strength.
8th "	Chu Shih-kuei	Canton-Hankow Railway "	
9th "	-	-	Not yet formed.

From M/A, China Report No, 5762 February 18, 1926

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Armed Forces of the Kuomintang in Kwangtung.

Organization	Commander	Location	Remarks
4th Army Corps	LI CHI-SHEN	Chao-ch'ing	Kuanghsi men.
10th Division	Ch'en Ming-shu	Ch'in-chow, Lien-chow	Ch'en is a young Communist.
11th "	Ch'en Chi-t'ang	Kao-chow, Lei-chow	
12th "	Ch'en K'o-yu	Chao-ch'ing.	
(N.B. 13th Division . Nil.)			
5th Army Corps	LI FU-LIN	Nan-hai	Old native forces of little fighting value.
14th Division	Ch'en Ping-chang	Nan-hai, Shunte.	
15th "	Li Ch'un	"	
6th Army Corps	CH'ENG CH'IEN	Pei-chiang.	
16th Division	Yang Yuan-chun	"	
17th "	Wu T'ieh-ch'eng	Chao-chow, Mei Hsien	Also called Ching Wei Chun (Precautional Guard)
Miscellaneous Troops			
1 Division of the South District	Ch'en Chang-fu	Yang-chiang	Formerly General Wei Pang-p'ing's troops, collected and reorganized by Gen. Li Chi-shen (Cmdg.4th Army Corps) 1925.
Chao Mei Chun (or Chao-chow and Mei Hsien troops)	Li Yi	Chao-chow & Mei Hsien (E. Province)	Formerly Ch'en Chiung-ming's troops under cmdr. Wang T'eng-hui, went over to the Kuomintang army recently.
Kuanghsi Troops	Lin Chun-t'ing	Ch'in-chow	Old Kuanghsi native troops Joining Kuomintang Army during operations against Teng Pen-yin in the South of the Province.
Kuanghsi Troops	Yu Tso=pai	Kao-chow	Sent to subdue Teng Pen-yin by Li Tsung-jen (Military Gov. of Kuanghsi) by order of Canton Govt. 1925
Fuchien Troops	Chang Chen	Fuchien border	The "Min Chun" or People's Army of Fuchien joined the Kuomintang Army when Chiang Chung-cheng was in Swatow (Nov. 1925).

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WAR DEPARTMENT 31

G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Military Forces in Kwangtung.

2009-166
RECEIVED G/2 W.D./ APR 23 1926

1. The following changes in the Kwangtung military forces should be added to my Report No. 5762 on the same subject.

2. Owing to the incorperation of defeated white units in the Kuomintang forces, the former three unit system is not being strictly adhered to, and some divisions now have four regiments instead of the original three regiments of three battalions each. Again some divisions that were under strength have been absorbed into others and renumbered.

3. The total strength of the Kwangtung forces appears to remain at 200,000.

Unit	Commander	Remarks
1st Army	HO YING-CHIN	In place of Chiang Chung-cheng, who resigned recently, and has been appointed by the Canton Government as Director-General of the Kuangtung Army.
1st Division	"	Consisting of 4 Infantry Regiments 1 Reserve Regiment 1 Artillery Battalion 1 Machine Gun "
2nd "	Feng Yi-P'ei	Consisting of 3 Infantry Regiments 1 Artillery Battalion 1 Machine Gun "
3rd "	T'an Shu-ch'ing	Consisting of 4 Infantry Regiments 1 Reserve Regiment 1 Artillery Battalion 1 Machine Gun "
2nd Army	T'AN YEN-K'AI	
4th Division	Tai Yueh	Consisting of 4 Infantry Regiments 1 Artillery Battalion 1 Machine Gun "
5th "	T'an Tao-yuan	Consisting of 4 Infantry Regiments 1 Artillery Battalion 1 Machine Gun "
6th "	Chang Hui-tsan	Consisting of 4 Infantry Regiments 1 Artillery Battalion 1 Machine Gun " 1 Independent " 1 "Instructed" Regiment of the 2nd Army.
3rd Army	CHU PEI-TE	
7th Division	Wang Chun	Consisting of 3 Infantry Regiments 1 Artillery Battalion 1 Machine Gun "

From M/A, China Report No. 5800 March 16, 1926

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Military Forces in Kwangtung.

Unit	Commander	Remarks
8th Division	Chu Shih-kuei	Consisting of 3 Infantry Regiments 1 Artillery Battalion 1 Machine Gun "
9th "	--	Consisting of 3 Infantry Regiments 1 Artillery Battalion 1 Machine Gun " 1 "Officers Company" 1 "Instructed" Regt.
4th Army	LI CHI-SHEN	
10th Division	Ch'en Ming-shu	Consisting of 4 Infantry Regiments 1 Artillery Battalion 1 Machine Gun "
11th "	Ch'en Chi-t'ang	"
12th "	Ch'en K'o-yu	"
2nd Division of the South District.	Ch'en Chang-fu	This Division was formerly anti-Sun Yat-sen, surrendered to Gen. Li Chi-shen in 1925 and is now joined to this Army, consisting of 3 Inf. Regts. only.
5th Army	LI FU-LIN	
18th Division	Li Ch'un	Consisting of 3 Infantry Regiments 1 Artillery Battalion 1 Machine Gun "
14th "	Ch'en Ping-chang	"
15th "	--	"
6th Army	CHENG CHIEN	
16th Division	Yang Yuan-chun	Consisting of 3 Infantry Regiments 1 Artillery Battalion L Machine Gun "
17th "	Wu T'ieh-ch'eng	"
18th "	Hu Ch'ien	"
Additional Formations		
1st "Instructed" Div.	Wang Po-ling	This Division, consisting of 3 Inf. Regts., is under direct control of the Military School at Whampoa.
2nd " "	Liu Chih	This Division was organized recently, consisting of 4 Infantry Regiments, 1 Artillery Battalion and 1 Machine Gun Battalion.
3 Student Regiments of the Military School, Whampoa.		
1st Regiment	--	
2nd "	Li Yuan-yu	
3rd "	Chang Chih-chung	

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The aftermath of war. A stray bullet found this soldier as he sat behind the lines eating his ration of dry bread and basking in the clear sunshine of an autumn day.

THE CHINESE ARMY

CONSIDERED AS A

MILITARY FORCE

BY

LAWRENCE IMPEY.

(ILLUSTRATED WITH PHOTOGRAPHS
TAKEN BY THE AUTHOR.)

1925

Tientsin Press Limited, 181 Victoria Road, Tientsin.

MARSHAL CHANG TSO-LIN.



MARSHAL WU PEI-FU.

THE CHINESE ARMY
CONSIDERED AS A
MILITARY FORCE!!

BY

LAWRENCE IMPEY.

Recent events throughout China seem to indicate that sooner or later there will be a definite clash between the military forces of the Republic and the armies of some foreign Power or Powers. This struggle appears to be inevitable not so much from animosities existing between the Chinese and any alien race as from the ultimate force of economic conditions, which, unless some measure of birth control comes into play, will compel an over-populated East to wage an economic war upon the commercialised West. Granting this premise, it is of the utmost interest to gather together what data is available on the military forces of China, and from this to obtain some idea of their strength and the probable outcome of any conflict with a foreign Power or Powers.

Such an estimate can best be derived from a consideration of the civil war of 1924 between Marshals Chang Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fu, leading the Fengtien and Chihli forces respectively, and as the writer was attached to Marshal Wu Pei-fu's Staff Headquarters during the whole struggle in the capacity of special war correspondent he ventures to examine below the conditions existing in and the efficiency of the Chinese army as it appeared to him during this interesting period. In this connection it is particularly necessary to remember that the war was in reality the first genuine test to which the bulk of the army had been subjected, from the point of view of the military standards of other nations, for the other civil war of 1922 was so brief and one combatant party so inefficient that no judgment as to the real value of a Chinese fighting unit could be formed. The only opinion regarding that struggle which has remained in the writer's mind after the lapse of three years is to the effect that the quality of the troops of General Feng Yu-hsiang was in the main responsible for the defeat of Marshal Chang Tso-lin and the unexpectedly sudden victory of Wu Pei-fu, though it must be admitted that the strategy of the campaign with its night march and flank attack was formulated by Marshal Wu and that much of the credit is therefore due to him. It is unfortunate that the recent struggle has afforded no opportunity of proving or disproving the excellence of General Feng Yu-hsiang's soldiers, for beyond a route march to the Jehol area at the beginning

TOP : Some of the 14th Division who were pretty seasick.
CENTRE : The soldiers of the famous "Christian General" capture Tientsin station with a rush after the final retreat of Wu Pei-fu.
BOTTOM : A commissariat train going up to the front line with supplies of flour, bread being the staple food of the soldiers in action.

of the war and the spectacular coup d'etat by which Peking was seized on October 23rd and the government of the Chihli party overthrown, these divisions had practically nothing to do with the conduct of the war in the sense of military conflict. It must seem somewhat extraordinary to the ordinary observer that an army composed of some of the best troops in China could thus remain inactive during the whole of a campaign, but it may be pointed out in this connection that the conditions prevailing in the Chinese Republic at the present time are such as obtain in no other country in the world, politics being intermingled with and influencing military strategy to an extent which is almost unbelievable elsewhere.

For example, it is difficult to comprehend why Marshal Wu Pei-fu allowed General Feng Yu-hsiang to remain in command of the army destined for the Jehol front, when he must have realised by his attitude at the previous Cabinet councils in Peking that his loyalty was uncertain, unless one recognises the complexity of the political influences that were operating behind the scenes, and which not only kept Feng in his post as generalissimo of an important sector but also enabled him to take with him a far greater proportion of heavy artillery and ammunition than was necessary for the mountain regions in which his troops were supposed to operate. Furthermore, the Christian General also received an aviation force which was practically useless, terrain suitable for aerodromes being almost undiscoverable in the Jehol area, while the nature of the enemy positions rendered both observation and bombing flights extremely difficult.

One cannot believe that Marshal Wu Pei-fu, for he is admittedly a capable general, would begin his campaign with an error of this magnitude and follow it up with such a blunder as the appointment of Tsao Ying to command the 26th Division at Shanhaikwan, unless the strongest political influences had been brought to bear upon him. When these two fatal mistakes are considered from a strategic point of view it is difficult to decide which was the more important of them, but after considerable reflection the writer is inclined to favour the latter, on the grounds that the loss of the Chiu Men passes by the 26th Division under Tsao Ying led to the partial collapse of the initial campaign, secure in the knowledge of which General Feng was emboldened to attempt his coup d'etat.

From a military viewpoint the Chiu Men disaster is almost incomprehensible, for anyone who has visited the spot will recognise that it is a position which is so strong as to be practically impregnable as long as the defending force's ammunition holds out, and the only satisfactory reason which has been advanced for the loss of the passes is based on a peculiarity in the formation of the Chinese army which is worthy of particular attention. The Chinese, whether he be soldier or bandit, is capable of the strongest sense of loyalty to some one



TOP: A Chihli battery engaging enemy gun firing from behind the hills in the distance, later in the day the gun crew were put out of action.

CENTRE: The reserves are forced to get to cover as a machine gun opens on them from the hill in the background.

BOTTOM: Bringing up reinforcements and ammunition to the advancing line.

leader, and if this commander be removed for one reason or another, the unit which he has controlled is slow to transfer its allegiance to a newcomer. This factor is said to have been the decisive one in the fight for Chiu Men, for a general of brigade in the Chihli defensive troops was superseded, with the result that the unit which he had commanded refused at the critical moment to obey the orders of a new officer, and this defection appears to have caused a panicstricken retreat on the part of the whole 26th Division. It was the more regrettable that this defeat occurred when it did from the fact that Marshal Wu Pei-fu had not yet arrived at Chinwangtao, for the writer is of the opinion that had the Generalissimo been present at headquarters he would undoubtedly have devised some means to speedily restore the situation, which as it was, became graver from day to day and ultimately proved to be the turning point of the whole campaign on the Shanhaikwan front. The writer accompanied Marshal Wu's special train when it left Peking on October 11th, and was with it until the war was concluded by Wu Pei-fu's flight from Tientsin on November 3rd, so that he had ample opportunity to observe the troops composing the Chihli army in all the stages of their advance and retreat. For the purpose of estimating the practical military value of these as efficient fighting units it seems best to classify them under the headings of the different branches of the service, and to consider each separately before judging them as a coordinated whole.

INFANTRY.

The rank and file of Wu Pei-fu's troops varied very greatly both from the point of view of physical fitness and military training, and from the quality of their morale and their steadfastness in adversity. If one considers at one end of the scale the 26th Division under Tsao Ying, which was not only badly led by an incompetent officer but was also ill-disciplined and poorly drilled in all those functions which go to make up a first class fighting unit, one will probably contrast it with the highly efficient 3rd Division, its complete antithesis. The 3rd Division had had the good fortune to be under Wu Pei-fu's personal supervision for some time, and with the 14th and 24th was considered the best body of troops at his command, so that it was particularly significant to find all three divisions located on the Shihmenchai front by October 18th. They were unfortunate in that they were being used as emergency troops in an endeavour to restore a most threatening situation, for the incompetency and cowardice of the 26th Division was really responsible for the extremely difficult task with which they were confronted. The Fengtien troops

TOP: A gun crew that was hit by shrapnel just before the writer reached the scene.

BOTTOM: The only field telephone that the writer saw in action with a gun, and even then the officer in command was missing.

had pushed through the Chiu Men pass so rapidly after its unexpected capture as to reach Shihmenchai before Marshal Wu was informed as to the situation, and by the time that he reached Chinwangtao Chang Tso-lin's troops had completed their southward march from Chiu Men and were facing east on the immediate flank of the Chihli line of communications. This had created a threat to the strategy of the campaign which rendered any advance at Shanhaikwan both unlikely and dangerous until the Chiu Men position could be regained, and it was towards that end that Wu Pei-fu directed all his energies immediately on his arrival at the field headquarters at Chinwangtao. It was interesting to note that the Generalissimo realised the position almost immediately the staff train reached Shanhaikwan, for whereas it had proceeded through Chinwangtao without a stop, as soon as Wu Pei-fu had conversed with his generals for ten minutes at Shanhaikwan he appreciated that the first-named station was the real railhead, and the whole headquarters returned there almost without delay. The Fengtien troops were then distant from Chinwangtao some fifteen or sixteen miles according to most estimates, and were already threatening to debouch into the plain through which the Peking-Mukden Railway runs, so that the task which was demanded of the counter-attacking force, composed of parts of the 3rd, 14th and 24th Divisions, was no easy one. The Fengtien guns already occupied the high ground and vantage points available, while their infantry had had time to consolidate their positions, so that direct frontal attack upon them was the only method availing under these conditions. The terrain is composed of undulating foothills sloping up towards the passes through the main range of hills both north and west, and excellent cover is therefore afforded for the movement of troops, as well by the hills as by the small watercourses that intersect the countryside. Besides the usual river beds the watercourses present another feature which is perhaps worthy of more particular notice, though none of the Chihli staff officers appear to have appreciated its possible value from a military point of view. The heavy rains which pour down from the hills in the months of July and August have cut for themselves special channels which of course eventually drain into the larger river beds, and those channels are six to ten feet in depth and from four to fifteen feet wide at the top. As many of them ran in the direction of the Fengtien lines it would seem that they might have been used to considerable advantage, for not only did they afford admirable cover against machine gun and artillery fire for troops in rest, but they seemed entirely suited as a means whereby to mass an unexpected attack against any particular portion of the line. To illustrate the writer's meaning it is only necessary to mention that on one occasion he himself wandered by mistake to a point where by looking out of



TOP: How the artillery arrived at Chinwangtao, after nearly wrecking the transport and the troops which accompanied it.

BOTTOM: The International Train bringing away some refugees. Although this was not one of its functions it often did such services thanks to the good nature of the officers in command.

one of these watercourses he could observe the working of a Fengtien machine gun at fairly close range.

Such an occurrence is obviously only possible where contact between the units of either side is very loosely maintained, and in the writer's opinion this fact was one of the most dangerous features in the tactics of both armies on the Shihmenchai sector. If any observant commander had utilised the opportunity and pushed skilled machine gunners through the gaps thus afforded, with orders that they were to decimate the enemy's rear and lines of communication, it is not too much to suppose that a panic would have ensued. Apparently this point was appreciated on the Shanhaikwan sector, for liason there was maintained pretty closely, while searchlights were used at night to observe the movements of the infantry; though of course it is possible that this was merely chance and that the better tactics employed were due purely to the restricted front on which operations could be conducted. To return to a consideration of the infantry themselves, both in action and out. The first point that strikes the onlooker, whether at the base or at the front, is the general shortage of officers when any practical work is being done. If it is a conference or a parade the whole ground is cumbered with officers of all grades, all equally excited and all equally inefficient, but when it comes to handling a food convoy, an ammunition train, a battalion passing up the lines of communication, or a battery in action the officers are usually noticeable by their absence. The work seems to be carried out either by the sergeants and corporals or by a peculiar system of common consent on the part of the rank and file, which it must be admitted works very well on some occasions. The writer recalls two or three instances when he watched a "ying" of the 14th division going forward under both artillery and machine gun fire and was unable to locate a single officer in command, though the soldiers advanced with perfect coolness and seemed to have a good understanding of what they were intended to do. As a matter of fact the conduct of the 3rd, 14th and 24th divisions under fire was admirable on the occasions referred to, and proved that if the Chinese soldier is well trained and has confidence in the leader for whom he is fighting, he makes an excellent military unit. For example, these three divisions on the Shihmenchai front did push back a considerably superior force for some distance, and until the coup d'etat in Peking wrecked the whole campaign it seemed more than likely that they would eventually succeed in regaining the Chiu Men Pass. The bitter character of the fighting here was particularly noticeable during the night engagements of the 18th and 19th of October, the writer meeting a steady stream of casualties coming back from Shihmenchai on the days following these engagements. The struggle was of a hand to hand character quite dissimilar to anything experienced in the campaign



TOP : A machine gun crew just going into the firing line near Shih-menchai.

BOTTOM : The line extends to the flank under cover and eventually succeeds in silencing the machine gun fire which is galling it.

of 1922, and the writer noticed on the field a large number of rifles with broken butts and twisted barrels indicative of the bitter nature of the fight. The bulk of the casualties during the period, and they appeared to amount to about twenty per cent of the forces engaged, were bayonet wounds, bullet wounds, or machine gun wounds, the artillery seeming to have been comparatively harmless in its effects. As a matter of fact the estimate formed by the writer as to the value of the opposing troops was to the effect that the Fengtien soldiers were the better equipped and generalled, but that the three divisions of Chihli troops already referred to were fully their equal in actual conflict, this opinion being born out by the fluctuating nature of the struggle on the Shihmenchai front, which lasted until the collapse in Peking broke up the plan of campaign. After this occurred the morale of most of the troops suffered greatly, though the 3rd division appears to have maintained some semblance of discipline up to the end, being fortunate in that it had a few officers of a different calibre to the majority, these few staying with their men through good and ill luck alike. As a contrast to these one may remember either the 26th division already referred to, or some of the Shensi troops who were defeated near Shanhaikwan, defeated again at Lanchowfu, and finally sent away from Tientsin by Wu Pei-fu on the night of November 1st because he feared they might either loot the city or turn traitor and endeavour to seize him for the reward that had been offered for his head by Feng Yu-hsiang. All the Shensi soldiers which the writer has had the opportunity to see have been brigands pure and simple, with no military discipline worth considering, and with little or no sense of loyalty or fighting spirit, though it is of course possible that time and training might eventually make real soldiers out of them. The one point of interest in regard to the infantry in the recent war is what is the comparative value of Feng Yu-hsiang's 11th Division and say the 3rd Division under Wu Pei-fu, and secondly how would either of these units compare with a Division of good quality chosen from any foreign army. Judging from the performance of the 11th division in the Civil War of 1922 the writer would imagine that these troops are better than any other unit in the Chinese Army at the present time, their discipline and training being far superior to any he has seen elsewhere, but if it were to be tested in a conflict between the 3rd and the 11th the former would probably win if it had the personal direction of Wu Pei-fu to help it, for Feng Yu-hsiang is more of a fighter in a subordinate position than a strategic leader of men. If either of these units were to be matched with a foreign division the result would not be in doubt for one moment, for the writer estimates that the superior individual training, the good discipline, the quality of the officers, and the greater tactical skill shown would render any good overseas division equal to at least two and possibly three Chinese ones.



TOP : A field gun showing the insufficient dug outs constructed for the crew. really only serving as camouflage in case of aeroplanes.

BOTTOM : One of half a dozen Citroen armoured motors which went up to Chinwangtao and came back to Tientsin without being used. Since this photo was taken Marshal Chang Tso-lin has secured delivery of a number of French tanks of Schneider and Renault manufacture.

CAVALRY.

Not much can be said as to the use of cavalry in China, for during the recent war it was employed but little on the fronts under the writer's notice, and when it did come into action its composition was in reality rather that of mounted infantry than cavalry as foreign nations understand the term. On one occasion a body of Fengtien mounted infantry or cavalry did break through the Chihli line near Shihmenchai, and wandered about for several hours to the rear of Hsiao Pu Lo, but the officer in command was either ignorant of his duties or incapable of quick decision for practically nothing was achieved, and in a few hours the two or three hundred men composing the force were either driven out or captured, a striking commentary on the incapability of both sides. On the other hand if every soldier who rode a horse were to be considered as included in the ranks of the cavalry, the part played by that arm of the service would be very greatly increased, for on the Shihmenchai front alone there was a steady stream of mounted men proceeding in the direction of the front line armed with the usual infantry rifle.

As a matter of fact the recent war was particularly unsuited to the use of cavalry for two reasons, the first being the static nature of the fighting on the Shanhaikwan and Shihmenchai fronts, and the second the difficulty of finding sufficient forage for the horses in the mountainous region north of Jehol in which the armies of Feng Yu-hsiang and Wang Chen-ping were supposed to operate. But in certain imaginable circumstances the Chinese "mounted infantry," as one would prefer to call them, might prove to be of considerable importance in the course of a campaign, for they are by no means bad riders, their horses are hardy, and their ability to adapt themselves to circumstances would greatly increase the mobility of the force with which they were operating.

ARTILLERY.

The understanding and use of field artillery has surprisingly increased since the civil war of 1922, for both sides then displayed a most lamentable ignorance of the first principles of gunnery. During this last war, it is true, the results obtained by both sides were by no means commensurate with the ammunition expended, but nevertheless the ranging and siting of the guns was so much improved as to lead one to believe that in the next struggle the artillery will play a very prominent role. It was noticeable, however, that whoever was responsible for the training of the officers on either side had not succeeded in educating them to a full understanding of the uses of their branch of the service, for several ludicrous errors were to be observed.



TOP : Farmers from the vicinity of Chinwangtao press ganged as munition carriers to the firing line, and the officer commanding them. Unfortunately many of these poor fellows were killed on the job by enemy gunfire.

BOTTOM : A battery disguised in a field of kaoliang stalks, and partially screened by the same.

To quote an example from personal experience, the writer found that the guns supporting the 3rd and 14th divisions of Wu Pei-fu's army near Shihmenchai were in the main excellently located as far as cover went, usually being camouflaged between grave mounds or behind a screen of kaoliang. On the other hand there was no adequate protection for the gunners from counter battery work, and two or three times on the 18th and 19th of October the crews were wounded by shrapnel, for the men had apparently not been taught to take advantage of the light dug-outs which in many cases they possessed. Then again, the system of control appeared to be inefficient, for although on one or two batteries the writer was able to discover field telephones, the use of these seemed to be the exception rather than the rule, while the forward observation of the firing was practically non-existent. Verbal messages were passed back to the gunners from the infantry they were supporting, and in many cases the range was then corrected by some non-commissioned officer in charge of the gun, the battery officer apparently residing at a safe distance in the rear. Discipline was extremely lax too, the ammunition being strewn about the ground in a most slovenly and careless manner, fuses lying in the dirt and shell cases impeding the satisfactory working of the guns, while the crew were permitted to wander about in the vicinity while the battery was supposedly in action in a way that was calculated to draw aeroplane attention to the gun position at once. With regard to the shelling of the Fengtien artillery, the points that struck the writer were three. Firstly, they made a great mistake in using high explosive against infantry advancing in open order instead of employing the far more efficacious shrapnel. Secondly, they wasted thousands of rounds of shrapnel in shelling villages whose ranges they had doubtless obtained from the map, but in which, even supposing they were occupied, the troops could obtain ample shelter behind walls and buildings. The writer was in Hsiao Pu Lo, the field headquarters of General Peng Tso-hsin at the time, on three occasions when enemy shells were bursting overhead, but the shrapnel was comparatively innocuous, whereas if high explosive had been used not only would the casualties have been very high but enormous damage would have been caused by the explosion of ammunition dumps, of which the village was full. The third, and possibly most important point of all, was that on nearly every occasion when the writer was observing the Fengtien fire the shells were bursting too high. For some reason or other the gunners seemed able to correct the range satisfactorily as far as the time fuse was concerned but at the same time to have no idea as to the necessity for lowering their trajectory. Several times shrapnel burst right over troops which were under observation with practically no results, all the force of the explosion being lost when the missiles reached their objective. Many

A panorama of a machine gun crew and supporting infantry advancing on the Fengtien lines under shell fire. The enemy is located at the base of the hog back hill on the right of the picture.

hundreds of rounds of high explosive were wasted in this manner also, time fuse instead of percussion being employed, and the shell exploding harmlessly above the village or battery for which it was intended. One last fact in connection with the artillery on both sides is worth nothing, and that is that neither staff had fully understood the necessity of heavy guns for bombarding a strongly held position such as the lines at Shanhaikwan proved to be. This was particularly noticeable with regard to the Fengtien fire, for the shelling of Shanhaikwan station, which should theoretically have destroyed the place within a week, did practically no damage at all beyond alarming the Chinese civilian staff. Taken as a whole, however, the use of the artillery arm on both sides showed that partial understanding of its employment which is indicative of a vast improvement in the course of the next war, when it will probably become a highly efficient unit.

AVIATION.

This may be said to be an entirely new branch of the Chinese army, and it cannot be claimed that it is a particularly efficient one either, in spite of the large sums of money which have been expended on it. What the Chihli aeroplanes did in the way of bombing the Fengtien lines the writer has no means of telling, but they brought back practically no information as to location and movement of enemy troops, they had no equipment to enable them to photograph and thus determine the position of the enemy artillery, and having no machine gun mounted in the nacelle they were not in a position to engage the enemy bombing planes when they came over. It would be interesting to know who was responsible for this oversight, for the attachment of a timing device to enable a machine gun to fire through the revolutions of the propellor was all that was necessary, and in default of this the Fengtien planes were able to come and go at will. It is difficult to understand why they did not take fuller advantage of this, for it was noticeable that not only did they come over the lines at such a height as to render any aim for their bombs an impossibility, but that as soon as a Chihli aeroplane appeared in pursuit they promptly withdrew. On only one occasion did the writer see an aerial combat, and that was carried out with automatic pistols by the pilots of the respective machines.

The bombs used were too small to be effective, being about fourteen pounders, which are all very well for disturbing the morale of troops in camp or on the march, but which do very little real damage against rolling stock or railway tracks. When one considers that the Fengtien aeroplanes came over Chinwangtao station nearly every morning, and that all the sidings were full of troops and ammunition trains waiting to be destroyed, whereas the total casual-



LEFT TO RIGHT :

A stretcher case coming to the train at Chinwangtao, where medical comforts were noticeable by their absence. The writer did not see a surgeon all the time he was at the headquarters.

How the Chinese misjudge the possibilities of military transportation. Camp cookers, ammunition, guns, fodder and fires all on the same truck bound for Shanhaikwan.

See next page.

ties achieved amounted to some twenty men wounded and one locomotive damaged, it can be realised that Chang Tso-lin's thirty Breguet bombing aeroplanes did not give value for the money that was expended on them. As a matter of fact the staff train on which Marshal Wu Pei-fu was living was on the main line and consisted of no less than twenty five coaches, a wonderful target which the Fengtien aviators could have bombed with deadly effect from five hundred to a thousand feet up, for the only anti-aircraft gun available at the station was quite ineffective and as a matter of fact ran out of ammunition soon after it was first employed. But not only were the enemy aeroplanes averse to flying low but they also gave little thought to their methods of attack, their usual practice being to bomb the sidings and the station while flying across them at right angles, instead of passing directly down the track and thus obtaining a much bigger target. It was interesting to note the indifference of the Chinese as a whole to bombing raids, for no sooner did a bomb drop than there was a wild rush on the part of the soldiers and onlookers to secure bits of it as souvenirs. If the Fengtien staff had realised their strategic opportunity they would have sent several expeditions to try and destroy the Lanchow railway bridge, an objective easily attained from Shanhaikwan and the destruction of which would have cut off Wu Pei-fu's army from further supplies of ammunition and foodstuffs. In the opinion of the writer this failure to fly low and attack with heavy bombs showed the most striking defect in staff work of the whole war, for combined with the lack of photographic equipment it rendered the costly aviation service of both armies practically useless, for there was no evidence that the presence of aeroplanes had any effect on the morale of either the troops or the civilian population.

TRANSPORTATION.

This is perhaps the most important arm from a military point of view, for without efficient transportation the infantry must remain

A picket on duty sheltering from shrapnel behind a wall, they do not appear to be particularly worried about it however.

An officer of General Peng Tso-hsin's staff with a despatch carrier.

The first of the Fengtien prisoners being brought in after the great battle at Shihmenchai on Oct. 16th, 1924.

The wireless operator for Marshal Wu's headquarters had a busy time, as both the Japanese and the British submarine in the harbour of Chinwangtao were helping to confuse his ideas.

One of Chang Tso-lin's aviators made a bad shot for Marshal Wu's train and dropped this bomb outside the writer's compartment as he was breakfasting. It did not explode being Japanese, and placed in a pool of water made an excellent photo.

A gun just about to fire at infantry advancing from the slopes in the middle distance.

without reinforcements, the artillery without ammunition, and the whole force without food and clothing, unless they can live on the country in which they are operating. And it is in this very matter that the armies of Wu Pei-fu failed most lamentably, for they apparently quite failed to appreciate that transportation is a branch of the service which requires specialised training, and that the railway system cannot but be disorganised if every passing general or lesser officer shall dictate how and when trains are to be run. The line from Tientsin to Chinwangtao was blocked for the duration of the war to all intents and purposes, as many as two hundred trains being accumulated on the up line at one time, while the down line, which should have been used to return the empties, was practically unoccupied except when the International Train manned by foreign troops was running. There were plenty of sidings available at Chinwangtao and Shanhaikwan to handle the traffic if it had been promptly dealt with, but unfortunately it was allowed to accumulate on the main line to a almost unbelievable extent, some trains being held so long that their engines ran out of water and therefore could not be moved without great difficulty. Officers and even private soldiers appeared to believe themselves fully qualified to dictate to the station officials as to the management of the track, and even went so far on many occasions as to brutally ill-treat these unfortunate men, who if left alone would have been quite capable to handle the traffic situation. The whole of the army, when travelling on the railways, was in a desperate hurry to reach its destination, but as soon as it arrived there it seemed to be quite incapable of even the simplest operations for detraining. Hundreds of trucks which the writer noticed seemed to be employed as permanent resting places for a few soldiers whom one would have imagined had no business there, but there did not appear to be any officer detailed to round up deserters or men absent without leave, though it must be admitted that even if there had been such a person it is a little uncertain whether his orders would have been obeyed without the use of force. While considering the question of transport it is worth noting the use made of Chinwangtao harbour, quite a number of troops being brought in by sea from Tanku. This raised an interesting point of discipline, for at the moment the ships arrived Marshal Wu Pei-fu was on board the cruiser Hai Chi with the expedition to bombard Hulutao, and the reinforcements refused to disembark without an order from the Commander-in-Chief, although the situation at Shihmenchai was at the moment extremely critical. In the matter of transportation during the whole of the war the Chihli armies had decidedly the best opportunities, for not only was there the service by sea and the use of the Peking-Mukden main line, but the front at Shihmenchai was supplied by the light railway from Chinwangtao, while all the Fengtien transportation in that sector



LEFT: The headquarters wireless set at Chinwangtao, with Marshal Wu's staff train in the background. Mostly the operating was prevented by the more powerful Japanese wireless installation down near the docks.

RIGHT. The only anti-aircraft gun available, and this fired high explosive instead of shrapnel. Marshal Wu's staff train was but poorly protected by it as it ran out of ammunition the third day.

had to be handled by mules through the Chiu Men pass. Having the inner line and railway communications it should have been possible for Marshal Wu Pei-fu to shift considerable bodies of troops from one sector to another for a big attack, in the manner which gave the German armies such an advantage in the Great War of 1914, but apparently the Chihli staff officers had not studied their opportunities thus afforded. It is most surprising that while the Chinese have had plenty of opportunities in which to familiarise themselves with the use of railways during times of peace, they entirely fail to grasp their possibilities in time of war, with the result that the efficiency of the army is reduced at least thirty per cent. In the opinion of the writer, it was quite possible for Wu Pei-fu to mass such forces on the Shanhaikwan front as to enable him to break through the Fengtien lines in the second week of the war, but the absolute incompetence of the military when it came to a question of transportation entirely negatived his superiority in man-power.

COMMISSARIAT.

This branch of the service may be said to be in a way linked up with Transportation, upon which it is in reality almost entirely dependant, but at the same time it presents unrelated features such as are in all probability non-existant in any other major army, and which therefore call for more particular examination. In the first place the writer cannot remember having observed the troops of any other nation fighting continuously on rations of such a low standard

as are received by the average Chinese soldier. As a matter of fact the Chihli forces at Chinwangtao and Shanhaikwan were comparitively well fed as standards go out here, but even at that the bulk of their supplies consisted of the common steamed bread eaten by coolies all over the country, these "man t'ou" oftentimes having taken a couple of weeks en route ere reaching the front line. Added to this uninteresting diet was an uncertain issue of vegetables supplemented by indiscriminate foraging over the country-side, and in many cases which the writer observed the shortage of fuel was such that these root crops had to be eaten raw. Practically no meat was obtainable, perhaps it was not even considered as a possible ration, for on one or two occasions when the writer had a meal with some headquarters up the line it appeared that beef, mutton or pork was not on the menu of the staff either, except at Chinwangtao itself, where there was an ample supply of everything.

One is inclined to speculate whether this restricted diet does not lessen the value of the Chinese soldier as a fighting force in exactly the same way as it did that of the Japanese in the years before meat was added to his customary supply of rice and pickled vegetables.

But if this is indeed the case, and the writer is himself inclined to think so, it will certainly be some time ere Chinese military leaders appreciate the fact and reorganise their commissariat arrangements to meet the necessity; any more than they will be pursuaded to the belief that well clad and comfortably shod troops are twice as efficient as those who march to war half frozen and with their feet a mass of sores and blisters. The Fengtien equipment showed some signs of such a necessary reorganisation, presumably under Japanese pursuasion, for Marshal Chang's troops had received both an issue of winter clothing and a pair of indifferent boots, which were, however, immeasurably superior to the cloth shoes worn by the average Chinese soldier. It was a colossal blunder on the part of the Chihli leaders that their men should have been compelled to take the field thus clad in their summer clothing, for not only were the bulk of the troops from the warmer climate of the south, but they had also no overcoats or padded garments which would have been suitable for the northern frosts which they would have had to experience if the campaign had endured only another month.

As far as the actual Chinese uniform itself goes, although it is somewhat sloppy in appearance, it serves its purpose well enough with the exception of the shoes aforesaid. Why it is that in a country where rawhide is so abundant the people persist in wearing cloth shoes that are rotted in every heavy rain, the writer has never discovered, but for ordinary occasions they seem to satisfy their wearers, and it is only in the case of troops undergoing continual forced

marches that the deficiency is very noticeable. The foregoing features may be said to be the most evident weaknesses of the army commissariat, for the ramifications which make it so important a branch of any Occidental army are practically non-existant at the present time in China.

MEDICAL CORPS.

Although no Chinese general has openly stated the fact in the hearing of the writer, he has always received the impression that the Chinese are in the main entirely indifferent to the uses of the Red Cross unit, looked at from a humanitarian point of view, while they consider that as a military adjunct it is practically useless. In this attitude anyone who has seen a prolonged campaign will discover a grave error, for leaving aside the humanitarian aspect the question of treating the lightly wounded cases so as to bring them back into the line as soon as may be is of the greatest importance. If one may judge from the treatment accorded to the casualties in the Chihli army, the Chinese soldier when wounded is a permanent loss to his unit, for the dressing stations and first aid units to be seen behind the line were of the most primitive description. The writer visited several in the vicinity of Shihmenchai and Hsiao Pu Lo and could discover no doctor in attendance, while the corporal in charge had little or no knowledge of the treatment of serious wounds. A bucket of water and some bandages was all the equipment in many places, so that the condition of these wounded after a few days without disinfectants or sterilisers can be well imagined. Over and above the disabilities inflicted by lack of medical attention the unfortunate troops suffered greatly in that many of them had to return from the firing line on foot after they had received wounds, the stretchers being insufficient to cope with even the badly injured cases. On arrival at Chinwangtao their case was little bettered, for no doctor was available there either, and it was often necessary to wait for two or three days to obtain a place on the so called "hospital train" for Tongshan or Tientsin. Numbers of the wounded died simply from exposure in the cattle trucks in which they were herded, and even when the remainder reached the base hospital the medical treatment they received would not be likely to return them to duty for many months. In a war as brief as the recent struggle this is perhaps not of great importance, but if it had lasted for six months or a year the reduction of the effectives by some thirty per cent which resulted from lack of medical organisation would have very seriously affected the outcome of the war. Taking all the branches of the Chinese army thus under consideration, the outstanding fact is the lack of efficient direction, for the soldier himself shows signs of being first class material if well

LEFT TO RIGHT :

A miscellany of baggage, food, and ammunition being landed at Chinwangtao harbour on Oct. 17th.

A camp kitchen at Chinwangtao, where the troops were really well fed.

Infantry doubling across the open under fire to reinforce the advance.

See next page.

handled, the incompetency of the officers being the principal reason for his temporary inefficiency as a fighting unit. But there is little reason to doubt that the next war will show a great improvement in this respect as well as in the utilisation of the purely mechanical instruments of warfare, supposing the recent lesson to have been well learnt.

For example, it was noticeable what an improvement had taken place in the junior commands in the Fengtien army since the war of 1922, when the defeat inflicted upon them by Feng Yu-hsiang near Chang Hsin Tien had disorganised the forces of Chang Tso-lin for several days, compelling him to a hasty retreat as far as the Great Wall at Shanhaikwan ere making a fresh stand. Apparently the Fengtien general staff realised the results of ill-discipline thus exemplified, for they subsequently engaged several qualified army instructors to drill their forces and thus remedy the defect, with the consequence that the efficiency of Chang Tso-lin's troops was increased at least thirty per cent in a period of some eighteen months. Unfortunately, although the troops were thus rendered amenable to discipline, it appeared that an anti-foreign spirit had been inculcated in them at the same time and on two or three occasions during the war the attitude towards American and British forces was such that the writer apprehended that a serious clash might occur, particularly in the vicinity of Tientsin after the flight thence of Wu Pei-fu. His soldiers were markedly different in this respect, though it must be admitted that there was at times a slight tension to be felt, more especially when the news from the front was bad, but on the whole the writer found it quite easy to mingle with them at will, and in the main he was treated with extreme courtesy. As long as the struggle was evenly maintained the Chihli troops were kept well in hand, being well fed and comparatively well clothed, but once Marshal Wu Pei-fu had been compelled to retire from Chinwangtao upon

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A typical example for how the artillery is sited between grave mounds, this giving excellent cover for the artillerists, although perhaps rough on their ancestors who may be resting there.

Refugees from between the lines took shelter behind the Great Wall at Shanhaikwan, and although hard put to it they managed to struggle along somehow, with the kindly sympathy and help of the foreign troops on duty at the forts near by.

Last scene of all in the war. Marshal Wu has fled on a transport to Tsingtao or Shanghai, and his troops are disarmed on the streets of Tientsin by the local police and the soldiers of Feng Yu-hsiang.

The tin hat brigade outside Hsiao Pu-lo on the Shihmenchai front. These helmets had a battered out French eagle on the crests of many.

The machine gun guarding General Peng's headquarters, where the writer was cordially entertained on steamed bread and vegetable stew, the usual field ration when the troops are in luck.

LOWER RIGHT: Excavating refugees from Shanhaikwan during the civil war of 1924. Marshal Wu placed several empty trains at their disposal and in general showed more humanity than is usual during a conflict in China. UPPER LEFT: Marshal Wu's O.T.C. where boys of twelve to sixteen were undergoing a course of three years training for a commission. Unfortunately the war necessitated using these boys as line of communication troops. LOWER LEFT: A camp cooker at Chinwangtao serving out soup, reminiscent of old times in France in 1915. UPPER RIGHT: The 14th Division disembarking at Chinwangtao harbour October 16th, 1924.

Tientsin the whole situation was altered for the worse and many units commenced to loot far and wide, even the poorest villages suffering from their depradations. It is perhaps hardly fair to blame the Generalissimo for this entirely, as he certainly did his best to maintain discipline wherever he chanced to be, but it serves as an excellent illustration of one of the chief differences between the two armies. In the Chihli forces everything depended upon the Commander-in-Chief and on him alone, for many of his entourage appeared to be both incompetent and ill-intentioned, while on the other hand the Fengtien troops were just as well controlled by subordinates when Chang Tso-lin himself was absent. From conversations which the writer has had with several of China's military leaders it appears to him that Marshal Wu Pei-fu is the most capable general in the country at the present time, without giving any consideration to his undoubted personal bravery, but unfortunately he lacks the power to choose and train efficient subordinate officers to control his troops, and it was just this weakness which led to his defeat in 1924 even as it must greatly hamper his possible return to power in the future.

But if it be admitted that Wu is the foremost amongst Chinese militarists and that Chang Tso-lin, Feng Yu-hsiang and the rest are only to be ranked in a descending scale of efficiency, an outside observer may well be excused for thinking that a war between China and any foreign Power or group of Powers would not be so dangerous as many alarmists have painted it.

As far as any external struggle goes this is probably the case, for the writer is hardly prepared to admit the possibility of such a war being waged with any measure of success for at least fifty years to come. A prominent Chinese politician remarked jokingly the other day in the course of an after-dinner conversation that if he were at the head of a stable Chinese government the first thing which he would do would be to raise an army of fifty million men and declare war on the West. Fortunately this is hardly likely to come true in the present generation for the simple reason that there will inevitably be a lack of skilled officers, technicians, and a general staff, to say nothing of arsenals, factories, and the like. But there is always the possibility that some concatenation of circumstances will thrust China into an offensive alliance with either Russia or Japan, and both of these countries could supply the missing factor which would render the yellow race a deadly menace to the peace of the world. The Chinese are not a naturally warlike people, but their very numbers, the ever increasing economic pressure exerted by their constantly growing population, and the conflict with the outside world occasioned by the insistant endeavour to exploit the slowly developing commercial field of the extreme orient, all seem to be factors threatening to thrust them into war. If external war on any large scale be relegated to the distant

future, there only remains the possibility of conflict on the borders of or within the Republic itself, and such a struggle may well occur at any time within the next ten years, either on the initiative of the Chinese themselves or as a part of some larger movement involving Japan or Russia. However the catastrophe may arrive there can be no gainsaying that it will be most disastrous in its results, for the Chinese army of to-day is disunited, ill-led, and comparitively ill-equipped, three faults which the present style of civil war affects but little but which will be speedily remedied under the pressure of necessity in a struggle with external military forces.

The army of fifty million men as envisaged by the Chinese politician quoted above will probably never materialise, but the writer is of the opinion that within the next ten years there will grow into existance within the Republic a total force of at least three millions operating in the various provinces, and all equipped with the latest armaments, thanks to the criminal folly and overwhelming greed of the governments of Europe. Given some sufficient reason for united action and premising that the younger generation of Chinese officers will be an improvement on the old, it is evident that China with its almost unlimited field of action and vast internal resources may be the central figure in a war which will completely reverse the present political and economic situation in the Orient.

4-1

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

2009-17

6290

WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

(CHINA - Military)

Subject: The Red Spear Societies in Honan Province.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JUL 15 1926

1. The Red Spear Societies, or Hung C'hiang Hui, as they are called by the Chinese, have become the most serious problem for the authorities in the province of Honan. They were organized some years ago in various parts of the province by the local farmers in an effort to protect themselves against the looting of their homes by the various roving bands of soldiers and bandits.

2. The possession of arms by private individuals is prohibited by Chinese law, so these bands were of necessity organized secretly. The members would meet at some point for drill and then disband to their homes to await a call on the part of their leaders. The members originally were armed with spears and short swords, both weapons traditional among the Chinese and with which they are very skillful. Gradually these organizations began to have a sort of religious ceremony connected with their meetings, including the burning of incense and other ceremonial rites, which had a profound psychological effect upon the minds of the members. They grew to believe that by virtue of their ceremonies and incantations they were possessed of supernatural powers and were immune to knife and bullet. As they were successful in their attacks upon their oppressors they accumulated a number of rifles which added to their strength. In their battles with the soldier they would be fired upon at long range and as none were killed their belief in their charm against bullets increased. The soldiers also came to regard them with fear, crediting the inability to inflict casualties upon the Red Spears to the supernatural rather than to their own poor marksmanship and to the long ranges employed.

3. These Societies have existed for some years in the provinces of Shensi, Honan and Shantung. In certain sections they are organized and cooperate but on the whole there is no indication that there is any central directing force behind them. In western Honan and Shensi there was an attempt to unite these local bodies under Wang T'ien-p'ei. He was a bandit and later became a division commander, but was put to death when Wu Pei-fu was most powerful in Honan some few years ago. Since then these local Red Spear Societies apparently have not attempted any organization on a large scale. While existing, as noted above, in Shensi and Shantung as well as in Honan, they are most powerful in the latter province.

4. When Wu Pei-fu began his fight to regain power in Honan in the spring of 1926 he was of course opposed by the Tupan of that province, Yueh Wei-chun. Wu himself was short of troops with which to fight Yueh and his Second National Army (2nd Kuominchun) and sent representatives to stir up the Red Spear Societies against the National Army. This move was successful and Wu's regaining of Honan was in a great measure due to the activities of the Red Spears. In Loyang (Honanfu) the Red Spears actually defeated the National Army troops and assumed control of the town for several days until forced to evacuate by Wu Pei-fu's soldiers. After Wu had regained control of the province he issued instructions to his military commanders to blot out the Red Spears. However, due to the fact that Wu has been moving all possible troops to the north, those left in Honan have not been able to handle the Red Spear Societies and the condition in the province at the present time is a serious one. It has become necessary to return about one division of troops to Honan for the purpose of keeping down the activities of the Red Spears. A satisfactory solution of this situation is not yet in sight. It is very hard to deal

From M/A, China Report No. 5864 June 3, 1926

CHINA (Military)

Subject: The Red Spear Societies in Honan Province.

with a force that is composed of farmers by day and Red Spears by night. The organization of these societies was for a good purpose but as they have become more powerful they have abused the power which they gained.

5. It is interesting to note that these Red Spear Societies appear to have a great many things in common with the practices of the Boxers, but there is no anti-foreign spirit apparent. It should be remembered, however, that with such an organization there always is a possibility that influential leaders might turn these fanatical bands against the foreigners should it be to their advantage to do so.

6. The attached photographs were taken at the town of Ning Ling Hsien, about seventy miles southeast of Kaifeng, Honan, during an attack upon the town by the Red Spears. The main body of the garrison, three companies of infantry, went just east of the town to meet the Red Spears. They took position in a drainage ditch along a road - in one line with no attempt to provide for a reserve or for an attack from the flanks. The grain in the fields was about a foot and a half high and the field of fire for the troops was therefore much restricted. The Red Spears remained at a distance of about eight hundred yards and hid behind graves, trees and in ditches. The town wall was manned by the remaining soldiers, about one company, and the gates were all closed with the exception one which was left open to admit women and children who fled to the town for protection. The attack of the Red Spears was repulsed with no casualties to the soldiers. It is likely that no casualties were suffered by the Red Spears, and that they withdrew on seeing the number of soldiers that were opposed to them.

Note: This report, with photographs, was prepared by Captain S. V. Constant, Cavalry, Assistant Military Attache, after a personal visit and inspection of Honan.

Distribution:
4 MID
1 CGUSAFC
1 File

CHINA (Military)

Subject: The Red Spear Societies in Honan Province.



West gate of Ning Ling Hsien during a Red Spear raid, May 16, 1926. This was the only gate left open and here were admitted women and children from the surrounding country. The loaded cart on the right of the picture belonged to a family of refugees.

North gate of Ning Ling Hsien. These refugees arrived after the gate was closed and they were forced to remain outside.

G-2 Report

4-1

SECRET CHIEF OF STAFF
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MAY 14
WAR DEPARTMENT 7
by

CHINA (Population &
Social Conditions)

Subject: The "Sacred Army" in the Yangtze Gorges.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 14 1928

The "Sacred Army" of the Yangtze Gorges, common referred to erroneously as "Red Spears", is an organization of farmers, shopkeepers, teachers and local people of all kinds in the area of the Gorges, banded together for the purpose of preserving peace and order and protecting their homes from brigands and the military.

The members of the organization are Buddhist religious fanatics who believe they are charged by the Supreme Being with carrying out the mission to which they have committed themselves, and whose courage and ferocity are derived from their belief that they are immune to bullets and all harm from their enemies. They are subjected to ridiculous fantastic tests and take certain religious oaths, after which immunity to harm is conferred upon them by the conventional practice of swallowing a piece of red paper on which the secrets of the Sacred Army are written.

This particular organization is believed to have had its origin about 1920, at which time its members were designated "Supernatural Soldiers". The Army is made up of local bands, under a local chieftan, the various bands being bound together by the religious beliefs of the organization and by its mutually protective purpose. All members of the organization serve without pay and ordinarily go about their regular occupations. Those who are free volunteer for service of a minor nature, but in an emergency all members must report for duty. Each family is supposed to furnish one able-bodied man but more may join if they so desire. There is no age limit, anyone able to carry the heavy sword with which they are armed being admitted. The discipline maintained by the local chieftan over his band is said to be excellent.

Each soldier carries a heavy sword, a dagger about a foot long stuck in the puttee of each leg, and occasionally a spear about six feet in length. They do not use rifles, believing that firearms are responsible for all of China's present ills, and have even been known to destroy the firearms taken from soldiers. Each band, however, has one rifle which they claim is used only for signalling.

The members of the Sacred Army wear the ordinary dress of the common people plus a red turban, red puttees, a broad red belt, and a red sash across the left shoulder on which is written the characters for "Buddhist Brotherhood of Sacred Soldiers of the Virtuous Way". Occasionally one is dressed in a bright yellow uniform of the same kind, but without any particular significance.

The Sacred Army has brought about peace and order wherever it has been organized, and is held in awe and respect throughout the country where it operates, even by the soldiers and brigands. Like all such organizations, however, unscrupulous leaders may sooner or later be expected to divert the otherwise worthy efforts of the Sacred Soldiers to their own selfish purposes.

John Magruder

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Tientsin
1 File

From M/A, China Report No. 7245 March 30, 1928

G-2 Report

4-1

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV
6720
2009-171
WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Loyang Military Camp.

RECEIVED G-2 W.D. JUL 15 1926

1. This report was prepared by Captain S. V. Constant, Cavalry, Assistant Military Attache, after a personal visit to the point described.

2. The city of Loyang, or Honanfu as it is sometimes called, is situated in the western part of Honan Province just south of the Yellow River. It lies in a very fertile valley practically surrounded by mountains, and is only easily accessible by means of the Lunghai railway which runs east and west from the Peking-Hankow trunk line at Chengchow.

3. The railway passes through eleven tunnels between Chengchow and Loyang, the destruction of any of which would close the road to the valley. This of course is a source of both strength and weakness from a strategic point of view. An attacking force holding the entrance to the valley could easily bottle up the defenders. On the other hand should the approaches to the valley be well defended it would be a veritable stronghold. As such it became the seat of the ancient Han dynasty and here in recent years Wu Pei-fu built up the army that made him the strongest military power in China south of the Great Wall until late in 1924 when he waged a war against Chang Tso-lin.

4. When his headquarters were in Loyang, Wu built the Loyang Military Camp, which is located about 3 miles to the west of the city wall. He planned on a large scale, building permanent brick structures for ten thousand men, large drill grounds, broad streets lined with trees, and an excellent aviation field. For communication with the outside world he erected a radio station. To the north of the camp is the aviation field (see Report No. 5878). ——— no. not listed

5. The radio station is located east of the aviation field. There are two stone buildings for apparatus and offices. These are in excellent repair and evidently were built later than the barracks. The radio poles are two in number. They are built of structural steel, in six main sections (see photograph). Each main section is braced by four steel guy ropes. A main section is composed of six small sections, each ten ft. long, making a main section sixty feet in height and the total height of the tower about three hundred and sixty feet. The towers rest on a concrete base and are about five hundred feet apart, giving an aerial spread of nearly the same length. Many of the instruments have been removed, but from what remain it would appear that the original installation had been the Marconi (British) type. Formerly this station could communicate with Peking, Tsingtao and Shanghai.

6. South of the aviation field was built the main camp, its broad streets, well ditched and lined with trees, running from north to south and east to west. The long brick barrack buildings are typical of the type seen in Pei Yuan Camp, Peking, with the exception that each compound is surrounded by a stone wall about fifteen feet high. The buildings themselves are in good condition but many door and window frames have been removed. Between the groups of buildings and dividing them from east to west is a large parade ground with the usual horizontal bars and other gymnasium apparatus common to a Chinese drill field. To the south of the entire camp is located another and smaller drill ground, and south of this the terrain slopes to the river bed. In the sides of these hills were dug a number of caves, which were used as quarters for troops when the cantonment was full. These caves in the loess are quite

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Loyang Military Camp.

common forms of dwellings in Honan Province. They are warm in winter and cool in summer, though they sweat after the rainy season. This is due to the structure of the loess, the peculiar properties of which have been mentioned before. The formation of a tubular like strata gives considerable capillary action, and a great deal of moisture is retained in the soil.

7. In order to have a "back door" to Loyang, Wu Pei-fu built a military road (see photograph) to Hsuchowfu on the Peking Hankow railway. This road, where it leaves the camp, is sixty feet wide between ditches and a good second class hard dirt road. Half a mile from the camp the road crosses the Lo Ho river, over which has been built a reinforced concrete bridge, about twenty feet wide (see photograph). The main bridge has twenty piers with a span of twenty feet between each pier, making the total length of the bridge about four hundred feet. Each pier rests on a block stone abuttment about ten feet in height. The approaches to the bridge have not as yet been constructed. The advantages of building this bridge are great, as can be seen from photograph showing the present means of crossing the river by scows pushed with poles. The remainder of the road to Hsuchowfu while not so wide as near Loyang is in good condition and can be traversed by automobile. There is a bridge at Lung Men, the pass to the valley, which has been washed out, necessitating the use of ferry there, but aside from this one point, the road is still in good condition for automobile traffic. This road is of great strategic importance as it gives another way of reaching the Peking-Hankow railway from the valley in which Loyang is situated.

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Camp Headquarters - Loyang Military Camp.



Radio station, Loyang Military Camp - looking northeast. The station is located at the east side of the aviation field. The poles run north and south.

Military road from Leyang Camp to Hsuchowfu. This section is between the Camp and the Lo River. The far end of the road is at the river bank.

General view of bridge over Lo River. The great fault in Chinese bridge building is that the spaces for the water to go through generally are too small for the volume of water. This bridge is an exception.



Lo River bridge. It will be noted that approaches are not completed.

Crossing the Lo River at low water. The bridge shown above will greatly facilitate traffic. Note the soldier standing on platform in right of picture. The water in places is so shallow that the scows cannot reach the shore, so passengers and baggage are carried out by coolies.



View of one of the piers of the Lo River bridge. Note that ample span has been given to allow for flow of water between piers.

These pictures were taken during low water (May, 1926.)

M.I.D.

from FE

192f 2009-17

WAR DEPARTMENT

Peking, May 29th., 1926.

CIRCULAR No. 127

Subject:- POLICE INSTRUCTIONS IN SHANGHAI.

The Senior Minister has the honour to circulate herewith among his Honourable Colleagues, a letter, dated April 18, received by him from the Senior Consul in Shanghai conveying - together with a covering from the Chairman of the Municipal Council of the International Settlement - a copy of the revised Police Mobilization Instructions.

COPY

Shanghai, April 18, 1926.

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit herewith, for the consideration of Your Excellency and the Diplomatic Body, a copy of a letter received from the Chairman of the Municipal Council of the International Settlement of Shanghai, covering a copy of the revised Police Mobilization Instructions.

These Instructions have been drawn up by a Board of International Experts in response to the recommendation made by the Diplomatic Representatives who were charged in June last with investigating and reporting on the incident of May 30, 1926, and whose findings were transmitted to the Consular Body on July 2, by the Senior Minister.

I have the honour etc.,

(sd). Cunningham

Consul-General for America,
and Senior Consul

His Excellency
Monsieur W. J. Oudendijk
Minister for the Netherlands and Senior Minister.

701.0093 D34

COPY

COUNCIL CHAMBER

Shanghai, May 5, 1926.

Sir,

I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the revised Police Mobilization Instructions for the information of the Consular Body.

You will recollect that in my letter of July 1, 1925, I conveyed to you the assent of the Council to the request made by the Diplomatic Representatives from Peking who were charged with the investigation of the incident of May 30th., that the Police Regulations should be modified, inasfar as the recommendation was consitent with the findings of a Board or Committee of experts to which the Council would submit the Police Regulations for such revision and modification as might be considered desirable.

The amended Mobilization Instructions, which have now been promulgated to members of the Police Force, are the outcome of the deliberations of such a Board, which was in session from April 22 to April 29, 1926, and constituted as under:-

Colonel W.F.L. Gordon, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
Commandant, Shanghai Volunteer Corps,
(Chairman).
Commander E. Friedrick, U.S. Navy
Commander H.B. Robinson, D.S.O., H.B.M. Navy
Commander O. Sato, E.I.J.M. Navy
(Major A. Bilton-Johnson, Commissioner-General,
Shanghai Municipal Council, in attendance.)
Captain E.I.M. Barret, C.I.E.,
Commissioner of Police.

I have the honour etc.,
(sd). Stirling Fessenden,
Chairman

N. U. Comm. C. de Rossi,
Consul-General for Italy
and Senior Consul

POLICE MOBILIZATION INSTRUCTIONS.

Memorandum for guidance.

In case of Serious Trouble in the Settlement.

1. Experience has shown that Shanghai is peculiarly liable to periodical outbreaks of disorder which may seriously menace the safety of life and property in the Settlement Such disorder may originate within the Settlement or outside. It may be widespread or confined to a particular locality. It may soon be over or it may last indefinitely. Sometimes it is foreshadowed by events; at others it occurs without warning. In any case the task of dealing with the situation in its initial stages will fall entirely on the Police, and it is of the utmost importance that Police action at such times be as prompt and effective as it is possible to make it.

When Trouble is Expected.

2. When trouble is foreseen or expected, as for instance in times of political unrest, the Commissioner will order the Mobilization of a part or the whole of the Force as a precautionary measure.

3. This order will be given personally by the Commissioner and will be telephoned to all stations, the Gaol and the Mixed Court, though the Central Station Exchange, in the form:-

"Precautionary Mobilization of .....stations ordered."

4. In case of a precautionary mobilization, instructions to all other Police Officers concerned will be given from Headquarters direct. (For further instructions, see No. 15 and following paragraph).

When Trouble occurs without Warning.

5. When trouble occurs without warning, the first news of the actual outbreak would probably be received by the Sergeant on duty in a Station Charge Room.

6. On receipt of such information the Sergeant will immediately notify the Inspector or Senior Police Officer present in the station.

7. If the latter is not fully satisfied that the matter is one he can deal with himself, he will immediately telephone the Officer on duty who, if he considers it necessary, will inform the Commissioner, whilst at the same time he move the whole or any portion of the reserve unit into the disturbed area, proceeding there himself to investigate.

8. If it appears to the Commissioner that the trouble is likely to be serious, the emergency mobilization of a part or the whole of the Force will be ordered.

9. This order will be given by the Commissioner personally, by telephone or otherwise through the Private Exchange at the Central Police Station.

10. On receipt of a message ordering an Emergency Mobilization the Sergeant on duty in the Central Charge-room will immediately attend to the following points in the order given. Prompt action on his part is of the utmost importance. If two operators are available, both Private Exchange Telephones (Nos. 55 and 56) will be used. The Public Exchange Telephone(No. 2040) will for the time being not be used for outgoing messages.

1) Notify all Stations, Gaol and Mixed Court, commencing with those nearest the scene of trouble.

2) Notify Deputy, Assistant and 2nd. Assistant Commissioners.

3) Notify Director of Criminal Intelligence and Senior Officer in Intelligence Branch, G.I.D.

4) Notify the Headquarters Superintendents.

The foregoing telephone message will be as brief as possible, thus:-
"Trouble reported at.....Emergency Mobilization of.....Stations ordered".

6) Formally notify Commandant, S.V.C., and the A.C.P., (Special Police Reserve) that serious trouble is reported at such and such a place; that the Regular Police are mobilized and that further details will be communicated to them as soon as possible.

7) formally notify Chief Officer of the Fire Brigade in same terms.

8) Formally notify French Police in same terms.

9) When all the above instructions are carried out, notify Secretary to the Council.

11. Until the notification of all concerned is finished, the Inspector i/c Central will understand that neither the Sergeant ob Charge-room duty nor the telephone clerk has time for anything else.

12. On receipt of emergency orders to mobilize, and in the absence of other instructions, the Deputy Commissioner will proceed direct to Police Headquarters and await instructions. Other Executive Officers will proceed immediately to their area headquarters which will be as follows:-

Central	A.C.P.	(Traffic's) Office
Northern	Hongkew	Police Station
Western	A.C.P.	(Chinese) Office, Gordon Road.
Eastern	Wayside	Police Station.

13. The Director of Criminal Intelligence will act at his discretion, bearing in mind that the chief duty of his department at such a time is to obtain early and accurate information concerning the trouble in all its aspects and to communicate the same to the Commissioner with the last possible delay.

14. The Headquarter Superintendents will proceed immediately to the office of the Commissioner which will (in the absence of other instructions remain the actual headquarters of the Force during the time the trouble lasts. The Commissioner's clerk will also report there without delay be to receive all message and orders, to communicate important information to all parties concerned, to keep in touch with the course of events generally and to make the complete written record of all business transacted.

Action to be taken at Stations.

15. On receipt of orders to mobilize at a Police Station (whether Precautionary or Emergency Mobilization), the Sergeant on Charge-room duty will immediately notify the Inspector or Senior Police Officer at the Station. The station gates will be closed and the necessary armed men posted. The arms and ammunition in the Charge-room will be ready for issue and all available men warned to stand by or turn out, as required. No man will be allowed to leave the Station except on duty. All armed Police leaving their stations will carry their arms and at least 20 rounds of ammunition. Any orders for the concentration of Chinese Police at Stations will be given separately. If there is serious trouble in the District, point duty men will be withdrawn.

Ncrmal duties and rcutine will prcceed as regularly as pcssible Whenever the Inspectcr Himself quite the Staticn he will leave a deputy with full pcwers tc act during his absence.

The Inspectcr will realize that early and accurate infcrmaticn bearing cn the situaticn in his cwn district is cf the greatest impcrtance, that such infcrmaticn must be actively scught and that fcr this purpcse he must use his detectives and bicycles tc the fullest extent.

If discrder cccurs in his district he will imeediately take what steps he ccnsiders necessary tc deal with it, bearing in mind that a display cf fcrce at the cutset may nip the trcuble in the bud and that any undue delay may result in the situaticn getting cut cf hand. He will remember that his available men are relatively few in number and that ccncentraticn rather than dispersal will be necessary fcr effective actic̈n. He is reminded that crcwds usually ccntain a large prcpcrtic̈n cf merely curicus cnlcckers, and that due distinction shculd be made between such pecple and ricters.

Frcm the Pclice pcint cf view a ricter may be defined as a persc̈n whc takes part with cthers in a tumultucus disturbance cf the peace during which actual viclence is dcne by thcse ccncerned.

In regard tc ricters the Pclice will nct hesitate tc take summary and drastic measures, utilizing as far as pcssible all crdinary Pclice methcds available, such as batcn charges and the use the rifle butt.

The use cf firearms is justifiable and may be rescrted tc when it appears that lcss cf life cr sericus damage tc persc̈n cr prcperty at the hands cf ricters is immenent and that such lcss cr damage can be prevented by nc cther means.

It is tc be clearly understccd that the cbject cf fire actic̈n by the Pclice against a rictcus mcb is tc prevent lcss cf life cr sericus damage tc persc̈n cr prcperty; and ccnsequently, that nc mcre than the minimum amcunt cf fire required tc achieve this cbject is permissible cr can be justified.

In this ccnnectic̈n it will be bcrne in mind that in scme cases the necessity fcr cpening cclllective fire may be avcided altcgether by the judicicus use cf individual shcts fired at selected targets in the mcb.

If circumstances allcw, due warning cf the intentic̈n tc cpen fire shculd be given. This may be dcne by wcrd cf mcuth; by the cstentaticus display and handling cf weapcns; the fixin cf baycnets; cr by the exhibitic̈n cs special banners which are kept at all Pclice Staticns fcr the purpcse. Every effcrt shculd be made tc explain tc the pecple that if fire is cpened, it will be effective.

On nc acccunt will blank ammunitic̈n be used; ncr will shcts be fired either cver the heads cf a mcb cr at the grcund in frcnt cf it.

On the ccntrary, it must be clearly understccd by all ccncerned that whenever the Pclice are called upcn tc use firearms against ricters in the prctectic̈n cf life cr prcperty, their fire will be effective.

16. Apart frcm the prctectic̈n cf life and prcperty generally, Inspectcrs must bear in mind the special impcrtance cf safeguarding the large public supply services. In the Settlement, these are the Electricity Department, the Gas Cc., the Waterwcrks Cc., the Telephcne Cc., amd the Tramway Ccmpany,, and in each system there are certain vulnerable pcints damage tc which wculd sericusly affect if nct entirely stcp any further supply.

These points are as follows:-

Electricity Department:-

1) and 2) The Riverside and Fearon Road Power stations; and the cable crossing at the undermentioned bridges:-
3) Yangtszepoo Road Bridge, over Yangtszepoo Creek
4) Seward Road Bridge, over Hongkew Creek
5) Yubang Road Bridge, over Hongkew Creek
6) Dent Road Bridge, over Singkeipang Creek
7) Garden Bridge, over Soochow Creek
8) Chekiang Road Bridge, over Soochow Creek.
9) Sinza Road Bridge, over Defence Creek (Thibet Road)
10) Sinza Road Bridge, over Creek West of Tatung Road; and the following sub-stations:-
11) Corner of Ferry and Sinza Roads
12) Corner of Kwangse and Foochow Roads
13) Corner of Chekiang and Newchwang Roads
14) Corner of Nelhi and Yangtszepoo Roads

Gas Company:-
The Gas Works in Thibet Road, particularly the two Gas Holders, the Governor House opposite the entrance to the Works and the main pipes over Defence Creek.

Waterworks Company:-
1) The Pumping Station, Yangtszepoo Road
2) The Water Tower, Kiangse Road, and the aqueducts at the following bridges:-
3) Broadway Bridge, over Hongkew Creek
4) Seward Road Bridge, over Hongkew Creek
5) Kiangse Road Bridge, over Soochow Creek

Telephone Company:-
Exchanges:-
1) Central, Kiangsu Road
2) Western, Carter Road
3) Northern, Haining Road
4) Eastern, Lay Road; and the
5) Cable crossing over Whangpoo, Foochow Road and Bund.

Tramway Company:-
Sheds and Workshops:-
1) Hart Road
2) Yangtszepoo Road

Headquarters.

17. During the mobilization the Headquarters of the Force will (in the absence of other instructions) be at the Commissioner's Office at the Central Police Station (Telephone: Central 1369, or by private line through Central 56, the Police Exchange). In the absence of the Commissioner elsewhere a responsible senior Officer with the necessary staff will always be on duty at Headquarters, night and day (see Par. 14). Unless other arrangements are notified this Officer is to be regarded as the Commissioner's deputy with full discretion to act as circumstances may require. It is of course essential that Headquarters be kept constantly informed of all important occurrences in Police districts.

Respcnsibility.

18. - In the fcregcing paragpaph general instructicns are issued fcr the guidance cf all ccncerned. Nc attempt, Hcwever, is made tc prcvide fcr any particular ccntingency befcrehand. Circumstances may arise tc which nc issued instructicns are applicable and in regard tc which fcr cne reascn cr ancther, ncne are tc be cbtained. In all such cases it is clearly tc be understccd that individuals cn the spct will nct at cnce cn their cwn initiative, and that lack cf acticn cn their part when acticn is cbvicusly necessary can never be excused by the plea cf lack cf crders. If such acticn is reascnable in the circumstances and intelligently undertaken all ranks may feel certain cf the Ccmmissicner's supccrt.

The last one got it in the neck!

19. The term "Ccmmissicner" whencver used in these Instructicns, will be understccd tc mean""the senicr Officer cf the Fcrce available".

Shanghai April 29, 1926.

Ccnfirmed:

W.F.L. Gcrdcn, Cclcnel Chairman
B.B. Rcbinscn, Ccmmander R.M.
F.I.M. Barrett
Ccmmissicner cf Pclice
O. Satch Ccmmander I.J.N.
B. Friedrick U.S.N.

THE CHINESE ARMY

The following is the result of combined studies by all officers attached to this office. It is designed to present a general picture of the Chinese Army, as of possible interest to the different branches of our service.

History.

Until 1895 China had no modern regular troops. The disasters of the Chinese-Japanese War of 1894-1895 led to a somewhat abortive attempt to reorganize the army. Five divisions of a new army known as the Wu Wei-chun were raised, but the majority of these were disbanded after or at the time of the Boxer trouble of 1900. One division under Yuan Shih-kai formed the nucleus of the "Lu Chun", the New Regular Army.

A decree was issued in 1901 ordering the reorganization of the army. Little, however, was done in this direction except in Chihli, where Yuan Shih-kai, as Viceroy, raised and organized six divisions of modern troops between 1903 and 1906. In the latter year four of these divisions were transferred to the control of the newly formed Ministry of War (Lu Chun-pu) and a comprehensive scheme of army reorganization was sanctioned. This scheme contemplated the formation within ten years of thirty-six divisions. In 1911 there were sixteen divisions and sixteen mixed brigades.

Since 1912 ~~to the present date~~ the army rapidly has become decentralized until now there is none belonging to the Central Government. The so-called Chinese Army is composed of several distinct armies, each belonging to contending war lords. The army of the Central Government is the army of the military leader who happens to be in control of Peking at the moment. There exist a Ministry of War and a General Staff Bureau, but these have no power whatever and do unimportant paper work when they do anything at all.

Organization and Strength.

The standard unit of the Chinese Army is the division though the mixed brigade is undoubtedly becoming more popular as a mobile unit and the number of men organized in mixed brigades throughout the country probably greater than the total number in the divisions. In remote districts, where divisions and brigades exist in theory, the Chinese military think and speak in battalions only, but are slowly developing an interest in such units as mixed regiments. In theory the division should number 12,512 officers and men. In practice it is customary to credit a division with 10,000 all told, and this often proves to be an over-estimate. There are now cases, however, in which the number of men enrolled in a division or a mixed brigade greatly exceeds even the theoretical figures. This is not because the commanders favor unwieldly units but is used sometimes as a device for increasing their strength without the knowledge of their military rivals or of the general public. It also is impossible ever to consider that the strength on paper coincides with the actual strength of the organization. Some units will appear on paper to be much stronger than they actually are, in order to enable the unit commander to draw more funds from higher authority and pocket the surplus himself. In other cases,

Types of Fengtien officers.
Full face - Gen. Yu Chen, Commander 10th Army and Garrison Commander of Peking (Dec. 1926).
Profile - Gen. Yang Fu-lin, one of Chang Tso-lin's staff officers.

General Chang Chih-chiang, 2nd in command of Kuominchun and Feng Yu-hsiang's right hand man.

where money and food are [illegible]
half times the normal strength in order to give the unit commander a more valuable article on which to trade his services. These swollen units are still the exception, however, and not the rule.

A division is made up of two infantry brigades of 2 regiments each; 1 cavalry regiment of 3 battalions; 1 artillery regiment of 3 battalions; 1 company of engineers; 1 company of transport; 4 or more companies of machine guns, number undetermined; military police; a sanitary detachment, a field hospital, and a band. The officers should number 748, the rank and file 10,436, and coolies and other camp followers 1,328.

A mixed brigade usually consists of 2 infantry regiments, one squadron cavalry, 1 battalion artillery, 1 company engineers, 1 company transport, and 1 or more companies of machine guns.

A mixed regiment usually consists of 1 regiment of infantry, 1 troop cavalry, 1 company artillery, 1 company machine guns, and small detachments of engineers and transport.

The theoretical strength of each unit in each branch of the service is given in the following list:

Unit	Men in the ranks	Strength, including officers, coolies, etc. (approximate)
Infantry		
1 squad (1 sergt.1 corpl., 12 soldiers)	14	18
1 section (3 squads)	42	55
1 company (3 sections)	126	165
1 battalion (4 companies)	504	659
1 regiment (3 battalions)	1,512	1,977
1 brigade (2 regiments)	3,024	3,954
Cavalry		
1 squad (1 sergt., 1 corpl.,12 soldiers)	14	23
1 section (2 squads)	28	45
1 troop (2 sections)	56	91
1 squadron (4 troops)	224	363
1 regiment (3 squadrons)	672	1,089
Artillery		
(Field Guns)		
1 squad (1 serg., 1 corpl., 12 soldiers)	14	21
1 section (3 squads)	42	63
1 battery (3 sections) 6 guns	126	189
1 battalion (3 batteries) 18 guns	378	568
1 regiment (3 battalions) 54 guns	1,134	1,704
(Mountain Guns)		
1 squad (1 sergt., 1 corpl., 12 soldiers)	14	22
1 section (3 squads)	42	66
1 battery (3 sections) 6 guns	128	197
1 battalion (3 batteries) 18 guns	378	592
1 regiment (3 battalions) 54 guns	1,134	1,776
Engineers		
1 squad (1 sergt., 1 corpl., 12 soldiers)	14	25
1 section (3 squads)	42	74
1 company (3 sections)	126	222
1 battalion (4 companies)	504	667

Unit		
Transport		
1 squad (1 sergt., 1 corpl., 12 soldiers)	14	28
1 section (3 squads)	42	84
1 company (3 sections)	126	251
1 battalion (3 companies)	504	752
Band		
20 musicians and 24 learning musicians	44	51

Machine Gun Company

Each consists of 4 to 6 guns, attached to infantry or cavalry. Sometimes a machine gun battalion is formed.

The total strength of all the various armies is estimated to be about 2,000,000, of which about 65% probably have arms of some sort.

Arms, Equipment, and Materiel.

The Chinese Army has no individual equipment except clothing, which distinctively Chinese. Even the uniforms are semi-foreign modified somewhat and adapted to Chinese standards of comfort. All arms, accoutrements and the like are either of foreign make or are manufactured in Chinese arsenals after foreign models, usually Japanese or German.

The Chinese uniform is of cheap grey cotton material, quilted for warmth in winter; some units have woolen khaki colored uniforms of Chinese manufacture. Wrap leggins of cloth are most commonly used. Leather leggins and boots are not standardized, all types being used.

In Manchuria and along the Mongol border all ranks are supplied with fur caps and long coats lined with sheepskin. In some outfits blankets and waterproof sheets are supplied but the majority of northern troops use the bulky and cumbersome cotton quilt when they have any bedding at all. In southern units the soldiers usually lack bedding, shoes and socks, but wear straw sandals, cloth puttees, short trousers and a wide brimmed woven sun hat. Many troops have umbrellas. Each soldier usually has a canteen or tin cup.

With the exception of the most northern armies, the most common shoe is low cut, with a very flexible cloth upper, and a sole comprised of layers of tightly stitched cloth. While these shoes are quite impracticable it is remarkable what Chinese troops wearing them can accomplish. They have the advantage of being very cheap, very light to carry, require practically no fitting, are easily repaired and easily replaced. The usual custom is to carry one extra pair. When the pair they are using wears out, they put on the ones they are carrying and pick up others in any village where they may be. While, as noted above, the Chinese make long marches over difficult country with these shoes, it is only due to the insensibility of the Chinese soldier to discomfort and the fact that his feet are toughened to these shoes from childhood. While very satisfactory in dry weather, they absorb moisture like a blotter, quickly becoming a soggy pulp with sand ground in. Thus in cold weather the wet shoes become a cake of ice and the fact that Chinese infantry makes long marches in severe weather becomes all the more remarkable.

Typical military bridges built by Kuominchun troops. Kaoliang stalks covered with mud serve as flooring. Heavy timber is scarce.

army and the marks of identification showing the branch of service and the particular unit to which a man or an officer belongs, follow closely those in use in the Japanese army. In field uniforms rank is indicated by the color and the number of stars on the shoulder straps, by the color of the band on the cap and the number of stripes on the breeches, ~~color~~. A general of the first class, for instance, would have a plain gold band on his cap, gold gorget patches on the front of his collar with crossed batons if he belonged to the general staff, gold shoulder straps with three stars, and three stripes on his trousers.

Arms of the service are distinguished, in the uniforming of all officers and men below the rank of general, by the color of the gorget patch on the front of the collar and sometimes by the color of hat bands and other insignia, though not invariably. The distinctive colors are as follows:

Infantry. . . .	Red	Commissary	Deep Red
Cavalry	Yellow	Medical	Green
Artillery . . .	Blue	Band	Tan
Engineers . . .	White	Military Police. .	Pink
Transport . . .	Black		

The unit to which a man belongs should be indicated on the collar patches by what appears to be a confusion of Roman, Chinese and Arabic numerals. There are differences of practice in some parts of China, but in the northern armies these markings are nearly standardized. The battalion number is marked on the left collar patch with metal Arabic numerals, the number of the regiment appears on the same patch in metal Roman numerals, while the soldier's individual number appears on the right collar patch in the small Chinese numerals known as ma tzu. To determine the division to which an individual belongs it is essential to bear in mind the number of regiments or battalions of each branch of the service which go to make up a division. The infantry brigades and regiments are numbered consecutively throughout the various divisions. Thus since there are four infantry regiments to a division, the first regiment of the 16th Division would be designated the 61st Regiment. Since, however, there is only one regiment to a division of cavalry, artillery, engineers, and transport, the regimental numbers follow the divisional numbers. To make this clear a few examples are necessary.

Soldier 854 of the 2nd battalion, 1st Infantry regiment, 1st division, would have across his collar 二 八 X II 1.

Soldier 765 of the 1st battalion, 78th infantry regiment, 20th division would be marked 一 十 八 I 78.

Soldier 263, of the 3rd battalion, 20th cavalry regiment, 20th division, would be marked 丨 川 三 III 20.

Soldier 765 of the 3rd battalion, 12th artillery regiment, 12th division, would be marked 一 十 八 III 12.

Soldier 654, of the 1st battalion, 4th engineers regiment, 4th division, would be marked 丨 八 X I 4.

Soldier 456, of the 2nd battalion, 3rd transport regiment, 3rd division, would be marked X 八 丨 II 3.

Since all pretense of keeping up the fiction that the army is now rapidly being abandoned, the division commanders are little concerned with the position of their units on the Lu Chun lists, so soldiers of the Lu Chun 5th Division, 9th Brigade, 2nd Infantry Regiment, 1st Battalion, are content to be known simply as infantry of such and such a battalion of Chang Tsung-chang's army, and no distinguishing marks are worn except the colored gorget patches indicating the arm of the service. Soldiers of the Kuominchun, for instance, are commonly devoid of all marks of identification, including even shoulder straps, so that one cannot tell a colonel from a private in the field.

It is now the common practice to distinguish between the men of various factional commands by armbands. These are of various colors and designs, often having the name of the particular high commander written on them. Soldiers of the Kuominchun display righteous platitudes in the white circles on their blue armbands. These insignia are in the nature of a reversion to those once worn in China on the breast and back.

It is not customary to put any mark of rank or of other identification on military overcoats. A single red stripe down the side of the trousers indicates that the wearer is a company officer, two stripes that he is a regimental or battalion commander, and three stripes that he is a general officer. Commissioned officers wear gold capbands, while non-commissioned officers and men wear plain cloth bands. Rank is more definitely indicated by shoulder straps and the stars upon them, as follows:

Rank	1st Class (Generals)	Shoulder Strap	Stars
1. General	Army or Divisional Commander	Gold	3
2. Lieut. Col.	Divisional Commander	"	2
3. Major-General	Brigade Commander	"	1
	2nd Cl.(Field Officers)		
1. Colonel	Regimental Commander	2 gold lines & 1 silver	3
2. Lieut. Col.	Regiment-2nd in command	2 gold lines	2
3. Major	Battalion Commander	" " "	1
	3d Cl.(Company Officers)		
1. Captain	Company, troop or battery Commander	2 silver lines & 1 gold	3
2. 1st Lieut.	Section Commander	2 silver lines	2
3. 2nd Lieut.	" "	" " "	1
	Rank and File		
Sergeants	Commander of Squad of 12 men	Cloth with thin gold line	3 or 2
Corporals	Assistant - ditto	ditto	2 or 1
Private soldiers		Plain cloth	3, 2 or 1

Identification Tags.

A cloth identification tag is sewed inside the upper left hand pocket of the tunic.



Kuomintang infantry transport on mountain road, northern Chihli. These carts are commandeered, bought or hired, depending on the military commander.

Army camel train. These are extensively used in North China and Mongolia. These usually travel in sections of six to ten camels each.

Like most things in China, pay is neither fixed nor uniform, except on paper. Nominal rates of pay exist on the statutes and have not been altered for many years, and while they have nothing to do with actualities, they may be regarded as standard and are therefore given in the following table:

	Monthly Pay Tls.	Allowances Tls.
Commander of an Army Corps	600	1,000
Commander of a Division	400	600
Commander of a Brigade	250	250
Commander of a Regiment	200	200
Commander of a Battalion	100	140
Commander of a Company	60	20
A.D.C. to Divisional Commander	100	100
A.D.C. to Brigade Commander	80	80
Quartermaster Sergeant	30	
Ordnance Sergeant	30	
Signalling Sergeant	16	
Corporal	5.1	
Lance-Corporal	4.8	
First Class Private	4.5	
Second Class Private	4.2	

From Tls. 1 to Tls. 1.50 is deducted from the pay of privates and non-commissioned officers for food.

In actual practice all pay is now reckoned in Mexican dollars and, in the few units in which the men and officers are regularly paid, there has been no material increase over the figures given above in ten years.

The actual method of payment of troops when such payment is made is for the military war lord to pay a division commander a lump sum for his troops. The division commander after taking out a certain amount for himself gives the remainder to the brigade commanders who in turn take out a certain amount for themselves, turning over the remainder to the regimental commander, and so on down to the enlisted man. This system is extremely bad as the soldier is likely to come out at the small end of the horn. Moreover, it causes each individual to look upon his next higher commander as the source of his pay rather than upon what should be the real source - the government. The effect of this is that the soldier becomes the personal employee of his immediate commander with the result that like any other employee he is looking for the employer who pays the highest wages. This system may be said to be one of the main causes for the present decentralization of the army.

Commissariat.

The diet of the Chinese soldier, whether in garrison or in the field, is essentially that of the average farmer, namely, a grain diet somewhat relieved by the addition of cooked green vegetables - cabbage, spinach, onions, etc. In the Yangtze valley and the south the staple grain diet is rice and for troops native to the rice growing areas no other grain will serve as a substitute. On the other hand, the health and morale of soldiers of the wheat growing northern provinces

The Chinese cart - universal means of transportation in North China.

View of Chinese cart without top. Note how load is piled to front and rear of body.

emergency, of millet, maize or sorghum. [illegible] facilities permit, wheat flour is most commonly prepared in the form of noodles cooked in a meat or vegetable soup. On active service, however, the staple is usually unleavened bread, either baked or steamed, the most quickly and readily prepared being what is known as "lao-ping", a thin pancake of unleavened flour the size of a dinner plate cooked on both sides in an open shallow iron boiler. Millet or sorghum, cooked like rice, are unpopular substitutes. In emergency the last resort is to heavy, indigestible cakes made of a mixture of bean flour and maize meal, thought to be heating but not sustaining. A catty of flour (one and one-third pounds) per man per day would be a very liberal ration. The value of the "green" supplied is almost negligible, while the meat supplied would not, on the average, exceed two ounces per man per day in any unit. The total cost of rationing varies widely, according to district and local conditions, but is now nowhere less than $2 per man per month, or more than $5 per man per month. The use of tinned meats and tinned biscuit is an innovation, but it has become the fashion in the best units to give out tinned beef to troops suffering from exposure and hardship in the trenches or under heavy strain, while biscuits are usually reserved for the wounded.

Fodder for animals in the north (virtually non-existent south of the Yangtze River) consists of grain as a staple, millet straw as "ruffage", and bran as a fattener. The grain staple fed to horses and mules varies according to climate and local usage. In north and central-north China dried black beans are commonly fed. In the western provinces dried peas take their place. In the mountains black, huskless barley of a native variety is the staple. In many mountainous areas in China oats grow wild and have been cultivated to no great advantage so that the value of oats has still to be recognized by the army.

Mobility, Marching, Transportation.

In the matter of transport the Chinese armies are everywhere particularly weak and inefficient from the Western point of view. For transport purposes the horse, mule, donkey and camel are employed throughout the north. In the south impressed farmers and coolies take the place of the animal. Where motor roads exist, or where it is possible to build temporary roads, the various northern armies have wholly inadequate fleets of staff cars, motor ambulances and motor trucks. These are of all well-known makes and types and invariably are in the worst possible condition. The artillery and cavalry of course have their own ponies and mules, but the great bulk of a Chinese army's impedimenta is hauled by conveyances and animals commandeered from the peasantry, for which trifling compensation is sometimes paid, while the hardest imaginable service is exacted. Carts, animals and men are frequently transported hundreds of miles by rail for use in a campaign, no advance provision being made for adequate supplies of fodder, and at the end of a campaign the carters and muleteers are supposed to find their own way home. The devastating effect upon local commerce in all war areas can scarcely be imagined, and, since the owners of conveyances resort to every possible device to escape military service, an army's movements are invariably erratic and behind schedule.

All of the above being true, the Chinese nevertheless accomplish remarkable results with this system.

Chihli troops of Wu Pei-fu being transported by rail. It is common to erect tents in open cars when closed ones are not available. Troops sometimes live for months in these cars.



The camel pack is composed of two sacks stuffed with straw, placed on either side of the camel's hump and held in place by two poles lashed at either end.

of way, as far as he is able, for his troops, and will not allow the regular staff to interfere, wrecks, tie-ups, deterioration and shortage of rolling stock naturally are the results.

Water Transportation.

In the central and southern part of China where water transportation is possible, the military leaders commandeer all types of boats from steamers down to sampans (small boats). As the steamers in many cases are flying under foreign flags, complications usually arise.

General Staff.

There has always been a form of general staff work in the Chinese Army, but not as foreign armies know it. There is and has been from time immemorial a great difference in caste between the scholar and the soldier; and the latter, knowing little or nothing of the art of writing dispatches, ~~etc.~~ was dependent on the former for the performance of this duty.

The Chinese dislike for responsibility has caused the higher officials to surround themselves with many subordinates who are charged with the arrangement of detail, but apparently mainly for the protection of the higher party in case of mistake or disaster. A Chinese general must have a great many people around him to attend to his minor contacts with outsiders, as loss of face would be suffered by him if he attempted to accomplish them himself.

In the recent meeting between Wu Pai-fu and Chang Tso-lin at Peking, all details and most of the final outcome of the conference were arranged by subordinates who met before the principals, showing again the Chinese disposition of self-protection first; as, should anything have gone wrong at the final parley, the chiefs would have repudiated advance negotiations without loss of face or undue friction.

The General Staff organization is supposed to follow the Japanese system. If there existed at this time a regular army under a central government, this would undoubtedly be the case. In Peking there is a General Staff Bureau connected with the War Office, but on account of existing political conditions it has completely ceased to function. The major officials of this office change with the changes of power in Peking but the minor officials generally remain, and some have held their posts for many years. Even during the early days of the Republic this office might be said to have existed in name only, as its main function was to provide places of honor and pecuniary advantage to numbers of hangers on.

By official decree promulgated on August 31, 1912, the supreme control of the army is vested in the General Staff (T'san mou pen pu) and in the Ministry of War (Lu Chün-pu). The President of China is the Commander-in-Chief and he is theoretically advised and assisted by the College of Marshals (Chiang chün fu) which is nominally a council of high military officials upon whom the rank of Marshal has been conferred. This body was modelled after the Japanese Genro, or Council of Elder

honor. The Members never meet and could never hope to in any way direct the policy of the government. This roll includes the names of high military officials who have been removed from their posts and whom the government in power at the time wish to retire gracefully.

The practical administration of military details, however, is supposed to be in the hands of the Ministry of War, whose office operates under the following departments:

1. Military Administration (practically A.G.D.)
2. Military Affairs (organization and distribution of troops, military communications, fortifications, etc.)
3. Ordnance
4. Military Education
5. Commissariat
6. Medical
7. Military Law
8. Remount

In actual practice the Ministry of War and General Staff are largely engaged on unimportant paper work. The army units look only to their Tuchuns for orders and the attitude of these leaders toward the Ministry of War depends upon their political alliances. To sum up the matter it may be said that while the central staff organization is there, it does not function.

Each military leader now has his own system of organization for his General Staff, arranged to suit his own needs and influenced by his advisors, who may be foreign trained Chinese or foreigners. As a result it is impossible to report a standard system. The following outline was obtained from an ex-staff officer (flying corps) who served as such in Wu Pei-fu's army within the last several years.

1. Chief of Staff: Advisor to commanding general.
2. Quartermaster: Responsible for rations, forage, clothing and money (soldiers' pay)
3. Judge Advocate: Responsible for military law.
4. Ordnance: Responsible for implements of war.
5. Business Manager (fu kuan): Buys all munitions, also attends to all other civilian contacts, arranges billeting, etc.
6. Communications: Stevedore work, transportation, railroads, telephone and telegraph.
7. Secretary: Publicity, official dispatches, letters, and inter-communications.
8. Intelligence: Military intelligence of all kinds.
9. Miscellaneous General Staff Officers (number indefinite): Advisors to Chief of Staff and assist him in promulgation of orders.
10. A.D.C. (also fu kuan - number indefinite): Personal attendants of commanding general. Transmission of orders and responsible for interviews and appointments.

General Staff officers are not detailed from the line as a rule but are trained in a staff school for the work they will later follow. There is such a school for quartermaster officers in Peking. Having once gone through one of these schools an officer is regarded as qualified for the rest of his service and there is no such thing as a rejuvination course. There are however exceptions to the above

C hanging guard, Kuominchun troops. This shows how pack is carried in some units, the blanket being passed through roll and across the chest.

Another method of carrying pack used by Kuominchun troops. It is carried by means of slings from the top on each side, over the shoulder and fastened to the bottom of the pack. They do not cross the chest.

from civilian life and all were commercial men. These officers hold very important positions on his staff. Each commander from and including the battalion up, was allowed to appoint and dismiss his own "fu kuan" without reference to higher authority. The "fu kuan" ranked a salute but did not command troops. Having direct access to their commanders, which is not ordinarily the case with subordinates, they occupied positions of considerable power and were much feared by the soldiers. In Feng's army they were very carefully picked and were charged with all civilian contact, such as billeting, arranging with Chambers of Commerce in towns through which the army would pass, handling supplies, establishing camps, ~~etc.~~ They are a very capable body of men.

The advance of the Fengtien forces on Peking in the late winter and spring of 1926 showed good staff work. Reports as to Chang Tso-lin's dispositions and plans which forced the National Army ~~forces~~ to evacuate the capital rather point to foreign advisement. ~~(probably Japanese)~~. However, the evacuation of the capital was also a very orderly affair, which leads to the conclusion that Feng's staff was also carefully organized and trained, and that it did function efficiently. Further, as to Feng's forces, an observer from this office reports on the Chihli-Fengtien War of 1924 as follows:

"Each brigade and division had a chief of staff with a varying number of staff officers to assist him. They were on the whole a very intelligent and well informed lot of men. The assistants to the chief of Staff had no definitely assigned duties as our general staff officers have but were assigned to do whatever work needed to be done. For example, a staff captain was assigned the duty of working out plans for defense against airplane attacks. When this was finished, he might be placed on personnel, or other work. There were no divisions for staff work as we know them, and in many cases there was a duplication of duties probably due to the dislike of assuming responsibility and to the characteristic of the Chinese which requires many heads and hands to accomplish a given end.

"There was no opportunity to observe how the brigade or division staff would function in active operations. Their planning and carrying out of the march to Jehol and return to Peking, however, was excellent. The orderly, efficient and speedy way in which Feng's troops returned to Peking for the coup d'etat was a logistic movement for which any army might be commended. It was planned in secret, the troops prepared under cover of darkness and carried out the plans, so far as the observer could see, without a hitch. While this movement was in progress civilians were not allowed to travel, and all mail and telegraphic communications were taken over by the military. In the opinion of the observer the staff work in the matter of logistics was very well done. In this connection it might be well to mention here the "fu kuan", or adjutants, who carry out the greater amount of the logistical work. They are in reality good business men chosen by each officer of high rank to assist in handling non-military matters of administration and supply. They cannot command troops, but rank an officer's salute. Each brigade and division headquarters has its "fu kuan chang" or chief adjutant, and they have their assistants down to the battalion.

Kuominchun bodyguard troops, often called "ta tao tui"
(big knife troops)



Kuominchun bodyguard going through special sword drill.

more important part than military strategy. In the history of Chinese military operations it has been the former and not the latter that has won victories. It is not believed, however, that much information leaked out from Feng's headquarters in time to be of use to the opposing side.

"The supply of the units was handled by the "fu kuan" or adjutants, who have been mentioned before. These go in advance of the troops and establish "ping chan" or supply stations at which the troops stop while on the march. These supply stations requisitioned from the town or village in which they were located whatever feed or forage was required. They also made arrangements to billet the troops when tents were not available."

In the engagement between the Fengtien troops and those of Kuo Sung-lin, December 23, 1925, on the Liao River, the former showed evidence of having been disposed for battle with great skill and of the possession of detailed and accurate information concerning the enemy. The cavalry maneuver was planned with consummate skill and executed at exactly the right minute. There is thus evidence of excellent staff work heretofore noticeably absent in Chinese battle maneuvers. (~~For detailed account of battle dispositions see Report of M/A, China, No. 5771, pars. 5,6,7,8; No. 5741, par. 8; No. 5734, par. 16.~~)

From the foregoing it is easily seen that the system of staff division differs in each large command. This is accounted for in two ways. First, the presence of foreign advisors; and second, because there is no central head to whom the various commanders are responsible. For instance, a foreign ex-officer on the staff of Chang Tsung-chang says that his (Chang's) chief of staff is not consulted or taken into confidence on any occasion. Chang writes all his own orders, consulting no one, and the chief of staff is not advised of the contents of such orders until they are ready for publication. On one occasion Chang was reading an order to this ex-officer when the chief of staff came into the room. Chang folded the paper, put it in his pocket and curtly dismissed the chief of staff. This same man says that Chang's most important functionary, practically the only one that he depends upon, is his finance officer. This is a general officer of the staff, who is charged with procuring money for Chang's needs. This officer works in collusion with a banker, who takes care of the money as it is levied. This money is controlled directly by Chang, and is paid out by him in such lots as are necessary.

One draws the conclusion from the above that in some organizations there is no coordinated staff such as we use. But it is easily seen from the various reports of recent engagements that the staff is being used by Chinese commanders, and that as they gain experience in actual warfare under increasingly modern conditions they give more time and thought to the selection and training of staff officers.

staff work is unquestionably improving in Chinese units, but the inability of the Chinese to completely trust one another makes good staff work very difficult.

Infantry.

The infantry in China, as in other countries, has always been the backbone of the army. Up to the time of the invention of firearms it compared favorably with that of the Western world. There was practically no progress made until the time of the Sino-Japanese War of 1904-1905, when the Chinese began to realize the appalling inefficiency of their infantry arms. Since that time they have endeavored to equip and train their troops after the pattern of foreign armies in general and of Japan and Germany in particular.

Although it is impossible to obtain accurate figures as to the strength of the infantry, it is estimated that it totals about eighty per cent of the entire armed forces existing in China.

The chief, and frequently the exclusive arm of the Chinese infantryman, is the rifle, the following models of which are known to be in use: Mannlicher 6.5 mm, rifles and carbines; Japanese 6.5 mm, rifles and carbines, 30th and 38th years of Meiji; Mauser 6.8 mm rifle, model 1913; Mauser 7.9 mm rifle, model 1888; Japanese 7.9 rifles of the 20th, 28th and 36th years of Meiji; Japanese 7.9 mm rifle of the 22nd year (Murata); and Russian 3 line rifles. In the more remote districts obsolete and obsolescent arms of all kinds are common. The model of rifle often varies throughout the individual unit. In many organizations there are not enough rifles to go around and in certain localities the scarcity of rifles has caused entire units to be armed with spears.

The commonest type of bayonet is made on an Austrian model with a blade just under ten inches in length and a trifle over an inch in breadth, designed as a cutting as well as a thrusting weapon. The type of bayonet is in many cases determined by the model of rifle, and many individual soldiers and organizations are unarmed with this weapon. One of the most popular weapons in use in the infantry as well as in other branches of the Chinese Army is the German Luger automatic pistol, which is imported and also manufactured in several arsenals. This, as well as the beheading sword, is a familiar article of equipment among personal bodyguard troops throughout China.

Chinese practice with regard to the incorporation of machine gun and trench mortar units in infantry organizations is by no means standardized, while the use of the 37mm gun and cannon of larger calibre as accompanying infantry weapons is rare. The efficacy of machine guns is universally recognized and they are manufactured in many arsenals throughout the country, the majority being designed after one or another of the following models: Maxim, Hotchkiss, "German Pack", "Rex" (made in Canton), and the Japanese air cooled gun. A considerable number of imported Japanese machine guns of more modern design are also in use. Nearly a year ago it was estimated that there were 1394 machine guns in service in China, but, as since then the facilities for the manufacture of these weapons in arsenals as well as the opportunities for procurement from abroad have materially increased, the number doubtless must greatly exceed this figure. The number of machine guns assigned to units of the infantry, while usually far below that

Kuomintang cavalry starting a march. Considerable loading is done by Chinese cavalry.

Chang Hsueh-liang's personal bodyguard cavalry. This is as tough an outfit of carefully picked cut-throats as can be found in China, and probably one of the best fighting organizations in the country.

indicated by modern practice may be said solely to depend upon the ability of commanding officers to lay hands upon them.

In 1924 trench mortars were first introduced into Chinese warfare by the Mukden army. Since that time they have grown in popularity throughout the Chinese service. The mortars at present in use are generally a modification of the well known Stokes Mortar improved with regard to range and accuracy. They are at present made at the Hanyang Arsenal, the Canton Arsenal, and in Mukden. The Mukden Arsenal has produced some six inch mortars, which have not met with great success.

In Chang Tso-lin's forces the battalion is supposed to have 8-3" trench mortars and 8-37 mm guns. This will be more closely approximated in the Fengtien Army than in other units.

The way in which equipment is carried varies greatly in nearly every unit even of the same large command. In Chang Tso-lin's army it approximates closely the Japanese way. About the only articles common to all are small cloth bags for small articles, and some type of water bottle. In Feng Yu-hsiang's army they have evolved a fairly satisfactory way of carrying equipment.

As noted above, his men carry a small bag, which is slung from the left shoulder to hang over the right hip. In rear of this, hanging on the belt, is carried a small cup and cloth covered water bottle, balanced by the bayonet on the left. The cartridge belt ~~on which were hung these articles~~ is of cloth, tied around the waist by strings. It holds about 100 rounds of ammunition. One or two bandoleers, made just like the belt, are slung diagonally across the chest. A sort of padded quilt and blanket are carried in the pack, the quilt being rolled first and the blanket then rolled long and thin. The latter was used to tie the pack on by being passed through the rolled quilt and then tied across the chest in front. The pack is then slung from the left shoulder and pointed toward the right hip, the blanket going over the left shoulder, across the chest and under the right arm, ~~as shown in the photographs~~. Extra shoes are attached to the outside of the roll by the strings which keep the quilt in place. A small trench spade or small mattock in leather case is also fastened to the roll in like manner. The umbrella is slung to balance the pick or mattock. In some regiments the pack is not slung across the back but was so arranged that the blanket formed a sling for the left shoulder and a cloth sling was used to go over the right shoulder. ~~In this way the pack was carried in position a little like our own, as can be seen from the photograph.~~

The marching ability of the Chinese infantryman cannot be questioned. Unhampered as he is by an excess of equipment, the Chinese soldier on the march is able to exploit the natural endurance of his race to the limit. Poor food, scarcity of provisions and adverse weather conditions do not seem to affect him in the least. Twenty-five miles under full equipment is an average day's march, while marches of thirty and thirty-five miles under the same conditions are not impracticable.

While the marching ability of the individual Chinese soldier is good, contrary to expectation the mobility of larger units is usually poor. The reason for this is the lack of march discipline and of organizing ability on the part of higher commanders. Where Chinese

Fengtien cavalry waiting to pass in review before Chang Hsueh-liang.

Kuominchun cavalry crossing the Lan River. This bridge was built by soldier labor.

wars are fought in the vicinity of railroads, the majority of unit commanders tend to depend upon rail transportation rather than upon marching. In this connection, however, it must be noted that while troop movements are relatively slow in execution, preparations for such movements usually can be accomplished in the minimum of time due to the paucity of equipment.

While relative immobility of large units is the rule, some notable exceptions may be pointed out. For example, the advance of Kuo Sung-lin into Manchuria in December, 1925, and the retreat of the Kuominchun from the Tientsin area in March and April, 1926, both showed splendid endurance on the part of the troops, intelligent staff work by the higher command, and considerable skill in the use of all transportation facilities available.

In the case of Feng's troops this march was conducted on the same principle as were his advance to Jehol and his return to Peking for the coup d'etat which took place near the close of the Chihli-Fengtien war of 1924. The troops marched from supply station to supply station (ping chan). They always marched at night as much as possible and in the early morning before daylight. The marches under cover of darkness were very well done and with very little confusion, and in the instances named above the march discipline was very good.

Chinese infantry tactics are of the simplest variety and generally represent an unreasoned application of Japanese military doctrine of the offensive. The method usually employed is the direct frontal attack, ultimate victory depending upon fire action and thus indirectly on the supply of ammunition available. The principles of wide deployment and concentration in depth are poorly understood. The coordinate employment of infantry weapons, such as indirect and flanking fire by machine guns, and the use of trench mortars to paralyze centers of resistance, is practically unknown. Defensive operations usually are passive and here, too, positions trend to be shallow. Cooperation between the infantry and other arms is achieved with difficulty and coordination between larger infantry units is the exception rather than the rule.

The training of the infantry soldier is almost exclusively confined to close order drill based on the German and Japanese regulations. Considerable attention is also paid to calisthenics and physical training, and in the Kuominchun in 1925 an exceedingly high degree of proficiency was attained in these exercises, with the result that the physique and bearing of the individual soldier was superior.

In times of peace only the rudiments of extended order are taught and training in combat principles is very lightly stressed. During the constant warfare of the past few years, however, the sheer necessity of self preservation has given the Chinese soldier a thorough grounding in the rudiments of open warfare. For the same reason, platoon and company officers are usually proficient in minor tactics.

Target practice for infantry in the past has been almost entirely neglected. In the more progressive armies of the present time some attempts are made in systematic target practice, but due to the poor condition and lack of uniformity of arms and ammunition such training has not been productive of any notable results. In consequence

the Chinese soldier of today is an execrable shot. The men as a rule understand the sights in a general way but have no conception of the use of the sling in shooting.

In firing the rifle the soldier takes a prone position in prolongation of the piece, the elbows are quite close together and the legs and feet are together. It is a most awkward position and one which causes the soldier much fatigue. After each shot the rifle is removed from the shoulder to work the bolt.

Bayonet drill while well executed as far as precision in the movements is concerned is done much more slowly than our own. There is quite a little of the theatrical flourish which characterizes the handling of all weapons by the Chinese. There is no bayonet work on dummies as far as it is possible to ascertain.

The Chinese infantryman at present is magnificent material, very poorly developed. He is patient, cool, hardy, and under proper leadership capable of sustained efforts. The very scantiness of his equipment tends to emphasize his endurance and to increase his individual mobility. The Chinese infantryman could undoubtedly be developed into an efficient soldier. The infantry in its present state of training is however inferior to the infantry of any Western nation.

Cavalry.

The Chinese have used cavalry since time immemorial. In ancient times Genghis Khan, Kublai Khan and other notable military leaders of the day used cavalry almost exclusively. The successive invasions of China from the north and northwest by the Tartars and Mongols, and the Manchus, all were accomplished by the use of cavalry. Because of the superior mobility of the invaders the Chinese were compelled to use cavalry in order to cope with them. When these people became established in power, and later when they were assimilated by the Chinese, they continued the use of cavalry in warfare.

Whatever may have been the powers of cavalry in the past, at the present time this arm has deteriorated to such an extent that it is almost a negligible quantity except in the northern and northwestern parts of China. In Manchuria, Kansu and the northern provinces, the largest cavalry unit is the division. Of these northern divisions probably the best are those of General Wu Chun-sheng, Governor of Heilungchiang Province, Manchuria. The organization of all cavalry units is very elastic.

There are no standard arms in the Chinese cavalry; however, all cavalry carry rifles or carbines with the exception of a few recently recruited units of Kansu cavalry which are equipped with lances only. The rifles used are either Italian rifles about fifteen years old, similar to those carried by the Chinese infantry, or are Japanese rifles or carbines of the Japanese 38th year model. Rifles and carbines are carried slung across the back of the trooper. In addition to rifles some cavalry is equipped with pistols and beheading knives. The Kansu cavalry is equipped throughout with lances.

Ammunition is carried in belts and bandoliers. The cartridge belt is of cloth and is tied around the waist by strings. It holds 100 rounds. The bandoliers are similar to the cartridge belts and are slung across the shoulder, crossing in front and in back if there are two of them. Sometimes both belts and bandoliers are worn, depending on the amount of ammunition available for each trooper.

Officer's Mount.



Portable feed troughs are used in some organizations.

Kunmingchun cavalry trooper with pushed saddle. This is of foreign type, sometimes imported, sometimes copied locally.

Chinese wooden saddle, still much used by cavalry. It is equally hard on horse and man.

ing of a rifle mounted was much stressed. At the present time very little attention is paid to the use of arms mounted. Mounted pistol and rifle practice have newer been observed nor heard of. In fact, target practice of any kind with any arm is rare in China. This is doubtless due to the value of ammunition which when once used is hard to replace.

The majority of soldiers have very little conception as to the use of the weapons with which they are equipped. The use of the sights is a mystery to them. Slings are never used in firing. Metal parts, when not badly rusted, are brightly polished. It is generally customary to plug the rifle barrel with a piece of rag to keep out the dust.

Mounted practice is held with spears and beheading knives, with which the men are very expert dismounted. These are traditional weapons of the Chinese and they know how to use them. When mounted, however, their expertness is in direct proportion to their ability to manage their horses, hence, with the exception of those units noted (i.e., some of the Heilungchiang and Kansu cavalry) the mounted use of weapons is very inferior.

The uniform is of grey cotton material and in the winter is padded. Wrap cotton puttees are worn and all men wear the typical Chinese low cloth shoe. At the present time some of the officers are wearing leather riding boots. A sort of padded quilt and blanket, a tin cloth-covered canteen, and a common enameled cup are practically all the personal equipment carried by the trooper; no intrenching tools or extra shoes being issued to them as is done in the infantry. The pack is rolled in a short cylindrical roll and is strapped on the cantle of the saddle. Some of Wu Pei-fu's cavalry have steel helmets.

The Chinese cavalry mount is the stocky pony common to North China. The horse equipment consists of a rope halter worn at all times, a leather bridle with a single snaffle bit, and a leather saddle made after the German type. Neither bridles, bits nor saddles are necessarily uniform. The saddles, while in general following the German pattern, are made lighter in order to fit the smaller Chinese horses. The pommel pockets, when present, are of leather and usually contain nothing. Cantle bags either are made of leather or of white canvas and are likewise generally empty. The horse equipment as a whole is poorly cared for and due to this fact and in addition, the uniform dryness of the climate would undoubtedly crack and break if subjected to much usage in campaign.

Under ordinary conditions, at the present time cavalry covers only slightly more ground in a day than infantry. Marching is accomplished by riding horses at a walk and by dismounting and leading. Trotting is used only for short periods due to the confusion involved by the different gaits of the horses, many of the animals being pacers, a gait which is considered very desirable by the Chinese. The average rate of march is 10 li, or a little over three miles per hour. However, they are capable of putting forth greater effort; for example, in the Chihli-Fengtien War of 1924 the average daily march of the so-called National Army cavalry was from 100 to 120 li, or from 30 to 40 miles per day.

use of the legs or the weight as an aid. They treat all animals cruelly and horses are no exception to the rule. On marches they cinch up their mounts until it is small wonder that the cinch does not cut through the animal. As long as the saddle does not fall off the horse's back no attempt is made to adjust the equipment. In camp, horses are left saddled on the picket line for protracted periods, the result being that sore backs are the rule rather than the exception.

Very little grooming is done and the hair is allowed to grow long and shaggy. Horses are fed anything from dry and unappetizing kaoliang stalks to soggy bread of the worst grade. Millet, beans and in fact anything that the country provides is also fed. However, they do use good judgment as to times of feeding and watering. They always water before feeding and on the march they water along the road wherever the opportunity presents itself. Also, they usually lead their horses for a time before mounting.

In isolated cases such as the battle of Hsinminfu in December, 1925, and the movement of General Wu Chun-sheng on Dolonor in July, 1926, great mobility was apparent, accompanied by fearful casualties among the animals due to lack of care in handling.

There is no type of transportation for cavalry. Most cavalry lives on the country and exists by foraging and requisitioning food for both men and animals from the inhabitants. If necessity arises for the use of animal drawn transportation, the ordinary Chinese two wheeled cart is used. These carts with their drivers usually are pressed into service from among the civil population for the necessary length of time and then dismissed. Occasionally carts are purchased but this is seldom done as the other method is easier and cheaper.

With the exception of some units of Heilungchiang cavalry, small numbers of the National Army cavalry and some of the Kansu cavalry, Chinese cavalry is far from efficient and effective. On the whole it can be characterized as average Chinese infantry hampered by a horse. In isolated cases they have been capable of putting forth superior efforts both in marching and in battle maneuvering. For example, at the most critical stage of the battle of Hsinminfu, December, 1925, General Kuo Sung-lin's rear was attacked by two Manchurian cavalry divisions and he was completely routed. The cavalry movement was planned with consummate skill and executed at precisely the right moment. It may be added that this attack was made after a long and fatiguing march in the dead of the cold Manchurian winter.

Discipline on the whole is poor. On the march there is much straggling over which no supervision is exercised either by officers or non-commissioned officers. Looting and other forms of terrorization of peaceful inhabitants is a recognized thing. The officers apparently make no effort to control this. In fact, the Chinese cavalry trooper in common with the enlisted man of the other branches seems to have things pretty much his own way as far as discipline is concerned.

Morale, as a rule, is a question of good food, regular pay, slackness in discipline on the part of the officers, and face. An exception to this is to be found in the cavalry of General Feng Yu-hsiang, where his use of Christianity, regardless of his personal feelings on the subject, has been ~~without peer as~~ a factor in raising morale.

Battery of Fengtien artillery (10th Army) passing in review. Note that the cannoneers carry rifles, and that the two riding on the piece are standing.

Kuominchun artillery park. There is a trench around the entire camp just behind the breastwork shown in foreground.

would be a negligible factor in modern warfare. It is so inferior to the cavalry of other nations as to preclude the idea of comparison. It can safely be assumed that any nation having cavalry at all has better cavalry than that of the Chinese.

Artillery.

The Chinese used Ballistae as far back as the beginning of the Christian era but they made practically no advance until after the Chino-Japanese war when they began buying and starting the manufacture of modern artillery. Since that time they have made fair progress.

Due to the decentralization it is impossible to obtain accurate figures on the artillery. An idea can be obtained, however, by considering that of Chang Tso-lin and Chang Tsung-chang, two of the most powerful of the leaders.

Chang Tso-lin has 7 regiments of 77mm guns, 12 to the battalion, or 36 to a regiment, and 1 regiment of 150 mm guns, 8 to a battalion or 24 to a regiment, nearly all of which were manufactured in his Mukden arsenal.

Chang Tsung-chang has a total of 160 field artillery guns of which about 40% are worn out and of no use. About 40% of the total number are old Russian guns and are the remains of the artillery equipment of the White Russian forces which fought in Siberia in 1918-1920. About 25% are Japanese made guns, mostly old models given by the Japanese to the White Russians at Vladivostok in 1919. The remainder are Chinese made Krupp, French 75mm and Krupp 75mm. Organization is the same as Chang Tso-lin's. An interesting feature of Chang Tsung-chang's artillery is that he has a regiment manned and officered by White Russians. This undoubtedly is the most efficient artillery in China. Their fire methods, however, are those of 1914 and 1915.

The artillery belonging to the above two generals amounts to about 50% of the total artillery in China and is the most efficient of the Chinese artillery.

In the various armies throughout China the artillery uses the following materiel:

Field and Mountain Guns.

Krupp 75 mm
Gurson 75 mm
" 57 "
Arisaka 75 mm
Schneider 75 mm
Austrian 77 mm
Also 77 mm and 150 mm of Chinese manufacture.

Rifles.

Manlicher 6.5
Japanese 6.5
Mauser 6.8 - 1913
" 7.9 - 1888
Japanese 7.9
Russian 3 line rifles.

Ammunition.

Imported or locally made. Some is old, deteriorated and unsafe for use.

In the matter of transportation Chinese artillerymen have acquired, through experience, astonishing dexterity in the breaking down and re-assembly of field artillery in the Yangtze valley, by virtue of the common practice of taking guns apart where there are no roads and of having them moved overland by carriers. The heaviest parts are readily moved over supposedly difficult mountain roads on bamboo frames slung between ten or twenty bearers. By the construction of a different system of bamboo frames, heavy artillery parts are as readily carried through rice swamp areas; and officers, accustomed to breaking down and setting up big guns, can move and place heavy artillery in the roadless southern country with almost the same speed and ease as over the cart roads of the north.

In the north where animal drawn artillery is possible, six horses are used with the 77 mm and eight horses with the 150 mm. Although the above is the rule the Chinese will, in cases of necessity, use any combination of horses, donkeys, mules and bullocks.

Due to expense and difficulty in obtaining ammunition practically no target practice is held. But due to incessant wars the northern troops obtain quite a bit of real experience.

The Chinese artillery, however, is not an efficient branch. Officers know very little concerning observation and adjustment. They are just beginning to use high explosives and know little concerning the value of shrapnel, high explosive, time, delay, non-delay and instantaneous fuses. They know little regarding the use of air service in connection with artillery, little about dispersion and the theory of probable error. Artillery as a rule is used at extreme ranges. The siege of Nankow by the Fengtien Army in August, 1926, was the first instance in China where artillery was ever massed in attack.

Although in many instances artillery not in use is very well kept, in combat it is usually poorly kept. Spare parts and even tools are soon lost and due to diversity of types, poor lines of communication, etc., are almost impossible to obtain.

The artillery, however, is fairly effective against Chinese troops. The side having the most artillery makes the most noise and particularly at night makes the greatest display, thereby gaining tremendous moral advantage. For the reasons given above, Chinese artillery cannot compare in any way with that of any foreign country. The main cause for this condition is the officer. Foreign officers, given a reasonable amount of time to train and power to discipline, could develop the artillery into an efficient arm.

Improvised armored trains, covered with light steel plates, mounting field pieces, are now used by the northern forces with doubtful efficiency.

Coast Artillery.

There are no modern fortifications in China. Old fortifications that should be taken into consideration still exist at the following places:

Fengtien machine gun unit. The Chinese pack saddle is very easily adapted to carrying equipment of this sort.

Type of soldier in bodyguard troops. These are all picked me

[illegible] River at
[illegible] (near Shanghai)
[illegible] (165 miles above Shanghai)
[illegible] " " "
Nanking (220 " " ")
Kiukiang (450 " " ")

The Woosung and Kiang Yin forts contain armament up to 12" Armstrong model, about 1895. The Nanking forts have armament up to 8" guns of model 1890. The Kiukiang forts contain 3 obsolete batteries, the largest breech loading guns being 4.7" Krupps. The latter gun is a favorite along the Yangtze. The larger Armstrong guns were usually constructed in the Shanghai arsenal on tubes shipped from England. These guns have not been fired for many years. There appears to be no prospect of replacement for many years to come. While dangerous at small ranges against unprotected cruisers, these guns can be outranged by late model guns on foreign vessels.

2. Canton (Kwangtung). The coast defense consists of barriers in the channels leading to the city and old forts on the Mainland and islands. The Whampoa Barrier narrows the channel to 400 ft. with 16 1/2 ft. depth at low water and could easily be closed to navigation. There are three other similar barriers chiefly made of stone and wood piles. The channel forts are well placed; the armament is obsolete.

The fortifications on Duane Island are the strongest and control the entrances to Canton harbor. The guns are mostly 6", no late models.

Canton has four old works for land defense. Though old and rotten, they have excellent locations and could easily be made fairly strong with modern artillery. Magazine Hill and City Hill are the key positions to the city. These are armed only with smooth bores.

3. Amoy (Fukien). There are three obsolete forts guarding the entrance to the harbor, the largest guns being two 28 centimeter and two centimeter breech loading Krupp rifles mounted about 36 years ago. There apparently is no system of range finding or fire control.

4. Foochow (Fukien). Below Foochow on the Min River there are some 10" guns.

The guns at all the above fortifications, although obsolete, are kept in good condition. They would be ineffective against modern naval guns.

Discipline and Morale in the Chinese Army.

In order to understand the discipline, or rather lack of discipline in the Chinese Army, it is necessary to understand the source from which the soldier comes.

In China today, every day, the greatest battle is waged by 200,000,000 people, about 50% of the total population, for bare existence - food; food on which an American or European could not exist. The struggle to keep from starving is something that a foreigner who has not seen conditions in China cannot appreciate. The result is that some of these people go into the army from choice rather than keep up

Typical camp in a temple ground (Kuominchun at Jehol).

Soldiers messing (Kuominchun at Lan River).

[illegible] pressed into service. In many cases [illegible] officers. They are told they will be given an appointment [illegible] of soldiers they can raise. By various promises and personal appeal they raise a company, battalion or regiment, which is incorporated into the war lord's army with the individual as commanding officer.

Another great source of obtaining soldiers is to take bands of bandits varying from a few in number to many thousands into the army in toto. These bandits are in most cases merely destitute people who either permanently or periodically turn bandit. Many have rifles obtained by various methods.

The source of the Chinese officers is relatively not much better. These are appointed from the ranks or from civilian life to any rank depending on their influence, what they have to offer, or friendships. They are promoted for the same reasons or as rewards for services rendered. Not over 10% are officers as we know them.

The Chinese coolie is one of the meekest persons on earth. Give him a uniform - it does not make him a fighting man but it does make him a bully over anyone who does not wear a uniform. This soldier will do many things in the way of discipline which he knows to be custom without a murmur. On the other hand he is not disciplined. If his commanding officers tells him to do something the soldier may say "Tell Wang to do it, he's not doing anything". If the officer insists, the soldier will do it but in a very unsatisfactory way. The question arises as to why the officer does not punish him. If it is very aggravating to the Chinese mind, he will. On the other hand, many things which we would not tolerate, the Chinese officer, not being a bona fide army officer, sees nothing contrary to his idea of good discipline. Another reason the soldier is not disciplined is that as he probably has not been paid for many months the officer knows that in battle he may do anything - he may go over to the enemy, desert, or make only a bluff at fighting. As no real record is kept of soldiers the deserter has no fear of arrest. He joins another force, becomes a bandit, or is lost in the crowd as a coolie. It therefore behooves the officer to treat his men well; that is, have lax discipline.

The above facts give some idea of the status of what may be called "discipline in general" in the Chinese Army. That particular discipline necessary to take a position by repeated assault or to defend a position against prolonged determined attack, where retreat is possible, is not to be found in the Chinese soldier.

In the first place the Chinese mind is such that it will never force an issue to a definite conclusion. Moreover, the Chinese not being brave or a natural fighter, and being in the army as a rule merely from force of necessity, will exert himself and defy death for three reasons only - he has been worked up to a fanatical pitch; he sees the hope of personal gain; or he fights from the instinct of self-preservation. The first need not be discussed; the second is the reason some commanding officers premise and allow three days for looting after capturing an important town; and the third accounts for the fact that a really decisive victory is never gained in Chinese warfare. To illustrate this point: A Chinese general will surround and attack his enemy on three sides and always give him a chance to escape on the fourth. He

knows that if he gives his enemy no chance to escape the latter will fight heroically and that his own soldiers, knowing this, will more or less lay down on the job, so that some catastrophy might happen. He knows that the enemy given the way of escape will take it; that the defeated soldiers seeing escape in the distance will never exert himself and therefore the victor can follow him and harass his retreat. By harassing his retreat just that is meant. The bulk of the victorious army will have a big banquet and enjoy the fruits of victory while a small portion only will follow up the retreating troops for a short distance. It is a common saying that the Chinese does not fear death. This is true. But he likes to live. This accounts for the fact that he will retreat rather than put up a really stiff resistance, that cornered with retreat or surrender impossible, he will fight till the end; but if all hope is lost meets his death without the slighest display of emotion.

These conclusions have not been reached from a mere study of actual warfare for a few years but also from a detailed study of some portions of ancient Chinese history. The Chinese psychology is now as it was then.

The result of the aforementioned pay system, the method of obtaining officers and men, and the looting system on discipline can well be imagined. Defection, murder and rape are common. The small amount of discipline that exists is a discipline of fear. The only loyalty that exists is loyalty to the next higher commander and this can easily be switched to another by the use of money. Soldiers fight equally badly for any side their immediate superior takes.

Feng Yu-hsiang's 1st Kuominchun is an exception to the above in that its "discipline in general" is good. By taking only young boys, as far as it is possible, into his army, using the slogan of Christianity, song singing, a large amount of calisthenics and drill, he has built up an excellent "barracks" discipline. In other respects his army is the same as the rest of the Chinese Army.

J. H. Barnard
Lieut. Colonel, F. A.,
Military Attache.

G-2 Report

6-1

6910

RESTRICTED

CHINA (Combat)

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 9 1940 WAR DEPARTMENT

Subject: Major Military Operations

Distribution of Chinese Troops

1. The following information was received by the Military Attache from British sources. It contains the locations of Chinese units as of January, 1940, and is forwarded as of possible interest:

(a) WAR ZONES

1st War Zone (Honan)

Commander: Wei Li-huang, Headquarters: Loyang
Vice Commander: Sun Lien-chung, ,, : Nanyang

Group Army	Army Corps or R.A.	Army	Division	Location
	1.	1.	1, 78.	Honan-Shansi. (Hq.:Tungkwan)
		68.	119,143.	S.W. Honan.
			31,132.	
		27.	45, 46.	Honan-Shansi.
2	26 R.A.	30.	37, 30, 31.	S.W. Honan.
			18 (NO).	W. Honan.
			35 (NO).	S.E. Honan.
			91.	S. Honan.
			23.	S. Honan.
3	3 R.A.	6.	29, 74.	E. Honan and W.
		12.	20, 22.	Kaifeng.
			81.	
		9.	47, 74.	Honan-Shansi.
		37.	8, 24.	Pinghan Railway.
		45.	125,126,127,131.	E. Pinghan Railway, S. Honan.
14.		76.	166,167.	Honan-Shansi.
			28.	Loyang.
			94.	N.Yellow River.
		2 Cav.	2.	E. Honan.
			10.	W. Honan.

2nd War Zone (Shansi-Suiyuan)

Commander: Yen Hsi-shan; Headquarters: Hsingtsi
Vice Commander: Fu Tso-yi; ,, :

From: M/A China Report No. 9854 February 28, 1940

RESTRICTED

Group Army	Army Corps or R.A.	Army	Division	Location
5.		3.	7, 12.	S. Shansi.
		14.	6, 10.	S. Shansi.
			83, 85.	S.W. Shansi.
14.		76.	116, 167.	S. Shansi.
		15.	64, 65.	S. Shansi.
18.	8 R.A.		115,120,etc.	Shansi-Suiyuan and E. Shansi.
			2 (NO).	
		47.	104,161,168.	S. Shansi.
7.		1 Cav.	3, 5, 6.	Shansi-Suiyuan.
		2 Cav.	1, 2.	N. W. Shansi.
		-	7.	Shansi-Suiyuan.
	1.	1.	1, 78.	Shansi-Shensi-Honan Border
4.		17.	177, etc.	S. Shansi.
		38.	17, etc.	
	27 R.A.	90.	42, 169.	S.E. Shansi.
		27.	45, 46.	S. E. Shansi.
13.		10.	70, 71.	W. Shansi.
8.		33.	68, 101.	N. W. Shansi.
		34.	66, 69.	E. Shansi.
		40.	39, 106.	S. E. Shansi.
6.		61.	72, 73.	N. W. Shansi.

3rd War Zone
(Kiangsu, Chekiang, S.Anhwei, E.Kiangsi, N.Fukien)

Commander: Ku Chu-tung; Headquarters: Shangjao

Group Army	Army Corps or R.A.	Army	Division	Location
		4 (NO).	Three Detachments.	Kiangsu-Anhwei
10.		28.	15,62,63,& 30(NO).	N.Chekiang & S.E. Kiangsu.
			43.	Haiyen.
			128.	Ningpo.
			194.	
23.		23.	147,148,164.	S. Yangtze,Anhwei.
		54.	58.	
28.		21.	144,145,146, & 162.	S. Anhwei.
32.		29.	79, etc.	N.E. Kiangsi.
22.		41.	122,123,124.	S.Anhwei-Kiangsu.
		43.	26.	N.E. Kiangsi.
		49.	108.	S. Anhwei.
		72.	67, 87.	Kiangsu-Chekiang.
			11 (NO).	N. Chekiang.

4th War Zone (Kwangsi-Kwangtung - South Fukien)

Commander: Chang Fa-kuei; Headquarters: Shaokwan

Group Army	Army Corps or R.A.	Army	Division	Location
		2.	3, 9.	Kweilin.
9.		4.	59,90,93.	N. Kwangtung.
			187.	N.E. Kwangtung
		5.	200,201,202. (mechanized)	Hq.,Chuanhsien.
12.		62.	151,152.	N.E.Canton & Hainan.
		64.	153,154.	N.Kwangtung.
		65.	157,158.	N.Kwangtung.
		66.	159,160.	N.E. Kwangtung.
		83.	192.	Waichow area.
16.		31.	176, 178.	S.W. Canton.
		48.	19(NO),175,188.	Pakhoi-Hoppo area, W. Kwangtung.
		69.	155, 156.	S.W. Canton.
			193.	W. Kwangtung.
			189, 190.	Kwangsi.
25.	20 R.A.		75, 76.	Foochow-Changchow.
		100.	80, 82.	Foochow-Chuanchow.
			6 Res.	S.E. Fukien(Changchow)
		18.	11, 14.	N. Kwangsi.

5th War Zone (N.Yangtze-Hupeh & Anhwei)

Commander: Li Tsung-jen; Headquarters: Hsiangyang?
Vice Commander: Li Pin-hsien; ,, : N. Anhwei

Group Army	Army Corps or R.A.	Army	Division	Location
		4 (NO).	One detachment	N. Anhwei-N.Kiangsu
33.		59.	38, 180.	Central Hupeh.
	25 R.A.		32, 33.	Central Hupeh.
		26.	41, 44.	W. Siang River.
31.		13.	4, 89.	N. Hupeh.
		39.	52, 56.	N. Hupeh.
21.	3.	7.	170,171,172.	N.E.Hupeh-Anhwei.
11.		48.	173,174.	N. Hupeh.
		55.	121, 8(NO).	E. Hupeh
			8 Cav.	N.W. Hupeh.
			34.	N. Hupeh.
		102.	102, 103.	Central Hupeh.
			179.	N. Anhwei.
		44.	149,150,163.	W. Hupeh

8th War Zone (North-West)

Commander: Chiang Ting-wen; Headquarters: Sian

Group Army	Army Corps or R.A.	Army	Division	Location
		1(NO).	165, etc.	S. Kansu.
	7 R.A.		49, 60.	E. Shensi.
18.	8 R.A.			Hq., Yenan.
		22.		N. Shensi.
		4 Cav.		N. Kansu.
		5 Cav.		Kokonor
17.	15 R.A.	11.	35,7(NO).& 23(NO).etc.	Ninghsia.
		81.	Three brig.	Linho.
		82.	100,9(NO).	N.Kansu & Kokonor
			86.	N. Shensi.
34.			97.	Lanchow.
			140.	Sian.
		Sinkiang Army	5 & 25(NO)., etc.	Sinkiang.
		71.	36, 88.	Shensi.

9th War Zone
(S.Yangtze: Hupeh-Hunan-Kiangsi)

Commander: Hsueh Yueh ; Headquarters: Hengyang.
Vice Commander: Lo Cho-ying; ,, : Hsiushui.

Group Army	Army Corps or R.A.	Army	Division.	Location.
15.	8.	16.	53,61.	N. Hunan.
		18.	11,14.	N. Hunan-Kiangsi.
		99.	99.	N. Hunan.
	32.	52.	2, 25.	N. Hunan.
27.		20.	133,134,135.	N. Hunan.
		25.	13.	Hupeh-Kiangsi.
20.		32.	139,141,142.	N.W. Kiangsi.
			18.	Central Kiangsi.
1.	10 R.A.	58.	Three divisions	Hunan & Hunan-Kiangsi.
		60.	182,183,184.	N.W. Kiangsi.
		94.	185,186.	S. Hupeh.
		46.	95.	N.E.Hunan.
		49.	105,107,108.	N.Kiangsi-N.Hunan.
	5.	10.	40, 48.	Kiangsi-Hupeh.
		53.	116,130,4 Cav.	S. Hupeh.
			34.	S. Hupeh.
19.		70.	16,19,34(NO).	N.W. Kiangsi.
		73.	77.	
			50,10(NO).,55, 57,92,98.	N.W.Kiangsi & Hupeh border
		74.	51.	Kiangsi-Hupeh.
		78.	21.	S.E. Hupeh.
			5 & 9 Res.	N. Kiangsi.
		87.	197, 198.	N. Hunan.
			188.	W. Hunan.
30.			Szechwan troops	N.Hunan.
		101.	205,206?	N. Hunan.

Special War Zones

(a) Kiangsu-Shantung

Commander: Yu Hsueh-chung; South Shantung.
Vice Commander: Shen Hung-lieh; West Shantung.

Group Army	Army Corps or R.A.	Army	Division	Location
		51.	110,113,114,118.	Kiangsu-Shantung
		57.	109,111,112.	N. Kiangsu.
		67.	117.	S. Shantung.
18.	8 R.A.		Various detachments	N. Shantung.
		89.	Two mixed brig.	N. Kiangsu.

(b) Hopei-Chahar

Commander: Lu Chung-lin; Headquarters: Nankung.
Vice Commander: Shih Yu-san;

Group Army	Army Corps or R.A.	Army	Division	Location
18.	8 R.A.		120.	C.Hopei & Chahar.
			129.	S. Hopei.
			1 Cav.	Chahar.
			84.	Hopei-Shansi.
			181, 6 (NO)., 9 Cav., etc.	Hopei-Chahar.

(b) GROUP ARMIES

No.	Commander	Composition	War Zones
1	Lu Han	58,60,94 Armies	9
2	Sun Lien-chung	30 Army, etc.	1
3	Sun Tung-hsuan	6, 12 Armies	1
4	Sun Wei-ju	17, 38, 90 Armies	2
5	Tseng Wan-chung	3, 14 Armies	2
6	Chen Chang-chieh	61 Army, etc.	2
7	Chao Cheng-shou	Cavalry Army	2
8	Sun Ch'u	33 Army	2
9	Wu Chi-wei	4 Army, etc.	4
10	Liu Chien-hsu	22Army, etc.	3
11	Li Pin-hsien	48 Army	5
12	Yu Han-mou	62,64,65,66,83 Armies	4
13	Wang Ching-kuo	19 Army, etc.	2
(14)	Wei Li-huang	76 Army, etc.	1 & 2
15	Kwan Lin-cheng	16, 18, 99 Armies	9
16	Hsia Wei	31, 69 Armies, etc.	4
17	Ma Hung-kuei	11 Army	8
18	Chu Teh	8 Route Army	2,8 etc.
19	Lo Cho-ying	70,73 Armies, etc.	9
20	Shang Chen	32 Army	9

(b) GROUP ARMIES (Continued)

No.	Commander	Composition	War Zones
21		7 Army	5
22	Sun Chen	41 Army	3
23	Tang Shih-tsun	23, 54 Armies	3
25	Chen Yi	20 Route Army & 100 Army	4
27	Yang Sen	20 Army	9
28	Pan Wen-hua	21 Army	3
29	Wang Tsan-hsu	44 Army	Szechwan
30	Wang Ling-chi	Szechwan troops	9
(31)	Tang En-po	13, 39 Armies	5
32	Shangkwan Yun-hsiang	29 Army, etc.	3
33	Chang Tze-chung	59 Army, etc.	5
(34)	Chiang Ting-wen	97, 140 Divisions	8

(c) ARMIES

No.of Army	Commander	Composition	Location & Remarks
1	Tao Chih-yao	1, 78 Divisions	Tungkwan area, Shansi
1(NO).	Teng Pao-shan	165 Div., etc.	Minhsien, Kansu
(2)	Li Yen-nien	3, 9 Divisions	Kweilin
(3)	Tsao Wan-shun	7, 12 Divisions	S. Shansi
(4)	Ouyang Chen	59,90,93 Divs.	N. Kwangtung
4(NO).	Yeh Ting	Four detachments	Chekiang-Anhwei-Kiangsi (ex-Red troops from Kiangsi-Fukien)
5	Tu Ching-ming	200,201,202 Divs.	Hq.Chuanhsien, N.E. Kwangsi (Semi-mech.)
6	Tsao Fu-lin	29, 74 Divisions	E. Honan. Shantung Prov. troops
7		170,171,172 Divs.	Anhwei-N.E. Hupeh. Kwangsi Prov.Troops.
(9)	Kuo Chi-chiao	47, 54 Divs.	S. Shansi
(10)	Hsu Chi-wu	40, 48 Divisions	Hupeh-Honan
11	Ma Hung-pin	7(NO),23(NO), & 35 Divs.	Ninghsia
12	Sun Tung-hsuan	20,22 Divisions	E.Honan. Shantung Provincial Troops
(13)	Wang Chung-lien	4,89 Divs.	N. Hupeh
(14)	Liu Kan	6,10 Divs.	S. Shansi
15	Liu Mao-en	64,65 Divs.	S.E. Shansi
16	Li Yun-heng	53, 61 Divs.	N. Hunan
17	Li Hsing-chung	84?,177 Divs.	S.Shansi. Shensi Troops
(18)	Li Shu-sen	11, 14 Divs.	N. Kwangsi?
19	Wang Ching-kuo	70,71 Divs.	N.W.Shansi, Shansi Troops
20	Yang Han-yu	133,134,135 Divs.	N.E.Hunan. Ex-Szechwan Provincial Troops
21	Kuo Hsun-chi	144,145,146,162 Divisions	S.Yangtze,Anhwei. Szechwan Prov. Troops
22	Sun Teh-tsao		N. Shensi
23	Chen Wan-jen	147,148,164 Divs.	S. Yangtze, Anhwei. Szechwan Prov. Troops

(c) ARMIES (Continued)

No.of Army	Commander	Composition	Location & Remarks
24	Liu Wen-hui	136,137,138 Divs.	Hq.Tatsienlou,Sikang. Szechwan Prov.Troops.
25	Feng Sheng-fa	13 Div.	Hupeh-Kiangsi.
26	Hsiao Chih-chu	41,44 Divs.	Hq.Ichang, Hupeh.
27	Liu Hsing	45, 46 Divs.	S.E. Shansi.
28	Tao Kuang	15,62,63? Divs.	N. Chekiang
29		79 etc., Divs.	N.E. Kiangsi
30	Feng An-pang	27, 30 Divs.	S. Honan
31	Wei Yung-sung	176, 178 Divs.	S. Kwangtung
32	Sung Ken-tang	139, 141, 142 Divs.	N. Kiangsi
33	Sun Chu	68, 101 Divs.	S.W. Suiyuan. Shansi Provincial troops
34	Yang Ai-yuan	66, 69 Divs.	Shansi. Shansi Provincial troops
36	Yao Shun	5, 15(NO), 96nDivs.	Szechwan
37	Tao Chih-yo	8, 24 Divs.	Chengchow area, Honan?
38	Chao Shou-shan	17 Div., etc.	S.Shansi. Shensi Tps.
39	Lee Hsing-jung	52, 56 Divs.	N. Hupeh
40	Pang Ping-hsun	39,106 Divs,1 Cav.Div.	S.E. Shansi
41	Sun Chen	122,123,124 Divs.	S.Yangtze, Anhwei? Szechwan Prov.Tps.
43	Kuo Ju-tung	26 Div.,etc.	Kiangsi-Anhwei.
44	Wang Tsan-hsu	149,150,163 Divs.	W. Hupeh. Szechwan Prov. Troops
45		125,126,127,131 Divs.	S.Honan. Szechwan Provincial Troops
46	Fang Sung-fu	95 Div.	N.E. Hunan
47	Li Chia-yu	104,161,168 Divs.	S. Shansi. Szechwan Provincial Troops
48	Wang Tsan-ping	173,174 Divs.	W.Hupeh. Kwangsi Provincial Troops
49	Liu Tuo-chuan?	105,107,108 Divs.	N.Kiangsi.(Ex-N.E.Army)
51	Yu Hsueh-chung	110,113,114,118 Divs.	S.Shantung. ditto
52	Chang Yao-ming	2,25 Divs.	N.E. Hunan.
53	Chou Fu-cheng	116, 130 Divs.	Hupeh-Hunan-Kiangsi. (Ex-N.E.Army)
54	Yu Chi-shih	58 Div.	Kweichih area,Anhwei.
55	Yu Kuo-tsai	121, 8(NO) Divs.	E. Hupeh
57	Miao Cheng-liu	109, 111, 112 Divs.	S.Shantung.(Ex-N.E. Army)
58	Sun Tu		Hunan. Yunnan Prov. Troops.
59	Chang Tzu-chung	38, 180 Divs.	Central Hupeh
60	Lu Han	182,183,184 Divs.	N.Kiangsi.Yunnan Prov. Troops
61	Chen Chang-chieh	72,73 Divs.	Shansi.Shansi Local Troops.
62	Chang Ta	151, 152 Divs.	N.E.Canton,Kwangtung.
64	Chang Jui-kwei	153, 154 Divs.	W.Kwangtung. Kwangtung Provincial Troops
65	Miao Pei-nan	157, 158 Divs.	N.Kwangtung. Kwangtung Prov. Troops
66.	Yeh Shao	159, 160 Divs.	Kwangtung. Kwangtung Prov. Troops

(c) ARMIES (Continued)

No.of Army	Commander	Composition	Location & Remarks
67	Yu Keh-jen	117 Div.	Shantung-Kiangsu. Ex-N.E. Army
68	Liu Ju-ming	119, 143 Divs.	S.W. Honan
69	Teng Lung-kuang	155, 156 Divs.	W.Kwangtung. Kwangtung Provincial Troops
70	Li Chueh	16,19,34(NO) Divs.	Hunan-Kiangsi
71	Fan Han-chieh	36, 88 Divs.	Shansi
72	Wang Ching-chiu	67, 87 Divs.	N. Chekiang
73		77 Div.	N. Kiangsi
74	Sung Hsi-lien	51 Div.	N.W.Kiangsi
76	Hao Tzu-chu	166, 167 Divs.	Honan-Shansi
78	Li Hsien-chou	21 Div.	S.E. Hupeh
81	Ma Hung-pin	Three brigades	Linho, W.Suiyuan
82	Ma Pu-fang	100, 9(NO) Divs.	Hq.,Sining, Tsinghai Kokonor local troops
83	Li Cheng-chiu	192 Div., etc.	E. Kwangtung
87	Liu Ying-ku	197, 198 Divs.	Hunan-Hupeh border
89	Han Teh-chin	Two mixed brigades	N. Kiangsu
90	Feng Chin-tsai	42, 169 Divs.	S. Shansi.
94	Kuo Chien	185, 186 Divs.	S.Hupeh. (Yangtze-Tungting Defense)
99	Fu Chung-fang	99 Div., etc.	N. Hunan
100	Chen Chi	80, 82 Divs.	Foochow area,Fukien
101	Chen Chu-chen	?, 205, 206 Divs.	N. Hunan
102	Pai Hui-chang	102, 103 Divs.	Central Hupeh. Kweichow Troops
?	Sun Tien-ying		S.E.Shansi
?	Hsuan Tieh-wu	One division,etc.	S. Chekiang

Note: There is also mention of 88 Army in Szechwan, but no further details are available.

(d) DIVISIONS

Division	Commander	Location	Remarks
1	Li Tieh-chun	Tungkwan area,N.W.Honan	1 Army
1(NO).	Li Hsiang-yung	Kwangteh area, Anhwei	
2	Cheng Tung-kuo	N. Hunan	52 Army
2(NO).	Chi Hsien-chang	E. Shansi	(Shansi)
3	Li Yu-tang	Kweilin	2 Army
3(NO).		Kwangteh area,Anhwei.	
4	Wang Wan-lien	N. Hupeh	13 Army
4(NO).	Lang Shing	Kwangteh area, Anhwei.	
5	Hsieh Pu-fu	Szechwan	36 Army
6	Chou Yen ?	S. Shansi.	14 Army
6(NO).	Chang ? ?	Hupeh	
7	Li Shih-lung	S. Shansi.	3 Army
7(NO).	Ma Teng-chiao	Ninghsia	11 Army(Ninghsia)
8	Tao Chih-yo	Shanhsien, Honan	37 Army
8(NO).	Chiang Tsai-chen	S.E. Hupeh	55 Army

(d) DIVISIONS

Division	Commander	Location	Remarks
9	Cheng Tso-min	Kweilin	2 Army
9(NO).	Ma Pu-fang	Sining, Kokonor	82 Army(Kokonor)
10	Peng Chieh-yu	S. Shansi	14 Army
10(NO).	Hsiao Chien	N.W. Kiangsi	
11	Mo Yu-shih	N. Kwangsi	18 Army
11(NO).	Chi Chwang-chien	N. Kiangsi	Ex-Pao An Tui
12	Tang Huai-yuan	S. Shansi	3 Army
13	Wu Liang-shen	Hupeh-Kiangsi	25 Army
14	Ho Kwei-chang	N. Hunan	18 Army
15	Wang Tung-yuan	N. Kwangsi	28 Army
15(NO).	Chen Chi-suan	Szechwan	36 Army
16	Ho Ping	Central Kiangsi	70 Army
17	Chao Shou-shan	S. Shansi	38 Army(Shensi)
18	Chu Yao-hua	Nanchang area, Kiangsi	
18(NO).	Ma Wen-teh	W. Honan	
19	Li Chueh	Hunan-Kiangsi	70 Army
19(NO).	Huang Ku	Pakhoi area,Kwangtung	(Kwangtung)
20	Sun Tung-hsuan	E. Honan	12 Army(Shantung)
21	Wang Chih-ping	S.E. Hupeh	78 Army
22	Shih Tung-jan?	E. Honan	12 Army(Shantung)
23	Yi Yun-lung	S. Honan	
23(NO).		Ninghsia	11 Army
24	Chen Ssu-hu	Honan	37 Army
25	Chang Hui-ming	N. Hunan	52 Army
25(NO).	Shen Chiu-cheng	Kweichow	
26	Liu Yu-ching	N. Kiangsi	43 Army
27	Huang Chiao-sung	N.W.Hupeh	30 Army
28	Tung Chao	W. Honan	
29	Tsao Fu-lin	W. Kaifeng	6 Army(Shantung)
30	Chang Chin-chao	S. Honan	30 Army
30(NO)	Chang Luan-chi	Kiangsu-Anhwei border	
31	Chih Feng-cheng	S.W. Honan	26 Route Army
32	Wang Hsiu-shen	Central Hupeh	25 Route Army
33	Chia Yu-shan	Central Hupeh	25 Route Army
34	Chang Lai-wei	N. Hupeh	
34(NO).		N. Kiangsi	70 Army
35	Ma Hung-pin	N. Kansu	11 Army(Ninghsia)
35(NO).	Yang Chin-tsai	Anhwei-Honan border	
36	Chen Jui-ho	Shensi	71 Army
37	Ho Chi-feng	S.W. Honan	
37(NO).	Chen Chi-hsin	Kwangteh area,Anhwei	
38	Huang Wei-kang	Central Hupeh	59 Army(Hopei)
39	Pang Ping-hsun	S.E. Shansi	40 Army
40	Liu Pei-hsu	N.E. Kiangsi	10 Army
41	Ting Chi-pang	W. Hupeh	26 Army
42	Liu Yen-ping	S. Shansi	90 Army
43	Chou Hsiang-chu	N. Chekiang	
44	Chang Yung	W. Hupeh	26 Army
45		S.E.Shansi	27 Army
46	Huang Tsun-hsuan	S.E.Shansi	27 Army
47	Fei Chang-hui	S. Shansi	9 Army
48	Yang Chao-tung	Hupeh-Honan	10 Army
49	Li Yu-lan	near Tungkwan,Honan-Shensi	7 Route Army

(d) DIVISIONS (Continued)

Div.	Commander	Location	Remarks
50	Cheng Kwang-yao	N. W. Kiangsi	
51	Wang Yao-wu	Kaoan area, N.W.Kiangsi	74 Army
52	Leng Jung-an	N. Hupeh	39 Army
53	Li Yun-heng	N. Kiangsi	16 Army(Hunan)
54		S. Shansi	9 Army
55	Li Sung-shan	Yangtze Valley, Hupeh	
56	Liu Shang-chih	N. Hupeh	39 Army
57		N. W. Kiangsi	
58		N. W. Kiangsi	54 Army
59	Han Hsiang-ying	N. Kwangtung?	4 Army (Hunan)
60	Chen P'ei	Shensi	7 Route Army
61	Yang Ting-ya	N. Hunan?	16 Army (Hunan)
62	Tao Liu	N. Chekiang-S. Kiangsu	28 Army
63	Tan Ching-kuo	N. Chekiang-S. Kiangsu	28 Army
64	Wu Ting-lin	S. Shansi	15 Army
65	Yuan Hsun	S. Shansi	15 Army
66	Yang Hsiao-ou	W. Shansi	34 Army (Shansi)
67	Li Shu-sen	S. Kiangsu-Chekiang	72 Army
68	Meng Hsien-chi	S.W. Suiyuan	33 Army(Shansi)
69	Yang Cheng-yuan	W. Shansi	34 Army(Shansi)
70	Hsu Tze-chen	W. Shansi	19 Army(Shansi)
71	Kuo Tsung-chun	N.W. Shansi	19 Army(Shansi)
72	Tuan Shu-hua	Central Shansi	61 Army(Shansi)
73	Liu Feng-ping	N.W.Shansi	61 Army(Shansi)
74	Li Han-chang	E. Honan	6 Army(Shantung)
75	Han Wen-ying	Near Changchow, Fukien	20 Route Army (Honan)
76	Wang Ling-yun ?	Foochow, Fukien	20 Route Army
77		Wuning area, Kiangsi	73 Army (Hunan)
78	Li Wen	Tungkwan area,N.W.Honan	1 Army
79		N. Kiangsi	29 Army
80	Chien Tung-liang	Foochow, Fukien	100 Army
81	Chan Shu-tang	E. Honan	3 Route Army (Shantung)
82	Chang Kang	Tsinkiang(Chuanchow),Fukien	100 Army
83	Cheng Wu	S.W. Shansi	
84	Kao Kwei-tzu	S. Shansi	17 Army ?
85	Chen Tieh	S.W. Shansi	
86	Liu Tzu-shu	N. Shensi	(Shensi)
87	Shen Fa-tsao	N. Chekiang	72 Army
88	Chung Ping	Shensi	71 Army
89		N. Hupeh	13 Army
90	Ouyang Chen	Yingteh area, Kwangtung	4 Army
91	Feng Chan-ahi	S. Honan	
92	Huang Kuo-liang	N.W. Kiangsi-S.E. Hupeh	
93	Kan Li-chu	N. Kwangtung	4 Army
94	Chu Hwai-pin	N. Honan	
95	Lo Chi-sheng	N.E. Hunan	46 Army
96		Chungking area, Szechwan	36 Army
97	Han Hsi-hou	Lanchow, Kansu	
98	Hsia Chu-chung	N. Kiangsi	
99	Fu Chung-fang(?)	Near Changsha, Hunan	99 Army
100	Ma Pu-fang	Chinghai, Kokonor	82 Army(Kokonor)
101	Li Chun-kung	S.W. Suiyuan	33 Army(Shansi)

(d) DIVISIONS (Continued)

Div.	Commander	Location	Remarks
102	Chao Yi-po	Central Hupeh	102 Army (Kweichow)
103	Ho Chih-chung	Central Hupeh	102 Army (Kweichow)
104	Li Tsung-fang	S. Shansi	47 Army (Szechwan)
105	Wang Tieh-han ?	S. Nanchang, Kiangsi	49 Army (N.E.)
106	Shen Ko	S.E. Shansi	40 Army
107		N. Hunan-S. Hupeh	49 Army (N.E.)
108	Chang Wen-ching	N. Kiangsi	49 Army (N.E.)
109	Ho Chieh-kuo	N. Kiangsu	57 Army (N.E.)
110	Chang Cheng-fang	N. Kiangsu	51 Army (N.E.)
111	Chang En-to	N.Kiangsu-S.Shantung	57 Army (N.E.)
112	Ho Shou-i	N. Kiangsu	57 Army (N.E.)
113	Li Chen-tang	N.Kiangsu-S.Shantung	51 Army (N.E.)
114	Mou Chung-heng	N.Kiangsu-S.Shantung	51 Army (N.E.)
115	Lin Piao	W. Shansi	8 Route Army (Ex-Reds)
116	Chou Teh-chuan	Hupeh-Hunan	53 Army (N.E.)
117	Li Shou-wei	N. Kiangsu	67 Army (N.E.)
118	Chou Kwang-lieh	N. Kiangsu	51 Army (N.E.)
119	Tsung Chao-lin	S.W.Honan	68 Army (N.E.)
120	Ho Lung	Shansi-Hopei-Chahar	8 Route Army (Ex-Reds)
121	Wu Chien-ping	Hengshan, Hunan	55 Army (Kweichow)
122	Huang Pei-mo	S. Anhwei	41 Army (Szechwan)
123	Tseng Hsien-tung	S. Yangtze, Anhwei	41 Army (Szechwan)
124	Shui Ti-chingO	S. Yangtze, Anhwei	41 Army (Szechwan)
125	Chen Ting-sheng	S. Yangtze, Anhwei?	45 Army (Szechwan)
126	Huang Yin ?	S. Honan	45 Army (Szechwan)
127	Ma Yu-chih	N. Hupeh	45 Army (Szechwan)
128	Ku Chia-chi	Ningpo	
129	Liu Pei-cheng	E. Shansi	8 Route Army (Ex-Reds)
130	Chu Hung-shun	Hupeh-Hunan	53 Army (N.E.)
131	Chen Li	Kinhan Railway,S.Honan	45 Army (Szechwan)
132	Wang Chan-hai	Hupeh-Honan	
133	Liang Han-ming	N.E. Hunan-S.E. Hupeh	20 Army (Szechwan)
134	Hsia Shun	N.E. Hunan-S.E.Hupeh	20 Army (Szechwan)
135	Yang Kan-tsai	N.E. Hunan	20 Army (Szechwan)
136	Chen Kuang-tsao	Sikang Province	24 Army (Szechwan)
137	Liu Yuan-tang	Sikang,Sikang Prov.	24 Army (Szechwan)
138	Tang Ying	Nyachu River,Sikang	24 Army (Szechwan)
139	Huang Kwang-hua	N.Kiangsi	32 Army (Hopei)
140	Wang Wen-yen	Sian, Shensi	
141	Fu Li-ping	N. Kiangsi	32 Army (Hopei)
142	Lu Chi	N. Kiangsi	32 Army (Hopei)
143	Li Tseng-chih	S.W. Honan	68 Army
144	Fan Chih-ying	Fanchang area, Anhwei	21 Army (Szechwan)
145	Jan Kuo-hua	Tatung area, S.Anhwei	21 Army (Szechwan)
146	Fan Shao-tseng	S. Yangtze, Anhwei	21 Army (Szechwan)
147	Yang Kuo-chen	Kweichih area, Anhwei	23 Army (Szechwan)
148	Chen Wan-jen	Kweichih area, Anhwei	23 Army (Szechwan)
149	Kuo Chang-ming	W. Hupeh	44 Army (Szechwan)
150	Liao Chen	W. Hupeh	44 Army (Szechwan)
151	Lin Wei-chou	N. Kwangtung	62 Army (Kwangtung)
152	Chen Chang	N. Kwangtung	62 Army (Kwangtung)

(d) DIVISIONS (Continued)

Div.	Commander	Location	Remarks
153	Chang Jui-kwei	N.Kwangtung	64 Army (Kwangtung)
154	Liang Shih-chi	N.Kwangtung	64 Army (Kwangtung)
155	Chang Chih	S.W. Canton,Kwangtung	69 Army (Kwangtung)
156	Wang Te-chuan	W. Canton,Kwangtung	69 Army (Kwangtung)
157	Huang Tao	N. Kwangtung	65 Army (Kwangtung)
158	Tseng Yu-jen	N. Kwangtung	65 Army (Kwangtung)
159	Chen Chi	N. Kwangtung	66 Army (Kwangtung)
160	Sung Shih-tai	E. Kwangtung	66 Army (Kwangtung)
161	Hsu Shao-tsung	S. Shansi	47 Army (Szechwan)
162	Peng Cheng-fu	S. Yangtze, Anhwei	21 Army (Szechwan)
163		W. Hupeh	44 Army (Szechwan)
164	Chang Pang-pen	Kweichih area, Anhwei	23 Army (Szechwan)
165	Lu Ta-chang	Minhsien,Kansu	1 (NO) Army
166	Hao Tzu-chu	S.W. Shansi	76 Army
167	Yang Chu-tung	N.W. Honan	76 Army
168	Li Chung-hsi	S. Shansi	47 Army (Szechwan)
169	Wu Shih-min	S. Shansi	90 Army (Shensi)
170	Ling Hsiang-nu	S. Kwangsi	7 Army (Kwangsi)
171	Yang Chun-chang	N.E. Hupeh-Anhwei	7 Army (Kwangsi)
172	Cheng Shu-feng	N.E.Hupeh-Anhwei	7 Army (Kwangsi)
173	Ho Wei-chen	N. Hupeh	48 Army (Kwangsi)
174	Wang Tsan-ping	N. Hupeh	48 Army (Kwangsi)
175	Mo Shu-chieh	Pakhoi area, Kwangtung	(Kwangsi)
176	Chu Shou-nien	S. Kwangtung	31 Army (Kwangsi)
177	Li Hsing-chung	Shensi-Shansi border	17 Army (Shensi)
178	Tan Lien-fang	Laichow Peninsula, Kwangtung	31 Army (Kwangsi)
179		Fowyang, Anhwei	
180	Liu Chen-san	Central Hupeh	59 Army (Hopei)
181	Shih Yu-san	Hopei-Chahar	
182		N. Kiangsi	60 Army (Yunnan)
183		N. Kiangsi	60 Army (Yunnan)
184		N. Kiangsi	60 Army (Yunnan)
185		S. Hunan	94 Army (Yunnan)
186		S. Hunan-N.Kwangtung	94 Army (Yunnan)
187		Lokchang,Kwangtung	(Kwangtung)
188	Liu Jen	Nanning area, Kwangsi	(Kwangsi)
189		Kwangsi	(Kwangsi)
190	Pi Yao ?	Kwangsi	
191	Lu Chih-chia?	Yunnan	(Yunnan)
192	K'ung K'o-chuan	Waichow-E.Kwangtung	83 Army (Kwangtung)
193	Hsien Kwei-yin?	W. Kwangtung	(Kwangtung)?
194		Ningpo	16 Group Army
195		N.E. Hunan	
196		N.W. Kiangsi	
197	Ting Ping-chuan	Hunan-Hupeh	87 Army (Hunan)
198	Tang Ming-san	Hunan-Hupeh	87 Army (Hunan)
199		Yamchow area, Kwangtung?	
200	Tai An-lang	Hq.Chuanhsien,Kwangsi	5 Army (Semi-mech.)
201			5 Army (Semi-mech.)
202			5 Army (Semi-mech.)
203			
204			
205?	Tai Chi-tao	Hunan	101 Army (Hunan)

(d) DIVISIONS (Continued)

Division	Commander	Location	Remarks
206?	Lung Yun-fei	Hunan	101 Army (Hunan)
207		Hunan?	(Sikang)
208		Hunan?	(Sikang)
209		Hunan?	
5 Res.		N.E.Kiangsi	
6 Res.	Chi Chang-chien	Changting-Changchow, Fukien	
9 Res.	Chang Yen-chuan	N.Kiangsi	

(e) CAVALRY FORMATIONS

1. ARMIES

1 Cavalry Army (Ex-N.E.Army)
Commander : Ho Chu-kuo
Headquarters:
Composition : 3,5,6,7 Cav. Divisions

2 Cavalry Army
Commander :
Headquarters: Shansi
Composition : 1, 2 Cavalry Divisions

4 Cavalry Army
Commander : Ma Pu-fang
Headquarters: N. Kansu
Composition :

5 Cavalry Army
Commander : Ma Pu-ching
Headquarters: Kokonor
Composition : 5 (NO).Cav.Div., etc.

2. DIVISIONS

Formation	Commander	Location	Remarks
1 Cav.Div.	Chang Cheng-teh	N.W. Hopei	2 Cav.Army
2 ,, ,,	Hao Kang	Shansi	2 Cav.Army(Ex-N.E.Army)
3 ,, ,,	Kuo Hsi-peng	Shensi-Suiyuan	1 Cav.Army(,, ,, ,,)
4 ,, ,,	Wang Chi-feng	S. Hupeh	53 Army (,, ,, ,,)
5 ,, ,,		Shensi-Suiyuan	1 Cav.Army(,, ,, ,,)
6 ,, ,,		W. Suiyuan	1 Cav.Army(,, ,, ,,)
7 ,, ,,	Men Ping-yueh	Shansi-Suiyuan Border	1 Cav. Army
8 ,, ,,	Huang Yuan-an	N.W. Hupeh	
9 ,, ,,	Cheng Ta-chang	Hopei	
10 ,, ,,		W. Honan	
5(NO). ,, ,,	Ma Tzu-yun	Liangchow, Kansu	5 Cav. Army

SHANSI-SUIYUAN CAVALRY FORCES: Commander: Chao Cheng-shou

1 Cav.Div.	Peng Yu-ping	N.W. Suiyuan
2 ,, ,,	Sun Chang-sheng	N.W. Suiyuan

CAVALRY FORCES IN NINGHSIA

1 Cav.Div.	Ting Pai-ting,	Ninghsia	11 Army
2 ,, ,,	Yang Ken-ching,	,,	

NOTES: a. (NO) refers to separate, newly organized divisions many of which have the same numbers as old divisions.

b. Strength of divisions varies, but is rarely more than 8,000.

c. Strength of cavalry divisions is probably about 3,000.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

F. P. MUNSON
Capt., F.A.,
Assistant Military Attache

Distribution:
6 MID.
2 File

MAP OF NORTH CHINA

Showing approximate locations

of Chinese Troops

AS OF April, 1940.

Scale

0 50 100 150

Miles

SUIYUAN

CHAHAR

PAOTOW

HWEJUHSIEN

PEKING

TIENTSIN

TANGSHAN

OKUAN

PAOTING

TANGKU

TAIYUAN

SHIHCHIACHWANG

CHEFOO

SHENSI

SHANSI

TSINAN

TSINGTAO

SHANTUNG

LIENYUN

CHENGCHOW

KAIFENG

HSUCHOW

HONAN

NEW YELLOW RIVER

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

A B C D E F G H

PREPARED IN M.I.A. OFFICE, PEKING, CHINA.

To accompany Report No. 9868.

G-2 Report

E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
OSD letter, May 9, 1972
By [illegible] NARS Date 4-2-74

~~RESTRICTED~~

6-1

6910

NNDI 16 [illegible]
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
02009-177
WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (COMBAT)

Subject: Major Military Operations

Japanese Map Showing Locations of Chinese Nationalist Forces in North China

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 6 1940

1. The accompanying data for the attached map were obtained from a Chinese source connected with the Peking Pacification Commission. The original map (not obtainable) was marked "most secret" and shows the Chinese forces in Hopei, Chahar, Shansi, Shantung and North Honan. The locations are as of February, 1940, and the study was reportedly made by the Second Section of the Japanese North China Military Headquarters in Peking.

Nationlist Troops:

A. Regular Troops .....about 500,000

a. About 50 divisions of Regular Troops numbering approximately 380,000.
b. Three divisions of the Eighth Route Army numbering approximately 120,000.

B. Irregular Troops (or bandits).....about 719,000

a. Communist guerrillas, about 110,000.
b. Semi-bandit or People's Army under Communist influence, about 500,000.
c. Kuomintang system (?) guerrillas, 100,000.
d. Semi-bandit or People's Army under Kuomintang influence, about 6,000.
e. Pure bandits or semi-bandits, 3,000.

Total 1,219,000

(Note: Additional data reported that since the beginning of the incident about 6,000 Chinese troops surrendered to the Japanese.)

C. War Zones (North China):

a. First War Zone (Shensi, Honan, South Shansi)
Commander: General Wei Li-huang;
Headquarters: Loyang, Honan.

b. Second War Zone (North Shansi and part of Shensi)
Commander: General Yen Hsi-shan;
Headquarters: Yichuan, Shensi.

c. Eighth War Zone (Kansu)
Commander: General Chu Shao-liang;
Headquarters: Kansu (?)

From: M/A China Report No. 9868 May 1, 1940

~~RESTRICTED~~

c. Eighth War Zone (continued)
The Chinese troops fighting around the Pingsui line in Suiyuan and those in Ninghsia area under this command.

d. Shantung-Kiangsu War Zone, commanded by Admiral Shen Hung-lieh (who is concurrently Chairman of Shantung Province) and General Yu Hsueh-chung.

e. Hopei-Chahar War Zone, commanded by General Lu Chung-lin.

2. The following legend applies to the attached:

(1) Chinese Puppet Troops (in red)

A. 1st Corps of the Pacification Army under the command of Liu Feng-chih, numbering about 3,000. The headquarters is located outside Antingmen (Gate), Peiping in the Yellow Temple.

B. 2nd Corps of the same Army, stationed outside Paoting under the command of Huang Nan-peng and numbering the same.

C. 3d Corps of the same Army stationed outside Tangshan commanded by Liu Tsu-sheng, numbering the same.

D. Police force and paoantui (Peace Preservation Corps) commanded by Wang Ti-hsiang, in Northeastern Hopei, numbering about 2,000.

E. Shantung Paoan Army, with headquarters at Wuyi, under Chang Ying-chi. Number unknown.

F. Anti-Communist Army under the command of Liu Shao-kun (who is also head of the anti-Wang Ching-wei Youth Party); about 5,000.

G. Kaifeng Pacification Headquarters. Although abolished after Wu Pei-fu's death, it was reestablished by Liu Yu-fen, appointed by Wang Ching-wei.

H. The various Huang Hsieh armies which are stationed along the Pinghan line south of Shihchiachwang. The number is said to be around 20,000 under the command of Tsui Pei-te.

(2) Chinese Nationalist Forces (in blue)

1. With Kuan as center, various small bands of the 8th Route Army active in Hopei.

2. Lu Cheng-tsao's communist 3d Pincer Corps, without definite headquarters, active in central Hopei.

3. Hsiao Keh's communist Hopei-Chahar-Jehol Heralding Army, active near Mentoukou and Chaitang.

4. Nieh Jung-cheng's communist Hopei-Chahar-Shansi Frontier Army, with headquarters at Fuping.

5. Shih Yu-san's guerrilla corps in south Hopei.

6. The Chinese West Shantung Administrative Zone, under the command of Li Shu-chuan.

7. The Chinese East Shantung Administrative Zone under the command of Cheng Teh-ping.

8. Admiral Shen Hung-lieh's active areas.

9. Generals Yu Hsueh-chung and Miao Cheng-liu's old Northeastern Army is in this area.

10. The Hopei Guerrilla Corps under Huo Ju-yung.

11. General Lu Chung-lin's headquarters here.

12. Chu Teh and his forces are stationed here in southeast Shansi.

13. Sun Tien-ying's forces here, in North Honan, (often clashed with communists) and so are

14. Pang Ping-hsun's forces. Both were old Northwest Army leaders under Feng Yu-hsiang.

15. The Central Army's 5th Army Corps (7th, 12th, 42d and 169th Divisions under Tseng Wan-chung) and the 14th Army Corps (64th 65th Divisions under Liu Mao-en).

16. General Sun Wei-ju's 4th Army and General Kao Kwei-tse's 17th Army.

17. General Wei Li-huang's headquarters and forces are here, holding the West Lunghai line and Pinghan line.

18. General Sun Tung-hsuan's troops, which often harass Kaifeng.

19. Shansi Army's base in West Shansi and Shensi, under Yen Hsi-shan.

20. Chao Cheng-shou's cavalry, in Northwest Shansi and Shensi.

21. Ma Chan-shan's Northeastern Storming Troop.

22. The Jehol Heralding Unit under Pai Feng-hsiang.

F. P. Munson

F. P. MUNSON
Captain, FA.
Assistant Military Attache

Enclosure: map

Distribution:
6 MID
2 File

1ST. IND.

THE MILITARY ATTACHE, AMERICAN EMBASSY, PEKING, CHINA.

TO: A. C. OF S., G-2

1. APPROVED.

WILLIAM MAYER,
MAJOR, FIELD ARTILLERY,
MILITARY ATTACHE.

JUN 17 1937
OFFICE OF NAVAL MIL., INTEL. DIV.
2009-177
WAR DEPARTMENT.

6-1

G-2 Report.

6180
REPLACE.

RESTRICTED

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Distribution of Troops (CHINESE)

Composition and Distribution of Troops as of May 21, 1937

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 18 1937

HOPEI - Feng Chih-an, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops

32nd Army Corps - Shang Chen			
139th Division	Huang Kuang-hua	Hantan	7,000
141st Division	Sung Ken-tang	Shunteh	7,000
142nd Division	Lu Chi	Shaho	7,000
4th Cav. Division	Wang Chi-feng	Taming	2,000
Ind. Cav. Regiment		Shunteh	1,000
Ind. Art. Regiment		Shunteh	1,000

Nominally Central Government Troops, Actually Controlled by Hopei-Chahar Political Council.

*29th Army Corps - Sung Che-yuan			
37th Division	Feng Chih-an	Paoting	12,000
38th Division	Chang Tze-chung	Tientsin	9,000
132nd Division	Chao Teng-yu	Peiping	8,000
13th Ind. Brig.	Liu Chen-shan	Kaopeitien	3,000
26th Ind. Brig.	Li Chih-ta	Tsangchow	3,000
1st Cav. Brig.	Chang Jen-chih	Chochow	2,000
Special Service Regt.		Peiping	1,600
Training Corps		Peiping	1,200
			39,800

Nominally Central Government Troops. Former Chang Hsueh-liang's Troops.

**53rd Army Corps - Wan Fu-lin			
116th Division	Liu Yuan-hsun	Tingchow	6,000
119th Division	Tsung Chao-lin	Shihkiachwang	5,000
130th Division	Chu Hung-hsun	Paoting	5,000
			16,000
**91st Division	Feng Chan-hai	Kaoyi	10,000

Provincial Troops

1st Ind. Brig.	Tai Shou-yi	Hokien	3,000
2nd Ind. Brig.	Kao Shu-hsun	Shunteh	3,000
North Hopei Peace Preservation Corps - Shih Yu-san			
1st Brig.	Chang Hsi-hsien	Peiping	3,000
2nd Brig.	Feng Shou-peng	Peiping	3,000
			6,000

RESTRICTED

G-2 Report

Troops of the East Hopei Autonomous Government Controlled by Yin Ju-keng. (Not Controlled by Nanking).

1st Corps	Chang Ching-yu	Tungchow	4,000
2nd Corps	Chang Yen-tien	Tsunhwa	4,000
3rd Corps	Li Yun-sheng	Lwanchow	4,000
4th Corps	Han Tze-hsi	Tangshan	4,000
Training Corps	Yin Ju-keng	Tungchow	2,000
			18,000

Total Troops in Hopei----------120,800

CHAHAR - Liu Ju-ming, Provincial Chairman.

Nominally Central Government Troops. Actually Controlled by Hopei-Chahar Political Council.

*29th Army Corps - Sung Che-yuan

143rd Division	Liu Ju-ming	Kalgan	8,000
3rd Ind. Brig.	Ku Tze-wen	Kalgan	3,000
3rd Cav. Brig.	Yao Ching-chuan	Hwailai	2,000
8th Cav. Brig.	Hsia Tze-ming	Kangchwang	2,000
39th Cav. Brig.	Juan Hsuan-wu	Suanhwa	2,000
			17,000

Total Troops in Chahar----------17,000

SHANSI - Chao Tai-wen, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops

x21st Division	Li Hsien-chow	Fenchow	9,000
x94th Division	Chu Huai-pin	Yuncheng	8,000
			17,000

Nominally Central Government Troops. Actually Controlled by Yen Hsi-shan.

33rd Army Corps - Sun Chu

66th Division	Feng Peng-chu	Pingyao	8,000
69th Division	Yang Chen-yuan	Fenchow	8,000
			16,000

34th Army Corps - Yang Hsiao-ou

71st Division	Kuo Tsung-chun	Pingyang	8,000

61st Army Corps - Li Fu-ying

68th Division	Li Fu-ying	Yangkao	9,000
101st Division	Li Chun-kung	Tatung	8,000
			17,000

Tem. 2nd Division	Chin Hsien-chang	Kiehsiu	2,800

Provincial Troops

1st Ind. Brig.	Tu Chun-yi	Taiyuan	3,000
2nd Ind. Brig.	Chou Yuan-chien	Yuanping	3,000
3rd Ind. Brig.	Feng Yu-hsi	Yangchwan	3,000

Total Troops in Shansi----------69,800

SHANTUNG - Han Fu-chu, Provincial Chairman.

Nominally Central Government Troops. Actually Controlled by Han Fu-chu.

*3rd Route Army under Han Fu-chu.

20th Division	Sun Tung-hsuan	Yenchow	12,000
22nd Division	Ku Liang-min	Chowtsun	9,000
29th Division	Tsao Fu-lin	Tsinan	10,000
74th Division	Li Han-chang	Tsinan	8,000
81st Division	Chan Shu-tang	Kiaochow	8,000
Ind. Cav. Brigade		Tsinan	1,500
Pistal Brigade	Wu Huan-wen	Tsinan	3,000
1st Art. Regiment		Tsinan	1,000
2nd Art. Regiment		Tsinan	1,000
			53,500

Provincial Troops

Militia Troops - Han Fu-chu

1st Corps	Chao Ming-yuan	Lintsing	2,000
2nd Corps	Chao Jen-chuan	Lintsing	2,000
3rd Corps	Ku Liang-yu	Kufow	2,000
4th Corps	Hsueh Shu-hsien	Chaoyuan	2,000
5th Corps	Chang Hsieh	Tsining	2,000
			10,000

Total Troops in Shantung----------63,500

SUIYUAN - Fu Tso-yi, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops

x13th Army Corps - Tang En-po		Hsingho	8,000
4th Division	Wang Wan-ling	Tsining	8,000
89th Division	Wang Chung-lien	Chotzeshan	4,500
*7th Cav. Division	Meng Ping-yueh		20,500

Nominally Central Government Troops. Actually Controlled by Yen Hsi-shan.

19th Army Corps - Wang Ching-kuo

70th Division	Wang Ching-kuo	Paotow	8,000
72nd Division	Chen Chang-chieh	Fengchen	8,000
			16,000

35th Army Corps - Fu Tso-yi

73rd Division	Fu Tso-yi	Wuchwan	8,000
7th Ind. Brig.	Ma Yen-shou	Wuchwan	2,500
1st Cav. Brig.	Shih Yu-shan	Hsingho	1,200
			11,700

Cavalry Army Corps - Chao Cheng-shou

1st Division	Peng Yu-pin	Wuchwan	1,500
2nd Division	Sun Chang-sheng	Taolin	1,500
			3,000

Total Troops in Suiyuan----------51,200

SHENSI - Sun Yu-ju, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops

x5th Army Corps - Yueh Sen			
23rd Division	Li Pi-fan	Wainan	8,000
43rd Division	Tai Yueh	Paoki	8,000
x17th Army Corps - Hsing Chen-nan			
2nd Division	Cheng Tung-kuo	Tungkuo	12,000
x25th Army Corps - Wan Yueh-huang			
140th Division	Wang Wen-yen	Fengsiang	6,000
x46th Army Corps - Fan Sung-pu			
79th Division	Chen An-pao	Fuping	8,000
x28th Division	Tung Chao	Sanyuan	7,000
x36th Division	Sung Hsi-lien	Sian	8,000
x53rd Division	Li Pao-ping	Hanchung	8,000
61st Division	Yang Pu-fei	Pucheng	7,000
84th Division	Kao Kuei-tze	Suiteh	8,000
86th Division	Kao Shuang-cheng	Yulin	9,000
x95th Division	Li Tieh-chun	Shanghsien	8,000

27th Route Army under Feng Chin-tsai

7th Army Corps - Feng Chin-tsai			
42nd Division	Liu Yen-piao	Tali	8,000
169th Division	Wu Shih-min	Tali	7,000
			15,000

Nominally Central Government Troops. Actually Controlled by Yang Hu-cheng.

17th Route Army under Yang Hu-cheng.

38th Army Corps - Sun Wei-ju			
17th Division	Chao Shou-shan	Sanyuan	8,000
177th Division	Li Hsing-chung	Tsingyang	7,000
			15,000
1st Ind. Brigade	Tang Tse-feng	Sanyuan	3,000
2nd Ind. Brigade	Kung Tsung-chow	Fuping	3,000
3rd Ind. Brigade	Wang Chen-hua	Hsingshih	3,000

Nominally Central Government Troops. Former Chang Hsueh-liang's Troops.

**1st Cav. Army Corps - Ho Chu-kuo			
3rd Cav. Division	Kuo Hsi-peng	Singping	1,500
6th Cav. Division	Pai Feng-hsiang	Sienyang	1,500
			3,000

Provincial Troops

East Shensi Garrison Brig.	Wang Kuang-tsung	Shanghsien	4,000
Ankang Garrison Brig.	Chang Hung-yuan	Ankang	4,000

Total Troops in Shensi----------147,000

KANSU - Ho Yueh-tsu, Provincial Chairman (Acting)

Central Government Troops

25th Army Corps - Wan Yueh-huang			
x49th Division	Li Chi-lan	Tienshui	8,000
x51st Division	Wang Yueh-wu	Lanchow	8,000
			16,000
x27th Army Corps - Mao Ping-wen			
8th Division	Chen Shih-tao	Tungwei	10,000
24th Division	Li Ying	Lungsi	8,000
			18,000
x18th Division	Chu Yueh-hua	Pingliang	8,000
x25th Division	Kuan Lin-cheng	Pingliang	10,000
x97th Division	Kung Ling-hsun	Lanchow	8,000
Tem. 1st Army Corps - Teng Pao-shan			
165th Division	Lu Ta-chang	Minhsien	7,000
10th Ind. Brig.	Tu Chieh	Lanchow	3,000
11th Ind. Brig.	Liu Pao-tang	Lanchow	3,000
			13,000

Total Troops in Kansu----------73,000

NINGSIA - Ma Hung-kuei, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops

*15th Route Army under Ma Hung-kuei			
35th Division	Ma Hung-pin	Ningsia	10,000
1st Mix. Brig.	Lu Chung-liang	Yuwang	4,000
2nd Mix. Brig.	Ma Chuan-liang	Ningsia	4,000
3rd Mix. Brig.	Ma Ying-tsai	Minki	4,000
1st Cav. Brig.	Ma Hung-kuei	Chungwei	2,500
2nd Cav. Brig.	Ma Chung-ching		2,500
			27,000

Total Troops in Ningsia----------27,000

TSINGHAI - Ma Lin, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops

Tem. 2nd Army Corps - Ma Pu-fang			
100th Division	Ma Pu-fang	Sining	8,000
5th Cav. Division	Ma Pu-ching	Sining	4,000
			12,000
Provincial Troops			
1st Garrison Brig.	Ma Yuan-hai	Lotu	3,000
2nd Garrison Brig.	Ma Piao	Tatung	3,000
Lapuleng Garrison Commander	Huang Cheng-ching		5,000

Total Troops in Tsinghai----------23,000

SINKIANG - Li Yung, Provincial Chairman.

Provincial Troops

Border Defense Army Corps - Sheng Shih-tsai			
5th Division		Tihwa	4,000
6th Ind. Brigade		Ili	3,000
15th Ind. Brigade		Tacheng	3,000
20th Ind. Brigade		Tihwa	4,000
			14,000
1st Ind. Brigade		Tihwa	3,000
4th Ind. Brigade		Ili	3,000
Bodyguard Brigade		Tihwa	2,000
Cav. Brigade		Hami	1,000
1st Art. Regiment		Tihwa	600
White Russian Troops		Tihwa	1,200

Total Troops in Sinkiang----------24,800

CHEKIANG - Chu Chia-hua, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops			
Tem.20th Division	Kao Tze-chu	Kashing	8,000
x19th Division	Li Chueh	Tsingtien	8,000
34th Division	Ku Chia-chi	Chuchow	8,000
x55th Division	Li Sung-shan	Kashing	8,000
x63rd Division	Chung Kuang-jen	Kiangshan	9,000
3rd Ind. Brig.	Chiang Tso-chun	Shaohing	3,000
35th Ind. Brig.	Li Yi	Hangchow	4,000
38th Ind. Brig.	Pan Shan-chai	Hangchow	4,000
Provincial Troops			
Six Ind. Regiment (Peace Preservation Corps)			8,800

Total Troops in Chekiang----------60,800

KIANGSI - Hsiung Shih-hui, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops			
20th Route Army under Chang Fang			
75th Division	Sung Tien-tsai	Kwangtseh	8,000
76th Division	Li Mo-lin	Linchwang	8,000
			16,000
x27th Army Corps - Liu Hsing			
92nd Division	Liang Hua-sheng	Pingsiang	8,000
x50th Division	Cheng Kuang-yueh	Wantsai	8,000
x67th Division	Hwang Wei	Kanchow	8,000
117th Ind. Brig.	Lu Feng-nien	Nanchang	4,000
**7th Art. Brig.	Chiao Fang	Nanchang	2,000
1st Constabulery Brig.	Lin Ping-chou	Kiukiang	3,000

Total Troops in Kiangsi----------49,000

HONAN - Shang Chen, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops

*26th Route Army under Sun Lien-chung

42nd Army Corps - Sun Lien-chung			
27th Division	Feng An-pang	Mienchih	8,000
31st Division	Chih Feng-cheng	Shanchow	8,000
			16,000
x3rd Army Corps - Tseng Wan-chung			
7th Division	Tseng Wan-chung	Chengchow	10,000
12th Division	Tang Huai-yuan	Kaifeng	10,000
			20,000
*40th Army Corps - Pang Ping-hsun			
39th Division	Li Yun-yung	Sinsiang	12,000
x13th Division	Hsia Chu-chung	Loyang	10,000
x58th Division	Yu Chi-shih	Loyang	8,000
106th Division	Shen Ke	Junan	10,000
167th Division	Yang Chu-tung	Yencheng	7,000
10th Cav. Division	Tan Tze-hsin	Hsuchang	2,000
118th Ind. Brig.	Liu Yueh-ting	Sincheng	3,000
24th Cav. Brig.	Ho Cho-lien	Kioshan	1,500
**6th Art. Brig.	Wang Ho-hua	Loyang	1,800

Nominally Central Government Troops, Former Chang Hsueh-liang's Troops.

**49th Army Corps - Liu To-chuan			
105th Division	Liu To-chuan	Nanyang	12,000
112th Division	Huo Shou-yi	Chenping	6,000
129th Division	Chu Fu-cheng	Tengchow	5,000
			23,000
**57th Army Corps - Miao Cheng-liu			
109th Division	Ho Knei	Hwaiyang	6,000
111th Division	Chang En-to	Sihwa	5,000
115th Division	Liu Chi-wen	Chowkiakow	5,000
120th Division	Chao Yi	Luyi	6,000
			22,000

Total Troops in Honan----------136,300

ANHWEI - Liu Shang-ching, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops

*11th Route Army under Liu Mao-en

15th Army Corps - Liu Mao-en			
64th Division	Wu Ting-lin	Anking	8,000
65th Division	Liu Mao-en	Tungcheng	8,000
			16,000
x14th Army Corps - Wei Li-huang			
10th Division	Li Mo-an	Liwan	8,000
83rd Division	Liu Kan	Hwoshan	8,000
			16,000

x85th Division	Chen Tieh	Pengpu	7,000
40th Ind. Brig.	Sung Shih-ko	Chengyangkwang	3,000
44th Ind. Brig.	Ho Chi-hsiung	Yingshan	2,000
46th Ind. Brigl	Pao Kang	Kweichow	4,000
11th Cav. Brig.	Tan Fu-lieh	Mengcheng	2,000
15th Cav. Brig.	Chang Hung-chun	Hwoshan	2,000

Nominally Central Government Troops, Former Chang Hsueh-liang's Troops.

**67th Army Corps - Wu Ke-jen

107th Division	Chin Kuei-pi	Pochow	4,000
108th Division	Chang Wen-ching	Fuyang	6,000
110th Division	Chang Li-heng	Kueyang	5,000
117th Division	Wu Ke-jen	Taiho	5,000
			20,000

Provincial Troops

Garrison Brigade	Juan Chin-ching	Anking	3,000

Total Troops in Anhwei----------75,000

HUPEH - Huang Shao-hsiung, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops

x26th Army Corps - Hsiao Chih-chu

44th Division	Hsiao Chih-chu	Siangyang	10,000
*30th Division	Peng Chen-shan	Tungshan	7,000
*33rd Division	Feng Hsing-hsien	Chungyang	8,000
x34th Division	Chang Nai-wei	Shasi	7,000
x40th Division	Liu Pei-hsu	Hankow	7,000
x47th Division	Pei Chang-huei	Siangyang	8,000
x77th Division	Lo Lin	Ichang	8,000
102nd Division	Ho Chih-chung	Sungfow	5,000
103rd Division	Po Hui-chang	Machang	6,000
12Rst Division	Wu Chien-ping	Kichow	6,000
Tem. 8th Division	Chiang Pei-hsu	Yangsin	5,000
43rd Ind. Brig.	Liu Tseng-ching	Chienli	3,000

Provincial Troops

Garrison	Shen Chen	Wuchang	4,000
1st Ind. Brig.	Wu Chun-ping	Wuchang	3,000
2nd Ind. Brig.	Li Ting-wu	Kwangki	3,000

Total Troops in Hupeh----------90,000

KIANGSU - Chen Kuo-fu, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops

x22nd Route Army under Chiang Ting-wen

m 2nd Army Corps - Chiang Ting-wen

9th Division	Li Yen-nien	Chinkiang	9,000

x1st Army Corps - Hu Tsung-nan			
1st Division	Li Tieh-chun	Suchow	14,000
78th Division	Ting Teh-lung	Suchow	8,000
			22,000
x87th Division	Wang Ching-chiu	Changshu	8,000
x88th Division	Sun Yuan-liang	Nanking	9,000
x8alt Division	Huang Chieh	Haichow	10,000
xTraining Division	Khei Yun-ching	Nanking	8,000
x4th Ind. Brig.	Li Tseng-kai	Nanking	3,000
**8th Art. Brig.	Huang Yun-an	Suchow	2,000
x1st Art. Brigade	Headquarters	Nanking	3,000
x2nd Art. Brigade	"	Nanking	3,000
x 8 Ind. Art. Regts.	"	Nanking	9,600
x10 Military Police Regts.	"	Nanking	12,000
x 2 Communication Regts.	"	Nanking	3,000
x 2 Engineering Regts.	"	Nanking	1,000
x 1 Signal Regts.	"	Nanking	800
x 1 Transport Regt.	"	Nanking	800
x 1 Railway Corps	"	Nanking	800
x 3 Armored Train Corps	"	Nanking	1,500

Nominally Central Government Troops, Former Chang Hsueh-liang's Troops.

**51st Army Corps - Yu Hsueh-chung			
113th Division	Li Chen-tang	Sutsien	6,000
114th Division	Mo Chung-hang	Hwaian	6,000
118th Division	Chow Kuang-lieh	Shuyang	7,000
Art. Regiment	Chang Wei-pin	Hwaian	1,500
			20,500

Total Troops in Kiangsu----------127,000

HUNAN - Ho Chien, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops

x28th Army Corps - Tao Kuang			
15th Division	Wang Tung-yuan	Changteh	7,000
16th Division	Chang Liang-chi	Hengchow	7,000
62nd Division	Tao Liu	Changsha	7,000
			21,000
x18th Army Corps - Li Shu-sen			
14th Division	Ho Khei-chang	Yochow	10,000
x43rd Army Corps - Kuo Ju-tang			
26th Division	Liu Yu-ching	Shenchow	8,000
x59th Division	Han Han-ying	Yochow	10,000
x60th Division	Chen Pei	Laiyang	8,000
x96th Division	Chao Hsi-kuang	Chenchow	8,000
x32nd Ind. Brig.	Hu Ta	Paoking	3,000

Total Troops in Hunan----------68,000

SZECHWAN - Liu Hsiang, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops

16th Route Army under Hsu Yuan-chuan

10th Army Corps - Hsu Yuan-chuan			
41st Division	Hwang Hsin	Wanhsien	8,000
48th Division	Hsu Chi-wu	Chungking	10,000
			18,000
26th Army Corps - Chow Yun-yuan			
5th Division	Hsueh Pu-fu	Chengtu	8,000

Nominally Central Government Trops Actually Controlled by Liu Hsiang.

6th Route Army under Liu Hsiang

21st Army Corps - Tang Shih-tsun			
145th Division	Jao Kuo-hua	Kiating	6,000
146th Division	Pan Shao-tseng	Suining	6,000
Tem. 2nd Division	Peng Cheng-fu	Nanchwan	3,600
			15,600
23rd Army Corps - Pan Wen-hua			
147th Division	Yang Kuo-chen	Tzechung	4,000
148th Division	Chen Wan-jen	Tungchwan	4,000
Tem. 9th Division	Pan Tso	Jungchang	2,000
Tem. 10th Division	Mu Shao-ching	Neikiang	1,800
			11,800
41st Army Corps - Sun Chen			
122nd Division	Wang Ming-chang	Kwanhsien	5,000
123rd Division	Tseng Hsien-tang	Sinfan	5,000
124th Division	Sun Chen	Mienchu	5,000
			15,000
44th Army Corps - Wang Tsan-pin			
149th Division	Kuo Chang-ming	Neikang	5,000
150th Division	Liao Chen	Tzeliutsing	4,000
Tem. 9th Brig.	Chen Lan-ting	Tzechung	3,400
			12,400
45th Army Corps - Teng Hsi-hou			
125th Division	Chen Ting-hsun	Tehyang	4,000
126th Division	Huang Ying	Chengtu	4,000
127th Division	Ma Yu-chih	Tzetung	4,000
128th Division	Yang Hsui-chun	Kwangyuan	5,000
131st Division	Chen Li	Chaohwa	5,000
			22,000
104th Division	Li Chai-yu	Anhsien	5,000
144th Division	Kuo Hsun	Chengtu	6,000
161st Division	Hsu Shao-tseng	Tungliang	7,000
Tem. 1st Ind. Brig.	Chang Pang-pen	Sufu	1,800
Tem. 2nd Ind. Brig.	Teng Kuo-chang	Kusung	1,800

Tem. 3rd Ind. Brig.	Chang Chieh-cheng	Pengshui	1,800
Tem. 4th Ind. Brig.	Shih Hsi-yi	Yungchwan	1,800
Tem. 6th Ind. Brig.	Pan Nan-hsuan	Tsangki	2,000
Tem. 7th Ind. Brig.	Tien Chung-yi	Chengtu	1,800
Tem. 8th Ind. Brig.	Hsiung Yu-chang	Kintang	1,800
Tem. 23rd Division	Lo Tze-chou	Lifan	5,000
	Total Troops in Szechwan----------		138,600

SIKANG - Liu Wen-hui, Provincial Chairman.

Nominally Central Government Troops. Actually Controlled by Liu Wen-hui.

24th Army Corps - Liu Wen-hui

136th Division	Chen Kuang-tsao	Kangting	5,000
137th Division	Liu Yuan-tang	Luting	5,000
138th Division	Tang Ying	Yakiang	4,000
1st Ind. Brig.	Yu Sung-lin	Kangting	2,000
			16,000
	Total Troops in Sikang----------		16,000

KWEICHOW - Hsueh Yueh, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops

x4th Army Corps - Wu Chi-wei

90th Division	Ou Chen	Kweiyang	8,000
46th Division	Liu Tze-hsia		8,000
			16,000

x9th Army Corps - Hao Meng-ling

54th Division	Hao Meng-ling	Tsungyi	9,000
x99th Division	Kuo Sze-yen	Kweiting	8,000
x34th Ind. Brig.	Lo Chi-kiang	Chenyuan	3,000
	Total Troops in Kweichow----------		36,000

FUKIEN - Chen Yi, Provincial Chairman.

Nominally Central Government Troops. Actually Controlled by Yu Han-mou.

4th Route Army under Yu Han-mou

156th Division	Teng Lung-kuang	Lungyen	6,000
157th Division	Huang Tao	Changchow	6,000
			12,000

Central Government Troops

39th Army Corps - Liu Ho-ting

56th Division	Liu Shang-chih	Pucheng	9,000
45th Ind. Brig.	Chang Luan-chi	Kienyang	3,000
			12,000
x3rd Division	Li Yu-tang	Yenping	10,000
x45th Division	Tai Min-chuan	Foochow	7,000
52nd Division	Lu Hsing-jung	Yungan	8,000

x80th Division	Chen Chi	Chwanchow	8,000
Tem. 10th Division	Chen Te-chun	Fuan	6,000
6th Ind. Brig.	Chow Chih-chun	Chengho	3,000
x37th Ind. Brig.	Chen Teh-fa	Shahsien	3,000
2nd Constabulary Brig.	Lin Tung	Mamoi	3,000
	Total Troops in Fukien----------		72,000

KWANGTUNG - Wu Tieh-cheng, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops

x18th ArmyCorps - Li Shu-sen

11th Division	Chou Tze-shou	Canton	10,000
x6th Division	Chow Yen	Samshui	9,000
x82nd Division	Jung Ching-fang	Shiuchow	8,000
x93rd Division	Chen Lieh	Yingtak	8,000
x98th Division	Hsia Chu-chung	Fachow	8,000
x9th Ind. Brig.	Wang Ting-hua	Kiungtung	3,000

Nominally Central Government Troops. Actually controlled by Yu Han-mou.

4th Route Army under Yu Han-mou

151st Division	Mo Hsi-teh	Shiuhing	6,000
152nd Division	Cheng Chang	Kiungshan	6,000
153rd Division	Chang Jui-kuei	Chungfa	6,000
154th Division	Wu Chien-hsiung	Yeungkong	6,000
155th Division	Li Han-yun	Chaoan	6,000
158th Division	Tseng Yu-jen	Tsiuleng	6,000
159th Division	Tan Sui	Muiluk	6,000
160th Division	Yeh Chao	Tsengcheng	6,000
Training Brig.	Lo Tze-hsia	Shiuchow	3,000
			51,000
	Total Troops in Kwangtung----------		97,000

KWANGSI - Huang Hsu-chu, Provincial Chairman.

Nominally Central Government Troops. Actually Controlled by Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi.

7th Army Corps - Liao Yen

19th Division	Hsi Chi-ming	Kweilin	8,000
21st Division	Yang Chun-chang	Liuchow	8,000
24th Division	Cheng Shu-fen	Chwanchow	8,000
			24,000

48th Army Corps - Hsia Wei

43rd Division	Ho Wei-chen	Kweilin	8,000
44th Division	Wang Tsan-pin	Wuchow	8,000
45th Division	Mo Shu-chieh	Jungyun	8,000
			24,000
Tem. 1st Division	Shou Nien	Kweilin	6,000
	Total Troops in Kwangsi----------		54,000

YUNNAN- Lung Yun, Provincial Chairman.

Nominally Central Government Troops. Actually Controlled by Lung Yun.

10th Route Army under Lung Yun.			
3rd Ind. Brig.	Lung Yu-tsang	Yunnan	6,400
5th Ind. Brig.	Lu Tao-yuan	Chiupei	4,400
7th Ind. Brig.	Kung Shun-pi	Chaotung	4,000
9th Ind. Brig.	Chang Chung	Yunnan	2,500
Guard Regiment	Chang Yi	Yunnan	2,000
Mixed Regiment	Wu Chung	Yunnan	1,000
Ind. Regiment	Tuan Tsan-kuai	Yunnan	1,600
			21,900
	Total Troops in Yunnan----------		21,900

Legend:- * Former Kuominchun Forces.
** Former Troops of Chang Hsueh-liang.
x Personal Troops of Chiang Kai-shek.

RECAPITULATION

Central Government Troops which are actually controlled by the Nanking Government---------- 953,300

Nominally Central Government Troops which are actually controlled by local military Authorities---------- 590,800

Troops of the East Hopei Autonomous Government---------- 18,000

Provincial Troops---------- 96,600

Total Forces under arms in China, not including irregulars----

1,658,700

Joseph W. Stilwell,

Joseph W. Stilwell,
Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

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CHINA (COMBAT)

Subject: ORGANIZATION - General

List of Names of Army Corps and Division Commanders of the Chinese Army

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. APR 4 1939

As of July, 1938, corps and division commanders were as follows. There had been relatively few changes in command in these units up to December 1, 1938.

ARMY CORPS

1st	Chün	.....Hu Tsung-nan
2nd	,,	.....Li Yen-nien
3rd	,,	.....Tseng Wan-chung
4th	,,	.....Wu Chi-wei
5th	,,	.....Hsueh Yueh
6th	,,	.....
7th	,,	.....Chou Tsu-huang
8th	,,	.....Huang Chieh
9th	,,	.....Kuo Chi-chiao
10th	,,	.....Hsu Yuan-chuan
11th	,,	.....Ma Hung-kuei
12th	,,	.....Sun Tung-hsuan
13th	,,	.....Tang En-po
14th	,,	.....Li Mo-an
15th	,,	.....Liu Mao-en
16th	,,	.....Li Yun-heng
17th	,,	.....Kao Kuei-tze
18th	,,	.....Lo Tso-ying
19th	,,	.....Wang Ching-kuo
20th	,,	.....Yang Sen
21st	,,	.....Tang Shih-tsun
22nd	,,	.....Tan Tao-yuan
23rd	,,	.....Pan Wen-hua
24th	,,	.....Liu Wen-hui
25th	,,	.....Wan Yueh-huang
26th	,,	.....Hsiao Chih-chu
27th	,,	.....Liu Hsing
28th	,,	.....Tao Kuang
29th	,,	.....
30th	,,	.....Tien Chen-nan
31st	,,	.....Wei Yun-sung
32nd	,,	.....Shang Chen
33rd	,,	.....Sun Chu
34th	,,	.....Yang Chen-yuan
35th	,,	.....Fu Tso-yi
36th	,,	.....Yao Chun
37th	,,	.....Mao Ping-wen
38th	,,	.....Sun Wei-ju
39th	,,	.....Liu Ho-ting
40th	,,	.....Pang Ping-hsun

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ARMY CORPS (Continued)

41st .....Sun Chen
42nd .....Feng An-pang
43rd .....Kuo Ju-tung
44th .....Wang Tsan-hsu
45th .....Teng Hsi-hou
46th .....Fan Sung-fu
47th .....Li Chia-yu
48th .....Liao Lei
49th .....Liu Tuo-chuan
50th .....Kuo Hsun-chi
51st .....Yu Hsueh-chung
52nd .....Kuan Lin-cheng
53rd .....Wan Fu-lin
54th .....Huo Kuei-chang
55th .....Tsao Fu-lin
56th .....Kuo Chang-ming
57th .....Miao Cheng-liu
58th .....
59th .....Chang Tze-chung
60th .....Lu Han
61st .....Chen Chang-chieh
62nd .....Chang Ta
63rd .....Chang Jui-kuei
64th .....Li Han-hun
65th .....Li Chen-chiu
66th .....Yeh Chao
67th .....Hsu Shao-tsung
68th .....Liu Ju-ming
69th .....Shih Yu-san
70th .....Li Chueh
71st .....Wang Ching-chiu
72nd .....Sun Yuan-liang
73rd .....Wang Tung-yuan
74th .....Yu Chi-shih
75th .....Chou Yen
76th .....Tao Chih-yueh
77th .....Feng Chih-an
78th .....Sung Hsi-lien
79th .....Hsia Chu-chung
80th .....Kung Ling-hsun
81st .....Ma Hung-pin
82nd .....Ma Pu-fang
83rd .....Teng Lung-kuang
84th .....Hsia Wei
85th .....Wang Chung-lien
86th .....Ho Chih-chung
87th .....Liu Ying-ku
88th .....Fan Shao-tseng
89th .....Han Te-chin
90th .....Peng Chin-chih
91st .....Kao Tze-chui
92nd .....Li Hsien-chou
93rd .....Liu Kan

ARMY CORPS (Continued)

New 1st Chün .....Teng Pao-shan
,, 4th ,, ...Yeh Ting

1st Cavalry Chün .....Chao Cheng-shou
2nd ,, ,, ...Ho Chu-kuo
5th ,, ,, ...Ma Pu-ching
6th ,, ,, ...Men Ping-yueh

DIVISION

1st Division.....Li Tieh-chun
2nd ,, ...Cheng Tung-kuo
3rd ,, ...Li Yu-tang
4th ,, ...Chen Ta-ching
5th ,, ...Sheng Feng-yao
6th ,, ...Chang Kung
7th ,, ...Li Shih-lung
8th ,, ...Tao Chih-yueh
9th ,, ...Cheng Tso-min
10th ,, ...Peng Chieh-ju
11th ,, ...Peng Shan
12th ,, ...Tang Huai-yuan
13th ,, ...Wu Liang-chen
14th ,, ...Chen Lieh
15th ,, ...Wang Chih-pin
16th ,, ...Ho Ping
17th ,, ...Chao Shou-shan
18th ,, ...Chu Yueh-hua
19th ,, ...Li Chueh
20th ,, ...Sun Tung-hsuan
21st ,, ...Li Hsien-chou
22nd ,, ...Ku Liang-min
23rd ,, ...
24th ,, ...Li Ying
25th ,, ...Chang Yueh-ming
26th ,, ...Liu Yu-ching
27th ,, ...Huang Sung-chiao
28th ,, ...Tung Chao
29th ,, ...Tsao Fu-lin
30th ,, ...Chang Chin-chao
31st ,, ...Chih Feng-cheng
32nd ,, ...Wang Hsiu-shen
33rd ,, ...Chia Yun-shan
34th ,, ...Kung Ping-fan
35th ,, ...Ma Teng-chiao
36th ,, ...Chiang Fu-sheng
37th ,, ...Chang Ling-yun
38th ,, ...Huang Wei-kang
39th ,, ...Ma Fa-wu
40th ,, ...Huang Chieh
41st ,, ...Ting Chih-pan
42nd ,, ...Liu Yen-piao
43rd ,, ...Chou Hsiang-chu
44th ,, ...Chen Yung

DIVISION

45th	Division.....	Liu Chin
46th	,, ...	Kuei Yung-ching
47th	,, ...	Pei Chang-hui
48th	,, ...	Hsu Chi-wu
49th	,, ...	Chou Shih-mien
50th	,, ...	Cheng Kuang-yueh
51st	,, ...	Wang Yueh-wu
52nd	,, ...	Tang Yun-shan
53rd	,, ...	Li Yun-heng
54th	,, ...	Kung Fan-ying
55th	,, ...	Liu Chi-ming
56th	,, ...	Liu Shang-chih
57th	,, ...	Shih Chung-cheng
58th	,, ...	Feng Sheng-fa
59th	,, ...	Chang Te-neng
60th	,, ...	Chen Pei
61st	,, ...	Chung Sung
62nd	,, ...	Tao Liu
63rd	,, ...	Chen Kuang-chung
64th	,, ...	Wu Ting-ling
65th	,, ...	Liu Mao-en
66th	,, ...	Tu Chun-yi
67th	,, ...	Huang Wei
68th	,, ...	Meng Hsien-chi
69th	,, ...	Lui Jui-ying
70th	,, ...	Tu Kun
71st	,, ...	Kuo Tsung-fen
72nd	,, ...	Tuan Shu-hua
73rd	,, ...	Liu Feng-pin
74th	,, ...	Li Han-chang
75th	,, ...	Sung Tien-tsai
76th	,, ...	Wang Ling-yun
77th	,, ...	Peng Wei-jen
78th	,, ...	Li Wen
79th	,, ...	Chen An-pao
80th	,, ...	Chen Chi
81st	,, ...	Chan Shu-tang
82nd	,, ...	Chang Kang
83rd	,, ...	Chen Wu
84th	,, ...	Kao Kuei-tze
85th	,, ...	Chen Tieh
86th	,, ...	Kao Shuang-cheng
87th	,, ...	Shen Fa-tsao
88th	,, ...	Lung Mu-han
89th	,, ...	Chang Hsueh-chung
90th	,, ...	Ou Chen
91st	,, ...	Feng Chan-hai
92nd	,, ...	Huang Kuo-liang
93rd	,, ...	Kan Li-chu
94th	,, ...	Chu Huai-ping
95th	,, ...	Lo Chi
96th	,, ...	Chao Hsi-kuang
97th	,, ...	Han Hsi-hou
98th	,, ...	Mo Yu-shih
99th	,, ...	Fu Chung-fang

DIVISIONS

100th	Division.....	Ma Pu-fang
101st	,, ...	Tung Chi-wu
102nd	,, ...	Po Hui-chang
103rd	,, ...	Ho Chih-chung
104th	,, ...	Li Ching-ting
105th	,, ...	Wang Tieh-han
106th	,, ...	Shen Ke
107th	,, ...	Liu Chien-hsu
108th	,, ...	Chang Wen-ching
109th	,, ...	Li Shu-sen
110th	,, ...	Chang Chen
111th	,, ...	Chang En-tuo
112th	,, ...	Huo Shou-yi
113th	,, ...	Chou Kuang-lieh
114th	,, ...	Mo Chung-heng
115th	,, ...	Lin Piao
116th	,, ...	Chou Fu-cheng
117th	,, ...	Li Shou-wei
118th	,, ...	Wang Yen
119th	,, ...	Li Chin-tien
120th	,, ...	Huo Lung
121st	,, ...	Wu Chien-ping
122nd	,, ...	
123rd	,, ...	Tseng Hsien-tung
124th	,, ...	Sun Chen
125th	,, ...	Chen Ting-hsun
126th	,, ...	Huang Yen
127th	,, ...	Chen Li
128th	,, ...	Wang Chin-tsai
129th	,, ...	Liu Po-cheng
130th	,, ...	Chu Hung-hsun
131st	,, ...	Tan Lien-fang
132nd	,, ...	Wang Chang-hai
133rd	,, ...	Yang Han-yu
134th	,, ...	Yang Han-chung
135th	,, ...	Su Tsu-hsin
136th	,, ...	Tang Ying
137th	,, ...	Liu Yuan-tang
138th	,, ...	Mo Te-hung
139th	,, ...	Li Chao-ying
140th	,, ...	Wang Wen-yen
141st	,, ...	Tang Yung-liang
142nd	,, ...	Fu Li-ping
143rd	,, ...	Li Tseng-chih
144th	,, ...	Fan Tze-ying
145th	,, ...	Tung Yi
146th	,, ...	Liu Chao-li
147th	,, ...	Chen Wan-jen
148th	,, ...	Pan Tso
149th	,, ...	Kuo Chang-ming
150th	,, ...	Liao Chen
151st	,, ...	Mo Hsi-te
152nd	,, ...	Chen Chang
153rd	,, ...	Chang Jui-kuei
154th	,, ...	Liang Shih-chi
155th	,, ...	Li Han-hun
156th	,, ...	Li Chiang
157th	,, ...	Huang Tao

DIVISIONS

158th	Division	Tseng Yu-jen
159th	,, ...	Tan Sui
160th	,, ...	Hua Chen-chung
161st	,, ...	Hsu Shao-tsung
162nd	,, ...	Peng Cheng-fu
163rd	,, ...	Chen Lan-ting
164th	,, ...	Chang Pang-pen
165th	,, ...	Lu Ta-chang
166th	,, ...	Ma Li-wu
167th	,, ...	
168th	,, ...	Ma Hung-kuei
169th	,, ...	Wu Shih-min
170th	,, ...	Hsu Chi-ming
171st	,, ...	Yang Chun-chang
172nd	,, ...	Cheng Shu-fen
173rd	,, ...	Ho Wei-chen
174th	,, ...	Chang Kuang-wei
175th	,, ...	Mo Shu-chieh
176th	,, ...	Ou Shou-nien
177th	,, ...	Li Hsing-chung
178th	,, ...	Li Tsung-fang
179th	,, ...	Ho Chi-li
180th	,, ...	Liu Chen-san
181st	,, ...	Shih Yu-san
182nd	,, ...	An En-pu
183rd	,, ...	Kao Yin-huai
184th	,, ...	Chang Chung
185th	,, ...	Kuo Chan
186th	,, ...	Li Chen
187th	,, ...	Peng Lin-sheng
188th	,, ...	Liu Jen
189th	,, ...	Ling Ya-hsi
190th	,, ...	Liang Hua-sheng
191st	,, ...	Yang Te-liang
192nd	,, ...	Hu Ta
193rd	,, ...	Li Tsung-chien
194th	,, ...	Chen Te-fa
195th	,, ...	Liang Kai
196th	,, ...	
197th	,, ...	Ting Ping-chuan
198th	,, ...	Wang Yu-ying
199th	,, ...	Lo Shu-chia
200th	,, ...	Tu Yi-ming
New 2nd	Division.....	Chin Hsien-chang
,, 5th	,, ...	Li Hsien
,, 6th	,, ...	Kao Shu-hsun
,, 8th	,, ...	Chiang Chai-chen
,,35th	,, ...	
Reserve	1st Div.	Hsieh Fu-san
,,	2nd ,, ...	Feng Chien-fei
,,	3rd ,, ...	Chou Kai-hsun
,,	6th ,, ...	Chi Chang-chien
,,	7th ,, ...	Tsao Jih-hui
,,	8th ,, ...	Ling Chao-yao
,,	9th ,, ...	Chang Yen-chuan
,,	10th ,, ...	Hsuan Tieh-wu
,,	11th ,, ...	Chao Ting-chang
,,	13th ,, ...	Lo Chi-chiang

Joseph W. Stilwell

JOSEPH W. STILWELL
Colonel, Infantry (DOL)
Military Attache

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REPLACE.

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FEB 26 1937
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
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WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Distribution of Troops (CHINESE)

Composition and Distribution of Troops as of January 15,1937.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. FEB 25 1937

HOPEI - Feng Chih-an, Provincial Chairman

Nominally Central Government Troops, Actually Controlled by Hopei-Chahar Political Council.

*29th Army Corps - Sung Che-yuan			
37th Division	Feng Chih-an	Paoting	12,000
38th Division	Chang Tze-chung	Tientsin	8,000
132nd Division	Chao Teng-yu	Peiping	8,000
1st. Ind. Brig.	Juan Hsuan-wu	Peiping	4,000
1st. Cav. Brig.	Chang Jun-chih	Chochow	2,000
Special Service Regt.		Peiping	1,600
Training Corps		Peiping	1,200
			36,800

Central Government Troops

32nd Army Corps - Shang Chen			
139th Division	Huang Kuang-hua	Hantan	8,000
141st Division	Sung Ken-tang	Shunteh	7,000
142nd Division	Lu Chi	Shaho	7,000
**4th Cav. Division		Taming	2,000
Ind. Cav. Regt.		Shunteh	1,000
Ind. Art. Regt.		Shunteh	1,000
			26,000

Nominally Central Government Troops, Actually Controlled by Chang Hueh-liang.

**53rd Army Corps - Wan Fu-lin			
116th Division	Liu Yuan-hsun	Tingchow	6,000
119th Division	Tsung Chao-lin	Shihkiachwang	5,000
130th Division	Chu Hung-hsun	Paoting	5,000
			16,000
**91st Division	Feng Chan-hai	Kaoyi	10,000

Provincial Troops.

1st Garrison Brig.	Cheng Hsi-hsien	Paoting	3,000
2nd Garrison Brig.	Tai Shou-yi	Hokien	3,000
North Hopei Garrison C.	Shih Yu-san	Peiping	4,000
			10,000

Troops of the East Hopei Autonomous Government Controlled by Yin Ju-keng. (Not controlled by Nanking).

1st Corps	Chang Ching-yu	Tungchow	4,000
2nd Corps	Chang Yen-tien	Tsunhwa	4,000
3rd Corps	Li Yung-sheng	Iwanchow	4,000
4th Corps	Han Tze-hsin	Tangshan	4,000
Training Corps	Yin Ju-keng	Tungchow	2,000
			18,000

From M/A, China. Report No. 9505 January 15, 1937.

Total Troops in Hopei----------116,800

CHAHAR - Liu Ju-ming, Provincial Chairman

Nominally Central Government Troops, Actually Controlled by Hopei-Chahar Political Council.

*29th Army Corps - Sung Che-yuan			
143rd Division	Liu Ju-ming	Kalgan	8,000
3rd Ind. Brig.	Ku Tze-wen	Kalgan	3,000
3rd Cav. Brig.	Yao Ching-chuan	Kwailai	2,000
8th Cav. Brig.	Hsia Tze-ming	Kangchwang	2,000
			15,000

Total Troops in Chahar----------15,000

SHANSI - Chao Tai-wen, Provincial Chairman

Nominally Central Government Troops, Actually Controlled by Yen Hsi-shan.

33rd Army Corps - Sun Chu			
66th Division	Yang Hsiao-ou	Pingyao	8,000
69th Division	Yang Chen-yuan	Fanchow	8,000
			16,000
34th Army Corps - Yang Ai-yuan			
71st Division	Kuo Tsun-chun	Pingyang	8,000
61st Army Corps - Li Fu-ying			
68th Division	Li Fu-ying	Yangkao	9,000
101st Division	Li Chun-kang	Tatung	9,000
			18,000
Central Government Troops			
x21st Division	Li Hsien-chow	Taiyuan	9,000
Provincial Troops			
1st Ind. Brig.	Tu Chun-yi	Taiyuan	3,000
2nd Ind. Brig.	Chou Yuan-chien	Yuanping	3,000
3rd Ind. Brig.	Feng Yu-hsi	Tatung	3,000
			9,000

Total Troops in Shansi----------60,000

SHANTUNG- Han Fu-chu, Provincial Chairman

Nominally Central Government Troops, Actually Controlled by Han Fu-chu.

*3rd Route Army under Han Fu-chu			
20th Division	Sun Tung-hsun	Yenchow	12,000
22nd Division	Ku Liang-ming	Chowtsun	9,000
29th Division	Tsao Fu-lin	Tsinan	10,000
74th Division	Li Han-chang	Tsinan	8,000
81st Division	Chan Shu-tang	Kiaochow	8,000
Ind. Cav. Brig.		Tsinan	1,500
Garrison Brig.		Tsinan	3,000
1st Art. Regt.		Tsinan	1,000
2nd Art. Regt.		Tsinan	1,000
			53,500

Provincial Troops

Militia Troops - Han Fu-chu

1st Corps	Chao Ming-yuan	Lintsing	2,000
2nd Corps	Chao Jen-chuan	Lintsing	2,000
3rd Corps	Ku Liang-yu	Kufow	2,000
4th Corps	Hsueh Shu-tang	Chaoyuan	2,000
5th Corps	Chang Hsien	Tsining	2,000
			10,000

Total Troops in Shantung----------63,500

SUIYUAN - Fu Tso-yi, Provincial Chairman

Nominally Central Government Troops, Actually Controlled by Yen Hsi-shan.

19th Army Corps - Wang Ching-kuo

70th Division	Wang Ching-kuo	Paotow	8,000
72nd Division	Chen Chang-chieh	Fengchen	8,000
			16,000

35th Army Corps - Fu Tso-yi

73rd Division	Fu Tso-yi	Wuchwan	8,000

Cavalry Army Corps - Chao Cheng-shou

1st Cav. Division	Peng Yu-pin	Wuchwan	1,500
2nd Cav. Division	Sun Chang-sheng	Taolin	1,500
			3,000

2nd Division	Chin Hsien-chang	Wuchwan	1,200
1st Cav. Brig.	Shih Yu-shan	Wuchwan	1,300
2nd Ind. Brig.	Wang Tze-hsiu	Hsingho	800
3rd Ind. Brig.	An Hwa-ting	Hsingho	800
7th Ind. Brig.	Ma Yen-shou	Wuchwan	2,400

Central Government Troops

13th Army Corps - Tang En-po

x4th Division	Wang Chung-lien	Hsingho	8,000
x89th Division	Wang Wan-ling	Tsining	8,000
*7th Cav. Division	Meng Ping-yueh	Lungshengchwan	4,500
			20,500

Total Troops in Suiyuan----------54,000

SHENSI - Sun Yu-ju, Provincial Chairman

Central Government Troops

x8th Route Army under Chao Kuan-tao

6th Division	Chou Yen	Tali	10,000

3rd Army Corps - Tseng Wan-chung

7th Division	Tseng Wan-chung	Paoki	10,000
12th Division	Tang Hwai-yuan	Paoki	10,000
			20,000

x5th Army Corps - Yueh Sen

43rd Division	Tai Yueh	Lungchow	8,000
23rd Division	Li Pi-fan	Hwayin	10,000
			18,000

x14th Army Corps - Wei Li-huang			
10th Division	Li Mo-an	Tungkwan	8,000
83rd Division	Liu Kan	Chihshui	8,000
			16,000
x17th Army Corps - Hsing Chen-nan			
2nd Division	Cheng Tung-kuo	Tungkwan	12,000
x18th Army Corps - Li Shu-sen			
14th Division	Ho Kuo-kuang	Chihshui	10,000
x25th Army Corps - Wan Yueh-huang			
13th Division	Hsia Chu-chung	Hwahsien	10,000
103th Division	Po Hui-chang	Hwahsien	6,000
			16,000
x46th Army Corps - Fan Sung-pu			
79th Division	Chen An-pao	Chihshui	8,000
x28th Division	Tung Chao	Chihshui	10,000
x53th Division	Li Pao-ping	Hanchung	8,000
x57th Division	Juan Chao-chang	Tungkwan	8,000
61st Division	Yang Pu-fei	Tungkwan	8,000
84th Division	Kao Kuei-tze	Suiteh	8,000
86th Division	Kao Shuang-cheng	Yulin	10,000
x95th Division	Li Tieh-chun	Shanhsien	8,000

Nominally Central Government Troops, Actually Controlled by Yang Hu-cheng.

17th Route Army under Yang Hu-cheng

7th Army Corps - Feng Ching-tsai			
42nd Division	Feng Ching-tsai	Tali	10,000
38th Army Corps - Sun Yu-ju			
17th Division	Sun Yu-ju	Sian	10,000
1st Ind. Garrison Brig.	Tang Tze-feng	Sian	4,000
2nd Ind. Garrison Brig.	Chang Fei-sheng	Sanyuan	4,000
3rd Ind. Garrison Brig.	Sun Tsang-lang	Pucheng	3,000

Nominally Central Government Troops, Actually Controlled by Chang Hsueh-liang.

**57th Army Corps - Miao Cheng-liu			
109th Division	Ho Kuei	Sian	6,000
112th Division	Huo Shou-yi	Lintung	5,000
115th Division	Hsiung Cheng-pin	Chihshui	5,000
			16,000
**67th Army Corps - Wang Yi-che			
107th Division	Chin Kuei-pi	Changwu	4,000
110th Division	Chang Wen-ching	Changwu	5,000
117th Division	Wu Ke-jen	Pinchow	5,000
			14,000
**105th Division	Liu To-chuan	Sian	12,000
**106th Division	Shen Ke	Yuehhsien	10,000
**108th Division	Chiang Wei-jen	Chunhua	6,000
**129th Division	Chu Fu-cheng	Sian	5,000

Provincial Troops

East Shensi Garrison Brig.	Wang Kwang-tsun	Shanghsien	4,000
Ankang Garrison	Chang Hung-yuan	Ankang	4,000
	Total Troops in Shensi----------		272,000

KANSU - Yu Hsueh-chung, Provincial Chairman

Central Government Troops

x7th Route Army under Mao Wei-shou

49th Division	Li Chi-lan	Hweining	8,000
78th Division	Ting Teh-lung	Tingsi	8,000
			16,000

x25th Army Corps - Wan Yueh-huang

51st Division	Fan Han-chieh	Tsingyuan	8,000
140th Division	Wang Wen-yen	Hweining	8,000
			16,000

x37th Army Corps - Mao Ping-wen

8th Division	Tao Chih-yueh	Tienshui	10,000
24th Division	Li Ying	Tsinan	8,000
			18,000

x1st Division	Hu Tsung-nan	Tungwei	14,000
x25th Division	Kwang Lin-cheng	Tsingyuan	10,000
x93rd Division	Fu Chung-fang	Haiyuan	8,000
x97th Division	Kung Ling-hsun	Haiyuan	8,000

1st Army Corps - Teng Pao-shan

165th Division	Lu Ta-chang	Minhsien	7,000
10th Ind. Brig.	Tu Chieh	Lanchow	3,000
11th Ind. Brig.	Liu Pao-tang	Lanchow	3,000
			13,000

Nominally Central Government Troops, Actually Controlled by Chang Hsueh-liang.

**51st Army Corps - Yu Hsueh-chung

113th Division	Li Chen-tang	Lanchow	6,000
114th Division	Mo Chung-hang	Lanchow	6,000
118th Division	Chow Kwang-lieh	Lanchow	7,000
			19,000

**Cavalry Army Corps - Ho Chu-kuo

1st Cav. Division	Chang Cheng-teh	Kingyuan	1,500
3rd Cav. Division	Kuo Hsi-peng	Sifengchen	1,500
6th Cav. Division	Pai Feng-hsiang	Chenning	1,500
10th Cav. Division	Tan Tze-hsin	Ninghsien	2,000
			6,500

**111th Division	Chang En-to	Kingyuan	5,000
**120th Division	Chang Ching-wu	Pingliang	5,000
	Total Troops in Kansu----------		138,500

NINGSIA - Ma Hung-kuei, Chairman of Provincial Government

Central Government Troops

*15th Route Army under Ma Hung-kuei

35th Division	Ma Hung-pin	Yuwang	10,000
1st Mix. Brig.	Ln Chung-liang	Ningsia	4,000
2nd Mix. Brig.	Ma Chuan-liang	Ningsia	4,000
3rd Mix. Brig.	Ma Ying-tsai	Kinki	4,000
1st Cav. Brig.	Ma Hung-kuei	Chungning	2,500
2nd Cav. Brig.	Ma Chung-ching	Chungning	2,500
			27,000

Total Troops in Ningsia----------27,000

TSINGHAI - Ma Lin, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops

2nd Army Corps - Ma Pu-fang

2nd Cav. Division	Ma Pu-ching	Shantan	5,000
100th Division	Ma Pu-fang	Sining	8,000
			13,000

Total Troops in Tsinghai----------13,000

SINKIANG - Li Yung, Provincial Chairman

Provincial Troops

Border Defense Army Corps - Sheng Shih-tsai.

5th Division		Tihwa	4,000
6th Ind. Brigade		Ili	3,000
15th Ind. Brigade		Tacheng	3,000
20th Ind. Brigade		Tihwan	4,000
			14,000

1st Ind. Brigade		Tihwa	3,000
4th Ind. Brigade		Ili	3,000
Badyguard Brigade		Tihwa	2,000
Cavalry Brigade		Hami	1,000
1st Art. Regt.		Tihwa	600
White Russian Troops		Tihwa	1,200
8th Division	Yang Cheng-chung	Chiehmo	2,000
35th Division	Ma Chung-ying	Hotien	2,000

Total Troops in Sinkiang----------28,800

CHEKIANG - Chu Chia-hua, Provincial Chairman

Central Government Troops

x18th Division	Chu Yueh-hua	Lishui	10,000
x20th Division	Kao Tze-chu	Kashing	8,000
x55th Division	Li Sung-shan	Kashing	8,000
x60th Division	Chen Pei	Hangchow	8,000
x34th Ind. Brig.	Lo Chi-kiang	Hangchow	4,000
x35th Ind. Brig.	Li Yi	Kashing	4,000
x38th Ind. Brig.	Pan Shan-chai	Hangchow	4,000
x3rd Ind. Brig.	Chiang Tso-chun	Shaohing	3,000

4th Route Army under Liu Chien-hsu

28th Army Corps - Tao Kwang

15th Division	Wang Tung-yuan	Chuchow	9,000
19th Division	Li Chieh	Chuchow	9,000
63rd Division	Chung Kuang-jen	Kiangshan	8,000
			26,000

Provincial Troops

6th Ind. Regiments (Peace Preservation Corps)			8,800
	Total Troops in Chekiang----------		83,800

KIANGSI - Hsiung Shih-hui, Provincial Chairman

Central Government Troops

x20th Route Army under Chang Fang			
75th Division	Sun Tien Tsai	Fuchow	8,000
76th Division	Li Mo-lin	Shangjao	8,000
			16,000
x27th Army Corps - Liu Hsing			
92nd Division	Liang Hua-sheng	Pingsiang	8,000
x50th Division	Chen Kuang-yueh	Kanchow	8,000
x67th Division	Hwang Wei	Kian	8,000
117th Ind. Brig.	Lu Feng-nien	Nanchang	4,000
7th Art. Brig.	Chao Fang	Nanchang	2,000
1st Constabulary Brig.	Lin Ping-chow	Kiukiang	3,000
	- Total Troops in Kiangsi----------		49,000

HONAN - Shang Chen, Provincial Chairman

Central Government Troops

26th Route Army under Sun Lien-chung			
*42nd Army Corps - Sun Lien-chung			
27th Division	Kao Shu-hsun	Shanchow	8,000
31st Division	Chih Feng-cheng	Wenhsiang	8,000
			16,000
x9th Army Corps - Hao Meng-ling			
47th Division	Pei Chang-hui	Sinyang	8,000
54th Division	Hao Meng-ling	Chengchow	8,000
			16,000
*40th Army Corps - Pang Ping-hsun			
39th Division	Li Yun-tung	Sinsiang	12,000
5th Division	Li Fu-ho	Sinsiang	1,500
			13,500
x58th Division	Chen Yueh-han	Loyang	8,000
5th Division	Yang Chu-tung	Yencheng	7,000
118th Ind. Brig.	Liu Yueh-ting	Hsuchang	3,000
24th Cav. Brig.	Ho Cho-lien	Hsuchang	2,000
**6th Art. Brig.	Wang Ho-hua	Loyang	1,800
	Total Troops in Honan----------		51,300

ANHWEI - Liu Chen-hua, Provincial Chairman

Central Government Troops

*11th Route Army under Liu Mao-en			
64th Division	Wu Ting-lin	Anking	8,000
65th Division	Liu Mao-en	Wuhu	9,000
			15,000

*25th Army Corps under Liang Kuan-yin.			
32nd Division	Wang Hsiu-shen	Luchow	12,000
5th Ind. Brig.	Liu Chi-ming	Liuan	3,000
15th Cav. Brig.	Chang Hung-chun	Shucheng	2,000
			17,000
x85th Division	Chen Tieh	Pengpu	7,000
x40th Ind. Brig.	Sung Shih-ke	Chengyangkwan	3,000
x44th Ind. Brig.	Ho Chi-hsiung	Yingshan	2,000
*46th Ind. Brig.	Pao Kang	Hweichow	4,000
11th Cav. Brig.	Tan Fu-lieh	Mengcheng	2,000
Provincial Troops			
Garrison Brig.	Juan Chin-ching	Anking	3,000
	Total Troops in Anhwei----------		53,000

HUPEH - Huang Shao-hsiung, Provincial Chairman

Central Government Troops

x26th Army Corps - Hsiao Chih-chu			
44th Division	Hsiao Chih-chu	Yunyang	10,000
*33rd Division	Feng Hsing-hsien	Chungyang	8,000
x34th Division	Chang Nai-wei	Ichang	8,000
x40th Division	Liu Pei-hsu	Hankow	7,000
x65th Division	Chen Hung-yuan	Tungshan	8,000
x69th Division	Wang Yi-chung	Tayeh	7,000
x94th Division	Chu Hwai-ping	Wuchang	7,000
102th Division	Ho Chih-chung	Sungfow	6,000
9th Ind. Brig.	Wang Ting-hua	Hwangpei	3,000
35th Ind. Brig.	Li Tseng-chien	Puchi	3,000
43rd Ind. Brig.	Liu Tseng-ching	Chienli	3,000
Provincial Troops			
Garrison Brig.	Shen Chen	Wuchang	4,000
1st Ind. Brig.	Wu Chun-ping	Wuchang	3,000
2nd Ind. Brig.	Li Ting-wu	Kwangki	3,000
	Total Troops in Hupeh----------		80,000

KIANGSU - Chen Kuo-fu, Provincial Chairman

Central Government Troops

22nd Route Army under Chiang Ting-wen			
x2nd Army Corps - Chiang Ting-wen			
9th Division	Li Yen-nien	Chinkiang	9,000
x18th Army Corps - Li Shu-sen			
11th Division	Li Shu-sen	Nanking	9,000
x36th Division	Sung Hsi-lien	Changchow	8,000
x87th Division	Wang Ching-chiu	Changshu	8,000
x88th Division	Sun Yuan-liang	Yangchow	9,000
xSalt Division	Huang Chieh	Haichow	10,000
xTraining Division	Kuei Yun-ching	Nanking	8,000
4th Ind. Brig.	Li Tsung-kai	Nanking	3,000
x1st Art. Brig.		Nanking	3,000
x2nd Art. Brig.		Nanking	3,000

x8 Art. Regiments		Nanking	9,600
x10 Military Police Regiments		Nanking	12,000
x2 Communication Regiments		Nanking	3,000
x1 Signal Regiment		Nanking	800
x2 Engineering Regiments		Nanking	1,000
x1 Transport Regiment		Nanking	800
x1 Railway Corps		Nanking	800
x1 Armored Train Corps		Nanking	1,500
**8th Art. Brig.	Huong Yung-an	Hsuchow	2,000
	Total Troops in Kiangsu----------		101,500

HUNAN - Ho Chien, Chairman of Provincial Government

Central Government Troops

4th Route Army under Liu Chien-hsu

16th Division	Chang Liang-chi	Shenchow	7,000
62nd Division	Tao Liu	Changsha	7,000

x43rd Army Corps - Kuo Ju-tung

26th Division	Liu Yu-ching	Shenchow	8,000
34th Division	Ku Chia-chi	Hengchow	8,000
x77th Division	Lo Lin	Chenchow	8,000
32nd Ind. Brig.	Hu To	Changteh	3,000
	Total Troops in Hunan----------		41,000

SZECHWAN - Liu Hsiang, Provincial Chairman

Central Government Troops

16th Route Army under Hsu Yuan-chuan

x10th Army Corps - Hsu Yuan-chuan

41st Division	Huang Hsin	Wanhsien	8,000
48th Division	Hsu Chi-wu	Chungking	10,000
			18,000

x4th Army Corps - Wu Chi-wei

90th Division	Ou Chen	Chengtu	8,000
46th Division	Liu Tze-hsia	Kwanhsien	8,000
			16,000

x36th Army Corps - Chou Hung-yuan

5th Division	Hsueh Pu-fu	Chengtu	10,000
96th Division	Chao Hsi-kuang	Tzechow	8,000
			18,000

Former Szechwan Troops

6th Route Army under Liu Hsiang

21st Army Corps - Tang Shih-tsu

1st Division	Jao Kuo-hua	Tungchwan	7,000
4th Division	Fan Shao-tseng	Langchung	7,000
Ind. Division	Peng Han-shih	Pengki	7,000
			21,000

23rd Army Corps - Pan Wen-hua

Training Division	Yang Kuo Cheng	Pachow	7,000
5th Division	Chen Wan-jen	Ilung	6,000
4th Ind. Brig.	Pao Tso	Pengan	3,000
			16,000

6th Route Army (continued)

44th Army Corps - Wang Tsan-pin			
2nd Division	Kho Chang-ming	Chengtu	8,000
1st Division	Liao Chen	Paoning	6,000
1st Ind. Brig.	Chen Lan-ting	Pachow	3,000
			17,000
20th Army Corps - Yang Sen			
133rd Division	Yang Han-yu	Penghsien	5,000
134th Division	Hsia Chung	Fushun	6,000
135th Division	Yang Han-chung	Meishan	7,000
			18,000
41st Army Corps - Sun Chen			
122nd Division	Wang Ming-chang	Kwangyuan	6,000
123rd Division	Tseng Hsien-tang	Kienke	5,000
124th Division	Sun Chen	Lokiang	5,000
			16,000
45th Army Corps - Teng Hsi-hou			
125th Division	Chen Ting-hsun	Pishan	6,000
126th Division	Huang Ying	Kienyang	6,000
127th Division	Ma Yu-chih	Suining	5,000
128th Division	Yang Hsiu-chun	Anyueh	5,000
131th Division	Chen Li	Hweichow	5,000
			27,000
23rd Division	Lo Tze-chow	Jungchang	8,000
104th Division	Li Chai-yu	Lifan	8,000
	Total Troops in Szechuan----------		183,000

SIKANG - Liu Wen-hui, Provincial Chairman

Central Government Troops

24th Army Corps - Liu Wen-hui			
136 Division	Chen Kwang-tsao	Kangting	5,000
137th Division	Liu Yuan-tang	Luting	5,000
138th Division	Tang Ying	Yakiang	5,000
1st Ind. Brig.	Yu Sung-lin	Kangting	3,000
			18,000
	Total Troops in Sikang----------		18,000

KWEICHOW - Ku Chu-tung, Provincial Chairman

Central Government Troops

x59th Division	Han Han-ying	Kweiyang	10,000
x99th Division	Kho Sze-yen	Tsunyi	8,000
121st Division	Wu Chien-ping	Pichieh	5,000
	Total Troops in Kweichow----------		23,000

FUKIEN - Chen Yi, Provincial Chairman

Central Government Troops

4th Route Army under Yu Han-mou			
156th Division	Tseng Yu-jen	Lungyen	6,000
157th Division	Huang Chih-wen	Changchow	6,000
			12,000

x1st Army Corps - Chen Chi-cheng			
3rd Division	Li Yu-tang	Yenping	10,000
80th Division	Chen Chi	Chwanchow	8,000
			18,000
39th Army Corps - Liu Ho-ting			
56th Division	Liu Shang-chih	Pucheng	10,000
45th Ind. Brig.	Chang Luan-chi	Kienyang	3,000
			13,000
10th Division	Chen Te-chun	Fuan	7,000
x45th Division	Tai Min-chuan	Foochow	8,000
52nd Division	Lu Hsing-jung	Yungan	8,000
6th Ind. Brig.	Chow Chih-chun	Chengho	4,000
2nd. Constabulary Brig.	Lin Tung	Mamoi	3,000
37th Brig.	Chen Te-fa	Shahsien	3,000
	Total Troops in Fukien----------		76,000

KWANGTUNG - Huang Mu-sung, Provincial Chairman

Central Government Troops

x82nd Division	Jung Ching-fang	Canton	8,000
x98th Division	Kan Li Chu	Yingtak	8,000

Former Chen Chi-tang's Troops

4th Route Army under Yu Han-mou			
151st Division	Mo Hsi-te	Samshui	6,000
152nd Division	Yeh Chao	Canton	6,000
153rd Division	Chang Jui-kuei	Shiuchow	6,000
154th Division	Wu Chien-hsiung	Yingtak	6,000
155th Division	Li Han-hun	Swatow	6,000
158th Division	Peng Lin-sheng	Meihsien	6,000
159th Division	Tan Sui	Pakhoi	6,000
160th Division	Chen Han-kwang	Canton	6,000
Training Brig.	Lo Tze-tsai	Canton	3,000
			51,000
	Total Troops in Kwangtung----------		67,000

KWANGSI - Huang Hsu-chu, Provincial Chairman

Nominally Central Government Troops, Actually Controlled by Li Tsung-jen

5th Route Army under Li Tsung-jen

7th Army Corps - Liao Lei			
19th Division	Hsu Chi-ming	Nanning	8,000
21th Division	Yang Chun-chang	Liuchow	8,000
24th Division	Cheng Shu-feng	Kweihsien	8,000
			24,000
15th Army Corps - Hsia Wei			
43rd Division	Ho Wei-Chen	Kweilin	8,000
44th Division	Wang Tsan-pin	Wuchow	8,000
45th Division	Mo Shu-chieh	Yangyun	8,000
			24,000
1st Division	Weng Chao-yuan	Kweilin	6,000
	Total Troops in Kwangsi----------		54,000

YUNNAN - Lung Yun, Provincial Chairman

Nominally Central Government Troops, Actually controlled by Lung Yun

10th Route Army under Lung Yun

3rd Ind. Brig.	LungYu-tsang	Kwangan	6,400
5th Ind. Brig.	Lu Tao-yuan	Chiupei	4,400
7th Ind. Brig.	Kung Shun-pi	Chaotung	4,000
9th Ind. Brig.	Chang Chung	Yunnan	2,500
Guard Regt.	Chang Yi	Yunnan	2,000
Mixed Regt.	Wu Chung	Yunnan	1,000
Ind. Regt.	Tuan Tsan-kuei	Yunnan	1,600
			21,900

Total Troops in Yunnan----------21,900

Legend:-

* Former Kuominchun Forces
** Former Troops of Chang Hsueh-liang
x Personal Troops of Chiang Kai-shek.

RECAPITULATION:-

Central Government Troops which are actually controlled by the Nanking Government----------1,189,800

Nominally Central Government troops which are actually controlled by local military authorities---------- 411,700

Troops of the East Hopei Autonomous Government---------- 18,000

Provincial Troops---------- 87,600

Total Forces under arms in China, not including irregulars----1,707,100

Joseph W. Stilwell

Joseph W. Stilwell,
Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

Distribution:-

6 MID
1 Embassy
1 File

G-2 Report

6-1 Military -6180

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MAR 19 1937 OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF MIL. INTEL. DIV. 2009-177 13 WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Distribution of Troops

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The following detailed list shows the names and ranks of all military officers of the 4th Route Army and the localities where their troops are at present stationed, as of January 13, 1937:

Organization	Commanding Officer	Locality of Station
151st Division	Lt.General Mo Hsi-teh	Shiuhing
451st Brigade	Brig-Gen. Pang Lin-sang	"
901st Regt.	Colonel Chang Shu-min	Szewui & Kwong Ning
902nd "	" Wen Shu-hai	Shiuhing & Takhung
903rd "	" Lo Mu-hsun	Shiuhing
453rd Brigade	Brig-Gen. Li Chun	"
904th Regt.	Colonel Liang Lai-lin	Samsui, Sainam, Shuntak & Tai Leung
905th "	" Liu Chung-yiu	Shunwui, Taishan & Chungshan
906th "	" Ho Luan-fang	Shiuhing
152nd Division	Lt-General Chen Chang	Kiungshan
454th Brigade	Brig-Gen. Soong Sze-tai	Mancheong
907th Regt.	Colonel Tsen Sik-pang	Puchenkon
908th "	" Shao Wen-ming	Tingon
909th "	" Liang Yung-liu	Mancheong
456th Brigade	Brig-Gen. Tang Ki-chang	Hoihou
910th Regt.	Colonel Chao Chung-yung	Kiungshan and Hoihou
911th "	" Lao Pai-chien	Hoihou
912th "	" Yeh Kun-shiang	Chingmai
153rd Division	Lt-General Chang Shui-kwei	Chungfa
457th Brigade	Brig-Gen. Pang Chi-fang	Kongcheun
913th Regt.	Colonel Au Hsung	Chungfa & Chingyuen
914th "	" Chen Yiu-shu	Kongcheun
915th "	" Tseng Shao-ki	Kai-kan-hang, N.E. suburb of Canton city.
469th Brigade	Brig-Gen. Chung Fang-chun	Sunkai
916th Regt.	Colonel Huang Chi-hsung	Sheklung & Tigris Forts
917th "	" Chen Jun-yung	Ngan-chan-ngau, Chunten & Chingyuen
918th "	" Li Hsun	Chungfa
154th Division	Lt-Gen. Wu Chien-hsung	Yeungkong City
460th Brigade	Brig-Gen. Liang Shih-ki	"
919th Regt.	Colonel Wang Fae-wen	Pai-sha
920th "	" Lok Shao-li	Hop-shan
921st "	" Ma Ngai	Yeungkong

From M/A, China Report No. 9515 February 18, 1937

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CHINA (Military)

Subject: Distribution of Troops

Organization	Commanding Officer	Locality of Station
462nd Brigade	Brig-Gen. Chiang Wu	Chih-kwei
922nd Regt.	Colonel Liao Tao-ming	"
924th "	" Chang Shau	Wu-chuan
923rd "	" Li Huang-chung	Yeung-tsun
155th Division	Lt-General Li Han-yun	Chao-an
463rd Brigade	Brig-Gen. Kung Ko-chuen	Yao-ping
925th Regt.	Colonel Lin Jen	Ching-hai
926th "	" Chang Kwang-kiung	Yao-ping
927th "	" Chen Chao-yu	Taipo
465th Brigade	Brig-Gen. Ho Tung	Chao-an
928th Regt.	Colonel Teng O	Un-fou
929th "	" Li Lin	Chao-an, Kit-yang
930th "	" Tan Sang-lin	Chao-yang, Wei-lai
156th Division	Lt-Gen. Teng Lung-kwang	Weichow
466th Brigade	Brig-Gen. Wang Teh-chuen	"
931st Regt.	Colonel Tseng Chun-kai	"
932nd "	" Li Shao-chia	Po-lo
933rd "	" Yang Chi-kai	Ho-yuan
468th Brigade	Brig-Gen. Huang Shih-tao	Tan-shui
934th Regt.	Colonel Huang Chin-min	Weichow
935th "	" Teng Pai-han	Tan-shui
936th "	" Chung Chin-ten	Ping-shan
157th Division	Lt-General Huang Tao	Tsangchow, Fukien
469th Brigade	Brig-Gen. Len Ti-sang	Lungan
937th Regt.	Colonel Tseng Chen-ying	Yen-shih
938th "	" Chen Fung-shao	Pai-toa
939th "	" Lo Lung	Shih-chung
471st Brigade	Brig-Gen. Li Chung-kan	Tsangpu, Fukien
940th Regt.	Colonel Li Yau-tsan	Pingho
941st "	" Yeh Kiang	Yunshao
942nd "	" Chen Chun	Shekma
158th Division	Lt-Gen. Tseng Yao-jen	Tsiu-leng
472nd Brigade	Brig-Gen. Tsung Chun-hua	Shang-hang
943rd Regt.	Colonel Tseng Chun-jen	Shu-kou-hsu
944th "	" Hsia Si-chun	Pan-kou
945th "	" Chen Shao-wu	Shang-hang
743rd Brigade	Brig-Gen. Yeh Wei-hao	Yung-ting
946th Regt.	Colonel Tseng Tat-yu	"
947th "	" Kung Chao-king	Ta-Shih
948th "	" Fu Ching-hai	Mai Hsien

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Distribution of Troops

Organization	Commanding Officer	Locality of Station
159th Division	Lt-General Tan Shui	Muiluk
475th Brigade	Brig-Gen. Lo Chak-chung	Len-liang
949th Regt.	Colonel Huang Chi-fuk	Hai-hang
950th "	" Lin Wei-tsou	Hop-po
951st "	" Hung Shih-yang	Len-kiang
477th Brigade	Brig-Gen. Chen Chih	Mao-ming
952nd Regt.	Colonel Tang Pud	"
953rd "	" Tseng Chak-huan	Fa Hsien
954th "	" Tsen Kwan-lan	Shui-tung
160th Division	Lt-Gen. Yeh Shao	Tseng-cheng
478th Brigade	Brig-Gen. Teng Chi-chai	Chu-Chuan
955th Regt.	Colonel Hou Wen-tsin	Tseng-cheng
956th "	" Yu Ying-chi	"
957th "	" Shao Chung-ming	Fu-tien
480th Brigade	Brig-Gen. Lee Shu-chung	Yung-ching
958th Regt.	Colonel Yu Chi-wu	"
959th "	" Chak Yu-hsung	Lung-man
960th "	" Mo Fook-yu	Tseng-chung
Training Brigade	Brig-Gen. Lo Chi-chai	Shaokwan
1st Regt.	Colonel Li Cho-yuan	Ying-tak
2nd "	" Wu Shao-wu	Shaochow
3rd "	" Li Ming	"
9th Independent Brigade.	Brig-Gen. Wang Ting-hua	Ka-Chik-Sze, Kiungtung
625th Regt.	Colonel Chen Li-chuen	Kiungtung
627th "	" Li Yu-fung	Wan-ning
Artillery Corps	Commandant Chen Chung-fan	In-tang
Engineers Corps	Commandant Fang Wang-fang	"

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TROOPS

11th Division	Lt-General Huang Wei	Shaochow
67th "	Lt-General Li Shu-sin	Nan-yung
27th Regiment	Colonel Chen Tuk-kwang	"

Joseph W. Stilwell

Joseph W. Stilwell
Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache

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2009-178

G-2 Report

6210

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Commissioned Officers.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. MAR 2 1927

1. General. Upon the consolidation of military and political power in China by Yuan Shih-kai in the period 1912-1916, the regular army was provided with a comprehensive organization. With regard to officers, the salient points of this organization were: procurement of officer material from military academy graduates or from enlisted men intensively trained in the so-called "model regiments"; commissioning of newly commissioned officers in the lower grades initially; promotion on a merit basis; and a theoretical system of retirement. With the incorporation of the regular army in the personal troops of the various local satraps, all vestige of control by the national Ministry of War has, of course, vanished; but the traditions instituted by Yuan Shih-kai still remain, and are adhered to so far as local conditions permit. There is thus still a considerable similarity in the methods of administration of commissioned personnel throughout the various armies now in being in China.

2. Appointment. The power to appoint commissioned officers may be said to be inherent in the power to pay and attract them, and in the term "pay" must be included all the extra-legal opportunities now obtaining for acquiring money. Thus in small and loosely organized armies the colonel of an independent regiment may have complete control over appointments in his unit. In such a comparatively coordinated body as the Fengtien Army, even, appointments are a function of the "Army" (Corps or Division) commander, who merely reports his action to General Headquarters. Definite information is not available as to the process of appointment to commissioned grade in the Cantonese Army, but it is believed that appointments in certain units are centralized in the General Headquarters. Initial appointments are made in all grades from second lieutenant to general officer, the determining factors being the needs of the moment and the experience and influence of the appointee. Higher appointments, of course, partake more of the nature of political alliances than of purely military actions. Except in those cases where appointments are made from cadet corps or model regiments, examinations, whether physical, mental or professional, are unknown.

3. Promotion. The situation with regard to promotions is on a par with that concerning appointments. The power to appoint implies also the power to promote. With armies forming, disintegrating and coalescing almost overnight, promotion is naturally entirely on a selection basis, and selections are influenced by merit, political influence, friendship, fear of defection and long service (not necessarily seniority nor yet service in the army in which promotion is made). Because of the decentralization of administration, promotions are quickly affected and require a minimum of formalities. Where no vacancies exist it is occasionally the practice to honor or placate officers by brevetting them to higher grades; but this custom is limited by the fact that an officer's pay is always small and generally in arrears and high rank is only attractive because of the increase in power or in opportunities for feathering one's nest inherent in substantive, not in brevet rank. In times of peace the converse practice of making probationary promotions, confirmed after a few months of satisfactory performance of the duties of the higher grade, is occasionally resorted to.

4. Discharge as such does not exist among the commissioned personnel of the Chinese armies. The individual officer with regard to tenure of office has the same status as that of the employe of a commercial organization, and leaves the service without formality. If dissatisfied with his present situation, with army life in general, or

if he thinks to better himself elsewhere, he simply leaves amid general good feeling. If he is found to be inefficient or if he is not in favor, he is advised to leave. Obstacles are placed in his way if he is believed to be going over to a potential enemy, and there is naturally no discharge in campaign; but even in these last two cases, effective restraint is difficult.

5. Retirement. Retired status does not exist among the present military establishments in China. A few officers were retired during the regime of Yuan Shih-kai from the then national army, but with the bankruptcy of the national government their retired pay and their obligations as to possible service have lapsed.

6. Efficiency Reports and Records. Efficiency reports do not exist generally, and in view of the decentralization of administration are not really necessary. Other records of officers vary with different armies, but are always reduced to a minimum, are of little value, and are seldom referred to.

7. Sources from which officers are obtained. Officer material is obtained as follows:

(1) From returned military students (chiefly from Japan).
(2) From graduates of Chinese military academies.
(3) From the personnel of "Model Regiments".
(4) From the ranks and from organized bandits.
(5) From other armies.
(6) From civil life.

The value attached to the sources is roughly in the order indicated, graduates of military schools being generally assured of commissions of field rank. Appointments from "Model Regiments" and from the ranks are usually commissioned as lieutenants. Officers absorbed from other armies are commissioned with reference to their previous rank, to their immediate political importance, and often to the number of troops they can bring over with them. Commissions from civil life are usually awarded as the result of personal acquaintanceship or of recommendation by trusted friends. A consequence of the informality of military organization at present obtaining is that officers frequently leave one army, return to civil life, decide to become soldiers again and are incorporated in a totally different force. These men form the backbone of the officers recruited from civil life; although occasionally persons of outstanding influence but with no military experience are able to obtain commissions, sometimes with high rank.

8. Organized Militia. There is no such thing as an organized militia pertaining to either the nation as such, or to the various feudal armies. There do exist in many localities local organizations that partake of the nature of militia. They defend their areas against bandits, sometimes against the encroachments of the so-called "armies", and frequently indulge in banditry on their own account. The officers of these "T'uan" are usually men with military experience either as officers, enlisted men or bandits. They are occasionally appointed by the provincial authorities (e.g. Yunnan), more often are chosen by self-constituted councils of gentry or guilds, and sometime assume office in their own right as a reward of organizing the "T'uan" or of reclaiming it from

banditheed. Obviously there are no regulations nor even is there any uniformity of practice governing the commissioning and administration of these militia officers.

9. Organized Reserves. There are no organized reserves in China.

10. Commissioned Strengths. At a time when it is difficult to estimate the number of men under arms in China to the nearest million, it is obviously impossible to give definite figures as to commissioned strengths. Tables of organization for the Chinese Army line units give a ratio of approximately one officer to twenty-five enlisted men. In the many armies and units which are in a low state of organization, the ratio of officers to men is undoubtedly greater, probably reaching one to fifteen. On the other hand Chinese armies are notoriously deficient in General Staff, staff technical, and specialist officers. It is believed therefore that a ratio of one officer to twenty men is substantially correct. Assuming then that there are two million men under arms in C hina (counting "army" troops, militia and organized bandits; for the roles are usually interchangeable), this would work out an aggregate commissioned strength of one hundred thousand. This aggregate is obviously correct only within wide limits, and is subject to large fluctuations.

John Magruder

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache.

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G-2 Report

6-1

FEB 26 1936 5210
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2009-178
WAR DEPARTMENT,

CHINA (COMBAT)

Subject: Personnel, Commissioned

Statement of Commissioned Strength and Classification as to Training

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. FEB 25 1936

The figures shown below are derived from the estimates of an officer of the War Ministry. They are not official in that there has never been any official tabulation on this subject. Unreliable as these figures are, they are here presented for what they may be worth in the absence of anything better.

I. Classification of officers by grade:

Lieut. Generals	124	(Grade of Army Commander)
Major "	418	(" " Division ")
Brigadier "	1,240	
Colonels	3,233	
Lieut. Colonels	4,707	
Majors	13,178	
Captains	39,736	
1st Lieuts.	37,554	
2nd "	36,284	
Total commissioned	136,476	
Warrant Officers	27,655	

II. Classification of officers as to military education:

Peiping Military Academy (now defunct)	992
Paotingfu " " (" ")	6,575
Nanking and Whampoa Military Academies	43,018
Special Service Schools	1,075
Foreign " "	1,922
Provincial Elementary Military Training Schools	20,033
" Higher " " "	11,493
Engineering School	2,175
Quartermaster "	2,175
Medical "	1,414
Ordnance "	237
Special Training Regiments	5,621
Total officers with some form of military education	96,346
Without special military education	39,744
Total	136,474

III. Returned Students from Foreign Military Schools:

(a) Japan.

General Staff School	45
Infantry School	240
Cavalry "	75

From M/A, China Report 9282 January 28, 1936

CHINA (Combat)

Subject: Personnel, Commissioned

Statement of Commissioned Strength and Classification as to Training

(a) Japan - cont'd

Artillery School	86
Engineering "	12
Ordnance "	45
Motor Transport School	23
Air Service School	6
Cadet School	1,143
Quartermaster School	91
Medical School	19
Veterinary School	6
Total Japan.....	1,791

(b) United States of America

Command & General Staff School	3
Infantry School	3
Field Artillery School	1
West Point	5
Norwich	16
V.M.I.	8
Texas A. & M.	5
Citadel	8
Cavalry School	1
Coast Artillery School	1
War College	1
Total U.S.A.....	54

(c) France

General Staff School	2
Infantry School	2
Saint Cyr	23
Field Artillery School	2
Ecole Polytechnique	3
Ecole de Guerre	2
Total France.....	34

(d) Germany

Infantry School	14
Cadet Schools	13
Ordnance School	2
Total Germany	29

CHINA (Combat)

Subject: Personnel, Commissioned

Statement of Commissioned Strength and Classification as to Training

(e) England

Imperial Defense College	1
Artillery School	1
Sandhurst	8
Infantry School	2
Total England	12

(f) Belgium

Cadet School	1
Total Belgium	1

(g) Switzerland

Cadet School	1
Total Switzerland	1

Summary of Foreign Educated Officers:

Japan.....	1,791
U. S. A.....	54
England.....	12
Germany.....	29
France.....	34
Belgium.....	1
Switzerland.....	1
Total----------	1,922

Notes and Comments:

By far the greater number of Chinese Army Officers rise directly from the ranks. Of these more than half are said to be completely illiterate. Under the present regime the hopelessly illiterate are practically barred from promotion beyond the grade of Captain. Those who by reason of comparative youth and some primary education are regarded as susceptible to higher training may obtain same at one of the several national or provincial military training centers. Such training opens the way for the ex-rankers to promotion to field grade, in theory at least.

CHINA (Combat)

Subject: Personnel, Commissioned

Statement of Commissioned Strength and Classification as to Training

But really rapid promotion comes only to two classes - foreign returned students and graduates of the Central Military Academy at Nanking. Graduates of foreign military schools attain field grade within two or three years from their date of commission; many are originally commissioned in the grade of major. A common condition in the Central Government troops is to have battalions and regiments commanded by youths in their early twenties, while the company and platoon commanders under them are many years senior in age and length of service.

Graduates of the Central Military Academy at Nanking have the special confidence of Chiang Kai-shek and may enjoy rapid advancement. This advancement however is not nearly so rapid as that of the foreign graduates as it is generally by orderly progress through the grades from second lieutenant up.

There is still some nepotism among the Central Government troops. A man of twenty-five may be a colonel merely because his father is an army commander. But this evil is much less pronounced than formerly - probably less prevalent than at any time in the history of China. At present a general who has military ambitions for his son sees to it that his son obtains a military education abroad, preferably in Japan, thus qualifying for field grade immediately upon graduation.

Joseph W. Stilwell

B A T

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JAN 12 1940
WAR DEPARTMENT

2009-177

5180-67

G-2 Report

CHINA (COMBAT)

Subject: Distribution of Troops

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 11 1940

Herewith distribution of Chinese troops by War Zones. The information was secured from British and Chinese sources and from the press. It is believed to be fairly correct up to November 1, 1939.

Reference map: Chinese
War Zone accompanying
Report No. 9824

William Mayer
Major, F.A.
Military Attache

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From: M/A China Report No. 9822 November 21, 1939

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DISTRIBUTION OF CHINESE TROOPS

(a) WAR ZONES

Number	Location	Commander	Headquarters
1	Honan	Wei Li-huang.(Also in charge of S.Shansi)	Loyang
		Sun Lien-chung, Vice Commander	Nanyang
2	Shansi-Suiyuan	Yen Hsi-shan	Hsingtsi
		Fu Tso-yi, Vice Commander	
3	Kiangsu,Chekiang, S.Anhwei & N. Fukien	Ku Chu-tung	Shangjao
4	Kwangtung-Kwangsi and South Fukien	Chiang Kai-shek (In nominal command)	Kweilin
		Chang Fa-kuei Commander	Shaokwan
5	North of Yangtze (Hupeh & Anhwei)	Li Tsung-jen	Hsiangyang(?)
		Li Pin-hsien, Vice Commander. (Reported replaced by Hsia Wei. No confirmation yet.)	
7	Kiangsi	Huang Chi-hsiang	
	(Newly formed from the 9th War Zone.)		
8	North-West	Chiang Ting-wen	Sian
9	South of Yangtze and west of Poyang Lake. (Hupeh-Hunan)	Hsueh Yueh	Pingkiang
		Lo Cho-ying, Vice Commander	Hsiushui
10	Shensi-Kansu	Chu Shao-liang	
Special	North Kiangsu-Shantung	Yu Hsueh-chung	S. Shantung
		Shen Hung-lieh, Vice Commander	W. Shantung
Special	Hopei-Chahar	Lu Chung-lin	Nankung
		Shih Yu-san, Vice Commander	

(b) WAR ZONES IN DETAIL

1st War Zone (Honan)

Commander .....Wei Li-huang ...Headquarters: Loyang

Vice Commander...Sun Lien-chung..Headquarters: Nanyang

Group Army	Army Corps or Route Army	Army	Divisions	Location
	1	1	1, 78	Honan-Shansi (H.Q.,Tungkwan)
1		68	119, 143, 31, 132.	S. W. Honan
		27	45, 46.	Honan-Shansi
5	3 R.A.	6 12	29, 74, 20, 22. 81.	E. Honan and W. Kaifeng
	5	10	40, 48.	Honan-Hupeh
6	26 R.A.	30	27, 30, 31. 18 (New). 35 (New). 91. 23.	S.W. Honan. W. Honan. S.E. Honan. S. Honan. S. Honan
		37	8, 24.	Pinghan Railway
		45	125,126,127, 131.	E.Pinghan R.R., S. Honan.
14		76	166, 167. 28. 94.	Honan-Shansi. Loyang. N. Yellow River
		2 Cav.	2. 10.	E. Honan. W. Honan.

2nd War Zone (Shansi-Suiyuan)

Commander .....Yen Hsi-shan ...Headquarters: Hsingtsi

Vice Commander..Fu Tso-yi .....Headquarters:

Group Army	Army Corps or Route Army	Army	Divisions	Location
14		3 9 14	7, 12. 47, 54. 6, 10. 83, 85.	S. Shansi. S. Shansi. S. Shansi. S.W. Shansi
		15	64, 65.	S. Shansi.
18	8 R.A.		115,120,etc. 2 (New).	Shansi-Suiyuan & E. Shansi

2nd War Zone (continued):

Group Army	Army Corps or Route Army	Army	Divisions	Location
		1 Cav.	3, 5, 6.	Shansi-Suiyuan.
			7.	Shansi-Suiyuan.
		Cav.	1, 2.	N.W. Suiyuan.
26		17.	177, etc.	S. Shansi.
		38	17, etc.	
	27 R.A.	90	42, 169.	S.E. Shansi.
		?	? ?	S.E. Shansi.
		19	70, 71.	W. Shansi.
		33	68, 101.	N.W. Shansi.
		34	66, 69.	E. Shansi
		40	39, 106.	S.E. Shansi
		61	72, 73.	Shansi-Suiyuan

3rd War Zone
(Kiangsu, Chekiang, S.Anhwei, E.Kiangsi, N.Fukien)

Commander.....Ku Chu-tung Headquarters: Shangjao

Group Army	Army Corps or Route Army	Army	Divisions	Location
		4(New)	Three detach-ments	Kiangsu-Anhwei
10		28	15,62,63.	N.Chekiang & S.E. Kiangsu.
			43.	Haiyen.
			128.	Ningpo.
			194.	
		?	One div. and two regiments	E. Chekiang.
23		23.	147,148,164.	S.Yangtze,Anhwei.
		54	58.	
			1,3,4,& 37(New)	S. Anhwei
32		21	144,145,146,162.	S.Anhwei.
		29	79, etc.	N.E. Kiangsi
		41	122, 123, 124.	S.Anhwei-Kiangsu.
		43	26.	N.E. Kiangsi.
		49	108.	S. Anhwei.
		71	87.	S. Kiangsu.
		72	67, 88.	Kiangsu-Chekiang.
			11 (New)	N. Chekiang.

4th War Zone
(Kwangsi-Kwangtung -S.Fukien)

Commander .....Chang Fa-kuei .....Headquarters: Shaokwan

Note: Chiang Kai-shek in nominal command.

Group Army	Army Corps or Route Army	Army	Divisions	Location
		2	3, 9.	Kweilin
9		4	59, 90, 93. 187.	N. Kwangtung. N.E.Kwangtung.
		5	200,201,202. (mechanized)	H.Q. Chuanhsien. Units scattered on all fronts
12		62 64 65 66 83	151, 152. 153, 154. 157, 158. 159, 160. 192.	N.E.Canton & Hainan. N. Canton. E. Kwangtung. N.E. Canton. Waichow.
16		31 48 69	176, 178. 175. 155, 156. 191, 193. 189, 190.	S.W. Canton. Pakhoi. S.W. Canton. W. Kwangtung. Kwangsi.
	20 R.A.		75, 76.	Foochow-Changchow.
		100	80, 82	Foochow-Chuanchow.
			6 Res.	S.E. Fukien (Changchow).

5th War Zone
(N.Yangtze - Hupeh & Anhwei)

Commander .....Li Tsung-jen. Headquarters: Hsiangyang(?)

Vice Cmdr. ....Li Pin-hsien. Headquarters:
(Reported replaced by Hsia Wei. No confirmation yet.)

Group Army	Army Corps or Route Army	Army	Divisions	Location
2		59	38,180.	Central Hupeh.
	25 R.A.		32, 33.	Central Hupeh.
		4(New)	One detachment	N. Anhwei
		26	41, 44.	W. Siang River
4		13 39	4, 89. 52, 56.	N. Hupeh. N. Hupeh.
	5	10	40, 48.	Hupeh-Honan.
21	3	7 48	170,171, 172. 173, 174.	N.E. Hupeh. N. Hupeh.

5th War Zone (continued)

Group Army	Army Corps or Route Army	Army	Divisions	Location
		55	121, 8 (New).	E. Hupeh
			8 Cav.	N.W. Hupeh
30			Szechwan troops	W. Hupeh
		102	102, 103.	E. Hupeh.
			179.	N. Anhwei.

7th War Zone (Kiangsi)

Commander: Huang Chi-hsiang. Headquarters:

Note: This War Zone was organized in November by dividing the 9th War Zone. Troops pertaining to this War Zone are shown in the 9th War Zone as details on commands are not yet available.

8th War Zone (North-West)

Commander: Chiang Ting-wen. Headquarters: Sian

Group Army	Army Corps or Route Army	Army	Divisions	Location
		1(New)	165, etc.	S. Kansu
	7 R.A.		49, 60.	E. Shensi
18	8 R.A.			H.Q.:Yenan
		4 Cav.	?	N. Kansu
		5 Cav.	5(New).	Kokonor.
	15 R.A.		35,7 & 23(New),etc.	Ninghsia.
		47	104,161,168.	S. Shensi.
		81	Three brigades	Linho.
		82	100, 9(New).	N.Kansu & Kokonor.
			86.	N. Shensi.
			97.	Lanchow.
			140.	Sian.
		Sinkiang Army	5 & 25(New) & 5 brigades.	Sinkiang

9th War Zone
(S. Yangtze: Hupeh - Hunan - Kiangsi)

Commander ...Hsueh Yueh Headquarters: Pingkiang

Vice Cmdr. ..Lo Cho-ying Headquarters: Hsiushui

Group Army	Army Corps or Route Army	Army	Divisions	Location
	8	16	53, 61.	N. Hunan.
		18	11, 14.	N. Hunan.
		20	133,134, 135.	Milo River
		25	13.	Hupeh-Kiangsi
		32	139,141,142.	S. Nanchang.
		22	18.	Central Kiangsi.
	32	52.	2, 25.	N. Hunan front.
17	10 R.A.	58	Three divisions.	Hunan & Hunan-Kiangsi.
		60	182, 183,184.	N.W. Kiangsi.
		94	185, 186.	S. Hunan.
		46	95.	N.E. Hunan
		49	105, 107.	N. Kiangsi.
		53	116,130, 4 Cav.	S. Hupeh.
			34.	S. Hupeh.
19		70	16,19,34(New).	N.W. Kiangsi.
		73	77.	
			50, 10(New),55, 57,92,98.	N.W.Kiangsi & Hupeh border
		74	36, 51.	Kiangsi-Hupeh.
		78	21.	S. E. Hupeh.
			5 & 9 Res.	N. Kiangsi.
		87	197, 198.	N. Hunan.
			188.	W. Hunan.
		99	99.	N. Hunan.

Special War Zones

(a) - Kiangsu - Shantung

Commander .....Yu Hsueh-chung. Headquarters:S.Shantung

Vice Cmdr. ....Shen Hung-lieh. Headquarters:W.Shantung

Group Army	Army Corps or Route Army	Army	Divisions	Location
3		51	110,113,114,118.	Kiangsu-Shantung
		57	109,111,112.	N. Kiangsu.
		67	117.	S. Shantung.

Special War Zones (a)-Kiangsu-Shantung (continued)

Group Army	Army Corps or Route Army	Army	Divisions	Location
18	8 R.A.		129, etc.	N. Shantung.
24		89	5 brigades, etc.	N. Kiangsu.

(b) - Hopei - Chahar

Commander .....Lu Chung-lin Headquarters: Nankung

Vice Cmdr. .....Shih Yu-san. Headquarters:

Group Army	Army Corps or Route Army	Army	Divisions	Location
18	8 R.A.		120. 129.	Central Hopei & Chahar. S. Hopei.
			1 Cav.	Chahar
			84.	Hopei-Shansi.
33			181,6(New),9 Cav., etc.	Hopei-Chahar

10th War Zone (Shensi-Kansu)

Commander .....Chu Shao-liang

Vice Cmdr. .....(Unknown)

Note: The distribution of forces in the 10th War Zone is unknown at the present time. A supplementary report will be made when this information becomes available.

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NOV 18 1936
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
2009-177
WAR DEPARTMENT

AMERICAN LEGATION

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
PEKING, CHINA.

October 21, 1936

CONFIDENTIAL

No. 9476

Subject: Estimate of Strength of 19th Route Army

To: A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. NOV 17 1936

1. As an indication of how much salt must be sprinkled on many so-called reliable reports of conditions in China, the following estimate of the strength of the 19th Route Army by the Yangtze Patrol is submitted. This report reached the Naval Attache at Peiping, but I believe will not go any further. However, similar reports are being made constantly by agencies that should know better.

Present Strength of 19th Route Army:

Officers and men.	300,000
Rifles	310,000
Machine Guns.	7,779
Sub-Machine Guns.	1,555
Heavy artillery on wheeled mounts	109
Anti-aircraft guns	320
Planes	11
Foreign instructors	14

Joseph W. Stilwell

Joseph W. Stilwell
Colonel Infantry
Military Attache

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Report.

6180

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Distribution of Troops (CHINESE).

Composition and Distribution of Troops as of August 1, 1936.

SEP 12 1936

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WAR DEPARTMENT

HOPEI - Sung Che-yuan, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Nominally Central Government Troops, Actually Controlled by Hopei-Chahar Council.

*29th Army Corps - Sung Che-yuan

37th Division	Feng Chih-an	Peiping	12,000
38th "	Chen Tao-chung	"	8,000
132nd "	Chao Tung-yu	Paoting	8,000
Special Service Regt.		Peiping	1,600
Training Corps		"	1,200
			30,800
1st Ind. Brig.	Juan Hsuan-wu	Peiping	4,000
2nd " "	Hsia Tao-ming	Langfang	4,000

Central Government Troops.

52nd Army Corps - Shang Chen

139th Division	Huang Huang-hua	Shuntch	8,000
141st "	Sung Hsi-tang	Shahe	7,000
142nd "	Hu Chi	Tuning	8,000
4th Cav. Div.		Yenshuang	2,000
Ind. Cav. Regt.		Shuntch	1,000
" Art. "		"	1,000
			26,000

**68th Army Corps - Wan Fu-lin

116th Division	Miao Cheng-liu	Tingchow	6,000
119th "	Sun Te-chuan	Hsaifu	5,000
120th "	Chu Hung-hsun	Paoting	5,000
2nd Cav. Div.	Huang Hsien-sheng	Shihkiachwang	2,800
			18,800
**91st Division	Feng Chan-hai	Kaoyi	10,000

Troops of the East Hopei Autonomous Government Controlled by Ying Ju-keng (not controlled by Nanking).

1st Division	Chang Ching-yu	Changli	4,000
2nd "	Chang Yen-tien	Luanchow	4,000
3rd "	Li Hai-tien	Kichow	4,000
4th "	Chao Lai	Tungchan	4,000
5th "	Li Yun-sheng	Tungchow	4,000
			20,000

Total Troops in Hopei 118,000

CHAHAR - Liu Ju-ming, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Nominally Central Government Troops, Actually Controlled by Hopei-Chahar Political Council.

*29th Army Corps - Sung Che-yuan

143rd Division	Liu Ju-ming	Kalgan	8,000

From M/A, China. Report No. 9447. August 11, 1936.

Provincial Troops.			
3rd Ind. Brig.	Ma Tse-wan	Hungtaowang	3,000
1st Cav. "	Wien Chun-fang	Antwan	2,000
2nd " "	Ho Ching-chuan	Kuanlun	2,000
			7,000
		Total Troops in Chahar	15,000

HUNAN - Chao Tai-wan, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Nominally Central Government Troops, Actually Controlled by Hsu Kai-chun.

19th Army Corps - Wang Ching-kuo			
72nd Division	Chen Chang-chieh	Mishih	8,000
70th "	Wang Ching-kuo	Tatung	8,000
			16,000
32rd Army Corps - Sun Chu			
66th Division	Wang Hsiao-ou	Pingyao	8,000
69th "	Yang Chan-yuan	Fenchow	8,000
			16,000
34th Army Corps - Yang Ai-yuan			
71st Division	Ho Tsun-chun	Pingyang	8,000
61st Army Corps - Li Fu-ying			
68th Division	Li Fu-ying	Tungkuo	9,000
101st Division	Li Chun-kung	Mishih	9,000

Central Government Troops.

x 15th Army Corps - Tang En-po			
4th Division	Wang Chun-lien	Mishih	8,000
69th "	Tang En-po	Fenchow	9,000
			17,000

Provincial Troops.

1st Ind. Brig.	Tu Chun-yi	Taiyuan	3,000
2nd " "	Chou Yuan-chien	Hsiaoyi	3,000
3rd " "	Feng Yu-hsi	Tatung	3,000
			9,000
		Total Troops in Shansi	84,000

SHANTUNG - Han Fu-ch'u, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Nominally Central Government Troops, Actually Controlled by Han Fu-ch'u.

*3rd Route Army under Han Fu-ch'u.			
20th Division	Sun Tung-hsun	Weihsien	12,000
22nd "	En Liang-min	Fenchow	9,000
29th "	Tsao Fu-lin	Tsinan	10,000
74th "	Li Han-chang	"	8,000
61st "	Chan Shu-tang	Kiaochow	7,000
Cavalry Brigade		Tsinan	1,500
Ind. Art. Regt.		"	800
Garrison Brigade	Wu Huan-wen	"	3,000
			51,300

Provincial Troops.

Militia Corps - Han Fu-ch'u			
1st Regt.	Chao Ming-yuan	Lintsing	1,200
2nd "	Chao Jen-chuan	"	1,200
3rd "	En Liang-yu	Tsining	1,200

(Continued)

4th Regiment	Hsieh Shu-tien	Hsiaw	1,200
5th "	Chang Hsien	Chaoyuan	1,800
			6,000

Total Troops in Shantung 57,300

SHENSI - Fu Tso-yi, Provincial Chairman.

Nominally Central Government Troops, Actually Controlled by Yen Hsi-shan.

35th Army Corps, 73rd Div., Fu Tso-yi Hweisui 8,000

Cavalry Army Corps - Chao Cheng-chou

1st Cav. Brig.	Sun Cheng-cheng	Pangchan	1,600
2nd " "	Li Yu-chi	Taining	1,500
3rd " "	Cheng Yu-chien	Paotow	1,900
			4,600

Total Troops in Suiyuan 12,600

HUNAN - Shao Li-tze, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops.

17th Route Army under Tang En-cheng.

31th Army Corps - Sun Yu-jen

17th Division	Sun Yu-jen	Nanchang	10,000
43rd "	Pang Ching-tsai	Sanyuan	10,000
			20,000

*90th Army Corps - Hsiang Ming-hsun

89th Division	Hsiang Ming-hsun	Shanghsien	12,000
196th "	Shen Ko	Shangnan	10,000
5th Cav. Div.	Li Pu-ho	Chenan	2,000
			24,000

**52nd Army Corps - Wan Fu-lin

109th Division	Chiang Wei-jan	Sian	7,000
129th "	Chou Fu-chang	Yushsien	5,000
			12,000

**27th Army Corps - Tang Yin-pin

109th Division	Ho Hsei	Wukung	6,000
112th "	Hao Shou-yi	Sian	5,000
115th "	Haiung Chen-ping	Sienyang	5,000
			16,000

**96th Division Hao Hsei-tse Shihsh 11,000

96th " Hao Shuang-cheng Yulin 9,000

**165th " Liu Te-chuan Sian 12,000

32,000

Provincial Troops.

Garrison Division	Wang Yi-san	Sian	7,000
Special Service Bagt.		"	2,000
Artillery Regiment		"	1,500
East Shensi Garrison Brig.	Wang Hsiang-tsun	Hsingping	4,000
Ankang Garrison Brigade	Chang Hung-yuan	Ankang	3,000
			17,500

Total Troops in Shensi 121,500

KANSU - Yu Hsueh-chung, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops.

7th Route Army under Hao Mei-shih.			
69th Division	Wu Cheng-jun	Wutu	8,000
81st "	Yang Ting-yu	Pihsien	7,000
			15,000
x **8th Route Army under Chao Hsun-ting.**			
6th Division	Chou Kun	Lanchow	10,000
x **3rd Army Corps** - Wang Chun			
12th Division	Tang Hsai-yuan	Lanchow	12,000
x **27th Army Corps** - Hao Ping-wen			
8th Division	Tao Shih-yueh	Tungwei	10,000
26th "	Li Ying	Pinglieng	8,000
			18,000
****81st Army Corps** - Yu Hsueh-chung			
111th Division	Chao En-to	Tienshui	6,000
113th "	Li Chen-tang	Tsingcheng	7,000
114th "	Ho Chung-heng	Hsiaining	6,000
115th "	Chou Hsiang-lieh	Lanchow	6,000
			25,000
****Cavalry Army Corps** - Ho Chu-kuo			
1st Cav. Div.	Chang Cheng-te	Tingsi	1,500
3rd " "	Hao Hai-peng	Haifangcheng	1,500
4th " "	Pai Feng-heiang	Hsiyuan	1,500
			4,500
Provincial Troops.			
10th Ind. Brig.	Shih Ying-hsiu	Wusei	3,000
11th " "	Li Hsei-ching	Hochow	3,000
			6,000
	Total Troops in Kansu		**98,500**

NINGHSIA - Ma Hung-kuei, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops.

***15th Route Army under Ma Hung-kuei.**			
35th Division	Ma Hung-pin	Hsiki	10,000
1st Mix. Brig.	Ma Chuan-liang	Ninghsia	4,000
2nd " "	Ma Pao-lin	Yungning	4,000
1st Cav. "	Li Te-tsung	"	2,000
2nd " "	Yang Hsu-cheng	Liwangpu	2,000
			22,000
	Total Troops in Ninghsia		**22,000**

TSINGHAI - Ma Lin, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops.

2nd Army Corps - Ma Pu-fang			
2nd Cav. Div.	Ma Pu-ching	Hsunhua	4,000
100th Division	Ma Pu-fang	Hsining	7,000
			11,000
	Total Troops in Tsinghai		**11,000**

SINKIANG - Li Yung, Provincial Chairman.

Provincial Troops.

Border Defense Army Corps - Sheng Shih-tsai			
5th Division		Tihua	7,000
6th Brigade		Ili	4,000

(Continued)

25th Brigade		Tsaidam	5,000
29th "		Tihwa	5,000
			21,000
1st Independent Brigade		Tihwa	4,000
4th " "		Ili	5,000
Bodyguard Brigade		Tihwa	2,000
Cavalry "		Hami	2,000
1st Artillery Regiment		"	800
White Russian Troops		Tihwa	1,200
			11,000
		Total Troops in Sinkiang	32,000

HUNAN - Hsiung Shih-hui, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops.

8th Route Army under Chao Heng-ting.

21st Division	Li Hsien-chou	Shangjao	12,000
x 50th Division	Cheng Hsiang-yueh	Ichun	8,000
x 28th "	Tung Chao	Hanhsiang	8,000
x 67th "	Li Hsu-sen	Hanchow	8,000
x 32nd Ind. Brig.	Hu Ta	Pingsiang	3,000
x 117th " "	Hu Fang-mien	Fuchow	4,000
1st Constabulary Brig.	Lin Ping-chou	Kiukiang	4,000
			55,000
		Total Troops in Kiangsi	47,000

CHEKIANG - Hsu Ching-fu, Acting Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops.

x 18th Division	Chu Yueh-han	Hanchow	8,000
x 36th "	Sung Hsi-lien	"	8,000
x 3rd Ind. Brig.	Chiang Tso-chun	Changan	3,000
			19,000

x 18th Army Corps - Lo Cho-ying

11th Division	Lo Cho-ying	Kingyuan	10,000
14th "	Hsu Hsu-hsiang	Lungchwan	10,000
			20,000

Provincial Troops.

Peace Preservation Corps.

1st Ind. Regt.	Chen Shih-chang	Kingyuan	1,400
2nd " "	Hsu Yi	"	1,400
3rd " "	Feng Chien	Wusing	1,500
4th " "	Ho Lien-hsiao	Changshan	1,500
5th " "	Hsu Kun	Chuchow	1,500
6th " "	Chang Pei	Paikwan	1,500
			8,800
		Total Troops in Chekiang	47,800

HONAN - Shang Chen, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops.

7th Route Army under Hsu Wei-shou.

60th Division	Chen Pei	Khifeng	8,000
78th "	Kuei Yung-ching	Kweiteh	9,000
			17,000

[illegible] - Tang Pao-chun			
[illegible] Division	Tang Cho-tung	Yuncheng	7,000
14th "	Yu Ta-chang	Linying	8,000
			15,000
x 17th Army Corps - Hsing Chen-nan			
[illegible] Division	Huang Chieh	Changchow	10,000
25th "	Huan Lin-chang	Singyang	12,000
			22,000
x 96th Division	Li Tieh-chun	Changteh	8,000
x 19th "	Tan Tze-hsin	Chowtsichow	5,000
x 116th Ind. Brig.	Liu Yueh-ting	Yuechow	5,000
x 12th Cav. Brig.	Liu Hung-chi	Hanyang	3,000
x 14th " "	Chang Chen-kuei	Lanfeng	2,000
x [illegible] " "	Ho Cho-lien	Hsuchang	2,000
x 6th Art. "	Wang Ho-hua	Laifeng	2,100
x 7th " "	Chiao Hung	"	2,000
x 6th " "	Huang Tung-an	"	1,600
			26,700
	Total Troops in Honan		80,700

ANHWEI - Liu Chen-hua, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops.

* 11th Route Army under Liu Chen-hua.			
64th Division	Wu Ting-lin	Anking	8,000
65th "	Liu Hao-en	Luchow	9,000
			17,000
* 25th Route Army under Liang Hsue-ying.			
[illegible] Division	Liang Hsue-ying	Liuan	12,000
5th Ind. Brig.	Liu Chi-ming	Tsaihan	3,000
15th Cav. "	Chang Hung-chun	Yingshan	2,000
44th Ind. Brig.	Ho Chi-hsiung	Liuan	2,000
			19,000
108nd Division	Ho Chih-chung	Anking	6,000
108rd "	Po Hui-chang	Shucheng	5,000
11th Cav. Brig.	Tan Fu-lieh	Luncheng	2,000
40th Ind. "	Sung Shih-ko	Chengyang	3,000
45th " "	Pao Hang	Kweichow	4,000
			20,000
Provincial Troops.			
Garrison Brigade	Juan Chin-ching	Anking	3,000
	Total Troops in Anhwei		59,000

[illegible] - Hang Hung-tai, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops.

x 26th Army Corps - Hsiao Chih-chu			
44th Division	Hsiao Chih-chu	Yunyang	10,000
* 33rd Division	Fang Hsing-hsien	Chungyang	8,000
x 34th "	Chang Hai-wei	Patung	8,000
x 49th "	Liu Pei-hsu	Hankow	7,000
x 51st "	Po Tien-min	Kuuchow	8,000
x 65th "	Chen Hung-yuan	Tungshan	8,000
x 69th "	Wang Yi-chung	Tayeh	7,000
x 85th "	Chen Tieh	Wuchang	7,000
x 94th "	Chu Huai-ping	Kingshan	7,000
x 55th Brigade	Li Tsung-chien	Puchi	5,000
			65,000

Provincial Troops.

Garrison Brig.	Shen Chen	Wuhsing	4,000
1st Mtd. Brig.	Yu Chen-ping	"	3,000
2nd " "	Li Ting-wu	"	3,000
			10,000

Total Troops in Hupeh 85,000

KIANGSU - Chen Mao-fa, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops.

4th Route Army under Sun Lien-chung.

22nd Army Corps - Sun Lien-chung			
27th Division	Li Sung-kuei	Huaiyin	8,000
31st "	Chih Feng-cheng	Huaian	7,000
			15,000
x 2nd Army Corps - Chiang Ting-wen			
9th Division	Li Tan-xien	Chinkiang	10,000
x 3rd Army Corps - Wang Chun			
7th Division	Tsang Wan-chung	Nanking	10,000
x 55th Division	Juan Chao-chang	Soochow	10,000
x 57th "	Li Sung-shan	Kunshan	8,000
x 87th "	Wang Ching-chiu	Nanking	10,000
x 88th "	Sun Yuan-liang	"	10,000
x 84th "	Wen Yin-hsin	Haichow	10,000
x 1st Art. Brig.		Nanking	4,000
x 2nd " "		"	4,000
x 6th Mtd. Art. Regts.		"	9,600
x 10th Military Police Regts.		"	12,000
x 2 Communication Regiments		"	3,000
x 1 Signal Regiment		"	800
x 2 Engineering Regiments		"	1,000
x 1 Transport Regiment		"	800
x Railways Corps		"	800
x Armoured Train Corps		"	6,000
			90,000

Total Troops in Kiangsu 125,000

HUNAN - Ho Chien, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops.

4th Route Army under Lin Chien-hsin.

26th Army Corps - Tao Kwang			
19th Division	Li Chieh	Paoking	8,000
62nd "	Chung Kwang-jen	"	9,000
			17,000
15th Division	Wang Tung-yuan	Kiyang	7,000
16th "	Peng Wei-jen	Wukang	8,000
63rd "	Chen Kwang-chung	Shenchow	8,000
24th "	Chu Kia-chi	Yuhsien	8,000
			48,000
x 1st Division	Hu Tsung-nan	Hengchow	16,000
x 77th "	Lo Lin	Chenchow	8,000
			24,000

46th Army Corps - Pan Sung-yu			
79th Division	Chen An-pao	Ningyuan	9,000
	Total Troops in Hunan		81,000

[redacted] - Liu Hsiang, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops.

x 4th Army Corps - Wu Chi-wei

90th Division	Ou Chen	Hsinghsien	10,000
46th "	Liu Tse-hsia	Wenchuan	8,000
			18,000

x 16th Route Army under Hsu Yuan-chuan.

16th Army Corps - Hsu Yuan-chuan

41st Div.	Huang Hsin	Chungking	10,000
49th "	Hsu Yuan-chuan	Wanhsien	8,000
			18,000

x 24th Army Corps - Chou Kung-yuan

9th Division	Hsieh Pe-fu	Chengtu	12,000
96th "	Chao Hsi-hwang	Luchow	8,000
			20,000

Former Szechwan Provincial Troops.

20th Army Corps - Yang Sen

133rd Div.	Yang Han-yu	Nanchuan	5,000
134th "	Hsia Chung	Tayi	6,000
135th "	Yang Han-chung	Weifuhan	7,000
			18,000

21st Army Corps - Tang Shih-tsun

1st Div.	Jao Hsu-hua	Tungchuan	8,000
4th "	Fung Shao-tseng	"	8,000
Ind. "	Fong Han-chih	Kuohsien	8,000
			24,000

23rd Army Corps - Pan Wan-hua

Training Div.	Yang Hsu-chang	Mingshan	7,000
5th Division	Chen Wan-jen	Pukiang	6,000
4th Ind. Brig.	Pao Tao	Hsintsin	3,000
			16,000

24th Army Corps - Liu Wan-hui

136th Division	Chen Kuang-tsao	Yachow	5,000
137th "	Liu Yuan-tang	Kangting	5,000
138th "	Tang Ying	Tienchuan	5,000
1st Ind. Brig.	Yu Sung-lin	Luting	3,000
			18,000

41st Army Corps - Sun Chen

122nd Division	Wang Ming-chang	Chungpa	6,000
123rd "	Tseng Hsien-tung	Kiangyu	5,000
124th "	Sun Chen	Lokiang	5,000
			16,000

44th Army Corps - Wang Tsan-hsu

2nd Division	Hsu Chang-ming	Chengtu	8,000
1st "	Liao Chen	Pachung	6,000
1st Ind. Brig.	Chen Lan-ting	Paoming	3,000
			17,000

45th Army Corps - Tang Hsi-hou

125th Div.	Chen Ting-hsun	Peichuan	5,000
126th "	Huang Ying	Anhsien	6,000
127th "	Ma Yu-chih	Mienchu	6,000
128th "	Yang Hsiu-chun	Kienchow	5,000
121st "	Chen Ki	Jungchiang	5,000
			27,000

[illegible] Division	Lo Tse-chou	Jungchang	8,000
104th "	Li Chai-yu	Lifan	8,000
			16,000

Total Troops in Szechuan 208,000

[illegible] - Liu Wen-hui, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops.

x [illegible]rd Division	Li Hso-ping	Hungting	10,000
x [illegible]nd "	Liang Hsu-cheng	Luting	8,000
			18,000

Total Troops in Sikang 18,000

[illegible] - Hu Han-tung, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops.

x 6th Route Army under Hsueh Yueh.

88th Division	Han Han-ying	Luzli	10,000
97th "	Li Hsiang-jung	Tuyun	8,000
99th "	Hsu Sen-yen	Tsunhsien	7,000
			25,000

x 5th Army Corps - Yueh Wen

43rd Division	Tai Yueh	Anshun	8,000
22nd "	Li Pi-fan	"	10,000
			18,000

x 9th Army Corps - Hsu Kung-ling

67th Division	Pei Chang-hui	Tsunyi	10,000
54th "	Hsu Kung-ling	Tungtze	8,000
			18,000

25th Army Corps - Wan Yueh-huang

108rd Division	Miao Hui-chang	Tating	5,000
121st "	Wu Chien-ping	Pichieh	5,000
140th "	Shen Chih-cheng	Chihsihui	6,000
			16,000

x 46rd Army Corps - Hsu Ju-tung

26th Division	Hsu Ju-tung	Chenyuan	9,000

Total Troops in Kweichow 86,000

[illegible] - Chen Yi, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops.

20th Route Army under Chang Fang.

75th Division	Sung Tien-tsai	Changchow	8,000
76th "	Li Mo-lin	Yenping	8,000
			16,000

x 1st Army Corps - Chen Chi-cheng

3rd Division	Li Yu-tang	Changchow	10,000
80th "	Chen Chi	Lungyen	8,000
			18,000

20th Army Corps - Liu Ho-ting

56th Division	Liu Shang-chih	Kienyang	10,000
45th Ind. Brig.	Chang Luan-chi	Kienou	5,000
			15,000

10th Division	Chen Ta-chun	Fuan	7,000
45th "	Tai Min-chuan	Pochow	8,000
82nd "	Lu Hsin-yung	Yungan	8,000

(Continued)

6th Ind. Brig.	Chen Chih-chun	Chenghe	4,000
2nd Constabulary Brig.	Lin Tung	Meimei	3,000
			30,000
		Total Troops in Fukien	77,000

[redacted] - Huang Hu-sung, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops.

x 14th Army Corps - Wei Li-huang			
19th Division	Li Mo-an	Canton	8,000
63rd "	Liu Han	Shaohwei	8,000
			16,000
x 15th Division	Wan Yueh-huang	Taihing	10,000
x 46th "	Chen Yueh-han	Shiuchow	8,000
x 62nd "	Jung Ching-fang	Canton	8,000
x 92nd "	Han Li-chu	Shiuhing	8,000
x 98th "	Hsia Chu-chung	Canton	8,000
			42,000

Former Chen Chi-tang's Troops.

4th Route Army under Yu Han-mou			
151st Division (former 1st Div.)	Mo Hsi-te	Tsungfa	6,000
152nd Division (former 2nd Div.)	Yeh Chao	Canton	6,000
153rd Division (former 3rd Div.)	Chang Jui-kwei	Kotong	6,000
154th Division (former 4th Div.)	Wu Chien-hsiung	Yingtak	6,000
155th Division (former 5th Div.)	Li Han-hun	Shuichow	6,000
156th Division (former 6th Div.)	Teng Lung-kwang	Waichow	6,000
157th Division (former 7th Div.)	Huang Chih-wen	Hoyun	6,000
158th Division (former 8th Div.)	Tseng Yu-jen	Meihsien	6,000
159th Division (former 9th Div.)	Tan Sui	Canton	6,000
160th Division (former 1st Ind. Div.)	Chen Han-kwang	Shuntak	6,000
			60,000
		Total Troops in Kwangtung	118,000

[redacted] - Huang Hsu-chu, Provincial Chairman.

Troops Loyal to Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi.

7th Army Corps - Liao Lei			
15th Division	Wei Yun-sung	Wuchow	8,000
19th "	Chou Tse-kwang	Yungyun	8,000
24th "	Tan Lien-fang	Wuchow	8,000
			24,000
16th Army Corps - Hsia Wei			
42nd Division	Wang Tsan-pin	Kwanchow	8,000
43rd "	Su Tsu-ching	Yungyun	8,000
44th "	Ho Wei-chen	Kweilin	8,000
			24,000
		Total Troops in Kwangsi	48,000

YUNNAN - Lun Yun, Provincial Chairman.

Nominally Central Government Troops, Actually Controlled by Lung Yun.

19th Route Army under Lung Yun.

3rd Brig.	Lung Yu-tsang	Kwangan	6,400
5th "	Lu Tao-yuan	Chiupei	4,400
7th "	Kung Shun-pi	Chaotung	4,000
9th "	Chang Chung	Yunnanfu	2,500
Guard Regiment	Chang Yi	"	2,000
Mixed "	Wu Chung	"	1,000
Ind. "	Tuan Than-kuei	"	1,600
			21,900

Total Troops in Yunnan 21,900

Legend:-

* Former Kwangsichuan Forces.
** Former troops of Chang Hsueh-liang.
x Personal Troops of Chiang Kai-shek.

RECAPITULATION:-

Central Government Troops which are actually controlled by the Nanking Government 1,301,400

Nominally Central Government troops which are actually controlled by local military authorities 198,600

Kwangsi troops loyal to Li Tsung-jen and Pai Chung-hsi 48,000

Troops of the East Hopei Autonomous Government 20,000

Provincial troops 100,100

Total forces under arms in China, not including irregulars .. 1,660,100

(See accompanying map).

Joseph W. Stilwell

Joseph W. Stilwell,
Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

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REPLACE

G-2 Report

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE~~ ONLY

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Distribution of Troops (CHINESE)

Composition and Distribution of Troops as of March 15, 1936

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 21 1936

HOPEI - Sung Che-yuan, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Nominally Central Government Troops, Actually Controlled by Hopei Chahar Political Council.

*29th Army Corps - Sung Che-yuan			
37th Division	Feng Chih-an	Peiping	12,000
132nd "	Chao Teng-yu	"	8,000
2nd "	Liu Ju-ming	"	8,000
Special Service Regiment		"	1,600
			29,600

Central Government Troops, Controlled by Nanking Government.

32nd Army Corps - Shang Chen			
139th Division	Huang Kuang-huo	Shunteh	8,000
4th Cav. Div.	Wang Chi-teng	Taming	2,000
Ind. Cav. Regt.		"	1,000
" Art. "		"	1,000
			12,000
**53rd Army Corps - Wan Fu-lin			
116th Division	Miao Cheng-liu	Chochow	6,000
119th "	Sun Te-chuan	Hwailu	5,000
130th "	Chu Hung-hsun	Paoting	5,000
2nd Cav. Div.	Huang Hsien-sheng	Shihkiachwang	2,200
			18,200
**91st Division	Feng Chan-hai	Kaoyi	10,000

Troops of the East Hopei Autonomous Government Controlled by Yin Ju-keng (No Control by Nanking):

East Hopei Garrison Commander - Tung Feng-hsiang			
1st Division	Chang Ching-yu	Tangshan	4,000
2nd "	Chang Yen-tien	Lwanchow	4,000
3rd "	Li Hai-tien	Fengjen	4,000
4th "	Chao Lei	Changli	4,000
5th "	Li Yun-sheng	Tungchow	4,000
			20,000

Total Troops in Hopei - 89,800

CHAHAR - Chang Tze-chung, Acting Chairman, Provincial Government.

Nominally Central Government Troops, Actually Controlled by Peiping-Chahar Political Council.

*29th Army Corps - Sung Che-yuan			
38th Division	Chang Tze-chung	Kalgan	8,000

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CHAHAR - continued. Brought forward - 8,000

Provincial Troops			
1st Ind. Brig.	Juan Hsun-wu	Kalgan	3,000
2nd " "	Hsia Tze-ming	Kangchwang	3,000
3rd " "	Ku Tze-wen	Yuhsien	3,000
1st Cav. Brig.	Tien Chun-fang	Lumen	2,000
2nd " "	Yao Ching-chuan	Suanhwa	2,000
			13,000
	Total Troops in Chahar -		21,000

SHANSI - Hsu Yung-ch'ang, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Nominally Central Government Troops, Actually Controlled by Yen Hsi-shan.

19th Army Corps - Li Sheng-ta			
72nd Division	Li Sheng-ta	Lingshih	8,000
33rd Army Corps - Hsu Yung-ch'ang			
66th Division	Yang Hsiao-ou	Chiehhsiu	8,000
69th "	Yang Chen-yuan	Fenchow	8,000
			16,000
34th Army Corps - Yang Ai-yuan			
70th Division	Wang Ching-kuo	Fenchow	8,000
71st "	Yang Yueh-fang	Pingyao	8,000
			16,000
61st Army Corps - Li Fu-ying			
68th Division	Li Fu-ying	Taiyuan	9,000
101st Division	Sun Chu	Lishih	8,000

Central Government Troops (Controlled by Nanking Government).

x17th Army Corps - Hsin Chen-nan			
2nd Division	Huang Chieh	Lingshih	10,000
25th "	Kuan Lin-cheng	Tzechow	12,000
7th Art. Regt.	Li Shih-to	Lingshih	1,500
			23,500
32nd Army Corps - Shang Chen			
141st Division	Sung Ken-tang	Chiehhsiu	7,000
142nd "	Lu Chi	"	8,000
			15,000
Provincial Troops			
1st Ind. Brig.	Tu Chun-yi	Taiyuan	3,000
2nd " "	Chou Yuan-chien	Siaoyi	3,000
3rd " "	Feng Yu-hsi	Tatung	3,000
			9,000
	Total Troops in Shansi -		104,500

SUIYUAN - Fu Tso-yi, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Nominally Central Government Troops, Actually Controlled by Yen Hsi-shan.

35th Army Corps - Fu Tso-yi			
73rd Division	Fu Tso-yi	Kweisui	8,000
Cavalry Army Corps - Chao Cheng-shou			
1st Cav. Brig.	Sun Chang-sheng	Fenchen	1,600
2nd " "	Lu Ju-chi	Pingtichuan	1,500
3rd " "	Chang Yu-chien	Paotow	1,500
			4,600
	Total Troops in Suiyuan		12,600

SHANTUNG - Han Fu-chu, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Nominally Central Government Troops, Actually Controlled by Han Fu-chu.

*3rd Route Army under Han Fu-chu.			
20th Division	Sun Tung-hsuan	Weihsien	12,000
22nd "	Ku Liang-min	Yenchow	9,000
29th "	Tsao Fu-lin	Tsinan	10,000
74th "	Li Han-chang	"	8,000
81st "	Chan Shu-tang	Kiaochow	7,000
Cav. Brigade		Tsinan	1,500
Ind. Art. Regt.		"	800
Garrison Brig.	Wu Huan-wen	"	3,000
			51,300

Provincial Troops.

Militia Corps - Han Fu-chu			
1st Regt.	Chao Ming-yuan	Lintsing	1,200
2nd "	Chao Jen-chuan	"	1,200
3rd "	Ku Liang-yu	Tsining	1,200
4th "	Hsieh Shu-tien	Kufow	1,200
5th "	Chang Hsien	Chaoyuan	1,200
			6,000
	Total Troops in Shantung -		57,300

SHENSI - Shao Li-tze, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops (Controlled by Central Government).

17th Route Army - Yang Hu-cheng			
38th Army Corps - Sun Yu-ju			
17th Division	Sun Yu-ju	Hanchung	10,000
42nd "	Feng Chin-tsai	Sangnan	10,000
			20,000
*40th Army Corps - Pang Ping-hsun			
39th Division	Pang Ping-hsun	Ankang	12,000
106th "	Shen Ke	Chenan	10,000
6th Cav. Div.	Li Fu-ho	Ankang	2,000
			24,000

SHENSI - continued		Brought forward -		44,000
**55rd Army Corps - Wan Fu-lin				
108th Division		Chiang Wei-jen	Tungkwan	7,000
129th "		Chou Fu-cheng	Yuehhsien	5,000
				12,000
**57th Army Corps - Tung Ying-pin				
109th Division		Niu Yuan-feng	Wukung	6,000
112th "		Chang Ting-shu	Sian	5,000
115th "		Hsiang Cheng-ping	"	5,000
				16,000
84th "		Kao Kuei-tze	Suiteh	11,000
86th "		Kao Shuang-cheng	Yulin	9,000
**105th "		Lin To-chuan	Sian	12,000
				32,000
Provincial Troops.				
Guard Division		Wang Yi-san	Sian	7,000
Special Service Regt.			"	2,000
Artillery Regiment			"	1,500
East Shensi Garrison Brigade		Wang Kuang-tsung	Hwayin	4,000
Ankang Garrison Brigade		Chang Hung-yuan	Ankang	3,000
				17,500
		Total Troops in Shensi -		121,500

KANSU - Yu Hsueh-chung, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops (Controlled by Nanking Government)

***7th Route Army - Mao Wei-shou			
49th Division	Wu Cheng-jen	Wutu	8,000
61st "	Yang Ting-ya	Pikow	7,000
			15,000
x8th Route Army under Chao Kuan-tao			
6th Division	Chao Kuan-tao	Lanchow	10,000
x3rd Army Corps - Wang Chun			
12th Division	Tang Huo-yuan	Lanchow	12,000
x37th Army Corps - Mao Ping-wen			
8th Division	Tao Chih-yueh	Tungwei	10,000
24th "	Li Ying	Pingliang	8,000
			18,000
**51st Army Corps - Yu Hsueh-chung			
111th Division		Tienshui	6,000
113th "	Li Chen-tang	Tsingning	7,000
114th "	Chen Kuan-chun	Hwaining	6,000
118th "	Chou Kuang-lieh	Lanchow	6,000
			25,000
**Cavalry Army Corps - Ho Chu-kuo			
1st Cav. Div.	Chang Cheng-te	Tingsi	1,500
3rd " "	Kuo Hsi-peng	Lunghsi	1,500
6th " "	Pai Feng-hsiang	Pingliang	1,500
			4,500

KANSU - continued		Brought forward -	84,500
1st Army Corps - Teng Pao-shan			
5th Division	Yang Chu-tung	Lanchow	7,000
14th "	Lu Ta-chang	Taochow	8,000
			15,000
Provincial Troops			
10th Brigade	Shih Ying-hsiu	Wuwei	3,000
11th "	Li Kuei-ching	Hochow	3,000
			6,000
		Total Troops in Kansu -	105,500

NINGHSIA - Ma Hung-kuei, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops (Controlled by Nanking Government).

*15th Route Army under Ma Hung-kuei			
35th Division	Ma Hung-pin	Ningsia	10,000
1st Mixed Brig.	Ma Chuan-liang	Ninghsia	4,000
2nd " "	Ma Pao-lin	Yenchih	4,000
1st Cav. "	Li Te-tsang	Ninganpu	2,000
2nd " "	Yang Kan-chen	Chungwei	2,000
			22,000
		Total Troops in Ninghsia -	22,000

TSINGHAI - Ma Lin, Provincial Chairman

Central Government Troops (Controlled by Nanking Government).

2nd Army Corps - Ma Pu-fang			
2nd Cav. Div.	Ma Pu-ching	Hsunhwa	4,000
100th Division	Ma Pu-fang	Sining	7,000
			11,000
		Total Troops in Tsinghai -	11,000

SINKIANG - Li Yung, Provincial Chairman.

Provincial Troops

Defense Commissioner - Sheng Shih-tsai		
1st Ind. Brig.	Tihwa	4,000
4th " "	Ili	3,000
Bodyguard "	Tihwa	2,000
Cavalry "	Tami	1,000
1st Art. Regt.	Tihwa	600
White Russian Troops	"	1,200
		11,800

xx**Border Defense Corps** - **Previously Volunteers in Manchuria.**

Commander - Sheng Shih-tsai		
5th Division	Ili	7,000
6th Brigade	Tacheng	4,000
15th "	Tihwa	5,000
20th "	"	5,000
		21,000
	Total Troops in Sinkiang -	32,800

KIANGSI - Hsiung Shih-hui, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops (Controlled by Nanking Government).

x 8th Route Army under Chao Kuan-tao			
21st Division	Liang Li-chu	Shangjao	12,000
x 4th Division	Tang En-po	Juichang	8,000
x 28th "	Wang Mao-te	Kian	8,000
x 67th "		Ining	8,000
x 77th "	Lo Lin	Pingsiang	8,000
x 32nd Ind. Brig.	Hu Ta	Yungsin	3,000
x 117th " "	Lu Feng-nien	Fuchow	4,000
3rd Constabulary Brigade	Lin Ping-chou	Kiukiang	4,000
			43,000

Troops of the Southwest Political Council - Controlled by Chen Chi-tang

1st Group of Armies under Chen Chi-tang

1st Army Corps - Yu Han-mou			
1st Division	Mo Hsi-te	Sinfeng	7,000
2nd "	Yeh Chao	Nankang	7,000
3rd "	Chao Jui-kuei	Ankang	7,000
Guard Regiment		Kanchow	1,500
			22,500
	Total Troops in Kiangsi -		77,500

CHEKIANG - Huang Shao-hsiung, Provincial Chairman

Central Government Troops (Controlled by Nanking Government)

x 18th Division	Chu Yueh-hua	Hanchow	8,000
x 36th "	Sung Hsi-lien	"	8,000
x 3rd Ind. Brig.	Chiang Tso-chun	Changan	3,000
x 4th " Regt.	Kung Ching-kuei	Chapu	1,500
x 2nd Communication Regt.	Chu Li-wei	Hangchow	1,200
x 13th Army Corps - Tang En-po			
13th Division	Wang Yueh-huang	Kiangshan	10,000
x 18th Army Corps - Lo Cho-ying			
11th Division	Lo Cho-ying	Kingyuan	10,000
14th "	Huo Kuo-kuang	Lungchwan	10,000
			20,000

Provincial Troops

Peace Preservation Corps			
1st Ind. Regt.	Chen Shih-chang	Kingyuan	1,400
2nd " "	Han Yi	"	1,400
3rd " "	Peng Chien	Changshan	1,500
4th " "	Ho Lin-hsiao	Wusing	1,500
5th " "	Hsu Kan	Chuchow	1,500
6th " "	Chang Pei	Peikwan	1,500
			8,800
	Total Troops in Chekiang -		60,500

HONAN - Shang Chen, Provincial Chairman

Central Government Troops (Controlled by Nanking Government).

***7th Route Army under Mao Wei-shou			
60th Division	Chen Pei	Kaifeng	8,000
78th "	Kuei Yung-ching	Kweiteh	9,000
			17,000
xx95th Division	Li Tieh-chun	Changteh	8,000
xx10th Cav. Div.	Tan Tze-hsin	Chowkiakow	3,000
118th Ind. Brig.	Liu Yueh-ting	Hsuchow	3,000
*13th Cav. Brig.	Liu Feng-chi	Nanyang	3,000
*14th " "	Chang Chan-kuei	Kweiteh	2,000
24th " "	Yu Shih-ming	Hsuchang	2,000
**6th Art. Brig.	Wang Ho-hua	Kaifeng	2,100
**7th " "	Chiao Fang	"	2,000
**8th " "	Huang Yung-an	"	2,000
x5th Art. Regt.	Hung Shih-chi	"	1,600
x6th " "	Lu Chao-hsiang	"	1,600
x1st Communication Regiment	Hua Chen-lin	"	1,200
			31,500
	Total Troops in Honan -		48,500

ANHWEI - Liu Chen-hua, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops (Controlled by Nanking Government).

*11th Route Army under Liu Chen-hua			
64th Division	Liu Mao-en	Anking	8,000
65th "	Liu Chen-hua	Luchow	9,000
			17,000
*25th Route Army under Liang Kuan-yin			
32nd Division	Liang Kuan-yin	Liuan	12,000
5th Ind. Brig.	Chen Ting-chen	Yingshan	3,000
15th Cav. Brig.	Chang Hung-chun	Tushan	2,000
44th Ind. Brig.	Ho Chi-hsiung	Liuan	2,000
			19,000
x14th Army Corps - Wei	Li-huang		
10th Division	Li Mo-an	Mafu	8,000
83rd "	Liu Kan	Tungcheng	8,000
			16,000
101st Division	Ho Chih-chang	Anking	6,000
102nd "	Po Hui-chang	Shucheng	5,000
11th Cav. Brig.	Tan Fu-lieh	Liuan	2,000
40th Ind. "	Sung Shih-ke	Chengyang	3,000
45th " "	Pao Kang	Hweichow	4,000
			20,000
Provincial Troops			
Garrison Brigade	Juan Chin-ching	Anking	3,000
	Total Troops in Anhwei -		75,000

HUPEH - Chang Chun, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops (Controlled by Nanking Government).

x 16th Route Army under Hsu Yuan-chuan.

10th Army Corps - Hsu Yuan-chuan			
41st Division	Huang Hsin	Ichang	10,000
48th "	Hsu Yuan-chuan	Kungan	8,000
			18,000

*26th Route Army under Sun Lien-chung

42nd Army Corps - Sun Lien-chung			
27th Division	Li Sung-kuei	Macheng	8,000
30th Army Corps - Sun Lien-chung			
30th Division	Feng Hsing-hsien	Sungfow	8,000
31st "	Chih Feng-cheng	Yangsin	7,000
			15,000
26th Army Corps - Hsiao Chih-chu			
44th Division	Hsiao Chih-chu	Yungyang	10,000
x 34th Division	Chang Wan-hsin	Patung	8,000
x 40th "	Liu Pei-hsu	Hankow	7,000
x 50th "	Cheng Kwang-yueh	Tungcheng	7,000
x 51st "	Po Tien-min	Kunchow	8,000
x 58th "	Chen Yueh-han	Shasi	8,000
x 65th "	Chen Hung-yuan	Tungshan	8,000
x 69th "	Wang Yi-chung	Tayeh	7,000
x 82nd "	Jung Ching-fang	Sinti	7,000
x 85th "	Chen Tieh	Wuchang	8,000
x 94th "	Chu Huai-ping	Kingshan	7,000
x 35th Ind. Brig.	Li Tsung-chien	Chungyang	3,000
			78,000

Provincial Troops

Garrison Brigade	Shen Chen	Wuchang	4,000
1st Ind. "	Wu Chun-ping	"	3,000
2nd " "	Li Ting-wu	"	3,000
			10,000

Total Troops in Hupeh - 139,000

KIANGSU - Chen Kuo-fu, Provincial Chairman.

Central Government Troops (Controlled by Nanking Government).

1st Route Army under Chen Tiao-yuan			
55th Division	Juan Chao-chang	Soochow	10,000
57th "	Li Sung-shan	Kunshan	8,000
			18,000
x 2nd Army Corps - Chiang Ting-wen			
9th Division	Li Yen-nien	Chinkiang	10,000

KIANGSU - continued		Brought forward -	28,000
x3rd Army Corps - Wang Chun			
7th Division	Tseng Wen-chung	Nanking	10,000
x87th Division	Wang Ching-chiu	Nanking	10,000
x88th "	Sun Yuan-liang	"	10,000
xSalt "	Wen Ying-hsing	Haichow	10,000
x1st Art. Brigade		"	4,000
x2nd " "		"	4,000
x1st " Regiment	Liu Pei-pin	"	1,600
x8th " "	Li Lu-chung	Kiangyinhsien	1,600
x8 Military Police Regiments	Ku Chen-lun	Nanking	9,600
			50,800
	Total troops in Kiangsu -		88,800

HUNAN - Ho Chien, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Central Government Troops (Controlled by Nanking Government).

4th Route Army under Liu Chien-hsu.

28th Army Corps - Tao Kuang			
19th Division	Li Chieh	Changteh	8,000
62nd "	Chung Kuang-jen	Shenchow	9,000
			17,000
x13th Army Corps - Tang En-po			
89th Division	Wang Chung-lien	Supu	9,000
x46th Army Corps - Fan Sung-pu			
79th Division	Fan Sung-pu	Suining	9,000
15th Division	Wang Tung-yuan	Hungkiang	7,000
16th "	Peng Wei-jen	Wukang	8,000
63rd "	Cheng Kuang-chung	Yuanchow	8,000
34th "	Chu Chai-chi	Paotsing	8,000
x98th	Hsia Chu-chung	Shihmenhsien	7,000
			38,000
	Total troops in Hunan -		73,000

SZECHWAN - Liu Hsiang, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Central Government Troops (Controlled by Nanking Government).

x4th Army Corps - Wu Chi-wei			
90th Division	Ou Chen	Tienchwan	10,000
46th "	Liu Tze-hsia	Lushan	8,000
			18,000
x5th Army Corps - Yueh Sen			
43rd Division	Tai Yueh	Chengtu	8,000
23rd "	Li Pi-fan	Luting	10,000
			18,000

SZECHWAN - continued	Brought forward -		36,000
x9th Army Corps - Hao Meng-ling			
47th Division	Pei Chang-hui	Chungking	10,000
54th "	Hao Meng-ling	Jungchang	8,000
			18,000
x36th Army Corps - Chou Hung-yuan			
5th Division	Hsieh Pu-fu	Chengtu	12,000
			8,000
			20,000

Former Szechwan Forces Now Organized as Central Government Units. (These troops are loyal only to local warlords who are controlled by Chiang Kai-shek only to the extent that it is profitable to be so.)

20th Army Corps - Yang Sen			
133rd Division	Yang Han-yu	Penghsien	5,000
134th "	Hsia Chung	Kwanhsien	6,000
135th "	Yang Han-chung	Tayi	7,000
			18,000
21st Army Corps - Tang Shih-tsun			
1st Division	Jao Kuo-huo	Tungchwan	8,000
4th "	Fan Shao-tseng	"	8,000
Ind. "	Peng Han-shih	Maohsien	8,000
			24,000
23rd Army Corps - Pan Wen-hua			
Training Division	Yang Kuo-cheng	Mingshan	7,000
5th Division	Chen Wan-jen	Pukiang	6,000
4th Ind. Brig.	Pao Tso	Sintsin	3,000
			16,000
24th Army Corps - Liu Wen-hui			
136th Division	Chen Kwang-tsao	Yachow	5,000
137th "	Liu Yuan-tang	Kangting	5,000
138th "	Tang Ying	Tanpa	5,000
1st Ind. Brig.	Yu Sung-lin	Luting	3,000
			18,000
41st Army Corps - Sun Chen			
122nd Division	Wang Ming-chang	Chungpa	6,000
123rd "	Tseng Hsien-tung	Kiangyu	5,000
124th "	Sun Chen	Lokiang	5,000
			16,000
44th Army Corps - Wang Tsan-hsu			
2nd Division	Kuo Chang-ming	Chengtu	8,000
1st "	Liao Chen	Tienchwan	6,000
1st Ind. Brig.	Chen Lan-ting	Lushan	3,000
			17,000
45th Army Corps - Teng Hsi-hou			
125th Division	Chen Ting-hsun	Peichwan	5,000
126th "	Huang Yin	Anhsien	6,000
127th "	Ma Yu-chih	Mienchu	6,000
128th "	Yang Hsiu-chun	Kienchow	5,000
131st "	Chen Li	Jungching	5,000
			27,000
x1st Division	Hu Tsung-nan	Sungpan	16,000
23rd "	Lo Tze-chou	Jungching	8,000
104th "	Li Chai-yu	Lifan	8,000
			32,000
	Total troops in Szechwan -		242,000

SIKANG -

Central Government Troops (Controlled by Nanking Government).

x55rd Division	Li Pao-ping	Kangting	10,000
x92nd "	Li Hua-sheng	Luting	8,000
			18,000

Total troops in Sikang - 18,000

KWEICHOW - Wu Chung-hsin, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Central Government Troops (Controlled by Nanking Government).

x6th Route Army under Hsueh Yueh.

59th Division	Han Han-ying	Lungli	10,000
93rd "	Kao Li-chu	Kweiyang	9,000
97th "	Li Hsiang-jung	Panhsien	8,000
99th "	Fu Chung-fan	Chengyuan	7,000
			34,000

25th Army Corps - Wang Chia-lieh

103rd Division	Miao Hui-chang	Tsunyi	5,000
121st "	Wu Chien-ping	Tuyun	5,000
8th "	Chiang Pi-hsu	Sungkan	6,000
25th "	Shen Chiu-cheng	Chihshui	6,000
			22,000

x43rd Army Corps - Kuo Ju-tung

26th Division	Kuo Ju-tung	Wengan	9,000

Total troops in Kweichow - 65,000

FUKIEN - Chen Yi, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Central Government Troops (Controlled by Nanking Government).

20th Route Army under Chang Fang.

75th Division	Sung Tien-tsai	Shaowu	8,000
76th "	Li Mao-lin	Yenping	8,000
			16,000

x1st Army Corps - Chen Chi-cheng

3rd Division	Li Yu-tang	Changchow	10,000
80th "	Chen Chi	Chwanchow	8,000
			18,000

39th Army Corps - Liu Ho-ting

56th Division	Liu Shang-chih	Kienyang	10,000
45th Ind. Brig.	Chang Luan-chi	Kienou	3,000
			13,000
10th Division	Chen Te-chun	Fuan	7,000
17th "	Chou Chih-chun	Chengho	6,000
x45th "	Tai Min-chuan	Foochow	8,000
52nd "	Lu Hsing-yung	Yungan	8,000
			29,000

Total Troops in Fukien - 76,000

KWANGTUNG - Lin Yun-hai, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Troops of the Southwest Political Council.

1st Group of Armies under Chen Chi-tang.

2nd Army Corps - Chang Ta			
4th Division	Wu Chien-hsiung	Suichow	6,000
5th "	Li Chen-liang	Lienhsien	6,000
6th "	Li Han-hun	Pingshek	6,000
Guard Regiment		Suichow	1,200
			19,200
3rd Army Corps - Li Yang-ching			
7th Division	Huang Ting-chen	Polo	6,000
8th "	Huang Chih-wen	Wuhwa	6,000
9th "	Teng Lung-kuang	Swatow	6,000
Guard Regiment		"	1,200
			19,200
1st Ind. Div.	Huang Jen-huan	Meihsien	8,000
Training Division	Miao Pei-nan	Canton	6,000
Garrison "	Chen Han-kuang	"	6,000
Military Police Regiment	Chen Chi-nan	Kiungchow	1,200
2nd Ind. Regt.	Wang Ting-hua	"	1,200
			22,400
	Total troops in Kwangtung -		60,800

KWANGSI - Huang Hsu-chu, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Troops of the Southwest Political Council.

4th Group of Armies under Li Tsung-jen.

7th Army Corps - Liao Lei			
19th Division	Chou Tze-huang	Liuchow	8,000
24th "	Tang Lien-fang	Chwanchow	8,000
			16,000
15th Army Corps - Hsia Wei			
44th Division	Wang Tsan-pin	Hochih	8,000
45th "	Wei Yun-sung	Lungchow	8,000
			16,000
	Total troops in Kwangsi -		32,000

YUNNAN - Lung Yun, Chairman of Provincial Government.

Nominally Central Government Troops, Actually Controlled by Lung Yun.

10th Route Army under Lung Yun.			
3rd Brigade	Lung Yu-tsang	Kwangan	6,400
5th "	Lu Tao-yuan	Chiupei	4,400
7th "	Kung Shun-pi	Chaotung	4,000
9th "	Chang Chung	Yunnanfu	2,500
Bodyguard Regt.		"	2,000
Mix. Regt.	Chang Yi	Mengtze	1,000
1st Ind. Regt.	Tuan Tsan-kuei	Yunnanfu	1,600
			21,900
	Total troops in Yunnan -		21,900

RECAPITULATION

Central Government troops which are really controlled by the Nanking Government.....	1,066,200
Nominally Central Government troops which are actually controlled by local warlords...	348,400
Troops of the Southwest Political Council.....	115,300
Troops of the East Hopei Autonomous Government	20,000
Provincial troops (these troops are organized and maintained by provincial authorities. The Central Government can count on the support of these forces in the lower Yangtze provinces and in other provinces to the extent that it can control the local warlords).....	106,100
Total ground forces under arms in China, not including irregulars.....	1,656,000

Legend:-

* Former Kuominchun forces.
** Formerly troops of Chang Hsueh-liang.
*** Former troops of the 19th Route Army.
x Personal troops of Chiang Kai-shek.
xx Formerly volunteer troops in Manchuria.

Notes:

(a) For composition and distribution of air forces see Digest 9170, page 110.

(b) See Manchuria Digest 6180 for composition and distribution of Manchoukuo Army.

Source: Study in Office of Military Attache.

Joseph W. Stilwell

Joseph W. Stilwell
Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache

HSJ

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2009-177

WAR DEPARTMENT
6000.

G-2 Report.

CHINA (Military).

Subject: The Disposition of Forces in the Jehol Area.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAR 11 1933

In the London "Times" of February 21, there appears a despatch from Mukden dated February 20th, extract from which is as follows:

"The Headquarters of the Manchukuo expeditionary forces have issued a statement saying that though they would be justified in attacking Peking and Tientsin, as the fountain-heads of the disturbance in the new State, there was no intention to pass beyond the Manchurian frontiers.

The total forces which the Chinese have now at disposal are estimated at 470,000 according to the spokesman at Japanese Headquarters and their probable distribution is as follows:-

In the Kailu and Tientsin districts and just north of Chinchow there are 61,000, consisting of volunteers, remnants of defeated units, and miscellaneous irregulars. The first line (roughly Chihfeng-Wukungfu-Shanhaikwan) is held by Tang Yu-lin's and Chang Hsueh-liang's regulars numbering 80,000; in the second line (Tangsanying-Pingchuan-Changli) there are 33,000; the third line (Jehol City-Taohua-Lanksien) is occupied by 50,000.

Reserves at Tientsin number 40,000, at Peking 45,000, and at Kalgan 10,000. In addition, 30,000 Shansi troops, Han Fuchu's army of 30,000 in Shantung, and 100,000 troops of the Central Government under Chiang Kai-shek, are available at short notice.

General Chang Hai-peng, commanding the vanguard of Manchukuo's 40,000 troops, will probably soon leave Tungliao via Kailu, for the south-west. The disposition of the Japanese forces is not disclosed, but it is safe to assume that their numbers are not unlike those of Manchukuo."

Without risking a prophesy, the comment of this office is that if the Chinese dispositions are as reported, the stage is set for a Japanese maneuver against the enemy's rear exemplified by the strategical maneuver of the Lodi campaign, 1796, Marengo campaign, 1800, Ulm campaign, 1805, and Jena campaign, 1806.

From: M.A. London. Report No. 33501. Date: February 21, 1933.

In the present situation the maneuver would involve:

1. Containing the enemy on the Shan Hai Kwan-Kailu front with weak detachments.
2. Concentration of main forces in area near Tientsin using rail, motor, and sea transport.
3. Movement by forced marches north to area northeast of Pekin, interrupting Chinese supplies and seizing Great Wall south of Jehol.
4. Attack of the enemy's retreating forces and their defeat in detail. Fortifications and large cities to be contained and observed, not taken.

This maneuver is probably not orthodox enough for the Japanese. However, the taking of Shan Hai Kwan on January 1st would indicate their intention to secure the railroad; and their disclaimers concerning Tientsin and Pekin appear suspicious.

From: M.A. London. Report No. 33501. Date: February 21, 1933.

CORTLANDT PARKER,
Lt. Col., F.A.,
M.A., London.

OPNI & CHIEF OF STAFF
M.I. NT.L. DIV.
AUG 30 1932
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August 12, 1932.

Japan. 6180 - Distribution of Troops/

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 29 1932

Chinese Troops in and near Jehol.

The attached sketch showing Chinese troops in and near Jehol was copied from the Asahi newspaper of July 22nd.
That newspaper probably received its information from the press section of the War Office.

J.G.McIlroy
Lieut. Colonel, G. S.,
Military Attache.

MA/Tokyo Report No. 6384 12 August 1932.

4-1

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
AUG 30 2009-177 1932
WAR DEPARTMENT

DISTRIBUTION OF CHINESE TROOPS IN THE JEHOL PROVINCE AND IT'S VICINITY. (ON JULY 19, 1932)



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G-2 Report

6180

APR 12 1932

2009-177

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RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 11 1932

WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Order of Battle of Chinese Troops

Following is the order of battle (by locations) of Chinese troops at Shanghai, compiled from information available up to 3:00 p.m., February 28, 1932. This was sent this office by Captain Mayer who obtained if from British Intelligence, which he states is very well organized.

LIUHO & LOTIEN

Unknown.

TAZANG & KIANGWAN

88th Division (less Ind. Brig. & 2 Regts. 176th Brig.)			7,000
4th & 5th Regiments,	174th Brig.,	87th Div.	3,000
361st & 362nd "	121st "	61st "	3,000
355th "	119th "	60th "	1,500
358th & 359th "	120th "	60th "	3,000
529th "	177th "	89th "	1,500
2nd Bn. 19th Route Army Artillery			500
			19,500

WUSUNG & PAOSHAN

Guards & Volunteers			2,500
2 Regiments,	176th Brig.,	88th Div.	3,000
4th Regt.	156th "	78th "	1,500
363rd "	121st "	61st "	1,500
365th & 366th Regt.,	122nd "	61st "	3,000
78th Div. Artillery			1,500
88th " "	- approximately		500
88th " Anti-aircraft Bty.			130
3rd Bn. 19th Route Army Artillery			500
			14,130

CHAPEI

5th & 6th Regiments,	156th Brig.,	78th Div.	3,000
364th "	122nd "	61st "	1,500
356th & 357th "	119th "	60th "	3,000
360th "	120th "	60th "	1,500
1 Regt. 87th Div.			1,500
			10,500

CHENJU

H.Q's, 19th Route Army, 60th Div. & 78th Div.	500
2nd & 3rd Btys, 1st Bn. 19th Route Army Artillery	260
Armored Train	80
500 men 25th Route Army	500
	1,340

POHSINGKING & HUNGJAO

2nd Bn. 1st Regt.,	Ind.	Brig.,	88th	Div.	500
3rd "	"	"	"	"	1,500
					2,000

From M/A, China Report No. 8238 March 16, 1932

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Order of Battle of Chinese Troops

KIANGNAN ARSENAL	
Guards & Marines	800
LUNGHUA	
19th Route Army Police	170
1st Regiment, Ind. Brig., 88th Div. (less 2nd Bn.)	1,000
2nd " " " " "	1,500
2nd & 3rd " 155th Brig. 78th "	3,000
6th Regt., 2nd Brig. of 1st C. M. P. (less 3rd Bn)	800
530th " 177th " 89th Div.	1,300
2,000 Nanking Cadets (unarmed)	2,000
	9,770
SICCAWKI	
3rd Special Service Co., 78th Div.	126
POOTUNG	
1st Regiment, 155th Brig., 78th Div.	1,500
Ind. " 122nd " 61st "	1,500
	3,000
MUNICIPALITY OF GREATER SHANGHAI	
3rd Bn. 6th Regt., 2nd Brig. of 1st C. M. P.	400
NAZIANG	
H. Q. 61st Div.	200
1st Bty. 1st Bn. 19th Route Army Artillery	130
Part of 87th Div. - approximately	1,500
531st Regt., 177th Brig., 89th Division	1,500
	3,330
GRAND TOTAL	64,896
Less casualties, estimated	6,000
NET TOTAL	58,896

NOTE: 2,000 men of Liang Kuan-ying's 25th Route Army are reported to have arrived at Kading. This report has not yet been verified.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery
Assistant Military Attache

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AUG 4 1931

2009-177
6190

WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Location of Red Mongol Army

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 3 1931

The accompanying map showing the location of the Red Mongol Army as of May 15, 1931, was given me by the French Military Attache who states that he believes it correct.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery
Assistant Military Attache

Distribution:
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From M/A, China Report No. 8054 July 3, 1931

G-2 Report

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6180
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JUL 22 2009-177 1931
4
WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Organization and Distribution of Troops in Szechuan.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUL 22 1931

There is quoted below an extract from a despatch from the Consulate-General in Hankow. In general it is believed to be correct.

- - - -

The Latest Condition the Various Military Units of Szechuan Are In.

20th Army of the National Revolutionary Army:
Commander: Yang Sen ( ).
Places of Garrison: Chuhsien, Lingshui, Kwangan, Tungliang, Tachu, Yochih.
Headquarters: Chuhsien.
Strength:
3 divisions
2 independent brigades
2 pistol detachments
1 artillery regiment
1 machine gun battalion
1 special detachment
Rifles (new model infantry): 36,000.
Pistols: 500
Machine guns: 40
Cannon: 44
Portable machine guns: 120

21st Army of the National Revolutionary Army:
Commander: Liu Hsiang ( ).
Places of Garrison: 25 hsien districts in east Szechuan, including Chungking, Chungchow, Kweifu, Yuyang.
Headquarters: Chungking.
Strength:
4 divisions
4 independent brigades
1 trench mortar regiment
2 machine gun regiments
3 pistol detachments
1 special detachment (bombs and hand grenades)
1 airplane corps
Rifles (new model infantry): 46,000
Cannon: 60
Trench mortars: 70
Machine guns: 200
Pistols: 800
Portable machine guns: 40
Airplanes: 7

24th Army of the National Revolutionary Army:
Commander: Liu Wen-hui ( )
Places of Garrison: 56 hsien districts in south Szechuan, including Luchow, Suifu, Kiating, Yachow, Chuankong.
Headquarters: Chengtu.
Strength:
3 divisions,
6 independent brigades
1 trench mortar regiment
3 pistol detachments
1 special detachment

From M/A, China Report No. 8041 June 19, 1931

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Organization and Distribution of Troops in Szechuan.

24th Army - cont'd.

Rifles (new model infantry): 35,000.
Cannon: 60.
Trench mortars: 50
Machine guns: 80
Pistols: 1,200.

28th Army of the National Revolutionary Army:
Commander: Teng Hsi-hou ( )
Places of Garrison: 32 hsien districts in west Szechuan, including Chengtu, Sungfang, Lifang, Maokung, Ningyuan.
Headquarters: Chengtu.
Strength:
4 divisions
3 independent brigades
20 battalions of river defence army
5 battalions of Han troops
1 artillery regiment
1 special detachment
1 machine gun battalion
2 pistol detachments
Rifles (new model infantry): 32,000
Cannon: 60
Trench mortars: 40
Machine guns: 50
Pistols: 800

29th Army of the National Revolutionary Army:
Commander: Tien Sung-yao ( ).
Places of Garrison: 24 hsien districts in north Szechuan, including Paoning, Lungan, Mienchow, Tungchuan.
Headquarters: Tungchuan.
Strength:
3 divisions
1 independent brigade
1 battalion of machine guns
1 pistol detachment
Rifles (new model infantry): 26,000
Cannon: 40
Machine guns: 40
Trench mortars: 20
Pistols: 650

Garrison for the Szechuan-Shensi Frontier:
Commander: Liu Chen-hou (Director General) ( )
Places of Garrison: 7 hsien districts in small north Szechuan.
Headquarters: Tahsien, Suiting
Strength:
2 divisions
2 mixed brigades
1 pistol detachment
1 portable machine gun detachment
Cannon: 34
Trench mortars: 8
Rifles (new model infantry): 8,000
Pistols: 350
Portable machine guns: 100

G-3 Refer.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Organization and Distribution of Troops in Szechuan

Garrison for the Frontiers:
Commander-in-Chief: Li Chi-siang ( ).
Places of Garrison: Pengchi and Shunking.
Headquarters: Nan Chung Hsien, Shunking.
Strength:
1 division
1 independent brigade
1 artillery battalion
1 special detachment (machine guns and pistols)
Rifles (new model infantry): 9,000
Cannon: 24
Machine guns: 16
Pistols: 250

36th Division (under temporary organization) of the National Army:
Commander: Lo Tse-chow ( )
Headquarters: Shunking
Temporary Headquarters: Chungking
Strength:
2 brigades
1 detachment
Rifles (new model infantry): 5,000
Cannon: 16
Machine guns: 4
Pistols: 120

NOTES:

1. The numbers for rifles given above are for new model infantry rifles. The troops under Chang Hai-yung, Commander for Bandit Suppression of the 21st Army, under the Commander of the Han troops in Chuankong of the 24th Army, under the command of General Yang Fu-chuan, Commander of the Han troops of the 28th Army, and under the command of Sun Teh-chao, Commander for the Rescue of Shensi, still possess different kinds of rifles, which are not included in the figures given above.

2. The 24th Army has ordered 4 military airplanes. In August, 1931, an airplane squadron may be organized. The station will be at Suifu. The airplane station of the 21st Army is at Kwang Chang Pa, Chungking.

3. The 21st, 24th and 28th Armies are equipped with radio corps, while the 20th Army is only equipped with a telephone corps.

4. The special detachment of the 20th Army is a bomb detachment; that of the 21st Army is one of new weapons (cavalry rifles which have been repaired) and hand grenades; that of the 24th Army is a dare-to-die corps, and that of the 28th Army is a combination of bombs and trench mortars.

5. The 146 hsiens in Szechuan are divided into five sections: west Szechuan, north Szechuan, east Szechuan, and upper and lower south Szechuan. Chuankong consists of 36 hsiens; only 6 are left, while 30 have been occupied by Tibetan troops.

The information given above is the latest and most accurate that is available, up to the end of April, 1931.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

Parker G. Tenney

Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery
Assistant Military Attache

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2009-177

FEB 17

2320 - Distribution of Troops

WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Composition and Location of Armies.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. FEB 17 1927

1. Accompanying are:

(1) Composition of Armies
(2) List of Approximate Military Strength of Provinces
(3) Location List of Provincial Armies.

2. This material, compiled by the British Military Attache, is taken from his annual "Changes Report" which he submitted as of December 31, 1926. It corresponds closely to our own estimates and we are using this as a basis for future situation reports.

3. It may be mentioned that the British Military Attache has one clerk employed who does nothing but keep up the detailed movements of Chinese troops.

John Magruder per elh.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache.

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Tientsin
1 File

From M/A, China Report #6033 January 19, 1927

OFFICE OF ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF MIL. INTEL. G-2
4-1 1927 2009-177
FEB 13
WAR DEPARTMENT

COMPOSITION OF ARMIES

	Headquarters	Numbers.
Sun Chuan-Fang	Nanking	
A. Anhui		38,000
B. Chechiang		8,000
C. Chiangsu		30,000
D. Fuchien		10,000
	Total ..	86,000
Chang Tso-lin	Tientsin	
A. Anhui		20,000
B. Chahar		35,000
C. Chiangsu		20,000
D. Chihli		105,000
E. Fengtien		35,000
F. Heilungchiang		32,000
G. Honan		10,000
H. Jehol		20,000
I. Kirin		25,000
J. Shantung		96,000
	Total ..	398,000
KUOMINTANG FORCES		
Chiang Kai-shek	Wuchang	
A. Anhui		30,000
B. Chianghsi		44,000
C. Fuchien		35,000
D. Honan		30,000
E. Hunan		50,000
F. Hupeh		56,000
G. Kuanghsi		35,000
H. Kwangtung		38,000
	Total ..	318,000
KUOMINCHUN		
Feng Yu-hsiang	Pingliang (in Kansu)	
A. Honan		28,000
B. Kansu		26,000
C. Shensi		65,000
D. Suiyuan		20,000
	Total ..	139,000
Wu Pei-fu	Chengchow	
A. Honan		115,000
Yen Hsi-shan	Taiyuanfu	
A. Shansi		60,000
B. Suiyuan		37,000
	Total ..	97,000

LIST OF APPROXIMATE MILITARY STRENGTHS OF PROVINCES

Anhui	88,000	
Chahar	35,000	
Chechiang	30,000	
Chiangsu	50,000	
Chiangsi	44,000	
Chihli	105,000	
Fengtien	35,000	M
Fuchien	65,000	
Heilungchiang	32,000	M
Honan	183,000	
Hsinchiang	36,000	
Hunan	50,000	
Hupeh	101,000	
Jehol	20,000	
Kansu	54,000	
Kirin	25,000	M
Kuanghsi	43,000	
Kuangtung	38,000	
Kweichow	26,000	
Shanhsi	60,000	
Shenhsi	65,000	
Shantung	96,000	
Szechuan	191,000	
Suiyuan	57,000	
Yunnan	30,000	
Estimated Grand Total Number of Forces in China	1,559,000	

LOCATION LIST OF PROVINCIAL ARMIES

Organization	Commander	Location	Remarks
ANHUI			
Sun Chuan-fang's Troops			
6th Div.	Ch'en Tiao-yuan	Anking & S. Anhui	Ch'en is Anhui Military Governor.
3rd(Kiangsi)Div.	Liu Pao-ti	Huichow & Ch'i-men	
1st(Anhui)Mix.Bde.	Yang Shih-yung	Wangchiang	
2nd " " "	Hsu Feng-ch'un	Nanshuchow	
3rd " " "	Wang P'u	Wuhu	
4th " " "	Liu Feng-t'u	Tungch'eng & Hofei	
12th " " "	Pi Hua-tung	N. Anhui	
	Estimated strength - 38,000		
Kuomintang Forces			
4th Army	L i Chi-ch'en		General Li is in Canton.
10th Division	Ch'en Ming-shu	Shusung & its vicinity	Part in Hupeh
12th "	Chang Fa-kuei	"	
7th Army	Li Chung-jen	Ma-tou-chen near Anking	1st, 3rd, 4th & 9th M.B. are in Kwangsi.
2nd Mix. Bde.	Li Ming-jui	"	
5th " "	Wu Ting-yang	"	
6th " "	Hsia Wei	"	
7th " "	Hu Chung-doh	"	
8th " "	Chung Choo-pei	"	
2nd(Indept.)Div.	Ho Yao-choo	In vicinity of Anking.	
	Estimated strength - 30,000		
Chihli-Shantung Allied Armies (under control of Chang Tsung-ch'ang)			
3rd Army	Ch'eng Kuo-jui	Pengpu	One part in Shantung.
7th "	Hsu Kun	Nanshuchow & Pengpu	"
	Estimated strength - 20,000		
	Estimated total strength - 88,000		
CHARHAR			
Chang Tso-lin's troops			
8th Army	Wan Fu-lin	Chahar district	
9th "	Kao Wei-yueh	Kalgan	Gen. Kao is Chahar Military Governor.
	Estimated total strength - 35,000		

Organization	Commander	Location	Remarks
CHECHIANG			
Sun Chuan-fang's troops			
1st Division	Ch'en Yi	Hangchow & Ningpo	Lately appointed Chechiang Civil Governor by Marshal Sun.
3rd "	Chew Feng-ch'i	Ch'angshan	About 1000 strong.
8th "	Meng Chao-yueh	Chiahsing	One part in Kiangsu.
10th "	Cheng Tsun-yen	Hangchow & vicinity	

Remarks: Estimated total strength - 30,000 (about 8,000 are Sun's men.) Only one Brigade is loyal to Sun; the remainder inclined to side with Kuomintang.

CHIANGSU

Sun Chuan-fang's troops

2nd Division	Lu Hsiang-t'ing	Nanking & Chinchiang	General Lu is Chechiang M.G.
4th "	Peng Teh-chuan	Hsuchow	
5th "	Pei Pao-shan	Ch'angchow & Haichow	
7th "	Feng Chao-min	I-hsing & S. Chiangsu	
8th "	Meng Chao-yueh	Nanking	One part in Chechiang
9th "	Li Pao-chang	Nantungchow & Shanghai	Formerly 7th Mix.Bde.
9th Mix. Bde.	Ma Teng-ying	Soochow	
12th (Newly Organized) M.B.	Chang Kuo-wei	Kunshan	

Estimated strength - 30,000

Chihli-Shantung Allied Armies

6th Army	Hsu Yuan-chuan	Hsuchow & Pukow

Estimated strength - 20,000

Estimated total strength - 50,000

CHIANGHSI

Kuomintang Forces

1st(Training)Div.	Wang Chen	E. Chianghsi

Organization	Commander	Location	Remarks
2nd Army	Tan Yen-kai		General Tan is in Canton.
4th Division	Tai Yueh	E.Chianghsi	
5th "	Tan Tao-yuan	"	
6th "	Chang Hui-tsan	"	
3rd Army	Chu Pei-teh	"	
7th Division	Wang Chun	"	
8th "	Chu Shih-kuei	"	
9th "	Chu Ming-yang	"	
5th Army	Li Fu-lin		Gen.Li is in Canton
14th Division	Ch'en Bing-chang	P'inghsiang	
6th Army	Ch'eng Ch'ien	Kiukiang	
17th Division	Cheng Yen-hua	Kiukiang & Hsiushui	
18th "	Hu Ch'ien	"	
14th Army	Lai Shih-huang	Chianghsi-Fukien border	Formerly under Sun Chuan-fang.

Estimated total strength - 44,000

CHIHLI

Manchurian troops

7th Army	Hsing Shih-lien	Nankou &Peking	
10th "	Yu Chen	Peking & vicinity	Gen. Yu is C-in-C of Metropolitan Grds.
11th "	Chao En-tsin	Peking, Tientsin & Paotingfu	
17th "	Yung Tsin	S. Chihli	Part in N. Honan.

Estimated strength - 55, 000

Chihli-Shantung Allied Armies.

4th Army	Sun Tsung-hsien	Tsangchow & neighborhood	
5th "	Wang Tung	Paotingfu	Large portion of this army is on the way to N.Chiangsu.
6th "	Hsu Yuan-chuan	S. Chihli	Large portion of this army is in N. Chiangsu.
11th "	Wang Han-sing	Tamingfu	

Estimated strength - 50,000

Estimated total strength - 105,000

Organisation	Commander	Location	Remarks
FENGTIEN			
8th (Manchurian) Division	Yu Tze-shan	Chinchow & vicinity.	
9th "	Ch'i Chin-ch'un	Fengtien-Jehol border.	
30th(Manchu)M.B.	Ch'i Ch'un-chiu	Mukden	
6th(Cavalry)M.B.	Wu Han-ching	Chinchow	
One Bodyguard Bde	-	Mukden	
	Estimated total strength - 35,000		
FUCHIEN			
Sun Chuan-fang's troops			
12th(Nat.) Div.	Li Sheng-ch'un	Foochow	At the time of writing Li is said to side with the Kuomintang.
1st(Fuchien) Div.	Chang Yi	In vicinity of Foochow	
11th(Nat.) M.B.	Wang Ch'i	Foochow-Chekiang border	
29th " "	K'ung Chao-tung	"	
30th " "	Su Yen	"	
1st(Fuchien) M.B.	Kuo Feng-ming	"	
2nd " "	Tung Sheng-piao	"	
5th " "	Ch'en Kuo-hua	"	Lately defeated by Kuomintang forces
6th " "	Wu Wei	"	
7th " "	Lu Sheng-yung	"	
1 Reserve Bde.	Chiang Chi-feng	"	
1 Bodyguard Bde.	Sun Yun-feng	"	
Naval Brigade	Lin Chung	Ma Wei	
	Estimated total strength - 30,000 (of whom possibly 10,000 remain loyal to Sun.)		
Kuomintang forces			
1st Army	Ho Ying-ch'in	Foochow	
1st Division	Chien Ta-chun	Foochow & vicinity.	
3rd "	Tan Shu-ch'ing	Foochow & Changchow	

Organization	Commander	Location	Remarks
1 Division	Tsao Wan-hsun	N.Changchow	Formerly one of Brig. Cmndrs. of 3rd (Fuchien) Div.
1 "	Tu Ch'i-yun	Yungtai	"
4th(Indept.)Div.	Chang Chen	Foochow	
2nd(Training)Div.	Liu Chih	Foochow & Changchow	

Estimated strength - 35,000

Estimated total strength - 65,000.

HEILUNGCHIANG

Manchurian troops.

12th Army	Wu Tsun-sheng	Amur River	Gen. Wu is the Heilungchiang Mil.Gov.
13th "	-	Tsitsihar & vicinity	

Estimated total strength - 32,000

HONAN

Wu Pei-fu's troops

1st Army	Wang Wai-wei	Chengchow & vicinity	About 8000 strong.
2nd "	Mi Chen-piao	Kaifeng	About 15,000 strong
3rd "	Yen Chih-tang	W. Honan	" 5,000 "
4th "	Ch'en Wen-chao	Nanyang & vicinity	" 6,000 "
5th "	Wang Wei-ch'eng	Changteh & vicinity	" 7,000 "
6th "	K'ou Ying-chieh	Yench'eng	" 18,000 "
7th "	Tien Wei-ch'in	Hsinyang & vicinity	" 20,000 "
8th "	Wei Yi-shan	"	" 16,000 "
Remnants of "Chen Sung Chun"	Liu Chen-hua	Shenchow	" 20,000 " Lately defeated by Kuominchun and retreated from Shensi.

Estimated strength - 115,000

Organisation	Commander	Location	Remarks
Kuominchun forces (under the control of Feng Yu-hsiang)			
1st Kuominchun			
1 Division	Liu Yu-fen	Ningpao	
1(Cavalry) Div.	Sun Liang-ch'en	Shouhsiang & Ningpao	
3 Regiments	-	"	
2nd Kuominchun			
1 Division	Tien Yu-chieh	"	
	Estimated strength - 28,000		
Kuomintang forces			
13th Army	Fan Chung-hsiu	Nanyang & vicinity	
	Estimated strength - 30,000		
Chang Tso-lin's troops			
17th Army	Yung Tsin	Changteh & vicinity	Part in S. Chihli
	Estimated strength - 10,000		
	Estimated total strength - 183,000		
HSINCHIANG			
1st (Hsinchiang) Mix. Bde.	Chiang Sung-lin	Tihua	
1st (Hsinchiang) Mix. Regiment	-	-	
Infantry Regt.	Liu Lien-k'o	Ili	
Cavalry "	Yang Ping-hsun	Ili	
Hsun Fang Tui (Patrolling troops)		-	Comprising 45 battalions.
Hsin Chun (New Army)	-	-	Comprising 22 battalions.
	Estimated strength - 36,000		
HUNAN			
Kuomintang forces			
8th Army	Tang Sheng-chih		
1st Division	Yeh Ch'i	Changsha	2nd, 3rd & 4th Divs. are in Hupeh
5th "	Chou Lan	Yochow	

Organization	Commander	Location	Remarks
9th Army	Peng Han-chang		Kueichow troops
1st Division	Ho Lung	N. Hunan	
2nd "	Yang Ch'i-ch'ang	"	
3rd "	Mao Hung-hsiang	"	
10th Army	Wang Tien-pei		"
1st Division	Wang Tien-hsi	"	
2nd Division	Yang Sheng-chih	N. Hunan	
3rd "	Wang Tien-sheng	"	

Estimated total strength - 50,000

HUPEH

Kuomintang forces

1st(Hupeh) Div.	Hsia Tou-jen	Hankow & Hanyang	
4th Army	Li Ch'i-ch'en		Gen.Li is in Canton
10th Division	Ch'en Ning-shu	Wu-hsueh & S.E. Hupeh	Part in Anhui.
12th "	Chang Fa-kuei	"	
8th Army	Tang Sheng-chih		1st & 5th Div. are in Hunan.
2nd Division	Ho Chien	Wushengkuan	
3rd "	Li P'in-hsien	Wuchang & W. Hupeh	
4th "	Liu Hsing	Wushengkuan & N. Hupeh	
15th Army	Liu Tao-lung	Hankow & Han-yang & W. Hupeh	Formerly pro Wu-Pei-fu.

Estimated strength - 56,000

18th(Nat.) Div.	Lu Chin-shan	In the vicinity of I-chang	Once pro-Wu Pei-fu. Attitude doubtful. Estimated 25,000 men all ranks
7th(Temporary organ.Nat.)Div.	Yu Teh-sheng	Kungan & Shasse	
26th(Nat.) Div.	Yu Hsueh-chung	"	
Szechuan troops	Yang Sen	W. Hupeh	At time of writing Yang is said to side with Kuomintang. Estimated 20,000 men

Estimated total strength - 101,000

ORGANIZATION	Commander	Location	Remarks
JEHOL			
Chang Tso-lin's troops			
5th Army	Tang Yu-lin	Ch'aoyang & Ch'engteh	Gen.Tang is Jehol Military Governor.
	Estimated total strength - 20,000		
KANSU			
Kuominchun forces	Feng Yu-hsiang		
1st Kuominchun			
7th Division	Ma Hung-kuei	Ninghsia & N.E.Kansu	
12th "	Chiang Hung-yu	Pingliang & E. Kansu	
	Estimated strength - 26,000		
Hsun Fang-Tui (Patrolling troops)	Ma Chi	Hsi-ning	
"	Ma Ting-hsiang	Liangchow	
"	Ma Lin	Kanchow	
"	Ma Hungpin	Ninghsia	
Newly Organized Army	Wu T'ung-ju	Suchow	
"	Pei Chien-chun	Hochow	
	Estimated strength - 28,000		
	Estimated total strength - 54,000		
KIRIN			
6th(Manchurian) Army	Chang Tso-hsiang	Kirin	Gen.Chang is Kirin M.G.
	Estimated total strength - 25,000		
KUANGHSI			
Kuomintang forces			
7th Army	Li Tsung-jen		Contains 9 M.B.with Huang Shao-hsiung as Second-in-Command
1st M.B.	Pei Sung-hsi	Wuchow	
3rd "	Liu Ju-fu	Nanning	Gen. Li is on the An-hui front with 2nd 5th, 6th, 7th & 8th M.B.
4th "	Huang Shu-ch'o	Shunchow	
9th "	Lu Huan-yen	Liuchow	
16th Army (Yunnanese)	Fan Shih-sheng	Yunghsun & Peishih	
	Estimated strength - 35,000		

Organization	Commander	Location	Remarks
Remnants of Shen Hung-ying & Han Tsai-feng		Kuangsi-Hunan border	Anti-Kuomintang.

Estimated strength - 8,000

Estimated total strength - 43,000

KWANGTUNG

Kuomintang forces

1st Army	Ho Ying-ch'in		
2nd Division	Feng Yi-pei	Chaochow, Swatow, etc.	
4th Army	Li Ch'i-ch'en		10th Div. in Anhui & Hupeh. 12th Div. in Hupeh.
11th Division	Ch'en Chi-t'ang	Hsinan & Ch'inchow	
5th Army	Li Fu-lin		14th Div. in Chianghsi.
13th Division	Li Ch'un	Canton & vicinity.	
15th "	Ch'en Chun	"	

Estimated total strength - 38,000

KUEICHOW

11th(T.O.Nat.) Division	Chow Hsi-ch'ang	Kueiyang & Chihshui
9th(T.O.Nat.)M.B.	Ho Pi-hui	P'engshui
10th(T.O.Nat.)M.B.	Li Yen	Kueichow-Szechuan border.
11th "	Ma Ming-liang	"

Estimated total strength - 26,000

SHANSI

Yen Hsi-shan's troops

1st Army	Chang Pei-mei	Tatung & N. Shansi
3rd "	Wang Chih-ch'ang	Tatung & Kaoyang
4th "	K'ung Fan-wei	Taiyuanfu & vicinity

Estimated total strength - 60,000

SHENSI

1st(Shensi)Div.	C heng Yueh-hsiu	N. Shensi	Pro-2nd Kuominchun
2nd " "	Yang Hu Ch'en	Sianfu	"

1st Kuominchun

1 (Cavalry) Div.	Sun Lien-chung	Shensi-Honan border
1 Brigade	Chi Hung-ch'ang	"

Organization	Commander	Location	Remarks
Remnants of 2nd Kuominchun	Li Yun-lung, Kung Fu-kuei, Feng Yu-tung & other ldrs	Siamfu and vicinity	
Remnants of 3rd Kuominchun	Hsu Yung-ch'ang	N. Shensi	
5th Kuominchun	Fang Chen-wu	"	

Estimated total strength - 65,000

Shantung

Chihli-Shantung Allied Armies

1st Army	Chang Tsung-ch'ang	Tsinanfu & vicinity	Gen. Chang is the Shantung Military Governor & C-in-C of Chihli-Shantung Allied Armies.
3rd "	Ch'eng Kuo-jui	Tsinang & K'ao-ch'eng	Part in Anhui
7th "	Hsu Kun	S. Shantung	" " "
8th "	Pi Shu-ch'eng	Tsingtao & along Chiaochow-Tsinan railway	

Estimated total strength - 96,000

SZECHUAN

The troops of:	Teng Hsi-hou	Chengtu & vic.	Estimated some 34,000 men.
	Tien Sung-yao	N.W.Szechuan	Estimated some 14,000 men.
	Liu Hsiang	Chunking & Yungchuan	Estimated some 50,000 men
	Liu Wen-hui	Chengtu	Estimated some 31,000 men.
	Liu Ch'eng-hsun	Szechuan Marches	Estimated some 18,000 men.
	Lai Hsin-hui	S.Szechuan	Estimated some 13,000 men.
	Yang Sen	Wanhsien & Szechuan-Hupeh border	Estimated some 45,000 men of whome about 20,000 are in West Hupeh.
	Liu Chuan-hou	Szechuan-Shensi border	Estimated some 6,000 men.

Estimated total strength - 191,000

Remarks: The above-mentioned eight leaders command in all 44 Divisions, 30 Mixed Brigades and 19 Independent Brigades. Often a division has merely a few rifles while some others exist in name only.

Organization	Commander	Location	Remarks
SUIYUAN			
Yen Hsi-shan's troops			
2nd(Shansi)Army	Shang C hen	Kueihua & vicinity.	Gen. Shang is Suiyuan Mil. Governor.
12th(Shansi)Div.	Han Fu-chu	Paotao	)Formerly commanders of some
13th " "	Shih Ching-ting	Kueihua	)of the divisions of 1st
14th " "	Shih Yiu-shan	Paotao	)Kuominchun, but now under Yen Hsi-shan.
	Estimated strength - 37,000		
Feng Yu-hsiang's troops			
1st Kuominchun			
10th Division	Liu Ju-ming	Wuyuan & vicinity	
1(Cavalry)Div.	Wang Chen-huai	Suiyuan-Kansu border	
	Estimated strength - 20,000		
	Estimated total strength - 57,000		
YUNNAN			
Troops of:	T'ang Chi-yao	Yunnanfu	2 regts.& 1 battalion (inf.of personal bodyguards) 1 (artillery) batta. 1 (cavalry) squad. 2 (engineers) comp.
	L ung Yun	Yunnanfu & W.Yunnan	4 regts.(2 of which are at present operating in W.Yunnan against Col.Liu of Tengyueh & other rebels)
	Li Yung-ho	Kaihua	2 regiments
	Hu Yueh-yu	Chiupei, Amichow, Lin-an, & Ko-chiu.	4 regiments H,Q. in Mengtze.
	Li Hsien-t'ing	Kwan-nan	1 regiment.
	Li Ping-yang	Talifu	2 regiments.
	Chang Ju-chi	Chao-tung	2 regiments.
	Wu Hsueh-hsien	Yuan-mou & Wu-ting	1 battalion.
	Estimated total strength - 30,000		

Note 1. Nominal strength of battalion 500 men, with three battalions to a regiment.

Note 2. The two regiments operating in West Yunnan are under the command of Gen. Ch'en Wei-keng.

Y-1 2
2009-177
APR 6
6180 (Distribution of troops). 2
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

C H I N A (Military).

Subject: Situation Report.

1. Composition of Principal Forces.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. APR 5 1927

Note: These figures are based upon an estimate of the combined strengths of such units of the various forces as are definitely on record in this office. Units whose affiliation with any particular faction is doubtful, such as bandit troops and many provincial armies, are not included in this summary:

ANKUOCHUN

Fengtien Forces	Chang Tso-lin	
Peking-Tientsin Area	20,000	
Kalgan Area	10,000	
Peking-Mukden Railway to Shanhaikuan	10,000	
Jehol area	20,000	
Peking-Hankow Railway to North bank of Yellow River	70,000	
Three Eastern Provinces (Manchuria)	40,000	
		170,000
Chihli-Shantung Allied Armies	Chang Tsung-chang.	
Province of Shantung and along Tientsin-Pukow line	40,000	
In Anhui and Honan	40,000	
In Kiangsu	40,000	
		120,000
Kiangsu Forces	Sun Chuan-fang	
Shanghai to Sunkiang	60,000	
Kiangsu forces fled into Anhui	20,000	
Troops of Chou Yin-jen (formerly Fukien)	3,000	
		83,000
Honan Forces		
The only troops which are possibly loyal to the Ankuochun are those of Kuo-Ying-chieh and Mi Chen-piao. The former's troops are at Yencheng, the latter's at Kaifeng	30,000	30,000
Total -		403,000

M/A Peking, China. Report No. 6083. March 4, 1927.

G-2 Report 6180 (Distribution of troops).

C H I N A (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

NATIONAL ARMY (CANTONESE)
and
ALLIED KUOMINCHUN

Cantonese Forces	Chiang Kai-shek
1st Army (Fukien & Chekiang)	15,000
2nd Army (Kiangsi)	12,000
3rd Army (Chu Pei-te)(Kianghsi and Anhui)	12,000
4th Army (Li Chi-shen)(Hupeh and Kiangshi)	12,000
5th Army (Li Fu-lin) Canton	10,000
6th Army (Ch'eng Ch'ien) Kianghsi	10,000
7th Army (Li Chung-jen) Anhui and Kianghsi	10,000
8th Army (Tang Sheng-chih) Hankow and Hupeh	15,000
9th Army (Kueichow troops, Peng Han-chang) Hupeh	12,000
10th Army (Wang Tien-pei) Hupeh	12,000
11th Army (Chen Min-chu) Strength unknown	
12th Army (Kweichow-Hunan border)	8,000
13th Army (Fan Ching-hsiu) Honan	12,000
14th Army (Lai Shih Huang (Kianghsi)	16,000
15th Army (Liu Tao-lung) Hupeh	12,000
16th Army (Fan Shih-sheng) Kwanghsi	10,000
17th Army (Tsao Wan-shun) Fukien and Chekiang	10,000
	182,000

Kuominchun	Feng Yu-hsiang
In Kansu and Shensi	90,000
Shensi troops (allied with Kuominchun)	15,000
	105,000
Total	287,000.

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, G.S.
Military Attache.

M/A Peking, Report No. 6083 March 4, 1927.
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G-2 Report

3 4-1 2009-177 6180

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report. 2009-177 (2)

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JUN 2 1927

Note: In contradistinction to Report No. 6083, which was based on the strengths of units definitely on record in this office, this report takes into consideration unit strengths that are not accurately known. The result is a notable increase in the forces under Kuomintang control. It is believed that this treatment, while resulting in admitted inaccuracies of detail, gives a more correct picture of the composition of the opposing forces.

1. Composition of Principal Forces.

ANKUOC HUN - Chang Tso-lin, Commander-in-Chief.

Fengtien Forces . . . . . Chang Tso-lin

Peking-Tientsin area	20,000	
Peking-Mukden Ry to Shanhaikuan	10,000	
Kalgan area	10,000	
Jehol area	20,000	
Peking-Hankow Ry to Yellow River	15,000	
Central Honan	70,000	
Three Eastern Provinces	60,000	
		205,000

Chihli-Shantung Forces. . . . . Chang Tsung-chang

Province of Shantung	35,000	
Hsüchou area	40,000	
Anhui front	60,000	
		140,000

Kiangsu Forces. . . . . Sun Chuan-fang

Kiangsu	50,000

Honan Allies

Liu Chen-hua & Chang Chih-kung	20,000	
K'ou Ying Chieh	20,000	
		40,000
	TOTAL -	435,000

NATIONAL ARMY (Cantonese) and ALLIED KUOMINCHUN

A. Combat Group

I. 1st Route Army Group (Shanghai-Chinkiang Sector)

1st Army	20,000	
17th "	15,000	
26th "	8,000	
14th "	15,000	
Group total -		58,000

From M/A, China Report No. 7015 April 14, 1927

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

II. 2nd Route Army Group (Nanking concentration)

2nd	Army	15,000	
6th	"	15,000	
27th	"	5,000	
40th	"	10,000	
3rd	"	12,000	
	Group Total -		57,000

III. 3rd Route Army Group (Central Anhui concentration)

7th	Army	20,000	
4th	"	18,000	
37th	"	18,000	
10th	"	15,000	
	Group Total -		71,000

IV. 4th Route Army Group (Northern Hupeh concentration)

8th	Army	25,000	
35th	"	13,000	
36th	"	12,000	
15th	"	12,000	
	Group Total -		62,000
	Grand Total Combat Group -		248,000

B. Garrison and Auxiliary Group

5th	Army	Kuangtung	20,000	
11th	"	Hupeh	10,000	
12th	"	Kweichow-Honan border	8,000	
13th	"	Honan	20,000	
14th	"	Kiangsu	15,000	
16th	"	Kwanghsi	20,000	
18th	"	Kiangsu	8,000	
19th	"	Chekiang	6,000	
31st	"	Shanghai	15,000	
		Total Garrison & Auxiliary Group		122,000
		Grand Total Cantonese Armies -		370,000

Honan Nationalist Allies

Chin Yun-ao	50,000	
Wei Yi-san	20,000	
T'ien Wei-ch'in	20,000	
		90,000

Kuominchun

In Kansu and Shensi	90,000	
Shensi Allies	15,000	
		105,000
Grand Total Anti-Ankuochun Forces		565,000

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Situation Report.

Forces not Partcipating in Present Struggle:

Szechuanese troops	(nominally	Kuomintang)		350,000
Kweichow	"	"	"	30,000
Yunnanese	"	"	"	40,000
Shansi	"			70,000
Honan	"			50,000
				530,000

2. Changes in the front since submission of last situation map (accompanying Report #7002, Comment on Current Events, March 15-31, 1927):

a) Western front: Ordos-Tungkuan - unchanged.

b) Honan front: Generally advanced about 40 miles south, at present Tungkwan-Siping-Chowkiakow.

c) Anhui front (Chihli-Shantung Army): Slightly advanced in west; re-established to Pukow after strong reaction by Northern forces to Nationalist advance against Hwaiyüan-Mingkwang line.

d) Kiangsu front (Sun Chuan-fang): Unchanged. This also represents a Northern reaction to shallow Nationalist penetration north of the Yangtze.

John Magruder
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Military Attache

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WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report 3790

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Chinese Personalities.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 16 1927

Name: Chiang Chiek-shih (Chiang Kai-shek).

Title: General.

Birthplace: Chekiang.

Date of Birth: 1888.

Language: Cantonese and Chekiang dialect.

Political Party: Kuomintang.

Historical Sketch: Was sent to Peiyang Military Academy in 1906 and from there to Japan where he spent four years in military school. After graduation he joined the 17th (Kaotien) Cavalry Corps. Appointed secretary to Sun Yat-sen, and later Chief of Staff, following the defeat of Chien Chiung-ming by Sun. He was appointed Sun's representative to Soviet Russia where he studied military and educational matters. In 1924 he returned to Canton and organized the Whampoa Cadet School, making himself the head. In 1926 was made Commander-in-Chief of Cantonese forces and led them in campaign against the North which culminated in the capture of Hankow, Nanking and Shanghai. He is a member of the Executive Committee of Kuomintang.

Estimate of Character: An intelligent, well educated man. A strong supporter of the Nationalist cause but moderate in comparison with the radical element of the Kuomintang. For this reason he is opposed by them. From the above it should not be assumed that he is conservative and incapable of taking drastic action when necessary. He can use strong arm measures and shows no hesitation in doing so. This was evidenced in Canton when Chiang, by a coup d'etat, assumed control of the government and became a virtual dictator.

At the present time he has lost his power, the radicals using on him much the same methods that he himself used in Canton. He was getting too much influence and it hence became a necessity to enforce party discipline which has shorn him of any individual authority.

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From M/A, China Report No. 7000 March 30, 1927

G-2 Report

4-1

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3790 009-180
WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Chinese Personalities.

Name: Yang Yu-t'ing

Title: General - Chief of Staff to Chang Tso-lin.

Birthplace: Fa K'u, Fengtien Province.

Date of Birth: 1885.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 5 1927

Language and dialect: Mandarin and Japanese.

Political Party: Moukden Party.

Historical Sketch: Graduated from Japanese Military School. Chief of Military Supply Department at Mukden. Chief Counsellor to Commander of Defense Troops of Three Eastern Provinces, in 1922, and concurrently Director-General of Moukden Arsenal. Tupan of Kiangsu in 1925. Chief of Staff for Chang Tso-lin.

Estimate of Character: Very intelligent, hardworking officer. Anti-Japanese. Largely responsible for the successes of the "Young General" Chang Hsueh-liang. Is believed to exercise a restraining influence upon Chang Tso-lin, and to keep him from over-extending himself in a military way. Is generally considered to be the "brains behind the throne" in the Feng-tien Army.

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From M/A, China Report No. 6072 February 25, 1927

4-1

2009-180

3790

G-2 Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Chinese Personalities.

Name: CHANG CHIH-CHIANG

Title: General.

Birthplace: Yen Shan Hsien, Chihli Province.

Date of Birth: About 1875.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. APR 5 1927

Language & Dialect: Mandarin.

Political Party: Kuominchun Party.

Historical Sketch: Received education in the old-styled Chinese school in youth. A loyal subordinate of Feng Yu-hsiang and formerly Tupan of the North-Western Frontier Defence. Commanded 7th M.B. in Chihli-Fengtien War of 1924, and also in charge of Kuominchun attack on Tientsin in December, 1925.

Estimate of Character: Feng Yu-hsiang's right hand man and in actual charge of the Kuominchun (National Army) while Feng was in Russia in 1926. Is opposed to civil war. Is believed to be more capable than Feng himself and can be relied upon much more. As nearly a "Christian" as any Chinese can be. A good leader, loved more than feared by his men and a strict disciplinarian. Capable, hardworking and conscientious. After Feng's return from Moscow, was given an empty title of Inspector General of Kuominchun, probably with a view to his gradual elimination, due to his antagonism to Feng's ambitious schemes.

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G-2 Report

CHINA (Political)

Subject: Chinese Personalities.

Name: FENG YU-HSIANG

Title: Marshal.

Birthplace: Anhwei Province.

Date of Birth: About 1880.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 5 1927

Language & Dialect: Mandarin and Anhwei dialect. A little English.

Political Party: Kuominchun Party.

Historical Sketch: Formerly Tupan of the North-Western Frontier Defence. Known as the Christian General. Imprisoned Tsao Kun, ejected the Manchu Emperor, and formed a Provisional Government. Was forced to evacuate from Peking and into Kansu by failure of ammunition supply from Soviets and pressure of Chang Tso-lin's troops in 1926. Went to Russia as guest of Soviet Government in spring of the same year. Is now working with Cantonese, but as an independent commander.

Estimate of Character: A supreme opportunist. Has used his connection with Christianity for all it is worth and has strong support from majority of foreign missionary element. Is an excellent disciplinarian, and one of the best Chinese leaders of troops. Has some education and is continually studying. Is not particularly bright himself but shows good sense in picking his advisers and listening to them. His use of religion as a morale factor, combined with his ability to enforce iron discipline among his officers and men are responsible for his success as a troop leader. What political success he has had has been due to the crookedness, double dealing and ability to see the opportune moment, all so common to the Chinese character.

On his return from Russia in the fall of 1926 he is reported to have changed his attitude toward Christianity. A foreign missionary states that he has acquired a very haughty mien and was very cool toward foreign mission representatives who were interested in putting the bible in the hands of each of Feng's soldiers.

SVC

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3-1 1927 2009-18

AMERICAN LEGATION
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PEKING, CHINA.

March 30, 1927

#7003

Subject: List of Military Terms.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. MAY 16 1927

1. I am forwarding a list of military terms prepared by Captain S. V. Constant, of this office. His explanation is as follows:

"Herewith a list of some 1200 military terms. This was prepared for my own personal use, and later enlarged in accordance with letter (G-2/242-55, April 15, 1926) from G- 2 reference the China Handbook.

"This list contains only such terms as I have used myself or actually heard used by Chinese military and civil officials during the periods when I have been with the Chinese Army - i.e., during the Chihli-Fengtien War of 1924 when on duty with Feng Yu-hsiang's forces and last year when with the Manchurian troops during the operations against bandits in the Howard case.

"Part I is indexed in English. Part II is indexed according to the Wade system of romanization. The same list of terms appears in each part. The second part will likely be of more use to those who speak Chinese, and the first part to those who do not."

2. This work has been accomplished with considerable effort on Captain Constant's part, and will be valuable for inclusion in the China Handbook. Four copies are available in this office. Arrangements are being made by Captain Constant to have the list published locally and should be available for purchase within about a month.

John Magruder
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Major, General Staff
Military Attache

2 encls. filed in F.E. section
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1-1 Enter
1927 MAY 15 2009-15
WAR DEPARTMENT

Ability, talent	資格	Tzu'ke^{2}
Adjutant; see "Army"		
Admiral,	海軍上將	Hai^{3} chun' shang^{4} chiang^{4}
vice	" " 中 "	" " chung' "
rear	" " 少 "	" " shao^{3} "
Advance;	前進	Ch'ien^{2} chin^{4}
military,	進兵	Chin^{4} ping'
straight to front,	直進	Chih^{2} chin^{4}
gain ground,	進步	Chin^{4} pu^{4}
in echelon.	梯進	T'i' chin^{4}
Advisor, to government -	顧問(官)	Ku^{4} wen^{4} (kuan')
official,	官僚	Kuan' liao^{2}
un "	幕府	Mu^{4} fu^{3}
Agriculture & Commerce - Ministry of.	農商部	Nung^{2} shang' pu^{4}
Aide de camp.	中軍	Chung' chün'
Aim, with gun.	瞄準	Miao^{2} chun^{3}
Airplane,	飛艇	Fei' t'ing^{3}
circles around,	盤旋	P'an^{2} hsüan^{2}
or baloon,	飛行器	Fei' hsing^{2} ch'i^{4}
combat.	空中戰爭	K'ung' chung' chan^{4} cheng'
Air Service - Office,	航空署	Hang^{2} k'ung' shu^{3}
head of,	署長	Shu^{3} chang^{3}
troops.	航空隊	Hang^{2} k'ung' tui^{4}
Alarm, gun.	警砲	Ching^{3} p'ao^{4}

All nations.	萬國；全國	Wan^{4} kuo^{2}; ch'üan^{2} kuo^{2}
Allied troops,	聯軍	Lien^{2} chün^{1}
friendly troops.	客軍	K'e^{4} chün^{1}
Allies, to be	同盟	T'ung^{2} meng^{2}
Ambassador,	大使	Ta^{4} shih^{3}
extraordinary and plenipotentiary.	特命全權大使	T'e^{4} ming^{4} ch'üan^{2} ch'üan^{2} ta^{4} shih^{3}
Ambulance	救傷車	Chiu^{4} shang^{1} ch'e^{4}
America, U. S. A.	美國	Mei^{2} kuo^{2}
citizens of America in foreign country.	美僑	Mei^{2} ch'iao^{2}
Ammunition; see "Military"		
Amputate	切斷	Ch'ieh^{1} tuan^{4}
Angle,	角兒	Chiao^{3} er^{3}
of deflection,	偏倚角	Pien^{1} i^{3} chiao^{3}
of depression,	俯角	Fu^{3} chiao^{3}
of elevation,	仰角	Yang^{3} chiao^{3}
of fire.	射角	She^{4} chiao^{3}
Annihilate	滅亡；覆沒	Mieh^{4} wang^{2}; fu^{4} mo^{4}
Anti-foreign	排外	P'ai^{2} wai^{4}
Armistice	罷戰	Pa^{4} chan^{4}
Army, (regular)	陸軍(常備軍)	Lu^{4} chün^{1} (ch'ang^{2} pei^{4} chun^{1})
troops, soldiers,	軍隊	Chün^{1} tui^{2}
Corps,	軍團	Chün^{1} t'uan^{2}
Division - D. Commander,	師；師長	Shih^{1} - Shih^{1} chang^{3}

Brigade - B. Commander,	旅 - 旅長	Lü³ - Lü³ chang³
Mixed Brigade,	混成旅	Hun⁴ ch'eng² lü³
Regiment - R. Commander,	團 - 團長	T'uan² - Tu'an² chang³
Bn. or Squdm - B.or S. C.o.	營 - 營長	Ying² - Ying² chang³
Co. troop or battery; C.T., B. Commander,	連 - 連長	Lien² - Lien² chang³
Platoon - P. Commander,	排 - 排長	P'ai² - P'ai² chang³
Adjutant ,	副官	Fu⁴ kuan⁴
" general	副都統	Fu⁴ tu' t'ung³
Second in command (regt. for example)	團副	T'uan² fu⁴
Own army,	本軍；主軍	Pen³ chün'；chu³ chün'
Enemy army	敵軍；敵人	Ti² chün'；ti² jen²
Raise an army	起兵	Ch'i³ ping'
unassisted army	孤軍；孤立	Ku' chün'；ku' li⁴
Welled drilled army	節制之師	Chieh² chih⁴ chih' shih'
Arrange,	結束	Chieh² shu⁴
Arsenal,	兵工廠	Ping' kung' ch'ang³
Artillery, troops,	砲隊；砲兵	P'ao⁴ tui⁴；p'ao⁴ ping'
park,	砲廠	P'ao⁴ ch'ang³
Fortress,	要塞砲	Yao⁴ sai⁴ p'ao⁴
(a) Coast,	海岸砲	Hai³ an⁴ p'ao⁴
battery.	海岸砲台	Hai³ an⁴ p'ao⁴ t'ai²

Heavy (mobile)	野戰重砲	Yeh³ chan⁴ chung⁴ p'ao⁴
(a) Howitzer	榴彈砲	Liu² tan⁴ p'ao⁴
山		
Field	野戰砲	Yeh³ chan⁴ p'ao⁴
(a) 75 mm.	野砲	Yeh³ p'ao⁴
(b) Mountain	山砲	Shan¹ p'ao⁴
(c) Automatic rifle.	騎砲	Ch'i² p'ao⁴
Infantry	步兵砲	Pu⁴ ping¹ p'ao⁴
(a) Trench mortar	砲擊砲	P'o¹ chi⁴ p'ao⁴
	曲射步兵砲	Ch'ü³ she⁴ pu⁴ ping¹ p'ao⁴
(b) 37 mm.	狙擊砲	Chü¹ chi⁴ p'ao⁴
	平射步兵砲	P'ing² she⁴ pu⁴ ping¹ p'ao⁴
Anti-aircraft	高射砲	Kao¹ she⁴ p'ao⁴
Assemble.	集合	Chi² he²
Assist, help, aid mutually.	輔助，策應，合作	Fu³ chu⁴, ts'e⁴ ying⁴, he² tso⁴
Attack,	攻擊	Kung¹ chi⁴
follow and attack,	追擊	Chui¹ chi⁴
counter "	反攻	Fan³ kung¹
surprise	襲擊	Hsi² chi¹
after enemy is exhausted,	以逸待勞	I³ i⁴ tai⁴ lao²
making a strategical retreat,	以進為退	I³ chin⁴ wei² t'ui⁴
advance to the,	攻進	Kung¹ chin⁴

to have been attacked and received a satback.	蒙一打擊	Meng² i' ta³ chi'
enemy were attacked, surprised and routed.	敵遂驚潰	Ti² sui² ching' k'uei⁴
Attention, close application,	專意	Chuan' i⁴
stand at (for individual).	立正	Li⁴ cheng⁴
" " " body of troops).	端正姿勢	Tuan' cheng⁴ tzu' shih⁴
Authority, exercise beyond proper sphere.	干涉	Kan' she⁴
Aviator.	飛行家	Fei' hsing² chia'
Avoid, responsibility mutually.	互相推諉	Hu⁴ hsiang' t'ui⁴ wei³
Axle.	車軸	Ch'e' chou²
Azimuth.	方位經儀	Fang' wei⁴ ching' i²
Backward nation.	後進國	Hou⁴ chin⁴ kuo²
Ball cartridge.	實彈	Shih² tan⁴
Baloon.	氣毬	Ch'i⁴ ch'iu²
Band, military.	軍樂	Chün' yüeh⁴
Bandit;	土匪，馬賊	T'u³ fei³; ma³ tsei²
to suppress.	剿匪	Ch'ao' fei³ (chiao³ fei³)
Barometer.	風雨表	Feng' yü³ piao³
Barracks.	營盤；兵營	Ying² p'an²; ping' ying²
Barrel, of gun.	槍筒	Ch'iang' t'ung³
Base, naval.	海軍根據地	Hai³ chün' ken' chu⁴ ti⁴
Battalion, see "Army".		
Battery, artillery, see "Army".		

Battery, electric.	電池	Tien⁴ ch'ih²
Bath house.	沐浴室	Mu⁴ yü⁴ shih⁴
Battle, fight;	打仗	Ta³ chang⁴
fierce,	劇戰	Chü⁴ chan⁴
decisive,	決戰	Chüeh² chan⁴
field of,	戰場；陣地	Chan⁴ ch'ang²; chen⁴ ti⁴
meet in,	接觸	Chieh¹ ch'o⁴
personally direct.	親自督戰	Ch'in¹ tzu⁴ tu¹ chan⁴
Battle ship,	軍艦	Chün¹ chien⁴
commander of.	艦長	Chien⁴ chang³
Bayonet, (fix, unfix).	刺刀(上，下)	T'zu⁴ tao¹ (shang⁴, hsia⁴)
Bearing, magnetic.	磁力方位	T'zu² li⁴ fang¹ wei⁴
Begin, start.	入手	Ju⁴ shou³
Behead.	斬罪	Chan³ tsui⁴
Bicycle troops.	脚踏車隊	Chiao³ t'a⁴ ch'e¹ tui⁴
Bit, of bridle.	嚼子	Chiao² tzu³
Bivouac.	露營	Lou⁴ ying²
Blanket; mattresses, tents, etc.	毯子；被服	Chan⁴ tzu³; pei⁴ fu²
Blister	泡兒	P'ao⁴ er³
Block pulley.	滑子	Hua² tzu³
Blood,(pure bred horse)	純種	Ch'un² chung³
Blood vessels.	血管	Hsüeh³ kuan³
Blow up.	炸毀	Cha⁴ huai³
Bomb.	炸彈	Cha⁴ tan⁴

Bore of gun. (caliber)	口徑	K'ou^{3} ching^{4}
Both (sides, parties).	雙方	Shuang^{1} fang^{1}
Boundary, line.	境界綫	Ching^{4} chieh^{4} hsien^{4}
Boycott.	抵制	Ti^{3} chih^{4}
Brake, air.	氣制動機	Ch'i^{1} chih^{4} tung^{4} chi^{1}
Branch, road.	岔道	Ch'a^{4} tao^{4}
Brave (as "Dare to Die Troops")	奮勇當先	Fen^{4} yung^{3} tang^{1} hsien^{1}
Break, camp.	拔營	Pa^{2} ying^{2}
Break, a horse.	排馬	P'ai^{2} ma^{3}
Breech, of gun.	後膛	Hou^{4} t'ang^{2}
Breed, mixed.	雜種	Tsa^{2} chung^{3}
Bridge, (spase of)	橋(身兒)	Ch'iao^{2} (shen^{1} er^{3})
pontoon,	浮橋	Fu^{2} ch'iao^{2}
used by soldiers for exercise.	天橋	T'ien^{1} ch'iao^{2}
Bridle, head-stall,	籠頭	Lung^{2} t'ou^{2}
reins.	扯手	Ch'e^{2} shou^{3}
Brigade, see "Army"		
Broad gauge.	寬軌	K'uan^{1} kuei^{3}
Bugle, to blow,	吹號	Ch'ui^{1} hao^{4}
bugler.	號兵	Hao^{4} ping^{1}
Build (with brick or stone).	建築	Chien^{4} chu^{2}
Bunker, a coal.	煤艙	Mei^{2} t'sang^{1}

Bull's eye (target)	月子；的	Yüeh⁴ tzu; ti′
Burial corps	掩護隊	Yen³ hu⁴ tui⁴
Burn, long-coal does'nt.	煤不禁燒	Mei² pu⁴ chin⁴ shao′
Butt, see "rifle".		
Calamity; great,	災禍	Tsai′ huo⁴
follows soldiers,	兵連禍結	Ping′ lien² huo⁴ chieh²
prevent by being careful of details.	杜漸防微	Tu⁴ chien⁴ fang²wei′
Caliber, see "bore"		
Camel.	駱駝	Lo⁴ t'ou²
Camera.	照像匣子	Chao⁴ hsiang⁴ hsia² tzu³
Camp (barracks),	兵營；營盤	Ping′ ying²; ying² p'an²
pitch,	扎營	Cha′ ying²
strike,	拔營	Pa²ying²
temporary,	露營	Lu⁴ying²
permanent.	舍營	She⁴ying²
Campaign,	戰役	Chan⁴ i⁴
plan of,	作戰計畫	Tso⁴ chan⁴ chi⁴ hua⁴
on active service.	從軍中	T'sung² chun′ chung′
Canal, the Grand,	運糧河	Yün⁴ liang² he²
a	運河	Yün⁴ he²
Cancel (or return).	撤消	Ch'e⁴ hsiao′
Cannon,	砲 (礮)	P'ao⁴
cannoneers, see "artillery".	砲手	P'ao⁴ shou³
Canteen.	水壺	Shui³ hu³
Canter, to	蹓	Lou′

Captain (army)	上尉	Shang⁴ wei⁴
Capital, city.	中央	Chung¹ yang¹
Capture;	攻奪，攻破	Kung¹ to², kung¹ p'o⁴
re - a position,	奪回	To² hui²
and occupy,	佔領	Chan⁴ ling³
by bandits,	擄票	Pang³ p'iao⁴
and keep - place where bandits hold captives.	秧子房	Yang¹ tzu³ fang²
Carbine	馬槍	Ma³ ch'iang¹
Card, visiting.	名片	Ming² p'ien⁴
Carry (on pack mule)	馳獻子	T'o² to⁴ tzu³
Cavalry	馬隊，騎兵	Ma³ tui⁴; ch'i² ping¹
Censorship (press)	檢察稿件	Chien³ ch'a² kao³ chien⁴
Change, alter	變更	Pien⁴ keng¹
in circumstances.	變化	Pien⁴ hua⁴
Channel.	水道	Shui³ tao⁴
Charge, rush against,	衝突	Ch'ung¹ t'u¹
hold rifle at "charge".	托槍	T'o¹ ch'iang¹
Charge' d' affaires.	署理公使	Shu⁴ li³ kung¹ shih³
Charger (horse)	軍馬	Chün¹ ma³
Chevaux de frise	轄罕木	Hsia² han³ mu⁴
China	中國	Chung¹ kuo²
Chronometer	船表	Ch'uan² piao³
City (walled)	城	Ch'eng²
capital.	京城	Ching¹ ch'eng²

Clearance, port.	紅單	Hung² tan′
Coal, to (a ship),	裝煤	Chuang′ mei²
mine,	煤礦	Mei² K'uang⁴
see "burn".		
Coast, defence.	海防	Hai³ fang′
see "artillery".		
Collar, horse.	馬套子	Ma³ T'ao′ tzu³
Colonel,	上校	Shang⁴ hsiao⁴
Lieut. Col.	中校	Chung′ hsiao⁴
Colors (military flags).	軍旗	Chün′ ch'i²
Colt.	駒子	Chü′ tzu³
Column - left, right "march".	向左(右)轉走	Hsiang⁴ tso³ (yu⁴) chuan⁴ tsou³
formation.	縱隊	Tsung⁴ tui⁴
Command; (verbal),	令(口令)	Ling;⁴ (k'ou³ ling⁴)
proclamation,	命令	ming⁴ ling⁴
word of,	號令	Hao⁴ ling⁴
have charge of,	管轄	Kuan³ hsia⁴
to issue a - inferior for a superior,	頒發命令	Pan′ fa′ ming⁴ ling⁴
take charge of troops,	督師;督戰	Tu′ shih′; tu′ chan⁴
of execution,	動令	Tung⁴ ling⁴
preparatory.	預令	Yü⁴ ling⁴
Commanding, general	總司令	Tsung³ szu′ ling⁴
or in Chief of army and navy,	海陸軍大元帥	Hai³ lu⁴ chün′ ta⁴ yuan² shuai⁴
officer.	司令(官)	Szu′ ling⁴ (kuan′)
Commercial attache'	商務參贊	Shang′ wu⁴ ts'an′ tsan⁴

Commissariat;	糧台	Liang^{2} t'ai^{2}
officer,	軍需官	Chün$'$ hsü$'$ kuan$'$
rank of company or battalion commissary officer.	司務長	Szu$'$ wu^{4} chang^{3}
Commissioned officers, (below general).	將校;將弁	Chiang^{4} hsiao^{4}; Chiang^{4} pien^{4}
of high rank.	將領	Chiang^{4} ling^{3}
Communications, Ministry of.	交通部	Chiao$'$ t'ung$'$ pu^{4}
see "line of"		
Company. see "army"		
Compass.	定南針	Ting^{4} nan^{2} chen$'$
Concentrate, (troops)	徵集;集中	Cheng$'$ chi^{2}; chi^{2} chung$'$
to move for.	徵調	Cheng$'$ tiao^{4}
Concession, foreign.	(外國)租界	(wai^{4} kuo^{2}) tsu^{1} chieh^{4}
Condition, present of affairs.	時局	Shih^{2} chü^{2}
Conference, attend.	列席	Lieh^{4} hsi^{2}
Connecting, (train)	聯絡(火車)	Lien^{2} lo^{4} (huo^{3} ch'e^{1})
Constitutional government.	法統	Fa^{3} t'ung^{3}
Consul.	領事	Ling^{3} shih$'$
Consular body.	領事團	Ling^{3} shih$'$ t'uan^{2}
Consulate.	領事館	Ling^{3} shih$'$ kuan^{3}
Contraband (of war).	(戰時)禁制品	(Chan^{4} shih^{2}) chin^{4} chih^{4} p'in^{3}
Convoy (under guard)	護送	Hu^{4} sung^{4}
Corporal.	副目	Fu^{4} mu^{4}

Corps, army. see "army"		
Council, of war.	軍事會議	Chün′ shih′ hui⁴ i⁴
Count off -	報數	Pao⁴ shu⁴
Country,	國	Kuo²
foreign,	外國	Wai⁴ kuo²
native.	本國	Pen³ kuo²
Court martial.	軍法會議	Chün′ fa⁴ hui⁴ i⁴
Courtesy; great,	優待	Yu′ tai⁴
without.	慢待	Man⁴ tai⁴
Crew, of ship.	水手	Shui³ shou³
Cross fire.	交射	Chiao′ she⁴
Custom, according to present.	正式慣例；條例	Cheng⁴ shih⁴ kuan⁴ li⁴; t'iao² li⁴
Customs, maritime.	海關	Hai³ kuan′
Culvert.	暗溝	An⁴ kou′
Danger,	危險	Wei² hsien³
volunteer for mission of.	告奮勇	Kao⁴ fen⁴ yung³
Day; officer of the,	當日將校；值日官	Tang′ jih′ chiang⁴ hsiao⁴; chih² jih⁴ kuan′
office of.	號房	Hao⁴ fang²
Dead and wounded.	死傷者	Szu³ shang′ che³
Decisive battle.	決戰	Chüeh² chan⁴
Deck, of ship.	船面	Ch'uan² mien⁴
Declaration, of war.	宣戰	Hsüan′ chan⁴

Decoration -	獎章; 勳章	Chiang^{3} chang^{1}; hsün^{1} chang^{1}
"Order of Literary Tiger" given to military.	文虎章	Wen^{2} hu^{3} chang^{1}
Defeated;	打敗仗	Ta^{3} pai^{4} chang^{1}
troops,	潰兵	K'uei^{4} ping^{1}
dispersed,	潰散	K'uei^{4} san^{4}
disorderly.	潰亂	K'uei^{4} luan^{4}
Defence.	守備;防衛	Shou^{3} pei^{4}; fang^{2} wei^{4}
Defend,	守衛;固守	Shou^{3} wei^{4}; ku^{4} shou^{3}
one's self.	自保; 自衛	Tzu^{4} pao^{3}; tzu^{1} wei^{4}
Defile.	要口	Yao^{1} k'ou^{3}
Degree (measurement),	度	Tu^{4}
(latitude),	緯線	Wei^{3} hsien^{4}
(longitude).	經線	Ching^{1} hsien^{4}
Delay; to,	耽悞; 耽擱	Tan^{1} wu^{4}; tan^{1} ke^{2}
long,	延長	Yen^{2} ch'ang^{2}
hinder,	貽誤	I^{2} wu^{4}
a few days for business,	勾留	Kou^{1} liu^{2}
" " " " pleasure.	盤桓	P'an^{2} hsüan^{2}
Demobilize.	遣散; 散兵	Ch'ien^{3} san^{4}; san^{4} ping^{1}
Demonstration, military.	示威 運動	Shih^{4} wei^{1} yun^{4} tung^{4}
Demolish, with gunfire.	轟擊	Hung^{1} chi^{1}
Deploy, open out,	展開	Chan^{3} k'ai^{1}
arrange, make dispositions (of troops),	布置(兵士)	Pu^{4} chih^{2} (ping^{1} shih^{1})
large number of troops deployed in position.	層層密布	T'seng^{2} t'seng^{2} mi^{4} pu^{4}

Desert, to; deserter.	逃軍；逃兵	T'ao^{2} chün^{1}; t'ao^{2} ping^{1}
Destroy, with gunfire. see "demolish".		
Detonator.	雷管	Lei^{2} kuan^{3}
Different, unlike,	懸殊	Hüan^{2} shu^{1}
great difference.	大有出入	Ta^{4} yu^{3} ch'u^{1} ju^{4}
Diplomatic corps.	外交團	Wai^{4} chiao^{1} t'uan^{2}
Direct, (supervise).	指揮(監督)	Chih^{3} hui^{4}, (chien^{1} tu^{1})
Disarm, troops,	解除武裝	Chieh^{3} ch'u^{2} wu^{3} chuang^{1}
disband troops.	解散兵	Chieh^{3} san^{4} ping^{1}
Disease, contagious.	傳染病	Ch'uan^{2} jan^{3} ping^{4}
Discipline, military.	軍紀；軍規	Chün^{1} chi^{3}; chün^{1} kuei^{1}
Discuss, meet and	接洽	Chieh^{1} ch'ia^{4}
ahead.	前提	Ch'ien^{2} t'i^{2}
Disguise,	微服	Wei^{1} fu^{2}
Disinfectant.	消毒藥	Hsiao^{1} tu^{2} yao^{4}
Dismount, (from horse).	下馬	Hsia^{4} ma^{3}
Distance, in column,	距離	Chü^{4} li^{2}
How far is (Peking)?	(北京)多遠	To^{1} yuan^{3}
Disturb, disrupt.	破壞	P'o^{4} huai^{4}
Distrust and dislike mutually.	相疑相忌	Hsiang^{1} i^{2} hsiang^{1} chi^{4}
Division, see "army".		
Dock (for ships).	船塢	Ch'uan^{2} wu^{4}
Double time march.	跑步走	P'ao^{4} pu^{4} tsou^{3}

Dress, get alignment.	看齊	K'an^{4} ch'i^{2}
Drill, to go to -	下操	Hsia^{4} t'sao$'$
methods of,	操法	T'sao$'$ fa^{3}
poorly drilled.	烏合之衆	Wu$'$ he^{2} chih$'$ chung^{4}
Door - "the open".	開放門戶	K'ai^{1} fang^{4} men^{2} hu^{4}
Drive out, expel.	驅	Ch'ü$'$
Duty - please attend to your. (polite form of leave-taking.)	治公	Chih^{4} kung^{1}
Dynamo	磨電機器	Mo^{2} tien^{4} chi^{1} ch'i^{4}
Dyke, bank of.	堤; 堤岸	Ti$'$; ti$'$ an^{4}
Dysentery	痢疾	Li^{4} chi$'$
Echelon, advance in.	梯進	T'i$'$ chin^{4}
Education, Ministry of.	教育部	Chiao^{4} yü^{4} pu^{4}
Elevation (gunnery)	仰角	Yang^{3} chüeh^{2} (chiao^{3})
Embassy	使館	Shih^{3} kuan^{3}
Emplacement, gun (permanent)	砲台	P'ao^{4} t'ai^{2}
(temporary)	砲壘	P'ao^{4} lei^{3}
stand for gun.	砲架	P'ao^{4} chia$'$
Encamp - see "camp".		
Enemy, enemy army,	敵人; 敵軍	Ti^{2} jen^{2}; ti^{2} chün$'$
enemy's position.	敵陣	Ti^{2} chen^{4}
Engineer, troops.	工兵; 工程隊	Kung$'$ ping; kung$'$ ch'eng^{2} tui^{4}
Engine, railway.	火車頭	Huo^{3} ch'e^{1} t'ou^{2}

England.	英國	Ying′ kuo²
Enlist, troops.	招兵	Chao′ ping′
Entertain, guests,	應酬; 周旋	Ying⁴ ch'ou²; chou′ hsüan²
new arrival,	接風; 洗塵	Chieh′ feng; hsi³ ch'en²
prepare a feast,	設筵; 設席	She⁴ yen²; she⁴ hsi²
lavishly.	筵宴	Yen² yen⁴
Entire, horse.	兒馬	Er² ma³
Equipment.	軍裝	Chün′ chuang¹
Escape.	逃跑	T'ao² p'ao³
Espionage,	偵探	Chen′ t'an⁴
Intelligence police,	偵探隊	Chen′ t'an⁴ tui⁴
Escort, see "convoy".		
Evacuate.	撤退	Ch'e⁴ t'ui⁴
Evening.	晚晌	Wan³ shang′
Examination, medical.	檢驗身體	Chien³ yen⁴ shen′ t'i³
Examine, goods.	驗貨	Yen⁴ huo⁴
Excited, very.	手足無措	Shou³ tsu² wu² t'so⁴
Execute (put to death).	執行死刑	Chih² hsing² szu³ hsing²
Exempt (from military service).	免役	Mien³ i⁴
Exercise, (move about),	運動	Yun⁴ tung⁴
a horse.	遛馬	Liu² ma³
Expedition, military,	遠征	Yüan³ cheng′
Expeditionary force.	遠征軍	Yüan³ cheng′ chün′

Explain (a misunderstanding),	解釋	Chieh^{3} shih^{4}
discourse.	講	Chiang^{3}
Extraterritoriality.	治外法權	Chih^{4} wai^{4} fa^{4} ch'uan^{2}
Field glass	千里眼 望遠鏡	Ch'ien^{1} li^{3} yen^{3}, wang^{4} yuan^{3} ching^{4}
Fierce (terrible, savage) of fires or war.	猛烈	Meng^{3} lieh^{4}
Fight, again.	再戰	Tsai^{4} chan^{4}
hand to hand. see "War".	衝鋒; 肉迫	Ch'ung^{1} feng^{1}; jou^{4} po^{2}
Finance, Ministry of.	財政部	T'sai^{2} cheng^{4} pu^{4}
Finished, just,	甫畢	Fu^{3} pi^{4}
affair completely.	告一段落, 完竣	Kao^{4} i^{1} tuan^{4} lo^{4}; wan^{2} chün^{4}
Fire, cross.	交射	Chiao^{1} she^{4}
Flank - (left, right),	翼, 側, (左右)	I^{4}, t'se^{4} (tso^{3}, yu^{4})
right, left, flank guard,	右, 左, 翼 衛隊	Yu^{4}, tso^{3}, i^{4} wei^{4} tui^{4}
attack on both flanks.	夾攻	Chia^{1} kung^{1}
Flag, see "colors",		
signalling.	信號旗	Hsin^{4} hao^{4} ch'i^{2}
Flee, secretly,	潛逃	Ch'ien^{2} t'ao^{2}
in awful condition.	狼狽而逃	Lang^{2} pei^{4} er^{2} t'ao^{2}
Forage.	草料	T'sao^{3} liao^{4}
Force, to use.	勒令; 威迫	Le^{1} ling^{4}; wei^{1} p'o^{4}
Forced march.	急行軍	Chi^{2} hsing^{2} chün^{1}
Foreign - see "country",		
office, see "minister", see "concession".	外交部	Wai^{4} chiao^{1} pu^{4}

Fortifications (permanent)	要塞	Yao' sai'
Forward, march.	開正步走	K'ai' cheng^{4} pu^{4} tsou^{3}
Fracture (bone).	斷骨	Tuan^{4} ku^{3}
France	法國	Fa^{4} kuo^{2}
Friendly terms with.	接近	Chieh' chin^{4}
Fuse.	引火線	Yin^{3} huo^{3} hsien^{4}
Future.	前途	Ch'ien^{2} t'u^{2}
Gain, ground.	進步	Chin^{4} pu^{4}
Gallop.	跑馬	P'ao^{3} ma^{3}
Garrison, a, to,	守衛兵;守備	Shou^{3} pei^{4} ping'; shou^{3} pei^{4}
to change.	接防;換防	Chieh' fang^{2}; huan^{4} fang^{2}
Gas - gun shooting, shell.	煙砲	Hsün^{4} p'ao^{4}
Gelding, (to geld).	騸馬	Shan^{4} ma^{3}
Gendarme.	憲兵	Hsien^{4} ping'
General -	上將	Shang^{4} chiang^{4}
Major,	中將	Chung' chiang^{4}
Brigadier.	少將	Shao^{4} chiang^{4}
address him as "司令"		"Szu' ling"^{4}
Germany	德國	Te^{2} kuo^{4}
Girth, saddle.	周圍	Chou' wei^{2}
Glanders.	馬癟	Ma^{3} sang^{3}
Gonorrhoea.	淋症	Lin^{2} cheng^{4}
Government (used for provincial as well as national),	政府	Cheng^{4} fu^{3}
art of.	政治	Cheng^{4} chih^{4}

Governor, of province.	省長	Sheng³ chang³
Great Wall.	萬里長城	Wan⁴ li³ ch'ang² ch'eng²
Grenade, hand.	手溜彈	Shou³ liu² tan⁴
Groom, a,	馬夫	Ma³ fu¹
to groom horse.	刷馬	Shua¹ ma³
Guard, a place, locality,	看守	K'an⁴ shou³
bodyguard- (pistol troops)	衛隊 (手鎗隊	Wei⁴ tui⁴ (shou³ ch'iang¹ tui⁴
bodyguard- ("Big-knife" troops)	衛隊 (大刀隊	Wei⁴ tui⁴ (ta⁴ tao¹ tui⁴
against,	防備	Fang² pei⁴
advance,	前鋒;前衛隊	Ch'ien² feng; Ch'ien² wei⁴ tui⁴
ones' own territory,	恪守疆界	Ch'ueh⁴ shou³ chiang¹ chieh⁴
rear -	後衛隊	Hou⁴ wei⁴ tui⁴
see "flank",		
leave troops to,	留守	Liu² shou³
"guard house", where guard lives,	衛兵室	Wei⁴ ping¹ shih⁴
"guard house".	營務處	Ying² wu⁴ ch'u⁴
Hand grenade - see "grenade".		
Harness, a horse.	套車	T'ao⁴ ch'e⁴
Hatchway (on ship).	艙口	T'sang¹ k'ou³
Haul, pull.	拉	La¹
Heavy, artillery.	重砲	Chung⁴ p'ao⁴
Height.	高矮	Kao¹ ai³
Heliograph.	回光通信機	Hui² kuang¹ t'ung¹ hsin¹ chi¹
Herd, of horses.	一羣馬	I⁴ ch'ün² ma³

Hide in.	隱屁	Yin³ pi⁴
Hillock.	土坡兒	T'u³ p'o' er
Hobble, an animal.	絆上	Pan⁴ shang⁴
Hold, of ship,	艙	T'sang'
in a horse.	勒住	Lei' chu⁴
Hold troops and not move them.	按兵不動	An⁴ ping' pu²⁺⁴ tung⁴
Horizontal bar, used by soldiers to exercise.	槓子	Kang⁴ tzu³
Horse, shoe,	馬掌	Ma³ chang³
manship,	馬術	Ma³ shu⁴
to saddle,	備馬	Pei⁴ ma³
mane,	馬鬃	Ma³ tsung'
back,	馬上	Ma³ shang⁴
How old is this,	幾歲口	Chi³ sui⁴ k'ou³
place to exercise,	馬廠	Ma³ ch'ang³
" " water	飲馬廠	Yin⁴ ma³ ch'ang³
wooden, for exercise.	木馬	Mu⁴ ma³
Hospital.	醫院	I' yuan⁴
Hostilities,		
commencement of,	戰鬬開始	Chan⁴ tou⁴ k'ai' shih³
during,	交戰中	Chiao' chan⁴ chung'
suspension of.	休戰	Hsiu' chan⁴
Howitzer.	(野戰)榴彈砲	(yeh³ chan⁴) liu² tan⁴ p'ao⁴
Ichun troops (originally from Anhui under Tseng Kuo-fan.	毅軍	I⁴ chün'
Impassable.	過不去的	Kuo⁴ pu⁴ ch'ü⁴ ti⁴

Imperialism.	帝國主義	Ti^{2} kuo^{2} chu^{3} i^{4}
Important, office -	(緊要)機關	(Chin^{3} yao^{4}) chi' kuan'
piece of machinery,	機關	Chi' kuan'
as to time,	吃緊	Ch'ih' chin^{3}
personage.	幹部; 當局	Kan^{4} pu^{4}; tang' chü^{2}
Impregnable (defence, position).	攻打不開	Kung' ta^{3} pu^{4} k'ai'
Increase,	積極	Chi' chi^{2}
(one's efforts grow large)	發展	Fa' chan^{3}
Independent,	獨立	Tu^{2} li^{4}
(of central government).		
Indoor instruction.	內堂	Nei^{4} t'ang^{2}
Infantry.	步兵; 步隊	Pu^{4} ping; pu^{4} tui^{4}
Influence - use someone's.	藉圖 困位	Chieh^{4} tu^{2} ku^{4} wei^{4}
India	印度國	Yin^{4} tu^{4} kuo^{2}
Inexperienced.	生手	Sheng' shou^{3}
Influence, (for bad).	影響	Ying^{3} hsiang^{3}
Insignia, collar,	領章	Ling^{3} chang'
shoulder,	肩章	Chien' chang'
hat etc.,	帽章	Mao^{4} chang'
sash worn to designate O.D. etc.	值班帶	Chih^{2} pan' tai^{4}
Inspect - see "examined",	搜索	So' so^{3}
preparations for defence.	視察防務	Shih^{4} ch'a^{2} fang^{2} wu^{4}
Insulation, (electric).	絕緣	Chüeh^{2} szu.'
Interior, Ministry of the.	內務部	Nei^{4} wu^{4} pu^{4}

International, affairs, relations.	(各國)交涉事件 國際	(Ke^{4} kuo^{2}) chiao^{1} she^{4} shih^{4} chien^{4} Kuo^{2} chi^{4}
Interpreter, official.	繙譯官	Fan^{1} i^{1} kuan^{1}
Interval, in line.	間隔	Chien^{1} ke^{2}
Interview.	面見;會見	Mien^{4} chien^{4}; hui^{4} chien^{4}
Intrench.	挖戰壕	Wa^{1} chan^{4} hao^{2}
Invade (attack).	攻(擊)	Kung^{1} (chi^{4})
Iron foundry.	製鐵所 鐵工廠	Chih^{4} t'ieh^{3} so^{3} T'ieh^{3} kung^{1} ch'ang^{3}
Italy.	義國	I^{4} kuo^{2}
Japan.	日本	Jih^{4} pen^{3}
Join, the fighting, take part in.	入戰 參加	Ju^{4} chan^{4} T'san^{1} chia^{1}
Journey, start on, preparations for arrival, baggage ready for - and waiting to leave.	起身 前站 束裝待發	Ch'i^{3} shen^{1} Ch'ien^{2} chan^{4} Shu^{1} chuang^{1} tai^{4} fa^{1}
Jump, over.	跳過去	T'iao^{4} kuo^{4} ch'ü^{4}
Kerosene.	煤油	Mei^{2} yu^{2}
Kick.	踢	T'i^{1}
Killed, in battle.	陣亡	Chen^{4} wang^{2}
Knoll - see "hillock".		
Korea.	朝鮮	Ch'ao^{2} hsien^{4}

Landmark	境界標	Ching⁴ chieh⁴ piao¹
Lantern	燈籠	Teng¹ lung²
Lasso (lariat)	套馬杆子	T'ao⁴ ma³ kan¹ tzu³
Latitude - see "degree".		
Launch (small boat)	小輪船	Hsiao³ lun² ch'uan²
Laundry, post or camp.	洗晒場	Hsi³ shai⁴ ch'ang³
Law, military,	軍法	Chün¹ fa³
civil,	國法	Kuo² fa³
international,	萬國公法	Wan⁴ kuo² kung¹ fa³
break the,	犯法	Fan⁴ fa³
thing to break the,	謀為不軌	Mou² wei² pu⁴ kuei³
Leather.	皮子	P'i² tzu³
Leave, (to take - (of absence	告假	Kao⁴ chia⁴
Legation - see "embassy".	使館	Shih³ kuan³
Liaison, officer.	聯絡員	Lien² lo⁴ yuan²
Lieutenant,	中尉	Chung¹ wei⁴
second.	少尉	Shao⁴ wei⁴
Lights out - bugle call.	息燈號	Hsi² teng¹ hao⁴
Line of communications,	兵站線	Ping¹ chan⁴ hsien⁴
to break.	拆斷(割斷)後路	Ch'ai¹ tuan⁴ (ke¹ tuan⁴) hou⁴ lu⁴
Line - "front line"	前綫	Ch'ien² hsien⁴
formation,	橫隊	Heng⁴ tui⁴
see "Distance".		

Little

Little, a very.	絲毫	Szu′ hao²
Load, see "pack".		
Loan, war,	戰事公債	Chan⁴ shih′ kung′ chai′
government.	借款	Chieh⁴ k'uan³
Locomotive, see "engine".		
Loins.	腰	Yao′
Longitude, see "degree".		
Look at - "eyes right" or "left"	注目	Chu⁴ mu⁴
Loot.	戰利品	Chan⁴ li⁴ p'in³
Lose, face,	丟臉	Tiu′ lien³
battle.	敗戰	Pai⁴ chan.⁴
Low, ground.	窪地	Wa′ ti⁴
Machine, gun,	機關槍	Chi′ kuan′ ch'iang′
troops.	機關槍隊	Chi′ kuan′ ch'iang′ tui⁴
Magazine, military,	武庫	Wu³ k'u⁴
powder,	火藥庫	Huo³ yao⁴ k'u⁴
rifle.	彈腔	Tan⁴ ch'iang′
Magistrate, district.	縣知事	Hsien⁴ chih′ shih′
Magnetic, pole,	磁極	T'zu² chi²
compass, see "compass"		
Major (military rank).	少校	Shao⁴ hsiao⁴
Malaria	瘴氣	Chang⁴ ch'i′
Mandate	命令	Ming⁴ ling⁴

Manila, P. I.	呂宋	Lü³ sung⁴
Manner	形勢	Hsing² shih⁴
Manoeuvre	野外勤務	Yeh³ wai⁴ ch'in² wu⁴
	運動	Yun⁴ tung⁴
	善謀	Shan⁴ mou²
	演習行軍	Yen³ hsi² hsing² chün′
Manure	糞	Fen⁴
Map, military,	軍行地圖	Chün′ hsing² ti⁴ t'u²
to draw.	繪圖	Hui⁴ t'u²
see "topography"		
March, of troops,	行軍	Hsing² chün′
start on,	拔隊;開拔	Pa² tui⁴; k'ai′ pa²
forced.	兼程	Chien′ ch'eng²
Marching orders.	發營令	Fa′ ying² ling⁴
Marksman	射手	She⁴ shou³
Marshal (military rank).	大元帥	Ta⁴ yüan² shuai⁴
Martial law, proclaim,	戒嚴	Chieh⁴ yen²
take off (end).	解嚴	Chieh³ yen²
Marine corps.	海軍陸戰隊	Hai³ chün′ lu⁴ chan⁴ tui⁴
Masked battery	隱蔽砲台	Yin³ pi′ p'ao⁴ t'ai²
Mechanic, engineer.	技師	Chi⁴ shih′
Medical corps,	軍醫	Chün′ i′
office.	診斷室	Chen³ tuan⁴ shih⁴
Medicine, to take.	吃藥	Ch'ih′ yao⁴

Mercenary (soldier).	傭兵	Yung′ ping′
Messenger, orderly.	馬弁	Ma³ pien⁴
Metropolitan District, (20 hsien around Peking)	京兆, 京師	Ching′ chao⁴, ching′ shih′
Governor of.	京兆尹	Ching′ chao⁴ yin³
Military, power,	武力	Wu³ li⁴
attache',	陸軍參贊	Lu⁴ chün′ t'san⁴ tsan⁴
notes,(money)	軍用票	Chün′ yung⁴ p'iao⁴
expenses,	軍費, 兵費	Chün′ fei⁴, ping′ fei⁴
officers,	武官	Wu³ kuan′
police,	憲兵	Hsien⁴ ping′
uniform,	軍服	Chün′ fu²
dress uniform,	軍禮服	Chün′ li³ fu²
supplies, (ordnance)	軍械	Chün′ hsieh⁴
storehouse	軍械庫	Chün′ hsieh⁴ k'u⁴
supplies (food, arms etc.)	軍需, 武器	Chün′ hsu¹, wu³ ch'i⁴
No weapons to fight with,	手無寸鐵	Shou³ wu² t'sun⁴ t'ieh³
weapons (to throw down and secretly run away)	棄械潛逃	Ch'i⁴ hsieh⁴ ch'ien² t'ao²
weapons (lay down and take off insignia)	解除武裝	Chieh³ ch'u² wu³ chuang′
ammunition (small arms)	子彈	Tzu³ tan⁴
" (artillery)	砲彈	P'ao⁴ tan⁴
" box.	子彈盒	Tzu³ tan⁴ he²
Militia	民團, 商團	Min² t'uan², shang′ t'uan²
Mine - see "coal"		
land (military)	地雷	Ti⁴ lei²
lay mine	安設地雷(敷設)	An′ she⁴ ti⁴ lei′ (fu² she⁴)
Minister - see "ambassador"		
foreign affairs,	外交總長	Wai⁴ chiao′ tsung³ chang³
prime.	國務總理	Kuo² wu⁴ tsung³ li³

Mobilization	出師準備	Ch'u' shih' chun^{3} pei^{4}
Money (funds) all expended.	支絀	Chih' ch'o^{4}
Mongolia	蒙古	Meng^{3} ku^{3}
Morale,	士氣	Shih' ch'i'
bad, troops disturbed.	(軍心) 搖動	(Chün' hsin') yao^{2} tung'
Morning.	早晨	Tsao^{3} ch'en^{2}
Mount, a horse.	上馬	Shang^{4} ma^{3}
Mountain, top,	山頂	Shan' ting^{3}
pass,	山口子	Shan' k'ou^{3} tzu^{3}
gun.	山砲	Shan' p'ao^{4}
Mutiny;	兵變	Ping' pien^{4}
troops that,	叛兵	P'an^{4} ping'
sudden and unexpected.	倉猝過變	T'sang' t'su^{4} yü^{4} pien^{4}
Muzzle, of rifle,	槍口	Ch'iang' k'ou^{3}
of cannon.	砲口	P'ao^{4} k'ou^{3}
Name, (surname)	姓	Hsing^{4}
what is your ?(polite)	貴姓	Kuei^{4} hsing^{4}
my name is	敝姓	Pi^{4} hsing^{4}
(personal)	名字	Ming^{2} tzu^{3}
what is your ?	台甫	T'ai^{2} fu^{3}
my name is	草字	Tsao^{3} tzu^{3}
Nation - see "country".		
Navy -	海軍	Hai^{3} chün'
Department,	海軍部	Hai^{3} chün' pu^{4}
blocade,	封鎖	Feng' so^{3}
naval attache'	海軍參贊	Hai^{3} chün' t'san^{4} tsan^{4}

Neck, of horse.	(馬)脖子	(ma^{3}) po^{2} tzu^{3}
neglect, of duty.	不盡其職	Pu^{4} chin^{4} ch'i^{2} chih^{2}
Negotiations,	交涉	Chiao^{1} she^{4}
break off.	斷絕	Tuan^{4} chüeh^{2}
Neutral.	中立	Chung^{1} li^{4}
Newspaper.	新聞紙	Hsin^{1} wen^{2} chih^{3}
Night, in the.	夜裏	Yeh^{4} li^{3}
Non combatant	非戰鬪員	Fei^{1} chan^{4} tou^{4} yuan^{2}
commissinoed officers.	下士官	Hsia^{4} shih^{1} kuan^{1}
North, south, east, west.	北,南,東,西(東南西北)	Pei^{3}, nan^{2}, tung^{1}, hsi^{4}
Notify to, officially,	告示	Kao^{4} shih^{4}
clearly state,	表示	Piao^{3} shih^{4}
everyone.	通知	T'ung^{1} chih^{1}
Numerous.	紛紛	Fen^{1} fen^{1}
Obey, commands,	遵命	Tsun^{1} ming^{4}
regulations,	遵章程	Tsun^{1} chang^{1} ch'eng^{2}
refuse to obey superior.	違抗	Wei^{2} k'ang^{4}
Obstacles, brush,	鹿柴	Lu^{4} ch'ai^{2}
hidden to surprise enemy (as pits, ambush, etc.)	埋伏	Mai^{2} fu^{2}
Offensive (attack),	攻擊	Kung^{1} chi^{1}
and defensive alliance.	攻守同盟	Kung^{1} shou^{3} t'ung^{2} meng^{2}
Office, take,	就職	Chiu^{4} chih^{2}
temporary (while travelling) see "resign"	行轅	Hsing^{2} yuan^{2}
gate,	傳達處	Ch'uan^{2} ta^{2} ch'u^{4}
relinquish,	卸職,卸責	Hsieh^{4} chih^{2}, hsieh^{4} tse^{2}

Officer -		
civil,	文官	Wen^{2} kuan^{1}
military,	武官	Wu^{3} kuan^{1}
N. C. O.	下士官	Hsia^{4} shih^{2} kuan^{1}
Commanding,	總司令	Tsung^{3} szu^{1} ling^{4}
of the day,	當日將校	Tang^{1} jih^{4} chiang^{1} hsiao^{4}
consular,	領事官	Ling^{3} shih^{4} kuan^{1}
see "commissioned" and "non " "		
high ranking,	將領	Chiang^{1} ling^{3}
dependable.	心腹	Hsin^{1} fu^{4}
Oil, see "kerosene".		
Operation, military,	軍事, 戰事	Chün^{1} shih^{4}, chan^{4} shih^{4}
area of.	戰綫	Chan^{4} hsien^{4}
Opium.	大煙	Ta^{4} yen^{1}
Opportunity - take advantage of this - to enter.	乘虛而入	Ch'en^{4} hsü^{1} er^{2} ju^{4}
Oppose, see "resist",	抵抗	Ti^{2} k'ang^{4}
hinder, obstruct,	阻碍	Tsu^{3} ai^{4}
" and stop.	阻止	Tsu^{3} chih^{3}
Opposite each other and ready to fight.	對峙, 相持	Tui^{4} ch'ih^{4}, hsiang^{1} ch'ih^{2}
Order, (by telegraph),	令(電令)	Ling^{4} (tien^{4} ling^{4})
attack in open,	散兵攻擊	San^{4} ping^{1} kung^{4} chi^{4}
"order arms"	搶放下	Ch'iang^{1} fang^{4} hsia^{4}
see "command"		
or send out troops.	伐兵	Fa^{2} ping^{1}
Orderly, messenger.	馬弁, 護兵	Ma^{3} pien^{4}, hu^{4} ping^{1}
Ordnance.	軍械	Chün^{1} hsieh^{4}

Pacing horse	走馬	Tsou^{3} ma^{3}
Pack, soldiers,	背包	Pei^{1} pao^{1}
on cart,	裝車上	Chuang^{1} ch'e^{1} shang^{4}
on animal,	(駝)獸子	(t'o^{2}) to^{4} tzu^{3}
saddle.	攏頭	Lung^{3} t'ou^{2}
Pass, to go on.	掛號	Kua^{4} hao^{4}
Passport.	護照	Hu^{4} chao^{4}
Password	口號	K'ou^{3} hao^{4}
Patrol - to,	巡查	Hsün^{2} ch'a^{2}
to inspect,	放哨	Fang^{4} shao^{4}
infantry,	步哨	Pu^{4} shao^{4}
cavalry,	騎兵哨	Ch'i^{2} ping^{1} shao^{4}
of 8 men,	大排哨	Ta^{4} p'ai^{2} shao^{4}
of 4 men,	小排哨	Hsiao^{3} p'ai^{2} shao^{4}
Rendevaus of.	會哨	Hui^{4} shao^{4}
Pay & rations of troops.	兵餉	Ping^{1} hsiang^{3}
Peace, peaceful,	太平, 平安, 肅清	T'ai^{4} p'ing^{2}, p'ing^{2} an^{1}, su^{4} ch'ing^{1}.
treaty of,	講和條約	Chiang^{3} he^{2} t'iao^{2} yüeh^{4}
no peace for years,	迄無寧歲	Ch'i^{4} wu^{2} ning^{2} sui^{4}
cause,	治安	Chih^{4} an^{4}
advocate for.	排解	P'ai^{2} chieh^{3}
Peking - see "Metropolitan District"	北京, 都城	Pei^{3} ching^{1}, tu^{1} ch'eng^{2}
Photograph - see "camera".		
Pigeon	鴿子	Ke^{1} tzu^{3}
Pioneer, troops - see "engineers"		

Pistol, (troops)	手槍 (隊)	Shou^{3} ch'iang^{1} (tui^{4})
Plan:-	計畫	Chi^{4} hua^{4}
think of,	籌備, 取締	Ch'ou^{2} pei^{4}, ch'ü^{3} t'i^{4}
according to my,	揣測	Ch'uai^{3} t'zu^{4}
talk over plan before doing,	醞釀	Yun^{4} niang^{4}
misunderstood plan,	誤會	Wu^{4} hui^{4}
secret,	隱情	Yin^{3} ch'ing^{2}
for opponents to join together,	媾和	Kou^{4} he^{2}
means, ability, skill,	手段	Shou^{3} tuan^{4}
advocate, originate a,	主張, 提倡	Chu^{3} chang^{1}, t'i^{2} ch'ang^{4}
complete, perfect,	具體, 圓滿	Chü^{4} t'i^{3}; yuan^{2} man^{3}
keep in mind.	不死心	Pu^{4} szu^{3} hsin.^{1}
Platform, railway.	站台	Chan^{4} t'ai^{2}
Pleasure, look with,	樂觀	Le^{4} kuan^{1}
" " dis.	悲觀	Pei^{4} kuan^{1}
Plenipotentiary - see "ambassador"		
Police - see "military"	巡警	Hsün^{2} ching^{3}
Policy, appearance.	態度	T'ai^{4} tu^{4}
Politician.	政客	Cheng^{4} k'e^{4}
Pontoon - see "bridge"		
Powerful, become very. (historical phrase)	執牛耳	Chih^{2} niu^{2} er^{3}
Praise or compliment troops	勉勵, 慰勞	Mien^{3} li^{4}, wei^{2} lao^{2}
President	大總統	Ta^{4} tsung^{3} t'ung^{3}
Prison: guards.	收容隊	Shou^{3} jung^{2} tui^{4}

Prisoners, of war,	俘虜兵	Fu² lu³ (lo³) ping′
to guard.	監視	Chien′ shih⁴
Private, 1st class,	正兵，一等兵	Cheng⁴ ping′, i⁴ teng³ ping′
2nd "	副兵，二等兵	Fu⁴ ping′, er⁴ teng³ ping′
3rd "	三等兵	san′ teng³ ping′
Proclaim, publish.	宣告，公布	Hsüan′ kao⁴, kung′ pu⁴
Proclamation - see "notification".	佈告	Pu⁴ kao⁴
Promote, by seniority,	按着資格升	An⁴ cho⁴ tzu′ ke² sheng′
to be promoted.	升任	Sheng′ jen⁴
Protect.	保護	Pao³ hu⁴
Protocol, Powers, the.	列强	Lieh⁴ ch'iang²
Province,	省	Sheng³
capital of,	省城	Sheng³ ch'eng²
governor of,	省長	Sheng³ chang³
provinces of China:-		
Anhwei	皖（安徽）	Wan⁴ (An′ hui′)
Chekiang	越（浙江）	Yüeh⁴ (Che⁴ chiang′)
Chihli	燕（直隸）	Yen′ (Chih² li⁴)
Fukien	閩（福建）	Min³ (Fu² chien⁴)
Honan	豫（河南）	Yü⁴ (He² nan²)
Hunan	湘（湖南）	Hsiang⁴ (Hu² nan²)
Hupeh	鄂（湖北）	Ao⁴ (Hu² pei³)
Kansu	隴（甘肅）	Lung³ (Kan′ su⁴)
Kiangsi	贛（江西）	Kan⁴ (Chiang′ hsi′)
Kiangsu	吳（江蘇）	Wu² (Chiang′ su′)
Kuangsi	桂（廣西）	Kuei⁴ (Kuang³ hsi′)
Kuangtung	粵（廣東）	Yüeh⁴ (Kuang³ tung′)
Kweichow	黔（貴州）	Ch'ien′ (Kuei⁴ chou′)
Shansi	晉（山西）	Chin⁴ (Shan′ hsi′)

Shantung	魯（山東）	Lu³ (Shan′ tung′)
Shensi	秦（陝西）	Ch'in² (Shan³ hsi′)
Szechuan	蜀（四川）	Shu² (Szu⁴ ch'uan¹)
Yunnan	滇（雲南）	Tien′ (Yün² nan²)
Provost Marshal's Dept.	(軍法)執法處	Chün′ fa³ chih² fa³ ch'u⁴
Public opinion.	輿論	Yü⁴ lun⁴
Pulley, see "block"		
Punitive expedition	征伐	Cheng′ fa²
Quartermaster, see "commissariat"		
Questionable	曖昧	Ai⁴ mei⁴
Radio, see "telegraph"		
Railway:-	火車，鐵道，鐵路	Huo³ ch'e⁴, t'ieh³ tao⁴, t'ieh³ lu⁴
repair troops,	輕便鐵路隊	Ch'ing′ pien⁴ t'ieh³ lu⁴ tui⁴
station,	火車站	Huo³ ch'e⁴ chan⁴
train sent ahead of official to test tracks.	押車	Ya⁴ ch'e⁴
rail,	鐵軌	T'ieh³ kuei³
Peking-Mukden,	京奉	Ching′ feng⁴
" Hankow,	京漢	Ching′ han⁴
" Suiyuan,	京綏	Ching′ sui′
Tientsin-Pukow	津浦	Ching′ pu²
Chinese Eastern	中東	Chung′ tung′
Trans Siberian	西比利亞	Hsi′ pi⁴ li⁴ ya³
South Manchurian	南滿	Nan² man³
Range,	射程	She⁴ ch'eng²
finder.	射遠器	She⁴ yüan³ ch'i⁴

Ration, emergency.	乾粮	Kan¹ liang²
Reason, cause.	原因	Yüan² yin¹
Rear, (attack).	背面(攻擊)	Pei⁴ mien⁴ (kung¹ chi⁴)
see "guard"		
Rebel.	反叛	Fan³ p'an⁴
Received (and follow orders of superior).	承奉	Ch'eng² feng⁴
Recoil, of gun.	反撞	Fan³ chuang⁴
Regiment, see "Army"		
Reinforcements, see "reserves"		
Rendevous, see "patrol"		
Reorganize,	整頓 整理	Cheng³ tun⁴, cheng³ li³
(troops) under another commander,	另立旗幟 改編	Kai³ pien¹ Ling⁴ li⁴ ch'i² chih²
bad conditions.	支持殘局	Chih¹ ch'ih² t'san² chü²
Replacement brigade.	補充旅	Pu³ ch'ung¹ lü³
Report,	報告	Pao⁴ kao⁴
state clearly.	明瞭	Ming² liao²
Representatives, of important officials.	代表	Tai⁴ piao³
Reserves, reinforcements,	後援隊	Hou⁴ yüan² tui⁴
special or local.	預備隊	Yü⁴ pei⁴ tui¹
Resign, from office,	辭職 棄職	T'zu² chih², ch'i⁴ chih²
admit faults and....	引咎下野	Yin³ chiu⁴ hsia⁴ yeh³
Resist - see "oppose",		
strongly and stubbonly.	頑強抵抗	Wan² ch'iang² ti² k'ang⁴

Respect (a superior).	信仰	Hsin⁴ yang³
Responsibility, take.	擔任	Tan¹ jen⁴
Restrain, hinder from behind.	牽制	Ch'ien¹ chih⁴
Retreat, of army,	退却，退兵	T'ui⁴ ch'üeh⁴, t'ui⁴ ping¹
defeated,	敗退	Pai⁴ t'ui⁴
withdraw.	裁撤	T'sai² ch'e⁴
Return, to,	回復	Hui² fu¹
to duty.	回任	Hui² jen⁴
Reveille	拂曉號	Fo² hsiao³ hao⁴
Revenge, to take.	報仇	Pao⁴ ch'ou²
Revolt - see "rebel".		
Revolver - see "pistol".		
Ride (a horse).	騎(馬)	Ch'i² (ma³)
Riding - see "horse".		
Rifle:-	槍	Ch'iang¹
sling; stock; bolt;	帶；靶；子；	Tai⁴; pa;³ tzu;³
sight; trigger;	表尺；機子；	piao³ ch'ih;³ chi¹ tzu;³
butt; muzzle; barrel.	都；口；筒	tu¹; k'ou;³ t'ung.³
Risk one's life.	拚命	P'in⁴ ming⁴
River (cross a).	(渡)河	(tu⁴) he²
Rocket, military.	火箭	Huo³ chien⁴
Roll call.	點名	Tien³ ming²
Rout,	衝散	Ch'ung¹ san⁴
disorderly, following defeat, see "attack".	奔竄	Pen¹ t'suan⁴

Russia - see "Soviet".	俄國	E^{2} kuo^{2}
Saber,	軍刀	Chün′ tao′
scabbard,	鞘子	$Ch'iao^{4}$ tzu^{3}
"present saber"	舉刀	$Chü^{3}$ tao′
Saddle, a,	鞍子一副	An′ tzu^{3} (i^{4} $p'an^{2}$)
to, see "horse".		
Saddler (military),	皮匠	$P'i^{2}$ $chiang^{4}$
girth.	周圍	Chou′ wei^{2}
Sailer, see "crew".		
Salute, with hand,	舉手	$Chü^{3}$ $shou^{3}$
with rifle.	舉槍	$Chü^{3}$ $ch'iang$′
Sanitary troops	衛生隊	Wei^{4} sheng′ tui^{4}
Savage, see "fierce".		
Scout, (spy - see "espionage")	偵探	Chen′ $t'an^{4}$
Secret, (very),	(秘)密	(pi^{4}) mi^{4}
prepare in..	暗中設備	An^{4} chung′ she^{4} pei^{4}
go in secret.	微行	Wei′ $hsing^{2}$
Section, leader (of 10 men),	棚頭	$P'eng^{2}$ $t'ou^{2}$
part of a whole.	局部	$Chü^{2}$ pu^{4}
Seize (capture).	爭奪	Cheng′ to^{2}
Sentry, act as.	站崗	$Chan^{4}$ $kang^{3}$
Sergeant	正目	$Cheng^{4}$ mu^{4}
Service, active,	從軍中	$T'sung^{2}$ $chün$′ chung′
see "exampt".		
Shield, gun.	護板	Hu^{4} pan^{3}

Shock troops	生力軍	Sheng⁴ li⁴ chün¹
Shoe, horse - see "horse"		
Shoot	放槍	Fang⁴ ch'iang¹
Shoulder a gun	扛槍	K'ang² ch'iang¹
Shrapnel	開花彈	K'ai¹ hua¹ tan⁴
Sign, affix signature.	署名	Shu³,⁴ ming²
Signal troops,	旗語隊	Ch'i² yu³ tui⁴
signalling, see "flag".		
Sink, by gun fire.	轟沈	Hung¹ ch'en²
Smuggle, to.	夾帶私貨	Chia¹ tai⁴ szu¹ huo⁴
Soldier - see "private"		
soldiers' servant who cooks for them,	火夫	Huo³ fu¹
see "mercenary".		
Soviet	赤化黨	Ch'ih⁴ hua¹ tang³
Spasa - see "bridge"		
Spy - see "scout", "espionage".		
secret agent.	間諜	Chien¹ tieh²
Squadron, of cavalry.	一營馬隊	I⁴ ying² ma³ tui⁴
Stable, for horses.	馬棚, 馬廐	Ma³ p'eng,² ma³ chiu⁴
Staff, General office,	參謀部	T'san² mou² pu⁴
(head of, ass't.)	(總長, 次長)	(Tsung³ chang³ t'zu⁴ chang³)
chief of (tactical unit)	參謀長	T'san² mou² chang³
G. S. officer,	參謀官	T'san² mou² kuan¹
G. S. officer aigulettes.	參謀帶	T'san² mou² tai⁴

Stallion.	兒馬	Er³ ma³
Standing army - see "army".		
Station - troops or officials.	駐紮	Chu⁴ cha²
railway, see "railway"		
permanently stationed at,	久居	Chiu³ chü′
temporarily stationed at,	暫駐	Chan⁴ chu⁴
lst. aid.	治療所	Chih⁴ liao² so³
Steam ship.	火輪船	Huo³ lun² ch'uan²
Strategy, military,	軍略	Chün′ lüeh⁴
tricks to scare enemy as fire, wooden cannons, etc.	疑兵	I² ping′
Strength, fighting (of army),	戰鬪力	Chan⁴ tou⁴ li⁴
real.	實力	Shih² li⁴
Stirrup,	馬鐙	Ma³ teng⁴
Stop.	停止	T'ing² chih³
Stumble, of horse.	打前失	Ta³ ch'ien′ shih′
Submarine, vessel.	海底艦	Hai³ ti³ chien⁴
Subordinate.	部下	Pu⁴ hsia⁴
Succeed, to,	成效	Ch'eng² hsiao⁴
follow in office,	繼任	Chi⁴ jen⁴
consecutively.	相繼	Hsiang′ chi⁴
Supplies - see "military",		
money and grain.	餉糈	Hsiang³ hsü⁴

Surrender -	歸伏	Kuei′ fu²
to victor, troops going over to victorious side,	投降	T'ou² hsiang²
exhort to.	招降	Chao′ hsiang²
Surround	圍, 包圍	Wei², pao′ wei²
Survey,	測量	T'se⁴ liang⁴
instruments.	測量表	T'se⁴ liang⁴ piao³
Sword - see "saber",		
used by police.	指揮刀	Chih³ hui′ tao¹
Syphilis.	痧毒	Mei⁴ tu²
Tactics - see "military".		
Target,	靶子, 目標	Pa³ tzu³, mu⁴ piao′
practice,	打靶	Ta³ pa³
see "bulls eye".		
Tax	稅	Shui⁴
Telegram, a,	電報	Tien⁴ pao⁴
send.	打電報	Ta³ tien⁴ pao⁴
Telegraph, troops,	電報隊	Tien⁴ pao⁴ tui⁴
wireless.	無線電	Wu² hsien⁴ tien⁴
Telephone,	電話	Tien⁴ hua⁴
troops.	電話隊	Tien⁴ hua⁴ tui⁴
Telescope - see "field glasses"		
Temporary	臨時	Lin² shih²
Tent	帳房	Chang⁴ fang²
Territory,	地方	Ti⁴ fang′
on which to raise money for supply of troops.	地盤	Ti⁴ p'an²

Thermometer, a.	寒暑表	Han^{2} shu^{3} piao^{3}
Thibet.	西藏	Hsi^{1} tsang^{4}
Time; what time is it?	幾點鐘	Chi^{3} tien^{3} chung^{1}
no time for that,	不暇顧及	Pu^{4} hsia^{2} ku^{4} chi^{2}
very short, hurried, busy,	倉卒	T'sang^{1} tsu^{4}
at same time.	同時	T'ung^{2} shih^{2}
Topography	地勢	Ti^{4} shih^{4}
Torpedo (mine in water).	水雷	Shui^{3} lei^{2}
Town - see "city"		
Train - see "railway"		
gun, see "arm",		
armored,	裝甲車, 鐵甲車	Chuang^{1} chia^{3} ch'e^{1}, T'ieh^{3} chia^{3} ch'e^{1}
troops,	訓練士卒	Hsun^{4} lien^{4} shih^{1} tsu^{2}
Traitors.	內應.	Nei^{4} ying^{4}
Transfer, troops. see "garrison"	調兵	Tiao^{4} ping^{1}
Translate - see "interpreter".		
Transport, corps.	輜重兵 輜重隊 運輸隊	Tzu^{1} chung^{4} ping^{1}, Tzu^{1} chung^{4} tui^{4}, Yun^{4} shu^{1} tui^{4}.
Treaty, a,	條約	T'iao^{2} yüeh^{4}
make a.	和約	He^{2} yüeh^{4}
Trench, to dig,	挖戰壕, 挖戰溝	Wa^{1} chan^{4} hao^{2}, Wa^{1} chan^{4} kou^{1}
entrenching tools,	工具	Kung^{1} chü^{4}
work on,	工做	Kung^{1} tso^{4}
breastworks.	堡壘	P'u^{3} lei^{3}
Triangulation.	三角測量法	San^{1} chiao^{3} t'se^{4} liang^{2} fa^{3}

Trigger, of gun.	機子簧	Chi' tzu³ huang³
Troop - see "army"		
Trophy - see "loot".		
Truce, a.	暫行停戰	Chan⁴ hsing² t'ing² chan⁴
Truth, of the matter.	直相	Chen' Hsiang⁴
Ultimatum	戰書	Chan⁴ shu'
Understand andappreciate (one's difficulties)	諒解	Liang⁴ chieh³
- able to all (evident)	暴露	Pao⁴ lou⁴ (lu⁴)
Uniform, official. see "military"	制服	Chih⁴ fu²
Vaccinate.	種花	Chung⁴ hua'
Veterinary, surgeon.	獸醫	Shou⁴ i⁴
Vicinity of	附近	Fu⁴ chin⁴
Vicious (of horse)	烈性	Lieh⁴ hsing⁴
Victory, or defeat.	勝負	Sheng⁴ fu⁴
announce a victory.	(紅旗) 報捷	(hung² ch'i²) Pao⁴ chieh²
Village	村莊	T'sun' chuang'
Violent	激烈	Chi' lieh⁴
Volley, fire a.	放聯環槍	Fang⁴ lien² huan² ch'iang'
Volunteer, soldier.	義勇兵	I⁴ yung³ ping'
Waggon	敞車 (一輛)	Ch'ang³ ch'e⁴ (i² liang⁴)

Wait, with respect,	恭候	Kung′ hou⁴
until afterwards.	俟候	Szu⁴ hou⁴
War:- wage,	戰爭	Chan⁴ cheng′
declaration of,	宣戰	Hsüan′ chan⁴
fight,	打仗	Ta³ chang⁴
commence,	開火，開戰	K'ai′ huo³, k'ai′ chan⁴
make war upon,	興戎	Hsing′ jung²
important things in,	戎機	Jung² chi⁴
Ministry of,	陸軍部	Lu⁴ chün′ pu⁴
Secretary of,	陸軍總長	Lu⁴ chün′ tsung³ chang³
Ass't. Secretary of,	陸軍次長	Lu⁴ chün′ t'zu⁴ chang³
make war on one of lesser strength.	出征	Ch'u′ cheng′
council of,	軍事會議	Chün′ shih′ hui⁴ i⁴
cease.	息兵	Hsi² ping′
Warn, admonish.	警告	Ching³ kao′
Waves, electric,	電浪	Tien⁴ lang⁴
sound.	聲浪	Sheng′ lang⁴
Weapons, see "military"		
Well, a.	井(一眼)	Ching³ (i⁴ yen³)
Whistle, used by officers.	笛子	Ti² tzu³
Wing, (of army) see "flank".		
Wire, entanglement,	鐵條網	T'ieh³ t'iao² wang³
electric entanglement,	電網	Tien⁴ wang³
barbed "	鐵絲網	T'ieh′ szu′ wang³
to lay out.	敷設鐵條網	Fu² she⁴ t'ieh³ t'iao² wang³
Wireless, see "telegraph".		
Withdraw, see "retreat".		
Wound, receive a.	受傷	Shou⁴ shang′

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Ai

Ai⁴ mei⁴	曖昧	Questionable (undertaking), not easily understandable.

An

An¹ cho⁴ tzu¹ ke² sheng¹	按着資格升	Promote by seniority.
An¹ chung¹	暗中	In secret, secretly.
An¹ she⁴	安設	Put up or prepare (as mine, telegraph, etc.).
An¹ tzu³ (i⁴ p'an²)	鞍子(一鞏)	A saddle.
An⁴ chung¹ she⁴ pei⁴	暗中設備	Prepare in secret.
An⁴ kou¹	暗溝	Culvert.
An⁴ ping¹ pu² tung⁴	按兵不動	Hold troops and not move them.

Ao

Ao⁴	鄂(湖北)	Hupeh province.

Cha

Cha¹ ying²	扎營	Pitch camp.
Cha⁴ huai⁴ (ch'iao²)	炸毀(橋)	Blow up (a bridge).
Cha⁴ tan⁴	炸彈	Bomb.

Ch'a

Ch'a² ch'ao¹	查抄	Find and confiscate.
Ch'a² pan⁴	查辦	Send special inspector.
Ch'a⁴ tao⁴	岔道	Branch of road.

Ch'ai

Ch'ai′ tuan⁴ (hou⁴ lu⁴)	拆斷 (後路)	To break, asunder, destroy (line of communications).

Chan

Chan³ K'ai′	展開	Deploy, open out
Chan³ shu′	戰書	Ultimatum
Chan³ tsui⁴	斬罪	Behead
Chan⁴ cheng′	戰爭	Wage war
Chan⁴ ch'ang²	戰場	Field of battle
Chan⁴ chi⁴	戰紀	War records
Chan⁴ hao², wa′ chan⁴ hao²	戰壕, 挖戰壕	Trench, to dig trench
Chan⁴ huo⁴	戰禍	Aftermath, calamity of war
Chan⁴ k'uang⁴	戰況	Condition of hostilities
Chan⁴ i⁴	戰役	Campaign
Chan⁴ t'ai²	站台	Railway platform
Chan⁴ shih′	戰事	Military operations
Chan⁴ chu⁴	暫駐	Temporarily stationed at
Chan⁴ hsing² t'ing² chan⁴	暫行停戰	A truce
Chan⁴ hsien⁴	戰綫	Area of military operations
Chan⁴ tou⁴ li⁴	戰鬪力	Strength with which to fight

Chan⁴ kang³	站崗	Sentry. (on elevation) (general term)
Chan⁴ ling³	佔領	Occupy, capture
Chan⁴ shou³ chih′ pei⁴	戰守之備	Preparations of defense
Chan⁴ tsu³	毡子	Blanket
Chan⁴ tou⁴ k'ai′ shih³	戰鬬開始	Commencement of hostilities
Chan⁴ shih′ kung′ chai′	戰事公債	War loan
Chan⁴ li⁴ p'in³	戰利品	Loot

Chang

Chang⁴ ch'i′	瘴氣	Malaria
Chang⁴ fang²	帳房	Tent

Ch'ang

Ch'ang² pei⁴ chün′	常備軍	Regular army
Ch'ang³ ch'e⁴ (i² liang⁴)	敞車(一輛)	Waggon

Chao

Chao′ chi²	招集	Collect together (troops)
Chao′ hsiang²	招降	Exhort one side to join the other (in war) or to surrender.

Chao¹ ping¹	招兵	To recruit soldiers, look for recruits.
Chao⁴ hsiang⁴ hsia² tzu³	照像匣子	Camera

Ch'ao

Ch'ao² fei³ (chiao³ fei³)	剿匪	Hunt or suppress bandits
Ch'ao¹ hsi²	抄襲	Secretly attack rear or flanks.
Ch'ao² hsien⁴	朝鮮	Korea

Ch'e

Ch'e⁴ hsiao¹	撤消	Return, cancel
Ch'e⁴ t'ui⁴	撤退	Evacuate
Ch'e³ shou³	扯手	Bridle reins

Chen

Chen¹ hsiang⁴	真相	Truth of the matter
Chen³ tuan⁴ shih⁴	診斷室	Medical office
Chen¹ t'an⁴	偵探	Scout, spy, espionage
Chen⁴ ti⁴	陣地	Battle ground
Chen⁴ wang²	陣亡	Killed in battle

Ch'en

Ch'en^{4} hsü^{1} er^{2} ju^{4}	乘虛而入	Take advantage of this opportunity to enter.

Cheng

Cheng^{1} chi^{2}	徵集	To concentrate (troops)
Cheng^{1} tiao^{4}	徵調	To move for concentration
Cheng^{1} to^{2}	爭奪	To seize, capture
Cheng^{1} fa^{2}	征伐	Punitive expedition
Cheng^{3} li^{3}	整理	Revise, arrange, make over
Cheng^{3} t'an^{4}, cheng^{3} t'an^{4} tui^{4}	偵探, 偵探隊	Spies, intelligence police, dictives (used by side that sends them.)
Cheng^{3} tun^{4}	整頓	Reorganize
Cheng^{4} k'e^{4}	政客	Politician
Cheng^{4} mu^{4}	正目	Sergeant
Cheng^{4} fu^{3}	政府	Government (used for provincial as well as national.)
Cheng^{4} shih^{4}	正式	Properly, according to custom.
Cheng^{4} chih^{4}	政治	Art of government
Cheng^{4} ping^{1}	正兵	Private, 1st class

Ch'eng

Ch'eng^{2}	城	City (walled)
Ch'eng^{2} feng^{4}	承奉	Received and accordingly follow (orders of superior)
Ch'eng^{2} hsiao^{4}	成效	To succeed.

Chi

Chi^{1} tzu^{3} huang^{2}	機子簧	Trigger of gun
Chi^{1} i^{2}	機宜	Special plan
Chi^{1} chi^{2}	積極	Increase (one's efforts) to go ahead, progress.
Chi^{1} lieh^{4}	激烈	Violent
Chi^{1} kuan^{1}	機關	Important office, piece of machinery
Chi^{1} kuan^{1} ch'iang^{1}	機關槍	Machine gun
Chi^{1} kuan^{1} ch'iang^{1} tui^{4}	機關槍隊	Machine gun troops
Chi^{1} sheng^{1} i^{4} wai^{4}	激生意外	Because of this, the most unexpected things happened.
Chi^{2} chung^{4}	集中	Concentrate (troops)
Chi^{2} he^{2}	集合	Assemble
Chi^{2} hsing^{2} chün^{1}	急行軍	Forced march
Chi^{3} sui^{4} k'ou^{3}	幾歲口	How old is this horse?
Chi^{3} tien^{3} chung^{1}	幾點鐘	What time is it?
Chi^{4} hua^{4}	計畫	Plan

Chi⁴ jen⁴	繼任	Follow in office, successor, to succeed.
Chi⁴ shih⁴	技師	Engineer, mechanic

Ch'i

Ch'i⁴ ch'iu²	氣毬	Baloon
Ch'i⁴ chih⁴ tung⁴ chi⁴	氣制動機	On brake
Ch'i² (ma³)	騎(馬)	To ride (horse)
Ch'i² ping⁴	騎兵	Cavalry
Ch'i² ping⁴ shao⁴	騎兵哨	Cavalry patrol
Ch'i² p'ao⁴	騎砲	
Ch'i³ hsin⁴	起釁	Break out (of war) start, begin.
Ch'i³ ping⁴	起兵	Raise troops, put troops in motion.
Ch'i³ shen⁴	起身	Start on journey
Ch'i⁴ wu² ning² sui⁴	迄無寧歲	No peaceful years for a long time.
Ch'i⁴ chih²	棄職	Give up office
Ch'i⁴ hsieh⁴ ch'ien² t'ao²	棄械潛逃	Throw down weapons and secretly run away.
Ch'i² yü³ tui⁴	旗語隊	Signal corps

Chia **Chia**

Chia¹ kung¹	夾攻	Attack on both flanks.
Chia¹ tai⁴ ssu¹ huo¹	夾帶私貨	To smuggle

Chiang

Chiang³ chang¹	獎章	Decoration (general term)
Chiang³	講	Explain, discourse
Chiang³ he² t'iao² yüeh⁴	講和條約	Treaty of peace
Chiang⁴ hsiao⁴, chiang⁴ pien⁴	將校,將弁	Commanding officers - officers below rank of general.
Chiang⁴ ling³	將領	High ranking officers (field grade up)

Ch'iang

Ch'iang¹, ch'iang¹ tai⁴	槍,槍帶	Rifle, rifle sling
Ch'iang¹ pa³, ch'iang¹ tzu³	槍靶,槍子	Rifle stock, rifle bolt
Ch'iang¹ piao³ ch'ih,³	槍表尺	Rifle sight
Ch'iang¹ chi¹ tzu³	槍機子	Rifle trigger
Ch'iang¹ k'ou³	槍口	Muzzle of rifle
Ch'iang¹ tu¹	槍都	Butt of gun
Ch'iang¹ t'ung³	槍筒	Barrel of gun
Ch'iang¹ fang⁴ hsia⁴	槍放下	"Order arms"

Chiao

Chiao¹ chan⁴ chung²	交戰中	During hostilities
Chiao¹ feng¹	交鋒	Meet (of opposing armies)
Chiao¹ fu⁴	交付	To give
Chiao¹ she⁴	交射	Cross fire
Chiao¹ she⁴	交涉	Negotiations
Chiao¹ t'ung¹ pu⁴	交通部	Ministry of Communications
Chiao¹ she⁴ shih⁴ chien⁴	(各國)交涉事件	International affairs
Chiao² tsu³	嚼子	Bit
Chiao³ er²	角兒	Angle
Chiao³ t'a⁴ ch'e¹ tui⁴	脚踏車隊	Bicycle troops
Chiao⁴ yü⁴ pu⁴	教育部	Ministry of Education

Ch'iao

Ch'iao² (shen¹ er³)	橋(身兒)	Bridge (space of)
Ch'iao⁴ tzu³	鞘子	Saber scabbard

Chieh

Chieh¹ ch'ia⁴	接洽	To meet and discuss
Chieh¹ chin⁴	接近	On friendly terms, agree with.
Chieh¹ ch'o⁴	接觸	To meet in battle
Chieh¹ fang²	接防	Change troops (at post or station)
Chieh¹ feng¹	接風	Entertain new arrival
Chieh² chih⁴ chih¹ shih¹	節制之師	Well drilled troops
Chieh² na⁴	結納	Bring together (of persons)
Chieh² shu⁴	結束	Put together, arrange
Chieh² ch'e¹	截車	
Chieh² ch'eng² liang³ tuan⁴	截成兩段	
Chieh³ chueh²	解決	
Chieh³ (hsieh⁴) ch'u² wu³ chuang¹	解除武裝	Take off insigina and lay down arms
Chieh³ san⁴	解散	Disband troops
Chieh³ shih⁴	解釋	Explain (a misunderstanding)
Chieh³ yen²	解嚴	Take off, end martial law
Chieh⁴ yen²	戒嚴	Proclaim martial law
Chieh⁴ chi²	階級, 上中下三級	Classes of society
Chieh⁴ k'uan³	借款	Government loan
Chieh⁴ t'u² ku⁴ wei⁴	藉圖固位	Use someone's influence.

Ch'ieh

Ch'ieh' tuan"	切斷	Amputate

Chien

Chien' ch'eng^{2}	兼程	Forced march
Chien' chieh'	間接	Personally arrange ?
Chien' chang'	肩章	Shoulder insignia
Chien' ko^{2}	肩隔	Interval in line
Chien' shih^{4}	監視	To guard prisoners
Chien' tieh^{2}	間諜	Secret agent, or spy in war.
Chien^{3} ch'a^{2} kao^{3} chien^{4}	檢察稿件	Censorship (press)
Chien^{3} yen^{4} shen' t'i^{3}	檢驗身體	Medical examination
Chien^{4} chang^{3}	艦長	Commander of battle ship
Chien^{4} chu^{2}	建築	Build (with brick or stone-building)

Ch'ien

Ch'ien'	黔 (貴州)	Kueichow province
Ch'ien' chih^{4}	牽制	Hinder from behind, restrain.
Ch'ien' li^{3} yen^{3}	千里眼	Field glasses

Ch'ien² chin⁴	前進	Military advance
Ch'ien² t'u²	前途	Future
Ch'ien² feng¹	前鋒	Advance guard
Ch'ien² ti²	前敵	
Ch'ien² chan⁴	前站	To make preparations in travelling, for journey.
Ch'ien² fang¹	前方	
Ch'ien² t'i²	前提	Discuss ahead, talk over in advance.
Ch'ien² hsien⁴	前綫	The "front lines"
Ch'ien² wei⁴ tui⁴	前衛隊	Advance guard
Ch'ien² t'ao²	潛逃	Secretly flee
Ch'ien² fu²	潛伏	Secretly hide
Ch'ien³ chiang⁴	遣將	Order officers of high rank
Ch'ien³ san⁴	遣散	Demobilize

Chih

Chih² chieh¹	直接	Arrange through someone else.
Chih¹ ch'o⁴	支絀	Funds all expended
Chih¹ ch'ih² t'san² chü²	支持殘局	Reorganize bad conditions
Chih² chin⁴	直進	Advance straight to front
Chih² jih⁴ kuan¹	值日官	Officer of the Day

Chih² niu² er³	執牛耳	To become very powerful (historical phrase)
Chih² hsing² ssu³ hsing²	執行死刑	Execute (put to death)
Chih⁴ pan¹ tai⁴	值班帶	Insignia or sash worn to designate officer of the day, etc.
Chih³ hui¹ chien¹ tu¹	指揮監督	Direct (supervise)
Chih³ hui¹ tao¹	指揮刀	Blunt sword as carried by police.
Chih⁴ an¹	治安	Cause peace, tranquility
Chih chih		
Chih⁴ kung⁴	治公	Please attend to your duty (polite form of leave-taking.)
Chih⁴ fu²	制服	Official uniform (school, civil and military)
Chih⁴ liao² so³	治療所	1st aid station
Chih⁴ wai⁴ fa⁴ ch'üan²	治外法權	Extraterritoriality
Chih⁴ t'ieh³ so³	製鐵所	Iron foundry

Ch'ih

Ch'ih¹ chin³	吃緊	Very important (time)
Ch'ih¹ yao⁴	吃藥	Take medicine
Ch'ih⁴ hua¹ tang³	赤化黨	Soviet

Chin

Chin⁴ chih⁴ p'in³	(戰時) 禁制品	Contraband (of war)
Chin⁴	晉(山西)	Shansi province
Chin⁴ ping¹	進兵	Advance troops
Chin⁴ pu⁴	進步	Gain ground

Ch'in

Ch'in¹ tsu⁴ tu¹ chan⁴	親自督戰	Personally direct the fighting (some high commander)
Ch'in²	秦(陝西)	Shensi province

Ching

Ching¹ ch'eng²	京城	Capital city
Ching¹ hsien⁴	經線	Degree of longitude
Ching¹ chao⁴ yin⁴	京兆尹	Governor of Metropolitan District (20 hsien around Peking)
Ching¹ shih¹ i² tai⁴	京師一帶	Metropolitan District of Peking
Ching¹ tu²	京都	Peking
Ching³ kao¹	警告	Warn, admonish
Ching⁴ lü³	勁旅	Fighting troops

Ching³ p'ao⁴	警砲	Alarm gun
Ching³ (i⁴ yen³)	井(一眼)	A well
Ching⁴ chieh⁴ hsien⁴	境界綫	Boundary line
Ching⁴ chieh⁴ piao¹	境界標	Landmark

Ch'ing

Ch'ing¹ pien⁴ t'ieh³ lu⁴ tui⁴	輕便鐵路隊	Railway repair troops

Chiu

Chiu³ chü¹	久居	Permanently stationed at
Chiu⁴ chih²	就職	Take office, installed in office.

Chou

Chou¹ hsüan²	周旋	Entertain guests
Chou¹ wei²	周圍	Saddle girth

Ch'ou

Ch'ou² pei⁴	籌備	Consider preparations, Think of plans.

Chu

Chu³ chang¹	主張	To advocate, originate a plan.
Chu³ chün¹	主軍	Our own army
Chu³ li⁴ chün¹ tui⁴	主力軍隊	Troops which have a certain responsibility to perform.
Chu⁴ ch'eng²	築城	Breastwork or embankment (to surround a camp)
Chu⁴ cha²	駐紮	Stationed at -
Chu⁴ mu⁴	注目	To "eyes right" or "eyes left", look at (a command).

Ch'u

Ch'u¹ cheng¹	出征	To fight one of less strength (country with reference to provinces)
Ch'u¹ shih¹ chun³ pei⁴	出師準備	Mobilization
Ch'u⁴ chih²	處置	Manage (a person or an officer)

Ch'uai

Ch'uai³ t'su⁴	揣測	According to my idea, or plan.

Chuan

Chuan¹ i⁴	專意	Close attention, close application.

Ch'uan

Ch'uan²; huo³ lun² ch'uan²	船；火輪船	Ship, vessel; steam ship
Ch'uan² mien⁴	船面	Deck of ship
Ch'uan² piao³	船表	Chronometer
Ch'uan² wu⁴	船塢	Dock (for ships)
Ch'uan² ta² ch'u⁴	傳達處	Gate office
Ch'uan² jan³ ping⁴	傳染病	Contagious disease
Ch'uan⁴ tai⁴	串袋	Bandoleer or cartridge belt.

Chuang

Chuang¹ chia³ ch'e⁴	裝甲車	armored train
Chuang¹ ch'e⁴ shang⁴	裝車上	Pack on cart
Chuang¹ mei²	裝煤	To coal (a ship)

Chui

Chui' chi'	追擊	To follow and attack

Ch'ui

Ch'ui' hao⁴	吹號	To blow bugle

Chung

Chung' chün'	中軍	Aide de camp
Chung' kuo²	中國	China
Chung' li⁴	中立	Neutral
Chung' yang'	中央	Capital (seat of national government)
Chung' hsiao⁴	中校	Lieut. colonel
Chung' wei⁴	中尉	1st lieut.
Chung' chiang⁴	中將	Major general
Chung⁴ hua'	種花	Vaccinate
Chung⁴ p'ao⁴	重砲	Heavy artillery

Ch'ung

Ch'ung' feng'	衝鋒	Fight hand to hand
Ch'ung' san³	衝散	Rout an enemy
Ch'ung' t'u'	衝突	Charge, rush against suddenly.

Chü

Chü¹ tzu³	駒子	A colt
Chü² mien⁴	局面	
Chü² pu⁴	局部	Section, part of whole
Chü³ tao¹	舉刀	Present saber
Chü³ ch'iang¹	舉槍	"Present arms"
Chü³ shou³	舉手	Salute with hand
Chü³ ping¹	舉兵	Raise troops, recruit
Chü⁴ chan⁴	劇戰	Fierce battle
Chü⁴ li²	距離	Distance in column
Chü¹ chi⁴ p'ao⁴	狙擊砲	37 mm. gun
Chü⁴ t'i³	具體	Complete, perfect (plan)

Chü

Ch'ü

Ch'ü¹	驅	Drive out, expel, urge forward.
Ch'ü¹ shih⁴	趨勢	
Ch'ü¹ she⁴ pu⁴ ping¹ p'ao⁴	曲射步兵砲	Trench mortar
Ch'ü¹ t'i⁴	取締	Think up a plan to handle a situation.

Ch'üan

Ch'üan² kuo²	全國	All nations

Chüeh

Chüeh² chan⁴	決戰	Decisive battle
Chüeh² szu¹	絕緣	Electric insulation

Ch'üeh

Chüeh¹ fa²	缺乏	To be short of food, ammunition, etc.
Ch'üeh³ shou³ chiang¹ chieh⁴	恪守疆界	Carefully guard one's own territory.

Chün

Chün¹ ch'i²	軍旗	Colors (military flags)
Chün¹ chien⁴	軍艦	Battleship
Chün¹ chi⁴, chün¹ kuei¹	軍紀，軍規	Military discipline
Chün¹ ch'i⁴	軍器	Military supplies, as guns, ordnance, etc.
Chün¹ chuang¹	軍裝	Military equipment
Chün¹ fu²	軍服	Military uniform
Chün¹ i¹	軍醫	Army medical corps

Chün¹ fa²	軍閥	Military officers
Chün¹ yüeh⁴ (tui⁴)	軍樂(隊)	Army Band
Chün¹ hsü; chün¹ hsü¹ chang³	軍需; 軍需長	Military supplies - food ammunition, clothing; Quartermaster.
Chün¹ li³ fu²	軍禮服	Military dress uniform
Chün¹ hsieh⁴	軍械	Military supplies, as guns, ordnance, etc.; weapons.
Chün¹ hsieh⁴ k'u⁴	軍械庫	Place to store arms
Chün¹ tao¹	軍刀	Saber
Chün¹ shih⁴	軍事	Military matters
Chün¹ jung²	軍容	Military operations
Chün¹ ma³	軍馬	Charger
Chün¹ shih¹ hui⁴ i⁴	軍事會議	Council of war
Chün¹ fa³ (hui⁴ i⁴)	軍法(會議)	Military law (Court martial)
Chün¹ hsing² ti⁴ t'u²	軍行地圖	Military map
Chün¹ yung⁴ p'iao⁴	軍用票	Military notes
Chün¹ fei⁴	軍費	Military expenses
Chün¹ fa³ chih² fa³ ch'u⁴	軍法執法處	Provost Marshal's Dept.
Chün¹ lüeh⁴	軍略	Military strategy

E

E² mo²	俄國	Russia

Er

Er³ ma³	兒馬	Stallion
Er⁴ teng³ ping¹	二等兵	2nd class private

Fa

Fa¹ chan³	發展	Progress, grow large, increase.
Fa¹ ping¹	伐兵	To order or send out troops
Fa¹ ying² ling⁴	發營令	Marching orders
Fa³ t'ung³	法統	Former law or rule. (Constitutional Gov't.)
Fa⁴ kuo²	法國	France

Fan

Fan¹ i² kuan¹	繙譯官	Official interpreter
Fan³ chuang⁴	反撞	Recoil of gun
Fan³ ke²	反戈	
Fan³ kung⁴	反攻	To counter attack
Fan³ P'an⁴	反叛	Rebel

Fan⁴ fa³	犯法	Break the law

Fang

Fang⁴ lien² huan² ch'iang'	放聯環槍	Fire a volley
Fang³ pei⁴	防備	Guard against
Fang⁴ ch'iang'	放鎗(槍)	Shoot a gun
Fang⁴ shao⁴	放哨	To send out patrols, to inspect sentries outside of camp.

Fei

Fei' chan⁴ tou⁴ yuan²	非戰鬪員	Non combatant
Fei' t'ing², fei' t'ing³ tui⁴	飛艇,飛艇隊	Airplane, Air Service troops.
Fei' hsing² ch'i⁴	飛行器	Flying machine (plane or baloon.)
Fei' chi'	飛機	Airplane

Fen

Fen' fen'	紛紛	Numerous
Fen' jao³	紛擾	
Fen⁴ yung³ tang' hsien'	奮勇當先	Very bravely in front (as "Dare to die" troops)
Fen⁴	糞	Manure

Feng

Feng¹ so³	封鎖	Naval blocade
Feng¹ yü³ piao³	風雨表	Barometer

Fo

Fo² hsiao³ hao⁴	拂曉號	"Reveille"

Fu

Fu² ch'iao²	浮橋	Pontoon bridge
Fu² lu³ (lo³) ping¹	俘虜兵	Prisoners of war
Fu² she⁴ (ti⁴ lei²)	敷設(地雷)	Lay out (land mines, barbed wire, etc.)
Fu³ chu⁴	輔助	Help, aid, assist.
Fu³ pi⁴	甫畢	Just finished
Fu³ chiao³	俯角	Angle of depression
Fu⁴ shang¹ ch'e¹	負傷車	Ambulance wagon
Fu⁴ chin⁴	附近	Vicinity of
Fu⁴ kuan¹	副官	Adjutant
Fu⁴ ping¹	副兵	2nd class private
Fu⁴ mu⁴	副目	Corporal
Fu⁴ ying² chang³	副營長	Second in command of bn. or sqdn.

Fu⁴ t'uan² chang³	副團長	Second in command of regt.; Lt. Col.
Fu⁴ tsa²	複雜	Confused
Fu⁴ tu¹ t'ung³	副都統	Adjutant General

Hai

Hai³ lu⁴ chün¹ ta⁴ yuan² shuai⁴	海陸軍大元帥	Commander in Chief of Army and Navy
Hai³ chün¹	海軍	Navy
Hai³ chün¹ pu⁴	海軍部	Navy Department
Hai³ chün¹ lu⁴ chan⁴ tui⁴	海軍陸戰隊	Marines
Hai³ chün¹ ts'an⁴ tsan⁴	海軍參贊	Naval Attache
Hai³ chün¹ shang⁴ chiang⁴; Chung chiang; Shao chiang	海軍上將; 中將; 少將	Admiral; vice admiral; rear admiral
Hai³ an¹ p'ao⁴	海岸砲	Coast artillery
Hai³ an¹ p'ao⁴ t'ai²	海岸砲台	" " battery
Hai³ fang²	海防	" defence
Hai³ kuan¹	海關	Maritime Customs
Hai³ ti³ chien⁴	海底艦	Submarine vessel

Han

Han² shu³ piao³	寒暑表	Thermometer

Hang

Hang^{2} k'ung^{1} shu^{3}	航空署	Air Service Office
Hang^{2} k'ung^{1} shu^{3} chang^{3}	航空署長	Head of Air Service office

Hao

Hao^{2} kou^{1}	壕溝	Trench
Hao^{4} fang^{2}	號房	O. D's office
Hao^{4} ling^{4}	號令	Word of commands "of execution" as "March"
Hao^{4} ping^{1}	號兵	A bugler
He tso		Mutually assist

He

He^{2} tso^{4}	合作	Mutually assist
He^{2} yueh^{4}	和約	Make a treaty

Hei

Hei^{1} mu^{4}	黑幕	

Heng

Heng^{2} tui^{4}	橫隊	Line formation

Hou

Hou⁴ chin⁴ kuo²	後進國	Backward nation
Hou⁴ fang¹	後方	Rear
Hou⁴ fang²	後防	
Hou⁴ t'ang²	後膛	Breech of gun
Hou⁴ wei⁴ tui⁴	後衛隊	Rear guard
Hou⁴ yuan² tui⁴	後援隊	Reserves, reinforcements

Hsi

Hsi¹ tsang⁴	西藏	Thibet
Hsi² chi¹	襲擊	Make a surprise attack
Hsi² deng¹ hao⁴	息灯號	"Lights out" bugle call
Hsi² ping¹	息兵	Cease war
Hsi³ ch'en²	洗塵	Invite new arrival to dine "Wash off stains of journey"
Hsi³ shai⁴ ch'ang³	洗晒場	Post or camp laundry.
Hsi⁴	系	Political party
Hsi¹ sheng¹	犧牲	Throw away, waste, not to want.

Hsia

Hsia⁴ t'a⁴	下榻	Live at, stay at. (asking a superior)
Hsia⁴ t'sao¹	下操	To go to drill
Hsia⁴ t'su⁴ tao¹	下束刀	"Unfix bayonets"
Hsia⁴ ma³	下馬	Dismount (from horse)
Hsia⁴ shih¹ kuan¹	下士官	Non commissioned officer
Hsia⁴ yeh³	下野	

Hsiang

Hsiang¹ chi⁴	相繼	Consecutively, in succession
Hsiang¹ ch'ih²	(兩軍) 相持	(2 armies) opposite eachother and ready to fight.
Hsiang¹ i² hsiang¹ chi⁴	相疑相忌	Mutually distrust and dislike
Hsiang³ hsü⁴	餉糈	Money and grain
Hsiang³ ying⁴	響應	Treachery
Hsiang⁴ tso³ chuan⁴ tsou³	向左轉走	"Column left-march"
Hsiang⁴ yu⁴ chuan⁴ tsou³	向右轉走	"Column right-march"

Hsiao

Hsiao¹ chi²	消極	Lessen (one's efforts) to go back, not progress
Hsiao¹ hsi²	消息	News, reports, tidings,. intelligence.

Hsiao¹ tu²yao⁴	消毒藥	Disinfectant
Hsiao³ p'ai² shao⁴	小排哨	Patrol of 4 men

Hsieh

Hsieh⁴ chih²	卸職	Give up office (relinguish)
Hsieh⁴ tse²	卸責	Give up responsibility
Hsieh⁴ (chieh³) ch'u²wu³chuang¹	解除武裝	Lay down arms and take off uniforms.

Hsien

Hsien⁴ wei²	陷圍	Surround
Hsien⁴ ping¹; hsien⁴ ping¹ tui⁴	憲兵；憲兵隊	Military police; M.P. police
Hsien⁴ hsi²	先襲	Surprise attack

Hsin

Hsin¹ pien¹	新編	New
Hsin¹ wen² chih³	新聞紙	Newspaper
Hsin¹ fu⁴	心腹	Very dependable officer
Hsin¹ fu⁴ chih¹ huan⁴	心腹之患	That which one fears most
Hsin⁴ yang³	信仰	Respect (a superior)
Hsin⁴ hao⁴ ch'i²	信號旗	Signalling flags.

Hsing

Hsing¹ jung²	興戎	Make war upon, declare war
Hsing² chün¹	行軍	Troops on march
Hsing² li³	行禮	Ceremony
Hsing² yuan²	行轅	Temporary office (while travelling)
Hsing² shih⁴	形勢	Manner, likeness
Hsing⁴	姓	Surname
Hsing⁴ tuan¹	釁端	Mischief is brewing

Hsiu

Hsiu¹ chan⁴	休戰	Suspension of hostilities

Hsiung

Hsiung¹ ch'iang²	胸牆	Breastwork for an individual soldier
Hsiung² hsin¹	雄心	
Hsiung² fan⁴	兇犯	) Assailant, criminal,) one who attacks,) wounds or murders.)
Hsiung¹ shou³	兇手	)

Hsüan

Hsüan¹ chan⁴	宣戰	Declaration of war
Hsüan¹ kao⁴	宣告	Publish, proclaim

Hsüan² shu¹	懸殊	Unlike, a great difference

Hsueh

Hsüeh³ kuan³	血管	Blood vessels

Hsün

Hsün¹ chang¹	勳章	Decoration (general term)
Hsün² ching³	巡警	Police
Hsün² ch'a²	巡查	To patrol
Hsün⁴ lien⁴ shih¹ tsu²	訓練士卒	To train troops, drill, instruct.
Hsün⁴ p'ao⁴	煙砲	Gun shooting gasshells

Hu

Hu⁴ hsiang¹ t'ui⁴ wei³	互相推諉	Mutually avoid responsibility
Hu⁴ chao⁴	護照	Pass-port
Hu⁴ ping¹	護兵	Orderly
Hu⁴ pan³	護板	Gun shield
Hu⁴ sung⁴	護送	Convoy (under guard)

Hua

Hua⁴ pien⁴	譁變	Accident occurred
Hua² tsu³	滑子	Block pulley

Huan

Huan⁴ fang²	換防	Exchange troops, garrison

Hui

Hui¹ fu⁴ tsu⁴ yu²	恢復自由	To free, give back liberty to.
Hui² fu⁴	回復	To return to
Hui² jen⁴	回任	To return to duty
Hui² kuang¹ t'ung¹ hsin¹ chi¹	回光通信機	Heliograph
Hui⁴ chien⁴	會見	Interview
Hui⁴ shao²	會哨	Rendevous - place for or meeting of patrols; to meet
Hui⁴ t'u²	繪圖	Draw maps

Hun

Hun⁴ chan⁴	混戰	Confusion of battle
Hun⁴ ch'eng² lu³	混成旅	Mixed brigade

Hung

Hung¹ ch'en²	轟沈	Sink with gunfire
Hung¹ chi¹	轟擊	Demolish with gunfire, destroy with artillery.
Hung² tan¹	紅單	Clearance, a port

Huo

Huo³ chien⁴	火箭	Military rocket
Huo³ ch'e¹ t'ou²; huo³ ch'e¹ chan⁴	火車頭; 火車站	Railway engine; railway station
Huo³ yao⁴ k'u⁴	火藥庫	Powder magazine
Huo³ fu¹	伙伕	Men hired to cook for soldiers.
Huo⁴ shou³	禍首	Greatest calamity

I

I¹ yüan⁴	醫院	Hospital
I² ping¹	疑兵	Use tricks to scare enemy, (wooden cannons, fire, etc.)
I² wu⁴	貽誤	Delay, hinder
I³ i² tai⁴ lao²	以逸待勞	Wait until enemy is exhausted before attacking.
I³ chin⁴ wei² t'ui⁴	以進為退	To attack for purpose of making strategical retreat.
I¹ chün² ma³	一羣馬	Heard of horses
I¹ teng³ ping¹	一等兵	1st class private

I⁴chün¹	毅軍	Ichun troops (Anhwei prov. Tseng Kuo-fan)
I⁴chien⁴	意見	Opinion
I⁴kuo⁴	義國	Italy
I⁴ping¹	義兵	Volunteer soldier

Jih

Jih⁴ chien⁴ hsien³ e⁴	日見險惡	Worse day by day
Jih⁴ pen³	日本	Japan

Jou

Jou⁴ po²	肉迫	Hand to hand fighting

Ju

Ju⁴ chan⁴	入戰	Join the fighting
Ju⁴ shou³	入手	Start or begin, enter.

Jung

Jung² chi⁴	戎機	Important things in war
Jung² na⁴	容納	Receive, hear, agree, allow, accept (properly or fittingly) (Not a concrete object.)

Kai

Kai³ pien¹	改編	Reorganise, change to (of troops)

K'ai

K'ai¹ cheng⁴ pu⁴ tsou³	開正步走	"Forward-march"
K'ai¹ fang⁴ men² hu⁴	開放門戶	"The open door policy"
K'ai¹ hua¹ tan⁴	開花彈	Shrapnel
K'ai¹ huo³, k'ai¹ chan⁴	開火, 開戰	Start fighting (war)
K'ai¹ pa²	開拔	Start on march

Kan

Kan⁴	贛(江西)	Kiangsi province
Kan¹ liang²	乾粮	Emergency ration, dry food
Kan¹ she⁴	干涉	Exercise authority beyond proper sphere
Kan⁴ pu⁴	幹部	Important people

K'an

K'an¹,⁴ ch'i²	看齊	To get alignment in ranks - to "dress".
K'an¹,⁴ shou³	看守	To guard (a place, locality

Kung

Kung^{1} tzu^{3}	槓子	Horizontal bar used by soldiers for exercise.

K'ang

K'ang^{1} ch'iang^{1}	扛槍	Shoulder a gun

Kao

Kao^{1} ai^{3}	高矮	Height
Kao^{1} she^{4} p'ao^{4}	高射砲	Anti-aircraft guns
Kao^{4} chia^{4}	告假	Take leave of absence
Kao^{4} fen^{4} yung^{3}	告奮勇	Volunteer for dangerous mission
Kao^{4} i^{1} tuan^{4} lo^{4}	告一段落	Affair completely finished
Kao^{4} shih^{4}	告示	An official notification

Ke

Ke^{1} tzu^{1}	鴿子	Pigeon
Ke^{1} tuan^{4}	割斷	To cut asunder

K'e

K'e^{4} chün^{1}	客軍	An allied army

Kou

Kou¹ chieh²	勾結	Induce to join (the enemy)
Kou⁴ he²	媾和	To think of plan for opposing armies to join together.
Kou⁴ hsing⁴	搆釁	
Kou¹ liu²	勾留	Delay, stop a few days (for business)

K'ou

K'ou³ ling⁴	口令	Give verbal commands
K'ou¹ liu²	扣勾留	Detain
K'ou³ ching⁴	口徑	Bore of gun, caliber
K'ou³ hao²	口號	Password

Ku

Ku¹ chu⁴ i⁴ chih¹	孤注一擲	Stake all in one move
Ku¹ chün⁴	孤軍	Unassisted
Ku¹ li⁴	孤立	Alone, unassisted
Ku⁴ shou³	固守	Defend
Ku⁴ wen⁴ (kuan¹)	顧問(官)	Advisor (attached to some government office)

Kua

Kua⁴ hao⁴	掛號		To go on pass

Kuan

Kuan¹ liao²	官僚		Official advisors
Kuan³ hsia²	管轄		To command; have charge of
Kuan⁴ li⁴	慣例		Custom, precedent.

Kuei

Kuei¹ fu²	歸伏		Surrender
Kuei⁴	桂	(廣西)	Kuangsi province
Kuei⁴ hsing⁴	貴姓	(Polite)	What is your surname?

K'uei

K'uei⁴ ping¹	潰兵		Defeated troops
K'uei⁴ san³	潰散		Defeated and dispersed
K'uei⁴ luan⁴	潰亂		Defeated and disorderly

Kung

Kung¹ chin⁴	攻進		Advance to the attack
Kung¹ chi⁴	攻擊		Attack (in war)
Kung¹ chü⁴	工具		Entrenching tools

Kung¹ hou⁴	恭候	Await with respect
Kung¹ ping¹, kung¹ ch'eng² tui⁴	工兵, 工程隊	Pioneer troops, engineer corps.
Kung¹ to², kung¹ p'o⁴	攻奪, 攻破	To capture
Kung¹ tso⁴	工做	To do work
Kung¹ shou³ t'ung² meng²	攻守同盟	Offensive and defensive alliance
Kung¹ pu⁴	公布	To make public
Kung¹ ta³ pu⁴ k'ai¹	攻打不開	Impregnable (position, defence)

K'ung

K'ung¹ chung¹ chan⁴ cheng¹	空中戰爭	Aerial combat

Kuo

Kuo²	國	Country, nation
Kuo² chi⁴	國際	International relations
Kuo² fa³	國法	Civil law
Kuo² wu⁴ tsung³ li³	國務總理	Prime Minister
Kuo⁴ pu⁴ ch'ü⁴ ti⁴	過不去的	Impossible

La

La¹	拉	Haul, pull

Lang

Lang^{2} pei^{4} er^{2} t'ao^{2}	狼狽而逃	Fled in an awful condition (clothes, etc. unsightly, a fugitive.)

Le

Le^{4} ling^{4}	勒令	To use force, forceably.
Le^{4} kuan^{1}	樂觀	Look with pleasure, anticipate good

Lei

Lei^{1} chu^{4}	勒住	Hold in (a horse)
Lei^{2} kuan^{3}	雷管	Detonator

Li cheng

Li^{4} cheng^{4}	立正	Stand at attention "Attention"
Li^{4} chi^{1}	痢疾	Dysentery
Li^{4} t'u^{2}	力圖	Seriously think of plan

Liang

Liang^{2} t'ai^{2}	糧台	Commissariat
Liang^{4} chieh^{3}	諒解	Understand and appreciate (one's difficulties)

Lieh

Lieh⁴ ch'iang²	列强	The Protocol Powers
Lieh⁴ hsi²	列席	Attend a conference
Lieh⁴ hsing⁴	烈性	Vicious (of horse)

Lien

Lien²	連	Company, troop or battery.
Lien² chang³	連長	Company commander
Lien² chün¹	聯軍	Allied armies
Lien² lo⁴ (huo³ ch'e¹)	聯絡 (火車)	Relationtte, connecting; (train)
Lien² lo⁴ yuan²	聯絡員	Liaison officer

Lin

Lin² cheng⁴	淋症	Gonorrhoea
Lin² shih²	臨時	Temporary, at the time.

Ling

Ling³ chang¹	領章	Collar insignia
Ling³ shih¹ t'uan²	領事團	Consular body

Ling⁴ li⁴ ch'i² chih²	另立旗幟	Reorganise soldiers under another command
Ling⁴	令	Command

Liu

Liu² ma³	遛馬	Exercise horse
Liu² shou³	留守	Leave troops to guard
Liu² tan⁴ p'ao⁴ (yeh³ chan⁴)	榴彈砲 (野戰)	Howitzer

Lo

Lo² t'ou²	駱駝	Camel

Lou

Lou¹	蹓	To canter
Lou⁴ ying²	露營	Bivouac

Lu

Lu³	魯 (山東)	Shantung province
Lu⁴ ch'ai²	鹿柴	Brush obstacles
Lu⁴ chün¹ pu⁴	陸軍部	War Department
Lu⁴ chün¹ tsung³ chang³	陸軍總長	Head of War Department Secretary of War.

Lu⁴ chün¹ t'su⁴ chang³	陸軍次長	Assistant Secretary of War
Lu⁴ chün¹	陸軍	Army
Lu⁴ hsü⁴	陸續	Successsion
Lu⁴ ying²	露營	Temporary camp (as on march)
Lu⁴ chün¹ hsüeh² hsiao⁴	陸軍学校	Military school
Lu⁴ chün¹ ts'an¹ tsan⁴	陸軍參贊	Military attache

Lung

Lung² t'ou²	韝頭	Bridle head stall
Lung³ t'ou²	攏頭	Pack saddle
Lung³	隴(甘肅)	Kansu province
Lung³ lo⁴ ju⁴ shou³	籠絡入手	To bribe

Lü

Lü³	旅	[redacted] Brigade
Lü³ chang³	旅長	Brigade commander
Lü³ sung⁴	呂宋	Manila, P.I.

Ma

Ma³ (i⁴ p'i¹)	馬 (一匹)	A horse
Ma³ tui⁴	馬隊	Cavalry
Ma³ ch'iang¹	馬槍	Carbine
Ma³ p'eng², ma³ chiu⁴	馬棚, 馬廐	Stable for horses
Ma³ ch'ang³	馬廠	Place to exercise horses
Ma³ fu¹	馬夫	A groom
Ma³ pien⁴	馬弁	Orderly, messenger
Ma³ sang³	馬癢	Glanders
Ma³ tsei²	馬賊	Brigand
Ma³ chang³, ma³ shu⁴	馬掌, 馬術	Horse shoe, horsemanship
Ma³ tsung¹, ma³ shang⁴	馬鬃, 馬上	Mane, back.
Ma³ teng⁴	馬鐙	Stirrup
Ma³ t'ao⁴ tzu³	馬套子	Horse collar

Mai

Mai² fu²	埋伏	Hidden obstacles to hinder enemy (mines, pits, ambush)

Man

Man⁴ tai⁴	慢待	Without courtesy, rude.

Mao

Mao⁴ chang¹	帽章	Hat insignia

Mei

Mei² ch'iao²	美僑	American nationals in foreign country.
Mei² kuo²	美國	United States
Mei² t'sang¹	煤艙	Coal bunker
Mei² pu⁴ chin⁴ shao¹	煤不禁燒	Coal doesn't burn long
Mei² k'uang⁴	煤礦	Coal mine
Mei² yu²	煤油	Kerosene
Mei⁴ tu²	痧毒	Syphilis

Meng

Meng² i¹ ta³ chi¹	蒙一打擊	Receive a great setback, have been successfully attacked.
Meng³ ku³	蒙古	Mongolia
Meng³ lieh⁴	猛烈	Fierce, terrible, savage, (of fires or war)

Mi

Mi⁴	密	Secret

Miao

Miao^{2} chun^{3}	瞄準	To aim (a rifle)

Mieh

Mieh^{4} wang^{2}	滅亡	Annihilate

Mien

Mien^{3} i^{4}	免役	Exempt from military service
Mien^{3} li^{4}	勉勵	Compliment or praise troops
Mien^{4} chien^{4}	面見	To interview

Min

Min^{2} t'uan^{2}	民團	Militia supported by merchants
Min^{3}	閩(福建)	Fukien province

Ming

Ming^{2} liao^{2}	明瞭	State very clearly
Ming^{2} tzu^{3}	名字	Personal name
Ming^{4} ling^{4} (i^{2} tao^{4})	命令(一道)	Command, proclamation, mandate.

Mo

Mo² tien⁴ chi' ch'i⁴	磨電機器	Dynamo

Mou

Mou² wei² pu⁴ hsi'³	謀為不軌	Think of doing something unlawful.

Mu

Mu⁴ piao'	目標	Target
Mu⁴ ti⁴	目的	
Mu⁴ ma³	木馬	Wooden horse
Mu⁴ fu³	幕府	Unofficial advisor, colleague.
Mu⁴ yü⁴ shih'	沐浴室	Bath house

Nei

Nei⁴ hung⁴	內訌	Discord within
Nei⁴ mu⁴	內幕	State of things within, inside.
Nei⁴ t'ang²	內堂	Indoor instruction
Nei⁴ wu⁴ pu⁴	內務部	Ministry of Interior
Nei⁴ ying⁴	內應	Traitors

Ni

Ni⁴ t'se⁴	逆測	To consider beforehand

Nung

Nung² shang¹ pu⁴	農商部	Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce

Pa

Pa² tui⁴	拔隊	Start on march
Pa² ying²	拔營	Break camp
Pa³ tsu³	靶子	Target
Pa⁴ chan⁴	罷戰	Stop fighting, armstice

Pai

Pai⁴ chan⁴	敗戰	Lose battle
Pai⁴ t'suan⁴	敗竄	defeated, run away, retreat in disorder.
Pai⁴ t'ui⁴	敗退	Retreat defeated

P'ai

P'ai² chieh³	排解	Advocate for peace
P'ai², p'ai² chang³	排, 排長	Platoon, platoon leader

P'ai^{2} wai^{4}	排外	Anti-foreign
P'ai^{2} ma^{3}	排馬	Break a horse

Pan

Pan^{4} fa^{1} ming^{4} ling^{4}	頒發命令	Give command, issue proclamation. (inferior for a superior.)
Pan^{4} shang^{4}	絆上	Hobble an animal

P'an

P'an^{2} hsüan^{2}	盤旋	Circle around (of airplane)
P'an^{2} huan^{2}	盤桓	Delay, visit a few days (for pleasure)
P'an^{4} ch'i^{2}	叛旗	White flag
P'an^{4} ping^{1}	叛兵	Mutinous troops

Pang

Pang^{3} p'iao^{4}	掳票	To take captives (by bandits)

Pao

Pao^{1} wei^{2}	包圍	To surround
Pao^{2} chiang^{2}	褒獎	Decoration
Pao^{2} hsu^{4}	褒卹	Reward for service to country.

Pao⁴ chieh²	(紅旗)報捷	Announce a victory (formerly used red flag)
Pao⁴ ch'ou²	報仇	Take revenge
Pao⁴ fu⁴	報復	A return
Pao³ hu⁴	保護	Protect
Pao⁴ kao⁴	報告	Report, inform
Pao⁴ shu⁴	報數	"Count off"
Pao⁴ lou⁴ (lu⁴)	暴露	All comes to light, becomes evident to all.

P'ao

P'ao³ ma³	跑馬	Gallop
P'ao³ tao¹	拋刀	"Present saber"
P'ao³ pu⁴	跑步	"Double time"
P'ao⁴, p'ao⁴ ch'e¹	砲(礮), 砲車	Cannon, gun carriage
P'ao⁴ ping¹, p'ao⁴ tui⁴	砲兵, 砲隊	Artillery troops
P'ao⁴ ch'ang³	砲廠,	Gun park
P'ao⁴ er³	泡兒	A blister
P'ao⁴ lei³	砲壘	Gun emplacement (temporary)
" t'ai²	砲台	" " (permanent)
" chia¹	砲架	Stand for gun
" shou³	砲手	Cannoneer
" tan⁴	砲彈	Artillery ammunition

P'ao⁴ k'ou³	砲口	Muzzle, of cannon

Pei

Pei¹ pao¹	背包	Soldiers pack
Pei⁴ chan⁴ chih¹ chi⁴	備戰之跡	(Enemy) has prepared for war
Pei⁴ fu²	被服	Tents, blankets, mattresses, etc.
Pei⁴ kuan¹	悲觀	Look with displeasure, anticipate bad.
Pei⁴ mien⁴ (kung¹ chi⁴)	背面(攻擊)	Attack (rear)

Pen

Pen¹ t'suan⁴	奔竄	Disorderly rout, (following defeat)
Pen³ kuo², pen³ chün¹	本國, 本軍	Native country, own army

P'eng

P'eng² t'ou²	棚頭	Section leader (of 10 men)

Pi

Pi⁴ mi⁴	秘密	Very secret
Pi⁴ hsing⁴	敝姓	My surname is ...

P'i

P'i⁴ tzu³;p'i⁴chiang⁴ 皮子;皮匠 Leather; a saddler

Piao

Piao³ shih⁴ 表示 Announce, clear statement, typify.

Pieh

Pieh² tung⁴ tui⁴ 別慟隊 Troops sent on special mission - such as railway party.

Pien

Pien⁴ hua⁴ 變化 Change in circumstances

Pien⁴ keng¹ 變更 To change, alter

P'ien

P'ien¹ i² chiao³ 偏倚角 Angle of deflection

P'in

P'in⁴ ming⁴ 拚命 To risk one's life

Ping

Ping¹ hsiang³ 兵餉 Pay and rations of troops

Ping¹, ping¹ ch'i⁴ 兵;兵器 Soldier; military weapons

Ping¹ chan⁴, ping¹ chan⁴ hsien⁴	兵站，兵站線	Military supply station, line of communications.
Ping¹ ko²	兵革	Military supplies (except commissary)
Ping¹ kung¹ ch'ang³	兵工廠	Place for making military supplies, arsenal.
Ping¹ pien⁴	兵變	Mutiny
Ping¹ lien² huo⁴ chieh²	兵連禍結	Where there are soldiers there is calamity.
Ping¹ ying²	兵營	Barracks, camp
Ping¹ fei⁴	兵費	Military expenses

P'ing

P'ing² an¹	平安	Peaceful
P'ing² she⁴ pu⁴ ping¹ p'ao⁴	平射步兵砲	37 m.m. gun

Po

Po² tzu³	(馬)脖子	Neck (of horse)
Po⁴ chi¹ p'ao⁴	迫擊砲	Trench mortar

P'o

P'o⁴ huai⁴	砲壞	Disturb, disrupt

Pu 步

Pu⁴ hsia⁴	部下	Subordinate
Pu⁴ chin⁴ ch'i² chih²	不盡其職	neglect of duty
Pu⁴ kao⁴	佈告	Proclamation, to issue a -
Pu⁴ ti⁴	不敵	Unable to fight, oppose
Pu³ ch'ung¹ lü³	補充旅	Replacement brigade
Pu⁴ hsia² ku⁴ chi²	不暇顧及	No time for that
Pu⁴ chih² (ping¹ shih¹)	布置(兵士)	Open out, arrange, make dispositions (troops)
Pu⁴ ssu³ hsin¹	不死心	Keep up in mind
Pu⁴ ping¹ p'ao⁴	步兵砲	Artillery infantry
Pu⁴ ping¹, pu⁴ tui⁴	步兵, 步隊	Infantry
Pu⁴ ch'iang¹	步槍	Infantry rifle
Pu⁴ shao⁴	步哨	Infantry patrol

P'u

P'u⁴ lei³	堡壘	Breastworks (in trenches, etc)

San

San¹ chiao³ t'se⁴ liang² fa³	三角測量法	Triangulation
San¹ teng³ ping¹	三等兵	3rd class private
San⁴ ping¹	散兵	Demobilize

Shan

Shan¹ k'ou³ tsu³	山口子	Mountain pass
Shan¹ p'ao⁴	山砲	Mountain gun
Shan¹ ting³	山頂	Mountain top
Shan⁴ hou⁴	善後	Condition of affairs (after war)
Shan⁴ ma³	騸馬	Gelding, to geld a horse

Shang

Shang¹ t'uan²	商團	Militia supported by merchants
Shang¹ wu⁴ ts'an¹ tsan⁴	商務參贊	Commercial attache'
Shang⁴ t'su⁴ tao¹	上刺刀	"Fix bayonets".
Shang⁴ ma³	上馬	Mount a horse
Shang⁴ hsiao⁴	上校	Colonel
Shang⁴ wei⁴	上尉	Captain
Shang⁴ chiang⁴	上將	General

Shao

Shao⁴ wei⁴	少尉	2nd. lieut.
Shao⁴ hsiao⁴	少校	Major
Shao⁴ chiang⁴	少將	Brigadier general

Shao⁴ hsi¹	少息	To rest, "Rest".

She

She⁴ chiao³	射角	Angle of fire
She⁴ hui⁴	社會	Society (condition of)
She⁴ ch'eng²	射程	Range
She⁴ shou³	射手	Marksman
She⁴ yen², she⁴ hsi²	設筵, 設席	Prepare a feast
She⁴ ying²	舍營	Permanent camp or post
She⁴ yuan³ ch'i⁴	射遠器	Range finder

Sheng

Sheng¹ jen⁴	升任	To be promoted
Sheng¹ shou³	生手	Inexperienced
Sheng¹ lang⁴	聲浪	Wave length (sound)
Sheng¹ shih⁴	聲勢	Superfluous influence
Sheng³, sheng³ chang³,	省, 省長,	Province, governor of province
Sheng³ ch'eng²	省城	Capital of province.
Sheng⁴ fu⁴	勝負	Win or lose, victory or defeat (battle).
Sheng⁴ li⁴ chün¹	生力軍	Shock troops.

Shih

Shih¹, shih³ chang³	師，師長	Division, division commander
Shih⁴ pai⁴	失敗	To fail, lose
Shih² chü²	時局	Present condition of affairs
Shih² chi⁴	實際	True state of affairs
Shih² li⁴	實力	Real strength
Shih² tan⁴	實彈	Ball cartridge
Shih³ kuan³	使館	Embassy, legation
Shih³ tso⁴ yung³ che³	始作俑者	The first one to do this, (of something bad)
Shih⁴ wei¹ yun⁴ tung⁴	示威運動	Military demonstration
Shih⁴ ch'a² fang² wu⁴	視察防務	Examine preparations for defence
Shih⁴ ch'i⁴	士氣	Morale

Shou

Shou³ jung² tui⁴	收容隊	Prison guards (at prison camps)
Shou³ ch'iang¹, shou³ ch'iang¹ tui⁴	手槍，手槍隊	Pistol, pistol troops, (generally bodyguard troops)
Shou³ wei⁴ ping¹, shou³ pei⁴	守衛兵，守備	To guard, defend, garrison, sentry.
Shou³ hsien¹	首先	First
Shou³ tuan⁴	手段	Ability, skill, plan, means.
Shou⁴ i¹	獸醫	Veterinary surgeon.

Shu

Shu¹ chuang¹ tai⁴ fa¹	東裝待發	Baggage ready and waiting to leave
Shu³,⁴ ming²	署名	To sign, affix signature
Shu³	蜀(四川)	Szechuan province

Shuang

Shuang¹ fang³	雙方	Both sides

Shui

Shui³ hu²	水壺	Canteen

Shun

Shun² chung³	純種	Blood (pure bred horse)

So

So¹ so³	搜索	To inspect sentries (inside camp)

Shou

Shou¹ fu⁴	收復	Retake
Shou¹ pien¹	收編	Reorganize
Shou³ ch'iang¹	手槍	Pistol

Shou³ liu² tan⁴	手留彈	Hand grenade
Shou³ wu² t'sun⁴ t'ieh³	手無寸鐵	Has no weapons with which to fight
Shou³ tsu² wu² t'so⁴	手足無措	Very much excited
Shou⁴ shang¹	受傷	Receive a wound

Shu

Shu⁴ li³ kung³ shih³	署理公使	Charge' d'Affairs

Shua

Shua¹ ma³	刷馬	Groom a horse

Shui

Shui³ shou³	水手	Crew (of ship)
Shui³ tao⁴	水道	Channel
Shui³ lei²	水雷	Torpedo (water mine)
Shui⁴	稅	Tax

Su

Su¹ ch'ing¹	肅清	Completely peaceful

Sui

Sui⁴ jih⁴ hsien³ lu⁴	遂日顯露	Gradually the thing becomes known.

Ssu

Ssu¹ hao²	絲毫	A very little
Ssu¹ ling⁴ (kuan¹)	司令(官)	Commander, "C.O."
Ssu¹ wu⁴ chang³	司務長	Company Q.M. and finance officer.
Ssu³ shang¹ che³	死傷者	Dead and wounded
Ssu⁴ hou⁴	嗣後	Hereafter
Ssu⁴ hou⁴	俟後	Wait until afterwards

Ta

Ta³ ch'ien² shih¹	打前失	Stumble - of horse
Ta³ chang⁴	打仗	Fight a battle
Ta³ tien⁴ pao⁴	打電報	Send a telegram
Ta³ ch'uan²⁴, ch'uan² shu⁴	打拳, 拳術	To box, boxing
Ta³ pa³	打靶	Target practice
Ta³ pai⁴ chang⁴	打敗仗	Defeat
Ta⁴ yu³ ch'u¹ ju⁴	大有出入	A great difference
Ta⁴ p'ai² shao⁴	大排哨	Patrol of 8 men
Ta⁴ tsung³ t'ung³	大總統	President of Republic

Ta⁴ pen³ ying²	大本營	Main military camp
Ta⁴ tao¹ tui⁴	大刀隊	"Big knife troops" (Generally used as body-guard troops.)
Ta⁴ chü²	大局	General situation
Ta⁴ chen⁴	大振	Well known
Ta⁴ shih³	大使	Ambassador
Ta⁴ yuan² shuai⁴	大元帥	Marshal (military rank)

Tai

Tai⁴ piao³	代表	Representatives of important persons.

T'ai

T'ai² p'ing²	太平	Peaceful
T'ai⁴ tu⁴	態度	Policy, appearance

Tan

Tan¹ jen⁴	擔任	Take the responsibility
Tan¹ ke², tan¹ wu⁴	躭擱, 躭悞	Wait, delay
Tan⁴ ch'iang¹	彈腔	Magazine of rifle

Tang

Tang¹ chü²	當局	Important persons
Tang¹ jih⁴ chiang⁴ hsiao⁴	當日將校	Officer of the Day

T'ao

T'ao² chün¹, t'ao² ping¹	逃軍, 逃兵	To desert, a deserter
T'ao² p'ao³	逃跑	To escape
T'ao⁴ ma³ kan¹ tzu³	套馬杆子	Lasso (lariat)
T'ao⁴ ch'e¹	套車	Harness a horse

Te

Te² kuo²	德國	Germany

T'e

T'e⁴ ming² ch'uan² ch'uan² ta⁴ shih³	特命全權大使	Ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary.

Teng

Teng¹ lung²	燈籠	Lantern

Ti

Ti'	的	Bull's eye, target.
Ti^ shih^	地勢	Topography
Ti^ p'an^	地盤	Territory (on which to raise money for support of troops, etc.)
Ti^ k'ang^	抵抗	Prevent, oppose, resist.
Ti^ jen^, ti^ chün'	敵人，敵軍	The enemy, enemy army
Ti^ chen^	敵陣	Enemy position
Ti^ ch'ing^	敵情	Condition of enemy
Ti^ sui^ ching' k'uei^	敵遂驚潰	Enemy were surprised and routed.
Ti^ yü^	抵禦	Oppose
Ti^ tzu^	笛子	Whistle used by officers
Ti^ fang'	地方	Territory
Ti^ lei^	地雷	Land mine

Tiao

Tiao^ ping'	調兵	Move troops, transfer

T'iao

T'iao^ li^	條例	Precedent
T'iao^ kuo^ ch'ü^	跳過去	Jump over

T'ieh

T'ieh³ lu⁴-	鐵路	Railway:-
Ching¹ feng⁴	京奉	Peking-Mukden
Ching¹ han⁴	京漢	Peking-Hankow
Ching¹ sui¹	京綏	Peking-Suiyuan
Ching¹ pu²	京浦	Tientsin-Pukow
Chung¹ tung¹	中東	Chinese Eastern
Hsi¹ pi⁴ li⁴ ya³	西比利亞	Trans Siberian
Nan² man³	南滿	South Manchurian
T'ieh³ kuei³	鐵軌	Rail
T'ieh³ chia³ ch'e¹	鐵甲車	Armored train
T'ieh³ ssu¹ wang³	鐵絲網	Barbed wire entanglements
T'ieh³ t'iao² wang³	鐵條網	Wire entanglement
T'ieh³ kung¹ ch'ang³	鐵工廠	Iron foundry

Tien

Tien³ ming²	點名	Roll call
Tien⁴ pao⁴ tui⁴	電報隊	Telegraph troops (of signal corps)
Tien⁴ hua⁴ tui⁴	電話隊	Telephone troops (of signal corps)
Tien⁴ ling⁴	電令	Telegraphic command
Tien⁴	滇(雲南)	Yunnan province
Tien⁴ lang⁴	電浪	Wave length (electricity)
Tien⁴ wang³	電網	Electric wire entanglements.

T'ien⁴ lei²	電雷	Electric mine
T'ien⁴ ch'ih²	電池	Electric battery
T'ien⁴ ma³ pu⁴ ming²	電碼不明	Code words indecipherable

T'ien

T'ien¹ ch'iao²	天橋	Bridge used by soldier s for exercise

Ting

Ting⁴ Nan² chen¹	定南針	Compass

T'ing

T'ing² chih³	停止	Stop

To

To² huo⁴	奪獲	Captured
To¹ yuan³	多遠	How far is ?
To² huan²	奪還	Retake (a position)

T'o

T'o¹ ch'iang¹	托槍	To hold rifle at "charge"
T'o³ ch'ou²	妥籌	Think of dependable plan.

Ts'é⁴ to¹ tsu³	駝 馱 子	Carry on pack animal

T'ou

T'ou² hsiang²	投 降	Surrender (to victor) troops going over to victorious side.

Tsa

Tsa² chung³	雜 種	Mixed breed

Tsai

Tsai⁴ chan⁴	再 戰	Fight again

Ts'ai

Ts'ai² cheng⁴ pu⁴	財 政 部	Ministry of Finance
Ts'ai² ch'e⁴	裁 撤	Withrow (troops)

Tsan

Ts'an¹ mou² pu⁴	參 謀 部	General Staff Office
" " Tsung³ Chang³	" " 總 長	" " " - head of
" " Tzu⁴ Chang³	" " 次 長	" " " Asst. " "
" " chang³	" " 長	Chief of Staff (Tactical units.)
" " kuan¹	" " 官	General staff officer
" " tai⁴	" " 帶	" " aigulettes.

Ts'an¹ chia¹	參加	Take part in

Ts'ang

Ts'ang¹	艙	Hold of ship
Ts'ang¹ k'ou³	艙口	Hatchway (on ship)
Ts'ang¹ ts'u⁴ yü⁴ pien⁴	倉猝遇變	Suddenly (unexpectedly) the troops mutined.
Ts'ang¹ ts'u⁴	倉卒	Very hurried, busy, time very short.

Tsao

Tsao³ ch'en²	早晨	Morning

Ts'ao

Ts'ao¹ fa³	操法	Methods of drill
Ts'ao³ liao⁴	草料	forage
Ts'ao³ tzu⁴	草字	My personal name is...

Ts'e

Ts'e⁴ liang⁴, ts'e⁴ liang⁴ piao³	測量，測量表	Survey, surveying instruments.
Ts'e⁴ ying⁴	策應	To plan to mutually assist.
Ts'e⁴ mien⁴	側面	Side

Ts'eng

Ts'eng² ts'eng⁴ mi⁴ pu⁴	層層密布	Large number of troops in position

Tso

Tso³ i⁴	左翼	Left flank or wing
Tso³ t'se⁴ wei⁴ tui⁴	左側衛隊	Left flank guard
Tso⁴ chan⁴ chi⁴ hua⁴	作戰計畫	Plan of campaign
Tso⁴ chen⁴	坐鎮	

Tsou

Tsou³ ma³	走馬	Pacing horse

Tsu

Tsu¹ chieh⁴	租界	Foreign concession
Tsu³ ai⁴	阻碍	To hinder, obstruct
Tsu³ chih¹	組織	Complete a plan, finish
Tsu³ chih³	阻止	Hinder and stop

Tsun

Tsun¹ chang¹ ch'eng²	遵章程	Obey regulations
Tsun¹ ming⁴	遵命	Obey commands

Tsung

Tsung³ szu¹ ling⁴	總司令	Commander in Chief
Tsung⁴ tui⁴	縱隊	Column formation

Ts'ung

Ts'ung² chün¹ chung¹	從軍中	On active service

Tu

Tu¹ ch'eng²	都城	Peking
Tu¹ shih¹	督師	Take charge or command of, encourage or push the troops.
Tu² li⁴	獨立	To be independent (of central government)
Tu³ chien⁴ fang² wei¹	杜漸防微	Prevent misfortune by being careful of details.
Tu⁴ he²	渡河	To ford or cross a river
Tu⁴	度	Degree (measurement)

T'u

T'u³ p'o¹ er²	土坡兒	Hillock
T'u³ fei³	土匪	Bandits, robbers.

Tuan

Tuan¹ cheng⁴ tsu¹ shih⁴	端正姿勢	To come to attention (body of troops)
Tuan³ ping¹ hsiang¹ chieh¹	短兵相接	Hand to hand fighting
Tuan⁴ ku³	斷骨	Fracture (bone)
Tuan⁴ chüeh² chiao¹ she⁴	斷絕交涉	Break of negotiations

T'uan

T'uan², t'uan² chang³	團, 團長	Regiment, regiment commander
T'uan² fu⁴ kuan¹	團副官	Regiment adjutant

Tui

Tui⁴ ch'ih⁴	對峙	Opposite eachother ready to fight
Tui⁴ fang¹	對方	Opposite side

T'ui

T'ui¹ tao³	推倒	Overturn, upset
T'ui⁴ ping¹	退兵	Retreat, withdraw troops.

Tung

Tung⁴ ling⁴	動令	Command of execution
Tung⁴ yuan² ling⁴	動員令	Order to move

T'ung

T'ung² meng²	同盟	Alliance, allies
T'ung¹ chi⁴	通緝	Order of arrest
T'ung¹ chih¹	通知	Notify everyone
T'ung² shih²	同時	At the same time

Tsu

Tsu¹ chung⁴ (ping¹ / tui⁴)	輜重 (兵 / 隊)	Military transport, (Q.M.) Corps.
Tsu¹ ke²	資格	Talents, ability
Tsu³ tan⁴, tzu³ tan⁴ he²	子彈, 子彈盒	Bullets or rifle ammunition, bullet or rifle box.
Tzu⁴ pao³, tzu⁴ wei⁴	自保, 自衛	Protect yourself.

T'su

T'su⁴ tao¹ (shang⁴, hsia⁴)	衷刀 (上 下)	Bayoent (fix, unfix)
T'su³ chih³	辭職	Resign from office
T'su² li⁴ fang¹ wei⁴	磁力方位	Magnetic bearing
T'su² chi²	磁極	Magnetic pole

Wa

Wa¹ chan⁴ hao⁴	挖戰壕	Entrench
Wa¹ ti⁴	窪地	Low ground

Wai

Wai⁴ chiao¹ tsung³ chang³	外交總長	Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Wai⁴ chiao¹ pu⁴	外交部	Foreign Office
Wai⁴ chiao¹ t'uan²	外交團	Foreign Ministers i.e.- "Diplomatic Corps"
Wai⁴ kuo²	外國	Foreign country

Wan

Wan² ch'iang²(ti² k'ang⁴)	頑强(抵抗)	Strongly and stubbornly (resist)
Wan² chün⁴	完竣	Completely finished
Wan³ shang¹	晚晌	Evening
Wan⁴ li³ ch'ang² ch'eng²	萬里長城	Great Wall
Wan⁴ kuo²	萬國	All nations
Wan⁴ kuo² kung¹ fa³	萬國公法	International law

Wang

Wang² ming⁴	亡命	No regard for one's life.
Wang⁴ yuan³ ching⁴	望遠鏡	Field glasses

Wei

Wei³ hsien⁴	緯線	Degree of latitude
Wei¹ fu²	微服	To disguise oneself
Wei¹ hsing²	微行	To go secretly
Wei¹ he⁴	威嚇	Induce by force
Wei¹ p'o⁴	威迫	Forceably, to use force
Wei²	圍	Surround
Wei² hsien³	危險	Danger
Wei² k'ang⁴	違抗	Refuse to obey superior
Wei² lao³	慰勞	Compliment, thank troops
Wei⁴ hsieh⁴	未楔	Place when guard lines
Wei⁴ ping¹ shih⁴	衛兵室	"Guard House"
Wei⁴ tui⁴	衛隊	Bodyguard troops
Wei⁴ sheng¹ tui⁴	衛生隊	Ambulance corps, sanitary troops.

Wen

Wen² hu³ chang¹	文虎章	"Order of Literary Tiger" given to military.
Wen⁴ t'i²	問題	Questions

Wu

Wu¹ he² chih¹ chung⁴	烏合之衆	Poorly drilled rabble

Wu² hsien⁴ tien⁴	無線電	Wireless telegraph
Wu³ kuan¹	武官	Military officer
Wu³ ch'i⁴	武器	Military supplies, weapons.
Wu³ chuang¹	武裝	Military dress
Wu³ li⁴	武力	Military powers
Wu³ k'u⁴	武庫	Military magazines storehouse
Wu⁴ hui⁴	誤會	To make mistake in thinking of a plan.
Wu²	吳	Kiangsu province

Ya

Ya⁴ ch'e¹	押車	Train sent ahead of official train to test track for bombs, etc.

Yang

Yang¹ tzu³ fang²	秧子房	Place where bandits keep captives
Yang³ chiao³ (chüeh²)	仰角	Angle of elevation

Yao

Yao¹	腰	Loins
Yao¹ k'ou³	要口	Defile

Yao⁴ tung'	(軍心)搖動	Upset, disturbed, (morale bad - of troops)
Yao⁴ sai' (p'ao⁴)	要塞(砲)	Fortification, fortress artillery.
Yao⁴ shih⁴	葯室	Dispensary

Yeh

Yeh³ p'ao⁴	野砲	Heavy (mobile) artillery
Yeh³ chan⁴ chung⁴ p'ao⁴	野戰重砲	Field artillery (75 mm)
Yeh³ wai⁴ ch'in² wu⁴	野外勤務	Field exercise, manouvers

Yen

Yen² ch'ang²	延長	Long delay
Yen² yen⁴	筵宴	Lavishly entertain
Yen³ hu⁴ tui⁴	掩護隊	Burial corps
Yen¹	燕(直隸)	Chihli province
Yen² ch'eng³	嚴懲	To punish severely
Yen³ hsi² hsing² chün¹	演習行軍	Manouver, route march
Yen⁴ huo⁴	驗貨	Examine goods

Yin

Yin⁴ tu⁴ kuo²	印度國	India

Yin³ ma⁴ ch'ang³	飲馬廠	Place to water horses
Yin³ pi⁴ p'ao⁴ t'ai²	隱蔽砲台	Masked battery
Yin³ ch'ing²	隱情	Secret plans
Yin³ huo³ hsien⁴	引火線	Fuse
Yin³ chiu⁴ hsia⁴ yeh³	引咎下野	Admit fault and resign from office
Yin³ pi⁴	隱庇	Hide in
Yin⁴ hsin⁴	印信	Official seal

Ying

Ying³	營	Battalion or squadron
Ying³ chang³	營長	" " " commander
Ying³ fu⁴ kuan¹	營副官	" " " adjutant
Ying³ p'an²	營盤	Barracks, camp.
Ying³ hsiang³	影響	Influence, effect (for bad)
Ying¹ kuo²	英國	England
Ying¹ fu⁴	應付	Agree
Ying¹ wu⁴ ch'u⁴	營務處	Guard house
Ying¹ ch'ou²	應酬	Entertain guests

Yu

Yu¹ tai⁴	優待	Great courtesy, polite.

Yu⁴ ts'e⁴ wei⁴ tui⁴	右側衛隊	Right flank guard
Yu⁴ i⁴	右翼	Right flank or wing

Yü

Yü⁴ ling⁴	預令	Preparatory command
Yü⁴ pei⁴ tui⁴	預備隊	Special or local reserves
Yü⁴ lun⁴	輿論	Public opinion
Yü⁴	豫(河南)	Honan province

Yuan

Yuan² mao³	圓滿	Complete, perfect
Yuan² tui⁴	援隊	Reserves
Yuan² yin¹	原因	Reason
Yuan⁴	皖(安徽)	Anhui province
Yuan² cheng¹ (chün¹)	遠征('軍)	Military expedition, (expeditionary force)

Yüeh

Yüeh⁴	粵(廣東)	Kuangtung province
Yüeh⁴ tzu³	月子	Bull's eye

Yun

Yun⁴ tung⁴	運動	Exercise, move about, manouver.

Yun⁴ shu¹ tui⁴	運輸隊	Transport troops
Yun⁴ niang⁴	醞釀	Talk over a plan before starting to carry it out.
Yun⁴ liang² he²	運糧河	The grand Canal
Yun⁴ he²	運河	A canal

Yung

Yung² ping¹	傭兵	Mercenary (soldier)
Yung⁴ wu³	用武	To use force

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6110 - Agencies of Central Government

MIL. INTEL. DIV.
DEC 2009-184 1933
RECEIVED G/2 W. WAR DEPARTMENT DEC 4 1933

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Peiping Branch Military Council

2009-184

Attached hereto is a list showing the organization of the Peiping Branch Military Council (see G-2 Report No. 8597). Given below are a few notes which explain the chart:

Chairman (General Ho Ying-ch'in)

Secretariat: Attending to confidential matters, documents, telegrams and foreign affairs.

Foreign Affairs Department: Relative to foreign affairs, dealing with legations, giving of military intelligence and receiving of pressmen.

Confidential Secretariat's Dept.: Relative to confidential matters, documents, telegrams, statistical returns of receipts and expenditures, and record of minutes of meetings.

Ciphers Department: Relative to despatch, receipt and deciphering of telegrams.

1st Bureau: Handling military orders, etc.

1st Department: Relative to foreign military intelligence.

2nd Department: Relative to war matters, national defense, transfer and distribution of forces.

3rd Department: Relative to military communication, transportation, etc.

4th Department: Relative to educational plans and training for the navy and the aviation force.

2nd Bureau: In charge of military affairs.

5th Department: Relative to arms and munitions, and giving of orders for the repairs and manufacture of arms.

6th Department: Relative to appointments, dismissals, rewards and punishments of military officers and personnel in the service.

7th Department: Relative to enlistment of soldiers, their dismissals and the filling up of vacant posts.

8th Department: Relative to repairs and construction of barracks.

3rd Bureau: In control of military administration.

9th Department: Relative to examinations of the Commissariat's staff.

From M/A, China Report No. 8688 November 9, 1933

G-2 Report

6110 - Agencies of Central Government

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Peiping Branch Military Council

10th Department: Relative to military surgery, purchase and distribution of medical supplies.

11th Department: Relative to military litigations, decisions of cases, etc.

12th Department: Relative to Chinese social affairs, reception of Chinese guests, etc.

Source: Official and confidential.

COMMENTS: It will be noted that General Ho Ying-ch'in is chairman and naturally exercises great authority as many things must be done between the meetings of the permanent members.

The 12th Department has been called the Adjutant General's Department for lack of better translation. The "fu kuan" does the work of an adjutant or aide in our service but in China also handles a great many personal affairs for the commander. This department takes care of entertainment, etc., of other Chinese officials.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

S. V. Constant
Major, Cavalry
Assistant Military Attache

Encls. 1 chart.

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軍事委員會北平分會
PEIPING BRANCH MILITARY COUNCIL



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6110-Agencies of Central Government

CHINA (Military) 4-1

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WAR DEPARTMENT

Subject: Peiping Branch Military Council

Names of the Peiping Branch Military Council together with a short biography are given below:

Ho Ying-ch'in

Native of Hsingi, Kweichow. Graduate, Tokyo Military Staff College. 1928, chairman, Chekiang Provincial Government. Member of Kuomintang Central Executive Committee since 1926. Member of Kuomintang Central Political Council since 1927. Minister of War since March 1930. Now acting chairman of the Peiping Branch Military Council.

Wang Shu-ch'ang

Native of Liaoning. Former Chairman, Hopei Provincial Government. At present Garrison Commandant, Peiping-Tientsin area.

Wan Fu-lin

Native of Kirin. Sometime Commander, Northeastern 8th Army. Chairman, Kirin Provincial Government, before its occupation by the Japanese.

Chang Tso-hsiang

Native of Liaoning. 1918, Chief of Staff to Inspector-General of Manchuria. 1919, concurrently Commander, 27th Div. 1924-8, Military Governor of Kirin. Former Chairman, Kirin Provincial Government and Deputy C-in-C of N.E. Frontier Defense. State Councillor of the National Government since 1930.

Chang Chun

Native of Szechwan. Graduate, Paoting Military Academy and Tokyo Military Staff College. Member, Tung Meng Hui. 1912, served under General Ch'en Ch'i-mei. 1920, Chief of Police, Chengtu (Szechwan). 1922, Chief of Police, Kaifeng (Honan). 1927, Counsellor, Commander-in-Chief's Hdqrs., Northern Expedition. 1928, Director, Shanghai Arsenal; political Vice-Minister of Military Affairs. Transferred as Mayor of Shanghai since 1929; at the same time elected member of Kuomintang Central Executive Committee. Sometime representative of Chiang Kai-shek in the north.

Han Fu-chu

Native of Hopei. 1917, Major, 1st Regiment, 16th Mixed Brigade; 1921, Colonel, Cavalry Regiment, 11th Division. 1923, Colonel, 43rd Regiment. 1924, Brigadier-General, 1st Mixed Brigade. 1925, Major General, 1st Division (temporarily organized). 1926, General, 6th Army. Commander-in-Chief, 3rd Route Army, since 1928. Former Chairman, Honan Provincial Government. Chairman, Shantung Provincial Government since 1930.

Hsu Yung-ch'ang

Native of Shansi. One of Yen Hsi-shan's trusted commanders. Now Chairman of Shansi Provincial Government and Commander of the 33rd Army Corps.

Wang Shu-han

Native of Liaoning. Sometime Commissioner of Finance, Liaoning Provincial Government; Civil Governor of Kirin Province. State Councillor of the National Government since 1930.

From M/A, China Report No. 8591 May 31, 1933

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Peiping Branch Military Council

Sung Che-yuan
1925, Commander, 11th Division; Military Governor of Jehol. 1926-7, Commander, Kuominchun 1st Division; Commander, Kuominchun 4th Army. 1927-8, Chairman, Shensi Provincial Government; Commander, 29th Army Corps.

Pao Wen-yueh
Native of Liaoning. Former Chief of Staff to Chang Hsueh-liang.

Yu Hsueh-chung
Native of Shantung. Graduated from a school of military training. 1918, Commander, Artillery Regiment, 18th Mixed Brigade. 1921, Commander, 18th Mixed Brigade. 1927, Commander-in-Chief, Chinchow and Liaoyang Defense Forces; Commander, 20th Army, 3rd and 4th Columns. 1928, Adviser, Northeastern Frontier Defense Headquarters. 1930, Commander, Northeastern Frontier Defense 1st Army. Garrison Commander, Peiping and Tientsin areas, 1930-32. Now Chairman of Hopei Provincial Government and Commander of the 51st Army Corps.

Shang Chen
Native of Hopei. Graduate, Peiyang Military College. Rose to Commander, 1st Division, Shansi Provincial Army. 1925, Tutung (Military Governor) of Suiyuan. 1928, Commander of Shansi troops in Peiping and Tientsin. 1929, Chairman, Hopei Provincial Government. 1930, acting Garrison Commander, Peiping and Tientsin areas; Chairman, Shansi Provincial Government. March 1929, elected reserve member, Kuomintang Central Executive Committee.

Yung Chen
Native of Liaoning. Former Chief of Staff to Chang Hsueh-liang.

Pang Ping-hsun
Commander of the 40th Army Corps. Former subordinate of Feng Yu-hsiang.

Shen Hung-lieh
Commander of the Northeastern Squadron at Tsingtao. Chang Hsueh-liang's man.

T'ang Yu-lin
Native of Jehol. Graduate, Mukden Military Institute. Sometime Commander, 54th Brigade; Commander, 13th Army. 1926-8, Civil and Military Governor of Chahar and Jehol. Chairman, Jehol Provincial Government before its occupation by the Japanese.

Chiang Po-cheng
Former resident representative of Chiang Kai-shek in the North.

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6110 - Agencies of Central Government

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Peiping Branch Military Council

Liu Yi-fei
Sometime Commander, Northeastern 4th Brigade. Chairman, Chahar Provincial Government 1930-1932.

Hsiao Chen-ying
Sung Che-yuan's representative in Peiping. A former Kuominchun man.

New members added following the appointment of the "Peiping Political Affairs Readjustment Committee" (see G-2 Report No. 8583) are as follows:

Chi Yi-yao
Native of Hupeh. Former Commander, Northeastern Army and Chang Hsueh-liang's Chief of Staff.

Hu Ju-kun
Native of Liaoning. Former Commander, 16th Army Corps, Northeastern Army. 1929, Commander, 2nd Frontier Defense Army during the Sino-Soviet dispute. 1932, Director, Hopei Government Property Bureau.

Chou Tso-hua
Native of Liaoning. Former Commander, Northeastern Artillery Army. Only recently returned to China from abroad.

Chang Huan-hsiang
Native of Liaoning. Former Commander, Railway Guard of Chinese Eastern Railway, and Northeastern Aviation Force.

Kao Wei-yueh
Native of Liaoning. Former Tutung of Chahar, and Counselor of Northeastern Border Defense Army Headquarters.

Liu Suan-chin
Native of Liaoning. Former Civil Governor of Fengtien. 1931, Minister of Home Affairs.

Source: Study in M/A Office.

COMMENTS: It will be noted that all the six new members are of the old Manchurian regime. This is a move on the part of the National Government to insure the loyalty of the former leaders and troops of Chang Hsueh-liang.

W. S. Drysdale
Lieutenant-Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache

SVC

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WAR DEPARTMENT

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. OCT 24 1932

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Peiping Branch of the Military Council

The Peiping Branch of the Military Council was organized immediately after the resignation of Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang from his post as Pacification Commissioner of the Peiping Area, which resignation was accepted by the Central Executive Committee of the National Government in August. The title was abolished and the post and duties were superseded by a military committee of eighteen, later increased to nineteen, to be known as the "Peiping Branch of the Military Council of the Nationalist Government".

The Peiping Branch of the Military Council was immediately organized as shown on the attached blue print.

The nineteen permanent members of the Peiping Branch of the Military Council are as follows:

Chang Hsueh-liang, Acting Chairman. (Former Pacification Commissioner of Peiping)
Wang Shu-han, member. (Former Chief Secretary of Chang Hsueh-liang)
Wan Fu-lin, permanent member. (Former Chief Councillor of Chang Hsueh-liang)
Chang Tso-hsiang, member. (Former member of the Peiping Branch Political Council)
Chang Chun, member. (Former member of the Peiping Branch Political Council)
Han Fu-chu, member. (Chairman of Shantung Provincial Government)
Hsu Yung-chang, member. (Chairman of Shansi Provincial Government)
Wang Shu-chang, member. (Garrison Commander of Peiping and Tientsin)
Sung Che-yuan, member. (Commander of the 29th Army Corps)
Pao Wen-yueh , member. (Former Chief of Staff of Chang Hsueh-liang and his representative at Nanking)
Yu Hsueh-chung, member. (Chairman of Hopei Provincial Govt.)
Shang Chen, member. (Commander of the 32nd Army Corps)
Yung Chen, permanent member. (Former C.ofS. of Chang Hsueh-liang)
Pang Ping-hsun, member. (Commander of the 40th Army Corps
Shen Hung-lieh, member. (Mayor of Tsingtao and Commander of the Northeastern Navy)
Tang Yu-lin, member. (Chairman of Jehol Provincial Govt.)
Chiang Po-cheng, permanent member. (Chiang Kai-shek's representative at Peiping)
Liu Yi-fei, member. (Former Chairman of the Chahar Provincial Government)
Hsiao Chen-ying, member. (Former member of the Peiping Branch Political Council)

The so-called permanent members on the above list, that is, Yung Chen, Wan Fu-lin and Chiang Po-cheng, constitute the standing committee of the Peiping Branch of the Military Council. It is worthy of note that this committee consists of Chang Hsueh-liang's former Chief of Staff, his former Chief Councillor, and a

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Peiping Branch of the Military Council

representative of Chiang Kai-shek. This committee is empowered to act in routine affairs but the responsibility still rests with the Chairman of the Peiping Branch of the Military Council, Chang Hsueh-liang.

The councillors at the present time consist of Shen Yung-yi and seven others. Shen is the Director of the Bureau of Engraving and Printing at Peiping. The number of councillors is not limited and may be increased or decreased at the will of the members of the Peiping Branch of the Military Council.

The Chief Secretary is Wang Shu-han, the former Chief Secretary of Chang Hsueh-liang.

The Chief of the Secretariat is Yung Chen, former Chief of Staff of Chang Hsueh-liang, and a member of the standing committee. He has as his assistant in this department Chu Kwang-mu, former Assistant Chief of Staff to Chang Hsueh-liang.

Under the Secretariat are three divisions, - the Diplomacy Division, the Division of State Affairs, and the Ciphers Division. These three divisions have the following personnel:

Diplomacy Division:

Chief - Shen Tsu-tung, former vice-chief of General Affairs Department, Peiping Pacification Commissioner's Office.
Assistant - Ning Hsiang-nan.

Division of State Affairs: Chief - Yeh Pi-liang
Assistant - Chow Tsung-cheng

Ciphers Division: Chief - Chang Chih-hsien
Assistant - Kao Chen-kai

The First Bureau consists of the Military Intelligence Division, the Division of Strategy, the Communication Division, and the Naval Affairs Division. The following persons occupy these various offices:

First Bureau:

Chief - Wang Yi-che, formerly Commander of the7th Independent Infantry Brigade.
Assistant - Chen Chin-juo.

Military Intelligence Division: Chief - Yang Cheng-chih
Assistant - Chi Chia-ling

Division of Strategy: Chief - Chin Yuan-cheng
Assistant - Ho Hung-to

CHINA (Military)

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Communication Division: Chief - Chiang Pin
Assistant - Chow Yung-yeh

Naval Affairs Division: Chief - Sung Shih-shan
Assistant - Hwang Tu-wang

The Second Bureau consists of the Ordnance Division, Personnel Division, Engineering Division, and Transportation Division. Following is the personnel of this Bureau:

Second Bureau:

Chief - Chow Lien, former Chief of the Commissariat Dept., Peiping Pacification Commissioner's Office.
Assistant - Feng Ping-chuan

Ordnance Division: Chief - Feng Chao-chi
Assistant - Yen Kuo-hwa

Personnel Division: Chief - Chang Chin-hsiang
Assistant - Wang Teng

Engineering Division: Chief - Tseng Kuang-lin
Assistant - Wang Pao-tien

Transportation Division: Chief - Ma Han-chang
Assistant - Chen Jui-chang

The Third Bureau consists of the Commissariat Division, Medical Division, Division of Military Justice and The Adjutant General's Division. This Bureau has the following personnel:

Third Bureau:

Chief - Hwang Shih-yu, former 17th Ind. Brig. Commander
Assistant - Tang Kuo-chen, Chang Hsueh-liang's former Adjutant General.

Commissariat Division: Chief - Shen Chen-jung
Assistant - Wen Jen-pang

Medical Division: Chief - Liu Jung-fu
Assistant - Jen Tso-chou

Division of Military Justice: Chief - Yen Wen-hai
Assistant - Li Wen-tse

Adjutant General's Division: Chief - Hsu Ying
Assistant - Li Ju-chow

Each of the preceding divisions is further divided into a first, second and third section. Each section has a section chief, clerks, etc., for handling the details of administration.

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CHINA (Military)

Subject: Peiping Branch of the Military Council

It is worthy of note that all important positions in the entire organization are occupied by subordinates of the Young Marshal with the exception of one member of the Standing Committee who is Chiang Kai-shek's personal representative. This indicates that the Young Marshal and Chiang Kai-shek are working hand in glove and that Chang Hsueh-liang will still be held responsible by the National Government for any military action that may be necessary in the North.

W. S. Drysdale

W. S. Drysdale
Lieutenant-Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache

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G-2 Report

6110

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Organization of Military Council

(Translation of a Mandate Promulgated by the National Government on September 18, 1939.)

JUN 7 2009-184 1930
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Article 1. The Military Council is the source for military information and the proposal of military plans, and is directly under the National Government.

Article 2. The Military Council shall have a president, who shall take charge of all matters of the Council.

Article 3. The Military Council shall have a vice-president, who assists the president in managing all matters of the Council.

Article 4. The Military Council shall have from 20 to 20 councillors, and 20 to 60 advisers. The number of councillors ranked as generals will not be more than 12, and major generals not more than 24.

Article 5. Councillors and advisers are appointed to the Military Council from those who have held important posts in the army. They must have knowledge and experience, have obtained recognition for their services, have long service in the Party and Government, and must rank as general officers or colonels of the army, navy or aeronautic force.

Article 6. Councillors and advisers of the Military Council should initiate inquiries, propose plans, hold inspections of troops by maneuvers and practice exercises as well as perform other duties assigned in time of peace, and shall be chosen as high military commanders or appointed to adequate posts in time of war.

Article 7. In order to promote further studies in tactics and to improve sciences, the Military Council will establish the following research committees:

1. Military Research Committee
2. Political " "

Article 8. Members of the committees are appointed from the councillors and advisers of the Council.

Article 9. There shall be a chairman in each committee, who shall be designated by the President of the Council.

Article 10. The Military Council is divided into General Affairs and Military Affairs Departments. The General Affairs Department is composed of Document and Controlling Sections; and the Military Affairs Department is composed of Compilation, Collection and Investigation Sections.

Article 11. The formation of the Military Council is shown in the attached table.

Article 12. The functions and rules of the Military Council are otherwise provided.

Article 13. The above regulations will come into force from the date of their promulgation.

John Magruder
Major, Field Artillery (DOL)

From M/A, China Report No. 7719 May 5, 1930

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6110 - Organization
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: New Nationalist (Kuomintang) Military Council.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JUN 2 1927

1. On March 22nd, the Nationalist Government at Hankow established a Military Council. The members are

Chiang Kai-shih
Tan Yen-kai
Fang Yu-hsiang
Tang Sheng-chih
Chang Ch'ien
Li Chung-jen
Ho Yin-chin
Li Chi-sen
Chu Pei-te
Chang Fah-kwei
Wang Ching-wei
Sun Fo
Kou Meng-yu
T. V. Soong
Hsu Ch'ien
T'eng Yen-ta.

2. This Council will now be the highest military administrative organ of the Nationalist Government. It will control all naval, and aerial forces and military arsenals. It will be responsible for war preparedness and for adequate steps for increasing the fighting efficiency of war forces.

3. Among other responsibilities of the new Council will be the fixing of the strength, method of organization and equipment of national defence forces, and the direction of military training and education. To be valid, the resolutions and plans of the Council must be approved by the Central Executive Committee.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

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From M/A, China Report No. 7020 April 15, 1927

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G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Recruitment - Enlisted Personnel.

RECEIVED G/2 W.D. JUN 29 1927

1. Recruitment of Chinese armies is absolutely decentralized, and is effected by militarists with political aspirations within the territories which they control. Because of the constant wastage ensuing on steady campaigning and because of the almost general belief that sheer numbers are what count in warfare, recruiting activities proceed intensively at all times throughout China. Feng Yu-hsiang and Sun Ch'uan-fang are practically the only militarists that have given any thought to the evolution of small and comparatively highly trained armies; the others steadily endeavor to recruit their forces to a point just beyond that which their local territories will stand, always hoping to acquire further means by further conquests that will enable them again to control more troops for still greater expansions.

2. Recruitment for Chinese armies is accomplished by voluntary enlistments, requisitioned enlistments, impressment conscription and the taking over of other units in block. The first is the normal method, relied on to procure replacements for ordinary wastage. Practically all units have recruiters out in the districts under their control trying to attract new men to their ranks at all times. The standard recruiting appeals are made, emphasis being chiefly laid on the chances for steady work, clothing and regular meals. No particular efforts are made as to the selection of men nor is there any great system observed in recruiting procedure. The men enlisted are largely drawn from the unemployed, with a sprinkling of criminals and boys keen on adventure.

3. When the above procedure proves inadequate, due to heavy losses or projected military expansions, resort is had to recruitment by requisition. The civil authorities of any given district are notified that they have to produce a given quota of recruits, and the methods of procurement are left to them. Such recruits frequently are delivered bound to prevent their escape. The local officials when presented with such a requisition endeavor to fill it so as to cause the least hardship possible to the community and its families and also seek to avoid offending people of consequence, but in the face of repeated requisitions, frequently from different military organizations, even the roughest sort of justice is often impossible. In the recruits from this source boys of fourteen to sixteen predominate.

4. In times of stress almost indiscriminate impressment is resorted to. This last measure is generally used to obtain transportation coolies, rather than soldiers, but on occasion the ranks of armies are filled up by the same measures. In impressing men a rough effort is made to pick persons out of employment, and the recruiters carefully abstain from laying hands of people who seem well-to-do, and hence may have influence enough to make things unpleasant for the press gang. But this method is so rough and ready that it admits of little care or refinement in its application.

5. In contradistinction to impressment, organized and regulated conscription never has been applied to Chinese armies. Chang Tso-lin, war lord of Manchuria, has toyed with the idea on several occasions, and actually proclaimed the adoption of a conscription system in the Three Eastern Provinces in the fall of 1925 and again in 1926, but to date no such measure has been enforced.

From M/A, China Report No. 7050 May 26, 1927

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Recruitment - Enlisted Personnel.

6. Recruitment by filling the ranks from existing and generally enemy organizations is a very prevalent practice. Soldiers are taken over as individuals and also in mass as organizations. After a military victory troops of the defeated army are generally enrolled by the victors, and in such cases they usually are so distributed as to weaken as much as possible the ties that bound them to former commanders. On the other hand when accessions are gained as the result of negotiations rather than by war, the commanders going over usually stipulate that they shall remain in control of the troops they lead, and such organizations generally are taken over in block.

7. There are no age limit, weight limit, literacy requirements or investigations as to personal character. Practically the only physical requirements are superficially sound limbs and eyes. Venereal diseases are not taken account of at all. Due to the innate hardiness of those Chinese who survive infancy, the sketchiness of physical standards works less harm than would be expected.

John Magruder

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache.

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G-2 Report

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CHINA (Military)

Subject: Enlisted Personnel.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 29 1927

1. Enlisted Strength - Active Army, Organized Militia and Organized Reserves. The enlisted strength of the active armies in China is estimated, within wide limits, as about 1,500,000 men. The numbers are subject to almost daily fluctuation, as large commands constantly disband, change their affiliations, turn bandit, change from banditry to regular army units, or fill their ranks with great levies of recruits. It may be said for any locality that the number of soldiers contained therein is usually limited only by the ability of the countryside to support them. A centrally organized militia does not exist, nor is there any provision for employing such an organization in national defense. There are, notably in Honan, Szechwan and Yunnan, large bodies of armed men who, with some degree of organization, try to protect their localities from the depradations of soldiers and bandits, and who frequently indulge in banditry on their own account; but these train-bands seldom even fit into the schemes of the local militarists. In the aggregate these militiamen probably run into two or three hundred thousand men, but information about them is most vague and their numbers fluctuate greatly. Organized reserves do not exist in China.

2. Titles and Grades. The grades of enlisted men in the Chinese army are borrowed directly from Japan. They consist of first, second and third class private, and first, second and third class non-commissioned officer. Second and third class private correspond to our first and second class private respectively. First class private is roughly speaking a lance corporal. Third class non-commissioned officer has approximately the duties of a corporal. Second class non-commissioned officer is to all intents and purposes a duty sergeant, while first class non-commissioned officer holds the posts of section leader, performs technical duties in the company and headquarters, and very occasionally acts as platoon commander. First sergeantcies and sergeant-majorships generally are filled by warrant officers. The above distribution of duties does not exactly correspond with our army, especially in the infantry, as the Chinese tables of organization tend to make their minimum combat unit a section of about twenty-five men instead of a squad as in the American service.

3. Promotion, Discharge and Retirement. Promotion of enlisted men in the Chinese armies is largely a function of the company or corresponding unit commander. Promotions are most informal in character, as the question of pay rarely enters into the soldier's scheme of things: he is generally in arrears and pa yment is made on the basis of just enough to ensure the troops' loyalty and no more. Promotion in grades is generally well ordered. Thanks to Yuan Shih-kai, Chinese tables of organization are fairly uniform threughout the country; they now have the force of tradition and in consequence, except around the headquarters of generals, supernumerary holders of non-commissioned grades are rare. The fact must be emphasized, however, that there exists no authority whatever definitely limiting the numbers of troops in any unit, nor their distribution in grade.

Discharge in the Chinese armies is an academic question. Soldiers enlist for an indefinite term and serve until they are disbanded, drop out because of disease or wounds, go over to the enemy, or until they desert.

There exists no system of retirement for enlisted men.

From M/A, China Report No. 7053 May 26, 1927

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Enlisted Personnel.

4. Standard of Non-Commissioned Officers. The Chinese non-commissioned officer varies from a dirt-encrusted bully in some ragtag and bobtail "army" to a well-set up, reasonably clean and superficially trained man in such organizations as the Fengtien and 1st Kuominchun armies. The essential of the Chinese n.c.o. is the possession of a certain amount of force and an ability to get along with his men. He is generally, but not universally illiterate. Thanks to the constant active service in which Chinese armies engage, he is usually in hard physical condition, is an adept at getting along in the field, and has a fair knowledge of minor tactics. The constant operations involving steady wastage of enlisted personnel, together with the constant recruitment of commissioned grades from the ranks, tend to lower the period of non-commissioned service so that good non-coms generally are young men with only three or four years' soldiering behind them, with the further consequence that the Chinese armies do not possess a seasoned non-commissioned backbone. The non-commissioned personnel is afflicted with the same moral dry rot of uncertain loyalty and generally of complete disinterestedness in the cause or causes which it serves that pervades Chinese armies from top to bottom. As compared with the American non-commissioned officer, physically the Chinese is his equal, and in the higher grades probably his superior; he is mentally, morally and technically his inferior. He is hampered by gross illiteracy on his own part and on the part of the men whom he leads, not to mention the obstacle presented by a language that does not lend itself readily to military use.

John Magruder

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

TJB

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1 Tientsin
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ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF
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G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Development and Maintenance of Morale.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 9 1927

1. The Chinese military forces being split up into a large number of factional armies, there exists no single governmental agency for the promotion of morale nor for welfare work among the troops. Organizations specializing in work of this character, such as the Y.M.C.A. during the world war, are conspicuous by their absence. The nearest approach to them is the "Red Swastika" society, a Buddhist organization modeled on the Red Cross, which however devoted itself mostly to the care of wounded and the burial of dead, rather than in true morale work. Of recent years it has become fashionable for the womenfolk of prominent militarists to interest themselves in the comfort of troops at the front and to distribute special articles of clothing and of food; but this work is sporadic in character and is generally organized with a view to publicity in the back areas rather than for effect at the front.

2. On the other hand the various Chinese militarists have been keenly alive to the value of moral issues in the wars in which they engage. The institution of the Chinese Republic was followed by a five year period of centralization under Yuan Shih-kai. At this time much good work was accomplished in the organization of the army, most of the methods and details being borrowed from Japan. During this period a strong effort was made to built up a spirit in the army corresponding to the Japanese Bushido, substituting the national flag and the presidential office for the personality of the Emperor. The abstractness of these symbols was in itself an obstacle to development along Japanese lines, and the situation was further complicated by the erection of a military feudal system and the commencement of the present period of civil wars in which all factions claimed an equal right to appropriate these symbols to their own uses. In consequence the conventional abstract moral issues became largely discounted. They are still included in training schedules as a matter of form, but their morale-building power is slight. As a result the ordinary militarist generally sets up the concept of maintenance of peace and protection for the common people in his district as a cause and theoretically inculcates these principles in his troops. This concept has the advantage of being characteristically Chinese; but it also has become conventionalized by universal adoption and has become discredited by the general hardships characteristically imposed on the civilian population by armies everywhere.

3. In addition to the above, Chinese military leaders have from time to time fostered various negative issues with the idea of providing their troops with a cause to fight for. Thus Wu Pei-fu in his 1920 campaign against the Anfu group stressed the anti-Japanese issue with such success that he actually enrolled volunteers during his advance, an unprecedented event in Chinese warfare. The principal negative causes advanced are anti-imperialism, anti-foreignism and anti-bolshevism. Of these anti-foreignism, usually evolved as a corollary of anti-imperialism, is the only one that has developed any strong appeal to the mass of soldiers. The others are generally regarded by the rank and file in the light of face-saving platitudes on the part of higher commanders.

From M/A, China Report No. 7071 June 17, 1927

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Development and Maintenance of Morale.

4. Any discussion of the fostering of moral issues in Chinese armies as a means of securing organizational cohesion would be incomplete without a mention of Feng Yu-hsiang's use of Christianity. Feng was, and probably is a true Christian, though of somewhat exotic type, and his interest in the dissemination of christianity was probably sincere. At the same time he can not but have been aware of the value of a common religious faith as a means of securing cohesion in his troops. Feng pushed this idea in training his armies to such an extent that it was estimated in 1925-26 that half his soldiers were Christians. His recent alignment with the radical elements of the Kuomintang, his dependence on Russia for supplies, and the scanty means at his command for training have caused him to cease to lay emphasis on christianity; and it is reported in 1927 that large numbers of his men have recanted; although Feng himself continues a Christian of his own peculiar type.

5. The most successful modern attempt to inspire Chinese soldiers with the idea of fighting for a cause is the case of the Kuomintang armies in their 1926 and 1927 campaigns. In addition to stressing the appeals of sectionalism and of anti-foreignism ("anti-imperialism"), a conscientious effort was made to indoctrinate the troops with the idea that they were fighting for the application of Sun Yat-sen's "Three People's Principles". There can be no doubt that the existence of a positive cause for which to fight has played a great part in the nationalist advance. This is admitted by the Northern leaders, who have set about evolving causes of their own with no great success.

6. Welfare activities have received little attention in Chinese armies. Athletics are encouraged but are unorganized. Most companies possess a football that is kicked about during recreation periods. Practically every barracks has some gymnastic apparatus, consisting usually of horizontal bars, and the men take great interest in performing gymnastic feats. It is believed however that this apparatus is provided more with the idea of physical training than of morale building.

7. Certain units endeavor to educate their men, the chief objective being the reduction of illiteracy. Feng Yu-hsiang during his occupation of Peking made great strides toward abolishing illiteracy in his forces; but after his retreat to the West it is believed that his efforts in this direction have lapsed. The original nationalist armies also installed educational schedules in their forces; but this system has not been extended to the large bodies of troops absorbed by them.

8. In addition to his educational activities, Feng Yu-hsiang in his more prosperous days also put into operation a vocational training system, approximately half of his men's time being devoted to learning trades. This is the only known instance of vocational training among Chinese armies, and this, too, has lapsed with Feng's withdrawal to the West.

9. Practically all Chinese militarists endeavor to form corps d'elite, usually as their bodyguards. These troops are specially selected, sometimes for bravery, sometimes from notoriously loyal localities. Efforts are made to give them good uniforms, better food and more regular pay than the common run of soldiers. These troops are armed with a high percentage of pistols and automatic weapons, together with two handed executioner's swords. Their training emphasises hand to hand fighting.

TJB

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

CHIEF OF STAFF
INTEL. DIV.
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WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Discipline in Chinese Armies.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 9 1927
RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 9 1927

1. The enforcement of discipline in Chinese armies is characterized by promptness and arbitrariness. While the relations between company officers and their men are characterized by good nature and good feeling, punishments when awarded are dealt out immediately and without appeal. Punishments awarded in Chinese armies include those common to all armies: restriction to barracks or quarters, hard labor, extra fatigue, extra drill and reduction in grade. They also include confinement, beating and the death penalty. As Chinese armies are constantly engaged in campaign, the most convenient of these penalties are beating and death, and such are constantly employed, frequently in cases that would only draw a short period of confinement in the American army. For example, in the fall of 1926, in the city of Peking, two soldiers endeavored to force their way into a theatre without paying admission. They were noticed by the garrison commander, who happened to pass by, and he had them decapitated on the spot and their heads hung over the theatre door. The above instance is typical and not in the least exceptional.

2. It is practically a matter of Chinese common law that Army commanders are authorized to inflict punishments including the death penalty at will and without review. Furthermore these army commanders have the right to delegate these powers as they see fit and frequently exercise them. A common sight in Chinese cities is the "ling", a military or mixed military-and-polite patrol carrying a board with the garrison commander's name and the word "ling" (authority) written on it. This board theoretically represents the garrison commander's person and is obeyed and respected accordingly. The commander of the "ling" patrol possesses such varying powers of summary punishment as may be allotted to him, varying from the right of summary execution to that of beating a predetermined number of blows.

3. From the foregoing it will be realized that the operations of military courts in Chinese armies are reduced to a minimum. Practically every militarist has a judge-advocate general on his staff, but the duties of such an officer are rather those of an organizer of military police than of an officer of justice. When military courts are convened they are generally employed in cases that should be called state trials than for the judging of military offenses.

4. Because of the supinity of Chinese civil courts generally and because of the universal subordination of civilian to military administration, not to mention the fact that most of China is normally under martial law officially proclaimed, there is practically no amenability of military persons to trial before civil courts. Police officials generally refuse to arrest persons in the military service, and when they dare take such action invariably turn their prisoners over to the militia ry authorities for such punishment as the latter deem fit to award.

John Magruder

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

TJB

From M/A, China Report No. 7069 June 17, 1927

G-2 Report

4-1

CHIEF OF STAFF
SECRETARY'S DIV.
AUG 9 1927

2009-190
6300

WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Discipline and Morale in the Chinese Armies.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 9 1927

1. The Chinese soldier like the Chinese generally is remarkably amenable to discipline in the sense of restraint. He submits uncomplainingly to hardships at the command of his superiors. He renders military courtesies ungrudgingly and conscientiously. He is willing to spend hours in the minutiae of drill, going through the goose step in slow motion and by the numbers. But this very ease of restraint seems to militate against the use of discipline as a builder of morale and esprit.

2. In these last two qualities the Chinese armies are sadly lacking; but the causes thereof are much more varied than the single one given above. It must be remembered that the Chinese soldier is scantily and infrequently paid, that he is often underfed and badly equipped, and that when wounded he has no expectation of adequate medical attention or of compensation for permanent or partial disability. He generally belongs to an army that is working for the personal ambitions of its commander, and in which high-sounding principles are obviously brought forward as so much rhetoric. To him the national government means little or nothing, and nationalism itself is frequently confused with anti-foreignism. At the same time it must be noted that in the few cases where Chinese armies have been given a cause to fight for their reaction has been prompt and effective. In the 1926 operations of the Cantonese Kuomintang armies most of their purely military successes are clearly attributable to troops trained to know what their aims were rather than to any tactical superiorities.

3. Constantly on field service, and often engaged in active campaign, the relations between officers and men are democratic; troops usually are thoroughly attached to their company officers. This relation is prevented from lapsing into familiarity by means of the severity and promptness of military punishments, while it is intensified by reason of the company officers being responsible more or less directly for the procurement of pay and rations. Desertion rates are high; but it must be remembered that with unlimited enlistment periods desertion is practically the normal method of obtaining separation from the service. Desertions are also encouraged by the lack of military records and of means of identification, together with the constant changes in the compositions of armies.

4. True mutinies and revolts are rare in Chinese armies. Instances of organizations rebelling or going over to the enemy are frequent, but these must generally be classified as political rather than military phenomena, the units involved in such cases generally being regiments or larger units. On the other hand, the prevalently low morale of the troops often results in a minimum of resistance being offered to attacks. "no pay, no fight" is practically an axiom of Chinese defensive warfare, and troops in arrears frequently fail to put up even a shadow of resistance to an advancing enemy. On the offensive, however, the conditions are generally reversed to "No fight, no pay", the idea being to reward the troops from the spoils of victory. Even here, however, failure to pay over long periods has a decidedly dampening effect on the army's progress.

John Magruder

TJB

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

From M/A, China Report No. 7068 June 17, 1927

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WAR DEPARTMENT

October 26, 1927.

Brigadier General [illegible] C. Castner,
Headquarters U.S.Army Forces in China,
Tientsin, China.

My dear General Castner:

Your letter of September 23d, with a copy of Major Stillwell's report, has just reached me.

The former copy that you sent me also came and I regret that the reply was either overlooked or else did not reach you. I am most appreciative of your letters and of all the information that you can give me. They place me in touch with the situation better than any reports that could come through formal channels.

This morning I listened to a talk at the War College by Minister MacMurray in which he dwelt upon the political and racial questions in a most interesting manner.

I shall always be glad to hear from you.

Faithfully yours,

Major General,
Chief of Staff.

Copy for A.C.of S. G-2

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
TIENTSIN, CHINA.

Sept. 23, 1927.

CONFIDENTIAL 2099A-1/92

To General C.P.Summerall,

Chief of Staff,U.S.ARMY,

Washington, D.C.

RECD OCT 27 1927
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF

Dear General Summerall:-

I have your very kind letter of July 21st., replying to mine of June 15th., and have delayed answering,expecting you would soon have one I wrote about June 20th. enclosing a copy of a report on reconnoissance made by Major Stillwell,15th. Inf., copy of which I enclose. You may have this report before this reached you,if so, you can ignore this second copy. We have frequent reconnoissances to the front lines of the northern troops,but Major Stillwell went to and through these lines,then through "no man's land",then through the southern lines,which is something different again. I consider his reconnoissance the best we have had,and changing names and dates it would most probably give a true picture of what conditions are today,as it did last June. I am sorry if my letter of June 20th., did hot reach you. I sent it to the Legation pouch in Pekin,which is carried by messenger and placed on steamer en route to America,but apparently it still failed to reach its destination. This letter I am giving to the "Thomas" which will be at Chinwangtao about the 27th.

Conditions remain very quiet in this area,as they have for more than a year. I built a new camp and a new target range at Chinwangtao in June,and have had most all my command down there,180 miles from Tientsin,since July 1st. This is the first time, in 15 years service over here that,this command has had a chance to get some excellent field training. I will give them my test there the first week in October. The new target range has 30 targets,the old one at Nan Ta Szu had but nine.This summer was the hottest for many years,and our troops have spent practically all of it down by the seashore in the cool breezes. The Marines held Tientsin without a bit of trouble. We are all in better health than ever before over here,and already for any job you have for us. With every good wish,

Sincerely, J.C. Gaither

Encl 1

CONFIDENTIAL

2009-192

2nd Copy of Maj. Stillwell's Report. First sent about June 20th

J.C.C.

American Barracks,
Tientsin, China,
June 16th, 1927.

To: The Commanding General, U.S.A.F.C.

Subject: Observations in Kiangsu and Anhui.

1. Itinerary.—Pursuant to instructions, I left Tientsin on the morning of May 26th, arriving at Tsinanfu at 1:00 p.m., May 27th, at Lin-Ch'eng, 2:00 p.m., same day, and at Hsuchowfu at 7:30 p.m., same day. I remained at Hsuchowfu until June 9th and then proceeded via P'u K'ou and Nanking to Shanghai, returning to Tientsin on the 15th.

2. Brief statements of militaty situation. Chang Tsung Ch'ang began his retirement by rail and marching from Hsuchowfu on May 29th, and completed it on June 2nd. The southern army entered Hsuchowfu on the afternoon of June 2nd. Chang Tsung Ch'ang retired beyond Han Chuang and the southerners, passing thru Hsuchowfu, followed him up. During the retirement from P'eng Pu to Han Chuang there was very little fighting. Chang Tsung Ch'ang took with him all the available rolling stock on the Tientsin-Pukow Railroad.

Units identified. Northern.--
3rd, 5th, 6th and 20th Army Corps. 20th, 21st and 36th divisions. 4th, 7th, 83rd, 33rd, 91st, 105th, 121st, and 124th Brigades. 13th, 195th and 465th Regiments.

Units identified. Southern.--
(At Hsuchowfu and North). 7th and 10th Army Corps. 28th, 29th and 30th Divisions. 1st and 3rd Communications Units.

(South of Hsuchowfu). 15th, 31st, 36th, 37th and 40th Army.Corps.

Estimated numbers. Northern.
At Hsuchowfu, 50 to 60 thousand. South of Hsuchowfu 20,000.
Southern
At Hsuchowfu, June 2nd, 3,000. At Hsuchowfu, June 9th, 10,000.
Total of three weak Divisions.

Morale. Northern. Very Bad. The troops have been about five months without pay. They are fed twice a day, getting two doughballs per man each time. Desertions are heavy. Several units considered doubtful have been disarmed. Instances were noted where officers had to strike soldiers with sticks or whips to make them obey. Only the presence of the Tupan's train restrained the Northern troops, and as soon as it left, looting became general.

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Observations

There is a large proportion of undersized boys and conscripted coolies in Chang Tsung Ch'ang's Army.

Southern. Very Good. Altho the troops are receiving little food, their ciscipline is good. They are in high spirits, they have a great deal of confidence, they give cheerful obedience and I saw no evidence of looting.

Equipment. Northern. Chang Tsung Ch'ang's army is far better equipped. Besides the usual types of rifles and pistols they are well supplied with machine guns, three inch mortars, mountain guns, three inch field guns, and a large number of Bergmann Automatic rifles. Two planes were in daily use for reconnaissance and bombing, and three armored trains were used on the railroad almost daily. Besides the railroad transportation, 16 motor trucks, (Federal, Graham Bros., and Berliets), were held for use in Hsuchowfu. Ammunition seemed plentiful.

Equipment. Southern. The Southern Army have the usual assortment of pistols and rifles, a few machine guns, a few Krupp 3 inch mountain guns, and some captured trench mortars. Ammunition was scarce.

Transportation. North. Practically all the railroad rolling stock remains in Chang Tsung Ch'ang's hands. Only a few broken down cars and engines were left behind at Hsuchowfu. He has also a large number of carts of the type commonly used in the north.

Transportation. South. The Southern Army is greatly handicapped by lack of transportation. Not being able to bring across the Yang Tze any of the rolling stock on the Shanghai-Nanking road, they have only the odds and ends left behind by the retreating northerners. This is all in bad condition. To supplement this they are using large numbers of pack animals, mostly the scrawny southern pony, and what native carts they can pick up. Unless they can in some way get a large number of cars and locomotives they will be greatly delayed in any further movement north.

3. Officer Personnel

There is a great contrast in the officer personnel below the rank of Regimental Commander. In the northern force the company and battalion officers are largely uneducated coolies. Among the southerners these same grades are largely filled by students from 18 to 22 years of age. They give the impression that they fully believe in the announced policies and ideals of the southerners and can be depended upon to carry out orders. There is an air of determination about them which indicates that they are of tremendously more value as officers than the trash which fills the corresponding grades in the Northern Army.

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Propaganda

The southern propaganda had been widely spread in Hsuchowfu before the arrival of the southerners. There were said to be about a thousand members of the Kuo Min Tang in Hsuchowfu and they knew and reported the location of the southerners in their advance daily. The town gave a cordial welcome to the southerners. The troops behaved themselves well and confidence was at once established. On the day following the entry of the southerners most of the shops were open for business and women appeared freely on the streets, an impossibility while the northerners were present. Posters were stuck up everywhere with the usual slogans of the Nationalists printed on them, and mass meetings were held daily. The soldiers are well soaked in this propaganda and talk it glibly altho they dont understand much about it. Emphasis being laid on opposition to foreigners, the southerners do not consider the northerners as bitter enemies so much as deluded brothers and are quite willing to take in deserters and add them to their own ranks.

Plans

According to rumors current among the troops at Hsuchowfu, Chang Chow having been taken by Feng Yu Hsiang and Hsuchowfu by Chiang Kai Shek, their forces are now joined along the Lung Hai Railroad. A period of consolidation and concentration is now going on, and when complete a simultaneous movement north along the Kin-Han and Tiching-P'u railroads is to take place. Due to the difficulties of transportation which have been met on both lines it will probably be a matter of weeks before this movement can take place. The southerners at Hsuchowfu do not expect much resistance. The Northerners having given up without a fight many excellent positions south of Hsuchowfu, the southerners see no reason why they cannot advance to Tsinanfu with very little trouble. The northerners probably have no definite plans. It is doubtful if their troops will fight, and in my opinion a determined advance by the southerners will cause a collapse in the northern force and a retreat thru Tsinanfu and Tientsin.

Conditions in Hsuchowfu

The people were all ejected from their homes by the northerners and forced to live in miserable make-shift shacks anywhere. All their household goods were stolen. The wooden fittings of the houses have all been burned. Food is very scarce. Many people have died of starvation and were left lying in the streets until the arrival of the southern burial corps began to clear things up. The town has been repeatedly looted by soldiers and Russians. Chang Tsung Ch'ang's Russians are the worst type of ruffians. The current report is that they receive no pay but collect what they can by looting. Win or lose they run the armored trains up and down the railroad, terrorizing people by shooting and then stealing everything movable. The train is then run up the line and an auction held. When the country people occasionally attempt to pull up the track and block the train the usual method followed by the Russians is a general massacre in the village nearest the break. They are hated and feared by everybody.

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The Red Spear Society is wide spread and increasing in numbers. Worn out by continual abuse and looting by both sides, the people are taking the law into their own hands and killing all small parties of soldiers they can handle. The northerners fear them more than they do the southern army. The southerners have apparently been able to restrain their activities somewhat. The whole country side over a belt of from 10 to 20 miles between the two forces is in a state of chaos where Russians and disorderly soldiers roam at will and Red Spears lie in wait for any stragglers. Meanwhile the common people, caught between these various elements, are entirely at their mercy. A few feeble efforts at relief have been made at Hsuchowfu where beancake, commonly used as fertilizer in the north, is being issued as food to the destitute.

The fighting reported at Peng Pu and Pulitsi did not amount to anything. There were very few wounded at Hsuchowfu, altho many sick were wandering around absolutely uncared for. At Hsuchowfu and north there were only small rear guard actions with the exceptions of the cutting of and capture of an armored train.

We may expect this wave to roll northwards again as soon as transportation becomes available to the southerners and sufficient strength is brought up to Hsuchowfu and Cheng Chow. Similar scenes will probably be repeated around Tsinanfu, and from there, after another period of consolidation, the advance will probably be continued to Tientsin.

The most noticeable elements in the situation are: The good order and discipline maintained by the southerners, and the confidence they inspire in captured territory, and their better type of young officers. There is a decided contrast to the low morale and bad discipline of the northern troops, the fear and hate the latter inspire in the people, and the ease with which their greatly superior numbers have been pushed back so far and so rapidly by troops with greatly inferior equipment.

4. Hostility to foreigners is not diminishing. Although the Kueichow troops, who were the first units to reach Hsuchowfu, were friendly on learning that I was an American, it was not a very cordial welcome, and I could not get access to any brigade or division commander. South of Hsuchowfu, the feeling was much more intense, and before reaching P'u K'ou, attempts were made, by the usual Chinese methods of insult, to provoke me into remonstrance and resistance. However, although my belongings were turned inside out, and my pistol and papers stolen, no one actually laid hands on me or attempted to take money from me. I was threatened with arrest and detention at P'u K'ou, but nothing was done. I believe the southerners have instructions not to go to extremes in their treatment of foreigners, but I do not consider it advisable as yet for any foreigners to attempt to circulate in territory controlled by them.

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5. The type of troops at present operating on the Tientsin-Pukow line is, on the northern side, the usual coolie soldier, very poorly instructed, unpaid and badly fed. Many of them have been conscripted; few of them have any idea why they are fighting, and none have their heart in it. They are simply dragged out and handed a gun, or have taken a job to tide them over hard times. Victory or defeat means nothing to them; they are in the pawns used by the higher ups to further their own schemes of personal aggrandizement. The high command does not even take the trouble to distribute propaganda or try to improve the morale and fighting ability of the men in any other way than an occasional harangue when they are to be used in action. As a result, there are very few units that can be depended upon to fight at all, and numerous incidents have occurred where troops have been disarmed to prevent munitiny. I was told on several occasions that it wouldn't do to let some of these units retain their arms, or they would simply turn bandit. Apparently the only real factors that hold Chang Tsung Ch'angs force together are fear of the southerners and Red Spears, and the stiffening due to the presence of a few Russians and the armored trains. The company officers and many battalion commanders are of the same general class, coolies who have shown some little force or extra brutality, which is taken for force, or who are crafty enough to play the game that appeals to their superiors. These men are loyal just as long as they can make something out of it. Beyond that they are entirely unreliable, and in any case are too ignorant to be of any use in action.

In case of a disorderly retreat through Tientsin, the only thing to fear from such troops is an attempt to save their own skins by a rush to get into the concessions. Large numbers might try to break in at some point or points, and it would be well to be prepared in advance with a definite policy for handling them. (i.e. shall they be allowed in at all? Shall they be allowed in if they give up their arms? Shall they be congregated in any given location for admission, etc.) It must be remembered that among them there would undoubtedly be many agitators of the Nationalist persuasion, who could not be allowed at large without the danger of serious disturbance.

From deliberate offensive action conducted by any or all of Chang's army, I do not feel that the Tientsin garrison has anything to fear. We can stop decisively any attack they are capable of, but such action is only the remotest possibility.

On the southern side the case is somewhat different. The southerners have, or think they have, a cause. Their advance has been practically uninterrupted and almost wholly unopposed. They have behind them an extensive and excellent organization, especially in respect to propaganda, and their morale is high. They have been told repeatedly that their army could not only defeat any one European army but all of them put together, and the reluctance of foreigners to take definite action against them on several occasions when provocation was great only tends to prove to them that it is due to fear.

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Against the far superior numbers and equipment of the northerners, they have overrun two-thirds of China in a year and can apparently complete the task at any time they care to if they can only hang together long enough. They attribute to their own ability the success which has been largely due to the complete disgust of the people with the methods of the northern leaders.

However, there is a noticeable difference between the soldiers and junior officers in the southern army from the corresponding grades of Chang's army. Although the proportion of small boys of from 13 to 16 years of age is greater in the southern army than in the northern, they have an idea of why they are fighting, and more than make up in morale what they lack in physique. Continuous propaganda keeps their minds off questions of pay and food, and such matters will not be of burning importance to their leaders until complete success is attained and a period of inaction occurs. All ranks talk glibly of the San Min Chu I, the unification of China, and the expulsion of the imperialists.

It is among the junior officers that the answer for the reason for southern success is to be found. The noticeably great majority of such ranks are boys from school and college, of from 18 to 25 years of age. Although their attainments are very inadequate, they are far superior to the corresponding grades in the northern armies. They believe in their cause, they have obtained a hold on their men without, apparently, using the Prussian tactics common in the north and they create the impression that they take their work quite seriously and can be depended upon to do as they are told. They are at the age where propaganda takes hold the most firmly, and it would take a series of reverses and considerable punishment to break down their morale.

However, neither the southern soldier nor officer is anywhere near the point where he can cope with foreign troops. Individually, their physique is far inferior, and collectively their training is entirely inadequate. Even though the feeling of anti-foreignism grows tremendously, I do not believe that their advisers would ever consider an attack on such a garrison as the one at Tientsin, other than as a means of getting a lot of them killed and arousing the whole country, as a result, against us. The mere fact of our being ready will be a sufficient safe guard.

If the northern forces collapse and the southern advance takes in Tientsin, I think we may expect that the civilian populations will welcome the change, that order will be maintained, and that the foreign concessions, as long as an adequate garrison is maintained, will be let alone.

There is one element on the present situation that is being overlooked to some extent--the Red Spears. This fact spreading secret society is the terror of the soldiers of both sides, and is the logical reaction of the oppressed and ill treated farmer, who asks only to be allowed to work for his

 CONFIDENTIAL

living. They have become an important factor in the military operations and it is probable that most of the southern casualties now jamming Hankow are due more to their work than to battle with the Feng Tien Army. They have proved a factor in causing Chang Tsung Ch'ang's retreat, and if they increase much more, may even cause the entire suspension of military operations in some sections. They are beginning to exhibit some of the characteristics of the Boxers of 1900, and it is quite possible that, to divert their attention, one or both sides may use them, or attempt to, in an anti-foreign demonstration.

JOSEPH W. STILWELL,
Major, 15th Infantry.

COPY

INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
In replying refer to

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
WAR DEPARTMENT

1927 2009-1928 033.28

August 26, 1927.

MEMORANDUM:

The information contained in the attached report, with the exception of the number of Nationalist troops north of the Yangtze, checks with information already at hand.

The number of Chiang Kai-shek's troops along the Pukow-Tientsin Railway, given in this report, is considered timely and accurate, and is accepted by the Military Intelligence Division.

Our Military Attache in Peking made one trip to Shanghai and Hankow in order to secure information regarding Southern Chinese military forces, and all of the reports rendered by him were excellent. It is probable that the personal danger incident to acquiring the information was greater in the case of Major Stilwell. Major Stilwell travelled into the interior unattended, when outside assistance was not available to him in case of trouble.

W. S. Drysdale

W.S. Drysdale,
Major, Infantry

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN CHINA
TIENTSIN. CHINA.
June 21, 1927.

1927 2009-192 OCT 28

WAR DEPARTMENT

To General C.P.SUMMERALL,

Chief of Staff, U.S.ARMY,

Washington, D.C.

Dear General Summerall:-

This letter is being sent through the Legation Post Office in Pekin,so I can write as if I were seated in your office reporting to you. The enclosed account of Major Stillwell's trip I hope you will find interesting. The local Chinese authorities would not have permitted his departure from Tientsin,save on the mission to meet U.S.Senator Bingham,who had gone down the Pekin-Hankow R.R. from Pekin,and was to cross to the Tientsin-Pukow line by the cross-road Chengchow-Suchow,just south of the Hwang Ho(Yellow River).Senator Bingham had to go back to Pekin by the Pekin-Hankow R.R.,he was unable to get through on the cross-road. The Legation furnished the money for Major Stillwell's trip,we didnot have any. I agreed to this trip in co-operation with the M.A. at the Legation,Major Magruder.

Major Stillwell does not dwell on the dangers to himself. Three times on hunting trips,with one or two companions,I have encountered this hostile anti-foreign feeling in the country from 40 to 50 miles southeast of Tientsin. It is not a pleasant sensation to be surrounded by several hundred of these yelling ignorant coolies. The average mind of the average Chinese,in my opinion,is little above that of one of our five year old children,with apologies to our children of that age. I recalled Major Stillwell about the right time,he informs me,as undoubtedly the Southerners would have interned him had he remained longer in their controlled areas.

I agreed to this trip with the Legation authorities,because of the absolute impossibility of getting any definite or accurate information of just what is going on to the south of us. All newspaper accounts,statements made by returning missionaires or other civilians are scarcely worth listening to,so stampeded are the individ-

uals who make them. As we have followed rigidly a policy of avoiding trouble with the Chinese,civilian or military,trips like Major Stillwell's are ordered only when I deem it of vital importance that we get something definite in the matter of information.We cannot depend on anything save a report like Major Stillwell's.

If a W.D.C. could be obtained for Major Stillwell I would gladly recommend it, but in peace times I presume that is out of the question. He used rare judgement and common sense on this trip,and was almost constantly in imminent danger of bodily injury, if not actual death. He was successful and owes much of his success no doubt to the fact that he speaks Chinese fluently,Pekin as well as Cantonese. You know a Pekin Chinese cannot understand a Cantonese when he talks.

I would like to suggest,if you deemed it worthy,that a letter from you to the Major would be most highly prized by him,moreso than a W.D.C.,which he surely deserves. Courage in battle,surrounded by one's comrades,is not such a difficult matter of accomplishment,as going down this R.R. clear through both armies,dressed as a civilian,and bringing back what the Major sets forth in his report. As he states one has a sort of "gone" feeling when surrounded by a mob of these angry grown-up children. I felt it I know,but I was worse off than the Major because I could not speak to them. I might as well have been among an enraged crowd of the inmates of a deaf and dumb asylum,save that the latter do not go armed as a rule.

We are still very quiet here,but I shall endeavor to keep you informed of how matters are going. As the Major states in his report,I cannot see any danger to anyone hereabouts,with all the reenforcements we have received. I shall send a copy of this report through the Adjutant General.

With every good wish,

Sincerely,

JBAustin

OCS/15754-29

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF

AMERICAN BARRACKS,
Tientsin, China,
June 16th, 1927.

2009-192

3

WAR DEPARTMENT

OCT 28 1927

TO : The Commanding General, U.S.A.F.C.

SUBJECT : Observations in Kiangsu and Anhui.

1. Itinerary—Pursuant to instructions, I left Tientsin on the morning of May 26th, arriving at Tsinanfu at 1:00 P.M., May 27th, at Lin Ch'eng, 2:00 P. M., same day, and at Hsuchowfu at 7:30 P. M., same day. I remained at Hsuchowfu until June 9th and then proceeded via P'u K'ou and Nanking to Shanghai, returning to Tientsin on the 15th.

2. Brief statement of military situation. Chang Tsung Ch'ang began his retirement by rail and marching from Hsuchowfu on May 29th, and completed it on June 2nd. The southern army entered Hsuchowfu on the afternoon of June 2nd. Chang Tsung Ch'ang retired beyond Han Chuang and the southerners, passing thru Hsuchowfu, followed him up. During the retirement from P'eng Pu to Han Chuang there was very little fighting. Chang Tsung Ch'ang took with him all the available rolling stock on the Tientsin-Pukow Railroad.

Units identified. Northern,-
3rd, 5th, 6th and 20th Army Corps. 20th, 21st and 36th divisions. 4th, 7th, 83rd, 33rd, 91st, 105th, 121st, and 124th Brigades. 13th, 195th and 465th Regiments.

Units identified. Southern,-
(At Hsuchowfu and North). 7th and 10th Army Corps. 28th 29th and 30th Divisions. 1st and 3rd Communications Units.
(South of Hsuchowfu). 15th, 31st, 36th, 37th and 40th Army Corps.

Estimated numbers. Northern.
At Hsuchowfu, 50 to 60 thousand.. South of Hsuchowfu 20,000.
Southern.
At Hsuchowfu, June 2nd, 3,000. At Hsuchowfu, June 9th, 10,000.
Total of three weak Divisions.

Morale. Northern. Very Bad. The troops have been about five months without pay. They are fed twice a day, getting two doughballs per man each time. Desertions are heavy. Several units considered doubtful have been disarmed. Instances were noted where officers had to strike soldiers with sticks or whips to make them obey. Only the presence of the Tupan's train restrained the Northern troops, and as soon as it left looting became general.

Observations.

There is a large proportion of undersized boys and conscripted coolies in Chang Tsung Ch'ang's Army.

Southern. Very Good. Altho the troops are receiving little food, their discipline is good. They are in high spirits, they have a great deal of confidence, they give cheerful obedience and I saw no evidence of looting.

Equipment. Chang Tsung Ch'angs army is far better equipped. Besides the usual types of rifles and pistols they are well supplied with machine guns, three inch mortars, mountain guns, three inch field guns, and a large number of Bergmann Automatic rifles. Two planes were in daily use for reconnaissance and bombing, and three armored trains were used on the railroad almost daily. Besides the railroad transportation, 16 motor trucks, (Federal, Graham Bros., and Berliets), were held for use in Hsuchowfu. Ammunition seemed plentiful.

Equipment. Southern.

The Southern army have the usual assortment of pistols and rifles, a few machine guns, a few Krupp 3 inch mountain guns, and some captured trench mortars. Ammunition was scarce.

Transportation. North.

Practically all the railroad rolling stock remains in Chang Tsung Ch'ang's hands. Only a few broken down cars and engines were left behind at Hsuchowfu. He has also a large number of carts of the type commonly used in the north.

South.

The Southern army is greatly handicapped by lack of transportation. Not being able to bring across the Yang Tze any of the rolling stock on the Shanghai-Nanking road, they have only the odds and ends left behind by the retreating northerners. This is all in bad condition. To supplement this they are using large numbers of pack animals, mostly the scrawny southern pony, and what native carts they can pick up. Unless they can in some way get a large number of cars and locomotives they will be greatly delayed in any further movement north.

3.Officer Personnel.

There is a great contrast in the officer personnel below the rank of Regimental Commander. In the northern force the company and battalion officers are largely uneducated coolies. Among the southerners these same grades are largely filled by students from 18 to 22 years of age. They give the impression that they fully believe in the announced policies and ideals of the Southerners and can be depended upon to carry out orders. There is an air of determination about them which indicates that they are of tremendously more value as officers than the trash which fills the corresponding grades in the Northern Army.

Propaganda.

The southern propaganda had been widely spread in Hsuchowfu before the arrival of the southerners. There were said to be about a thousand members of the Kuo Min Tang in Hsuchowfu and they knew and reported

Observations.

the location of the southerners in their advance daily. The town gave a cordial welcome to the southerners. The troops behaved themselves well and confidence was at once established. On the day following the entry of the southerners most of the shops were open for business and women appeared freely on the streets,-an impossibility while the northerners were present. Posters were stuck up everywhere with the usual slogans of the Nationalists printed on them, and mass meetings were held daily. The soldiers are well soaked in this propaganda and talk it glibly altho they dont understand much about it. Emphasis being laid on opposition to foreigners, the southerners do not consider the northerners as bitter enemies so much as deluded brothers and are quite willing to take in deserters and add them to their own ranks.

Plans.

According to rumors current among the troops at Hsuchowfu, Cheng Chow having been taken by Feng Yu Hsiang and Hsuchowfu by Chiang Kai Shek, their forces are now joined along the Lung Hai Railroad. A period of consolidation and concentration is now going on, and when complete a simultaneous movement north along the Kin-Han and T-Yching-P'u railroads is to take place. Due to the difficulties of transportation which have been met on both lines it will probably be a matter of weeks before this movement can take place. The southerners at Hsuchowfu do not expect much resistance. The Northerners having given up without a fight many excellent positions south of Hsuchowfu, the southerners see no reason why they cannot advance to Tsinanfu with very little trouble. The northerners probably have no definite plans. It is doubtful if their troops will fight, and in my opinion a determined advance by the southerners will cause a collapse inthe northern force and a retreat thru Tsinanfu and Tientsin.

Conditions in Hsuchowfu.

The people were all ejected from their homes by the northerners and forced to live in miserable make-shift shacks anywhere. All their household goods were stolen. The wooden fittings of the houses have all been burned. Food is very scarce. Many people have died of starvation and were left lying in the streets until the arrival of the southern burial corps began to clear things up. The town has been repeatedly looted by soldiers and Russians. Chang Tsung Ch'ang's Russians are the worst type of ruffians. The current report is that they receive no pay but collect what they can by looting. Win or lose they run the armored trains up and down the railroad, terrorizing people by shooting and then stealing everything movable. The train is then run up the line and an auction held. When the country people occasionally attempt to pull up the track and block the train the usual method followed by the Russians is a general massacre in the village nearest the break. They are hated and feared by everybody.

The Red Spear society is wide spread and increasing in numbers. Worn out by continual abuse and looting by both sides the people are taking the law into their own hands and killing all small parties of soldiers they can handle. The Northerners fear them more than they do the southern army. The southerners have apparently been able to restrain their activities somewhat. The whole country side over a belt of from 10 to 20 miles between the two forces is in a state of chaos where Russians and disorderly soldiers roam at will and Red Spears lie in wait for any stragglers. Meanwhile the common people, caught between these v arious elements, are entirely at their mercy. A few feeble efforts at relief have been made at Hsuchowfu,

where beancake, commonly used as fertilizer in the north, is being issued as food to the destitute.

The fighting reported at Peng Pu and Fulitsi did not amount to anything. There were very few wounded at Hsuchowfu, altho many sick were wandering around absolutely uncared for. At Hsuchowfu and north there were only small rear guard actions with the exceptions of the cutting of and capture of an armored train.

We may expect this wave to roll northwards again as soon as transportation becomes available to the southerners and sufficient strength is brought up to Hsuchowfu and Cheng Chow. Similar scenes will probably be repeated around Tsinanfu, and from there after another period of consolidation the advance will probably be continued to Tientsin.

The most noticeable elements in the situation are: The good order and discipline maintained by the southerners, and the confidence they inspire in captured territory, and their better type of young officers. There is a decided contrast to the low morale and bad discipline of the northern troops, the fear and hate the latter inspire in the people, and the ease with which their greatly superior numbers have been pushed back so far and so rapidly by troops with greatly inferior equipment.

4. Hostility to foreigners is not diminishing. Although the Kueichow troops, who were the first units to reach Hsuchowfu, were friendly on learning that I was an American, it was not a very cordial welcome, and I could not get access to any brigade or division commander. South of Hsuchowfu, the feeling was much more intense, and before reaching P'u K'ou attempts were made, by the usual Chinese methods of insult, to provoke me into remonstrance and resistance. However, althought my belongings were turned inside out, and my pistol and papers stolen, no one actually laid hands on me or attempted to take money from me. I was threatened with arrest and detention at P'u K'ou, but nothing was done. I believe the southerners have instructions not to go to extremes in their treatment of foreigners, but I do not consider it advisable as yet for any foreigners to attempt to circulate in territory controlled by them.

5. The type of troops at present operating on the Tientsin-Pukow line is, on the northern side, the usual coolie soldier, very poorly instructed, unpaid and badly fed. Many of them have been conscripted; few of them have any idea why they are fighting, and none have their heart in it. They are simply dragged out and handed a gun, or have taken a job to tide them over hard times. Victory or defeat means nothing to them; they are the pawns used by the higher ups to further their own schemes of personal aggrandizement. The high command does not even take the trouble to distribute propaganda or try to improve the morale and fighting ability of the men in any other way than an occasional harangue when they are to be used in action. As a result, there are very few units that can be depended upon to fight at all, and numerous incidents have occured where troops have been disarmed to prevent mutiny. I was told on several occasions that it wouldnt do to let some of these units retain their arms, or they would simply turn bandit. Apparently the only real factors that hold Chang

servations.

Tsung Ch'angs force together are fear of the southerners and Red Spears, and the stiffening due to the presence of a few Russians and the armored trains. The company officers and many battalion commanders are of the same general class, coolies who have shown some little force or extra brutality, which is taken for force, or who are crafty enough to play the game that appeals to their superiors. These men are loyal just as long as they can make something out of it. Beyond that they are entirely unreliable, and in any case are too ignorant to be of any use in action.

In case of a disorderly retreat through Tientsin, the only thing to fear from such troops is an attempt to save their own skins by a rush to get into the concessions. Large numbers might try to break in at some point or points, and it would be well to be prepared in advance with a definite policy for handling them. (i.e. shall they be allowed in at all? shall they be allowed in if they give up their arms? shall they be congregated in any given location for admission? etc etc .) It must be remembered that among them there would undoubtedly be many agitators of the Nationalist persuasion, who could not be allowed at large without the danger of serious disturbance.

From deliberate offensive action conducted by any or all of Chang's army, I do not feel that the Tientsin garrison has anything to fear. We can stop decisively any attack they are capable of, but such action is only the remotest possibility.

On the southern side the case is somewhat different. The southerners have, or think they have, a cause. Their advance has been pra ctically uninterrupted and almost wholly unopposed. They have behind them an extensive and excellent organization, especially in respect to propaganda, and their morale is high. They have been told repeatedly that their army could not only defeat any one European army but all of them put together, and the reluctance of foreigners to take definite action against them on several occasions when provocation was great only tends to prove to them that it is due to fear.

Against the far superior numbers and equipment of the northerners, they have overrun 2/3 of China in a year and can apparently complete the task at any time they care to if they can only hang together long enough. They attribute to their own ability the success which has been largely due to the complete disgust of the people with the methods of the northern leaders.

However, there is a noticeable difference between the soldiers and junior officers in the southern army from the corresponding grades of Chang's army. Although the proportion of small boys of from 13 to 16 years of age is greater in the southern army than in the northern, they have an idea of why they are fighting, and more than make up in morale what they lack in physique. Continuous propaganda keeps their minds off questions of pay and food, and such matters will not be of burning importance to their leaders until complete success is attained and a period of inaction occurs. All ranks talk glibly of the San Min Chu I, the unification of China, and the expulsion of the imperialists.

It is among the junior officers that the answer for the reason for southern success is to be found. The noticeably great majority of such ranks are boys from school and college, of from 18 to say 25 years of age. Although their attainments are very inadequate, they are far superior to the corresponding grades in the northern armies. They believe in their cause, they have obtained a hold on their men without, apparently, using the Prussian tactics common in the north and they create the impression that they take their work

quite seriously and can be depended upon to do as they are told. They are at the age where propaganda takes hold the most firmly, and it would take a series of reverses and considerable punishment to break down their morale.

However, neither the southern soldier nor officer is anywhere near the point where he can cope with foreign troops. Individually, their physique is far inferior, and collectively their training is entirely inadequate. Even though the feeling of anti-foreignism grows tremendously, I do not believe that their advisers would ever consider an attack on such a garrison as the one at Tientsin, other than as a means of getting a lot of them killed and arousing the whole country, as a result, against us. The mere fact of o ur being ready will be a sufficient safe guard.

If the northern forces collapse and the southern advance takes in Tientsin, I think we may expect that the civilian population will welcome the change, that order will be maintained, and that the foreign concessions, as long as an adequate garrison is maintained, will be let alone.

There is one element on the present situation that is being overlooked to some extent;-the Red Spears. This fast spreading secret society is the terror of the soldiers of both sides, and is the logical reaction of the oppressed and ill treated farmer, who asks only to be allowed to work for his living. They have become an important factor in the military operations and it is probable that most of the southern casualties now jamming Hankow are due more to their work than to battle with the Feng Tien Army. They have proved a factor in causing Chang Tsung Ch'ang's retreat, and if they increase much more may even cause the entire suspension of military operations in some sections. They are beginning to exhibit some of the characteristics of the Boxers of 1900, and it is quite possible that, to divert their attention, one or both sides may use them, or attempt to, in an anti-foreign demonstration.

Joseph W. Stilwell,

JOSEPH W. STILWELL,
Major, 15th Infantry,

[redacted]

NOTED
N. E. MARGETTS

[redacted]

E. D. SUMMERALL.

[redacted]

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SEP 8 1927

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
AUG 1927
WAR DEPARTMENT

4-1

2009-1929

G-2 Report

CHINA

Subject: Report of Official Trip of Major J. W. Stilwell, 15th Infantry, to Kiangsu Front.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. AUG 9 1927

On May 24, 1927, the retreat of the Chihli-Shantung forces before the Nationalist advance promised to create a crisis in the Peking-Tientsin area. Having none of the officers on duty in this office free to proceed immediately to Hsuchow, I succeeded in obtaining the voluntary services of Major Stilwell, with the permission of the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in China. His very excellent report is herewith forwarded.

The digest material contained in the report will be arranged in digest form as time permits.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -

Tientsin, China,
June 16, 1927.

To: The Military Attache, American Legation.

Subject: Observations in Kiangsu and Anhui.

1. Itinerary. Pursuant to instructions, I left Tientsin on the morning of May 26th, arriving at Tsinanfu at 1:00 a.m., May 27th, at Lin Ch'eng, 2:00 p.m. same day and at Hsuchowfu at 7:30 p.m. same day. I remained at Hsuchowfu until June 9th and then proceeded via P'u K'ou and Nanking to Shanghai, returning to Tientsin on the 15th.

2. Brief statement of military situation. Chang Tsung-ch'ang began his retirement by rail and marching from Hsuchowfu on May 29th, and completed it on June 2nd. Chang Tsung-ch'ang retired beyond Han Chuang and the southerners, passing thru Hsuchowfu, followed him up. The southern army entered Hsuchowfu on the afternoon of June 2nd. During the retirement from P'eng Pu to Han Chuang there was very little fighting. Chang Tsung-ch'ang took with him all the available rolling stock on the Tientsin-Pukow railroad.

Units identified - Northern.

3rd, 5th, 6th and 20th Army Corps. 20th, 21st, and 56th Divisions. 4th, 7th, 83rd, 33rd, 91st, 105th, 121st and 124th Brigades. 13th, 195th and 456th Regiments.

Units identified - Southern.

(At Hsuchowfu and north) 7th and 10th Army Corps. 28th, 29th and 30th Divisions. 1st and 3rd Communications Units.

South of Hsuchowfu. 15th, 31st, 36th, 37th and 40th Army Corps.

Estimated numbers - Northern.

At Hsuchowfu, 50 to 60 thousand. South of Hsuchowfu, 20,000.

Southern.

At Hsuchowfu, June 2nd, 3,000. At Hsuchow, June 9th, 10,000. Total of three weak Divisions.

From M/A, China. Report No. 7072 June 21, 1927

CHINA

Subject: Report of Official Trip of Major J.W. Stilwell, 15th Infantry, to Kiangsu Front.

Morale - Northern. Very bad. The troops have been about five months without pay. They are fed twice a day, getting two doughballs per man each time. Desertions are very heavy. Several units considered doubtful have been disarmed. Instances were noted where officers had to strike soldiers with sticks or whips to make them obey. Only the presence of the Tupan's train restrained the Northern troops, and as soon as it left looting became general. There is a large proportion of undersized boys and conscripted coolies in Chang Tsung-chang's army.

Morale - Southern. Very good. Although the troops are receiving little food, their discipline is good. They are in high spirits; they have a great deal of confidence; they give cheerful obedience, and I saw no evidence of looting.

Equipment. Chang Tsung-chang's army is far better equipped. Besides the usual types of rifles and pistols, they are well supplied with machine guns, three inch mortars, mountain guns, three inch field guns, and a large number of Bergmann rifles. Two planes were in daily use for reconnaissance and bombing, and three armored trains were used on the railroad almost daily. Besides the railroad transportation, 16 motor trucks (Federal, Graham Bros. and Berliets) were held for use in Hsuchowfu. Ammunition seemed plentiful.

Equipment - Southern. The Southern Army have the usual assortment of pistols and rifles, a few machine guns, a few Krupp 3 inch mountain guns, and some captured trench mortars. Ammunition was scarce.

Transportation - Northern. Practically all the railroad rolling stock remains in Chang Tsung-chang's hands; only a few broken down cars and engines were left behind at Hsuchowfu. He has also a large number of carts of the type commonly used in the north.

Transportation - Southern. The Southern Army is greatly handicapped by lack of transportation. Not being able to bring across the Yangtze any of the rolling stock on the Shanghai road they have only the odds and ends left behind by the retreating Northerners. This is all in bad condition. To supplement this they are using large numbers of pack animals, mostly the scrawny southern pony, and what native carts they can pick up. Unless they can in some way get a large number of cars and locomotives they will be greatly delayed in any further movement north.

Officer Personnal. There is a great contrast in the officer personnel below the rank of Regimental Commander. In the Northern force the company and battalion officers are largely uneducated coolies. Among the Southerners these same grades are largely filled by students from 18 to 22 years of age. They give the impression that they fully believe in the announced policies and ideals of the Southerners and can be depended upon to carry out orders. There is an air of determination about them which indicates that they are of tremendously more value as officers than the trash which fills the corresponding grades in the Northern army.

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CHINA

Subject: Report of Official Trip of Major J. W. Stilwell, 15th Infantry, to Kiangsu Front.

reported the location of the Southerners in their advance daily. The town gave a cordial welcome to the Southerners. The troops behaved themselves well and confidence was at once established. On the day following the entry of the Southerners most of the shops were open for business and women appeared freely on the streets - an impossibility while the Northerners were present. Posters were stuck up everywhere with the usual slogans of the Nationalists printed on them and mass meetings were held almost daily. The soldiers are well soaked in this propaganda and can talk it glibly although they don't understand much about it. Emphasis being laid on opposition to foreigners, the Southerners do not consider the Northerners as bitter enemies so much as deluded brothers, and are quite willing to take in deserters and add them to their own ranks.

Plans. According to rumors current among the troops at Hsuchowfu, Cheng Chow having been taken by Feng Yu-hsiang and Hsuchowfu by Chiang Kai Shek, their forces are now joined along the Lung Hai railroad. A period of consolidation and concentration is now going on, and when complete a simultaneous movement north along the Kin-Han and Tching-P'u railroads is to take place. Due to the difficulties of transportation which have been met on both lines it probably will be a matter of weeks before this movement can take place. The Southerners at Hsuchowfu do not expect much resistance. The Northerners having given up without a fight many excellent positions south of Hsuchowfu, the Southerners see no reason why they cannot advance to Tsinanfu with very little trouble. The Northerners probably have no definite plans. It is doubtful if their troops will fight, and in my opinion a determined advance by the Southerners will cause a collapse in the Northern force and a retreat thru Tsinanfu and Tientsin.

3. Conditions in Hsuchowfu. The people were all ejected from their homes by the Northerners and forced to live in miserable makeshift shacks anywhere. All their household goods were stolen. The wooden fittings of their houses have all been burned. Food is very scarce. Many people have died of starvation and were left lying the streets until the arrival of a southern burial corps began to clean things up. The town has been repeatedly looted by soldiers and Russians. Chang Tsung-chang's Russians are the worse type of ruffians. The current report is that they receive no pay but collect what they can by looting. Win or lose, they run the armored trains up and down the railroad, terrorizing the people by shooting and then stealing everything movable. The train is then run up the line and an auction held. When the country people occasionally attempt to pull up the track and block the train the usual method followed by the Russians is a general massacre in the village nearest the break. They are hated and feared by everybody.

The Red Spear society is widespread and increasing in numbers. Worn out by continual abuse and looting by both sides, the people are taking the law into their own hands and killing all small parties of soldiers they can handle. The Northerners fear them more than they do the Southern army. The Southerners have apparently been able to restrain their activities somewhat. The whole countryside over a belt of from 20 to 30 miles between the two forces is in a state of chaos where Russians and disorderly soldiers roam at will and Red Spears lie in wait for any stragglers. Meanwhile the common people, caught between these various elements, are entirely at their mercy. A few feeble efforts at relief have been made at Hsuchowfu, where beancake, commonly used as fertilizer in the north, is being issued as food to the destitute.

G-2 Report

CHINA

Subject: Report of Official Trip of Major J. W. Stilwell, 15th Infantry, to Kiangsu Front.

The fighting reported at P'eng Pu and Fulitsi did not amount to anything. There were very few wounded at Hsuchowfu, although many sick were wondering around absolutely uncared for. At Hsuchowfu and south there were only small rear guard actions with the exception of the cutting off and capture of an armored train.

4. We may expect this wave to roll northwards again as soon as transportation becomes available to the Southerners and sufficient strength is brought up to Hsuchowfu and Cheng Chow. Similar scenes will probably be repeated around Tsinanfu and from there after another period of consolidation the advance probably will be continued to Tientsin.

5. Hostility to foreigners is not diminishing. Although the Kueichow troops, who were the first units to reach Hsuchowfu, were friendly on learning that I was an American, it was not a very cordial welcome, and I could not get access to any brigade or division commander. South of Hsuchowfu, the feeling was much more intense, and before reaching P'u K'ou attempts were made by the usual Chinese methods of insult to provoke me into remonstrance and resistance. However, although my belongings were turned inside out, and my pistol and papers stolen, no one actually laid hands on mr or attempted to take money from me. I was threatened with arrest and detention at P'u K'ou, but nothing was done. I believe the Southerners have instructions not to go to extremes in their treatment of foreigners, but I do not consider it advisable as yet for any foreigners to attempt to circulate in territory controlled by them.

6. The most noticeable elements in the situation are: The good order and discipline maintained by the Southerners, the confidence they inspire in captured territory, and their better type of younger officers. There is a decided contrast to the low morale and bad discipline of the Northern troops, the fear and hate the latter inspire in the people, and the ease with which their greatly superior numbers have been pushed back so far and so rapidly by troops with greatly inferior equipment.

/s/ J. W. Stilwell,
Major, 15th Inf.

- - - - - -

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache.

Distribution:

4 MID
1 Japan
1 File

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
JAN 25

4-1 1928 2009-193
6700 - Basic Tactical Doctrine Underlying Training

G-2 Report

CHINA

Subject: Shansi Combat Regulations.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 24 1928

1. Introductory.

During the month of November, 1927, the Peking "Shun T'ien Shih Pao" published in instalments a document allegedly captured at Shansi G.H.Q. at Tingchow by the Fengtien Army. Fengtien authorities are quoted as stating that this paper is evidence of Yen Hsi-shan's long and cold-bloodedly matured plans for a breach of the peace in North China. As a matter of fact it is nothing of the sort, being an ordinary combat regulation of the most general description. It is believed to be of considerable interest, however, as this is the first instance that has come to the writer's notice of a Chinese military publication that was not a blind borrowing from foreign sources, but that has been drawn up to fit a concrete local situation. For these reasons a summary of its salient points are given below.

2. General.

The situation envisaged is that of defensive mountain warfare on the Shansi borders, primarily a war of small units. The doctrine enunciated is that conventional to such a situation, with emphasis laid on terrain, necessitating dispersion of force and consequent tactical independence of local commanders. It is laid down initially that units will often have to operate and to hold on independently, with no assurance of support or relief; "the role of a company commander will tend to approximate that of a battalion commander, and the platoon leader will face with his unit the problems that generally confront a company". The points stressed below represent on the whole departures from orthodox methods and doctrine.

3. Terrain.

(a) Terrain is emphasized throughout the regulations, its consideration taking up approximately one-half of the pamphlet. While terrain is obviously the factor differentiating mountain warfare from ordinary operations, it is believed that even from this point of view it is unduly stressed in these regulations and thereby they are characteristic of current Chinese military thought which invariably emphasizes territory in place of the objective, place instead of maneuver.

(b) In the occupation of positions, command is to be sought even at the expense of field of fire.

(c) North slope positions are recommended whenever possible, as the South slopes of Shansi mountains are used for cave dwellings, which provide cover from fire except from the South.

4. Maneuvre.

Maneuvre is invariably subordinated to position. In the defense of a position an arrangement of roughly parallel lines is suggested, to be defended seriatim, the defending troops withdrawing when pressed from line to line until a line of ultimate resistance is reached.

From M/A, China. Report No. 7180 December 16, 1927

CHINA

Subject: Shansi Combat Regulations.

which is to be defended to the last. No suggestion is made of an elastic defense.

In attack of a given strong point (generally conceived as a pass) the enemy is to be immobilized in position and then flanked out. In attack of a line of such points, penetration is to be sought where resistance is weakest or absent. The stronger individual positions are to be immobilized and to be dealt with after their isolation has been accomplished.

In considerations of both attack and defense there seems to be an apprehension of and groping after disposition in depth, but the concept of such disposition is nowhere clearly enunicated or discussed.

5. Fire Power.

No mention is made of machine guns nor of artillery. A rifleman's war is obviously contemplated.

Rifle fire is divided into the following categories:

(a) Fire for effect - within 300 meters.
(b) Opportunity (i.e. rencontre) fire.
(c) Demonstration fire - fire to convince the enemy that it is unprofitable to attack a lightly held spot.
(d) Deception fire - fire to lure the enemy into attacking in the wrong direction, or of attacking strong points in the belief that they are lightly held.

Economy of ammunition is strictly enjoined because of difficulties in procurement and supply. Soldiers fire only upon order of superiors. Non-commissioned officers may authorize expenditure up to 75% of ammunition allowance. Platoon commanders may expend to 85%, company commanders to 90%. The final 10% of the ammunition allowance is only to be used upon authorization from battalion commander or his superior.

Individual soldiers are limited to 20 rounds of ammunition in any one burst of fire. This limit is placed in the interests of economy and also because "after 20 shots a soldier's aim becomes uncertain".

6. Surprise.

True surprise is not mentioned, but deceptive measures are stressed throughout the pamphlet. The employment of demonstration and deception fires, of ambushes and of plain clothes troops, singly or in combination, is urged at every opportunity.

CHINA

Subject: Shansi Combat Regulations.

7. Reconnaissance.

Reconnaissance has apparently not been contemplated in the drawing up of these regulations. It is probably for this reason that the surprise element is not stressed as both armies are undoubtedly presupposed to be in ignorance of their opponents' movements and intentions, and in consequence surprise will be mutual and continuous.

8. Communications.

Visual flag signals are recommended because of the difficulties attendant on laying wires and because of the slow speed that runners make over mountainous country.

John Magruder
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Tientsin
1 File

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV..
APR 17 1928
6700
2009-196
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Complete Rewriting of Military Training - 6700.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 16 1928

Destroy pages 114, 115 and 115.5.

6700 - MILITARY TRAINING - GENERAL.

Judged by western standards, there is not a single military leader in China today who has a sound conception of basic tactical doctrines or fundamental principles of training. Due to the decentralization, the lack of organization and the heterogeneity of arms and equipment in the Chinese armed forces, any kind of standardized training for Chinese troops as awhole is impossible. A general staff section in charge of training of troops, such as our G-3 Section, does not exist in China. In some instances the army corps or division commanders prescribe a general training program, but in most cases the matter of training is left entirely to the regimental commanders who usually exercise little supervision over the training activities of their regiments. Today there are no regulations covering the scope and uniformity of training for Chinese troops as a whole.

Training varies widely from the snappy, well drilled personal divisions and bodyguard units of the war lords to undisciplined rabble found in so many parts of China. In general the training of Chinese armies is far below the standard of any other modern military force, and at best, it is only a poor imitation of the training of European armies before the Great War.

The methods of training are mainly German, introduced by Yuan Shih-kai during the last years of the Manchu dynasty at the time of the organization of the model army, modified in recent years by the influence of Japanese advisers and Japanese trained Chinese officers. No training is typically Chinese or evolved by Chinese, except the traditional Chinese calisthenics and the "fencing" with the huge beheading knife or spear.

The sporadic attempts in recent years of some armies to improve and to standardize the training of their troops, which in some instances were initiated by foreign advisers, as in the Kuomintang Army and in the forces of Feng Yu-hsiang in 1925 and 1926, hardly ever went beyond the preparation of elaborate training programs and schedules. This was usually due to the lack of trained officer personnel, to the ignorance of the higher officers and their unwillingness to learn or their inability to even appreciate their ignorance. A notable exception was the Whampoa School which was to provide a nucleus of trained personnel for the future armies of the south. There the success of the Soviet advisers was principally due to the fact that the Russians were in a position to exercise strong pressure on the headquarters of the army through the supply of arms and equipment.

Owing to the fact that the old fashioned Chinese General objects to taking advice from a junior officer, and hardly ever trusts any subordinate officer sufficiently to give him the necessary authority and responsibility, Chinese officers who are foreign trained and educated

From M/A, China Report No. 7230 March 8, 1928

in foreign military schools, seldom find themselves in a position to exercise influence over the training of troops. If they are placed in charge of training and attempt to introduce modern methods, they soon meet with the inertness of the higher officers and the ignorance of the junior officers, and losing their enthusiasm for reforms, they revert to type and become typical Chinese officers intriguing and struggling for lucrative and influential posts.

Although Chinese have employed and are still employing foreign instructors, none of the military leaders has a permanent staff of foreign experts, whose advice or directions are fully carried out. If foreigners succeed in drilling and training some organizations or specialists, the Chinese do not know how to make use of that training. When the foreigners leave, the officers and soldiers soon revert to the perfunctory routine drill, the purpose of which they do not understand.

The recent failure of the South China Group of Soviet advisers shows how much and again how little a group of foreign instructors and advisers can accomplish in China. This group of Soviet advisers had an excellent opportunity, and took advantage of it, of making a most thorough study of the armed forces in the South and it is quite certain that these advisers gathered more precise information about the Chinese Army than any group of foreigners before in Chinese history. An excerpt from the Report on the Kuomintang Army by Soviet advisers, dated April, 1926, is quoted here because the training of that army is quite typical of that in the other armies of China:

> "The training of an army for war must be carried out in accordance with its armament and the armament of its probably enemy. The probable theatre of war must be also taken into consideration.
>
> "The National-Revolutionary army and its next adversaries are armed with magazine rifles, a rather small quantity of machine guns (6-10 to a regiment) and artillery guns (from 6 to 24 to a corps, mostly obsolete mountain guns), a very few and often rather useless technical communication equipment. Cavalry is completely absent. The number of other auxiliary and special troops is so insignificant that they are quite unimportant.
>
> "For this reason the training of the National Revolutionary army must be conducted approximately along the lines of the training of the European armies before the Great War, adding to it the political instruction. In this stage it will probably have to remain for quite a long time, because while in the West the introduction of powerful technical equipment radically changed the tactics and conformably the training of the troops, in South China the extensive use of technical means will be hindered, on one hand, by the lack of railways and the poverty of the government, and on the other hand by the special conditions in the theatre of war, by the absence of roads and by the fact that the regions are infested with bandits who make it impossible to supply the army regularly from the rear.

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"Though the training is done in a comparatively primitive manner the troops are even from this viewpoint far from being prepared for war. The reason for it is the absence of proper instruction, the inertness of the old officer personnel and especially the ignorance and inexperience of the junior officers, who are graduates of the schools of the National Revolutionary army. Besides, the drill regulations and the text-books on tactics which the army uses are extracts compiled from the German and Japanese regulations which were used in those armies in the beginning of this century and which do not agree with the methods of modern warfare. There are, moreover, several kinds of military terminologies which the officers use indiscriminately; this also hinders much the training of the troops. It is therefore necessary to revise the old regulations (this work has already been started), to "jack up" the commanding officers and to make field exercises more effective.

"There is almost no military literature in China and the few books that exist are not used by the majority of the officers.

"The training is being done in each corps separately. The General Staff, however, will soon issue a general training program. Each corps has now its own program, but it is carried out inconsistently and there are often no training schedules in the companies. The higher commanders pay little attention to the manner in which the training is done and the junior officers seldom account to their superiors for the work they are doing. This lack of control brings about an incomplete and irrational waste of time which should be used for instructions.

"Considered from our standpoint the training is unworthy of criticism; but it must be considered that the training of the troops which the National Revolutionary army had to fight, was, in the best case, the same if not worse. The same can be said of the next probable adversaries. But remembering that the task of the National Revolutionary army goes beyond the struggle with neighbors and that it will probably have to do with the better prepared armies of Central and North China, the training must be considerably improved, so much the more since under the present conditions this is, if not wholly, at least to a great degree possible.

"A critical examination of the training for war will doubtless show that many things must be improved and even changed altogether, but the conclusion should not be drawn that the National Revolutionary army is at present entirely unfit for war (the preparedness of the 'Whampoa' units is a little better than that of the rest of the army).

"The method of instruction is absolutely irrational. In the training program prepared by the Chinese too much time is given to close order drill. About 4 1/2 hours daily are given to instruction in classes where besides the political instruction and the teaching of regulations too much time is spent on the theory of shooting and even of field service. This proves that there is a tendency towards training for the parade-ground and that the method of lecturing is quite irrationally applied to the illiterate Chinese soldier, instead of the method of practical instruction on the range and in the field.

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The exercises are carried out indolently according to the old established routine, without any interest on the part of the commanders and the soldiers, all of whom seem to be carrying out a boresome fatigue-duty. It is worth noting that very little attention is being paid by the commanders to faults and very little is being done to correct them, and that the critiques of tactical exercises, though being practised, bear the character of reports of the commanders and not of a discussion."

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Distribution:
4 MID
1 Tientsin
1 File

1st Ind.
Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China, March 8, 1928 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

Reviewed and concurred in.

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. D.V.
MAY 14
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WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Complete Rewriting of 6720 -
Organizational and Unit Training.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 14 1928

Destroy pages 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 123, 124 and 125 of the Digest.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 14 1928

The training discussed here applies only to regularly organized army units, there being no organized militia or reserves. Much that has already been said with regard to individual training also applies to organization and unit training, especially as concerns lack of uniformity and standards of proficiency. Training in general is turned over to junior officers and non-commissioned officers, higher commanders exercising little or no supervision. For example, at battalion drill of any infantry unit, the captains and first lieutenants are commonly seen grouped in one spot engaged in conversation, paying absolutely no attention to the work of their companies, while the actual drilling is carried out by non-commissioned officers under the supervision of subalterns. As a result drill schedules when existing are usually carried out in a perfunctory and unreasoning manner.

One thing that particularly strikes a foreigner observing the drill of Chinese troops is the fact that the most egregious errors are allowed to pass without correction. Commands are usually well given, in a loud clear voice, but as soon as this is done the drill master seems to feel that his responsibility is concluded, and as long as the movement is carried out at all he is apparently satisfied. Troops in ranks at close order drill are continually gazing about at any object of interest which may come within their view, the well known Chinese trait of insufferable curiosity being too strong to permit them to concentrate upon the work of the moment when there is anything distracting to be seen. While there is seldom if ever any immediate correction of errors in drill, long-winded explanations, often as not on irrelevant subjects, are often given by instructors, the men usually paying little attention.

Considerable stress is placed upon indoor instruction, the day being usually divided into outdoor drill in the mornings, and theoretical instruction or "studies" in the afternoon. Here again lack of supervision on the part of officers of superior ranks results in a mere perfunctory effort to put in the time prescribed in the schedule rather than any honest effort to explain and supplement the practical instruction given on the drill grounds. Oftentimes the instruction takes the form of lectures on some military subject, in which the language employed is far beyond the grasp of the ordinary enlisted men. If the officer in charge of the "studies" happens to have had some literary education, he occasionally takes the opportunity to display his erudition by the use of language which is beyond the ability of his audience to comprehend.

It is not to be supposed, however, that because training in the Chinese armies is generally entrusted to the junior officers that it is universally bad. Because of the prevalence of war conditions throughout the country, many bright young men are compelled to turn to

From M/A, China Report No. 7249 April 6, 1928

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the army as the only means of making a livelihood, and are gaining commissions through the medium of the many military schools which the individual military leaders are establishing. Some of the graduates of these schools are capable and willing young officers who are not content with a mere perfunctory performance of their duties, with a resultant improvement in the training of the particular unit to which they may be assigned, in spite of the indifference of their superiors.

While texts on organizational and unit training are numerous in China, they are merely translations and paraphrases of the regulations of other countries, principally Japan. While in the North at least, these books are supposedly issued under the direction of the Ministry of War, they are in no way standardized, nor is their use prescribed throughout any one army, and such officers as are aware of their existence or have some slight familiarity with their contents pay little attention to the teaching contained therein.

Infantry. The training of the Chinese infantry consists principally of close order drill, with special emphasis on marching. In spite of the stress laid upon it, however, the troops march badly, without keeping direction and alignment.

In the little instruction that is given in extended order, too much attention is paid to keeping the troops in a straight line, and to regular intervals, and there is no adaptation to the terrain.

There is little, if any, target practice, and when this is held there are sometimes only three to five rounds of ammunition per man per year to be actually fired on the range. In 1926, the best trained troops of the Kuomintang Army, firing on the range at one hundred meters, made only ten per cent of hits on the target, while even at seventy meters, only fifty percent of the shots hit the target. This poor shooting is explained by the bad condition of the rifles, and the poor quality of the ammunition, as well as the lack of proper training. Combat firing in Chinese armies is unknown and fire control in battle is very poor.

The Chinese armies are now gradually beginning to pay some attention to field training, especially as concerns adaptation to terrain, the organization of advance guards and outposts, and to reconnaissance. At the present time, however, even the best trained units still display a woeful ignorance of the basic principles of such training. In maneuvers and battles, often no reconnaissance is made. Scouts are sent out only a few hundred meters. On the march advance guards are often lacking. Outposts when posted are seldom instructed as to their duties. Mutual support is lacking, and communication between units is poorly maintained, usually only runners or visual signals being employed. The sending of reports to the next higher headquarters by smaller units is very infrequent. Little is done by the various units in the collection of combat intelligence information. It is usual to depend for such information upon the local inhabitants and civilian spies. The defects pointed out alone are largely due to the fact that too much emphasis is laid on classroom instruction and lectures on field training rather than on practical work in the open.

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Tactical exercises for smaller as well as for larger units are infrequently employed in training. The tactical problems are carelessly prepared, show lack of originality and variety, and are executed in a routine manner. Discussions and critiques of such exercises are of a purely formal character. The importance Chinese attach to "face" precludes the pointing out of individual errors on the part of officers, and such criticisms as are made are usually of a very general nature or are applied to the enlisted personnel only. A Soviet adviser attached to the Kuominchun infantry, which must be considered as at least the equal of any other Chinese troops, reports the following of their efficiency in action during the war near Tientsin in 1926:

"When in positions, the troops were evenly spread out along the whole front, thus displaying their fear of organizing a strong "fist" at the expense of the secondary sections of the front. Skirmish lines were too deep and rectilinear. The adaptation to the terrain and the proper utilization of it were a rare phenomenon. A strong tendency for gathering in companies was easily observed in the troops. The rifle fire was unsatisfactory (all Chinese armies are very poorly trained in this respect), i.e., not well-aimed; the direction of fire was not satisfactory enough and fire discipline was very poor. The infantryman, as a fighter, is enduring, cool-headed and brave enough and when wounded, bears his sufferings with surprising patience.

"Generally speaking, military operations demonstrated that army units, on a whole, were trained very poorly as regards tactics and that a long preparatory training on rational lines was absolutely necessary, in order to be able to utilize the troops to their full capacity.

"The use of machine guns was in most cases inefficacious. The experience in this respect revealed that machine gun crews were trained very poorly. Cases when machine guns did not work at all occurred quite frequently. Commanders of infantry units insufficiently utilized the full value of machine guns. Flank fire was used in rare cases and even when used, mostly without any effect".

Cavalry. In former days the Chinese cavalry was very expert in the use of the knife and spear mounted. Later, in the latter days of the empire, shooting of the rifle mounted was much stressed. At the present time, however, very little attention is paid to the use of arms on horseback, and mounted pistol and rifle practice is unheard of. Mounted practice is still held with spears and beheading knives, with which the men of some units are very expert dismounted. These are traditional weapons of the Chinese and they know how to use them. When mounted, however, their expertness is in direct proportion to their ability to manage their horses, hence with the exception of some of the Heilungkiang and Kansu cavalry units, the use of weapons mounted is most inferior.

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Training in riding and horsemanship, as we know it, is indescribably poor. The cavalryman is taught to ride with the back stiff, to jerk the horse's mouth to make his start and stop, and apparently nothing whatsoever is known of the use of the legs and weight as aids in riding. The Chinese treat all animals cruelly and horses are no exception to the rule. When saddling they cinch the mount as tightly as the equipment will stand, regardless of the animal. On the march, as long as the saddle does not fall off the horse's back, no attempt is made to adjust the equipment. In camp, horses are left saddled on the picket line for protracted periods, the result being that on long marches sore backs are the rule rather than the exception.

Very little grooming is done, and the hair is allowed to grow long and shaggy. Horses are fed anything from dry and unappetizing kaoliang stalks to soggy bread of the worst grade, besides millet, beans, and in fact almost anything that the countryside provides. The Chinese, however, use good judgment as to time of feeding and watering, as they always water before feeding and also make use of every opportunity to water horses on the march. Also they usually lead their horses for a time before mounting when beginning a march.

Under ordinary conditions, Chinese cavalry of the present time covers only slightly more ground on the march than infantry. In marching horses are ridden at the walk or are led. Trotting is little used because of the confusion caused by the different gaits of the horses, many of which are pacers and single footers, gaits which are considered very desirable by the Chinese. The average rate of march is 10 li per hour. Under exceptional circumstances, Chinese cavalry can make marches of considerable length, as in the Chihli-Fengtien war of 1924, when the average daily march of the National Army (present Kuominchun) cavalry was from 100 to 120 li, or from 30 to 40 miles per day.

In most cavalry units march discipline is extremely bad. There is little supervision by officers and non-commissioned officers, and consequently much straggling.

Due to the above enumerated defects and deficiencies in training, lack of discipline, and grossly inferior equipment, it may be said that Chinese cavalry would be a negligible factor in warfare against troops of western powers, and even in internecine wars it is seldom effective. Reports of eye witnesses of the fighting between Feng Yu-hsiang and Li Ching-lin near Tientsin in 1925 stated that the Kuominchun cavalry served no other purpose than to cause confusion in the ranks of its own infantry. Present day Chinese cavalry may be characterized as average Chinese infantry hampered by horses, and is so inferior to that of western nations as to preclude the possibility of comparison.

Artillery. With very few exceptions, Chinese artillery is poorly trained. In action with indirect fire, it is used at the limit of its range against the enemy's trenches and gun positions, but in this with the lack of proper training of the gun crews, lack of observation, and uniformity in grade of powder and fuses, it is almost absurdly ineffective in

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ranging, which added to the noted inefficiency in controlling bursts, makes its value very low as compared with that of a western army. It is because of these qualities that the trench mortar, with its simple control, projectile visible throughout the flight and bursts upon impact, has gained such an important place in Chinese equipment. As a matter of fact, the Fengtien armies are now supplied with a three inch trench mortar, manufactured in the Mukden Arsenal, which surpasses our own in range and accuracy. These new trench mortars are in fact used as light howitzers, with a reported effective range of over three thousand yards. Opposing artillery lacks the ability to hit, and the H.E. lacks power to destroy trench mortar emplacements, even when the location of them is known. As a whole the technical and tactical handling of artillery is most primitive. Officers know very little of observation and adjustment, and of the proper employment of shrapnel, high explosive ammunition, and the various kinds of fuses. They are often ignorant of the most elementary principles of gunnery. Dispersion and the theory of probable error are mysteries of which the majority of officers have never heard.

Systematic training for the artillery driver in horsemanship and draft may be said to be almost totally absent. There is no uniformity in harness and horse equipment even in individual batteries. As draft animals, horses, mules, donkeys and even bullocks and cows are used. In many cases drivers are not mounted but handle the animals in typical native fashion by walking alongside. While in the better trained units field artillery on the march resembles western artillery, in many organizations it resembles a string of Chinese carts on the road. In the best Fengtien batteries when obstacles are met all drivers beat the heads of their animals with heavy whips. Neither officers no men have any idea of the proper adjustment of harness. It is not an unusual sight to see four small draft animals, all in pitiable condition, dragging a field piece over a rough dirt road by means of ordinary native harness, the collars of some of the harness being so small that the animals' tongues hang out and they breathe with such difficulty that their snorts may be heard for a considerable distance, the coolie driver walking alongside the while and belaboring their gaunt frames with a club as thick as his wrist. A draft animal without harness or saddle sores is seldom seen in an artillery unit on the march, and the fact that Chinese artillery is able to move at all is not due so much to any skill on the part of the troops as to the almost unbelievable hardihood of the animals.

In the south where roads suitable for wagon transportation are few and draft animals are lacking, Chinese artillerymen have acquired, through experience, astonishing dexterity in breaking down, transporting by coolie carriers, and re-assembling of field artillery material. The heaviest parts are readily taken over the most difficult mountain roads on bamboo frames slung between ten or twenty bearers, and by the use of a different system of bamboo frames, these parts are as readily carried through rice swamps.

When in garrison, the upkeep of artillery materiel in the better units is quite good. In the field, however, artillery is usually in very poor condition due to the lack of attention and proper cleaning materials.

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Proper grooming is as unknown in the field artillery as it is in the cavalry.

As regards the efficiency of Chinese artillery in action, the observations of American army officers on the operations of the field artillery in the Chihli-Fengtien war of 1922 are of interest:

"All guns (Chihli artillery) were in the open where a clear view could be had to the front. Intervals were great and little attention was paid to fire control in most places. Artillery officers were numerous, sometimes three at each gun, especially at the three-inch pieces. The senior artillery officer present would occasionally give orders which were carried along the line of guns, but in most cases the firing was conducted by each gun separately. No instruments, such as battery commanders telescopes, range finders, or signal equipment were on hand. No advance observation posts were established. Each gunner laid direct on his fancied target, estimated the range, experimented with the fuze setters for each shot, and blazed away. Each shot in the early stages of the opening fire was watched by all present. Officers had field glasses, mostly prismatic, but none had mil scales or other measuring devices. One officer used a Chinese foot ruler without cord and seemed to give out considerable advice at his particular gun. A debate would always ensue during the adjustment of fire, and when firing became general, or during the fire for effect, every gun was apparently independent. Lateral communication was of little consequence, and was usually effected by an officer strolling from one to another of the guns in his immediate vicinity.

"The Fengtien Artillery fire was exceedingly high, shrapnel bursts at times being over two hundred feet in the air, others bursting on impact, short and over, while some were effective only by luck."

In contrast to the above, showing what might be expected of the best artillery units, during the Kuominchun-Mukden fighting in the vicinity of Tientsin in the winter of 1925 and the spring of 1926, the Russian advisors attached to Feng Yu-hsiang's forces reported on the artillery of the first Kuominchun as follows:

"The artillery has made great progress in firing. It is well trained, and its fire is in most cases well directed and effective. It is bold in action and capable of self-sacrifice in order to accomplish some common mission. In many cases artillery is the last to retreat under enemy rifle fire, directed from close range. Most of the batteries fire from open or semi-covered positions. Those batteries which made an attempt to fire from covered positions, fired at random on account of the absence of technical means of communication and poor observation. Considering the circumstances and conditions under which the artillery functions, such as absence of communication equipment, irregular and casual supply of ammunition, no experience in firing from covered positions, etc., it acquitted itself very well."

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It may be noted here that Feng's artillery had received the benefit of extensive training at the hands of Russian advisors, who had instituted schools in which carefully prepared programs of instruction were carried out. In these schools the training methods, drill schedules, and as far as possible, the textbooks were all patterned after those in use in the pre-war Tsarist armies.

The artillery of the Fengtien Army is at present without doubt better organized, equipped and trained than the artillery of any other army. Still in 1927, in the siege of Chochow, a walled city about 35 miles south of Peking, Fengtien artillery displayed a great lack of efficiency as judged by western standards. Considering the number of guns employed in the siege and ammunition expended, the effect of the artillery fire was almost negligible. Artillery commanders showed ignorance of the most elementary artillery tactics. The fire was inaccurate and ammunition ineffective. The 150 mm guns were unable to damage seriously the enemy headquarters in the city. Although there were excellent rail facilities, ammunition supply was unorganized and uncertain.

This report was prepared in collaboration by Captains Ratay and Barrett.

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Distribution:
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STATUS CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
MAY 1928
2009-196
6710
WAR DEPARTMENT

G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Individual Training.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. APR 30 1928

Recruit Instruction. There is no more uniformity in the instruction of recruits in the various armies of China than there is in the methods of recruiting. Generally speaking there are no prescribed regulations for the training of recruits. In most armies the recruits are turned over to the companies, troops or batteries which need replacements, and there such instruction is given them as the organization commanders see fit. It is not unusual to see a group of recently impressed or enlisted coolies, many of them boys between 14 and 16 years of age, in tattered clothes and in the summer time often barefooted, just as picked up off the streets or farms, being drilled by non-commissioned officers who are visibly stupid and inefficient. There is little, if any supervision on the part of officers.

Methods bordering on the ludicrous are often employed by the instructors, such as having men stand on one foot in extremely constrained and awkward positions in order to illustrate the mechanics of some movement in marching. Also it is a common sight to see a group of recruits stand at attention for considerable periods while the instructor delivers a long-winded harangue on the subject of military virtues or some other irrelevant topic. As soon as the recruit has acquired the most rudimentary knowledge of marching and handling a rifle, his recruit training ceases and he is placed in the ranks of his organization where he follows the movements of other men in ranks as well as he can.

While in many of the Chinese armies there are no recruit depots, training or replacement units, and the organizations themselves procure and train their own recruits, in some of the better organized forces such as the Third and Fourth Army Group of the Ankuochun, a definitely established recruiting headquarters with a training center attached thereto is maintained as one of the sections of the rear echelon. This section not only procures recruits but also gives them some elementary training before sending them to the organizations needing replacements. In addition, the Third and Fourth Army Group has recently raised by conscription a force of 15 regiments for the express purpose of furnishing replacements to front line units. Nine regiments of this force have been formed into an army with headquarters in Peking, called the "Eleventh Replacement Army".

School of the Soldier. With respect to the individual training of the soldier who has advanced beyond the recruit stage, it may be said in general that this training is only a poor imitation of the pre-war German and Japanese drill corresponding to our own School of the Soldier. As stated before, the only individual training which is typically Chinese is that in "fencing" with the beheading knife, and a traditional form of calisthenics.

Marching is given the most attention in the individual instruction of the soldier. The Chinese manner of drill ground marching is a cross between the German and Japanese parade step. It lacks, however, the snap and precision to which we are accustomed in the

From M/A, China Report No. 7239 March 23, 1928

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movements of Western troops, although in the better trained units marching attains a comparatively high standard of excellence.

The manual of arms is taught in a slovenly manner, and the soldier apparently never attains the ability to handle his piece with snap and precision.

Instruction in the use of the rifle is poorly carried out even in the best organizations. The average soldier never acquires a knowledge of its proper manipulation. As no dummy cartridges are available, the soldier is given no practical instruction in loading the rifle before actually firing it. Range estimation, setting off distances on the sight, and correction for windage are subjects beyond the mental capacities of the average instructor, to say nothing of the ignorant coolies who form the rank and file of Chinese armies. Of all preparatory exercises for shooting, only aiming from a sand-bag rest at a simple target is taught. The soldier is not instructed in assuming the proper position in firing. He is made to lie prone, in prolongation of the piece, with elbows quite close together and legs and feet together. After each shot the rifle is removed from the shoulder to work the bolt. The use of the sling is unknown. No attention is paid to trigger squeeze. As a result of such training, the poor condition of rifles and ammunition, and almost total absence of target practice, the Chinese soldier is an execrable shot.

Instruction in the use of the bayonet is a beautiful example of perfect timing and laborious training, but in comparison with our own bayonet drill the movements are executed much more slowly and there is a considerable amount of the theatrical flourish which characterizes the handling of military weapons by the Chinese. As far as is known, there is no practice on dummies. Bayonet practice, as conducted in the better trained units, results in a considerable degree of gymnastic ability among the men. It includes much posturing and leaping about known as "boxing" and "fencing", in which individuals meet imaginary opponents. It might be compared to our "shadow boxing" except that its movements seem to be prescribed by tradition and to follow rigid lines of attack, feint and defence, the excellence of a performance being judged by the faithful adherence in all movements to an established sequence. Showy as it is, this exercise is of no value in inculcating a desire to close with the weapon or to make the soldier efficient in its use in a hand-to-hand fight.

Reminiscent of mediaeval times is the instruction which some Chinese units receive in the use of the beheading knife, an exercise which is supposed to imbue the soldier with a martial spirit. Feng Yu-hsiang laid particular stress upon this training, and the "Ta Tao Tui", (Big Knife Corps) is still a part of his forces, being used as body and provost guards. Reports are occasionally received of the formation of such units, to be used as "shock troops", in the forces of other military leaders, especially when there is a shortage of rifles. The effectiveness of such troops against modern weapons, even in the hands of the Chinese, may be seriously questioned.

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Care of Arms. The amount and character of instruction which the individual Chinese soldier receives in the care of arms and equipment is governed entirely by the attitude of his commanding officer. In some units so little attention is paid to this that arms and equipment are in the worst possible state of neglect, while even in the best organizations standards of condition and care do not approach those required in a Western army. In some instances careful instruction is given but the methods taught are faulty, such as scrubbing rifles with fine sand until they gleam both inside and out.

Calisthenics and Athletics. Instruction is given in setting up exercises, but usually the movements are executed perfunctorily and without snap, and do not serve the purpose of improving physical development and military bearing. In this connection again an exception must be made in the case of Feng Yu-hsiang's troops, where great attention is paid to calisthenics, as a result of which the men are unusually well set up and have a military carriage which would do credit to a Western army.

Athletics are almost completely neglected in the Chinese army, just as they are amongst the mass of the people. In recent years attempts have been made to introduce athletics into the armies, but have met with little success due to the total absence of the sporting instinct in the Chinese. Groups of soldiers are occasionally seen kicking a football about in an aimless manner, but organized games, athletic contests and field sports, as we understand them, are unknown.

Sanitation and Hygiene. Along the lines of sanitation and personal hygiene very little instruction is given, as is to be expected in a country where ignorance of even the most elementary principles of these subjects prevails among all classes. Although permanent barracks are usually kept quite clean, camps are generally filthy, especially as the digging of latrines is considered unnecessary. In point of personal cleanliness, soldiers do not differ much from the coolies on the streets of large cities. In winter, in the north, padded and fur-lined clothing is worn both day and night. As this clothing is rarely if ever changed during the cold season, it becomes infested with vermin, dirty, and odorous beyond description. Facilities for bathing are negligible and such as do exist are seldom resorted to in cold weather. Feng Yu-hsiang's soldiers, while cleaner than the average Chinese troops, from our point of view still leave much to be desired in the way of cleanliness.

Instruction in first aid is confined to showing the soldier how to apply a tourniquet. No first aid packets are issued to troops.

Miscellaneous. Instruction in guard duty is a simple matter in that there are no general orders. The soldier is simply posted and told what to do on his particular post.

Instruction in military courtesy and saluting is given to all Chinese soldiers, but no respect for superiors is thereby inculcated. Although senior officers are saluted punctiliously little attention is paid to junior officers as they move among the troops.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Individual Training.

In some armies, elementary education in reading and writing is given the troops, the men being sometimes required to learn a certain number of Chinese characters each day.

In the present internecine wars of China, as patriotism cannot play an important role, the military leaders strive to give their soldiers something to take its place, and various slogans have been coined for the purpose of convincing the troops that they are fighting for some cause. Often pamphlets are distributed by military leaders to their men, and officers are ordered to instruct them in the political doctrines contained therein. Such a system was worked out to the highest degree by the far-sighted Soviet advisors attached to the Kuomintang Army in 1924-25-26. In this army, political instruction of the individual soldier was considered as equal in importance to military instruction. In Feng Yu-hsiang's army Christianity has been intermingled with political doctrine. Prior to Feng's experiments with Russian theories, all recruits automatically became Christians, and were instructed in a brand of christianity adapted to their understanding and suited to the purposes of their commanding officers. Men also were trained in the singing of hymns, which were used as marching songs, and in this way contributed in no small degree to the upkeep of morale.

In summing up the subject of individual training, it is apparent that in accordance with Western standards, the average soldier of any of the Chinese armies is at his best only a very poorly trained man. This is due to the lack of system and coordination in instruction and to the ignorance and inefficiency of the commissioned personnel rather than to any inherent defects on the part of the men. The individual Chinese is excellent raw material for a solider, having unending patience, a marked submissiveness to authority and a strong, disease-resisting physique. Properly trained and officered, well fed, adequately clothed and regularly paid, he would make a good soldier, judged even by our standards.

The foregoing report was prepared in collaboration by Captains Ratay and Barrett.

John Magruder.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

Distribution:
4 MID
1 File
1 Tientsin

CHINA (Military)

Subject: The Officers Training Camp at Nanking.

General Remarks: We saw the students at their various drills, etc., which I mentioned before. Some of the detachment were doing recruit drill and were very serious about it. The cavalry detachment was riding in circles on flat saddles without stirrups at a trot. The men were going quite well considering the ponies they were riding, which as General Li explained, a few weeks ago were pulling carts, etc., in Nanking and out in the country. This cavalry detachment is supposed to be the nucleus for the Kuomintang cavalry. After the drill we inspected barracks, club rooms, conference rooms, class rooms, mess halls, etc. We visited two class rooms. In one of them was a class for military engineering. There were about 60 students in the class, each one of them with note book, ruler, pencil, etc., taking notes. The instructors had on a large black-board drawn diagrams of trenches, using "meters" as measuring unit and foreign numerals, including decimal fractions. In his lecture he used such English expressions as "plus" and "minus". In the other class room a lecture on the organization of the French Army was being given. When we walked in, the instructor was just explaining the organization of the French air service, for which purpose he had diagrams on the black-board.

This training camp or school is a temporary institution for the purpose of improving and standardizing the officer personnel. Later, I was told, it is intended to establish officers' schools for infantry, artillery, etc. Although I am certain that some of the drill, exactness in saluting and so on was done for my special benefit, still I was very much impressed and must say that it was far beyond anything I expected.

Distribution:
4 MID
1 Tientsin
1 File

J. P. Ratay,
Captain, F. A.
Assistant Military Attache.

1st Ind.

Office of the Military Attache, American Legation, Peking, China, May 16, 1928 - To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

Forwarded.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

G-2 Report

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1928 2009-197 JUN 28

CHINA (Military)

WAR DEPARTMENT

Subject: The Officers Training Camp at Nanking.
Kuomin ko ming chün chün kuan t'uan.

(Literal translation - "The People's Revolutionary Army's Officers' Corps"

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JUN 26 1928

Established: At Nanking in March 1928 (two months ago).

Purpose: To train officers of infantry and cavalry.

Duration of Course: 9 months, divided into three terms.

Student Body: Consists of 600 officers of the grade of captain to colonel, of 700 officers of the grade of second and first lieutenant, and 200 cadets of the former Whampoa Academy, who did not complete the course there. Total 1500 men.

Instructors: Officers of the rank of major to colonel. Most of them graduates of Paoting and Whampoa. A number of these instructors are graduates of Japanese military schools, and some had been to German or French schools.

The Commandant: General (two stars) Huang Mu-sun. A graduate of the highest Staff College in Japan. Visited Europe after the war and spent about one year in Germany. About 45 years old.

The Assistant Commandant: General (one star) Li Hua-yin. A graduate of the Japanese Infantry School. About 40 years old.

In Charge of Political Instruction: Colonel Hou Pao-?, about 25 years old. Graduated from Temple University, Philadelphia, 1927, as M.A. (of "Transportation"). A Canton man who is temporarily in charge while his chief is at the front.

Schedule of Instructions: Outdoors. From 6:30 to 8:00 a.m., school of the soldier and squad. Company and battalion drill. Calisthenics. Exercises with wooden swords and spears (old Chinese style). Machine gun drill, digging of trenches (actually done by students themselves), rifle drill, aiming exercises similar to our own. Cavalry detachment - mounted drill.

Indoors. From 8:30 to 11:30 in 1 1/2 periods and two hours in the afternoon. Military science, including military engineering, minor tactics, organization of Chinese and foreign armies, etc., is taught. Political instruction: A total of 7 1/2 hours a week. Along the same lines as given in the former Whampoa School, except much less of it. There is no special section receiving political instruction only.

Textbooks: There are no regular textbooks. Each instructor prepares his lecture for the day which is printed and handed to the student in the classroom. At the end of the course these printed sheets are bound in book form.

From M/A, China Report No. 7265 May 16, 1928

CHINA (Military)

Subject: The Officers Training Camp at Nanking.

Organization: The student body is organized into three battalions and one cavalry squadron. Each battalion and the squadron is commanded by a general (one or two stars). The commanding officers are practically all graduates of Paoting.

The Camp Site & Buildings: The camp is located within the city walls of Nanking. The buildings are permanent brick structures. The place was used formerly as a military school by Sun Chuan-fang. It was partly destroyed by Sun when retreating last year, but has been repaired since. The buildings are white-washed inside and outside. There are the administration building, barracks, club buildings, classrooms, conference rooms for instructors, mess halls, reading rooms, etc.

Squad Rooms: Clean; equipment and furniture ("double decker" wooden bunks) uniformly arranged. Personal equipment uniformly laid out on bunks. Complete, including spittoons and waste baskets. The cleaning of the interior is done entirely by the students no matter of what rank.

Class Rooms: Well arranged. Furniture (chairs, desks, etc.) more uniform than that at Fort Sill.

Mess Halls: Seating capacity for all students. Tables and benches of uniform size. 6 men to a table. On each table a framed card with the names of students eating at that table. On ceiling beams large pennants of uniform size and lettering with inscriptions such as "Be kind and fair to the country people. They are your friends". I did not see posters inscribed with "Down with Imperialism" etc., with which this city is covered. The dishes on the table were uniform, very nice china ware and clean. Three meals a day are served: one at 6:00 a.m., one at 12 noon and one at 6:00 p.m. The mess halls are all screened with new screens. In every respect they would compare well with our barrack mess halls. The officers in charge of the detachment ("tactical officers") including those of general rank eat with the students. I did not see the kitchens.

General Appearance of Personnel: Surprisingly clean. Shaved, hair cut uniformly. Uniforms: uniform and clean; more uniform in color than our own khaki uniforms. Shoes varied from leather to ordinary Chinese cloth shoes. Wrap leggins of uniform color and pattern were worn by all students.

Drill: Executed with old German precision. Students and enlisted men stood rigidly to attention, without looking to the left or right.

Military Bearing: As observed in the camp as good as that of our army.

Discipline: Soldiers and officers saluted with precision without that embarrassed clumsiness usually observed in Chinese military men. The officers in command of the battalions on the drill field (all generals), upon approach of our party, brought their outfits to attention, came toward us at a fast run, stopped within 50 paces, got their heels together, and saluting, reported the number of men in their organization present on the field and what they were doing at the time. They stood at the salute until ordered to "take post", then "about faced" and ran back!

TABLES OF ORGANIZATION

OF THE

NATIONALIST REVOLUTIONARY ARMY

January, 1928

The following organization of the Nationalist Revolutionary Army is hereby proclaimed.

By order of the Military Council of the Nationalist Government.

Tan Yen-k'ai
Cheng Chien
Ho Ying-ch'in
Chu P'ei-te
Yang Shu-chuang
Li Tsung-jen
Pai Chung-hsi

Chairman and Members of
the Standing Committee.

January, 1928.

Table of Organization of

- Communications Detachment { Telegraph " / Wireless "
- Military Police Company.
- Military Band
- Field Hospital[x]
- Supply Base[xx]
- Advance Hospital[xx]

REMARKS:

1. "A"class Division contains 4 regiments. The normal organization is the " B" class Division of 3 regiments.
2. One cavalry platoon is added to separate (independent) divisions.
3. Organization of special service Bn. & Co. is the same as that of Inf. Bn. and Co.
4. "B" class Division has only 3 companies in transportation detachment.
5. x indicates units organized only in time of war.
6. xx indicates units under corps commander's supervision only.

The Nationalist Revolutionary Army.

Corps

- Division
- Division
- Division
- Division
- Training Regiment
- Cavalry Squadron
- Artillery Regiment
- Engineer Battalion

Infantry Division

- 1st Infantry Regt.
- 2nd " "
- 3rd " "
- 4th " " (A class Div.only)

Inf.Reg.

- 1st Battalion — Inf.Bn. — ____ Co.
- 2nd " — Inf.Bn. — ____ Co.
- 3rd " — Inf.Bn. — ____ Co.
- Inf.Bn. — ____ Co.
- Special Service Co.
- Machine Gun Co.
- Trench Mortar Co.
- Transportation Detachment
- Sanitary Detachment

- Special Service Battalion
- Artillery Battalion
  - 1st Battery
  - 2nd "
  - 3rd "
- Communications Detachment
- Transportation Detachment
- Field Hospital[x]
  - 1st Company[x]
  - 2nd Company[x]
  - 3rd Company[x]
  - 4th Company[x] (A class Div.only)

Training Regiment

- 1st Infantry Battalion — Inf.Bn. Tr.Rgt. — ____ Co.
- 2nd Infantry Battalion — Inf.Bn. Tr.Rgt. — ____ Co.
- 3rd Infantry Battalion — Inf.Bn. Tr.Rgt. — ____ Co.
- Machine Gun Company
- Artillery Battery
- Communications Detachment

Artillery Regiment

- 1st Battalion — Artillery Battalion — ____ Battery
- 2nd Battalion — Artillery Battalion — ____ "
- 3rd Battalion — Artillery Battalion — ____ "

Engineer Battalion

- 1st Company
- 2nd "
- 3rd "

Organization of Headquarters of Corps.

Office of Corps Commander

Corps Commander, General or Maj. General.
Directly under the Military Council and in command of whole corps.

Chief of Staff, Brig. General.
Assists Commander of Corps in important affairs and supervises the various departments in executing all orders of Corps Commander.

Secretary (Adjutant), Lt. Col.
Manages and files all important documents and telegrams, and takes charge of seal under direction of the Commander and Chief of Staff.

Aide de Camp, Captain,
" " " 1st Lieut.
Accompanies the Commander and Chief of Staff; delivers orders and attends to other matters when directed by Corps Commander.

Telegraph Officer, 1st Lieut.
" " 2nd Lieut.
Translates and despatches telegrams and in charge of telegrams and documents.

Clerk, Sergeant major.
Receives, despatches and records all messages, orders, etc.

Office of the Corps Chief of Staff

Chief of Staff — Brig. General

Chief of Dept. (Executive Officer), Colonel. (Also Section Chief of First Section)
Manages all matters of the department by order of the Corps Commander and under the instructions of the Chief of Staff.

Secretaries, 1 Captain and 1 1st Lieut.
In charge of all documents of the Office of Chief of Staff.

3 Clerks, Warrant Officers.
Receive and despatch documents of all kinds.

First Section

Chief of Section, Colonel. (The Executive Officer).
In charge of mobilization plans, training plans, ceremonies, reviews, organization, and military education. Charged with compilation of military reports.

Assistants, 1 Lt. Col., 1 Major and 1 Captain.
Assist the Chief of Section in all matters of the section.

Second Section

Chief of Section, Lt. Col.
Assists the Executive Officer in supervision of accounts; charged with the preparation of maps, and, in time of war, in charge of Military Intelligence and liaison.

Assistants, 1 Major and 2 Captains.
Assist the Chief of Section in all matters of the section.

Third Section

Chief of Section, Lt. Col.
Assists the Chief of Department (Executive Officer) in appointments, promotions, transfers, dismissals and replacements. In charge of compensations, claims and awards; in time of war, is charged with plans for troop replacements, transportation and location of military bases.

Assistants, 1 Major and 3 Captains.
Assist the Chief of Section in all matters of the section.

Office of the Corps Adjutant

Chief of Dept.(Adjutant General) Col. or Lt. Col.
In charge of social affairs by order of the Commander and under instructions of the chief of staff; directs all matters of the department.

Assistant Chief of Department, Captain or 1st Lieut.
In charge of all documents and correspondence of the department.

2 clerks, Warrant Officers.
Receive and despatch all orders, correspondence, etc. of the office of the Corps Adjt.

C.O. Mounted Detach.
In charge of all animals of Corps Headquarters.

First Section

Chief of section, Lt. Col.
Assists the Chief of Dept. in maintaining discipline of the corps and directs all matters of the section.

Assistant Adjutants, 1 Major and 1 Captain.
In charge of training of the corps and of the maintenance of communications in the rear; in charge of all boats, carts and other transportation.

Assistant Adjutant, 1st or 2nd Lieut.
In charge of documents, etc., and files of the section.

Second Section

Chief of Section, Major.
Assists the Chief of Department in social affairs and manages all matters of the sec.

Assistant Adjutants, 2 Captains.
In Charge of procurement of funds and disbursements of the A.G.O.; in charge of enlisted personnel and laborers - transfers, replacements, promotions, etc. of A.G. personnel.

Adjutant, 1st or 2nd Lieut.
Inspector of all food supplies and other stores of the A.G.O.; accountable officer for same.

Messenger Section

Chief of Section, 2nd Lieut.
In charge of communication affairs and communication troops of the Corps A.G.O.

Commanders of Squads, 4 Corporals or lance Corporals.

Messengers, 24 1st class privates.

Office of the Corps Adjutant - cont'd.

Orderlies - N.C.Os. 1 Sgt., 5 Corporals, 8 Lance Corporals.
In charge of the orderlies of the various sections of Corps Headquarters.

Orderlies - 7 1st Class, 7 2nd Class, 7 3rd Class Privates.

Cooks - 1 1st Class, 4 2nd Class, 6 3rd Class Privates.

Stable Orderlies - 2 1st Class, 6 2nd Class, 10 3rd Class Privates.

Office of the Corps Quartermaster

Chief of Department (Corps Q.M.) - Colonel.
Manages all matters pertaining to supplies for the Corps. Under the supervision of the Supply Section of the Military Council and under the orders of the Corps Commander.

Secretary, Captain or First Lieutenant.
Responsible for and handles all documents, etc., of the Department.

3 clerks - Warrant Officers.
Receive and despatch all orders, messages, etc., and proof-read all printed matter of the Department.

Accounts Section

Chief of Section, Lieut. Colonel.
Assists the Chief of Department in the preparation of estimates for current expenses and in the preparation of the budget.

Assistant Chief of Section, Major.
In charge of all funds of the Corps; Corps disbursing officer and auditor of accounts.

Assistant Chiefs of Section, 2 Captains and 2 First Lieut. or Second Lieutenants.
Responsible, under the Chief of Section, for the preparation of accounts, reports of expenditures, and the keeping of all records of the section.

Munitions Section

Arms, Equipment and

Chief of Section, Lieutenant Colonel.
Responsible, under the Chief of Department, for all matters pertaining to arms, equipment and munitions of the Corps.

Assistant Chiefs of Section, 1 Captain and 2 First or Second Lieutenants.
Responsible for storage, receipt, issuance, replacement and inspection of all arms and munitions, and for accounts for same.

Clothing and Supplies Section

Chief of Section, Major.
Responsible, under the Chief of Department, for all matters pertaining to clothing and food supplies.

Assistant Chiefs of Section, 1 Captain and 2 First or Second Lieutenants.
Responsible, under Chief of Section, for receipt, storage, issuance, and replacement and inspection of all clothing and food supplies, and for all accounts for same.

Orderlies - N.C.Os. 1 Corporal, 2 Lance Corporals.
In charge of orderlies of the Office of the Q. M.

Orderlies - 3 1st Class, 3 2nd Class, 4 3rd Class privates.

Cooks - 1 2nd Class, 2 3rd Class Privates.

Office of the Corps Surgeon

- Chief of Department (Corps Surgeon), Colonel.
  Responsible for sanitation of the Corps and for all matters of the department. Under orders of the Commander of the Corps and under the supervision of the Military Council.
- Veterinarian, Major.
  Chief Veterinarian.
- Special Service Officer, 1st Lieutenant.
  In charge of the receipt and issue of clothing and supplies of the department and all accounts for same.
- Secretary, Captain or 1st Lieutenant.
  Handles all correspondence and all documents of the Department.
- Clerks - Warrant Officers (2)
  Receive, despatch, and file all correspondence of the Department. (In time of war, may be transferred to Field Hospital for duty.)

Medical Section

- Chief of Section, Lieutenant-Colonel. Assistant to the Chief of Department in all medical matters of the Corps. (In time of war commands the Corps Field Hospital.
- Assistants, 1 Major and 1 Captain.
  Handle all routine matters of the Section. (In time of war may be transferred to Field Hospital.

Sanitary Section

- Chief of Section, Lieutenant-Colonel or Major.
  Responsible to the Chief of Department for all sanitary and epidemic prevention measures of the Corps, and for all accounts pertaining to same. (In time of war may be transferred to Field Hospital.)
- Assistants, 1 Captain and 1 1st Lieutenant.
  Handle all routine matters of the Section. (In time of war may be transferred to Field Hospital.)

Office of the Corps Surgeon - cont'd.

Supply Section

Chief of Section, Lieutenant-Colonel or Major.
Responsible to the Chief of Department for the purchase, storage and issue of all sanitation supplies.

Assistants, 1 Captain and 1 First Lieutenant.
Responsible for preparation of medicines and for all other matters of the section. (In time of war will be transferred to Corps Field Hospital.)

Head Nurses - 1 Sgt., 2 Corporals or Lance Corporals.

Nurses - 2 1st Class Privates.

Messengers - 2 1st Class Privates.

Orderlies - N. C. O's. 1 Corporal, 1 Lance Corporal.
In charge of all orderlies of the Department. In time of war may be transferred to Field Hospital.

Orderlies - 3 1st Class, 3 2nd Class, 2 3rd Class Privates.
In time of war may be transferred to Field Hospital.

Cooks - 1 2nd Class, 2 3rd Class Privates.
In time of war may be transferred to Field Hospital.

Office of the Corps Judge Advocate General

Chief of Department (Judge Advocate General), Lieut. Colonel or Major.
Responsible for all legal matters of the Corps and the trial of all courts-martial cases. Under the orders of the Corps Commander, and under the direction of the Chief of Staff.

Judge Advocates - 1 Captain and 1 First Lieutenant.
Assist the Chief of Department in the management of all affairs of the Department.

Secretary, 1st Lieutenant.
Responsible for the records of all courts- martial and for all correspondence, etc., of the Department.

Clerk, Sergeant Major.
Prepares all correspondence and documents of the Section, and responsible for despatch and receipt of same.

Orderlies, 1 1st Class, 1 2nd Class and 2 3rd Class Privates.

Department of Political Training

Chief of Department, Lieutenant-Colonel.
Manages political training affairs, all matters of the Kuomintang, and all outside propaganda for the Corps. Under the orders of the Military Council and the Central Political Council, and under the direction of the Corps Commander.

Assistants, 2 Majors, 2 Captains.
Assistants to the Chief of Department in all matters of the Department.

Secretary, 1st Lieutenant.
In charge of all documents and literature of the Department.

Clerk, Warrant Officer.
Receives and despatches all correspondence and documents of the Department.

Assistant, Sergeant.
Prepares for printing all documents, pamphlets, etc., of the Department.

Orderlies, 1 1st, 2nd and 3rd class soldiers.

ORGANIZATION OF CORPS HEADQUARTERS

Remarks

1. An Assistant Corps Commander will be appointed when necessary.

2. In time of war, the staff of the Corps Quartermaster may, if needed, be transferred to the Corps supply base.

3. In time of peace, the staff of the Corps Surgeon will also serve in the local Corps hospital. In time of war selected members of the staff will remain with the Corps in charge of its medical work in the field and other selected personnel with the base hospital. All other members of the staff will be transferred to the field hospital.

4. In time of war, 80 transport troops will be added to Corps Headquarters to move and transport public property and officers' baggage. When the Corps is on the march or in the field, a staff officer is appointed to command the transport detachment.

5. Orderlies are distributed as follows:

General	1 Sgt.,	1 Corporal,	1 Lance Corporal
Major General	1 "		1 " "
Brigadier-General . .		1 "	1 " "
Colonel		1 "	
Lieut. Colonel			1 " "
Major	1 1st Class Private		
To every 2 Captains or Lieutenants . .	1 2nd or 3rd Class Private		
To every 3 Warrant Officers.	1 " " "	"	"

ORGANIZATION OF CORPS HEADQUARTERS

Remarks - cont'd.

In addition to the above, orderlies are assigned to chiefs of departments of the Corps staff and to commanders of independent organizations as follows:

General	1 Corporal, 1 Lance Corporal
Major-General	1 "
Brigadier-General	1 " "
Colonel	1 1st Class Private
Lieut. Colonel.	1 2nd " "
Major	1 3rd " "
Captain, 1st Lt. and 2nd Lt.	1 Private each.
Every 2 Warrant Officers	1 Private

6. When the supply of arms is sufficient, all combatant officers above the grade of warrant officers will be supplied with pistols, but company and detachment commanders will be supplied first. Messengers will be supplied with carbines or pistols.

7. The following mounts will be provided Corps Headquarters personnel:

Corps Commander	3
Chief of Staff	2
Aide de Camp	1
Secretary.	1
Office of Chief of Staff.	7
" " Adjutant General.	4
" " Quartermaster	1
Chief Surgeon	1
Judge Advocate.	1
Political Training Office	1
Orderlies	12
Total . . .	35

ORGANIZATION OF DIVISION HEADQUARTERS

Office of Division Commander

Division Commander, Major General or Brigadier General.
Commands the Division, under direct orders of the Corps Commander.

Chief of Staff, Colonel.
Assists the Commander of Division in secret and important matters and supervises the execution of all orders.

Secretary (Division Adjutant), Lieutenant-Colonel.
Responsible for all important documents and telegrams and keeper of the seals.
Under orders of the Corps Commander and the Chief of Staff.

Judge Advocate, Captain.
In charge of all courts-martial of the Division and records of all cases.

Aide de Camp, 1st Lieutenant.
Accompanies the Division Commander to assist him in every way possible.
Transmits and delivers all orders, etc.

Telegraph Officer, 1 1st Lieut. and 1 2nd Lieutenant.
Transmits, despatches and files all telegrams and documents.

Clerk, Sergeant Major.
Receives, despatches and writes up all correspondence.

Orderlies (N.C.O's) 1 sergeant, 2 corporals and 3 lance corporals.
In charge of orderlies of Division Headquarters.

Orderlies, 5 1st class, 6 2nd class and 10 3rd class privates.

Cooks, 1 1st class, 3 2nd class and 4 3rd class privates.

Stable Orderlies, 1 1st class, 3 2nd class and 6 3rd class privates.

OFFICE OF DIVISION CHIEF OF STAFF

Chief of Staff - Colonel

Chief of Department, Lieutenant-Colonel.
In charge of instruction and training, mobilization and war plans. Manages all matters of the department. Under orders of the Commander and under the direction of the Chief of Staff.

Staff Officer, Major.
Assists the Chief of Department in plans for intelligence, liaison, transportation and communications, and also supervises all military reports of the Division.

Staff Officers, 3 Captains.
Responsible for preparation of and keeping of all maps, and for all accounts of the Department; assist in management of other matters of the Department.

Secretaries, 1 Captain and 1 1st Lieutenant.
Responsible for all correspondence and documents of the Department.

Clerks, Warrant Officers (3).
Receive and despatch documents, and handle all printed matter.

OFFICE OF DIVISION ADJUTANT

Chief of Department (Division Adjutant), Lieutenant Colonel.
In charge of social relations of the Division and responsible for all other affairs of the department. Under orders of the divisional commander and under supervision of the Chief of Staff.

Assistant Adjutant, Major.
Assists the Chief of Department in maintenance of military discipline in Division Headquarters. Responsible for the Guard of the Division (internal security); in charge of communications of Division Headquarters, and assists in management of other matters of the Department.

Assistant Adjutants, 2 Captains and 2 1st Lieutenants.
In charge of accounts of the Division Adjutant and rations & supplies for Headquarters personnel. Responsible for the training of Division Headquarters enlisted staff.

Secretary, 1 1st Lieutenant.
Responsible for all documents of the department.

Clerks, Warrant Officers (2)
Receive and despatch documents, and in charge of all printed matter.

C.O. Stable Detachment - Warrant Officer.
Commands stable detachment and in charge of all Division Headquarters animals.

Information and Message Center

Chief of Section, Sergeant.
In charge of message center, and commands message center troops.

Messengers - N.C.O's. 4 corporals or lance corporals.

Messengers, 16 1st Class privates.

OFFICE OF DIVISION ADJUTANT - cont'd.

Orderlies (N.C.O's) 1 Sergeant, 2 Corporals, 3 Lance Corporals.
In charge of orderlies of Division Headquarters.

Orderlies - 5 1st Class, 6 2nd Class, 10 3rd Class Privates.

Cooks - 1 1st Class, 3 2nd Class, 4 3rd Class Privates.

Stable Orderlies - 1 1st Class, 3 2nd Class, 6 3rd Class Privates.

OFFICE OF DIVISION QUARTERMASTER

Division Quartermaster,
Chief of Department, Lieutenant Colonel.
In charge of all supplies of the division and other matters of the department. Under orders of the Division Commander, and under the supervision of the Corps Quartermaster.

Secretary, 1st Lieutenant.
Responsible for all correspondence and all documents of the Department.

Clerks, Warrant Officers (3)
Write up, receive and despatch all documents of the Department. (In time of war are transferred to Division Trains.)

Accounting Section

Chief of Section, Major.
Assists the Chief of Department in preparation of estimates, and budgets for the Division.

Accounting Officers, 1 Captain and 1 1st Lieutenant.
Responsible for receipts, disbursements, and audit of accounts. (In time of war transferred to Division Trains.)

Clerks, Warrant Officers (3)
Assist in the preparation of estimates, etc., and in the compilation of reports.

OFFICE OF DIVISION QUARTERMASTER - cont'd.

Supply Section

Chief of Section, Major.
Assistant to the Chief of Department in all matters pertaining to arms, equipment and food supply of the Division. (In time of war transferred to Division Trains.)

Ordnance Officers, 1 Captain and 2 2nd Lieutenants.
Directly responsible for receipt, storage, inspection, issue and replacement of all arms and ammunition of the Division. (In time of war may be transferred to Division Trains.)

Quartermasters, 1 1st Lieut. and 1 2nd Lieut.
Responsible for the storage, issue and replacement of all food supplies and clothing, and for the repair of uniforms and clothing. (In time of war may be transferred to Division Trains.)

Clerks, Warrant Officers (2)
Assist in the preparation of estimates and in the compilation of reports. (In time of war will be transferred to Division Trains.)

Gunsmith, 1st Lieutenant.
Responsible for the repair of arms of all kinds.

Ordnance Mechanics - Warrant Officers (3)

Orderlies, 1 Lance Corporal, 2 1st Class Privates, 5 2nd Class Privates, 6 3rd Class Privates. (In time of war will be transferred to Division Trains.)

Cooks - 1 2nd Class, 2 3rd Class Privates. (In time of war transferred to Division Trains or Division Supply Base.

OFFICE OF DIVISION SURGEON

Chief Surgeon - Lieutenant Colonel.
Responsible for sanitation of the Division and for all matters of the Department. Under orders of the Divisional Commander, and under the supervision of the Corps Medical Officer. Also in command of Division Infirmary.

Military Surgeon, Major.
Assists the Chief of Department in the management of affairs of the Department. In charge of the Division hospital and all medical matters in the Division.

Military Surgeon, 1 Captain, 2 1st or 2nd Lieutenants.
In direct charge of all medical and surgical cases of the Division, and assistant to Division medical officer in other matters of the Department. (In time of war, 2 1st Lieutenants transferred to Division Trains for duty.)

Pharmacist, 1 Captain, 1 2nd Lieutenant.
In charge of the preparation of medicines, and the receipt, storage and issue of all medical supplies and surgical instruments. (In time of war transferred to Field Hospital.)

Special Service Officer, 2nd Lieutenant.
Accounting and disbursing officer of Division hospital and medical department. (In time of war transferred to Field Hospital.)

Secretary, 1st Lieutenant.
In charge of correspondence of the department. (In time of war transferred to Field Hospital.

Clerks, 1 Warrant Officer, 1 Sergeant.
Receive, despatch and write up all correspondence and documents of the department. (In time of war transferred to Field Hospital.)

Supply Sergeant - Sergeant.
In charge of clothing and food supplies of the department and hospital.

OFFICE OF DIVISION SURGEON - cont'd.

Litter Section

Chief of Section, 2nd Lieutenant.
In charge of instruction of the Section. (In time of war transferred to Field Hospital.)

2 corporals or 2nd Corporals. (In time of war transferred to Field Hospital.)

Litter bearers - 24 1st Class Privates . " " " " "

Nurses - N.C.O's. 1 Sergeant; 2 Corporals or Lance Corporals.
Responsible for the nursing of wounded and sick, and assist in the preparation of medicine. (In time of war transferred to Field Hospital.)

Nurses ---- 12 1st Class Privates. (In time of war transferred to Field Hospital.)

Messengers - 2 1st Class Privates. " " " " " " " "

Orderlies, N.C.O's. 1 Lance Corporal.
In charge of orderlies of the organization. (In time of war transferred to Field Hospital.)

Orderlies - 1 1st Class, 3 2nd Class, 4 3rd Class Privates. (In time of war transferred to Field Hospital.)

1 1st Class, 2 2nd Class, 2 3rd Class Privates.
(The number of cooks will be increased or decreased in proportion to the number of sick and wounded.

DIVISION HEADQUARTERS POLITICAL TRAINING DEPARTMENT

Chief of Department, Major.
In charge of the political training and the carrying out of Party instructions in the Division. Under the orders of the Chief of Political Training Department of the Corps and under the supervision of the Division Commander.

Assistants, 2 Captains, 1 1st Lieut.
Assist the Chief of Department in managing all affairs of the Department, and responsible for expenditures and accounts.

Secretary, 1st Lieutenant.
In charge of all documents of the Department.

Clerk, Warrant Officer.
Receives, despatches and writes up all documents and printed matter of the Department.

Clerk, Corporal.
In charge of mimeograph and printing.

Orderlies - 1 1st Class, 1 2nd Class and 1 3rd Class soldiers.

Officers (Section Chiefs and Assistants	- 69
Enlisted Men	146
Total	215

ORGANIZATION OF DIVISION HEADQUARTERS

Remarks

1. An Assistant Division Commander will be appointed when necessary.

2. In time of war, certain officers and enlisted men of the staff of the Division Quartermaster will be transferred to the Division trains as needed. The remainder will be held at the Division supply base or moved with the Division.

3. In time of peace, the staff of the Division Surgeon will also run the various hospitals of the Division. In time of war, a small number of officers and men will be held with Division Headquarters to handle the medical administration of the Division; the remainder will be transferred to the Field Hospital for duty.

4. In an independent Division, one 2nd Lieutenant, Chief Bugler, will be added.

5. In time of war, 36 men are added to the personnel of Division trains to move and transport public property, and officers' baggage. When the Division moves, a staff officer is detailed to command these troops. When the baggage of the entire Division is collected for a move or an advance, a field officer will be detailed in charge.

6. In time of war, secretaries and clerks will accompany the baggage trains.

7. Orderlies are assigned in accordance with the regulations laid down for the Corps.

ORGANIZATION OF DIVISION HEADQUARTERS

Remarks - cont'd.

8. The following mounts will be provided Division Headquarters personnel:

Division Commander.	1
Chief of Staff.	1
Aide de Camp	1
Office of Chief of Staff . . .	3
Office of Division Adjutant . .	2
Quartermaster	1
Division Surgeon.	1
Political Training Office . . .	1
Messengers and Orderlies . . .	9
Total.....	20

9. The organization of the Special Service Battalion of the Division is the same as for the Infantry Battalion.

ORGANIZATION OF INFANTRY REGIMENT.

Regimental Commander, Colonel.
In command of the regiment, and responsible for its education, discipline and control, sanitation and supply, by order of the Division Commander.

Assistant Regimental Commander, Lt. Col.
Assists the Regimental Commander in the education and training of the regiment and in the preparation of plans of all kinds.

Assistant Regimental Commander, Major.
In direct charge of instruction of the regiment and assists the Lt. Col. in matters under his command.

Adjutants, 1 Captain and 1 1st Lieut.
In charge of transmission of orders, the training and control of Regimental Headquarters N.C.O's. and disbursements and accounts of the regiment.

Flag Lieutenant, 2nd Lieut.
Responsible for flags of the regiment. Assists the adjutants in the keeping of accounts.

Chief Bugler, Warrant Officer.
In charge of instruction of buglers of the regiment and the unification of bugle calls.

Supply Officer, Major.
In charge of arms, munitions, and supplies of all kinds in the regiment under the orders of the Regimental Commander, and under the direction of the Division Supply Officer. (In time of war, in command of the regimental train.)

Supply Officers, 1 Captain, 2 1st Lieuts and 2 2nd Lieuts.
Assist the Regimental Supply Officer in all matters under his control. (In time of war, transferred to regimental train.)

Chief Surgeon, Major.
Responsible for the sanitation of the regiment and for treatment of all medical and surgical cases, under orders of the Regimental Commander and under the direction of the Division Chief Surgeon. (In time of war, commands the Regimental Sanitary Detachment.)

Surgeons, 2 Captains and 2 1st or 2nd Lieuts.
Assistants to Chief Surgeon. (In time of war, transferred to Sanitary Detachment.)

Pharmacist. 1st Lieut.
In charge of the preparation of medicines, and of receipt, storage and issue of all medical and surgical supplies. (In time of war, transferred to Sanitary Detachment.)

Political Training Officer, Captain.
Responsible for political training affairs of the regiment, carrying out of instructions of the Kuomintang and for all propaganda work, under orders of the chief of Political Training Department of the Division and under the direction of the Regimental Commander.

Assistant Political Training Officer, 1st Lieut.
Assists the Captain in all matters.

Secretaries, 1 Captain and 1 1st Lieut.
In charge of all records and documents of the regiment and keeper of the seal.

Clerks - Warrant Officers (2)
Write up, receive, and despatch all letters and documents of the regiment.

Clerks, 3 sergeants.
In charge of printing and mimeographing.

Supply Office Enlisted Personnel - 1 Sergeant, 2 Corporals or Lance Corporals.
In charge of munitions, clothing and food stores; make all issues of arms, clothing and rations under direction of Supply Officer.

Head Nurses, 2 Sergeants and 2 Corporals or Lance Corporals.
Take care of sick and wounded, and assist Regimental Pharmacist. (In time of war, attached to Sanitary Detachment.)

Nurses, 8 1st class privates. (In time of war, attached to Sanitary Detachment.)

Litter Bearer, N.C.O's. - 1 Sergeant, and 2 Corporals or Lance Corporals.
In charge of litter bearers and responsible for instruction of the detachment. (In time of war, in charge of Sanitary Detachment litter bearers.

Litter Bearers, 6 1st class and 6 2nd class privates. (In time of war, reorganized as Sanitary Detachment.)

Message Center Chief, Corporal.
In charge of all messengers of Regimental Headquarters.

Messengers, 8 1st class privates.

Communication Section

- Chief of Section, 2nd Lieut. or Sergeant-major.
  In charge of instruction of the section and of telephone communications of the regiment, under orders of the Assistant Commander of regiment.
- Assistant Chief of Section, Sergeant.
  Assists the Chief of Section in instruction and training of the section.
- Squad Leaders, 2 Corporals.
- Assistants, 2 Lance Corporals.
- Communication troops, 6 1st class, 6 2nd class, and 8 3rd class privates.

- Orderlies, N.C.O's. - 1 Corporal and 1 Lance Corporal.
  In charge of orderlies of the regiment.
- Orderlies, 4 1st class, 5 2nd class, and 7 3rd class privates. (In time of war, 3 orderlies transferred to regiment train, 3 to Sanitary Detachment.)
- Cooks, 1 1st class, 3 2nd class, and 4 3rd class privates.
- Stable Orderlies, 1 2nd class and 3 3rd class privates.

Officers	26
Enlisted Men	97
Total	123

Total number of Officers & Enlisted Men

1st Battalion	Officers	23
	Enlisted Men	592
2nd Battalion	Officers	23
	Enlisted Men	592
3rd Battalion	Officers	23
	Enlisted Men	592
Special Service Co. (Organization same as for Infantry Co.)	Officers	5
	Enlisted Men	144
Machine-gun Co.	Officers	5
	Enlisted Men	113
Trench Mortar Co.	Officers	5
	Enlisted Men	125
Total	Officers	110
	Enlisted Men	2255
		2365

ORGANIZATION OF INFANTRY REGIMENT

Remarks.

1. The Regimental Train is not organized in time of peace. In time of war, it is organized from the staff of the Regimental Supply Officer and a detachment of the Special Service Co. New troops will be recruited to complete the organization.

2. In time of peace, the staff of the Regimental Surgeon will run the Regimental Infirmary. The Sanitary Detachment is not organized in time of peace. In time of war, the Sanitary Detachment will be organized from the staff of the Regimental Surgeon and litter bearers recruited to complete the organization. The litter bearer N.C.O's in time of war command the squads of the Sanitary Detachment.

3. The Regimental Communications Section is equipped with one 5 telephone switchboard, 5 field telephone sets, and 6 kilometers of wire. This equipment is carried by the Communications Section.

4. The clerks, secretaries, etc. of Regimental Headquarters will be organized as the personnel section to handle all correspondence etc. of the regiment, including that of the Political Training Department. When necessary, other N.C.O's of the regiment will be transferred temporarily to the personnel section. In time of war, the personnel section moves with the Regimental baggage train.

5. Orderlies are assigned in accordance with the regulations governing assignment of orderlies in the Corps.

6. The Regimental Train is increased by 12 men in time of war to take care of public property and officer's baggage. When the regiment is on the march, the baggage of each battalion will be collected and transferred by this detachment, under the supervision of a regimental staff officer.

7. The following mounts will be furnished Regimental Headquarters personnel:-

Regimental Commander	-	1
2nd in Command	-	1
Adjutant (captain)	-	1
Messengers & Orderlies	-	4
Total		7

ORGANIZATION OF INFANTRY BATTALION

- Battalion Commander, Major.
  Commands the battalion and responsible for its training, discipline and control.
- Assistant Battalion Commander, Captain.
  Assists the Battalion Commander in the instruction and training of the battalion.
- Adjutant, 1st or 2nd Lieut.
  In command of Battalion Headquarters troops, and in charge of files and correspondence of the battalion.
- Battalion Sgt. Majors, Sgts. (2)
  Write up, despatch and file all documents of Battalion Headquarters.
- Supply Sergeant.
  In charge of food supplies and miscellaneous purchases of Battalion Headquarters, under direction of Battalion Adjutant.
- Bugler, Corporal or Lance Corporal.
  Assists the chief bugler of the regiment in unifying calls throughout the regiment and responsible for instruction of Battalion buglers.
- Message Center Chief, Corporal or Lance Corporal.
  In charge of Message Center Detachment and responsible for transmission of all messages.
- Messengers, 4 1st class privates.
- Orderlies, 1 1st class, 1 2nd class and 2 3rd class privates.
- Cooks, 1 2nd class and 1 3rd class privates.
- Stable orderly, 1 3rd class private.

Officers	3
Enlisted Men	16
Total	19

ORGANIZATION OF INFANTRY BATTALION (Continued)

STRENGTH OF BATTALION

1st Company	Officers	5	
	Enlisted Men	144	
2nd Company	Officers	5	
	Enlisted Men	144	
3rd Company	Officers	5	
	Enlisted Men	144	
4th Company	Officers	5	
	Enlisted Men	144	
Total	Officers	23	
	Enlisted Men	592	
			615

NOTE: The companies in the regiment are numbered consecutively, 1 to 12.

ORGANIZATION OF INFANTRY BATTALION

Remarks

1. All matters of Supply and Sanitation in the various Companies of the Regiment are directly under Regiment Headquarters, but all reports etc. relating thereto will be forwarded through the Battalion Headquarters concerned.

2. In time of war, two men are added to Battalion Headquarters to look after public property and officers' baggage.

3. Orderlies are assigned in accordance with the regulations laid down for organization of Corps Headquarters.

4. One horse each is furnished the Battalion Commander and the 2nd in Command.

ORGANIZATION OF INFANTRY COMPANY.

Company Commander, Captain.
Commands the company, responsible for its instruction, supply, sanitation, discipline and control, under the orders of the Battalion Commander.

Platoon Leaders, 1 1st Lieut. and 2 2nd Lieutenants.
Assist the Company Commander in the instruction and control of the company.

Quartermaster, Warrant Officer.
In charge of storage and issue of arms, ammunition, clothing and food in the company; pays off troops under supervision of Company Commander.

Company Clerk, Sergeant.
In charge of clerical work of the company.

Supply Sergeant.
Ass't. to the Quartermaster.

Squad Leaders, 3 Corporals and 6 Lance Corporals.

Enlisted Men (not including N.C.O's. and specialists) 18 1st class, 45 2nd class and 54 3rd class privates.

Buglers, 2 1st class privates.

Orderlies, 2 2nd class and 2 3rd class privates.

Cooks, 1 1st class, 4 2nd class and 5 3rd class privates.

Officers	5
Enlisted Men	144
Total	149

ORGANIZATION OF INFANTRY COMPANY

Remarks

1. Each company is divided into three platoons of three squads each. Each squad is composed of 1 corporal (Squad leader) 2 lance corporals, 2 1st class, 5 2nd class, and 6 3rd class privates.
2. The Infantry Company is armed with 108 rifles, which are distributed evenly among the various squads. All but two men in each squad are armed with rifles; the two unarmed men carry ammunition, take care of and assist the wounded, and act as replacements for the armed members of the squad.
3. Messengers will be selected from the enlisted men of the company.
4. Orderlies are assigned in accordance with the regulations laid down for the organization of the Corps.
5. In time of war, 4 men will be added to Company Headquarters for the purpose of taking care of and transporting public property and officer's baggage.

ORGANIZATION OF MACHINE GUN COMPANY

Company Commander, Captain.
Commands the Company and responsible for its instruction, supply, sanitation, discipline and control, under orders of Regimental Commander and under direction of 2nd in Command.

Platoon Leaders, 1 1st Lieut. and 2 2nd Lieutenants.
Assist the Company Commander in the instruction, control, and all other matters pertaining to the Company.

Quartermaster, Warrant Officer.
In charge of storage , issue, and replacement of arms, ammunition, clothing and food of the Company - pays off troops under supervision of Company Commander.

Company Clerk, Sergeant.
In charge of clerical work of the Company.

Supply Sergeant.
Assistant to the Quartermaster.

Company Mechanic, 1 sergeant.
In charge of storage and repair of arms.

Squad Leaders, 6 corporals.

Assistant Squad Leaders, 6 lance corporals.

Enlisted Men (other than N.C.O's and specialists) 12 1st class, 36 2nd class, and 36 3rd class privates.

Buglers, 2 1st class privates.

Orderlies, 2 2nd class and 2 3rd class privates.

Cooks, 1 1st class, 3 2nd class, and 4 3rd class privates.

Officers	5
Enlisted Men	113
Total	118

ORGANIZATION OF MACHINE GUN COMPANY

Remarks.

1. The Machine Gun Company is divided into three platoons of two squads each. Each Company has six machine guns, and 20 rifles or carbines. 4000 rounds of ammunition will be carried by each gun in the field. The Maxim Gun has been adopted as the standard for the Nationalist Army.

2. Guns and ammunitions are transported by hand.

3. Messengers will be selected from the enlisted men of the company.

4. Orderlies are assigned in accordance with the regulations laid down in organization of the Corps.

5. In time of war, 4 men are added to Company Headquarters to take care of and transport public property and officer's baggage.

ORGANIZATION OF TRENCH MORTAR COMPANY

Company Commander, Captain.
Commands the Company and responsible for its instruction, supply, sanitation, discipline and control, under orders of Regimental Commander and under direction of 2nd in Command.

Platoon Leaders, 1 1st Lieut. and 2 2nd Lieutenants.
Assist the Company Commander in the instruction, control, and all other matters pertaining to the Company.

Quartermaster, Warrant Officer.
In charge of storage, issue, and replacement of arms, ammunition, clothing and food of the Company - pays off troops under supervision of Company Commander.

Company Clerk, Sergeant.
In charge of clerical work of the Company.

Supply Sergeant.
Assistant to the Quartermaster.

Company Mechanic, 1 sergeant.
In charge of storage and repair of arms.

Squad Leaders, 6 corporals.

Assistant Squad Leaders, 6 lance corporals.

Enlisted Men (other than N.C.O's and specialists) 12 1st class, 36 2nd class and 48 3rd class privates.

Buglers, 2 1st class privates.

Orderlies, 2 2nd class and 2 3rd class privates.

Cooks, 1 1st class, 3 2nd class and 5 3rd class privates.

Officers	5
Enlisted Men	125
Total	130

ORGANIZATION OF TRENCH MORTAR COMPANY

Remarks.

1. Each company is divided into three platoons of two squads each, and is armed with six trench mortars and forty rifles. Each gun will carry 30 rounds of ammunition. The 82 mm. mortar manufactured in the Shanghai Arsenal is adopted as the standard trench mortar.

2. Mortars and ammunitions are carried by hand.

3. Messengers will be selected from the enlisted men of the company.

4. Orderlies are assigned in accordance with the regulations laid down in organization of the Corps.

5. In time of war, 4 men are added to Company Headquarters to take care of and transport public property and officer's baggage.

ORGANIZATION OF CAVALRY SQUADRON

Squadron Commander, Major.
Commands the squadron and in charge of its instruction, supply, sanitation and control, under direct orders and supervision of Corps Commander.

Platoon Commanders, 1 Captain and 3 1st Lieutenants.
Assist the Squadron Commander in the instruction, control, and management of the squadron.

Supply Officer, 2nd Lieut. or Sergeant major.
In charge of storage, issue, and replacement of arms, ammunition, clothing, and food supply of the squadron; and handles payment of troops.

Veterinarian, Captain or 1st Lieut.
In charge of all veterinary matters in the squadron.

Officer in Charge of Stables, 1st or 2nd Lieut.
Responsible for feeding and sanitation of all animals in the squadron.

Squadron Sergeant Major - Warrant Officer.
In charge of all clerical work of squadron.

Supply Sergeants, 1 sergeant and 1 corporal.
Assist the Supply Officer in performance of his duties, and in direct charge of all horse equipment.

Horse Shoer, 1 corporal.
Responsible for foot inspection and shoeing of all animals.

Section Leaders, 8 corporals.

Assistant Section Leaders, 8 corporals and 8 lance corporals.

Enlisted Men (other than N.C.O's and specialists) 48 1st class and 72 2nd class privates.

Recruits, 16 3rd class privates.

Chief Bugler, 1 2nd corporal.
In charge of buglers and responsible for their instruction.

Buglers, 4 1st class privates.

Orderlies, 1 1st class, 2 2nd class and 3 3rd class privates.

Cooks, 1 1st class, 5 2nd class and 6 3rd class privates.

Officers	9
Enlisted Men	186
Total	195

ORGANIZATION OF CAVALRY SQUADRON

Remarks

1. Each squadron is divided into 4 platoons of 2 sections each. Each section consists of 1 sergeant, 1 corporal, 1 lance corporal, 6 1st class privates, 9 2nd class privates, and 2 recruits.
2. Each squadron has 158 horses and 144 carbines.
3. Officers mounts are taken care of by the recruits in the squadron. Permanent stable orderlies are not provided for.
4. Orderlies are assigned in accordance with the regulations laid down in the organization of the Corps.
5. In time of war, 6 men are added to Squadron Headquarters to take care of and transport public property and officers baggage.

ORGANIZATION OF INDEPENDENT CAVALRY PLATOON

Platoon Leader, Captain or 1st Lieut.
Commands the platoon and responsible for its instruction, supply, sanitation, and control, under orders of the Divisional Commander.

Assistant Platoon Leader, 2nd Lieut.
Assists the Platoon Leader in handling various matters of the platoon.

Clerk, Sergeant.
In charge of all clerical work of the platoon.

Supply Sergeant, Sergeant.
In charge of storage, issue, and replacement of all arms, equipment and clothing, and for all matters pertaining to food supply; acts as payment for the platoon.

Squad Leader, 1 Sergeant.

Assistant Squad Leaders, 2 Corporals or Lance Corporals.

Enlisted Men (other than N.C.O's, specials and recruits) 12 1st class and 18 2nd class privates.

Recruits, 4 3rd class privates.

Buglers, 2 1st class privates.

Orderlies, 1 2nd class and 2 3rd class privates.

Cooks, 1 2nd class and 3 3rd class privates.

Officers	2
Enlisted Men	50
Total	52

ORGANIZATION OF INDEPENDENT CAVALRY PLATOON

Remarks

1. This platoon is organized in independent divisions only.

2. The platoon is divided into two squads, and is equipped with 36 carbines and 40 horses.

3. In time of war, 2 men are added to the platoon to take care of and transport public property and officer's baggage.

ORGANIZATION OF ARTILLERY REGIMENT

Regimental Commander, Colonel.
Commands the regiment and responsible for its instruction, supply, sanitation and control, under orders of the Corps Commander.

Assistant Regimental Commander, Lt. Col.
Assists the Regimental Commander in the instruction of the regiment, and in the preparation and execution of all plans.

Assistant Regimental Commander, Major.
Assistant to the Lt. Col.(2nd in Command). In time of war, commands Regimental trains.

Adjutant,-Captain.
Responsible for the transmission of orders, commands Regimental Headquarters enlisted men, and in charge of all disbursements and accounts.

Assistant Adjutant, 1st Lieut.
Assists the Adjutant in matters of disbursements and accounts; in charge of regimental flags.

Chief Bugler, Warrant Officer.
In charge of instruction of buglers and the unification of bugle calls of the regiment.

Supply Officer, Major.
Responsible for all arms, munitions, clothing, food supplies and pay of the regiment, under orders of Regimental Commander and under direction of the Corps Quartermaster.

Assistant Supply Officer, Captain.
Assists the Quartermaster in all matters pertaining to supply of the regiment.

Military Surgeon, Major.
In charge of sanitation and health of the regiment, under orders of the Regimental Commander and under supervision of the Corps surgeon.

Military Surgeon, 1st Lieut.
Assistant to chief surgeon.

Pharmacist, 1st Lieut.
In charge of storage, preparation, and issue of medicines and surgical supplies.

Veterinarian, Captain.
In charge of all veterinary matters of the regiment. In time of war, attached to Regimental trains.

ORGANIZATION OF ARTILLERY REGIMENT (Continued)

(b)

Ordnance Officer, Captain or 1st Lieut.
In charge of storage, and repair of all arms and munitions of the regiment.

Political Training Officer, Captain.
In charge of political training affairs of the regiment, carrying out of party instructions and outside propaganda, under orders of the Corps political training officer and under directions of Regimental Commander.

Assistant Political Training Officer, 1st Lieut.

Secretaries, 1 Captain and 1 1st Lieut.
Responsible for all correspondence and all documents of the regiment.

Clerks, Warrant Officers (2)
Despatch, receive and file all correspondence. (In time of war, one transferred to Regimental trains.)

Clerks, 3 Corporals.
Prepare all mimeographed and printed matter,

Commissary Sergeant, Sergeant.
In charge of clothing and rations stores of the regiment. (In time of war, attached to Regimental trains.)

Ordanance Sergeant.
In charge of storage, and issue of arms and equipment. (In time of war, attached to Regimental trains.)

Horse Horseshoer, Sergeant.
In charge of foot examination and shoeing of all animals. (In time of war, attached to Regimental trains.)

Blacksmiths, 1 Corporal, 2 1st class privates.
Make horseshoes for the command. (In time of war, attached to the Regimental train.)

Nurses, 1 Sergeant, 2 1st class privates.
Take care of wounded and sick officers and troops, and assist the pharmacist in preparation of medicines.

ORGANIZATION OF ARTILLERY REGIMENT (Continued)
(c)

Message Center Chief, Corporal.
In charge of Message Center and Message Center personnel.

Messengers, 6 1st class privates.

Special Service Section

Section Chief, 2nd Lieut.
In charge of section, and responsible for its instruction and discipline, under the direction of Regimental Adjutant. (In time of war, this section is reorganized as Regimental train.)

Squad Leaders, 3 corporals or lance corporals.

Enlisted Men, 6 1st class, 12 2nd class and 18 3rd class privates

Communications Section

Section Chief, 2nd Lieut. or Warrant Officer.
In charge of instruction of the section, and of telephone communications in the regiment, under direction of the Assistant Regimental Commander.

Squad Leaders, 3 corporals or lance corporals. (In time of war, one with each Battalion).

Assistant Squad Leaders, 3 lance corporals.

Communications troops, 6 1st class, 9 2nd class and 9 3rd class privates.

Orderlies, 4 1st class, 5 2nd class and 5 3rd class privates.

Cooks, 1 1st class, 4 2nd class and 5 3rd class privates.

Stable Orderlies, 1 1st class, 2 2nd class and 3 3rd class privates.

Officers	21
Enlisted Men	120
Total	141

STRENGTH OF ARTILLERY REGIMENT

1st Battalion	Officers	22
	Enlisted Men	371
2nd Battalion	Officers	22
	Enlisted Men	371
3rd Battalion	Officers	22
	Enlisted Men	371
Total	Officers	87
	Enlisted Men	1233
		1320

ORGANIZATION OF ARTILLERY REGIMENT

Remarks.

1. The Artillery Regiment comprises the Corps Artillery, and is directly under orders of the Corps Commander. It is compossed of three Battalions of Field Artillery, or of one Battalion Mountain Artillery and two Battalions of Field Artillery.

2. The Transportation Detachment (Regimental Train) is not organized in time of peace. In time of war, it is made up of personnel from Regimental Headquarters, the Special Service Platoon and specially recruited transportation troops.

3. In time of peace, the staff of the Regimental Infirmary is compossed of the staffs of the regimental and battalion surgeons. In time of war, it is compossed of the above-mentioned staffs plus certain personnel of local hospitals and other medical organizations.

4. The Communications Platoon is equipped with one 10 telephone switchboard, three 5 telephone switchboards, and 15 field telephones, with 15 kilometers of wire. On the march, the equipment of the Communications Platoon will be distributed among the various battalions and batteries for transportation.

5. The clerks, secretaries, etc. of Regimental Headquarters will be organized as the Headquarters Personnel Section to handle all correspondence etc. of the regiment (including that of the Political Training Department). When necessary, other N.C.O's of the regiment will be detailed to assist the personnel section. In time of war, the section will move with the baggage trains.

6. Orderlies are assigned in accordance with the regulations laid down for the organization of the Corps.

7. In time of war, 16 men will be added to the personnel of the regimental train to take care of and transport public property and officer's baggale. On the march, the baggage of each battery and battalion will be collected and transported under the supervision of a Regimental Staff Officer.

Remarks.

8. Horses are assigned as follows:-

Regimental Commander	-	1
2nd in Command	-	1
Adjutant (Captain)	-	1
Messengers & Orderlies	-	8
Total		11

9. The personnel of the Political Training Section of Regimental Headquarters will be assigned in accordance with the regulations laid down by the Political Training Department of the Military Council in Sept. 1927, and will be the same as for the Infantry Regiment. The personnel of this section of Headquarters of the Infantry Regiment was omitted, through error, from the remarks on the organization of the Regiment.

ORGANIZATION OF FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

Battalion Commander, Major.
Commands the battalion, and responsible for its instruction, supply, sanitation, discipline and control.

Assistant Battalion Commander, Captain.
Assists the Battalion Commander in the instruction, training and control of the Battalion.

Adjutant, 1st Lieut.
In command of Battalion Headquarters troops and responsible for all correspondence of the Battalion.

Supply Officer, Captain.
In charge of all arms, equipment, clothing, food supplies and pay of the Battalion, under orders of the Battalion Commander and under direction of Regimental Supply Officer.

Military Surgeon, Captain.
In charge of sanitation and health of the battalion, under orders of the Battalion Commander and under direction of the Military Surgeon of the Regiment.

Veterinarian, 1st Lieut.
In charge of all veterinary matters of the battalion.

Stable Sergeant, Warrant Officer.
In charge of Stabling and feeding of all animals.

Clerks, 2 corporals.
Receive, despatch and file correspondence and documents.

Supply Sergeant,
In charge of arms, clothing and rations storehouses, under direction of Supply Officer.

Nurse, 1 corporal.
Takes care of sick and wounded officers and troops, and assists in keeping of medical records of the battalion.

Chief Bugler, Corporal.
In charge of bugle calls and buglers.

Message Centor Chief, 2nd Corporal.
In charge of message center and messengers.

Messengers, 3 1st class privates.

Orderlies, etc., 1 1st class, 1 2nd class and 4 3rd class privates.

Cooks, 1 2nd class and 2 3rd class privates.

Stable Orderlies, 1 2nd class and 3 3rd class privates.

Officers	7
Enlisted Men	23
Total	30

ORGANIZATION OF FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (Continued)
(b)

STRENGTH OF BATTALION

1st Battalion	Officers	5	
	Enlisted Men	116	
2nd Battalion Company	Officers	5	
	Enlisted Men	116	
3rd Battalion Company	Officers	5	
	Enlisted Men	116	
Total	Officers		22
	Enlisted Men		371
			393

ORGANIZATION OF FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION

Remarks.

1. Scouts, observers, etc. needed in the field, are selected from the enlisted men of the various batteries.
2. In time of war, 8 men are added to the Battalion to take care of and transport public property and officer's baggage.
3. Orderlies are assigned in accordance with the regulations laid down of the Corps.
4. Battalion Headquarters is supplied with 8 horses for the use of the Battalion Commander, 2nd in Command, the Adjutant, Chief Bugler, and messengers.

ORGANIZATION OF FIELD ARTILLERY BATTERY

Battery Commander, Captain.
Commands the battery, and responsible for its instruction, supply, sanitation, discipline and control.

Assistant Battery Commander, 1st Lieut.
Assists the Battery Commander in the instruction of the battery and miscellaneous matters.

Platoon Leaders, 1st or 2nd Lieut. (2)
Assist in the instruction and control of the battery.

Supply Segt. Warrant Officer.
In charge of arms, clothing and rations stores; acts as paymaster.

Clerk, Sergeant.
In charge of correspondence of the battery.

Commissary Sergeant.
Assistant to the Supply Sergeant.

Ordanance, Sergeant.
In charge of storage and repair of arms and munitions.

Section Leaders, Corporals (4)

Assistant Section Leaders, 8 corporals or lance corporals.

Enlisted Men (other than N.C.O's and specialists) 16 1st class, 24 2nd class and 32 3rd class privates.

Nurses, 2 1st class privates.

Buglers, 2 1st class privates.

Orderlies, etc., 2 2nd class and 2 3rd class privates.

Cooks, 1 1st class, 3 2nd class and 5 3rd privates.

Stable Orderlies, 1 1st class, 4 2nd class and 7 3rd class privates.

Officers	5
Enlisted Men	116
Total	121

ORGANIZATION OF FIELD ARTILLERY BATTERY

Remarks.

1. Each battery is divided into 2 platoons of 2 squads each, and is equipped with 4 guns, 4 caissons and 20 carbines. The model 38 Field Gun manufactured at the Hanyang Arsenal, is adopted as the standard.

2. Each battery has 48 pack animals and 20 riding and pack horses.

3. Messengers, orderlies, and communications personnel are selected from the enlisted men of the battery.

4. Orderlies are assigned in accordance with the regulations laid down for the Corps.

5. In time of war, 3 men are added to the Battery to take care of and transport public property and officer's baggage.

ORGANIZATION OF MOUNTAIN GUN BATTALION HEADQUARTERS

Battalion Commander, Major.
Commands the Battalion and responsible for its instruction, training, sanitation, supply and control, under orders of the Regimental or Division Commander.

Assistant Battalion Commander, Captain.
Assistant to Battalion Commander and directly responsible for instruction and training of the battalion.

Adjutant, Captain or 1st Lieut.
Commands troops of Battalion Headquarters and responsible for all correspondence of the battalion.

Supply Officer, Captain.
In charge of arms, equipment, clothing, rations, and pay of the battalion, under orders of the Battalion Commander and under direction of the Regimental Supply Officer.

Military Surgeon, Captain.
Responsible for sanitation and health of the battalion, under orders of the Battalion Commander and under direction of the Regimental Surgeon.

Clerk, 1 corporal.
In charge of receipt, despatch and filing of correspondence and documents.

Supply Sergeant.
In charge of arms, equipment, clothing and rations storehouses, under direction of the Supply Officer.

Nurse, 1 corporal.
Takes care of sick and wounded officers and troops and assists in keeping of medical records.

Chief Bugler, Corporal.
In charge of instruction of buglers and unification of bugle calls in the battalion.

Message Centor Chief. Lance Corporal.
In charge of Message Center and messengers.

Messengers, 3 1st class privates.

Orderlies, etc. 1 1st class, 2 2nd class and 3 3rd class privates.

Cooks, 1 2nd class and 2 3rd class privates

Stable Orderlies, 1 2nd class and 3 3rd class privates.

Officers	5
Enlisted Men	22
Total	27

ORGANIZATION OF MOUNTAIN GUN BATTALION (Continued)

(b)

Strength of Mountain Gun Battalion

1st Battery	Officers	5
	Enlisted Men	147
2nd Battery	Officers	5
	Enlisted Men	147
3rd Battery	Officers	5
	Enlisted Men	147
Total	Officers	20
	Enlisted Men	463
		483

ORGANIZATION OF MOUNTAIN GUN BATTALION

Remarks.

1. Scouts, observers, etc. needed in the field are selected from the enlisted men of the various batteries.
2. When pack animals are available and a pack train is organized in the battalion, a veterinary surgeon (1st Lieut.) is assigned.
3. When the Battalion is detached with an independent division, a 2nd Lieut. is assigned to the Battalion to take charge of all correspondence and paper work, and 1/3 of the Régt. Communications platoon is attached as the Battalion Communications section. When a pack train is organized, one blacksmith (lance corporal) and 2 horseshoers (1st class privates) are attached to the Battalion.
4. Orderlies are assigned in accordance with the regulations laid down in the organization of the Corps.
5. In time of war, 8 men are added to the Battalion to take care of and transport public property and officer's baggage.
6. Horses are assigned as follows:-

Battalion Commander	1
2nd in Command	1
Adjutant	1
Chief Bugler	1
Messengers	4
Total	8

ORGANIZATION OF MOUNTAIN GUN BATTERY

666

Battery Commander, Captain.
Commands the Battery and responsible for its instruction, training, sanitation, supply and control.

Assistant Battery Commander, 1st Lieut.
Assists the Battery Commander in the instruction and training and all other matters pertaining to the battery.

Platoon Leaders, 2 1st or 2nd Lieutenants.
In direct charge of instruction and training of the battery.

Supply Sgt., Warrant Officer.
In charge of arms, equipment, clothing and food supply of the Battery.

Clerk, 1 Sergeant.
In charge of all correspondence and documents.

Commissary Sergeant.
Assistant to the Supply Sgt.

Ordanance Sergeant.
In charge of storage and repair of arms and munitions.

Squad Leaders, 4 corporals.

Assistant Squad Leaders, 8 corporals or lance corporals.

Enlisted Men (other than N.C.O's and specialists) 16 1st class, 32 2nd class and 64 3rd class privates.

Nurses, 2 1st class privates.

Buglers, 2 1st class privates.

Orderlies, etc. 2 2nd class and 2 3rd class privates.

Cooks, 1 1st class, 4 2nd class and 5 3rd class privates.

Stable Orderlies, 1 2nd class and 1 3rd class privates.

Officers	5
Enlisted Men	147
Total	152

ORGANIZATION OF MOUNTAIN GUN BATTERY

Remarks.

1. Each battery is divided into 2 platoons of 2 squads each, and has 4 mountain guns (of the model manufactured in the Shanghai Arsenal) and 20 carbines.

2. In time of war, each gun is manned by 45 men working in turn, one half at a time, who transport the gun and serve it in the field. When necessary additional men are taken from other duties to assist. For ammunition supply, 15 ammunition carriers are assigned to each gun. When animals are used to transport guns and ammunition 11 animals are assigned to each gun, 6 to transport the gun and 5 as ammunition carriers. Each battery will be allotted 52 animals, including 8 for use as mounts or pack animals.

3. Messengers, orderlies, and communications personnel are selected from the battery as needed.

4. Orderlies are assigned in accordance with the regulations laid down for the Corps.

5. In time of war, 4 men are added to the battery to take care of and move public property and officer's baggage.

6. One horse each is allowed the following:-
   Battery Commander, 2nd in Command, each platoon leader.

ORGANIZATION OF ENGINEER BATTALION HEADQUARTERS

Battalion Commander, Lt. Col. or Major.
Commands the Battalion and responsible for its instruction, training, sanitation, supply and control, under orders of the Corps Commander.

Assistant Battalion Commander, Major or Captain.
Assists the Battalion Commander in the instruction and training of the battalion. In charge of all engineering work of the Battalion.

Adjutant, 1st Lieut.
In charge of correspondence and accounts and assists in instruction of the Battalion.

Supply Officer, Captain.
In charge of clothing and supplies of the battalion, under orders of the Battalion Commander and under direction of the Corps Supply Officer.

Medical Officer, Captain.
Responsible for sanitation and health of the battalion, under orders of the Battalion Commander and under direction of the Corps Medical Officer.

Store-keeper, Warrant Officer.
Responsible for storage of all tools, implements, etc. of the battalion.

Political Training Officer, Captain or 1st Lt.
In charge of political training of the battalion, the carrying out of instructions of the Kuomintang, and of all outside propaganda, under direct orders of the Political Training Officer of the Corps, and under supervision of the Battalion Commander.

Secretary, 2nd Lieut.
In charge of all documents and all correspondence of the battalion.

Sgt. Major - Sergeant.
Responsible for the preparation of all printed and mimeographed matter.

Nurses

Nurses, 1 corporal or lance corporal.
Take care of sick and wounded, and assist in keeping of medical records.

Chief Bugler, Corporal or lance Corporal.
In charge of buglers of the battalion, and responsible for unification of bugle calls.

Message Centor Chief, Corporal or Lance Corporal.
In charge of message center and messengers.

Messengers, 4 1st class privates.

Orderlies, 1 lance corporal, 1 1st class, 2 2nd class and 2 3rd class privates.

Cooks, 1 2nd class and 1 3rd class privates.

Stable Orderlies, 1 2nd class and 1 3rd class privates.

Officers	8
Enlisted Men	23
Total	31

ORGANIZATION OF ENGINEER BATTALION (Continued)

(b)

Strength of Engineer Battalion

1st Company	Officers	6
	Enlisted Men	144
2nd Company	Officers	6
	Enlisted Men	144
3rd Company	Officers	6
	Enlisted Men	144
Total	Officers	26
	Enlisted Men	454
	Total	480

ORGANIZATION OF ENGINEER BATTALION

Remarks.

1. Orderlies are assigned in accordance with the regulations laid down for the Corps.

2. In time of war, 3 men are added to the battalion to take care of and transport public property and officer's baggage. When special equipment or materials are needed, a transportation platoon or detachment will be organized.

3. The Battalion Commander and the 2nd in Command will be allowed one horse each.

ORGANIZATION OF ENGINEER BATTALION

Remarks.

1. Orderlies are assigned in accordance with the regulations laid down for the Corps.

2. In time of war, 3 men are added to the battalion to take care of and transport public property and officer's baggage. When special equipment or materials are needed, a transportation platoon or detachment will be organized.

3. The Battalion Commander and the 2nd in Command will be allowed one horse each.

ORGANIZATION OF ENGINEER COMPANY

Company Commander, Captain.
Commands the company and responsible for its instruction, control, supply and sanitation.

2nd in Command, 1st Lieut.
Assists the Company Commander in all matters pertaining to the company and directly responsible for the instruction of the company, and for all engineering work.

Platoon Leaders, 3 1st or 2nd Lieutenants.
Assist in the instruction and control of the company.

Supply Officer, Warrant Officer.
Responsible for receipt, issue and replacement of arms, munitions, food supplies, clothing and all other materials. Also acts as paymaster.

Company Clerk, Sergeant.
In charge of all correspondence of the company.

Squad Leaders, 3 sergeants and 6 corporals.

Assistant Squad Leaders, 9 lance corporals.

Enlisted Men (other than N.C.O's and specialists) 18 1st class, 45 2nd class and 45 3rd class privates.

Buglers, 2 1st class privates.

Orderlies, etc. 1 2nd class and 3 3rd class privates.

Cooks, 1 1st class, 4 2nd class and 5 3rd class privates.

Officers	6
Enlisted Men	144
Total	150

ORGANIZATION OF ENGINEER COMPANY

Remarks.

1. Each company is divided into 3 platoons, each platoon consisting of 1 sergeant, 2 corporals (Squad leaders) 3 lance corporals (Squad leaders and assistants) and three squads of 2 1st class, 5 2nd class and 5 3rd class privates each.

2. Each company has 54 rifles, 40 shovels, 10 pick axes, and a certain (unspecified) amount of carpenter's tools and explosives for demolition purposes. On the march, these implements and apparatus are carried by hand.

3. Messengers are selected from the personnel of the company as needed.

4. Orderlies are assigned in accordance with the regulations laid down for the Corps.

5. In time of war, 5 men are added to take care of and transport public property and officer's baggage.

6. One horse is furnished the Company Commander, (In time of peace this horse to be kept at Battalion Headquarters.).

ORGANIZATION OF CORPS COMMUNICATIONS DETACHMENT
HEADQUARTERS

Chief of Detachment, Lt. Col.
Responsible for the instruction and control of the detachment and for all Corps communications, under direct orders of Corps Commander and Corps Chief of Staff.

2nd in Command, Captain.
Assists in the training of the detachment and responsible for the accounts and miscellaneous matters.

Supply Officer, 1st Lieut.
In charge of all arms, munitions, clothing, food supplies and pay of the detachment, under the orders of the Detachment Commander and under the direct supervision of the Corps Supply Officer.

Political Training Officer, 1st Lieut.
Responsible for political training of the detachment, carrying out of party instructions, and for all outside propaganda, under direct orders of Corps Political Training Officer and under supervision of Detachment Commander.

Secretary, 2nd Lieut.
In charge of all correspondence of the detachment.

Officer in Charge of Equipment and Materials, Warrant Officer.
In charge of issue, receipt and storage of all materials and equipment.

Clerks, 2 sergeants.
Write up, receive and despatch all printed and mimeographed matter.

Chief Messenger, 1 lance corporal.

Messengers, 2 1st class privates.

Chief Orderly, 1 lance corporal.

Orderlies, etc. 1 2nd class and 1 3rd class privates.

Cooks, 1 2nd class and 1 3rd class privates.

Officers	6
Enlisted Men	11
Total	17

ORGANIZATION OF CORPS COMMUNICATIONS DETACHMENT

HEADQUARTERS

Chief of Detachment, Lt. Col.
Responsible for the instruction and control of the detachment and for all Corps communications, under direct orders of Corps Commander and Corps Chief of Staff.

2nd in Command, Captain.
Assists in the training of the detachment and responsible for the accounts and miscellaneous matters.

Supply Officer, 1st Lieut.
In charge of all arms, munitions, clothing, food supplies and pay of the detachment, under the orders of the Detachment Commander and under the direct supervision of the Corps Supply Officer.

Political Training Officer, 1st Lieut.
Responsible for political training of the detachment, carrying out of party instructions, and for all outside propaganda, under direct orders of Corps Political Training Officer and under supervision of Detachment Commander.

Secretary, 2nd Lieut.
In charge of all correspondence of the detachment.

Officer in Charge of Equipment and Materials, Warrant Officer.
In charge of issue, receipt and storage of all materials and equipment.

Clerks, 2 sergeants.
Write up, receive and despatch all printed and mimeographed matter.

Chief Messenger, 1 lance corporal.

Messengers, 2 1st class privates.

Chief Orderly, 1 lance corporal.

Orderlies, etc. 1 2nd class and 1 3rd class privates.

Cooks, 1 2nd class and 1 3rd class privates.

Officers	6
Enlisted Men	11
Total	17

ORGANIZATION OF CORPS COMMUNICATIONS DETACH. (continued)

(b)

STRENGTH

Detachment Headquarters	Officers	6
	Enlisted Men	11
		17
Telephone Section	Officers	5
	Enlisted Men	95
Telegraph Section	Officers	5
	Enlisted Men	52
		57
Wireless Section	Officers	33
	Enlisted Men	101
		134
Total	Officers	49
	Enlisted Men	259
	Total	308

ORGANIZATION OF CORPS COMMUNICATIONS DETACHMENT.

Remarks

1. Orderlies are assigned in accordance with regulations laid down for the corps.
2. In time of war, 3 men are added to move public property and officer's baggage.
3. The Detachment Commander is furnished one horse (to be kept at Corps Headquarters in time of peace).
4. The personnel of the Political Training Section of Detachment Headquarters will be assigned in accordance with the regulations laid down by the Political Training Department of the Military Council in Sept. 1927.

ORGANIZATION OF TELEPHONE SECTION OF CORPS COMM. DETACH.

Chief of Section, Captain.
In charge of the instruction, training and control of the section and responsible for all telephone communications, under orders of the Communications Detachment Commander.

Assistant Chief of Section, 1st or 2nd Lieut.
Directly responsible for the instruction, training and control of the section and for supervision of telephonic communications.

Technical Expert, 1st or 2nd Lieut.
Responsible for the repair of all instruments and equipment and for stoarge of same.

Supply Officer, Warrant Officer.
In charge of food, clothing and pay of the section.

Clerk, 1 sergeant.
In charge of correspondence and paper work.

Squad Leaders, 6 sergeants or corporals.

Assistant Squad Leaders, 6 corporals or lance corporals.

Enlisted Men (other than N.C.O's, orderlies and cooks) 24 1st class, 24 2nd class and 24 3rd class privates.

Orderlies, etc. 1 2nd class and 2 3rd class privates.

Cooks, 1 1st class, 2 2nd class and 4 3rd class privates.

Officers	5
Enlisted Men	95
Total	100

ORGANIZATION OF TELEPHONE SECTION OF CORPS COMM. DETACH.

_____ Chief of Section, Captain.
In charge of the instruction, training and control of the section and responsible for all telephone communications, under orders of the Communications Detachment Commander.

_____ Assistant Chief of Section, 1st or 2nd Lieut.
Directly responsible for the instruction, training and control of the section and for supervision of telephonic communications.

_____ Technical Expert, 1st or 2nd Lieut.
Responsible for the repair of all instruments and equipment and for stoarge of same.

_____ Supply Officer, Warrant Officer.
In charge of food, clothing and pay of the section.

_____ Clerk, 1 sergeant.
In charge of correspondence and paper work.

_____ Squad Leaders, 6 sergeants or corporals.

_____ Assistant Squad Leaders, 6 corporals or lance corporals.

_____ Enlisted Men (other than N.C.O's, orderlies and cooks) 24 1st class, 24 2nd class and 24 3rd class privates.

_____ Orderlies, etc. 1 2nd class and 2 3rd class privates.

_____ Cooks, 1 1st class, 2 2nd class and 4 3rd class privates.

Officers	5
Enlisted Men	95
Total	100

ORGANIZATION OF TELEPHONE SECTION OF CORPS COMMUNICATIONS DETACHMENT

Remarks.

1. The section is divided into 6 squads of 1 squad leader, 1 assistant squad leader, 4 1st class, 4 2nd class and 4 3rd class privates each.

2. The section is equipped with 12 carbines, one 20 telephone switchboard, one 10 telephone switchboard, 20 field telephones, 20 kilometers of field wire, a certain amount of steel wire and a certain (unspecified) number of insulators. On the march, all equipment is carried by hand.

3. In time of war, 4 men are added to transport public property and officer's baggage.

ORGANIZATION OF TELEGRAPH SECTION OF CORPS COMMUNICATIONS DETACHMENT

- Chief of Section, Captain.
  Responsible for the instruction, training, discipline and control of the section and for all Corps telegraphic communications, Directly under Communications Detachment Commander.
- Assistant Chief of Section, 1st or 2nd Lieut.
  Directly responsible for the instruction, training and control of the section and for the supervision of Corps telegraphic communications.
- Technical Expert, 1st or 2nd Lieut.
  Responsible for the repair of all apparatus and equipment and for storage of same.
- Supply Officer, Warrant Officer.
  In charge of food, clothing, and pay of the section.
- Clerks, 1 sergeant.
- Squad Leaders, 4 sergeants or corporals.
- Assistant Squad Leaders, 4 corporals or lance corporals.
- Enlisted Men (other than N.C.O's, orderlies and cooks) 12 1st class, 12 2nd class and 12 3rd class privates.
- Orderlies, 1 2nd class and 2 3rd class privates.
- Cooks, 1 2nd class and 5 3rd class privates.

Officers	5
Enlisted Men	52
Total	57

TELEPHONE SECTION OF CORPS COMMUNICATIONS DETACHMENT

Remarks.

1. The section is divided into 4 squads of one squad leader, one assistant squad leader, 3 1st class, 3 2nd class and 3 3rd class privates each.

2. The section is equipped with 8 carbines, two field telegraph sets, a certain (unspecified) amount of uninsulated wire and a certain (unspecified) unmber of insulators. The equipment of the section is transported by hand.

3. In time of war, 4 men are added to transport public property and officer's baggage.

ORGANIZATION OF WIRELESS SECTION OF CORPS COMM. DETACHMENT.

SECTION HEADQUARTERS

Chief of Section, Major.
Responsible for the instruction, training, discipline and control of the section, and for all Corps wireless communications.

Assistant Chief of Section, Captain.
Directly responsible for the instruction and training of the section and for the supervision of Corps wireless communications.

Technical Expert, 1st or 2nd Lieut.
Responsible for storage and care of all apparatus and equipment and for repairs to same.

Supply Officer, Warrant Officer.
In charge of food, clothing, and pay of section.

Clerk, Sergeant.

Messengers, 2 2nd class privates.

Orderlies, 1 1st class, 1 2nd class and 2 3rd class privates.

Cooks, 1 2nd class and 1 3rd class privates.

Officers	4
Enlisted Men	9
Total	13

ORGANIZATION OF EACH WIRELESS SUB-SECTION

Sub-section Chief, Captain.

In charge of the instruction, training, and discipline of the sub-section, and responsible for the communication work of his section.

Communications Officer, 1st or 2nd Lieut.

Responsible to sub-section Chief for despatch, receipt, and recording of all wireless messages of the sub-section, and for all matters pertaining thereto.

Operators, 2 1st or 2nd Lieutenants.

In charge of setting up, repairing, and operation of the sub-section radio sets.

Supply Segeant, Sergeant.

Pay clerk, and in charge of receipt and issue of food and clothing of the sub-section.

Squad Leader, 1 sergeant or corporal.

Assistant Squad Leader, 1 corporal or lance corporal.

Comm. troops, 4 1st class and 6 2nd class privates.

Orderlies, etc. 2 2nd class and 2 3rd class privates.

Cooks, 1 2nd class and 1 3rd class privates.

Total, sub-section.	Officers	6
	Enlisted Men	19
		25
Total, Wireless Section.	Officers	33
	Enlisted Men	101
		134

WIRELESS SECTION OF CORPS COMMUNICATIONS DETACHMENT

Remarks.

1. The section is equipped with 5 field wireless sets(of the short wave type manufactured by the Shanghai wireless manufacturing plant for the Military Council) and one long wave set.

2. The section is sub-divided into 5 sub-sections, with one wireless set to each sub-section. The 1st sub-section is directly under Section Headquarters, and is commanded by the Section Chief.

2. The organization of the 1st sub-section is the same as that for every other section, except that its chief is the Section Chief, and it has no Supply Sergeant, or cooks, and one less orderly than other sub-sections.

3. Each sub-section is equipped with 4 carbines.

4. Orderlies are assigned in accordance with the regulations laid down for Corps.

5. On the march and in the field, all equipment is carried by hand, 20 transportation troops being assigned to each set for this purpose. In addition, 5 men are added to each sub-section to transport public property and officer's baggage.

ORGANIZATION OF DIVISION COMMUNICATIONS DETACHMENT

_____ Detachment Commander, Captain or 1st Lieut.
Responsible for the training, discipline and control of the detachment and for all Division telephonic communications, under direct orders of Division Commander.

_____ Second in Command, 1st or 2nd Lieut.
Assists the Detachment Commander in all matters pertaining to the Detachment.

_____ Technical Expert, 1st or 2nd Lieut.
Responsible for setting up of telephones and for storage and repair of all apparatus and equipment.

_____ Supply Officer, Warrant Officer.
In charge of clothing and rations of the detachment.

_____ Clerk, Sergeant.
In charge of all clerical work of the detachment.

_____ Squad Leaders, 4 sergeants or corporals.

_____ Assistant Squad Leaders, 4 corporals or lance corporals.

_____ Enlisted Men (other than N.C.O's, orderlies and cooks) 12 1st class, 12 2nd class and 16 3rd class privates.

_____ Orderlies, 1 2nd class and 2 3rd class privates.

_____ Cooks, 1 1st class, 1 2nd class and 2 3rd class privates.

Officers	4
Enlisted Men	56
Total	60

DIVISION COMMUNICATIONS DETACHMENT

Remarks.

1. The detachment is divided into 4 squads, and is equipped with 8 carbines, one 10 telephone switch-board, 10 field telephones, 15 kilometers of wire and a certain amount of material for replacement and repairs. All equipment is transported by hand.

2. Orderlies are assigned in accordance with the regulations laid down for Corps Headquarters.

3. In time of war, 4 men are added to transport public property and officer's baggage.

ORGANIZATION OF CORPS MILITARY POLICE COMPANY

Company Commander, Major or Captain.
Responsible for the training, discipline and control of the company and for the preservation of discipline and good order throughout the Corps.

Platoon Leaders, 3 Captains or 1st Lieutenants.
Assist the Company Commander in all matters under his control.

Supply Officer, Warrant Officer.
Responsible for the procurement, issue and storage of all clothing, rations and equipment of the Company.

Company Clerk, Sergeant.
In charge of clerical work of the Company.

Squad Leaders, 6 sergeants.
In command of squads and in charge of patrolling and other duties of military police, under the orders and supervision of the Company Commander.

Military Police, 12 corporals, 18 lance corporals and 36 1st class privates.

Buglers, 2 1st class privates.

Messengers, 2 1st class privates.

Orderlies, 2 2nd class and 2 3rd class privates.

Cooks, 1 1st class, 2 2nd class and 4 3rd class privates.

Officers	5
Enlisted Men	88
Total	93

ORGANIZATION OF CORPS MILITARY POLICE COMPANY

Remarks.

1. The company is divided into 3 platoons of 2 squads each, and is equipped with 72 carbines.
2. The Company Commander is furnished one horse, and when available, 28 additional horses will be furnished the company.
3. Orderlies are assigned in accordance with the regulations laid down for Corps Headquarters.
4. In time of war, 3 men are added to transport public property and officer's baggage.

ORGANIZATION OF MILITARY BAND

Band Leader, 1st or 2nd Lieut.
Responsible for instruction, training, supply, sanitation, discipline and control of the band.

Assistant Band Leader, 2nd Lieut. or Warrant Officer.
Assists the Band Leader in the instruction and training of the band.

Clerk, Sergeant.
In charge of all clerical work of the band.

Supply Sergeant, Sergeant.
In charge of clothing, rations, and all other supplies of the band.

Musicians, 2 sergeants, 8 corporals, 12 lance corporals, and 16 1st class privates.

Orderlies, 1 2nd class privates.

Cooks, 1 2nd class and 2 3rd class privates.

Officers	2
Enlisted Men	44
Total	46

ORGANIZATION OF TRAINING REGIMENT HEADQUARTERS

Regimental Commander, Brig. Gen. or Colonel.
Commands the regiment and responsible for its instruction, training, sanitation, supply and control, under orders of the Corps Commander.

Assistant Regimental Commander, Col. or Lieut. Col.
Assists the Regimental Commander in the instruction and training of the regiment and in the preparation of all training and other plans.

Assistant Regimental Commander, Major.
Supervises the instruction and training of all troops under the regiment, and assists the Lieut. Col. in the performance of his duties.

Adjutant, Captain.
Responsible for the preparation of training, reports, and for the purchase, storage and issue of all training equipment.

Assistant Adjutants, 1 Captain and 1 1st Lieut.
In command of Headquarters troops, and responsible for transmission of orders and for accounts, disbursements, etc. of Regimental Headquarters.

Chief Bugler, Warrant Officer.
Responsible for training of buglers of the regiment and for the unification of bugle calls.

Supply Officer, Major.
In charge of all clothing, rations, munitions, and equipment of the regiment, under orders of the Regimental Commander and under the supervision of the Corps Quartermaster.

Assistant Supply Officers, 1 Captain, 2 1st Lieuts. 2 2nd Lieuts.
Assist the Supply in all matters of supply.

Military Surgeon, Major.
Responsible for the sanitation and health of the regiment, under orders of the Regimental Commander and under the supervision of the Corps Surgeon.

Military Surgeons, 2 Captains and 2 1st Lieuts.
Assistants to the Regimental Surgeon.

Pharmacist, 1st Lieut.
Responsible for the preparation, storage and issue of medicines and medical supplies.

Political Training Officer, Major.
Responsible for political training affairs of the regiment, carrying out orders and instructions of the Kuomintang, and for all propaganda work, under orders of the Corps Political Training Officer and under the supervision of the Regimental Commander.

_____ Assistant Political Training Officers, 1 Captain and 1 1st Lieut.

_____ Secretaries, 1 Captain and 1 1st Lieut.
In charge of the Regimental Seal and responsible for all documents, etc. of the regiment.

_____ Clerks, 2 Warrant Officers.
Write up and despatch all correspondence, and assist the secretaries in other clerical work of the regiment.

_____ Clerks, 4 sergeants.
In charge of mimeographing and printing.

_____ Regiment Supply Sergeant, Sergeant.
In charge of supply rooms of the regiment and the issue of all clothing, equipment, and rations, under the supervision of the Supply Officer.

_____ Assistant Supply Sergeants, 2 corporals or lance corporals.

_____ Nurses, 2 sergeants, 2 corporals or lance corporals, and 8 1st class privates.
Take care of sick and wounded and assist the pharmacist in preparation and issue of medicines and medical supplies.

_____ Message Center Chief, Corporal.
In charge of messengers and message center.

_____ Messengers, 8 1st class privates.

_____ Orderlies (N.C.O's.) 1 corporal and 1 lance corporal.

_____ Orderlies, 5 1st class, 4 2nd class and 9 3rd class privates.

_____ Cooks, 1 1st class, 2 2nd class and 3 3rd class privates.

_____ Stable Orderlies, 1 2nd class and 1 3rd class privates.

Officers	26
Enlisted Men	56
Total	82

STRENGTH OF TRAINING REGIMENT

Regimental Headquarters	-	Officers	26	
		Enlisted Men	56	82
1st Infantry Battalion	-	Officers	31	
		Enlisted Men	605	636
2nd Infantry Battalion	-	Officers	31	
		Enlisted Men	605	636
3rd Infantry Battalion	-	Officers	31	
		Enlisted Men	605	636
Machine Gun Company	-	Officers	6	
		Enlisted Men	116	122
Artillery Battery	-	Officers	6	
		Enlisted Men	129	135
Communications Detachment	-	Officers	8	
		Enlisted Men	149	157
TOTAL		Officers	139	
		Enlisted Men	2404	

ORGANIZATION OF TRAINING REGIMENT

Remarks

1. The purpose of the training regiment is to train enlisted men in the duties of non-commissioned officers of the various arms. To facilitate instruction officer-instructors and assistants will be especially detailed for duty with the regiment.

2. Soldiers will be selected for training by each Division Headquarters and by each Headquarters of separate units under the Corps, from among the specially qualified 1st Class Privates of the organization.

3. No Special Service Company is organized in the training regiment. The duties normally performed by the Special Service Company are performed by student soldiers in turn, in order to familiarize them with its functions.

4. Orderlies are assigned in accordance with the regulations laid down for the Corps.

5. The regimental commander and the second in command are furnished one horse each.

6. When the regiment is mobilized for war, its transportation detachment and sanitary detachment are organized as in the infantry regiment. All personnel matters, such as transfers, replacements, etc., are also handled in accordance with the regulations laid down for the infantry regiment.

7. The staff of the Political Training Officer is detailed in accordance with the regulations laid down by the Political Training Department of the Military Council in September, 1927.

HEADQUARTERS OF INFANTRY BATTALION OF TRAINING REGIMENT

Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel or Major.
Commands the battalion and responsible for its instruction, training and control. Under orders of the Regimental Commander.

Assistant Battalion Commander, Major or Captain.
Assists the Battalion Commander in the instruction and training of the Battalion.

Adjutant, First Lieutenant.
Commands Headquarters personnel and in charge of disbursements and accounts.

Political Training Officer, Captain.
In charge of political training affairs of the battalion and other matters of the Kuomintang. Under orders of the Political Training Officer of the Regiment and under direction of the Battalion Commander.

Assistant, First Lieutenant.
Assists the Political Training Officer in all matters pertaining to his office.

Secretary, Second Lieutenant.
In charge of all correspondence and all documents, etc., of the battalion.

Clerk, Warrant Officer.
In direct charge of all clerical work of the battalion.

Clerk, Sergeant.
In charge of mimeographing and printing.

Supply Sergeant, Sergeant.
In charge of supplies and miscellaneous accounts, under the direction of the Supply Officer.

Chief Bugler - Corporal.
Assists the Chief buglers of the Regiment in the unification of bugle calls and responsible for the instruction of the Battalion buglers.

Message Center Chief, Corporal.
In charge of Message Center and messengers.

Messengers, 4 1st Class Privates.

Orderlies (N. C. O's.) 1 Lance Corporal
In charge of orderlies of the Battalion.

Orderlies, 1 1st Class, 2 2nd Class and 2 3rd Class Privates.

Cooks, 1 2nd Class and 1 3rd Class Private.

Stable Orderlies, 1 3rd Class Private.

TOTAL.	Officers	7
	Enlisted Men	17
		24

INFANTRY BATTALION OF TRAINING REGIMENT

STRENGTH OF BATTALION

1st Company	-	Officers	6
		Enlisted Men	147
2nd Company	-	Officers	6
		Enlisted Men	147
3rd Company	-	Officers	6
		Enlisted Men	147
4th Company	-	Officers	6
		Enlisted Men	147

TOTAL	Officers	31
	Enlisted Men	605
GRAND TOTAL		636

(The Companies of the Regiment (12) are numbered consecutively 1 to 12.

ORGANIZATION OF INFANTRY BATTALION OF TRAINING REGIMENT

Remarks

1. Regimental headquarters is responsible for all matters of sanitation and supply in the various companies, but reports must go through the Battalion Headquarters concerned.

2. Orderlies are assigned in accordance with the regulations for the organization of the Corps.

3. The Battalion Commander and the second in command are furnished one horse each.

4. The staff of the Political Training Officer is appointed in accordance with the regulations laid down by the Political Training Department of the Military Council in September, 1927.

ORGANIZATION OF INFANTRY COMPANY OF TRAINING REGIMENT

Company Commander, Major or Captain.
Commands the Company and responsible for its instruction, training, sanitation, supply, discipline and control.

Assistant Company Commander, Captain or First Lieutenant.
Assists the Company Commander in the instruction and training, and all other matters pertaining to the Company.

Platoon Leaders, 3 First Lieutenants.
In direct charge of the training of the Company, and assists the Company Commander in his other duties.

Supply Sergeant - Warrant Officer.
In charge of clothing and supplies of the Company. Also acts as paymaster.

Company Clerk - Sergeant.
In charge of clerical work of the Company.

Commissary Sergeant - Sergeant.
Assistant to the Supply Sergeant.

Squad Leaders - 9 sergeants or corporals.

Assistant Squad Leaders, 9 corporals or lance corporals.

Student Soldiers, 108 First Class Privates.

Buglers, 2 First Class Privates.

Messengers, 2 First Class Privates.

Orderlies, 2 2nd Class and 3 3rd Class Privates.

Cooks, 1 1st Class, 4 2nd Class and 5 3rd Class Privates.

TOTAL.	Officers	6
	Enlisted Men	147
		153

ORGANIZATION OF INFANTRY COMPANY OF TRAINING REGIMENT

Remarks

1. Each company is divided into 3 platoons of 3 squads each.
2. Each company is equipped with 128 rifles.
3. Orderlies are assigned in accordance with the regulations laid down for the Corps.

ORGANIZATION OF MACHINE GUN COMPANY OF TRAINING REGIMENT

_____ Company Commander, Major.

_____ Assistant Company Commander, Captain. (Same as for Infantry Company)

_____ Platoon Leaders, 3 First Lieutenants. " " " " "

_____ Supply Sergeant - Warrant Officer. " " " " "

_____ Company Clerk, Sergeant. " " " " "

_____ Commissary Sergeant, Sergeant. " " " " "

_____ Ordnance Sergeant, Sergeant.
Responsible for storage and repair of arms and munitions.

_____ Squad Leaders, 6 Sergeants or Corporals.

_____ Assistant Squad Leaders, 6 Corporals or Lance Corporals.

_____ Student Soldiers, 84 1st Class Privates.

_____ Buglers, 2 1st Class Privates.

_____ Messengers, 2 1st Class Privates.

_____ Orderlies, 1 1st Class, 2 2nd Class and 2 3rd Class Privates.

_____ Cooks, 1st Class, 3 2nd Class and 4 3rd Class Privates.

Total	Officers	6
	Enlisted Men	116
		122

ORGANIZATION OF MACHINE GUN COMPANY OF TRAINING REGIMENT

Remarks

1. The Company is divided into 3 platoons of 2 squads each, and is equipped with 6 machine guns.

2. 29 pack horses are furnished the Training Regiment Machine Gun Company for transporting guns and ammunition.

3. As there are many different types of machine guns in the army, units having different types should exchange them for training purposes, so that all machine gunners will become familiar with the types now in use.

4. Orderlies are assigned in accordance with the regulations laid down for the Corps.

1	Battery Commander, Major.	(Same as for Machine Gun Company)
1	Assistant Battery Commander, Captain.	" " " " " "
3	Platoon Leaders, 3 1st Lieutenants.	" " " " " "
1	Supply Sergeant, Sergeant.	" " " " " "
1	Battery Clerk, Sergeant	" " " " " "
1	Commissary Sergeant, Sergeant	" " " " " "
1	Ordnance Sergeant, Sergeant	" " " " " "
6	Squad Leaders, 6 Sergeants	
6	Assistant Squad Leaders, 6 Corporals or Lance Corporals.	
96	Student Soldiers, 96 1st Class Privates.	
2	Buglers, 2 1st Class Privates.	
2	Messengers, 2 1st Class Privates.	
5	Orderlies, 1 1st Class, 1 2nd Class, 3 3rd Class Soldiers.	
9	Cooks, 1 1st Class, 3 2nd Class and 5 3rd Class Privates.	

TOTAL . . . . . Officers 6
Enlisted Men 129
135

ORGANIZATION OF ARTILLERY BATTERY OF TRAINING REGIMENT

Remarks

1. The battery is divided into 3 platoons of 2 squads each.

2. When sufficient guns and equipment are available, the battery will be organized into one platoon of trench mortars, one platoon of mountain guns, and one platoon of field guns. When all the necessary guns and equipment are not available, it will be organized as circumstances permit, but for training purposes, guns will be exchanged with other units so that all men in the battery will become familiar with the various types in use.

3. The number of horses allowed the battery is not fixed, but will be determined from time to time as circumstances demand.

4. Orderlies are assigned in accordance with the regulations laid down for the Corps.

ORGANIZATION OF COMMUNICATIONS DETACHMENT OF TRAINING REGIMENT

_____	Detachment Commander, Major. Commands the detachment and responsible for its instruction, training, sanitation, supply and control.
_____	Assistant Detachment Commander, Captain. Assists the Detachment Commander in the instruction and training of the Detachment and in other works of the Detachment.
_____	Section Leaders - 3 1st Lieutenants. Assist in the instruction and training of the Detachment.
_____	Assistant Instructor - Captain or 1st Lieutenant. In direct charge of instruction of the Detachment in electricity and telegraphy.
_____	Supply Sergeant - Sergeant. (Same as for Machine Gun Company)
_____	Clerk - Sergeant " " " " " "
_____	Commissary Sergeant - Sergeant " " " " " "
_____	Storekeeper - Sergeant. In charge of storage and issue of communications instruments and supplies.
_____	Squad Leaders, 9 Sergeants.
6	Assistant Squad Leaders, 9 Corporals or Lance Corporals.
_____	Student Soldiers, 108 1st Class Privates.
_____	Buglers, 2 1st Class Privates.
_____	Messengers, 2 1st Class Privates.
_____	Orderlies, 1 1st Class, 1 2nd Class and 4 3rd Class Privates.
_____	Cooks, 1 1st Class, 4 2nd Class, 5 3rd Class Privates.
	TOTAL . . . . . Officers 8 Enlisted Men 149 157

ORGANIZATION OF COMMUNICATIONS DETACHMENT OF TRAINING REGIMENT

Remarks

1. The Detachment is composed of one field telegraph platoon and two field telephone platoons, each platoon consisting of 3 squads.

2. The allowance of instruments and equipment for the training of the Detachment is governed by the table of allowances for the various sections of the Corps Communications Detachment.

3. Orderlies are assigned in accordance with the regulations laid down for the Corps.

ORGANIZATION OF DIVISION TRANSPORTATION DETACHMENT (DIVISION TRAIN)

DETACHMENT HEADQUARTERS

_____ Detachment (Train) Commander. (When detachment is organized, the Division Quartermaster or the Chief of Supply Section of Office of Division Quartermaster.)
Commands the detachment and responsible for the transportation of munitions and supplies of the division, under direct orders of the Division Commander.

_____ Assistant Chief of Detachment. (When detachment is organized, the senior Ordnance Officer of Supply Section of Office of Division Quartermaster.)
Assists the Chief of Detachment in his various duties.

_____ Accounting Officer (1) (When detachment is organized, one officer from Accounts Section of Office of Division Quartermaster.)

_____ Ordnance Officer (1) (When detachment is organized, the junior ordnance officer of Supply Section of Office of Division Quartermaster.)

_____ Supply Officer (1) (When detachment is organized, one Quartermaster from Supply Section of Office of Division Q.M.)

_____ Special Service Officers (2) (When detachment is organized, two clerks from Supply Section of Office of Division Q.M.)
In direct charge of storage, procurement, and issue of rations and clothing of the detachment.

_____ Messengers, 1 lance corporal, 4 1st class privates. (To be recruited when detachment is organized.)

_____ Orderlies, 4 privates. (Transferred from Office of Division Q.M.)

_____ Cooks, 2 " (" " " " " " " ")

_____ Transportation Troops, 5 3rd class privates. (Recruited when detach. is organized)

_____ Stable Orderlies, 1 3rd class privates. (" " " " ")

Officers	7
Enlisted Men	18
Total	25

TABLE OF DIVISION TRANSPORTATION DETACHMENT (DIVISION TRAIN) Contued

STRENGTH OF DETACHMENT

Escort Section	Officers	5
	Enlisted Men	114
1st Transportation Section	Officers	4
	Enlisted Men	114
2nd Transportation Section	Officers	4
	Enlisted Men	114
3rd Transportation Section	Officers	4
	Enlisted Men	114
4th Transportation Section	Officers	4
	Enlisted Men	114
Total	Officers	28
	Enlisted Men	988
		1016

DIVISION TRANSPORTATION DETACHMENT (DIVISION TRAIN)

Remarks.

1.. The Transportation Detachment is organized only in time of war, when it is formed from the staff of the Division Quartermaster and specially recruited transportation troops. The 4th Section is organized in "A" class Divisions only.

2. The Escort Section is formed by the transfer of one Company of the Special Service Battalion, when, in the opinion of the Detachment Commander, an escort is necessary.

3. The articles to be transported by the various sections will be determined by circumstances.

4. When supplies are transported by cart, the organization of the detachment will be changed to meet existing requirements.

5. The Detachment Commander and Assistant Detachment Commander are furnished one horse each.

ORGANIZATION OF TRANSPORTATION SECTION OF DIVISION

TRANSPORTATION DETACHMENT (DIVISION TRAIN)

Section Commander, Captain. (Detailed from the Div. when Transportation Detach. is organized.)
Commands the section and responsible for the transportation of arms, munitions and supplies as directed by the Detachment Commander.

Assistant Section Commanders, 1 1st and 1 2nd Lieutenants. (Detailed from the Division when Transportation Detachment is organized.)
Assist the Section Commander in all matters pertaining to transportation.

Supply Officer, Warrant Officer. (Detailed from the Div. when Trans. Detach. is organized.)
In charge of storage, receipt, and issue of arms, munitions, clothing and rations of the section.

Clerk, Sergeant. (Detailed from the Division when Transportation Detachment is organized.)
In charge of clerical work of the detachment.

Squad Leaders (10) (Transferred from the Escort Section as needed.)

Transportation Troops, 200 3rd class privates. (To be recruited when Trans. Detach. is organized)

Orderlies, 1 2nd class & 2 3rd class privates. (" " " " " " " " ")

Cooks, 1 1st class, 3 2nd class, 6 3rd class " (" " " " " " " " ")

Officers	4
Enlisted Men	224
Total	228

ORGANIZATION OF TRANSPORTATION SECTION OF DIVISION TRANSPORTATION DETACHMENT (DIV. TRAIN)

Remarks.

1. Each Section is divided into 10 squads of 20 men each.

2. The standard load for each soldier is 60 catties. Each section will carry one day's food supply for the division, 100,000 rounds of rifle and machine gun ammunition, and 500 rounds of mountain gun and trench mortar ammunition.

3. When suuplies are transported by cart, each section will require 20 mule carts and 40 drivers. The standard load for each cart is 600 catties.

4. The escort for each Transportation Section is furnished by the Escort Section of the Transportation Detachment (Div. Train).

5. Transportation soldiers are given the pay and allowances of 3rd class privates, plus certain other allowances determined by circumstances.

ORGANIZATION OF TRANSPORTATION DETACHMENT OF INF. REGT.(REGT.TRAIN)

Detachment Commander (When the detachment is orgarized, the Regt. Supply Officer).
Commands the Detachment (Train) and responsible for the transportation of munitions and supplies of the Regt. Under direct orders of Regt. Commander.

Assistant Detachment Commander (Detailed from the Regt.)
Assists the Detachment Commander in all matters pertaining to transportation.

Supply Officer, Warrant Officer (Detailed from the Regt.)
In charge of storage, procurement and issue of arms, clothing, and rations of the detachment. Also Detachment paymaster.

Detach. Clerk - 1 (Detailed from the Regt.)
In charge of clerical work of the Detachment.

Squad Leaders, 12 (Appointed from members of the Escort platoon).

Transportation Soldiers, 240 3rd class privates.

Escort Section.

Section Leader (Transferred from the Special Service Co. of the Regt.)
Responsible for the protection of the Trans. Detachment (Regt. Train).

Squad Leaders, 3 (Transferred from the Special Service Co. of the Regt.)

Privates, 39 (Transferred from the Special Service Co. of the Regt.)

Orderlies, 4 2nd class or 3rd class privates.

Cooks, 1 1st class, 6 2nd class and 8 3rd class privates.

Officers	5
Enlisted Men	302
Total	307

ORGANIZATION OF TRANSPORTATION DETACHMENT OF INF. REGT. (REGT. TRAIN)

Remarks.

1. The detachment is organized into 12 squads of 20 men each. (Exclusive of Escort Section)

2. The following supplies and ammunition will be carried by the detachment:
   (a) 72,000 rounds of rifle ammunition (50 rounds of rifle), requiring 90 carriers, each man carrying 800 rounds.
   (b) 20,000 rounds of machine gun ammunition (3,000 rounds per gun), requiring 25 carriers, each man carrying 800 rounds.
   (c) 360 rounds of trench mortar ammunition (60 rounds per gun), requiring 60 carriers, each man carrying 6 rounds.
   (d) One day's food supply for the regiment (2600 officers and men),or 3200 catties, requiring 55 carriers, each man carrying 58 catties.
   (The food allowance per man per day is fixed at 1 catty, 4 oz.)

3. To transport the munitions and supplies of the regtment by cart will require 24 mule carts and 48 drivers.

4. Transportation soldiers are given the pay and allowances of 3rd class privates, plus certain other allowances determined by circumstances.

ORGANIZATION OF TRANSPORTATION DETACH. OF ARTILLERY REGT.

(REGIMENTAL TRAIN)

		Detachment Commander (When the Detachment is organized, the junior asst. Regt.Commander) Commands the detachment, and responsible for the transportation of the munitions and supplies of the regt.
		Assistant Detachment Commander, 1st or 2nd Lieut. (Detailed from the Regt.) Assists the Detachment Commander in all matters pertaining to transportation.
		Supply Officer, Warrant Officer, (Detailed from the Regt.) In charge of storage, procurement, and issue of arms, clothing and rations of the Detachment. Also Detachment paymaster.
		Detachment Clerk, 1. (Detailed from the Regt.) In charge of clerical work of the Regt.
		Commissary Sgt. (Detailed from the Regt.) Assistant to the Supply Officer.
		Squad Leaders, 10. (Transferred from the Regt. as needed)
		Drivers, 160. (Recruited when detachment is organized)
Escort Section		Section Leaders, 3. (Transferred from the Special Service Battery of the Regt.) Responsible for the protection of the Detachment (Regt. Train).
		Squad Leaders, 3. (Transferred from the Special Service Battery of the Regt.)
		Privates, 36. (Transferred from the Special Service Battery of the Regt.)
		Orderlies, 5. (Recruited when detachment is organized)
		Cooks, 1 1st class, 3 2nd class, 10 3rd class privates. (Recruited when detachment is organized)

Officers	7
Enlisted Men	219
Total	226

Animals		
	Pack mules	160
	Extra pack mules	16
	Riding horses	5
	Total	181

ORGANIZATION OF TRANSPORTATION DETACHMENT OF ARTILLERY REGT. (Regt. Train)

Remarks.

1. The detachment is divided into 10 squads of 16 pack mules and 16 drivers each. (Exclusive of Escort Section.)

2. The following supplies and ammunition will be carried by the detachment:

   (a) 1440 rounds of ammunition (40 rounds per gun) requiring 120 mules, each mule carrying 12 rounds.

   (b) Two day's food supply for the regiment (1700 officers and men), or 4250 catties, requiring 28 mules, each carrying 152 catties. (The food allowance per man per day is fixed at 1 catty, 4 oz.)

3. 12 pack mules are used to carry horseshoes, sanitation supplies, baggage and public property of all kinds.

4. To transport the munitions and supplies of the Regiment by cart will require 40 mule carts and 80 drivers.

5. Pack animals will be commandeered as needed.

6. Drivers are given the pay and allowances of 3rd class privates, plus certain other allowances determined by circumstances.

ORGANIZATION OF CORPS ADVANCE HOSPITAL

Superintendant, Lt. Col. (Transferred from staff of Corps surgeon when hospital is organized)
In charge of hospital, under the Corps Surgeon.

Chief Surgeon, Major. (Transferred from staff of Corps surgeon when hospital is organized)
In direct charge of all medical and surgical matters of the hospital, under orders of the Corps Surgeon and under the supervision of the Superintendant.

Surgeons, 3 Captains, 3 1st Lieuts, 3 2nd Lieuts. (1 Captain, 2 1st Lieuts. and 3 2nd Lieuts. are commissioned from civilian doctors when hospital is organized, 6 others transferred from staff of Corps Surgeon.)
Assistants to Chief Surgeon.

Pharmacists, 1 Capt., 1 1st Lieut. (Transferred from Corps staff)
Responsible for the preparation, storage, and issue of all medicines and all medical and surgical equipment.

Supply Officers, 1 1st and 1 2nd Lieut. (Transferred from other units)
In charge of accounts and disbursements, and all miscellaneous supplies.

Secretary, 1st Lieut. (Transferred from the Corps)
In charge of all documents and records of the hospital.

Clerks, 1 Warrant Officer, 1 Sergeant. (Transferred from Corps Headquarters)
In charge of preparation, despatch, and filing of all correspondence, etc.

Head Nurse, Warrant Officer. (Civilian nurse commissioned when hospital is organized)
In charge of all nurses and responsible for the cleanliness and appearance of the wards.

Supply Sgt. Sergeant. (Transferred from Corps)
In charge of storage and issue of clothing and supplies.

Assistant to Supply Sgt. 1 corporal. (Transferred from Corps)

Ward-Masters, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals. (Recruited when hospital is organized)
In charge of wards, and assist in the preparation of medicines.

ORGANIZATION OF CORPS ADVANCE HOSPITAL (Continued)

- Nurses, 32 1st class privates. (Recruited when hospital is organized)
- Messengers, 3 1st class privates. (Recruited when hospital is organized)
- Chief Orderly, lance corporal. (Transferred from Corps)
- Orderlies, 1 1st class, 4 2nd class, 5 3rd class privates. (Transferred from Corps)
- Cooks, 2 1st class, 8 2nd class, 20 3rd class privates. (Recruited when hospital is organized)
- Transportation Troops, 38 3rd class privates. (Recruited when hospital is organized)

Officers	17
Enlisted Men	125
Total	142

ORGANIZATION OF CORPS ADVANCE HOSPITAL

Remarks.

1. The advance hospital is organized in time of war only, from the staff of the Corps Surgeon and specially recruited officers and men. Its capacity is limited to 500 patients.

2. 26 chests of medical and surgical supplies will be transported by the Transportation detachment in addition to miscellaneous property and officer's baggage.

ORGANIZATION OF LITTER BEARER DETACHMENT OF CORPS ADVANCE HOSPITAL

Detachment Commander, Captain or 1st Lieut.
Responsible for the instruction and training of the detachment and for the transporting of sick and wounded. Directly under Hospital Superintendant.

Section Leaders, 3 2nd Lieuts.
Responsible for instruction and training of this section, and for the transporting of sick and wounded assigned to section by Detachment Commander.

Clerk, Sergeant.
In charge of all clerical work of the detachment.

Supply Sgt. Sergeant.

Assistant to Supply Sgt., 1 corporal.
In charge of storage and issue of clothing and supplies of the detachment.

Squad Leaders, 9 corporals or lance corporals.

Litter bearers, 162 3rd class privates.

Orderlies, 1 2nd class and 2 3rd class privates.

Cooks, 1 1st class, 4 2nd class and 7 3rd class privates.

Officers	4
Enlisted Men	189
Total	193

ORGANIZATION OF LITTER BEARER DETACHMENT OF CORPS ADVANCE HOSPITAL

Remarks

1. The detachment is divided into 3 sections of 3 squads each, and is equipped with 81 litters. Two or three litter bearers are required for each litter.

2. Litter bearers are recruited as needed and are generally made 3rd class privates.

3. When a sufficient number of litters are not available for transporting sick and wounded, carts and boats will be used.

ORGANIZATION OF DIVISION FIELD HOSPITAL

Superintendant, Lt. Col. (The Division Surgeon)

Chief Surgeon, Major. (Civilian Surgeon commissioned when hospital is organized)
In direct charge of all medical and surgical matters of the hospital.

Surgeons, 2 Captains, 2 1st Lieuts, 2 2nd Lieuts. (1 Captain, 2 1st Lieuts. commissioned from civilian surgeons when hospital is organized. Others transferred from staff of Division Surgeons.)
Assistants to Chief Surgeon.

Pharmacists, 1 Capt., 1 2nd Lieut. (Civilian pharmacists commissioned when hospital is organized) In charge of preparation, storage and issue of all medicines and all medical and surgical supplies.

Supply Officers, 1 Capt., 1 2nd Lieut. (Transferred from the Division)
In charge of accounts, disbursements, and miscellaneous supplies.

Secretary, 1st Lieut. (Civilian commissioned when hospital is organized)
In charge of all documents and records of the hospital.

Clerks, 1 Warrant Officer, 1 sergeant. (Transferred from the Division)
In charge of all correspondence, etc.

Head Nurse, Warrant Officer. (Recruited when hospital is organized)
In charge of nurses and responsible for the cleanliness and appearance of wards.

Supply Sergeant, Sergeant.
Asst." " Corporal. (Recruited when hospital is organized)
In charge of storage and issue of clothing and food supply of the hospital.

Wardmasters, 3 sergeants, 3 corporals. (2 sergeants recruited when hospital is organized. Others transferred from Division.)
In charge of wards and assist preparation of medicines.

ORGANIZATION OF DIVISION FIELD HOSPITAL (Continued)

_____ Nurses, 24 1st class privates. (Recruited when hospital is organized)

_____ Messengers, 2 1st class privates. (Recruited when hospital is organized)

_____ Chief Orderly, 1 lance corporal. (Transferred from the Division)

_____ Orderlies, 1 1st class, 4 2nd class and 5 3rd class privates. (Recruited when hospital is organized)

_____ Cooks, 2 1st class, 6 2nd class and 16 3rd class privates. (Recruited when hospital is organized)

_____ Transportation Troops, 30 3rd class privates. (Recruited when hospital is organized)

Officers	15
Enlisted Men	100
Total	115

ORGANIZATION OF DIVISION FIELD HOSPITAL

Remarks.

1. The field hospital is organized in time of war only, from the staff of the Division Surgeon and specially recruited officers and men. Its capacity is limited to 400 patients.

2. 20 chests of medical and surgical supplies will be carried by the transportation detachment, plus other public property and officer's baggage.

ORGANIZATION OF LITTER BEARER DETACHMENT OF DIV. FIELD HOSPITAL.

- Detachment Commander, 1st Lieut. (Transferred from the Division)
  Responsible for the instruction and training of the detachment and for the transportation of sick and wounded.
- Section Leaders, 2 2nd Lieuts. or Warrant Officers. (Civilians commissioned when hospital is organized) Responsible for instruction and training of these sections and for transportation of patients assigned by Detachment Commander.
- Clerk, Sergeant. (Transferred from the Division)
  In charge of all correspondence.
- Supply Sgt. 1 sergeant. (Transferred from the Division)
  In charge of storage and issue of clothing and supplies.
- Squad Leaders, 10 corporals or lance corporals. (2 transferred from the Division, others recruited when needed.)
- Litter Bearers, 20 2nd class and 100 3rd class privates. (90 recruited when hospital is organized. Others transferred from Division.)
- Orderlies, 1 2nd class and 3rd class privates. (Recruited when hospital is organized)
- Cooks, 1 1st class, 3 2nd class and 4 3rd class privates. (Recruited when hospital is organized)

Officers	3
Enlisted Men	142
Total	145

ORGANIZATION OF LITTER BEARER DETACHMENT OF DIVISION FIELD HOSPITAL

Remarks.

1. The detachment is divided into 2 sections of 5 squads each, and is equipped with 60 litters.
2. Squad Leaders and Litter bearers, privates 2nd class, are transferred to the detachment from the Division Surgeon's staff. All others are recruited as needed after the hospital has been organized and are given the rations of 3rd class private.
3. When a sufficient number of litters are not available, carts and boats may be used to transport sick and wounded.

ORGANIZATION OF SANITARY DETACH. OF INF. RGT.

Detachment Commander, Major. (Regimental Surgeon)
Responsible for sanitation in the regiment.

Surgeons

Surgeons, 2 captains, 2 1st Lieuts. 2 2nd Lieuts. (All but two 2nd Lieuts. transferred from Regimental Surgeon's staff when detachment is organized. Two 2nd Lieuts. are commissioned when detachment is organized.)

Pharmacist, 1st Lieut. (Transferred from Regimental Surgeon's staff when detach. is organized)
Responsible for the preparation, storage and issue of medicines, and medical and surgical supplies.

Special Service Officer, Warrant Officer. (Recruited when detachment is organized)
In charge of storage and issue of clothing and food supplies.

Clerk, Sergeant.
In charge of all clerical work.

Litter Section

Section Leader, 1st or 2nd Lt. (Appointed when detachment is organized)
Assistant Section Leader, Sergeant. (Transferred from the Regiment)
Squad Leaders, 6 corporals or lance corporals. (Transferred from Regimental Surgeon's staff or recruited when detachment is organized.)
Litter Bearers, 12 1st class, 24 2nd class and 36 3rd class privates. (Transferred from Regimental Surgeon's staff or recruited when detachment is organized.)

Nurses (N.C.O's) 2 sergeants, 2 corporals or lance corporals. (Transferred from Regt. Surgeon's staff.

Nurses, 12 1st class privates. (8 transferred from Regimental Surgeon's staff. Others recruited when detachment is organized.

Orderlies, 1 1st class, 3 2nd class, 3 3rd class privates. (3 transferred from Regt. Hdgs. Others recruited as needed.

Cooks, 1 1st class, 1 2nd class, 6 3rd class privates. (Recruited when detach.is organized)

Transportation Troops, 12 3rd class privates. (Recruited when detachment is organized)

Total :		
	Officers	10
	Enlisted Men	123
	Total	133

ORGANIZATION OF SANITARY DETACHMENT OF INFANTRY REGIMENT.

Remarks.

1. The detachment is organized in time of war only from the staff of the Regimental Surgeon and specially recruited personnel.

2. The litter section of the detachment is divided into 6 squads of 10 litters each. Two litters, with bearers, are attached to each company; the remaining 30 litters remain with the detachment. Three litter bearers are required for each litter.

3. Litter bearers, privates1st class, are transferred from the litter section of the Regimental Surgeon's staff; others are recruited when the detachment is organized.

4. 12 chests of medicines and medical supplies will be carried by the transportation section, in addition to miscellaneous public property and officer's baggage.

PEACE AND WAR STRENGTH OF VARIOUS UNITS

	Peace		War		Increase in time of war	
	Officers	Enlisted Men	Officers	Enlisted Men	Officers	Enlisted Men
Corps[1]	1741	28,731	1869	38,682	128	7951
Division[2]	446	8,022	483	10,414	37	2392
Infantry Regiment	110	2,255	155	2,684	5	429
" Battalion	23	592	23	611		19
" Company	5	144	5	148		4
Machine Gun Company	5	113	5	117		4
Trench Mortar Company	5	125	5	129		4
Cavalry Squadron	9	186	9	192		6
Independent Cavalry Platoon	2	50	2	52		2
Artillery Regiment[3]	87	1,233	91	1,476	4	243
Field Artillery Battalion	22	371	22	388		17
" " Battery	5	116	5	119		3
Mountain Gun Battalion[4]	21	477	21	677		200
" " Company	5	147	5	211		64
Engineer Battalion	26	454	26	472		18
Engineer Company	6	144	6	149		5
Corps Communications Detachment	49	259	49	375		116
Division Communications "	4	56	4	60		4
Military Police Company	5	88	5	91		3
Military Band	2	44				
Training Regiment	140	2,265				
Division Transportation Detachment (Division Trains)[5]			12	655	12	655
Transportation Detachment of Inf.Regt.(Regimental Train)			1	256	1	256
Transportation Detachment of Artillery Regt.(Regimental Train			4	176	4	176

(Continued on next page)

PEACE AND WAR STRENGTH OF VARIOUS UNITS - cont'd.

	Peace		War		Increase in time of war	
	Officers	Enlisted Men	Officers	Enlisted Men	Officers	Enlisted Men
Corps Advance Hospital			13	309	13	309
Division Field Hospital			10	191	10	191
Sanitary Detachment of Infantry Regiment			4	92	4	92

Notes:

1. These figures are based on the strength of the "B" Class Division and do not include the war-time increase in the Training Regiment.

2. These figures are for the "B" Class Division.

3. These figures are based on the strength of the Field Artillery Battalion.

4. These figures are based on the strength of the Mountain Gun Battalion of the Division.

5. These figures are based on the strength of the "A" Class Division.

PEACE AND WAR STRENGTH OF VARIOUS UNITS

Remarks

1. Transportation detachments, hospital personnel, sanitary troops, etc., are all included in the figures for the division, regiment, battalion and company.

2. Military bands are organized in time of peace only.

3. The Training Regiment is intended primarily for instruction purposes, but may be used for combat. When used for combat, additional troops will be added and it will be organized as an infantry regiment.

4. Miscellaneous troops, such as transportation troops (coolies), cooks, orderlies, etc., are all included in the above figures.

PAY TABLE

Rank	New Rate (Fixed by the Military Council)	Old Rate	Increase
General	$800,00	$460,00	$340.00
Major-General	500.00	380.00	120.00
Brigadier-General	320.00	280.00	40.00
Colonel	240.00	230.00	10.00
Lieutenant-Colonel	170.00	170.00	
Major	135.00	135.00	
Captain	80.00	75.00	5.00
First Lieutenant	60.00	60.00	
Second Lieutenant	42.00	42.00	
Warrant Officer	32.00	32.00	
Sergeant	20.00	20.00	
Corporal	16.00	16.00	
Lance Corporal	14.00	14.00	
First Class Private	12.00	12.00	
Second Class Private	10.50	10.50	
Third Class Private	10.00	10.00	
Orderly	9.00	9.00	

REMARKS:

1. The amounts shown in the above table are all in Y'uan currency (i.e., not payable in depreciated notes, etc.)

2. This table is effective from January 1, 1928.

MONTHLY ALLOWANCES FOR VARIOUS UNITS

Unit	Allowance	Increase over old allowance
Corps	$1500	$600
Division	600	220
Regiment	200	60
Battalion	60	
Company	30	10
Separate Division	700	
" Regiment	240	
" Battalion	100	10
" Company	40	10
" Platoon	20	

REMARKS

1. Cavalry, Artillery, Engineer, Machine Gun and Military Police companies and battalions receive the allowances of separate companies and battalions.

2. Special units, such as communications detachments, transportation detachments, etc., receive the allowances of the command corresponding to the rank of the organization commander.

3. Cleaning materials for guns, rifles, etc., gas for motor vehicles, expenses incident to apprehension of deserters, etc., will be paid for from the allowances shown above.

4. The amounts shown in the above table are all in Y'uan currency (i.e., not payable in depreciated notes, etc.)

5. This table of allowances is effective from January 1, 1928.

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JAN 2 1936 OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF MIL. INTEL. DIV. WAR DEPARTMENT

2009-198 10

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Combatant Arms

Organization of a Field Artillery Regiment.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. JAN 2 1936

The attached chart shows the prescribed organization for a Field Artillery Regiment which is an organic part of the Infantry Division. The organization is now in general use although like all Chinese organizations it is often modified due to special equipment on hand or number of men available.

The mountain gun battery and the field gun battery, both described below, are interchangeable as part of the Battalion; this is supposed to vary with the type of operation to be undertaken but in practice is also governed by the kind of guns on hand. Both the field guns and mountain guns in common use are 75 m.m. caliber and manufactured in the Taiyuanfu Arsenal. A detailed report of organization equipment will be made under Digest 6570.24 when better information is available.

While certain numbers of drivers, packs and carts are prescribed as shown below, it should be remembered that these are always readily available in China and can be varied overnight to suit the nature of the operations. The cart is that in common use by Chinese farmers (see Digest 6570.08, page 372) and for military use three animals usually pull one cart, with irregular loads up to about 2,000 lbs. While the military have their specially made packs, the regular Chinese pack is readily adapted to military loads, and the Chinese are unusually expert at any kind of crude packing.

The strength of an Artillery Regiment, organized entirely with field guns, is as follows: Note: The detailed organization of units, described in tables below, indicates the increase of enlisted men and animals when mountain gun units are substituted.

Unit:	Officers:	Enlisted Men:	Animals:	Guns:
Regimental Headquarters	16	37	26	0
1st Battalion	34	459	468	12
2nd "	34	459	468	12
3rd "	34	459	468	12
Communication Battery	7	228	105	0
	125	1642	1535	36

Organization of Regimental Headquarters:

Regimental Commander (Colonel), 2 horses
Regimental Executive (Lt. Col.), mounted
Adjutant (Captain), mounted
4 Supply and Procurement Officers (1 Major and 3 Captains), 1 mounted
Armament Officer (Captain), mounted

From M/A, China Report No. 9245 December 3, 1935

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Combatant Arms

Organization of a Field Artillery Regiment

Organization of Regimental Headquarters - cont'd.

Reconnaissance Officer, mounted
Ordnance Officer (1st Lt.), mounted
Personnel Adjutant (Captain)
Surgeon (Major), mounted
1 Medical Officer (1st or 2nd Lieutenant)
1 Veterinarian (Major), mounted
1 Warrant Officer (Headquarters clerical work)
1 Warrant Officer (Bugler)
2 Sergeants (message center)
1 Sergeant, Assistant to Reconnaissance Officer, mounted
1 Armament Sergeant
3 Supply Sergeants
1 Hospital Sergeant
1 Veterinary Sergeant
17 Messengers (8 mounted)
1 Horseshoer
1 Cobbler
3 Drivers with 6 pack horses for transportation of reconnaissance party instruments
3 Cooks
3 Horseholders

The strength of a Field Artillery Battalion (also assuming Field Gun organization) is as follows:

Unit:	Officers:	Enlisted Men:	Animals:	Guns:
Battalion Headquarters	13	45	21	0
1st Battery	7	138	149	4
2nd "	7	138	149	4
3rd "	7	138	149	4
Total -	34	459	468	12

Note: The total strength of a Mountain Gun Battery is 37 officers, 620 enlisted men, 681 animals and 12 guns.

Organization of Battalion Headquarters:

Battalion Commander (Major), mounted
" Adjutant (1st Lieut.) mounted
" Supply Officer (Captain)
" Surgeon (Captain)
1 Medical Officer (1st or 2nd Lieutenant)
1 Veterinary Officer (Captain)
1 Personnel Adjutant (1st Lieutenant)
1 Reconnaissance Officer (1st or 2nd Lieut.), mounted
1 Warrant Officer (Ordnance expert)
1 Supply Sergeant
1 Munition Sergeant

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Combatant Arms

Organization of a Field Artillery Regiment

Organization of Battalion Headquarters - cont'd.

1 Headquarters Staff Sergeant
1 Sergeant, Assistant to Reconnaissance Officer
1 Sergeant Bugler, mounted
1 Hospital Sergeant
3 Veterinary Assistants
1 Cobbler
1 Saddler
11 Messengers, 5 mounted
4 cooks
4 Horseholders

Signal Section:

1 1st Lieutenant, mounted
1 Signal Sergeant, mounted
2 Messengers, mounted

Instrument Section:

1 1st Lieutenant, mounted
2 2nd Lieutenant Assistants, mounted
7 Non-commissioned Officers
1 Horseholder
2 Messengers, mounted

Organization of Field Artillery Battery:

Battery Headquarters:

Battery Commander (Captain), mounted
1 Reconnaissance Officer (2nd Lieut.),mounted
1 Warrant Officer, for Battery administration and in action takes charge of led horses
1 Sergeant Battery Clerk
3 Sergeants, Assistants to Reconnaissance Officer
2 Buglers, mounted
1 Signal Sergeant, mounted
3 Signal Privates (field telephone operators)
4 Messengers, mounted

Signal Section:

2 Signal Sergeants, 1 mounted
8 Privates
3 Drivers with 6 horses and reel cart
1 Driver with 3 horses and instrument cart for use by reconnaissance party

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Combatant Arms

Organization of a Field Artillery Regiment

The Firing Battery (2 platoons, 4 guns):

Battery Executive (1st Lieutenant), mounted
2 Platoon Commanders (1st Lieutenant), mounted
4 Sergeant Gun Commanders, mounted
20 Cannoneers
12 Drivers with 24 horses (3 drivers and 6 horses per gun)
6 Messengers, mounted

Ammunition Section (2 platoons with 4 caissons):

1 2nd Lieutenant Commanding, mounted
2 Platoon Sergeants, mounted
12 Ammunition Detail (3 men per caisson)
12 Drivers with 24 horses (3 drivers and 6 horses per caisson)
1 Messenger

In time of war another similar section is organized.

Combat Train:

1 Staff Sergeant, mounted
1 Armament Sergeant
3 Horseshoers
1 Saddler
1 Cobbler
1 Wheelwright
3 Blacksmiths
2 Orderlies
7 Drivers, with 21 horses, 7 carts

Field Train:

1 Stable Sergeant
12 Drivers with 36 horses and 12 carts
8 Cooks

Organization of Mountain Artillery Battery:

Battery Headquarters:

Company Commander (Captain), mounted
1 Warrant Officer (mounted)
1 Reconnaissance Officer (2nd Lieutenant), mounted
3 Sergeants, mounted
1 Message Center Sergeant
2 Buglers, mounted
4 Communication privates (mounted, carrying telephones)
4 Messengers, 2 mounted

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Combatant Arms

Organization of a Field Artillery Regiment

Signal Section (2 switchboard squads):

2 Signal Sergeants, mounted
8 Privates
8 Drivers, with 8 pack horses for wire equipment

Instrument Section:

1 Warrant Officer, mounted
2 Privates
1 Driver with pack horse for instruments

Firing Battery (2 platoons, 4 guns):

Battery Executive (1st Lieutenant), mounted
2 Platoon Commanders (1st Lieutenant), mounted
4 Gun Squad Commanders
40 Gunners
40 Drivers with 40 pack horses (10 horses per gun for gun and ammunition)
6 Messengers, mounted

Ammunition Section (2 Squads):

1 2nd Lieutenant, mounted
2 Squad Leaders, mounted
10 ammunition carriers
20 Drivers with 20 pack horses
1 Messenger, mounted

In time of war another similar section is organized.

Combat Train:

1 Staff Sergeant, mounted
1 Armament Sergeant
3 Blacksmiths
3 Horseshoers
1 Saddler
1 Cobbler

Field Train:

1 Stable Sergeant
13 Drivers with 26 pack horses
11 Cooks

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CHINA (Military)

Subject: Combatant Arms

Organization of a Field Artillery Regiment

Organization of Communication Battery of the Regiment:

Battery Headquarters:

Battery Commander (Captain), mounted
1 Warrant Officer, mounted. In garrison times he handles battery administration; in action he commands the battery trains.
1 Warrant Officer, mechanic
1 Message Center Sergeant
1 Supply Sergeant
1 Stable Sergeant
1 Blacksmith
2 Horseshoers
2 Saddlers
13 Cooks
1 Bugler
2 Orderlies
3 Messengers, 1 mounted

Regimental Communication Platoon:

Platoon Commander (1st Lieutenant), mounted
1 Platoon Sergeant, mounted
1 Supply Sergeant
1 Switchboard Squad, 5 men
4 Telephone Squads, 5 men each, total 20 men
10 Drivers and 20 pack horses. Each of the above 5 squads has 4 packs for wire equipment
2 Messengers, mounted

3 Battalion Communication Platoons, each composed of:

1 Platoon Leader, 2nd Lieutenant, mounted
1 " Sergeant, mounted
1 Supply Sergeant
1 Switchboard Squad of a Sergeant and 4 men.
6 Telephone Squads of 5 men each
14 Drivers with 21 pack horses
3 Messengers, mounted

In time of peace the Signal Sections of the Battalions and Batteries are also attached to the Communication Battery.

Source: Official tables of organization and consultation with Chinese Officers

Joseph W. Stilwell

H S J

Joseph W. Stilwell
Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache

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DEC 21 1935 WAR DEPARTMENT

2009-198

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Combatant Arms.

Organization of the Infantry Regiment.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. DEC 20 1935

The attached chart shows the prescribed organization for an Infantry Regiment of the Chinese Army. The regiments of the Central Government can be considered to have this organization although often modified to conform to the number of men and types of equipment on hand. In many regiments a Trench Mortar Company with 6 mortars takes the place of the Howitzer Company shown on the chart.

The strength in officers, enlisted men and horses of an Infantry Regiment is as follows:

Unit:	Officers:	Enlisted Men:	Horses
Regimental Headquarters	11	33	9
1st Battalion	26	704	60
2nd "	26	704	60
3rd "	26	704	60
Howitzer Company	4	109	53
Communication Company	4	81	6
Total	97	2,335	248

Composition of the Regimental Headquarters:

Regimental Commander (Colonel) (2 horses)
Regimental Executive (Lt. Colonel) (2 horses)
Adjutant (Captain) (Mounted)
Assistant Adjutant (Lieut.)
4 Supply & Procurement Officers (1 Major, 3 Captains)
1 Regimental Surgeon (Major) (Mounted)
1 Medical Officer (Lieutenant)
1 Veterinarian (Captain)
1 Sergeant Major
1 Sergeant Bugler (Mounted)
2 Headquarters Sergeants
3 Supply Sergeants
1 Hospital Sergeant
1 Message Center Sergeant
15 Messengers (2 mounted)
1 Horseshoer
4 Cooks
3 Stable orderlies

The Strength of an Infantry Battalion is as follows:

Unit:	Officers:	Enlisted Men:	Horses:
Battalion Headquarters	5	17	2
1st Rifle Company	5	167	0
2nd " "	5	167	0
3rd " "	5	167	0
Machine Gun Company	5	118	39
Accompanying Gun Platoon	1	68	19
Total -	26	704	60

From M/A, China Report No. 9238 November 20, 1935

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Combatant Arms

Organization of the Infantry Regiment

Composition of Battalion Headquarters:

Battalion Commander (Major) Mounted
Executive Officer (Captain) "
Battalion Adjutant (Lieutenant)
Battalion Surgeon (Captain)
Assistant Adjutant (Lieutenant)
1 Battalion Sergeant Major
1 Supply Sergeant
1 Sergeant Bugler
1 Hospital Sergeant
2 Hospital Privates
1 Message Center Sergeant
7 Messengers
2 Cooks
1 Stable orderly

Organization of Rifle Company of the Infantry Battalion:

Company Headquarters:

Company Commander
Armament and Supply Officer
1 1st Sergeant
2 Buglers
2 Orderlies
9 Cooks

3 Platoons, each composed of:

1 Platoon Commander
1 Platoon Sergeant
5 Squad Commanders
45 Privates

Each of the three platoons is divided into 5 squads (2 Automatic Rifle squads and 3 rifle squads). All squads have a squad leader and 9 men. The A.R. squad is armed with 1 A.R. and 6 rifles. All members of rifle squads carry rifles.

In action, the Company Commander takes 1 man from each squad (total 15 men) and allots them as messengers, 6 to the company and 3 to each platoon.

Organization of the Machine Gun Co. of the Infantry Bn.:

Company Headquarters:

Company Commander (Mounted)
Armament and Supply Officer (Mounted)
1st Sergeant
Instrument Sergeant, mounted

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Combatant Arms

Organization of the Infantry Regiment

Company Headquarters - cont'd

Supply Sergeant
2 Buglers
4 Messengers (2 mounted)
2 Orderlies
1 Blacksmith
2 Horseshoers
1 Saddler
9 Cooks
4 Stable orderlies

Communication Squad:

2 Sergeants (1 mounted)
8 privates
2 drivers with 4 pack horses for wire and phone equipment

3 Platoons, each composed of:

1 Platoon Commander (Mounted)
1 Platoon Sergeant
2 Gun Squad Commanders
12 Gunners
1 head driver in charge of packs
8 drivers with 8 pack horses
2 messengers (Mounted)

Each of the three platoons is composed of 2 squads, each squad being equipped with 1 machine gun (total 6 machine guns in company).

In time of war, 3 ammunition squads are organized. Each squad contains a squad leader, 2 drivers with 2 pack horses, 4 reserve gunners and ammunition carriers and 1 horseshoer.

Organization of Accompanying Gun Platoon of the Infantry Bn.:

Platoon Headquarters:

Platoon Commander (Mounted)
1 Platoon Sergeant
1 Supply Sergeant
1 Armament Sergeant
1 Instrument Sergeant
1 Sergeant clerk
1 Bugler
3 Messengers
2 Orderlies
1 Blacksmith
1 Horseshoer
4 Cooks
1 Stable orderly

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Combatant Arms

Organization of the Infantry Regiment

2 Squads, each composed of:

1 Gun Squad Commander
6 Gunners
2 Head drivers
16 Drivers with 8 pack horses

Each of the 2 squads is equipped with one 2 c.m. gun.

Organization of Howitzer Company of Infantry Regiment:

Company Headquarters:

Company Commander (Mounted)
Armament and Supply Officer
Instrument Sergeant (Mounted)
Sergeant Clerk
Armament Sergeant
2 Buglers
4 Messengers, 2 mounted
1 Blacksmith
1 Horseshoer
1 Saddler
7 Cooks
2 Stable orderlies

Communication Squad:

2 Sergeants, 1 mounted
8 Privates
2 Drivers, with 4 pack horses for wire and phone equipment

2 Platoons, each composed of:

1 Platoon Commander, mounted
2 Instrument Sergeants, 1 mounted
2 Sergeants Gun Commanders, mounted
12 Gunners
2 Messengers, 1 mounted
2 Head drivers
16 Drivers, with 16 pack horses
1 Orderly.

Each of the 2 platoons is armed with 2 infantry howitzers. In time of war one ammunition platoon is formed consisting of a platoon commander, 1 messenger, 3 sergeants, 18 drivers with 18 pack horses and 9 reserve gunners and ammunition carriers.

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Combatant Arms

Organization of the Infantry Regiment

Organization of the Trench Mortar Company when it is substituted for the Howitzer Company in the Infantry Regiment:

Company Headquarters:

Company Commander, mounted
Armament and Supply Officer
1st Sergeant
Instrument Sergeant, mounted
Armament Sergeant
2 Buglers
4 Messengers, 2 mounted
1 Blacksmith
1 Horseshoer
1 Saddler
2 Orderlies
9 Cooks
2 Stable orderlies

Communication Squad:

2 Sergeants, 1 mounted
8 Privates
2 Drivers, with 4 pack horses for wire and phone equipment

3 Platoons, each composed of:

1 Platoon Commander, mounted
1 Platoon Sergeant
2 Gun Squad Commanders
12 Gunners
2 Messengers, 1 mounted
1 Head driver
12 Drivers with 12 pack horses

The 3 platoons are each divided into 2 squads, each squad equipped with one trench mortar.

In time of war one ammunition platoon will be formed comprising a platoon commander, 1 messenger, 3 sergeants and 18 drivers with 18 pack horses.

Organization of a Communication Company of the Infantry Regiment:

Company Headquarters:

Company Commander, mounted
Armament and Supply Officer
1st Sergeant
1 Bugler
3 Messengers
1 Blacksmith
1 Horseshoer
1 Saddler
5 Cooks

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Combatant Arms

Organization of the Infantry Regiment

2 Platoons, each composed of:

1 Platoon Commander, mounted
1 Platoon Sergeant
2 Messengers, 1 mounted
1 Orderly
30 Privates for operating field telephone systems.

The two platoons are each divided into one switch board squad and five field telephone squads, each squad consisting of 5 men.

In time of war two such platoons are added to the company and 35 drivers with 70 pack horses are added to carry wire.

Armament:

Rifles: The standard rifle now in use is the 7.9 mm. Mauser, manufactured in China.

Automatic Rifles: The standard automatic rifle is a Brunn, 7.9 mm., made in Czechoslovakia, fired from a bipod mount.

Machine Guns: Maxim 7.9 mm. manufactured at Nanking and Hanyang arsenals.

Accompanying (anti-tank) Guns: A 2 c.m. gun, made in China, which is packed on a horse, can be pulled on wheels or carried by hand, is officially adopted. However, this equipment is not yet uniform in the various regiments. A gun used by some Nanking regiments is an anti-aircraft or anti-tank 2.2 c.m. automatic cannon. This cannon, a Solothurn, is made in Switzerland and has a range of 5,000 meters and can fire 50-60 shots per minute semi-automatic fire or 150 shots automatic fire. The carriage is cumbersome and drawn by one or two mules.

Infantry Howitzers: Standard design unknown. Probably not yet uniform in various regiments but some 75 mm. mountain howitzers are known to be in use.

Trench Mortars: The mortar commonly seen in use by Chinese troops is the 3 inch Stokes mortar type, manufactured in Chinese arsenals. For full description of this Chinese mortar see Combat Digest 6570.25, page 380.01.

Trains: No permanently organized field trains are a part of the Chinese Infantry Regiment. The method of supply commonly used by all Chinese troops in the field is to conscript local carts, packs and coolies which are always obtainable. Trucks can also be assigned by higher units where roads permit.

G-2 Report 6170.25

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Combatant Arms

Organization of the Infantry Regiment

Source: Tables of Organization, consultation with Chinese officers and observation of Chinese troops.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

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Major, Cavalry
Acting Military Attache

HSJ

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OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.

2009-198

WAR DEPARTMENT

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Strength, General Disposition and Control of Chinese Army Units

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 6 1935

The attached chart shows the strength and distribution of Chinese Army units and the degree of control exercised by the Central Government through the National Military Affairs Commission. It may be presumed that during the life of Chiang Kai-shek or his tenure of office as Chairman of the Commission the control exercised over the various military units will be maintained and even improved. So far as can be foreseen at this time, there is no individual or combination of individuals in China capable of supplanting Chiang Kai-shek or of displacing him from the control of units now under his authority.

This study has been made with the utmost care, has taken several months of careful consideration and selection of available data and, while it is admittedly difficult to arrive at exact estimates of strength, the report is submitted as being sufficiently accurate to reach general conclusions as to strength and distribution and indicate with reasonable accuracy the degree of control that can be exercised by Chiang Kai-shek and his military commission.

The total strength of Chinese military forces is estimated as 1,750,200, of which 1,186,000 are estimated as loyal to Chiang Kai-shek, 435,200 as semi-loyal and 129,000 as practically independent of control by the Central Government. The terms loyal and semi-loyal refer to the degree of support that Chiang Kai-shek may expect in case of civil war and not to a national emergency involving the invasion of China by a foreign hostile force. In the latter case all Chinese units, with the possible exception of those in the province of Sinkiang, might be employed by the Military Commission.

A most startling and extraordinary development is shown in the list of troops loyal to Chiang Kai-shek. The Generalissimo about three years ago could depend on about 30 divisions totaling between 250,000 and 300,000 men. During the last three years he has practically quadrupled that number by reorganizing and absorbing the former Northeastern Army, the 19th Route Army, the Kuominchun (Feng Yu-hsiang's troops) and many of the so-called provincial forces. Chiang Kai-shek's ambition is to create a truly National or Central Government Army and he has succeeded beyond the most extravagant expectations. To-day the Generalissimo and the Young Marshal, the former as chairman and the latter as director of the Headquarters at Wuchang (see Report No. 9070), are in practical control of China's ground, air and sea forces and there seems no combination in sight that can dispute their control and no person or combination of persons in China of whom they need be afraid.

The Generalissimo is proceeding skilfully and fearlessly with his formation of a Central Government Army and is now in the process of reorganizing and bringing under control the troops of Szechwan, Kweichow and Yunnan, shown on the accompanying chart as semi-loyal. The provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Sinkiang are admittedly practically independent of

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Strength, General Disposition and Control of Chinese Army Units

Central Government control and there has been much newspaper publicity regarding the possibilities of serious trouble between the first two named provinces and Chiang Kai-shek.

The strength of the combined Kwangtung-Kwangsi forces would preclude the possibility of their undertaking a serious offensive beyond an extremely limited area along their northern frontiers and would seem to indicate the necessity for a wholly defensive operation, but difficulties involving a war between the Southerners and Chiang Kai-shek do not now seem probable. From a national-political point of view, the Kwangtung and Kwangsi Parties are not a united group. The Kwangtung Party in fact is afraid of the relatively more competent Kwangsi group whose sphere of influence might extend even to Canton if Chen Chi-tang and his followers are not alert. Kwangtung is loath to cooperate with the Kwangsi forces in any anti-Chiang move lest they themselves lose their present control. Chiang is at present inclined to overlook the present failure to cooperate and seems willing to permit the situation to develop gradually and normally, but he hopes in the end to bring both provinces under Nanking's control. There seems little likelihood that this hope will be realized for some years to come.

The Japanese penetration into Manchuria, the Shanghai incident and the well known positive policy of Japan have been largely responsible for the increased centralization of control noted. Chiang Kai-shek has taken the utmost advantage of those factors and the pressing need of anti-communist operations to effect unity. The German advisers and particularly General von Seeckt, the retiring chief military adviser, have assisted by advice and suggested plans. A determined and prolonged effort (still continuing) has been made to educate the Chinese officers to the need of unity in the present situation that is described as a national emergency. That tremendous progress has been made is certain and that some further progress will yet be made seems assured.

In addition to the air force, which is constantly being increased, Chiang has been purchasing modern tanks, artillery, machine guns and munitions from England and Europe. The Central Military Academy is working at full capacity, an additional school has been opened at Loyang, and the one at Yunnanfu is about to be reorganized (see G-2 Report No. 9089, April 9, 1935). At all these institutions a serious attempt is being made to indoctrinate the student officer with the need of a united China with a well co-ordinated and centrally controlled military force.

Chiang Kai-shek to-day controls a larger army than any other Chinese in recent history. These armies can offer better military protection to Chinese or foreigners in China than at any time since the Boxer days. The centralization of control and the training and discipline of the Chinese armies has been so improved during the last two years that a relatively

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Strength, General Disposition and Control of Chinese Army Units

more stubborn and effective resistance to foreign intervention could be offered in case of necessity. The power of that resistance should not be measured by the puny and futile efforts made by the Manchurian troops in 1932 but would more nearly approximate the resistance of the 19th Route Army and Chiang Kai-shek's 87th and 88th Divisions at Shanghai (see G-2 Report No. 8327, dated June 29, 1933).

I am inclined to believe that a drastic revision of our former estimates of the capabilities and powers of the Chinese armies is now justified.

2657-A-377/195

W. S. Drysdale

W. S. Drysdale
Lieutenant-Colonel, Infantry
Military Attache

1 chart attached

Distribution:
6 MID
1 File

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

G-2 Report. 6140 - Division.

2 Encs

CHINA (Military)

6-1

Subject: Organization of Central Government Divisions.

JAN 31 1935
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Submitted herewith are two diagrams (Charts I and II) showing the proposed plan of organization for divisions in the Central Governments Army. This organization was obtained from the tables of organization of the Nationalist Army, amplified by discussions with a colonel in the Chinese army educated militarily both in America and Germany. As will be noted, the organization, especially that of the infantry battalion, is typically German brought about by the influence both of the German advisers and the returned students from German military schools.

As explained by our informant, this organization will undergo further changes as study and experimentation with new weapons warrant. However, for the present, this organization will serve as a standard for the ten divisions which the Central Government is now planning on organizing, using the so-called training brigade and training battalion of special troops, now organized at Nanking, as a nucleus or for furnishing training cadres. There are no divisions at present in the Chinese army thus organized, mainly due to lack of standard equipment and training facilities.

According to the plan of organization of the division attached, no provision for security has been made, i.e., divisional cavalry or air corps. From conversations with Chinese officers at Nanking, we learn that an attempt is being made to motorize the divisional cavalry and as yet nothing definite has been decided, due to cost of procurement. The Central Government's air force is organized as an independent arm and again no decision has been reached as to the apportionment to organizations.

Except for the lack of auxiliary troops assigned to the division, the major departure from the organization of our own divisions is the organization of the infantry battalion. The battalion is composed of a heavy machine gun company, anti-aircraft or anti-tank platoon and three rifle companies.

The machine gun company is comprised of three platoons and a messenger squad or group of between 14-20 men for communication within the company and with companies of the battalion. The armament consists of 6 maxim 7.9 m.m. (.311") machine guns manufactured at the Nanking and Hanyang (Hankow) arsenals.

The anti-aircraft or anti-tank platoon is composed of two squads, each armed with one 22 m.m. (.866") automatic cannon. This cannon, a Solothurn, is manufactured in Switzerland, has a range of 5000 meters and is capable of firing 50-60 shots per minute semi-automatic fire or 150 shots per minute automatic fire. The carriage is a cumbersome affair with the gun mounted on the carriage to fire either against aerial or terrestrial targets and drawn by one or two horses or mules. It is our opinion that the cannon is far too intricate at present to be efficiently used by Chinese gunners.

The three rifle companies of the battalion are divided into three platoons of three squads of 14 men each. The organization of the squad is based on using the light machine gun of each

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Organization of Central Government Divisions.

squad as a pivot of maneuver. In the light machine gun group are four men and a leader - the remainder of the squad consisting of eight riflemen and a leader. In the initial stages of the fire fight the entire squad will participate as a group in building up fire superiority for the forward movement. The plan of maneuver is then for the riflemen to advance under the fire of the light machine gun, the light machine gun displacing forward as the action of the shock group (8 riflemen) warrants.

The riflemen of the squad are equipped with 7.9 Mauser rifles made in China - the light machine gun used is the Brünn (7.9 m.m. cal.) made in Szecho-Slovakia, fired from a bi-pod.

Conclusions:-

This German advised plan of divisional organization for China's army is still lacking in provision for auxiliary troops, as compared with that of our own army, but, as planned, is a great improvement over the present organization. It might be that the question of the proper proportion of auxiliary troops has not yet been considered, due to the woeful lack of such material as modern transportation, communication equipment and the like. It is quite evident, however, that an organization has been sought that can function with the material and equipment at hand or procurable and still correct the glaring deficiencies now present in the Chinese Army - namely, lack of uniformity and standardization of calibres and equipment. The plan seeks to correct these deficiencies by using the 7.9 m.m. (.311") calibre and the small arms now being manufactured in the arsenals under the control of the Central Government.

Source:-

Official tables of organizations: Chinese Army Officers, and personal inspection and study.

W. S. Drysdale

W. S. Drysdale,
Lieutenant - Colonel, Infantry,
Military Attache.

2 charts attached.

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G-2 Report

6180

JAN 21 1932

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CHINA (Military)

Subject: Tables of Organization of Fengtien Army

WAR DEPARTMENT
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Normally the brigade is the largest unit in the Fengtien Army and they have no tables of organization for larger units. During operations, whenever necessary, two or more brigades are grouped under one command and a commander and staff assigned. The strength of the infantry brigade is about 10,000.

Infantry Brigade.....	3 Inf. Regts.	3 Bns. of 4 Co's each 1 M. G. Co. 1 T. M. Co. 1 37 mm Co. 1 Communications Section
	1 Bodyguard Co. 1 Cav. Troop 1 Heavy T. M. Co. 1 Comm. Co.	
Cavalry Brigade.....	3 Cav. Regts.	4 Cav. Troops 1 M. G. " 1 T. M. " 1 Comm. Section
	1 Bodyguard Tr. 1 Hq. & Comm. Tr.	
Field Artillery Brigade.....	3 Regts.	3 Bns. — 3 Btrys.
Engineer Regiment.....	3 Bns.	3 Co's.
Transportation Regiment.....	3 Bns.	3 Trans. Co. 1 Motor Car Co.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery
Assistant Military Attache

W M

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From M/A, China — Report No. 8172 — December 23, 1931

G-2 Report

4-1

6180

CHINA (Military)

Subject: Organization of Nanking Model Divisions

2009-198

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Attached hereto is the organization of the Nanking Model Divisions, now the 1st, 2nd, 4th and 14th. It is thought that this is important since the government's plan is eventually to organize all divisions on this model.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

Parker G. Tenney
Captain, Field Artillery
Assistant Military Attache

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From M/A, China Report No. 8052 June 25, 1931

OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
M.I. INTEL. DIV.
JUL 22 1931
2009-198
WAR DEPARTMENT

4-1

Organization of a Model Division

DIVISION

Brigade | Brigade | Brigade

Regiment | Regiment

Battn. | Battn. | Battn. | Signal Co.(3 Plat's; 1 per Inf. Bn.). T.M. Co. (6 Stokes) 2 per Inf. Bn. Inf. Gun Co. (Nominally 6 Inf. Guns but at present have only 4).

2 Rifle Co's. Each has 12 light automatics | 1 M.G. Co. of 12 MGs. plus 6 heavy 2 c.m. M.G's. (i.e. 18 in.all).

Divisional troops consisting of:

Cavalry Squadron	(3 Tr's; 1 per Infantry Brigade)
Intelligence Bn.	(3 Co's; 1 " " ")
Pioneer Bn.	(3 Co's; 1 " " ")
Artillery Regt.	(3 Light & 1 Med. Bns; each subdivided into 3 Batteries of 4 guns each. Light guns - 75 m.m., Medium guns 15 c.m.
Light Tanks.	2 Companies of 12 tanks each.
A.S.C. Bn.	3 Companies. Transport is improvised as required.
Field Hospital.	

Each Division has 18 Battalions; each Bn. has 3 Companies; each Co. has 140 men.
Light automatic weapons are of Swiss make.
Organization is based on that of the Czecho-Slovakian Army

- - - - -

NOTES: (a) The organization table is based on information supplied by certain members of the German Mission. It is very complete and looks well on paper. It is tolerably certain that China will not desire, or be in a position to organise throughout on this basis for some time to come.

(b It is very difficult and a thankless job attempting to get tables of organization from the Chinese authorities. In conversation they are shifty and invariably prevaricate when it suits their purpose.

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2009-198
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G-2 Report

CHINA (Military)

Subject: National Army Division.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D FEB 5 - 1929

1. Herewith is a table showing the general composition of a division in the National Army. This organization is stated by an officer in the Shansi Army to have superseded that published in January, 1928 and forwarded in our No. 7314. Until further information is obtained in Nanking, I am withholding the detailed organization. To quote General Shang Chen, "No two groups of armies are using the same organization", so that this table shows the organization being used probably by Chiang Kai-shek's group alone.

2. It is hoped that the coming conference on military disbandment and reorganization will be able to impose some uniformity of organization among the military leaders; otherwise, there will be little value in knowing an organization which is purely theoretical.

Organization	Officers	Men	Rifles	Carbines	Guns	M.G. & M. Trench	Horses
Div. Hdqrs.	71	140	66 19				25
1st Brig. Hdqrs.	9	28					9
1st Regt. "	108	1936	1551	24		6 each	17
2nd " "	108	1936	1551	24		6 each	17
2nd Brig. "	9	28	19				9
3rd Regt. "	108	1936	1551	24		6 each	17
4th " "	108	1936	1551	24		6 each	17
3rd Brig. "	9	28	19				9
5th Regt. "	108	1936	1551	24		6 each	17
6th " "	108	1936	1551	24		6 each	17
Cavalry Co.	9	161		147			150
Artillery Bn.	23	502		70	12		Unfixed
Engineer "	21	560	228				25
Special Serv.Co.	5	134	122				
3 Special Service Platoon[x]	3	144	122				
Total -	817	13,341	9,901	361	12	36 each	329

[x] One platoon to each brigade.

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

From M/A, China Report No. 7411 January 3, 1929

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AMERICAN LEGATION

OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
PEKING, CHINA.

4-1 1928 2009-198 3 NOV 30

WAR DEPARTMENT

October 24, 1928

#7357 RECEIVED G-2 W. D. NOV 27 1928

Subject: Tables of Organization of Nationalist Revolutionary Army.

To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D. C.

2009-198 (2)

1. Reference letter No. 7345, October 11, 1928, herewith additional supplement to Tables of Organization of the Nationalist Revolutionary Army - "Organization of Nationalist Army Coast Defense District Headquarters".

John Magruder

John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

elh

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1928
WAR DEPARTMENT

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ORGANIZATION OF NATIONALIST ARMY COAST DEFENSE DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS.

_____ District Commander, Colonel.
Commands all posts and forts in the district. Directly responsible to the Military Council.

_____ Chief of Staff, Lieut. Colonel.
Responsible for preparation of training plans and for the execution of all orders of the District Commander.

_____ Ass't. Chief of Staff, Captain.
Assists the Chief of Staff in the preparation of training plans, etc.

_____ District Adjutant, Major.
Responsible for transmission of orders and for all miscellaneous matters. Under orders of the District Commander and under direction of the Chief of Staff.

_____ Ass't. Adjutant, Captain.

_____ District Quartermaster, Major.
Responsible for the supply of all posts and forts in the district. Under direct orders of the District Commander and under direction of the Chief of Staff.

_____ Ass't. Quartermaster, 1st Lieut.

_____ District Ordnance Officer, Captain.
Responsible for the repair of all rifles and guns in the district, and for the receipt, storage and issue of ammunition. Under direct orders of the District Commander.

_____ Ass't. Ordnance Officer, 2nd Lieut.
Assists the Ordnance Officer in the repair and storage of guns and ammunition. Must be specially qualified in the repair of arms.

_____ Medical Officer, Captain.
Responsible for sanitary conditions in the district, and for the care of sick and wounded.

_____ Pharmacist, Warrant Officer.
Responsible for receipt, storage and issue of medicines and medical equipment, and for the preparation of medicines.

- Secretary, Captain.
  In charge of seal and responsible for the preparation and filing of all correspondence, etc.
- Clerks, 2 Warrant Officers.
- Intelligence Officer, Warrant Officer.
  In charge of all intelligence work in the district and responsible for the instruction of intelligence personnel.
- Commissary Sergeant, Sergeant.
  In charge of receipt, storage and issue of rations and supplies for headquarters personnel.
- Ordnance Sergeant, Sergeant.
  In charge of ordnance storehouses.
- Chief Bugler, Sergeant.
  Responsible for the instruction of buglers and unification of bugle calls.
- Buglers, 2 2nd class privates.
- Chief Messenger, Lance Corporal.
- Messengers, 4 2nd class privates.
- Nurses, 2 2nd class privates.
- Intelligence Personnel, 1 Corporal and 1 Lance Corporal.
- Orderlies, 1 Lance Corporal, 4 1st class and 5 2nd class privates.
- Cooks, 4 3rd class privates.

Total: 15 officers and 28 enlisted men.

ORGANIZATION OF NATIONALIST ARMY COAST DEFENCE DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS

Remarks

1. Commissioned and enlisted personnel are assigned to Coast Defence Observatories according to the number of posts and forts in the District. Transportation (Horses, boats, steam - launches) are assigned in the same manner.

2. The number of guards for depots and magazines, and the number of intelligence personnel to be assigned to each district shall be determined by the number of forts in the district.

3. One Warrant Officer, 2 mechanics (Sergeants), one 1st class private and two 2nd class privates shall be assigned to each search light in the district.

4. One orderly is assigned to each two horses.

5. The present organization of the District Special Service Battalion and Company, and of the important posts and forts in the District will not be changed.

AMERICAN LEGATION
OFFICE OF THE MILITARY ATTACHE
PEKING, CHINA.

2 Encs

October 11, 1928 - 198

2

WAR DEPARTMENT

#7345

Subject: "Tables of Organization of the Nationalist Revolutionary Army"

To: A. C. of S., G-2, Washington, D.C.

RECEIVED G-2 W. D. NOV 13 1928

1. Enclosed are "Proposed Organization of Nationalist Army Aircraft Factory" and "Regulations Governing Proposed Reorganization of Nationalist Army General Prison", to supplement "Tables of Organization of the Nationalist Revolutionary Army" forwarded by letter No. 7314, August 29, 1928.

2009-198

2. Although no aircraft factory has yet been built by the Nationalist Government and the building of such a factory for some time is extremely doubtful, the enclosed table is of interest as showing an effort in this direction.

3. The proposed reorganization of the Nationalist Army General Prison at Nanking will probably be put into effect, in part at least. When definite information is received that the reorganization has been effected, this material will be forwarded as Digest material under 6330 - Military Prisons.

John Magruder,
John Magruder
Major, General Staff
Military Attache

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4-1

PROPOSED ORGANIZATION OF NATIONALIST ARMY AIRCRAFT FACTORY

2

Superintendant, Colonel.
Responsible to Aviation Section of Military Council for all matters pertaining to the factory.

Chief Engineer, Lieut. Colonel.
Charged with plans for manufacture and repair of airplanes and directs work of the various sections. Responsible for inspecting aircraft materials.

Secretary, (Adjutant) Captain.
In charge of Chinese and foreign correspondence, and receives, despatches and files all documents and correspondence.

Accountant, Captain.
In charge of accounts and preparation of the budget.

Ass't. Accountant, 2nd Lieut.

Office Supply Officer, Captain.
In charge of miscellaneous purchases, etc. of Superintendant's office.

Personnel Adjutant, 1st Lieut.
In charge of temporary appointments, transfers, etc. of factory personnel.

Medical Officer, Major or Captain.
Responsible for sanitation and health of factory personnel.

Pharmacist, Warrant Officer.
Responsible for preparation of medicines and for storage of surgical and medical supplies.

Clerks, 2 Warrant Officers.
In charge of printing and mimeographing.

NATIONALIST ARMY AIRCRAFT FACTORY (Continued)

Engineering Section

- Chief of Section, Major.
  Assists the Chief Engineer in plans for manufacture of aircraft, and responsible for all work of the section.
- Technical Expert, Major.
  Assists the Section Chief in preparation of plans, etc.
- Assistant Technical Experts, Captains (3).
- Draftsmen, Captains (2).
  In charge of drawing of all maps, plans, etc.

Inspection Section

- Chief of Section, Major.
  Responsible for the inspection of all work done in the factory, under orders of the Superintendant and under direction of the chief engineer.
- Machine Inspectors, Captains (2).
  Responsible to the Superintendant for the inspection and examination of all machinery and apparatus used in the factory.
- Recorder, 1st Lieut.
  Keeps records on time of beginning and completion, and daily progress on all work in the factory.

Materials Section

- Chief of Section, Captain.
  In charge of purchase of all materials.
- Storekeeper, 1st Lieut.
  In charge of receipt, storage and issue of all materials.
- In Charge of Tools, 2nd Lieut.
  In charge of storage and issue of all tools.

NATIONALIST ARMY AIRCRAFT FACTORY (Continued)

Construction Section

- Chief of Section, Major.
  In charge of manufacture and repair of aircraft and responsible for all work of the section, under direct orders of the Superintendant and under supervision of the chief engineer.
- Chief Machinist, Captain.
  In charge of machines for wood and iron work and responsible for the training of machinist personnel.
- Chief Carpenter, Captain.
  In charge of all woodwork in the manufacture and repair of planes.
- Chief Blacksmith, Captain.
  In charge of all iron and steel work in the manufacture and repair of planes.
- Motor Engineer, Captain.
  Responsible for the inspection and repair of all motors.
- Workmen, 90.
- Foremen, 8 sergeants, 8 corporals and 12 lance corporals.
- In charge of Storehouses, sergeant.
- Orderlies, 1 corporal, 6 1st class and 14 2nd class privates.
- Medical Troops, 2 1st class privates.
- Messengers, 2 1st class privates.
- Cooks, 10 2nd class privates.
- Factory Guards, 5 2nd class and 5 3rd class privates.

Total: 30 officers, 90 workmen, 28 foremen and 46 soldiers.

PROPOSED ORGANIZATION OF NATIONALIST ARMY AIRCRAFT FACTORY

Remarks.

1. Workmen are divided into four classes and twelve grades. The first class is composed of 10 men of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd grades; the second class of 20 men of the 4th, 5th and 6th grades; the third class of 30 men of the 7th, 8th and 9th grades, and the fourth class of 30 men of the 10th, 11th and 12th grades. Total number of workmen, 90.

2. The number of men to be employed will be decided by the Superintendant as occasion demands; he will submit reports from time to time on which an increase or decrease in workmen may be made.

3. The following table shows the rate of pay for workmen of various grades.

1st grade.....	$80.00	7th grade.....	$50.00
2nd "	75.00	8th "	45.00
3rd "	70.00	9th "	40.00
4th "	65.00	10th "	35.00
5th "	60.00	11th "	30.00
6th "	55.00	12th "	25.00

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WAR DEPARTMENT 2 '4

GENERAL REGULATIONS GOVERNING PROPOSED RE-

ORGANIZATION OF NATIONALIST ARMY GENERAL PRISON.

1. The Nationalist Army General Prison shall be under the direct control of the Judge Advocate General's Dept. of the Military Council of the Nationalist Government, and shall be administered in accordance with existing law and regulations.

2. The Nationalist Army General Prison shall be organized in accordance with Art. 2 of the regulations governing the organization of the Judge Advocate General's Dept. of the Military Council.

3. The staff of the prison shall be composed of a superintendant (Lieut. Col.) and five departments or sections which shall be charged with the following duties and responsibilities:

First Section

a. Safe-keeping of seal.

b. Preparation of the budget, and disbursements.

c. Drafting of all correspondence, documents and regulations.

d. Despatch and filing of all correspondence and documents.

e. Preparation of reports.

f. Appointment, discharge, reward and punishment of employees.

g. Execution of sentences; pardons and reprieves.

h. Safe-keeping of money and clothing deposited by prisoners.

i. Inspection of prison; living conditions of prisoners.

j. Applications and requests of prisoners; visits, etc.

k. Reports on discharge, illness and death of prisoners.

Second Section

a. Disposition, inspection, and reward and punishment.

b. Keeping of punishment instruments and fire-fighting apparatus.

c. Supervision and inspection of use of public property by prison guards and employees.

d. Safekeeping of keys, and opening and closing of prison gates and windows.

e. Checking of entrance and exit of prisoners.

f. Guarding of prison, and protection and restraint of prisoners.

g. Care and inspection of prisoner's work-shop.

h. Inspection of prison room and cells.

i. Examination and disposition of new prisoners; finger-prints.

j. Receiving and forwarding of prisoners; keeping of prisoner's records.

k. Issue and care of prisoners food, clothing and equipment.

l. Disposition of prison dead.

m. Examination and censorship of prisoner's mail.

n. Inspection of food and other articles sent to prisoners.

o. Supervision of interviews with prisoners and recording of their conversations.

p. Cleanliness of prisoners.

q. Inspection of prisoners living conditions; execution of rewards and punishments; examination of prisoners requests and appeals.

r. Apprehension of escaped prisoners.

Third Section

a. Allotment of work and assignment of prisoners thereto.

b. Purchase and storage of materials.

c. Preparation of work schedule.

d. Work estimates, distribution of work-schedules; pay.

e. Inspection of work and jobs.

f. Storage and use of tools, etc.

g. Storage and sale of articles manufactured in the prison.

Educational Section

a. Preparation of schedules for instruction.

b. Preparation and selection of educational matter.

c. Examination of prisoners qualifications for special work.

d. Reforming of prisoners.

Medical Section

a. Cure and treatment of sick prisoners.

b. Preparation and care of medicines and medical and surgical equipment.

c. Sanitation.

d. Preparation of medical records and death certificates.

4. The detailed organization of the prison is covered by special [illegible] regulations.

5. The detailed duties and responsibilities of prison personnel are covered in special regulations.

6. When any matter comes up not covered by these regulations the Superintendent shall request the Military Council to make such changes or additions as the situation may require.

7. These regulations shall be effective from date of promulgation.

Nanking, July ---, 1928.

DETAILED RE-ORGANIZATION OF NATIONALIST ARMY GENERAL PRISON

Superintendent, Lieut. Colonel.
In charge of prison, under direct orders of Judge Advocate General.

Secretaries, 1 Captain and 1 1st Lieut.
Responsible for drafting of all correspondences and compilation of reports.

* * * *

First Section.

Chief of Section, Major.
In charge of all administrative matters of the section.

Assistants, 1 Captain and 2 1st Lieutenants.
In charge of seal and responsible for correspondence and files.

Disbursing Officer, Captain.
In charge of disbursements and accounts.

Purchasing Officer, Captain.

Clerks, 2 Warrant Officers.

Second Section.

Chief of Section, Major.
Directly responsible for safe-keeping of prisoners, and for all matters pertaining to the section.

Assistants, 1 Captain and 2 1st Lieutenants.

Clerk, Warrant Officer.
In charge of correspondence.

Prison Guard (Commissioned personnel), 4 2nd Lieutenants.
In charge of various sections of prison guard.

Prison Guard (N.C.O's), 4 Warrant Officers.
In direct charge of various reliefs of prison guard.

Prison Guards - male, Corporals and Lance Corporals (number not specified)
In charge of male prisoners.

Prison Guards - female, (number not specified)
In charge of female prisoners.

Third Section.

Chief of Section, Major.
In charge of training and working of prisoners.

Assistant, Captain.

Instructors, 1 1st Lieut. and 1 2nd Lieut.
Instruct prisoners in the various trades taught in prison.

Clerk, Warrant Officer.
In charge of clerical work of section.

Educational Section.

Section Chief, Major.
In charge of moral instruction and reform of prisoners.

Assistants, 1 1st Lieutenant and 1 2nd Lieutenant.

Clerk, Warrant Officer.
In charge of clerical work of section.

Medical Section.

Chief Medical Officer, Major.
Responsible for medical administration of prison.

Medical Officer, 1st Lieut.
Responsible for sanitation of prison and for care of sick.

Pharmacist, 1st or 2nd Lieut.
Responsible for preparation and storage of medicines.

Head Nurse, Sergeant or Corporal.

Nurses, 5 1st class privates.

Chief Messenger, Corporal.
In charge of messengers.

Messengers, 2 1st class privates.

Orderlies, 6 1st class privates, 14 2nd class privates.

(Each Lieut. Col. or Major is allowed one orderly; each two junior officers one, and each three warrant officers one)

* * * * * *

REMARKS

1. Skilled workmen (instructors) will be assigned to various shops and factories as they are established.

2. When a shop or factory is enlarged, application will be made to the prison superintendent for increase in prisoner-workmen as conditions demand.

3. When skilled-workmen (instructors) can not be obtained at the rate of pay herein provided, special allowances may be granted upon application to the Superintendent.

4. One sergeant and 10 corporal-guards will be assigned to each 100 prisoners. The value of the ration for prisoners is fixed at $0.20 per day.

5. Total Prison personnel:-

Lieut. Col.	1	Sergeants (not specified)	
Majors	5	Corporals " "	
Captains	6	Lance Corps." "	
1st Lieuts.	9	1st class privates	13
2nd Lieuts.	6	2nd " "	16
Warrant Officers	9		

COMPARATIVE TABLE SHOWING INCREASE IN PRISON PERSONNEL PROVIDED FOR IN PROPOSED REORGANIZATION.

Rank.	Present number	Proposed number	Increase	Decrease	Remarks
Lieut. Col.	1	1	No	No	
Majors	5	5	No	No	
Captains	6	6	No	No	
1st Lieuts.	11	9		2	
2nd "	14	6		8	
Warrant Officers	14	9		5	
Sergeants	5	1		4	
Corporals	not specified	not specified			To be specified according to no. of prisoners.
Lance Corporals	"	"			-do-
1st class privates	10	13	3		
2nd " "	18	16		2	
	84	66	3	21	

* * * * *

NOTE The Nationalist Government has proposed the construction of an army prison at Nanking at the cost of some $88,870.00. Upon completion, this prison will hold about 1,700 prisoners.

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Classification

2009-198 1/19 Enclosures

Record Section File No.

Copy No. 6-1 For Record Section Only

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT CHINA
Country Reported On

Subject Organization of the North China Pacification Army **I.G. No.** 6100
Brief Descriptive Title

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Source: French sources and study made in the M.A.'s office
Degree of reliability: Good

Summarization of Report
When Required

Organization as of October, 1940, of the Japanese sponsored Chinese Army of Pacification of North China.

RECEIVED G/2 W. D. MAY 19 1941

In Comments on Current Events Enter Item Headings Here

1. There is enclosed herewith a list of the locations of units and organization of the North China Pacification Army, compiled from data received from French sources and a study made in this office.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

F. P. MUNSON
Major, Army of the U.S.
Assistant Military Attache

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N/A ...1
File...2

G-2 Distribution: 4, 5, 6,
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From M. A. China **Report No.** 9982 **Date** April 15, 1941
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WAR DEPARTMENT
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U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—14547

Enc. 1
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL. INTEL. DIV.
2009-198
19
MAY 20 1941
WAR DEPARTMENT

PACIFICATION ARMY OF NORTH CHINA

Organization of infantry units

Regiment (Tuan 團)

Composition	:	3 battalions 1 machine gun company 1 mortar company 1 troop of cavalry 1 signal company
Strength	:	1,650 officers and men
Armament (exclusive of rifles)	:	27 automatic rifles 9 machine guns 9 mortars

Battalion (Ying 營)

Composition	:	3 rifle companies
Strength	:	About 400 officers and men
Armament	:	9 automatic rifles

Rifle company (Lien 連)

Composition	:	3 platoons
Strength	:	About 125 officers and men
Armament	:	3 automatic rifles

Platoon (P'ai 排)

Composition	:	3 squads
Strength	:	39 men
Armament	:	1 automatic rifle

Squad (Pan 班)

Strength	;	12 or 13 men

Machine gun company (Chi Kuan Ch'iang Lien 機關鎗連)

Composition	:	3 platoons
Strength	:	90 officers and men
Armament	:	9 machine guns

Machine gun platoon (Chi Kuan Ch'iang P'ai 機關鎗排)

Composition	:	3 squads
Strength	:	28 men
Armament	:	3 machine guns

Machine gun squad (Chi Kuan Ch'iang Pan 機關鎗班)

Strength	:	9 men
Armament	:	1 machine gun

Mortar company (P'ai Chi P'ao Lien迫擊炮連)

This company has the same platoon and squad organization as the machine gun companies.

Infantry brigade (Pu Ping Lü 步兵旅)

The infantry brigade consists of two regiments and a communication company. Detachments of accompanying artillery and cavalry are not component parts of the infantry brigade.

The General Headquarters of the Pacification Army is in Peiping and the commanding general is General Chi Hsieh-yuan. There was a reorganization in October, 1940, and there are now believed to be twenty-two regiments grouped into seven brigades of two regiments each plus eight training and independent regiments.

There is a military academy at Ch'ingho near Peiping, which has about 1,000 cadets. There is also a Political Council Guard in Peiping of about 400 men.

No.of Regiment	Commander	Location
1st	Colonel Ou-yang Peng (歐陽鵬)	Peking
2nd	Colonel Chu Wen-lan (朱文瀾)	Chochow, Hopei
3rd	Lt-Col. Chi Ching-yu(齊靖宇)	Paoting, Hopei
4th	Lt-Col. Wang Chi-yen(王溪岩)	Chengting, Hopei
5th	Colonel Wang Chen-sheng(王振聲)	Kaiping & Changli
6th	Colonel Yeh Yin-nan (葉蔭南)	Tangshan, Hopei
7th	Colonel Li Ting-heng(李定衡)	Tungchow, Hopei
8th	Lt-Col. Chen Chih-ping(陳志平)	Tsinan, Shantung
9th	Lt-Col. Chang Yang-chuan(張養泉)	Peking
10th	Lt-Col. Tsui Fu-kun (崔福坤)	Peking
11th	Lt-Col. Chang Chi-chuan(張濟川)	Tungchow, Hopei
12th	Lt-Col. Liu Hsing-ho (劉興和)	Tungchow, Hopei
13th	Lt-Col. Li Kuo-chuan (李濶泉)	Chochow, Hopei
14th	Lt-Col. Li Ying (李瑛)	Paoting, Hopei
15th	Colonel Lu Feng-tse (盧鳳策)	Chengting, Hopei
16th	Colonel Chang Chi-kun(張吉堃)	Tangshan, Hopei
17th	Colonel Ku Hai-tsing (顧海清)	Tientsin
18th	Colonel Wang Yun-shan(汪韞珊)	Tangshan, Hopei
19th	Lt-Col. Chao Yu-sheng(趙雨生)	Tangshan, Hopei
20th	Lt-Col. Liu Cheng (劉澂)	Tsinan, Shantung
21st	Colonel Chao Chin-san(趙晉三)	Tsinan, Shantung
22nd	Colonel Hsiung Yi (熊毅)	Chingchow, Shantung

No.of Brigade	Commander	Chief of Staff
1st	Maj-Gen. Liu Feng-chih, Chochow (劉鳳池)	Col. Tien Shen (田申)
2nd	Maj-Gen. Huang Nan-peng, Paoting (黃南鵬)	Col. Hsu Kuan-i (徐貫一)
3rd	Maj-Gen. Liu Tsu-sheng, Peiyang (劉組望)	Col. Lo Pao-tai (羅寶泰)

No. of Brigade (continued)	Commander	Chief of Staff
4th	Maj-Gen. Chiang En-pu (姜恩溥)	Col. Wang Ching-ho (王景和)
5th	Maj-Gen. Hu En-cheng (胡恩承)	Col. Yang Chi (楊琦)
6th	Maj-Gen. Sung Ting-yu, Chengting (宋廷裕)	Col. Chi Chi-chung (祁繼忠)
7th	Maj-Gen. Ma Wen-chi (馬文起)	Col. Chao Hua-min (趙化民)

[redacted] Date 4-1-74

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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF

MILITARY ATTACHÉ REPORT CHINA

Country Reported On

Subject Map of Chinese War Zones **I.G. No.** 1220

Brief Descriptive Title

Source and Degree of Reliability:

Source: Assistant Military Attache, Chungking.
Reliability: Good.

Summarization of Report
When Received

In Comments on Current Events Enter Item Headings Here

1. There are enclosed herewith six copies of a war zone map prepared in this office to accompany Lieutenant Colonel Barrett's report on war zones dated October 1, 1940.

2009-198/17

WILLIAM MAYER
Lieut-Colonel, Field Artillery
Military Attache

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From M. A. China **Report No.** 9948 **Date** November 27, 1940
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OUTER MONGOLIA

SUIYUA

PAOTOW

NINGSIA

NINGSIA

8TH WAR ZONE

Chu Shao-liang

YENAN

TSINGHAI

LANCHOW

KANSU

TIENSHUI

SIAN

SHENSI

CHENGTU

SIKANG

SZECHWAN

CHUNGKING

6TH WAR ZONE

Chen Cheng

KWEICHOW

KWEIYANG

YUNNAN

YUNNAN

BURMA

INDO-CHINA

HAIPHONG

HAINAN

CHENGTEH

KALGAN

CHAHAR

HOPEI

PEKING

WAR ZONE

TIENTSIN

2ND WAR ZONE

YEN HSI-SHAN

HOPEI

TAIYUAN

TSINAN

LOAN

WAR ZONE

SINSIANG

KAIFENG

LOYANG

CHEN

WEI LI-HUANG

HONAN

5TH WAR ZONE

SIANGYANG

Li Tsung-jen

HUPEH

HANKOW

CHANGSHA

9TH WAR ZONE

HENGYANG

Hsueh Yueh

KIANGSI

EILIN

KWANGTUNG

Yu Han-mou

CANTON

4TH WAR ZONE

KWANGSI

Chang Fa-Kuei

NANNING

HONGKONG

7TH WAR ZONE

MIL. INTEL. DIV.
23009/198
19
WAR DEPARTMENT
MOUKDEN

HAHAR
MANCHOUKUO
CHENGTEH
KALGAN
CHAHAR - HOPEI
PEKING
WAR ZONE
TIENTSIN
DAIREN
2ND WAR ZONE
YEN HSI-SHAN
HOPEI
TAIYUAN
TSINAN
TSINGTAO
SHANTUNG
LOAN
WAR ZONE
SINSIANG
KAIFENG
SU LU
WAR ZONE
LIENYUN
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WEI LI-HUANG
HSUCHOW
SIAN
SHENSI
PENGPU
5TH WAR ZONE
SIANGYANG
Li Tsung-jen
ANHWEI
NANKING
SHANGHAI
WUHU
HANGCHOW
NINGPO
UPEH
HANKOW
KIUKIANG
3RD WAR ZONE
CHEKIANG
CHUNGKING
6TH WAR ZONE
Chen Cheng
CHANGCHANG
SHANGJAO
Ku Chu-tung
CHANGSHA
KIANGSI
9TH WAR ZONE
HENGYANG
FOOCHOW
Hsueh Yueh
KWEICHOW
KWEIYANG
KWANGTUNG
Yu Han-mou
CANTON
4TH WAR ZONE
Chang Fa-Kwei
NANNING
HONGKONG
HAIPHONG

CHINESE WAR ZONES

200 300 400 m.

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AMERICAN EMBASSY
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CHUNGKING, CHINA.

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2009-198

17

October 1, 1940.

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3(5) and 3(6) or 4(b)
OSD, Letter, May 3, 1978
By NARS Date

Subject: War Zones.

To: The A.C. of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D.C.

The following is a list of War Zones as of September 1, 1940:

First: South Shansi, South Hopei, and Northwest Honan.
Commander, Wei Li-huang; Vice-commander, Feng Chin-tsai.

Second: Eastern Shansi, Western Hopei.
Commander, Yen Hsi-shan; Vice-commanders, Chu Teh, Yang Ai-yuan.

Third: Chekiang, South Kiangsu, North Fukien, Northeast Kiangsi.
Commander, Ku Chu-tung; Vice-commanders, Liu Chien-hsu, Tang Shih-tsun.

Fourth: Kwangsi (formerly Kwangtung and Kwangsi).
Commander, Chang Fa-kuei. No vice-commander. Former Vice-commander, Yu Han-mou, has been made commander of Seventh War Zone.

Fifth: Southern Honan, North Hupeh, and Western Anhui.
Commander, Li Tsung-jen.

Sixth: South Hupeh, West Hunan, and four hsien in East Szechuan.
Commander, Chen Cheng; Vice-commander, Wu Chi-wei (formerly in command of 18th G.A. on East River, Kwangtung. This is a new War Zone.

Seventh: Kwangtung.
Commander, Yu Han-mou (no vice-commander).

Eighth: Part of North Shansi, Western Suiyuan, Kansu, and Shensi.
Commander, Chu Shao-liang; Vice-commanders, Fu Tso-yi and Ma Hung-kuei. This Zone was formerly commanded by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Ninth: Hunan, Western Kiangsi.
Commander, Hsueh Yueh; Vice-commanders, Lo Cho-ying, Wang Ling-chi, and Yang Sen.

Hopei-Chahar War Zone: Commander, Wei Li-huang (concurrently with First War Zone. This War Zone was formerly commanded by Lu Chung-lin, who recently resigned as Chairman of Hopei. This Zone will probably soon be abolished.

"Su-Lu" War Zone: This special Zone includes North Kiangsu and Southeast Shantung (hence the name "Su-Lu"). It is commanded by Yu Hsueh-chung, whose official tittle, "Szu Ling," is slightly different from that of a regular War Zone Commander, which is "Chan Chu Szu Ling Kuan."

David D. Barrett.
David D. Barrett,
Major, Ord. Dept.,
Assistant M/A.

Copy to:

Note: The Tenth War Zone, formerly in Shensi and commanded by Chiang Ting-wen, has been abolished.

G-2 Report

6-1

6120
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
MIL., INTEL. DIV.
SEP 19 1938
2009-198
WAR DEPARTMENT
2009

China (Military)

Subject: Armies

Organization of the Chinese Army

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2. Army Groups, pages 1-2
3. Route Armies, pages 2-7
4. Army Corps, pages 7-48
5. Divisions not included in Army Corps, pages 49-62

APPENDIX "A" to above report:

A-1 List of Independent Brigades

A-2 Miscellaneous Data:

a. Cavalry
b. Tanks
c. Artillery
d. Airplanes
e. Motor Transport
f. Notes on Chinese Military Forces
g. References to prominent Chinese leaders
h. Russian Technical Advisers

NOTE: This report is a digest of the files of this Office pertaining to the organization, equipment, strength and location of units of the Chinese Army during the current hostilities up to August 10, 1938. It is believed that the data therein, although much of it has been reported upon piece-meal and is subject to constant change, will constitute a convenient and valuable source of reference.

From: M/A, China Report No. 9677 August 10, 1938

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"Ever Advancing Army" 48

9

1. War Zones:

The following war zones were designated February 18, 1938:

1st - Honan, east of Loyang; commanded by Ch'eng Ch'ien Governor of Honan (at Wuhu on December 19th and Lanfeng May 25th).
2nd - Shansi; commanded by Wei L i-huang, Commanding General 2nd Route Army and Commanding General 14th Army Corps (10th and 83rd Divisions) at Nankou. Nominal commander 2nd Zone is Yen Hsi-shan. Yen Hsi-shan, west of Yellow River, had to recross into Shansi upon orders from Chiang Kai-shek March 15th. *(See page 1a.)
3rd - Hangchow front.
4th - Canton.
5th - Anhwei; commanded by Li Tsung-jen, who formerly commanded the 5th Route Army composed of the 7th Army Corps (171st, 192nd, and 173rd Divs.) and 48th Army Corps (174th, 175th, and 176th Divisions).
6th - Inactive.
7th - Inactive.
8th - All of Kansu, Honan, west of Loyang plus south Shensi; commanded by Chiang Ting-wen.
9th - New 9th War Zone is roughly Kiangsi Province less Kiukiang-Wuchang area and plus area south of Fanking and is under Ch'en Ch'eng.

2. Army Groups:

A. On February 23rd it was reported that the 1st Army Group under Sung Che-yuan consisted of the 59th Army Corps (38th and 180th Divisions) under Chang Tze-chung; the 68th Army Corps under Liu Ju-ming (143rd and 61st Divisions); the 77th Army under Feng Chih-an (37th Div.) and the 69th Army Corps (composition unknown) under Shih Yu-san.

B. On February 14th the 11th and 22nd Army Groups were reported in the Hsuchowfu area. The only known division in the 11th Army Group is the 135th. The 22nd Army Group under Teng Hsi-hou is probably the same as the old 45th Army Corps which is comprised of the 125th, 126th, 127th, 128th, and 131st Divisions.

C. 18th Army Group - (see 8th Route Army, p.4)

D. 19th Army Group - probably five to eight divisions under Lo Cho-ying in Fowliang area, north Kiangsi. Lo Cho-ying commands district east of Poyang Lake, headquarters at Fowliang, July 19th.

E. On February 10th the 20th Army Group under Shang Chen (relieved as Governor of Honan January 30th) was reported in the Chengchow-Kaifeng area. This group was composed of only the 32nd Army Corps consisting of the 139th, 141st, and 142nd Divisions, 4th Cavalry Division, and two independent cavalry regiments, all formerly com-

* - 2nd War Zone under "Dopey" Yen Hsi-shan who does nothing at Ichuan, Shensi. Wei Li-huang, actual commander, holds west Shansi including Lishih area to Wanchuan-Wensi line and south Shansi from just east of Yicheng to Tsincheng and Tsiyuan. He has 12 infantry divisions, 8 cavalry divisions, and/10 combined infantry and cavalry divisions including 14th, 33rd and 9th Army Corps's, Aug. 7th.

Yen and Wei Li-huang's command includes 1st Cavalry Army of 2 cavalry divisions and one independent brigade under Tsao Chun-shou. Eight infantry divisions organized in 9th Army Corps, 19th Army Corps of 17th and 72nd Divisions, 34th Army Corps and 61st Army Corps, all Shansi troops. 47th Army Corps of two divisions from Szechwan. 27th Route Army of three divisions and one independent brigade from Shensi. 14th Army Corps of 10th and 85th divisions. 3rd Army Corps of 7th and 12th Divisions mostly of combined infantry and cavalry divisions being reorganized to include guerrillas and partisans under Central Government. Aug. 17th.

manded by Shang Chen. Shang Chen at Kaocheng but Japanese
14 14th Division pushing down on his right May 25th; Shang Chen accused of letting Doihara (Japanese 14th Division) push down on his right; ordered to Hankow to be penalized. Liu Chih, of Chekiang and former Governor of Honan, urging drastic action June 2nd; Tang En-po (see 13th Army Corps) was placed in command on May 14th; Tang En-po with five divisions in swi tch position at Pohsien, Kuoyang, Fuyang, on May 28th; Shang Chen reprimanded for losing Kaocheng, Honan, June 13th; Tang En-po with 20 th Army Group which includes 98th Army Corps moving to Nanchang, Kiangsi, July 16th.

F. 21st Army Group of 6 Kwangsi divisions in Shangcheng, Yehchia tsi and Chiangchiatsi area, southeastern Honan, June 28th; 21st Army Group believed to be 170th, 171st, 172nd, 173rd, 174th, and 176th Divisions in area as reported above July 21st.

G. 29th Group Army under Li Han-tang in Yangtze Area consists of 64th A.C. 66th A.C. and an undesignated A.C. (See P. 24) Aug. 19

3. Route Armies - - Many of which have been reorganized under other designations since outbreak of hostilities.

Route Army	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
1st	Kweichow (It is believed that this Route Army was a temporary grouping). Hq. of 1st Route Army at Nanchang, Aug. 14th;	Shang-kuan Yun-hsiang
2nd	Shensi 14th Army Corps 15th Army Corps Wei Li-huang crossing river into Shensi July 16th.	Wei Li-huang (See 14th A.C.)
3rd (see 6th A.C.)	Shantung (Provincial) 20th Division 22nd Division 29th Division 74th Division 81st Division Independent Cav. Brig. Pistol Brigade 1st Artillery Regiment 2nd Artillery Regiment (This Route Army was organized to be composed of the 6th & 12th Army Corps, but this office is without information as to the exact division number of which they were composed.) In Hsuchow area on February 10th; Shen Hung-lieh probably got part of Han's troops Feb. 15th; remains of Han's troops in Tsining area under	Han Fu-ch'u (executed Jan. 1938, now commanded by Yu Hsueh-chung)

Route Army	Station before July 1, 1937, and movements since.	Commander
3rd (cont'd) Tsao Fu-lin (6th Army Corps) and Sun Tung-hsuan, February 28th.		
4th 62nd Army Corps 63rd ,, ,, 64th ,, ,, 65th ,, ,, 66th ,, ,,	Kwangtung(Provincial)	Yu Han-mou

To be organized Hankow Dec. 21st; C.O. 4th Route Army is Yeh Ting, going to Anhui, Kiangsi, in connection with 8th Route Army, Dec. 21st; 2 regiments, 4th Route Army, lower Yangtze to Hankow Feb. 3rd; Chinese 41st Army Corps of Reds crossed Yangtze, 5000 between Anking and Wuhu to Tsao Lake area in Anhui and 5000 east Nanking to north June 5th; new Red 4th Army Corps south of Nanking, May 30th; 4th Route Army active Hopei area July 12th;

4th (New) (Reds)
In Shanghai-Nanking area July 12th; in Hofei area July 12th;

5th 7th Army Corps 48th ,, ,,	Kwangsi (Provincial) In December 17 Kwangsi regiments passed thru Hankow to North	Li Tsung-jen Pengpu Dec. 19; Ping-Han Dec. 31; in general command Taierchwang Apr. 8; at Lowang (east of Kaifeng) May 30th.

Li Tsung-jen states he escaped Hsuchow with all troops. Crossed Tsinpu to west and joined other Chinese troops southeast of Yungcheng May 23rd. At Liuan on May 26th; in command east sector Hankow defense line, HQ at Huangchuan, June 13th.

6th 20th Army Corps 21st ,, ,, 23rd ,, ,, 24th ,, ,, 41st ,, ,, 44th ,, ,, 45th ,, ,, 47th ,, ,,	Szechwan(Provincial)	Liu Hsiang (now dead). Now commanded by Teng Hsi-hou.

Route Army	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander

6th (cont'd)

Seven Szechwan divisions in Tungliu-Tatung area, in Anhwei south of Yangtze, July 16th; "no good" Szechwan troops about 50,000 in Tungliu-Tatung area where no action July 17th; 5 divs. of 6th Route Army under Liu Chien-hsu in Chekiang;

8th (old) — Kansu — Chao Kuan-tao

(This Route Army has been dissolved since the outbreak of the present hostilities.)

8th (new) or 18th Army Group — Shansi — Chu Teh

50,000 Reds in Shansi after fall of Taiyuan Nov. 7th; Hq. of 8th Route Army at Yenan, Shensi, June 25th;

115th Division (new) -- in area north of Chengtai and east of Tungpu, less one brigade which was south of Fenchow after fall of Hsinkow and Taiyuan, Nov. 3rd and 7th; plan to move this division across the Ping-Han into Hopei cancelled by Japanese attack; the brigade of this division south of Fenchow en route to Wutai clashed with Japanese 104th Division en route from Fenchow west to Lishih to Yellow River; this brigade withdrew to east behind Chinese regular and provincial troops. *Lin Piao has half of this div. in S.W. Shansi; Hsu Hai-tung has other half in S.E. Shansi Aug. 19*

120th Division (new) --in area north of Taiyuan and west of Tungpu Railroad after capture of Hsinkow Nov. 3rd and Taiyuan November 7th; in south Shansi March 2nd; *Ho Lung ½ in N.W. Shansi and ½ between Kalgan and Tatung Aug. 19;*

129th Division (new) -- in area south of the Chengtai Railroad and east of the Tungpu line, after capture of Hsinkow Nov. 3rd and Taiyuan Nov. 7th; *Liu Pai-chien One brigade Shansi-Hopei border South of Cheng-Tai RR. and West of Ping-Han RR, one brig. under Hsu Shang-chien based at Nankung, Hopei, with one regt. in Shangtang. Aug. 19*

8th Route Army consists of three divisions of 20,000, each with independent regiments, total 100,000 April 1st; Chu Teh has ten divisions consisting of his own 115th, 120th and 129th, also 47th Army Corps, 3rd Army Corps, and one other Army Corps, March 31st; Chu Teh has nine or ten divisions attached in addition to his own army April 1st; Shansi Provincial troops too disorganized to be used February 10th; von Falkenhausen believes Red Army good for only guerrilla, March 31st;

Chou En-lai in 8th Route Army April 1st; C.G. refers to 8th Route Army as 18th Army Group. 8th Route Army is old Shensi Army April 4th. South of Chengtai Railroad. Small groups in Wutaishan and N.W. Shansi December 19th. The exact designations of the 8th Route Army (former Reds) are not known, but it is known as noted in the foregoing that the new 115th, 120th, and 129th Divisions are a part of the 8th Route Army, the bulk of which was reported on January 11th to be in the Pingting-Liaohsien area of southeast Shansi. Two regiments of infantry and one regiment of cavalry were reported on January 11th to be in the Wutaishan area of Shansi, total 8,000 losses since November 1st fully replaced. One division of this army south of Yoyu, Shansi.*

10th — Yunnan (Provincial) — Lung Yun

3rd Ind. Brig.
5th ,, ,,
7th ,, ,,
9th ,, ,,

Reports indicate either that the brigades comprising this route army have been expanded to divisions, or that these brigades have been combined to form divisions, since the outbreak of the present hostilities.

Four divisions from Yunnan (to H ankow) December 19th. Three Yunnan divisions were reported on January 11th to be east of Nanchang, Kiangsi; two Yunnan divisions to be in Hunan on the same date. At the outbreak of hostilities the only regular Yunnanese troops were in the 10th Route Army, Lung Yun commanding, comprised of the 3rd, 5th, 7th, and 9th Independent Brigades. Yunnan troops equipment and discipline good. Highly praised in Changsha Jan. 11th. (See note on 1st, 2nd, and 3rd newly formed Yunnan divisions, page 49.)

11th — Anhwei — Liu Mao-en
15th Army Corps

Since the outbreak of hostilities this old Route Army has been incorporated in the 2nd Route Army, see above. So called 11th Route Army at present is same as 11th Army Corps or 15th Army Corps, and consists of 64th and 65th Divisions April 16th.

15th — Ninghsia-Kansu — Ma Hung-kwei
35th Division
1st Mixed Brigade

* - Attached to 8th Route Army are 17th and 44th Army Corps. These attachments are temporary. At one time 14th Army Corps and 3rd Army Corps were attached. Wei Li-huang and Chu Teh work well together. In Wutaishan now all chih tui ( ) and partisans, about 80,000. Three groups of chih tui as follows:

1st Chih Tui ....into Chahar and Jehol;

2nd Chih Tui ....north of Peking, thru east Hopei towards Shanhaikwan;

3rd Chih Tui ...from Central Hopei to Tientsin area.

Chih tui are organized in regiments of 1,000 each, uniformed and armed. Total about 100,000. 8th Route Army now has 60,000 to 70,000 and controls 200,000 to 250,000 partisans, Aug. 19th.

Route Army	Station before July 1, 1937 & Movements since	Commander
15th (cont'd) 2nd Mixed Brigade 3rd ,, ,, 1st Cavalry Brigade 2nd ,, ,,		
16th 10th Army Corps 36th ,, ,,	Szechwan	Hsu Yuan-chuan
Szechwan troops out of control west of Wuhu Dec. 28th. Hsu Yuan-chuan in Kushih-Yinshang area on Honan-Anhwei border July 21st;		
17th 38th Army Corps 17th Division 177th ,, 1st Ind. Brig. (has become Reserve Div.) 2nd ,, ,, 3rd ,, ,,	Shensi	Sun Wei-ju
20th 75th Division 76th Division (Newly trained Kiangsi divisions rated very poor July 17th.)	Kiangsi	Chang Fang
25th 32nd Division 33rd Division 5th Ind. Brig.	Anhwei	Liang Kuan-ying
26th(same as 42nd A.C.) 27th Div.)..30th A.C. at Paotingfu Aug. 1937. 31st Div.) 30th ,,	Hopei-Honan	Sun Lien-chung
At Niangtzekuan; Sun Lien-chung behind Shang Chen in Chengchow area Feb. 10th; on Ping-Han R.R. at Sinyang Feb. 15th; 27th and 31st Divs. in Loyang, southern Honan, March 20th ; one division at Taierchwang April 8th; left Hsuchow area to S.W. and on Pohsien-Kuoyang-Lowang (east of Kaifeng) line May 29th; Sun Lien-chung with three divs. in Heyungcheng area May 28th; at Sinyang June 22nd; 42nd A.C. (30th, 31st, and 139 ? Divs.) under Sun Lien-chung to Sinyang June 29th; shifted probably to north bank Yangtze July 10th; in Nanchang area July 14th;		

Route Army	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
27th	Shensi	Feng Chin-tsai
7th Army Corps	27th Route Army of 3 division and one I. B. from Shensi Aug. 17	
42nd Division		
169th Division		
North Route Army	Shansi, (rept'd Aug.7)	Fu Tso-yi (see 35th Army Corps)
35th Army Corps		
6th Cav. Army Corps, near Paoteh		
Two Inf. and two cav. Chün under Yang Ai-yaan (special 21st A.C.)		

4. Army Corps:

The following is a list of the Army Corps of the Chinese Army as they are known to this office. Due to the reorganization of the Szechwan-Sikong troops in May and June of 1937, and expansion and reorganization throughout the Chinese Army since the outbreak of the present Sino-Japanese hostilities, it should be understood that the following list cannot be accepted as absolutely accurate.

Note: Class A Divs have 3 brigades of 3 regiments each
Class B ,, ,, 2 ,, ,, 3 ,, ,,
Class C ,, ,, 2 ,, ,, 2 ,, ,,

Each regiment has three battalions of one machine gun company and three rifle companies. In each section, one light machine gun. Shortage of supplies makes this impossible now. July 1937 30 divisions had finished reorganization. No organic artillery with divisions (Jan. 15th). *

A Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
1st	Kiangsu	Hu Tsung-nan
1st Army Corps of 1st, 58th and 78th Divs. west of Sian, March 1938; 1st Army Corps of 1st and 78th Divs. east of Chengchow June 13th; in Sinyang area June 27th; Hu Tsung-nan and 1st A.C. order to S. shansi, Aug. 16		Li Tieh-chun
1st Division, in Chengchow Jan. 26th; reported as arriving at Shanghai on Aug. 21st and sharing the main effort with the 2nd and 98th Divs.; in Paoshan Road area on Aug. 22nd; bore brunt of fighting in Yangtzepoo sector on Aug. 24th; part of this division was between the North Station and Liuho on Sept. 17th; near Nanchang on Jan. 11th; at Kaifeng on Feb. 1st; south Shantung March 31st; at Loyang July 16th;		
78th Division	Hsuchow, Kiangsu	Ting Teh-lung
Near Paoshan, Aug. 22nd; on the Shanghai front on Aug. 1st; in the Shanghai area from Sept. 24th to Nov. 3rd; in Hankow on Jan. 14th; reported on Tsimpu (?) on Jan. 26th; at Kaifeng on Feb. 1st; 53rd or 58th, 78th, and 191st Divs. in Shensi-Kansu area April 16th; at Sian April 16th; in counterattack on		

* - Following is organization of fifty new divisions and reorganized divisions. Two infantry brigades of two regiments each. Each regiment has three battalions, each battalion three companies, each company two heavy and nine light machine guns. One battalion seventy-five millimeter Bofors mountain guns, one battalion thirty-seven millimeter infantry guns for anti-tank and close defense. One cavalry regiment of three squadrons of three troops, one engineer regiment armed with rifles, and medical, supply, communication units. Old seventy-seven Krupp or newer seventy-five millimeter field guns often substituted for Bofor mountain guns. Total strength: ten thousand. Aug. 18th.

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
1st (cont'd)		
78th Div. (cont'd)		
	Lanfeng area May 30th; at Loyang July 16th;	
191st Div. See Page 61.		
58th Div., transferred from 74th Army Corps and to 72nd Army Corps.		
1st (Temporary) (New 1st A.C.)	Kansu	Teng Pao-shan
165th Div.	Minhsien	Lu Ta-chang
10th Ind. Brig.	Kansu	Li Kuei-chin (Shih Shou-yin)
11th Ind. Brig.	Kansu	Liu Pao-tung (Wang Yao-wu)
10th and 11th Brigades plus new regiments in Kansu and Shensi April 16th; New 1st Army in North Shensi in March;		
1st (Cavalry)	Shensi	Ho Chu-kuo
3rd Cav. Div.	One of Cav. Armies (of New 21st A.C.) is 2nd Cav. Army.	
6th ,, ,,	of two division under Ho Chu-kou (Ho Chu-kuo) Aug. 16. He and Fu Tso-yi permit looting.	
1st Cav. Army of two Cav. divs. and one I. B. under Tsao Chun-shou Aug. 17;		
2nd	Kiangsu	Li Yen-nien
In center of line east of Taierchwang, May 8th; part of Wuhan Defense Garrison July 8th; 2nd Army Corps of 3rd and 9th Divisions on Railroad in Hankow area July 19th;		
3rd Div. (one of Chiang Kai-shek's modern divs.)	Yenping, Fukien	Li Yu-tang
Reported at Shanghai on August 31st; east of Sian in March 1938; in south Shantung March 31st.		
9th Div.	Hunan	Li Yen-nien
In Shanghai-Soochow area from October 24th to November 3rd; in Taierchwang area May 6th; Linchow end of May; on Ping-Han June		

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
2nd (cont'd)		
9th Div. (cont'd)		
3rd; part observed in Hankow May 24th; on Ping- Han from Hankow to north of Hsiaokan July 1st;		
2nd(Temporary)	Chinghai	Ma Pu-fang
100th Div.	Chinghai-Kansu	Ma Pu-fang
At Hsuchow in May (Oriental Affairs) ;		
5th Cav. Div.		
3rd	Honan	Tseng Wan-chung
At Niangtzekwan Oct. 27th; in Fenchow, Shansi, area Nov. 7th; in Shansi March 2nd & 6th; to cross river into Shansi west of Loyang April 16th; 3rd Army and a Szechwan division both under Chu Teh in Yunnan July 13th; part of Wei Li-huang's Shansi Command Aug. 17 (probably Yenan)		
7th Div.		Tseng Wan-chung
At Chengchow on July 12th; south of the Lunghai Railway on August 19th; on the Ping-Han Railroad on August 25th; at Chengting on Oct. 9th; heavily reduced at Paoting on Oct. 19th; on Chengtai R.R. on Nov. 7th; two regiments of this division were reported on the Tsinpu R.R. in Dec. (?); reported in south Shansi on March 2nd; at Wuwangtu in S.W. Shansi on Yellow River Aug. 9th;		
12th Div.	North Kansu	Tang Huai-yuan
On Ping-Han R.R. from July 25th to Oct. 30th; reported on Chengtai R.R. on Nov. 7th; in south Shansi on March 2nd and 6th; Kaifeng to Lanfeng June 7th; S.E. of Wensi, S.W. Shansi, Aug. 3rd;		
4th	Kweichow	Wu Chi-wei
To Wuhu Feb. 3rd; 2 regiments from 4th Army and 4 regiments unidentified from Kweichow to Ping-Han R.R. Feb. 3rd; through Wuchang probably to Kiuchiang July 21st; west of Tehan July 24th; routed west of Lushan Mts. in Kiuchiang area July 27th; 4th A.C. under under Huang Wei in Nanchang Lohua area Aug. 21;		

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
4th (cont'd)		
46th Division	North Kiangsi	Liu Tsu-hsia*

Pootung to Lotien on Oct. 6th; Shanghai front on Aug. 27th; on Ping-Han moving toward Chengchow May 17th; in counter-attack Lanfeng May 30th; at Loyang July 2nd;

* - Kwei Yung-ching, 46th Div. (& 27th A.C.) dismissed for Lowang defeat June 13th.

90th Division	Kweiyang	Ou-yang Chen

On Shanghai front from Sept. 27th to Nov. 3rd; fought at Lotien on Sept. 30th;

New 4th(Red) (called "4th Route Army" July 24)

South of Nanking May 30th; crossed Yangtze, 5,000 between Anking and Wuhu to Tsao Lake area, Anhwei and 5,000 east Nanking to north June 5th; "New 4th Army" organized by Chinese Communists Consist of four Corps, 1st in Chekiang 2nd in Kiangsi and Fukien 3rd in Kwangtung, 4th in Huaan, Hupeh and Anhwei, Aug. 11

Yeh Ting
Hsiang Ying (Deputy)
Wang Chu (Pol. Adviser)

5th	Shensi	Yueh Sen
23rd Division	Wainan, Shensi	Li Pi-fan (committed suicide when 23d Div. defeated at Hotseh, Shantung, May 18th. Li Yun lung succeeded him as C.G. of 9th A.C. (?) when Li Pi-fan was killed in Shantung in the latter part of May.)

In Techow from Aug. 19th to about Oct. 1st; in Lunghai R.R. area on Oct. 13th; in Kweiteh on Feb. 14th; reported at Tsowhsien on Feb. 28th; reported in southwest Shansi on March 6th; south of Tsaochow, Shantung, May 18th. (The report of the 23rd Div. being in S.W. Shansi is probably confused with a Temporary 23rd Div. of which this office has no other records than that it is in existence.) In Hukow-Pengtseh area July 16th;

43rd Division	Chekiang	Chou Hsiang-chu

Shanghai-Soochow area Sept. to Nov. 3rd;

6th(see 3rd R.A.)	Shantung	Tsao Fu-lin

(Formerly a temporary grouping of certain 3rd R.A. divisions whose numerals are unknown to this office. This is now a permanent grouping.)

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
6th(cont'd)		
29th Division 74th Division	changed to 55th Army Corps ; 74th Div. probably to 12th Army Corps, July 27th;	
7th	Kwangsi	Liao Lei
	Near Hofei Feb. 23rd; of 7th and 48th Armies, five divisions went to Shanghai and two to Lunghai when Shanghai was live sector (reported Feb. 23rd); one regiment 7th Army from Hunan to Hankow Feb. 3rd.	
171st Division	Linchow, Kwangsi	Yang Chun-chang
	On south Tsinpu R.R.on Oct. 6th; on Shanghai front from Oct. 24th to Nov. 3rd;	
172nd Division	Nanning, Kwangsi	Cheng Shu-fan
	In south T sinpu R.R. area on Oct. 6th; on Hwai River, Anhwei, on Feb. 15th; near Hofei Anhwei, on Feb. 23rd;	
173rd Division	Kweilin, Kwangsi	Ho Wei-chen
	Reported as moving into Pootung, Sept. 15th; according to Ku Chu-tung's Hqrs., not in Pootung on Sept. 28th; reported on the Shanghai front in Oct.; reported in the south Tsinpu RR. area on Oct. 6th; on Hwai River on Feb. 15th; near Hofei, Feb. 23rd; in Anhwei, April 29th;	
Note: The 171st, 172nd, and 173rd Divisions are also reported belonging to the 21st Group Army. See Page 2.		
8th		
	8th Army Corps of 40th and 140th Divisions at Sian March 1938; ran to Kihsien June 7th; in Kiukiang July 24th;	
140th Division	Kweichow	Wang Wen-yen Shen Chiu-cheng
	(Transferred from 25th A.C.) Reported near Chengchow on Feb. 15th; near Tungkuan, southeast Shensi, on March 6th; at Taierchwang May 5th;	

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
8th (cont'd)		
40th Division	Hankow, Hupeh	Liu Pei-hsu
	Probably in Shanghai on Sept. 9th; in Anhwei April 29th; west of Hofei May 30th; at Chucheng near Kiukiang Aug. 7th; in Tehan and to east Aug. 14th;	
102nd Division	Honan	Po Hui-chang
	(Transferred to 82d A.C.) On Shanghai front from Oct. 5th to Nov. 3rd; part observed in Hankow May 24th; in Hankow July 24th;	
9th	Kweichow (in Shansi Aug.7)	(Hao Meng-ling) Kuo Chi-chao
84th Division	Sinteh, Shensi	Kao Kwei-tze
	At Shihching, Chahar, on Aug. 8th; north of Chanping on Aug. 12th; in Tatung-Kalgan area on Aug. 16th; part of 84th east of 89th at Nankow; on Ping-Han RR on Oct. 2nd; part of this division was at Taiyuan on November 7th; at Loyang, Honan, March 20th; from Shansi to Honan-Anhwei border June 3rd;	
54th Division	Tsungyi, Kweichow	Liu Chia-chi*
	At Kweichow on Aug. 27th; at Taiyuan on Oct. 15th; at HsinHo on Oct. 10th; at Hankow on Dec. 22nd; at Hsinkou, Shansi, Nov. 3rd; near Pengtseh July 1st;	
	* - The Division commander was reported by Japanese to have been killed at Hsinkow in North Shansi in October.	
10th	Szechwan	Hsu Yuan-chuan
41st Division	Wanhsien, Szechwan	Hsu Yuan-chuan
	Reported on the Ping-Han RR; in Anhwei April 29th; west of Hofei, May 30th; in Taihu-Tsienshan area July 2nd; troops of 41st Div. in Changsha area July 16th; part at Wuhu, May 14th; at Tsinhsien Aug. 14th;	
48th Division	Hupeh	Hsu Chi-wu
	At Changhsin from Oct. 24th to Nov. 3rd; in Nanking after Nov. 3rd; near Wuhu in Dec.; at Hankow on Dec. 22nd; in Anhwei April 29th; west of Hofei May 30th; at Chengyangkuan, Anhwei, June 10th; in Taihu-Tsienshan area July 2nd;	

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
11th (same as new 11th R. A. or 15th A.C.)	Anhwei	Liu Mao-en
64th Div.	Anking, Anhwei	Wu Ting-lin
	At Hsinkow on Oct. 10th; offered strong resistance at Hsinkow on Oct. 30th; in southwest Shansi on March 6th; near Yuanchü, Shansi, July 20th;	
65th Div.	Tungcheng, Anhwei	Liu Mao-en
	South of the Lunghai R.R. on August 19th; at Hsinkow on Oct. 10th; offered strong resistance at Hsinkow on Oct. 30th; in southwest Shansi on March 6th;	
12th	Shantung	Sun Tung-hsuan (former crook at Taierchwang Apr. 8th)
	Formerly a temporary grouping of certain 3rd Route Army divisions. Now a permanent grouping; 12th A. C.(20th, 81st and probably 74th Divisions) from Shantung to Yangsin, east Hupeh July 27th;	
20th Division	Yenchow, Shantung	Sun Tung-hsuan
	East of Tsinpu R.R. in Shantung on Aug. 19th; reported moving north of Yellow River on Oct. 2nd; at Sinchwang on Oct. 12th; along the Yellow River on Oct. 28th; part of this division was still north of the Yellow River on Nov. 8th; entire Div. on south bank of Yellow River by Dec. 20th; this is the best of the 3rd Route Army's five divisions; retreated to southwest of Tsining on Jan. 11th; in Tsining area on Feb. 28th; moving south from north side of Yellow River May 18th; near Tsinan May 5th; attacking Puyang, south Hopei, May 30th, moving s.w. Ping-Han June 10th; at Tsaohsien, Shantung, July 2nd;	
81st Division	Tsinan, Shantung	Chan Shu-tang
	Reported moving east from Tsinan on August 19th; north of the Kiao-Tsi R.R. on Sept. 10th; to the front south of Potouchen on Sept. 29th; fought well with heavy losses around Techow on Oct. 1st-2nd; on Oct. 4th withdrawn from the front to drive mutinous 49th Army troops into southern Hopei; at	

Army Corps	Station before July 1,	Commander
12th(cont'd)		

Sinchwang on Oct. 12th; at Kaotang on Oct. 19th; in Chowtsun area on Oct. 28th; near Tsining, Nov. 4th; to Lokow and north of the Yellow River on Nov. 13th; retreated to the southwest of Tsining on Jan. 11th; in Lincheng Jan. 18th; reported in Kweiteh-Tangshan area on Feb. 1st; south of Tsining on Feb. 28th; moving south from north side of Yellow River May 18th; near Tsinan May 5th; attacking Puyang in southern Hopei May 30th; at Tsaohsien, Shantung, July 2nd;

74th Division (?)

Reported July 27th;

13th (abolished May 14th. See 85th A.C.)	Suiyuan	T'ang En-po (40 years old, rated high as Cmdr. see 20th Army Group p.2)

4th and 89th after fight at Nankow moved down through Shansi and out again on Ping-Han line at Chang River north of Anyang. At Shunte Sept. 22nd; at Anyang joined Kuan and 52nd A.C. where Japanese attacked astride and west of Ping-Han R.R.; held there until relieved by Shang Chen's 32nd Army, thence to southern Honan on Ping-Han R.R. and to Tsaochuang at end of March.

Tang En-po in command of 20th Army Group May 14th and 13th Army Corps abolished as such May 14th. General T'ang's 4th, 89th at Honan Feb. 15th; 14th Brig. at Lanfeng, Honan, Feb. 15th; Tang's 13th Army in reserve north of Hwai River Feb. 23rd; east of Tsaochuang March 24th; at Taierchwang April 8th; attacked at Fushanko April 14th; to Peihsien April 20-May 7th; Tang's 13th Army Corps (4th, 15th ?, 24th ? and 89th Divisions) in Hsuchang region on Ping-Han June 29th; en route Nanchang area July 10th; in Nanchang area July 14th;

4th Div.	Suiyuan	Wang Wan-lin

(A good division). In Kalgan area and Nankow fight from Aug. 20th; heavily reduced at Paotou on Oct. 18th; later in Shansi; south of Chengchow on Feb. 10th; at Sinyang (Hsin-yang), Honan, on Feb. 15th; reported in reserve north of the Hwai River on Feb. 23rd; Pihsien area May 5th; left center line east of Taierchwang May 8th; went s.w. and not to Shantung June 7th;

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
89th Div.	Taolin, Suiyuan	Wang Chung-lien

(A good division. This division bore the brunt of the fighting at Nankow in Aug. 1937, and withdrew through Kalgan; on Pinghan R.R. on Oct. 4th; the division attacked Huan Ho on Oct.31st and was forced to retire on Nov. 3rd; south of Chengchow on Feb. 10th; at Sinyang (Hsinyang), Honan, on Feb. 15th; in reserve north of the Hwai River on Feb. 23rd; in south Shantung March 31st; Pihsien area May 5th; east of Taierchwang May 8th; to rear for refill May 14th; in Hsuchang, Honan, June 7th; in Sinyang area July 1st;

7th Cav. Div.

21st Div.

(Part of 13th Army Corps at Kalgan transferred to 71st Army Corps then to 14th Army Corps.)

14th(in 2nd R.A.)	Shensi-Honan	Wei Li-huang,* (See 2d War Zone, p.1)

In Hsinkow Nov. 3rd; astride motor road from Fenchow, Shansi, to south Nov. 7th; in Shansi March 2nd and 6th; retired to south bank Yellow River east of Tungkuan when ordered back into Shansi by Chiang Kai-shek March 15th; south of Pingyao April 1st. Wei Li-huang commands 70,000 Central Government troops in Shansi and is preparing to move across the Ping-Han against the Tsinpu April 16th; Kaifeng sector June 3rd; 14th Army Corps of 21st, 83rd & 85th Divisions under Wei Li-huang to Shansi front June 29th; in Shansi Aug. 7th; *14th A.C. consists of 10th and 85th Divs. Aug. 17;*

* - Wei Li-huang, with 10th & 83rd Divisions west of Mentoukou on Aug. 20th to assist Tang En-po at Nankow, blocked by troops of bandit chief Liu Kuei-tang, failed to make junction and then to Hsinkow, Shansi, Oct. 9th to Nov. 3rd when rear threatened due to Niangtzekuan fiasco.

10th Division.	Shansi	Li Mo-an

(Not listed in 14th Army Corps June 3rd). Reported at Paoting on July 19th; at Paoting on Aug. 20th; at Chengting on Oct. 9th; at Hsinho, Hopei, on 30th; reported in Shansi on Feb. 10th and 28th, and on March 6th; *at Wuling Pass S. Shansi Aug. 8*

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
83rd Div.	Shensi	Liu Kan

North of Paoting on Aug. 20th; at Chengting on Oct. 9th; at Hsinho, Hopei, on Oct. 10th; Taiyuan, Oct. 15th; at Hsinkow, Shansi, on Oct. 30th; in Shansi on Feb. 10th; in south Shansi on March 2nd and March 6th; south of Linfen, Shansi, accused by Japanese of using gas shells July 2nd; at Yuanchu, Shansi, July 10th;

21st Div. (to 92nd Army Corps, Aug. 7th)

Transferred from 71st Army Corps June 3rd;

85th Div.

See Page 57.

95th Div. (to 92nd Army Corps) — Lo Chi

Defended Kwoyang May 30; transferred from 46th Army Corps June 3rd; moving north from Changsha July 16th; south of Wuchang July 24th;

15th	Anhwei	Liu Mao-en

(In 2nd Route Army, same as 11th Army Corps, page 13). At Hsinkow, Shansi, Nov. 3rd; Fenchow area, Shansi, Nov. 7th; at Niangtzekuan in Shansi March 6th;

64th Division.

See page 13 .

65th Division.

See page 13

16th	Shensi, Szechwan	Li Yun-heng
53rd Div.	Szechwan	Li Pao-ping

Shanghai front from Oct. 24th to Nov. 3rd; to Anking, Anhwei, in Dec.; three regts. reported sent to Tsinpu R.R. front in Dec.; at Chengyangkuan, Anhwei, opposing Jap. 102nd Div. June 10th; in Matang area July 2nd; astride Yangtze, Matang area, July 8th;

ARMY CORPS	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
17th	Honan	Hsing Chen-nan (Liu Chih)

In Hsinkow Nov. 3rd; in Fenchow, Shansi, area Nov. 7th;

2nd Division	Kiangsu	Cheng Tung-kuo

(A good div. See 52nd Army Corps). Arrived Shanghai on Aug. 21st; sent into Kiangwan-Yangtzepoo fighting to relieve the exhausted 88th Div.; in Siangquin Road area of international Settlement on Aug. 22nd; in Shanghai-Woosung sector on Sept. 2nd; part of this div. reported on Shanghai-Liuho line on Sept. 17th; according to Ku Chu-t'ung's Hq. this div. was not on Shanghai-Liuho front on Sept. 26th; end of October Paoting; reported north of Shih-chichwang Aug. 16th; reported on Pinghan R.R. on Oct. 4th. (This div. may have been transferred in two increments - one prior to Aug. 16th and one after that date.) At Hsinho in Oct.; reported at Hsuchang, Honan, on Feb. 15th; reported in southwest Shansi on March 6th (there is also a 2nd (New) Div. of Shansi troops in the 21st Army, See page 19).(Reports of the 2nd Div. in Shansi may refer to this new div.); south Shantung March 31st; east of Taierchwang May 14th;

	Hunan	Huo Kwei-chang
18th	Kwangtung	Li Shu-sen
11th Div.	Hunan-Kwangtung	Mo Yu-shih

In Pootung on Sept. 2nd; on Shanghai-Liuho front on Sept. 17th; in Soochow area on Sept. 26th; in Shanghai front from Sept. 15th to Nov. 3rd; thru Wuchang to Kiukiang area July 2nd; at Liussuchiao on south bank Yangtze midway between Pengtzeh and Hukow July 13th;

14th Division	Hunan	Kuo Kwei-chang

Reported on Pinghan R.R. on Aug. 25th; part of this division was probably in Shanghai as early as Sept. 7th; on North Station-Liuho front on Sept. 17th; in Shanghai area from Sept. 15th to Nov. 3rd; part this time at Lotien; in Hankow area May 24th;

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
19th	Suiyuan	Wang Ching-kuo

In Hsinkow Nov. 3; in Shansi March 2nd; Consists of 17th and 72nd divs. Aug. 17; 19th A.C. under Li Lian-hun at Mahuiling S. of Kiukiang? Aug. 20;

70th Division	Paotou, Suiyuan	Hsu Tze-chen

In Suiyuan on Aug. 20th;offered strong resistance at Hsinkow on Oct. 30th;

71st Division (?)

See 34th Army Corps, page 26.

72nd Division	Suiyuan	Chen Chang-chieh

Reported moving into Chahar on Aug. 21st; at Hsinkow on Oct. 10th; offered strong resistance at Hsinkow on Oct. 30th; at Yulin, Shensi, on Feb. 10th and March 2nd; southwest Shansi on March 6th;

20th	Kweichow	Yang Sen

At Anking, Anhwei, May 30th; Hsi Yen-chen, 133rd and 134th Division, dismissed for loss of Hofei June 13th; Yang Sen's reinforced army of six to eight divisions making poor defense against Japanese at Matouchen boom June 18th; 133rd and 134th divisions 15 km. southwest of Tsienshan June 21st;

133rd Division	Tsiensi, Kweichow (Szechwan-Domei)	Yang Han-yu

(Transferred from 27th Army Corps.) Reported in Kiao-Tsi R.R. area, Shantung, on Oct. 6th; later sent to southwest Shantung; in Tsienshan, Anhwei, area, June 18th; in Taihu-Tsienshan area July 2nd;

134th Division	Anhsun, Kweichow	Hsia Chung

(Transferred from 27th Army Corps.) Reported in Shantung on Oct. 6th; on Shanghai-Wusih front from Oct. 24th to Nov. 34d; two regiments of this div. were reported as being sent to the Tsinpu R.R. Front in Dec.; Taihu July 8th;

135th Division	Kweiting, Kweichow	Hsia Chung

(11th Army Group)
(Transferred to 31st Army Corps, See page 25 .)

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander

20th (cont'd)

135th Div. (cont'd)

Reported in Shantung on Oct. 6th; on Shanghai-Wusih front from Oct. 24th to Nov. 3rd; reported in the H suchow area on Feb. 14th; retiring on Taihu June 20th; Tsienshan July 8th;

21st — Szechwan — Tang Shih-tsun

Anking captured by Japanese June 14th, Szechwan troops made no defense there.

145th Div. — Kiating, Szechwan — Jao Kuo-hua

One regiment of this division was reported in Hankow in Dec.; retreated across Lake Chao, north of Anking from Wuwei June 14th; in Taihu-Tsienshan area July 2nd;

146th Div. — Suining, Szechwan — Fan Shao-tseng

Part of this div. was reported as sent to the Pinghan R.R. front in Dec.; same report Feb. 3rd; bombed while retreating across Lake Chao, north bank Yangtze opposite Anking opposing Taiwan Brigade June 12th; at Tsienshan, west of Anking, June 14th;

2nd Division (New) — Shansi — Chin Hsien-chang

Newly organized. No exact record but from the above it is probable that this division's activities have been confused with the old 2nd Division.

21st New 22nd — New 21st A.C. of North Route Army consists of 156(New) and 86 Divs. Aug. 16 (See also Ho Chu-kuo's Cav. A.C. p. 8) Two Cav. Armies of 21st A.C. in North Route Army are Ma Chan-shan's Army and 2nd Cav. army Aug. 19;

Composition unknown.
Japanese spokesman claims Suzuki motorized unit captured General Tan Tao-yuan, commanding 22nd Army Corps, and entire staff 25 miles east of Suhsien, Anhwei, May 21st;

23rd — Szechwan — Pan Wen-hua

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937, & movements since	Commander
23rd (cont'd)		
147th Division	Tzechung, Szechwan	Yang Kuo-chen
At Hankow on Jan. 12th; on north bank Yangtze opposite Anking opposing Taiwan Brigade June 12th; with Kwangsi troops at Chienshan, west of Anking, June 14th; 146th and 147th Divisions under Li Pu-hsien, June 13th;		
148th Division	Tungchwang, Szechwan	Chen Wan-jen
No record		
9th Brigade		
24th	Sikong (Hsik'ang)	Liu Wen-hui
136th Division		
Listed in 1938 China Year Book as disbanded.		
137th Division		
No record.		
138th Division	Yakiang, Sikong	Tang Ying
From Szechwan to Pengpu area in Dec.; on Tsinpu-Lunghai front on Jan. 26th;		
1st Ind. Brigade		
See 38th Army Corps, page 28 .		
25th	Kansu-Shensi	Wan Yueh-huang (yao)
From Chekiang to N. Anhwei last of May; In Teian area south of Kiukiang July 24th;		
49th Division	Szechwan	Li Chi-lan
Reported by Navy sources in Shanghai on Aug. 27th; but according to Ku Chu-tung's Hq. it was not on that front; one regiment of this division reported sent from Hankow to Ping-Han front in Dec.; near Tungkwan, northeast Shensi, on March 6th; at Hsuchow in May (Oriental Affairs); west of Chengyangkuan, Anhwei, June 9th; from Hwainan to Kiukiang area July 9th; in Hankow area July 24th;		

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937n& movements since	Commander
25th (cont'd)		
51st Division	Hupeh	Chen Yu-hsin
(74th Army Corps). Reported as arriving to strengthen the Kunshan-Soochow line on Sept. 5th; probably in the Kunshan-Taitsang area on Sept. 17th; on Shanghai front from Sept. 24th to Nov. 3rd; in Nanking in Nov.; Sian March 1938; in Nanchang area July 16th; at Tehan Aug. 7th;		
140th Division		
Transferred to 8th Army Corps, page 11.		
26th	Hupeh	Hsiao Chih-chu
At Niangtzekwan Dec. 19th; on Ping-Han, south of Chengchow, March 1938;		
32nd Division	Honan	Wang Hsiu-shen
On Tsinpu R .R. from Aug. 25th to Sept. 10th; west of Tsinpu R.R. on Sept. 21st; on Cheng-Tai R.R. on Nov. 7th; at Hankow on Dec. 15th; depleted to about 3,000 men; at Loshan, south Honan, July 1st;		
44th Division	Siangyang, Hupeh	Hsiao Tze-chow
At Hsinkow in Oct.; Shanghai-Soochow front from Oct. 24th to Nov. 3rd; at Loyang, southern Honan, March 20th; defending Wuhu May 14th; at Kiukiang July 25th;		
27th	Kiangsi	Liu Hsing
At Niangtzekwan Dec. 19th; ordered to Hsinkow to help Wei Li-huang, but too much involved at Niangtzekwan; in Anhwei April 29th; at Loyang July 2nd;		
92nd Division	Szechwan	Liang Hua-cheng
See 46th Army Corps, page 31.		
133rd Division	Tsiensi, Kweichow	Yang Han-yu
Transferred to 20th Army Corps, page 18.		
134th Division	Transferred to 20th A.C., page 18.	

Army Corps	Station before July 1,	Commander
28th	Hunan	Tao Kwang

On Hangchow front July 1st;

15th Division	Changteh, Hunan	Wang Tung-yuan

South of Lunghai R.R. on Aug. 19th; reported in Shanghai area on Sept. 11th; at Hsinkow on Oct. 10th; near Wuhu April 13th; to Kaifeng area from east Chekiang June 3rd; Susung, southwest Anhwei, July 8th; transferred to 73rd Army Corps July 10th; at Kiukiang July 25th;

16th Division	Chekiang	Chang Liang-chi Chou Fu-cheng

Part of this division was on the Shanghai-Liuho front on Sept. 17th; reported by Ku Chu-tung's Hq. as being on the Shanghai-Liuho front on Sept. 26th; went north from Hankow prior to May 12th; at Yuanchu, Shansi, July 10th (?); south of Hukow July 14th;

62nd Division	Changsha, Hunan	Tao Liu

Pootung, from Oct. 24th to Nov. 34d; passed thru Nanking to Pukow on Dec. 2nd; near Chapu April 13th; column of 62nd Div. routed at Haiyen, Chentangkiang, Chekiang, Aug. 4th;

29th	Hopei-Chahar	Sung Che-yuan

(See 1st Army Group, page 1.)
At Tangying January 26th; Sung's 29th Army, now 34th Corps, en route Hsuchow Feb. 10th; at Kweiteh Feb. 14th; Sung in command at Kweiteh Feb. 14th; Sung's Army Corps commanders are Liu Ju-ming (allegedly responsible loss of Nankow and at Tsaohsien Feb. 28th), Chang Tze-chung (59th Army Corps of 38th and 180th Divs.), Feng Chih-an, Feb. 15th, and Shih Yu-san's 69th Army Corps.

~~Li Han-fang with 29th Army Corps from Kwangtung on north bank of Yangtze in Kiukiang area July 27th~~;

37th Division	Peiping, Hopei	Feng Chih-an

(Transferred to 77th Army Corps) On Pinghan R.R. on Aug. 6th; part of this Div. was at Chinghai, Hopei, in August; at Machang on Sept. 8th; reorganized with the 29th Army in the Lunghai R.R. area; under command of Liu Ju-ming, raided towards Shunteh, Hopei, and Shihchichwang on Nov. 10th; driven east thru Taming towards Tehchow, and later back towards

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander

29th (cont'd)

37th Division (cont'd)

Taming; reported by the Japanese as part of the captured 29th Army troops in the Taming area on Dec. 16th (probably part of this div. was actually captured); reported at Tangyin on Jan. 26th; moving towards Hsuchow on Feb. 10th; Feng Chih-an and Shih Yu-san with four divisions moved north in Shanghsien area, southwest Shantung; Southwest of Hsuchow (Chaokiatsi?) May 14th;

38th Division — Tientsin — Chang Tze-chung (former mayor of Tientsin)

(See 59th Army Corps). Part of this div. at Machang and Tsangchow, Hopei, on Sept. 12th; reported as crossing Yellow River towards the south on Oct. 9th; reorganized with the 29th Army south of the Lunghai R.R.; reported as part of the raiding force under Liu Ju-ming operating towards Shunteh and Shihchiachwang on Nov. 10th; in Tangyin-Yencheng area on Jan. 15th; reported near Kinhsiang, south of Tsining, on Feb. 1st; moving towards Hsuchow on Feb. 10th; in the Kweiteh area on Feb. 23rd; to Hwai River end of Feb; new 38th moved east May 26th;

132nd Division — Peiping — Chang Ching-yu

Two regiments of this div. to Kalgan on Aug. 27th; when sent to Hokien, south Hopei, for reorganization; separated troops of this div. fought at Tacheng and at Machang on Sept. 8th; the main body of the div. approached Shihchiachwang on Nov. 10th; about 3,000 men of this div. were driven out of Kwangping on Nov. 13th; reported near Tangyin on Jan. 26th and moving towards Hsuchow on Feb. 10th. Probably in 69th Army Corps; in Huangchuan area June 28th;

143rd Division — Kalgan, Chahar — Liu Ju-ming (later CG of 68th A.C., see page 48)

(Transferred to 68th Army Corps). At Kalgan on Aug. 20th; troops and commander rated very poor; after retreat from Kalgan the Division Commander was accused of cowardice, was court-martialled, but was given a chance to redeem himself. As part of reorganized 29th Army Corps this div. under Liu Ju-ming carried out a raid towards Shunteh and Shihchiachwang, captured the railway stations

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander

29th (cont'd)

143rd Division (cont'd)

at Kuanchwang and Shunteh on Nov. 10th; the division was later reported captured by the Japanese in the Taming area on Jan. 26th; reported moving towards Hsuchow on Feb. 10th, and in Tsowhsien area on Feb. 26th; at Taierchwang north of river April 8th; at Tsaohsien May 5th-last to leave; Hsuchow to southwest; on Pohsien-Kuoyang-Lowang line May 29th; retreating from Chowkiakow, east Honan, towards Shangshui June 20th; in Taihu-Tsienshan area July 2nd; in Nanchang area July 14th;

9th Cav. Div.

In east Shantung south of railroad July 17th;

1st Cav. Brig.

13th Ind. Brig.

26th ,, ,,

3rd ,, ,, (See 38th A.C. page 28.)

39th ,, ,, Yuan Hsuan-wu

3rd Cav. Brig.

8th Cav. Brig.

unidentified
~~29~~th New

Li Han-fang with 29th A.C. from Kwangtung on north bank of Yangtze in Kiukiang area July 27th; "~~29~~th A.C." of 188th 189th Kwangtung Divs. in Kwangtsi-Huangmei area Aug. 6th; Part of 29th Group Army Aug. 19;
Not 29th A.C. but 29th Group Army (See p. 2) Aug. 19

188th Division

189th Division

30th (26th Route Army) Kiangsu Sun Lien-chung

27th, 31st, & 30th Divs. withdrawn from east of Hsuchow May 18th; from Sinyang to north bank of Yangtze July 10;

27th Division Hupeh Kao Shu-hsun
Feng An-pang

(One of Chiang Kai-shek's modern divs.)
North of Paoting on Aug. 20th; offered strong resistance on Fangshan-Liuliho line on Sept. 18th; near Paoting on Sept. 24th; on Cheng-Tai RR on Nov. 7th; south of Chengchow on Feb. 10th; to Sinyang, Honan, on Feb. 15th; Loyang, March 1938; west of Tsaochuang, Taierchwang area May 5th; resting at Tsuiping, Honan, June 3rd; in Sinyang June 27th; on south bank of Yangtze August 10th;

31st Division Hupeh Ch'ih Feng-ch'eng

N.of Paoting on Aug.20th; offered strong resistance on Fangshan-Liuliho line on Sept. 18th; on Chengtai RR on Nov.7th; one regt. of this div. to Hankow in Dec.; the div. south of Chengchow on Feb. 10th; to Sinyang, Honan, on Feb. 15th; Loyang March 1938; bore brunt of battle at Taierchwang April 22nd; west of Tsaochwang, Taierchwang area, May 5th; in Sinyang June 27th; N.Kiangsu(?) Aug.9th;

Army Corps	Station before July 1,	Commander
31st	Kwangsi	Li Ping-hsien (Kwangsi C. of S.)

At Hwai River near Pengpu Feb. 18th; in line near Hofei Feb. 23rd; was organized in Oct. and went to Shantung then; in North Anhwei April 29th; (this Army Corps formed since the outbreak of the present hostilities).

131st Div. Chachwa, Szechwan Chen Li

Reported in Tsowhsien-Lincheng area on Feb. 18th and 23rd; in Taihu-Tsienshan area July 2nd;

135th Div.

(Transferred from 20th Army Corps, See page 18.)

32nd Honan Shang Chen

(See 20th Army Group, page 1.) Shang Chen blamed for loss of Changteh (Anyang) on Ping-Han R.R. fall of 1937. In Chengchow area Jan. 15th; in Chengchow Feb. 10th; Kaifeng March 1938; at Lanfeng to counteract possible thrust from Fengkiu May 5th; at Kaifeng or Lanfeng May 11th; Shang Chen with 141st and 142nd Divisions engaged with Japanese 14th Divisions at Tsaochow May 14th; in Loshan on way to Changsha June 28th; over 2/3 this Army Corp lost in action, reported July 1st; Shagg Chen received no replacements and is ordered to move from Changsha to Tungsiang in one week July 27th; 141st and 142nd Divs.to Tunghsiang Aug. 5th;

139th Division Hantan, Hopei Huang Kuang-hua

Between Pinghan R.R. and Tsinpu R.R. on Aug. 23rd; at Yunghsing and Kuan on Sept. 21st; pushed back to Yuanshih on Oct. 12th; in Chengchow on Jan.15th; in Kaifeng on Feb. 1st; reported in Chengchow-Kaifeng area on Feb. 10th; at Hsuchow May 5th; south of Pihsien May 14th; in Changsha July 16th; to Tsinsien area Aug. 10th; south of Nanchang Aug. 14th; North of Tungsiang Aug. 21;

141st Division Honan SungKen-tang

North of Machang on Aug. 20th; between Pinghan R.R. and Tsinpu R.R. on August 23rd; at Yunghsing and Kuan on Sept. 21st; pushed back at Yuanshih on Oct. 12th; in Chengchow on Jan. 15th; at Kaifeng area on Feb. 10th; 2 regiments from Kweichow to Pinghan or Tsinpu Feb. 3rd; moving toward Hsuchow May 17th; at Kaocheng May 26th; between Chengchow and river May 25th; in unsuccessful attempt to recapture Kaifeng June 8th; in Changsha July 16th; from Tsinhsien to Tungsiang Aug. 14th;

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander

32nd (cont'd)

142nd Division — Shihchiachwang, Hopei — Lu Chi

North of Machang on Aug. 20th; between Pinghan R.R. and Tsinpu R.R. on Aug. 23rd; at Yunghsing and Kuan on Sept. 21st; pushed back at Yuanshih on Oct. 12th; in Chengchow on Jan. 15th; at Kaifeng on Feb. 1st; in Chengchow-Kaifeng area on Feb. 10th; in Kaocheng area May 25th; in unsuccessful attempt to recapture Kaifeng June 8th; on way to Changsha area July 16th; at Lohua north of Nanchang Aug. 14th;

4th Cav. Division

2 Independent cavalry regiments

33rd — Shansi — (Sun Chu) Ni Mo-an

In Shansi March 2nd; in Shansi Aug. 7th;

66th Division — Pingyao, Shansi — Yang Hsiao-ou

Offered strong resistance at Hsinkow on Oct. 30th; in Shansi on March 2nd; at Liyang, 40 km. west of Lake Tai early in June (?); at Kashing July 31st;

69th Division — Fenchow, Shansi — Yang Chen-yuan

Offered strong resistance at Hsinkow on Oct. 30th; in south Shansi on March 2nd;

34th — Shansi — Yang Hsiao-ou

In Shansi March 2nd.

71st Division — Suiyuan — Ko Tsung-chun

Offered strong resistance at Hsinkow on Oct. 30th; in south Shansi on March 2nd;

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
35th	Suiyuan	Fu Tso-yi was in command at Taiyuan prior to Dec. 15th; going to Yulin Shensi, Feb. 10th; in N.W. Shansi April 1, in N.W. Shansi & S. Suiyuan July 13th; Fu Tso-yi with hq. at Pienkuan, Shansi commands all troops in field of specially organized North Route Army Aug. 7th;
	At Kalgan Aug. 1937; in Hsinkow Nov. 3rd; Fu Tso-yi's 35th Army (1 Inf. & 1 Cav. Div.) astride Tung-Pu R.R. in Shansi Nov. 7th; 35th A.C. of 73d and 101st Divs.& New 6th I.B. in N.W . Shansi Aug. 7th;	
	72nd Division	
	(To 19th Army Corps, page 18.)	
	73rd Division	
	See page 56 .	
	7th Independent Brigade	
	New 6th " " Brigade"	
	1st Cavalry " "	
	(To 29th Army Corps, page 24).	
	101st Division from 61st A.C., see p.39;	
36th	Szechwan	Chou Yun-yuan
5th Div.	Chengtu, Szechwan	Hsieh Pu-fu
	Reported in "Oriental Affairs" as being at Shanghai in Oct. ; fled into Shensi from Shansi Aug. 13th; 36th A.C. *Consisting of 2 divs. and 1 mixed brig. at Chungking. one div. moving down river Aug. 17;*	
37th	Kansu	Mao Ping-wen
24th Division	Shensi	Chen Ssu
	On Pingsui R.R. on Aug. 25th; in Sian area April 16th;	
8th Division	Shensi	Tao Shih-yao (Chih-yai)
	Reported at Shanghai from Oct. 5th to Nov. 3rd; reported as part of the 14th Army Corps in Shansi on Oct. 15th; on Pinghan June 3rd; at Hsuchow in May (Oriental Affairs); at Mach'eng June 28th;	

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
38th	Shensi	Sun Wei-ju

Tungkwan-Sian area March 20th; 38th Army Corps of 17th and 177th Divs. in Sian March 1938-April 16th; 38th Army Corps consists of 17th and 177th Divisions July 27th;

17th Division	Sanyuan, Shensi	Sun Wei-ju (Chang Shou-shan)

South of Lunghai R.R. on Aug.17th; reported by Japanese as being near Paoting on Sept. 24th; on Chengtai R.R. on Nov. 7th; at Yuanchu Shansi July 6th; north of Pinglu in S.W. Shansi Aug. 11;

177th Division	Tsinyang, Shensi	Li Hsing-chung

Reported in Nanziang, west of Shanghai, in Sept. and Oct.; west of Wensi, Shansi, Aug. 4th; in S.W. Shansi Aug. 11th;

1st Ind. Brigade	Shensi Province	(to 24th A.C.,p.20)	Ping Ching-tze
2nd ,, ,,	* ,, ,,		Chow Yuan-chien
3rd ,, ,,	,, ,,	(to 29th A.C.,p.24)	Fu Tsun-huai

* - Probably transferred elsewhere July 27th;

39th	Chekiang	Liu Ho-ting

Chinese 39th Army held positions near west bank of Weishan Lake during Japanese withdrawal by boat from Taierchwang area on night of May 15, 17th and 18th; 39th Army Corps of three divs. including the 185th garrisoning Wuhan July 2nd;

56th Division	Kahing, Chekiang	Liu Shang-chih

South of Pootung on Aug. 22nd; Shanghai front from Sept. 24th to Nov. 3rd; between Chengchow and Kaifeng May 30th; south from Chengchow to Changtsichung June 28th; moving south thru Sinyang July 1st;

185th Div.

See page 60 .

45th Ind. Brigade	Chekiang	Chang Luan-chi

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
40th	Honan	Pang Ping-hsun (also CG 39th Div.)

At Taierchwang April 8th. (Chinese troops at Hsuchow poor except Pang's Feb. 23rd.)

39th Division	Shansi	Pang Ping-hsun

At Machang, Hopei, at the end of July; bore the brunt of the entire resistance on the Tsinpu R.R. from south of Tientsin through Chinghsien to Techow, Shantung, throughout Aug. and Sept.; on Oct. 6th ordered south to the Lunghai R.R. area; at Linyi March 14th; retired on Tancheng Apr. 19th; east of Taierchwang May 8th; to rear for refill May 14th;

41st	Szechwan	Sun Chen

In Hsuchow area Feb. 14th; Taierchwang May 17th;

122nd Division	Kwanhsien, N.E. Szechwan	Wang Ming-cheng (chang)

In Shanghai area on Oct. 28th; Yunnan to Kweichow Feb. 3rd; in Hsuchow area on Feb. 10th; at Hanchuang on Hsuchow front May 5th;

123rd Division	Sinfan, Szechwan	Tseng Hsien-tung

In Shanghai area on Oct. 28th; reported in Hsuchow area on Feb. 10th;

124th Division	Shensi-Szechwan	Shui Ti-ch'ing

On Chengtai R.R. on Nov. 7th; reported in Hsuchow area on Feb. 14th; south of Hsuchow on Feb. 18th; at Hanchuang on Hsuchow front May 5th; in Sinyang area June 27th;

42nd

(See 26th Route Army.)

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
43rd	Hunan	Kuo Ju-tung
26th Division	Szechwan	Liu Yu-ching

On Shanghai front from Oct. 24th to Nov. 3rd; at Hsuchow in May (Oriental Affairs); Kiukiang July 8th;

44th	Szechwan	Wang Tsan-hsu Wang Ling-chi

Wang Ling-chi with Szechwan Army in Wuhan region July 21st; 149th and 150th Divs. in Yingshan area, Anhwei-Hupeh border, Aug. 6th; attached to 8th R.A. Aug. 17

149th Division	Szechwan	Kuo Chang-min

Part of 149th Div. from Kweichow to Anhwei Feb. 28th;

150th Division	Tzelingtsing, Szechwan	Liao Chou

No record.

9th Brigade (temporary)	Szechwan (Prov.)	P'an Tso

45th	Szechwan	Teng Hsi-hou

(See 22nd Army Group, page 1). AT Niangtzekwan; Teng with 45th Army is at Lincheng north; 124th, 125th, and 127th Divisions seen by Col. Stilwell Feb. 18th; at Tsowhsien in southern Shantung, Feb. 23rd; 7 regiments from 45th (reported 4th and 5th) Army from Szechwan to Hankow Feb. 3rd;

124th Division

(See 41st Army Corps page 29.)

125th Division	Tehyang, Szechwan	Chen Ting-shen

In Shanghai area on Oct. 28th; reported in Hsuchow area on Feb. 14th; to Tsowhsien, south Shantung, on Feb. 23rd; at Lincheng, Shantung, Feb. 18th; at Hanchwang on Hsuchow front May 5th;

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
45th (cont'd)		
126th Division	Chengtu, Szechwan	Huang Ying
	Reported in Tsowhsien-Lincheng area on Feb. 18th and 23rd; at Kiukiang July 25th;	
127th Division	Tzetung, NW Szechwan	Ma Yu-chih
	(41st Army Corps ?). In Shanghai area on Oct. 28th; reported in Tsowhsien-Lincheng area on Feb. 18th and 23rd; 1 regiment from Kweichow to Tsinpu in Dec.; at Hanchwang on Hsuchow front May 5th; in Sinyang area June 27th;	
128th Division	Kwangyuan, Szechwan	Yang Hsiu-ch'un
	Reported in Tsowhsien-Lincheng area on Feb. 18th and 23rd; west Hangchow April 13th; en route toward Hankow May 30th; Yingshan, Hupeh-Anhwei border, July 8th;	
131st Division		
	(See 31st Army Corps, page 25.)	
129th Division (old)	Tangchow, Honan	Chow Fu-cheng
	Reported in Kiangsi on Feb. 15th;	
23rd Division		
	See 5th Army Corps, page 10.	
24th Division		
	(See 37th Army Corps, page 27.)	
46th	Shensi	Fan Tsung-fu (roughneck & good drinker. When Jap. threat to cross Yellow R. faded, went from Tungkwan to Hsuchow area between P'inghsien and Tanch'eng.)
	28th, 49th and 140th Divs.* (latter attached) at Tungkwan March 6th and April 16th; at Taierchwang May 5th; 46th Army Corps (28th, 49th & 92nd Divs) on right of line east of Taierchwang May 8th; 46th Army Corps (28th, 49th, & 92nd Divs.) thru Wuhan on way to Hunan July 28th; *Fan and divisions other than the 28th to South of Hankow Aug. 17*	

* - According to our records 140th Div. belongs to 8th Army Corps, and the 49th to the 25th Army Corps.

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
46th (cont'd)		
79th Division	Fuping, Shensi	Chen An-pao
(Transferred elsewhere July 28th). South of Chengchow on Feb. 10th; at Sinyang (Hsinyang), Honan, on Feb. 15th; west of Hangchow April 13th; in Ankiu, Shantung, end of May;		
95th Division	Shanghsien, Shensi	Lo Chi
(Transferred to 14th Army Corps June 3rd.) North of Chengchow on Aug. 20th; southeast of Haichow on Sept. 24th; Loyang area Nov. 7th; reported near Chengchow on Feb. 15th; at Chengchow March 1938;		
28th Division	Shensi	Tung Chao
Near Tungkwan, northeast Shensi, on March 6th; to assist Chang Tze-chung at Tawangchwang, s.w. of Lini, April 27-May 7th; 20 miles North of Hankow Aug. 7;		
49th Division		
(To ~~See~~ 25th Army Corps, page 20.) Stopped south bound Japanese relief column from Matouchen (Shantung) April 29th;		
92nd Division		
(See 27th Army Corps, page 21.) At Tawangchwang, Shantung, April 27-May 7th;		
140th Division.		
(Transferred to 8th Army Corps, page 11.)		
47th	Szechwan	Li Chia-yu
At Niangtzekwan Oct. 27th; in Fenchow, Shansi, area, Nov. 7th; 1 regiment to Wuhu Feb. 28th; in Shansi March 2nd & 6th;		
104th Division	Anhsien, Szechwan	Li Chih-hsiang
In Shansi near Taiyuan on Oct. 28th; in South Shansi on March 2nd and 6th; Hsiahsien, S.W. Shansi, Aug. 9; near Pinglu S.W. Shansi Aug. 11th;		

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
47th (cont'd)		
104th Div. (cont'd)		
	Note: This division with one other div. form the 47th Army Corps which was reported in south Shansi on March 2nd. The other division, which has a new and unknown designation, is believed to be the former Temporary 23rd Division. One brig.104th Div.at Changsha Aug.5th;one regt.104th Div.near Liuyang (E.of Changsha)Aug.5;	
23rd Div. (Temporary)	Szechwan	
48th	Kwangsi	Hsia Wei
	(174th and 176th Divisions part of 21st Army Group, page 2.) Near Hofei Feb. 23rd; of 7th and 48th Armies five divisions went to Shanghai and two to Lunghai when Shanghai was live sector (reported Feb. 23rd).	
174th Division	Chanchow, Kwangsi	Wang Tsan-pin
	Shanghai front from Oct. 30th to Nov. 3rd; near Hofei, Feb. 23rd; in Anhwei April 29th;	
175th Division	Wuchow, Kwangsi	Mo Shun-chieh
	In Pootung from Sept. 15th to Oct. 24th; on Shanghai front from Oct. 24th to Nov. 3rd; near Hofei, Anhwei, Feb. 23rd; in Anhwei April 29th;	
176th Division	Watien, Kwangsi	Ou Shou-nien
	In Pootung from Sept. 15th to Oct. 24th; on Shanghai front from Oct. 24th to Nov. 3rd; in Pootung on Sept. 17th; near Hofei, Anhwei, on Feb. 23rd; in Anhwei April 29th; at Hsiahsien, S.W. Shansi, Aug. 3rd(?); Note: The original 7 Kwangsi divs. have been expanded to 12 divs. actually serving in Central and North China. The new designations are not known, which accounts for apparent contradictions in location in the above 7 divs. Replacements and new divs. are now being trained for future duty, so the present 12 divs. will probably not cover the total in the near future. The original 7 div. numerals were: 170th, 171st, 172nd, 173rd, 174th, 175th, and 176th.	

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
49th	Honan	Liu Tuo-chuan (Feb. 15th)

Elements of this Army Corps in Sinyang June 27th (probably 112th Div.);

105th Division — Nanyang, Honan — Liu Tuo-chuan

At Hsingtsi on the Tsinpu R.R. on Sept. 21st; near Tsangchow on Sept. 24th; south of Techow on Oct. 8th; this div. was a part of the 49th Army Corps of 5 divs. temporarily under Liu Tuo-chuan, a part of which mutinied south of Techow on Oct. 1-2-3rd while the Japanese were attacking that place. Reported in southwest Shantung on Oct. 30th; reported ordered to Kiangsi on Feb. 15th; Grand Canal east of Hsuchow May 19th; Tungliu-Chihteh area, north Kiangsi, July 8th; in Hukow-Pengtzeh area July 16th;

112th Division — Chanping, Honan — Hou Shou-yi

South of the Lunghai R.R. from Aug. 17th to Nov. 30th; in Nanking in early Dec.; ordered to Kiangsi on Feb. 15th;

129th Division

(See 45th Army Corps, page 31.)

51st	Kiangsu	Yu Hsueh-chung

Yu Hsueh-chung was in Tsingtao area in July 1937 as check on Han Fu-ch'u. After fall of Nanking sent to check Japanese coming up to Hwai River. Lost 4,000 men at Pengpu in Feb. Left April 17th for Taierchwang area. Yu Hsueh-chung with 5 divs. in Hsuchow area Feb. 10th; Yu Hsueh-chung and 51st Army on left of the north of Hwai River Feb. 23rd; east of Taierchwang April 18th with T'ang and Kuan; Taierchwang area May 5th; Yu Hsueh-chung commands 6 divs. and has six field guns and two 6-inch guns May 6th; near Kweiteh May 16; in Pohsien-Kwoyang sector June 2nd; under a cloud for some delay in attack but good man, JWS; east of Chumatien on Ping-Han July 1st; at Tungpa, Honan, July 2nd;

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
51st (cont'd)		
113th Division	North Anhwei	Li Chen-tang
In Shantung on Aug. 24th; at Weihsien on Sept. 2nd; in Tsingtao area on Sept. 16th to Dec. 23rd; in Kaomi (Tsingtao area) on December 19th; to Weihsien, and south thru Lini to Lunghai R.R. on Dec. 24th to 31st; reported east of Hsuchow on Feb. 10th; reported northeast of Hwai River on Feb. 15th & 23rd; east of Taierchwang May 8th;		
114th Division	Anhwei	Mo Chung-hang
In Shantung on Aug. 24th; at Lini on Sept. 2nd; in the Tsingtao area on Sept. 16th to Dec. 23rd; near Kaomi (Tsingtao area) on December 19th; to Weihsien and south thru Lini to Lunghai R.R. area on Dec. 24th to 31st; east of Hsuchow on Feb. 10th; reported northeast of the Hwai River on Feb. 15th and 23rd; east of Taierchwang May 8th; Grand Canal east of Hsuchow May 19th;		
52nd		Kuan Lin-cheng (33 years old. Wounded Hsi-fengkou '33. Rated high as commander)
Kuan on Sept. 22nd had 2nd, 17th and 25th Divs. at Ts'angchow, crossed to Paoting on Pinghan where he had 9,000 casualties, then joined T 'ang on Chang River; March 24th with T'ang En-po's 13th Army east of Tsaochuang; left center line east of Taierchwang May 8th; at Tancheng May 5th; between Chengchow and river May 25th; Sinyang area June 27th; between Kinchow and Ts'ungyang July 24th; at Yangsin N.W. of Juichang Aug. 21;		
2nd Division		
(See 17th Army Corps, page 17.)		
25th Division	Suiyuan-Ninghsia	Kuan Lin-cheng
North of Machang, Hopei, on Aug. 20th; at Machang from Sept. 2nd to Sept. 12th; near Kuan, Hopei, on Sept. 21st; on Pinghan R.R. late Sept.; at Hsuchang, Honan, on Feb. 15th; one regt. of 25th Div. from Hankow to Huangshihkang, Hupeh, Feb. 28th; east of Taierchwang May 14th; in S.W. Shansi(?), Aug. 10th;		
One unidentified division, ~~probably 17th~~,		
~~(See 38th Army Corps, page 28.)~~		

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
53rd	Hopei	Wan Fu-lin

East of Kuan, Sept. 19th; at Anyang and Taming Feb. 10th; north Chengchow May 25th;

91st Division	Tsangchow, Hopei	Feng Chan-hai

(Temporarily attached). North of Tsinan August 12th; at Machang Aug. 20th; ran without a fight at Kuan on Sept. 19th; also ran at Paoting on Sept. 24th; reported in the Anyang-Taming area on Feb. 10th;

116th Division*	Changhsintien, Hopei	Liu Yuan-hsun

On Pinghan R.R. from July 8th to Nov. 30th; north of Paoting Aug. 20th; at Chengting Oct. 9th; in the Anyang-Taming area on Feb. 10th;

119th Division*	Shihchiachwang, Hopei	Tsung Chao-lin

At Yungching on Sept. 18th; reported by Japanese at Chengting on Oct. 9th; reported in the Anyang-Taming area Feb. 10th;

* - These two divs. possibly have been combined.

130th Division	Liuliho, Hopei	Chu Hung-hsun

North of Paoting on Aug. 20th; at Yungching on Sept. 18th; at Chengting on Oct. 9th; reported in Anyang-Taming area on Feb. 10th;

54th

Elements of this army en route towards Hankow May 30th.
Posaibly the 55th and 7th Reserve Divs.; in Sinyang area July 1st; 54th Army Corps of three or four divisions on south bank in Hwangshihkang area east of Hankow July 24th;

55th

(See 6th Army Corps, page 10.). 55th Army Corps of 29th and 74th Divs. with 80th Div. which was before the fall of Hsuchow in Lincheng area, was S.W. of Chengchow June 10th and moving southwestward;

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
57th	Honan	Miao Cheng-liu
109th Division	Honan-Anhwei	Ho Kuei

South of the Lunghai R.R. on Aug. 20th. This Division with the 11th, 115th, and 120th Divisions form the 57th Army Corps, 2 divs. of which (numbers unknown) were on the Tsinpu front near Tsangchow on Sept. 23rd; this div. was reported near Chengchow on Jan. 15th; Kaifeng to Lanfeng June 7th; in Hankow area May 24th; looted and shot up Chengchow for several days stopped by Shang Chen June 26th; transferred to 73rd Army Corps at Hukow July 10th;

111th Division	Sihwa, Honan	Chang En-to

This division with the 109th, 115th, and 120th Divs. formed the 57th Army Corps, 2 divs. of which (Number unknown) were on the Tsinpu front on Sept. 23rd. No other record of this div.

115th Division	Chowkiakow, Honan	Liu Chi-wen

2 divisions (numbers unknown) of the 57th Army Corps were on the Tsinpu front on Sept. 23rd. No other record of this div.

Note: A 115th Div. (New) is a part of the 8th Route Army (former Reds) and was reported as being in south Shansi March 2nd.

120th Division	Luyi, Honan	Chao Yi

2 divisions (numbers unknown) of the 57th Army Corps were on the Tsinpu front on Sept. 23rd. No other record of this division.

Note: A 120th Div. (New) is a part of the 8th Route Army (former Reds),(see page 4).

59th (newly organized) — Chang Tzu-chung

In Chengchow area Jan. 26th; 38th & 180th Divs. in command of Chang Tze-chung on right of line north of Hwai River Feb. 23rd; at Pengpu on right of Yu Hsueh-chung's 51st Army Corps prior to March 14th; at

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander

59th (cont'd)

Taierchwang April 8th; east of Taierchwang May 8th; area of south-central Shantung May 29th; moved north from east of Tancheng to Taishan June 7th; in Szeshui, Mengyin, Chuhsien, Feihsien June 13th;

37th Division

(Transferred from 29th Army Corps, page 22& to 77th Army Corps.)

38th Division

(Transferred from 29th Army Corps, page 23.) At Linyi March 15th-April19th; at Tawangchuang April 27th; Shantung end of May;

180th Division (a new division)

In Tangyin-Yencheng area, Honan, on Jan. 15th; moving towards Hsuchow, Feb. 10th; on Hwai River Feb. 18th; in Kweiteh area on Feb. 23rd; at Linyi March 15th-April 19th; at Tawangchuang April 22nd; Shantung end of May; in east Shantung south of Railroad July 17th;

60th

Part of 60th Army Corps on Pinghan north of Hankow April 16th; the new 60th Army Corps of three Yunnan divisions on way to Hsuchow March 31st; on right of 51st Army Corps east of Taierchwang April 18th; north of Taierchwang April 25th; southeast Taierchwang May 5th; in Lushan area of Kiangsi July 24th;

182nd Division (a new division)

East of Taierchwang May 8th; north of Hankow Feb. 28th;

183rd Division (a new division)

East of Taierchwang May 8th; north of Hankow Feb. 28th

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
60th (cont'd)		
184th Division (a new division)		
East of Taierchwang May 8th; north of Hankow Feb. 28th;		
61st	Shensi	Li Fu-ying (reported executed for cowardice)
In Shansi March 2nd		
68th Division	Suiyuan	Li Fu-ying
Reported moving into Chahar on Aug. 21st; offered strong resistance at Hsinkow on October 30th; in south Shansi on March 2nd;		
101st Division (to 35th Army Corps, page 27) (There is another 101st Div. in 82nd Army).	Tatung, Shansi	Li Chun-kung
At Tatung on Aug. 20th; in vicinity of Yuanping on Oct. 8th; south of Taiyuan on Nov. 30th; in south Shansi on March 2nd; driven from southeast of Paotou in Suiyuan to 50 miles south of Kweihwa in May together with Ho Chu-kuo's cavalry brigade commanded by Fu Tso-yi, former governor of Suiyuan Province.		
62nd	Kwangtung	Chung Ta
152nd Division	Kiungshan, Kwangtung	Ch'en Chang (Yen Chao)
In Liuchow area and on Hainan Island Jan. 22nd; to Anhwei front June 29th;		
154th Division	Yeungkong, Kwangtung	Wu Chien-hsiung
On Shanghai front in Oct.; in Nanking area Dec. 9th; later in Dec. probably in Wuhu area; part in Hankow Jan. 14th; west of the Nanking-Tsinpu-Lunghai front, Jan. 26th; part of the original division (probably a new-type reinforced brigade) on the Kwangtung coast on Jan. 22nd;		

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
63rd	Kwangtung	Li Chen-kao
151st Division	Shiuhing, Kwangtung	Mo Hsi-teh

The 453rd Brigade of this div. was expanded to a full division and was reported on the Shanghai front in Sept. and Oct. The 451st Brigade of this div. was expanded to the new-type reinforced brigade, and was reported in the Canton area on Jan. 22nd;

157th Division	Changchow, Fukien	Huang T'ao

Reported in the Canton-Amoy-Swatow area, Jan. 15th; on Tsinpu-Lunghai front Jan. 26th;

64th	Kwangtung	Chang Sui-k'uei

64th Kwangtung AC.of 155th(?)& 1 other div.at Mahueiling,S.of Kiukiang,Aug.7;

153rd Division	Chungfa, Kwangtung	,, ,, ,,

Along Kwangtung coast on Jan. 22nd;

158th Division	Tainheng, Kwangtung	Tseng Yu-jen

Nanking (east side) Dec. 5th; part of this division reported sent to Wuchang in Dec.; division itself reported on Kwangtung coast on Jan. 22nd; from Teian to Kiukhiang July 16th;

65th	Kwangtung	Li Han-hun

Li Han-hun in Kiukiang-Nanchang area July 21st;

155th Division	Chaoan, Kwangtung	Li Han-hun (Li Huan-wun)

In Bias Bay area on Jan. 22nd; moving toward Hsuchow May 7th; to Kaifeng area, June 3rd;

156th Division	Kwangtung	Teng Lung-kuang

Reported in Shanghai area during Sept. & Oct.; Nanking (east side) Dec. 5; in Nanking area, Dec. 9th; later in Dec. in Wuhu area; west of Nanking on Jan. 12th; In counter-attack Lanfeng May 30th; to Anhwei front June 29th;

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
66th	Kwangtung	(Yeh Ch'ao) Yueh Ch'ao

Yeh Ch'ao in Kiukiang-Nanchang area July 21; To Tehan and North Aug. 21;

159th Division	Muiluk, Kwangtung	(T'an Sui) Hua Ching-tung

In Shanghai area including Kiangyin from Sept. 26th to Nov. 3rd; in action for the first time on Sept. 29th; probably in Wuhu area in Dec.; from Teian to Kiukiang July 16th; 159th Div. of 66th A.C. at Lohua north of Nanchang Aug. 14th;

160th Division	Tsangcheng, Kwangtung	(Yeh Ch'ao) Tan Sui

On Shanghai front from Sept. to Nov. 3rd; probably in Wuhu area in Dec.; in Hukow-Pengtseh a rea July 16th; 160th Div. of 66th A.C. east of Nanchang Aug. 14th;

Note: Brigades of certain Kwangtung divs., as the 151st and 154th Divs. above, have been expanded to divisions or to a new-type reinforced brigade of about the same strength as a division. Present numerals and designations are not known. This probably accounts for reports indicating that a certain division (actually strength of two divisions) is located at widely separated points at approximately the same time.

67th	Anhwei	Wu Ke-jen
107th Division	Fochow, Anhwei	Chin Kuei-pi

At Tsangchow and Tacheng, Hopei, from Aug. 23rd to Sept. 21st; in the Kwantao-Tangyi area on Oct. 15th; at Taming on Oct. 15th; at Taming on Oct. 28th; reported on the Shanghai front on Nov. 14th; Grand Canal east of Hsuchow May 19th;

108th Division	Honan	Chang Wen-ching

At Tsangchow and Tacheng, Hopei, from Aug. 23rd to Sept. 21st; in the Kwantao-Tangyi area on Oct. 15th; at Taming on Oct. 28th; reported on Shanghai front on Nov. 14th;

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
67th (cont'd)		
110th Division	Kuoyang, Anhwei	Chang Cheng-tang (Chang Li-heng)
	In the Kwantao-Tangyi area on Oct. 15th; at Taming on Oct. 28th; west of Taierchwang April 14th; west of Tsaochuang, Taierchwang area May 5th;	
117th Division	Honan	Wu Ke-jen
	In Kwantao-Tangyi area on Oct. 15th; at Taming on Oct. 28th; attacking in S.W. of Shansi May 18th;	
68th	Shensi	Liu Ju-ming
	(143rd Div. & 1 other, probably 61st; see page 23.) In Chengchow Jan. 26th; on Yellow River east of Shang Chen's 32nd Army; to Pihsien Ma6 6th; to Wucheng area in Shantung May 30th; to southeast of greater Wuhan July 10th; 68th Army Corps, 143rd Div. and one other div. (probably 61st) at Fengcheng southwest of Nanchang July 19th;	
143rd Division		
	Transferred from 29th Army Corps, see page 23.	
36th Division	Hupeh	Sung Hsi-lien
	(Transferred to 78th Army Corps Sept. 26th and to 71st Army Corps June 3rd and to 72nd Army Corps July 27th.) Reported as bearing brunt of fighting in Yangtzepoo-Wayside area on Aug. 24th. This "discontented" division reported as being relieved at Liuho prior to the Japanese landing at that point and as being replaced by Police Bureau Reserves and Paoantui; resulting in an easy landing for the Japanese; Shanghai-Woosung sector on Sept. 2nd; Shanghai-Liuho line on Sept. 17th. The Div. commander was promoted to command the 78th Army Corps on Sept. 26th. Part of the defense forces of Nanking in Nov. and Dec. Still in	

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander

68th (cont'd)

36th Division (cont'd)

Nanking on Dec. 3rd; withdrawn to the north bank of the Yangtze River on Dec. 6th; reported on the Tsinpu R.R. front between Lincheng and Pengpu on Jan. 26th and Feb. 1st. On Lunghai R.R. between Kweiteh and Lanfeng on Feb. 23rd; near Loyang July 27th;

61st Division — Szechwan — Yang Ting-ya

In Shanghai area on Aug. 31st; in Woosung Liuho sector on Sept. 2nd; on Shanghai-Liuho line Sept. 17th; also at Ch'angchow; transferred from Shanghai on Nov. 3rd; passed thru Nanking to Pukow on Dec. 2nd; on Tsinpu-Lunghai front on Jan. 26th; between Kweiteh and Lanfeng o n Feb. 23rd; in counter-attack Lanfeng May 30th; at Yehsien, Honan, July 2nd (?); in Matang area July 2nd;

69th — Shih Yu-san

(One of Corps made up from Sung's 29th Army). On extreme right flank beyond T'anch'eng, south-west Shantung, May 8th; east of Taierchwang May 8th;

71st — Wang Ching-chiu (King-kiu)

In Mienchih area, southern Honan, March 20th; in Tungkwan-Sian area April 16th; 71st Army of 36th & 87th Divs. in Kaifeng sector last half of May(4th Marines);

21st Division — Shensi — Li Hsien-chou

(Transferred to 14th Army Corps June 3rd). In Suiyuan on Aug. 7th; in Kalgan area and Nankow fight on Aug. 20th as part of 13th Army Corps; offered strong resistance at Hsinkow, Shansi, on Oct. 30th; near Chengchow on Feb. 15th; on Lunghai west of Loyang Mar. 1938; at Haichow May 5th; east of Taierchwang May 8th;

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander

71st (cont'd)

87th Division — Changshu, Kiangsu — Wang Ching-chiu (King-kiu)

(Transferred from 78th Army Corps). Only division in Shanghai except the 88th Div. on Aug. 13th; temporarily withdrawn from the Shanghai lines to rest and reorganize on Aug. 21st; on Shanghai-Woosung R.R. between Kiangwan and Woosung on Aug. 22nd; in Shanghai-Woosung area on Sept. 2nd; on Shanghai-Liuho line on Sept. 17th; Wang Ching-chiu was promoted to command the 71st Army Corps on Sept. 26th; withdrawn from Nanking to the north bank of the Yangtze River on Dec. 6th; in C huchow on Dec. 14th; in Hankow on Jan. 14th; on Lunghai west of Loyang March 1938; to southern Shantung May 14th; between Chengchow and Lanfeng May 19th; in Lanfeng-Kwei teh area June 7th;

88th Division — Hsuchow, Kiangsu — Sun Yuan-liang

("Lone Bn" at Shanghai part of this div.)
(Transferred to 72nd Army Corps June 3rd.? French police replaced from Shanghai)
One brigade of this division attacked Pa Tze Chiao on night of Aug. 14-15; fought near Shanghai University on the same day; Hqrs at Kiangwan Race Course Aug. 17th; exhausted in Yangtzepoo fighting, the div. was relieved by the 2nd and 98th Divs. on Aug. 19th; north of Shanghai-Woosung R.R. between Kiangwan and Woosung on Aug. 22nd; in Shanghai-Woosung sector on Sept. 2nd; on Shanghai-Liuho line on Sept. 17th; personnel observed between Wusih and Soochow on Sept. 26th; part Nanking garrison (south gate) Dec. 5th; withdrawn from Nanking to north bank of Yangtze River Dec. 6th; to Hankow in Dec. from Kiangsi; near Nanchang on Jan. 11th; Lunghai west of Loyang March 1938; between Chengchow and Lanfeng May 19th; in Chengchow area May 30th;

72nd — Sun Yuan-liang

Reported April 16th; in Kaifeng sector June 3rd; includes 58th Div. fr.Anhwei & 88th Div.(?) fr. Changsha(4th Marines)
36th Division

(Transferred from 78th Army Corps, to and from 71st Army Corps, see pages 42 and 46.)

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander

72nd (cont'd)

42nd Division — Tali, Shensi — Liu Yen-piao

(Not listed under 72nd Army Corps June 3rd?)
West of Hofei May 30th;

58th Division *(In 74th Aug. 14)*

Transferred from Anhwei last half May?;
in Nanchang area July 16th;

88th Division (probably still in 71st Army Corps)

Transferred from Changsha last half May?

73rd

73rd Army Corps of 15th, 77th, and 109th Divisions
counter-attacking at Hukow July 10th;

15th Division

Transferred from 28th Army Corps, see page 22.

77th Division

See page 57 .

109th Division

Transferred from 57th Army Corps, page 37.

74th

On way to Shantung May 14th; in counter-attack
Lanfeng May 30th; 74th A.C. of 51st & 58th Divs. in Tehan
& to east Aug. 14th;
51st Division

See 25th Army Corps, page 20.

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
74th (cont'd)		
58th Division	Hankow, Hupeh	Yu Chi-shih
	(Transferred to 1st Army Corps thence to 72nd Army Corps.) Probably in Shanghai on Aug. 31st; on Shanghai-Liuho line Sept. 17th; part of 1st Army Corps west of Sian March 1938;	
75th		
	Part of greater Wuhan defense garrison under Ch'en Ch'eng July 8th;	
77th		Feng Chih-an (See 37th Div.)
	In Loyang Nov. 7th; to Wucheng area in Shantung May 30th;	
78th		Sung Hsi-lien (See 36th Div. page 42.)
	Part of Nanking garrison Dec. 5th.	
36th Division.		
	Transferred from 68th Army Corps and to 71st Army Corps.	
87th Division		
	Transferred to 71st Army Corps.	
Model Brigade		
	See 36th (Model) Div. page 53 .	
80th		Kung Ling-hsun
	At Lanchow, Kansu, April 16th;	

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander

80th (cont'd)

43rd Division

43d Div. from Shansi thru Wuchang for South Aug. 10th; See 5th Army Corps, page 10.

97th Division — Lanchow, Kansu — Kung Ling-hsun

No record.

82nd — Ma Pu-fang

In Chinghai Province April 16th;

100th Division

See 2nd Temporary Army Corps, page 9.

101st Division

See 61st Army Corps, page 39.

102nd Division

Transferred from 8th Army Corps, see page 11.

103rd Division — Honan — Ho Chi-chung

On Shanghai front from Oct. 5th to Nov. 3rd; part observed in Hankow May 24th; in Changsha area July 16th; one regiment of this div. at Changsha Aug. 5th; near Macheng on Hupeh-Anhwei border Aug. 6th;

85th

East of Taierchwang May 14 th; 85th Army Corps (4th and 89th Divisions) southwest of Nanchang July 20th;

4th Division

See 13th Army Corps, page 14.

89th Division

See 13th Army Corps, page 15.

Army Corps	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
90th	First reported on April 16th; 90th Army Corps in Kiukiang area consists of 195th and 196th Divs. Aug. 14th;	
	195th Division	P'eng
	At Loyang on March 20th; at Lanfeng June 7th;	
	196th Division	
	At Yunho May 14th;	
92nd	At Tsinhsien Aug. 14th; 21st and 96th Divs. west of Tehan Aug. 14th;	
	21st Division	
	At Chucheng near Kiukiang Aug. 7 (see 14th A.C.)	
	95th Division	
	Near Tehan, Aug. 7th.	
94th	Part of Greater Wuhan defense garrison under Ch'en Ch'eng July 8th.	
96th	96th Army Corps of 196th Division(see 90th A.C.) and one other in Kiukiang-Kuling area July 24th;	
98th	98th Army Corps part of 20th Army Group under Tang En-po moving to Nancheng July 16th;	
"The Ever Advancing Army"	Suiyuan	Ma Chan-shan (Ma is not forceful)
	About 6,000 former Manchu troops in Army	
	3rd Cav. Div. (New)	Ching Teh-yuan
	5th Cav. Div. (New)	Mo Hsin-yao (deserted Japs. with 6th Div.)
	6th Cav. Div. (New	Wang Chou-kun
	1st Ind. Cav. Brigade	Lu Chun-yi
	2nd ,, ,, ,,	Lin Hsun-wu
	1st Ind. Cav. Regiment	Pai Yun-kun (mutinied against Japanese.)

(or details of which are not included in)

5. Divisions (not included in the above list of Army Corps):

Division	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
1st (Reserve) (Newly organized)	Kiangsi	Li Hsiang-yung
	(Activities may be confused with the old 1st Division.) Paochi, Shensi, Feb. 10th; Sian March 1938;	
2nd (Reserve)	Sian area March-April 1938 (See 21st Army Corps page 19);	
3rd (Reserve)	Reported near Hankow on Jan. 20th; 3 regiments and the engineer regiment (reported as 3rd Div.) from Hunan to Hankow in Dec. (reported Feb. 3rd). Sian area March-April 1938.	
Note: 1st, 2nd and 3rd divisions newly formed in Yunnan left Hankow for front (?) June 29th.		
4th (newly organized)	Szechwan	Hsu Chao-chung
6th (one of Chiang Kai-shek's modern divisions)	Honan	Kung Ling-hsun (shen)
	Near Shanghai from Sept. 24th to Nov. 3rd; to Hsuchow March 31st; Taierchwang area May 5th; went north from Hankow prior to May 12th; at Hsiahsien, southwest Shansi, Aug. 3rd;	
6th (New)	In East Shantung south of railroad July 17th;	

Division	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
7th (newly organized)	Ninghsia	Ma Hung-kwei
	No exact record, but this division was probably confused with the old 7th Div. at Paotou on Oct. 19th; 7th Reserve Div. in Chengchow area May 30th;	
8th (newly organized)	Yangsin, Hupeh	Chiang Pei-hsu
	In Hankow on Jan. 11th; at Kwangshui, Hupeh, on Feb. 28th; the 8th Div. reported above as being in Shansi was most probably the 8th Reserve Division; 8th Reserve Division from Kaifeng to Lanfeng June 7th; Chengchow June 28th;	
9th (Reserve)		
	In Kiuchiang July 19th;	
10th (newly organized)	Fuan, Fukien	Hsiao Chen
	At Shanghai on Aug. 26th; in Woosung-Liuho sector on Sept. 2nd; on North Station-Liuho line on Sept. 17th; wounded from this div. were in Soochow Hospital on Sept. 26th; reported in South Shansi on March 2nd;	
11th (newly organized) (Reserve)		Wang Yao-wu
	At Kiukiang July 25th;	
13th	Shensi	Lu Peng-tang Wang Yao-huang
	At Shanghai front from Oct. 24th to Nov. 3rd; north of Taierchwang April 25th; Taierchwang area May 5th; east of Taierchwang area May 8th; went north from Hankow prior to May 12th; in Hankow July 1st;	

Division	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
13th (New)		
	At Yoyang, Hunan, Aug. 5th;	
14th (New)		
	At Yoyang, Hunan, Aug. 5th;	
15th (New)		
	At Yoyang, Hunan, Aug. 5th;	
16th (New)		
	At Yoyang, Hunan, Aug. 5th;	
18th	Pingliang, Kansu	Chu Yao-hua
	Reported by "Oriental Affairs" in the Shanghai-W usih area in Oct.; reported by Domei at Tsomatang; defeated; Division Commander committed suicide on Oct. 27th; between Chengchow and river May 25th; few of this division at Changsha May 30th; in Hankow area May 24th; opposing Japanese 102nd Div. at Chengyang June 9th; on R.R. from Hankow to Sinyang June 27th; Hsiaokan to Sinyang July 1st; to Kiukiang area July 2nd;	
18th (newly organized)	Honan	Ma Wen-ta
	Ichow end of May and Mengyin June 13th;	

Division	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
19th	Tsingtien, Chekiang	Li Chueh (Chiu)

In Shanghai area from Oct. 24th to Nov. 3rd; west Hangchow April 13th; from Hankow to north June 4th; at Hsuchow in May (Oriental Affairs);

22nd	Chowtsun, Shantung	Ku Liang-min

South of Kiao-Tsi R.R. on Aug. 19th; east of Tsin-Pu R.R. and north of Kiao-Tsi R.R. on Sept. 10th; to Tsin-Pu front at Potowchen on Sept. 29th; in Tzitze-Putai-Chowtsun-Lintze area on Oct. 28th; moving east from Chowtsun on Nov. 5th; rated as poor troops with undependable commander; retreated southwest of Tsining on Jan. 11th; reported in Kweiteh-Tangshan area on Feb. 1st; in Tsining area on Feb. 28th; at Hsuchow in May (Oriental Affairs); chased by Japanese 14th Div. in Kaifeng area June 11th;

29th	Tsinan, Shantung	Tsao Fu-lin

(See 6th Army Corps & 3rd Route Army).
At Techow on Aug. 6th; to east Shantung on Aug. 11th; in Wukiao-Ningtsing-Linghsien area on Oct. 28th; north of Yellow River, Shantung, on Nov. 8th; south of the river on Dec. 20th; commander opposed to Han Fu-chu's policies; retreated southeast of Tsining on Jan. 11th; reported near Kinhsiang, south of Tsining, on Feb. 1st; Tsining area on Feb. 28th; west of Tsaochuang-Taierchwang area May 5th; moving southwest Pinghan June 10th; on July 12th came from Tsaohsien, West Shantung, crossed Lunghai R.R. and went to Taikang and thence to Chouchiakou, West Honan;

30th	Hupeh	Li Sung-kuei

(Part of Sun's 26th Route Army)
North of Paoting on Aug. 20th; on Pinghan R.R. until end of Oct.; on Chengtai R.R. on Nov. 7th; one regiment of this div. to Hankow in Dec. from Kiangsi; south of Chengchow on Feb. 10th; to Sinyang, Honan, on Feb. 15th; Loyang March 1938; west of Taierchwang April 14th; west of Tsaochuang-Taierchwang area, May 5th; withdrawn from east of Hsuchow May 18th; in Sinyang June 27th;

Division	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
33rd	Shensi	Feng Hsing-hsien

Reported as arriving to strengthen the Kunshan-Soochow line on Sept. 5th; in Kunshan-Taitsang area, northeast of Soochow, on Sept. 17th; on Shanghai-Liuho line on Sept. 26th; on Chengtai R.R. on Nov. 7th; in Nanchang July 24th; N. Kiangsu(?) Aug. 9th;

34th	Honan (Szechuan?)	Wang Hsiu-shen

Ichang to Chiaokow Feb. 3rd; moving toward Hsuchow May 17th; in unsuccessful attempt to recapture Kaifeng June 8th;

34th (newly organized)	Chuchow, Chekiang	Ku Chia-chi

In Shanghai area from Oct. 30th to Nov. 3rd; in Lanfeng-Kweiteh area June 7th; counter-attacked in Kaifeng area June 8th;

35th	North Kansu	Ma Hung-pin

At Kaifeng on Aug. 19th; moved towards Hsuchow in Dec.; new 35th Div. north of Chengchow May 17th; from Shensi to Kaifeng area June 3rd; in Poyang city area July 24th;

35th New At Fengcheng, Nanchang area Aug. 21;

36th (Model)	Nanking	

Part of defense forces of Nanking during Nov. & Dec.; reported as Model Brigade in Nanking Dec. 5th; reported in Hankow on Jan. 14th.

Note : The 36th Division and the 36th (Model) Div. may be confused as to exact locations in the above. At times they have been stationed at the same place at the same time, and it is possible that part of the fighting as noted above of the 36th Division actually was done by the 36th (Model) Div.; in counter-attack Lanfeng May 30th;

Division	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
37th (newly organized)	Kiangsi	Chen Chih-hsin

Apparently formed from the old 37th Independent Brigade; on Shanghai-Liuho line on Sept. 17th; according to Ku Chu-tung's Hqrs this div. was not on the Shanghai- Liuho line on Sept. 24th;

45th	Kiangsi-Chekiang-Fukien	Tai Min-chuan

Defending Wuhu May 14th;

47th	Honan	Fei Chang-kuei

From the reserves on Shanghai front to the north on Oct. 8th; at Yucheng on Oct. 19th; attacked Hun Ho, east Honan, with the 89th Div. on Oct. 31st; forced to withdraw on Nov. 3rd; one regiment reported sent to Hankow from Honan in Dec. (reported Feb. 3rd); Ichang to north Feb. 3rd;

50th	Hunan	Chen Kuang-yao

At Hsuchow in May (Oriental Affairs); in Changsha July 16th; to unknown destination Aug. 5th;

52nd	Fukien, Chekiang	Lu Hsing-jung

En route towards Hankow May 30th;

55th	Kiangsu	Li Sung-shan

At Pootung from Sept. 15th to Nov. 3rd; arrived on the Shanghai front on Aug. 16th and 17th, and placed in the Liho-Paoshan sector; opposed the Japanese landing on Aug. 23rd; in Hankow on Jan. 12th; en route towards Hankow May 30th from Changsha; southeast of Wuchang July 24th;

Division	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
57th	Northeast Kiangsi	Yuan Shao-chang (Li Shang-tze)

In Shanghai area on Aug. 31st; on Shanghai-Liuho line on Sept. 17th; holding Japanese (mixed infantry and cavalry brigade with two batteries) at Lini April 12th; engaged from landing of Japanese at Lungchiakow on June 24th to capture of Hukow July 4th; in Poyang city July 24th;

59th	Yochow, Hunan	Han Han-ying

In Shanghai-Wusih area (including Kiating) from Sept. 27th to Nov. 3rd; in Nanking early in Dec.; in Ihing-Liyang area April 13th;

60th	Honan	Chen Pei

In Shanghai-Wusih area on Aug. 31st; sent to the left flank near Liuho on Sept. 19th; one regiment of this div. reported sent to Hankow in Dec.; in Ihing-Liyang area April 13th; Tungliu-Chihteh area, north Kiangsi, July 8th; at Kashing July 31st;

63rd	Kiangshan, Chekiang	Chung Kuang-jen

On Shanghai front on Sept. 7th; on Shanghai-Liuho line on Sept. 17th; not on the Shanghai-Liuho line on Sept. 26th and Oct. 24th; north-east of Nanchang July 16th;

67th	Kwangtung	Li Shu-sen (Hwang Hwei)

In Shanghai area on Aug. 31st; moved to Pootung from Lotien sector on Sept. 8th; on Shanghai-Liuho line on Sept. 17th; in Shanghai front up to Nov. 3rd; half of this div. in Ihing-Liyang area and half at Ningpo April 13th; in Matang area July 2nd;

Division	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
73rd	Wuchuan, Suiyuan	Liu Feng-ping

(See 35th Army Corps, page 27.)
In Suiyuan on Aug. 20th; offered strong resistance at Hsinkow on Oct. 30th; part of this div. at Taiyuan on Nov. 7th; later on the Chengtai R.R.; Kaifeng to Lanfeng June 7th; en route towards Hankow May 30th;

74th	Weihsien, Shantung	Li Han-chang

In the Tsingtao area on Aug. 19th; at Linhsien, southeast of Techow on Oct. 17th; on Oct. 4th rushed to north of Yellow River to block mutinous troops of the 49th Army; on Oct. 18th the Div. commander submitted his resignation and was relieved of command by Han Fu-chu; in Linyi-Yucheng-Tsiho area on Oct. 28th; in Feicheng area, Shantung, on Nov. 8th; about Nov. 1st Li Han-chang reassumed command without authority from Han Fu-chu; retreated near Tsining on Feb. 1st and on Feb. 28th; west of Tsaochuang, Taierchwang area May 5th; moving southwest Pinghan June 10th; probably in 12th Army Corps at Yangsin, east Hupeh, July 27th;

75th	Amoy, Fukien	Sung Tien-tsai

One regiment of this division reported ordered to Hankow in Dec.; west of Chengchow March 1938; east of Loyang April 16th; Kaifeng to Lanfeng June 7th;

76th	Honan	Li Mo-lin

Moving north from Hankow on Aug. 11th; at Chengchow on Aug. 20th; in Changsu from Oct. 24th to Nov. 3rd; half in Ihing-Liyang area and half at Wuhing south of Lake April 13th;

Division	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
77th	Ichang, Hupeh	Lo Lin

(Part of 73rd Army Corps July 10th).
Arrived near Shanghai to strengthen the Kunshan-Soochow line on Sept. 5th; in Kunshan-Taitsang area on Sept. 17th; transferred to Hunan on Nov. 3rd; south of Loyang March 1938; in Hankow area May 24th; Pengtzeh July 2nd; Hukow July 8th;

80th	Amoy & Chwanchow, Fukien	Chen Chi (Chen Chai)

Moving southwest Pinghan from southwest of Chengchow June 10th;

82nd	Fukien	Jung Ching-fang

No record.

85th	Pengpu, Anhwei	Chen Tieh

Near Tsinpu R.R. from Aug. 5th to Sept. 30th; at Tsangchow on Aug. 20th; at M achang on Aug. 23rd; near Kuan on Sept. 21st;

Note: This numbered division was also reported in Shanghai on Aug. 16th and 17th.

86th *(See New 21st A.C.)*	Yulin, Shensi	Kao Shuang-cheng

At Tatung on Aug. 20th; in Shansi in Nov.; in northwest Shansi in March;

93rd	Yingtak, Kwangtung	Tang Yun-shan (Chen Lieh) (Kan Li-chu)

In Pootung on Sept. 2nd; transferred to the Nanking area on Sept. 16th; to Hsuchow March 31st; rated good troops; Taierchwang area May 5th; from Hwainan area to Kiuchiang area July 9th; ran away at Kiuchiang together with one other div. July 27th; at Tsungyang south of Hankow July 24th;

Division	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
94th	Yungchang, Shansi	Chu Huai-pin

At Kalgan on Aug. 20th; withdrew thru Tatung and Yuanping to south of Taiyuan;

96th	Shensi	Chao Hsi-kuang

Considered as probably being in Shanghai around Sept. 9th;

98th	Hupeh	Hsia Chu-chung

Arrived Shanghai on Aug. 19th and at once relieved the 88th Division in the Yangtzepoo fighting; in the northeast half of the International Settlement area on Aug. 22nd; withdrawn from the line on Aug. 24th; on Shanghai-Liuho line on Sept. 17th;

99th	Shensi-Shansi	Fu Chung-fang

In Chengchow on Jan. 26th; in Changsha July 16th;

106th	Junan, Honan	Shen Ke

Reported at Yencheng on Feb. 28th (a rabble); between Chengchow and Lanfeng May 19th; Kaifeng to Lanfeng June 7th; at Yehsien, Honan, July 2nd; in Loyang area July 16th;

118th	North Anhwei	Chow Kuang-lieh

No record.

121st	Hunan	Wu Chien-ping

Yunnan to Kweichow Feb. 3rd; near Macheng, Hupeh-Anhwei border, Aug. 6th;

Division	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
144th	Chengtu, Szechwan	Ko Shun-chi (Ku)
	At Hsuchow in May (Oriental Affairs)	
161st		
	Near Taihu Aug. 6th;	
162nd	Szechwan	
	No record	
164th		
	In Hukow-Pengtzeh area July 16th;	
166th	Loyang, Honan	Ho Tze-chu
	South of Lunghai R.R. on Aug. 20th; on Yellow River near Pinghan R.R. on March 2nd; north of river near Poai, northern Honan;	
167th	Yencheng, Honan	Yang Chu-tung
	Personnel of this division observed in Soochow on Sept. 26th; according to Ku Chu-tung's Hqrs this division was not on the Shanghai-Liuho front on Sept. 28th; personnel observed in Pukow on Nov. 12th; in Hankow area May 24th; Pengtzeh July 8th;	
169th	Tali, Shensi	Wu Shih-min
	On Chengtai R.R. on Nov. 7th;	

Division	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
170th	Kweiling, Kwangsi	Hsu Chi-ming

Reported moving into Pootung on Sept. 15th; not in Pootung on Sept. 27th; on Shanghai front on Oct. 24th; not on this front on Nov. 3rd. (It is possible that reports as to the location of this division were in error, as the division was also reported on the Tsinpu R.R. near Hsuchow at the above times.) In Anhwei April 29th; part of 21st Group Army July 21st;

178th — Szechwan

At Hsiahsien southwest Shansi Aug. 9th;

179th

On Honan-Anhwei border July 1st;

181st (a new div.)

In Chengchow Jan. 15th and 26th; Ichow end of May and Mengyin June 13th;

185th

In Hankow for sure Feb. 28th; from Hankow to north June 4th; part of 39th Army Corps, July 2nd; see page 28;

187th

At Poyang, Kiangsi, July 8th;

188th (a new div.) Kwangtung
(See New 29th A.C.)

In Hunan before Dec.; ordered to Hankow in Dec.;

189th (a new div.) Kwangtung
(See New 29th A.C.)

In Hunan before Dec.; ordered to Hankow in Dec.; on Pinghan line June 3rd;

Division	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
190th	West of Hofei May 30th; Nankang, west of Poyang Lake July 8th;	
191st	At Lanchow April 16th; belongs to 1st Army March;	
197th	In Changsha July 16; one regiment of 197th Div. at Hengshan, Hunan, (south of Changsha) Aug. 5th;	
198th	Near Wuhu May 14th; west of Hofei May 30th;	
199th	Defending Wuhu May 14th; at Yingshan, Hupeh-Anhwei border, July 8th;	
200th	At Hsuchow May 5th; north of Tungku July 16th; 2 Tank and Truck cos. of 200th Div. transferred to Loyang July 24th; 1 regt. of 200th Div. at Hsianghsiang, Hunan, (southwest of Changsha) Aug. 5th;	
201st	Probably north of Tungku July 16th;	

Division	Station before July 1, 1937 & movements since	Commander
Salt Division	Haichow, Kiangsu	Huang Chieh

At Yangchow, Kiangsu, Dec. 14th & 15th; at Haichow May 30th; Salt Guards under Shang Chen to Tunghsiang, Kiangsi, southeast of Nanchang Aug. 5th; To Tsinsien area Aug. 10th;

Notes:

1. New divisions go to 196th and maybe 200th Feb. 15th. Feng Yu-hsiang said, on Dec. 19th, 120 divisions then ready.

2. General Ch'en Ch'eng, commander of Wuhan area, said on July 7th that China has over 200 divisions compared to 100 when war started.

3. Divisions listed above as of July 12th total 207, as of Aug. 10th total 223, including six cavalry divisions.

Appendix "A" to G-2 Report on Organization of the Chinese Army

A-1. Independent Brigades:

The following is a list of the Infantry Brigades of the Chinese Army which are known to this office. These include Independent brigades, newly organized brigades, temporarily organized brigades, and reserve, pistol, special service, etc., brigades attached to various armies and headquarters. Few reports of brigade activities have been received by this Office since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese Incident.

Brigade	Station before July 1, 1937	Commander
1st	Shansi (Prov.)	Peng Ching-tze
2nd	,, ,,	Chow Yuan-chien
3rd	,, ,,	Fu Tsun-huai
4th	Hupeh	Chou Chia-chun
5th	Suiyuan	An Hua-ting
6th	Fukien	Chou Ch'ih-chun
7th (Independent)	Suiyuan	Ma Yen-shou
	A part of the 35th Army Corps under Fu Tso-yi, this brigade was reported near Yulin, Shensi, on Feb. 10th and on March 2nd; reported in west Shansi on March 6th;	
7th (Honan)	Honan	
	Reported as being ordered to the Wuhu area in Dec.	
8th	Chahar	
	Reported as being ordered to Hankow in Dec.	
9th	Kwangtung	Wang Ting-hua
10th	Kansu	Shih Shou-yin
11th	,,	Wang Yao-wu
12th	Kiangsu	Hsu Sheng-ju
14th		
	Reported near Lanfeng, north Honan, on Feb. 15th; See 13th Army Corps.	
22nd	Hupeh	Shou Teh-cheng
26th	S.W. Kiangsi	
31st	Chahar	Yuan Hsuan-wu

Brigade	Station before July 1, 1937	Commander
32nd	Hunan	Hu Ta
1 Regt. of this brig. at Hengshan (south of Changsha) Aug. 5th;		
33rd	Suiyuan	Tang Yung-hsi
34th	West Hupeh	Lo Chi-chiang
35th	Hunan	Li Tsung-chieh
36th	Kiangsi	Chen Lei
37th	Fukien	Chen Teh-fa
38th	S.W. Hupeh	Pan Shang-chai
39th	Hopei	Yuan Hsuan-wu
40th	Chahar	Hsia Tze-ming
43rd	Honan	Liu Chen-ching
44th	Honan	Chang Hua-tung
Reported near Kikungshan on Feb. 28th;		
45th	Chekiang	Chang Luan-chi
46th	Anhwei	P'ao Kan
Independent (unnumbered)	Hupeh	Liu Yi-feng
Independent (,,)	Honan	Sheng Hsi-ting
Mixed (,,)	Ninghsia	Ma Pao-lin
Mixed (,,)	Ninghsia	Lou Chung-liang
1st (Reserve)	Kansu	Yang Te-liang
1st (newly organized)	Hupeh (Prov.)	Li Pai-hua
3rd (,, ,,)	Southwest Hupeh (Prov.)	Chiang Tso-chun
4th (,, ,,)	Southwest Hupeh (Prov.)	Chang Lien-san
5th (,, ,,)	Anhwei	Cheng Ting-chen
7th (,, ,,)	Kiangsi-Anhwei	Li Tsung-chien
9th (,, ,,)	Szechwan (Prov.)	Chen Lang-ting
10th (,, ,,)	Kansu (Prov.)	Li Kuei-chin
11th (,, ,,)	,, ,,	Liu Pao-tung

Brigade	Station before July 1, 1937	Commander
1st (temporarily organized)	Szechwan (Prov.)	Chang Pan-peng
2nd (,, ,,)	,, ,,	Teng Kuo-chang
3rd (,, ,,)	East Hupeh(,,)	Chang Chieh-chung
4th (,, ,,)	,, ,,	Shih Hsi-yi
5th (,, ,,)	Szechwan ,,	Liu Chih-ming
6th (,, ,,)	,, ,,	Fan Nan-hsuan
7th (,, ,,)	,, ,,	T'ien Chung-yi
8th (,, ,,)	,, ,,	Hsiung Yu-chang
9th (,, ,,)	,, ,,	P'an Tso
10th (,, ,,)	,, ,,	Mu Su-chung
1st (Garrison Brigade)	Chinghai (Prov.)	Ma Yuan-hai
2nd (,, ,,)	,, ,,	Ma P'iao

A-2. Miscellaneous Data:

a. Chinese Cavalry.

Before July 1, 1937, there were thirteen (13) cavalry divisions and sixteen (16) cavalry brigades in the Chinese Army. Such information as this office has received concerning the location of cavalry organizations is incorporated under Sections L. Route Armies and 2. Army Corps, above.

Below follows a resume of such reports concerning the activities of cavalry organizations as this office has received:

1. The 4th Cavalry Division, 32nd Army Corps, was reported near Chengchow on Jan.15th (see page 26.

2. The 7th Cavalry Division, 13th Army Corps, was reported south of Chengchow on Feb. 10th; and north of the Hwai River on Feb. 23rd (see page 15).

3. The 10th Cavalry Army was reported in the Chengchow area on Jan. 26th.

4. The 1st Cavalry Brigade, a part of the 35th Army Corps under Fu Tso-yi, was reported near Yulin, Shensi, on Feb. 10th and on March 2nd; and in west Shansi on March 6th (see pages 24 and 27).

5. A brigade of the 9th Cavalry Division, 29th Army Corps, was reported in the Tangyin-Taming area on Jan. 26th.

6. Ma Piao and 1st Cavalry Division of Chinghai at Tungkwan April 16th.

7. The 5th Cavalry Division in Chinghai April 16th (see page 9.)

8. One cavalry army corps of Ho Chu-kuo in northwest Shansi April 1st (see page 8.)

9. Part of the 1st Cavalry Division observed in Hankow May 24th.

10. 4th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th are the Mongol Divs. in the northwest. Small cavalry units of 2,000 each.

b. Chinese Tanks.

1. 15 tanks lost at Nanking, reported Dec. 21st.

2. 1,200 tanks in Hankow area June 29th.

3. Motorized tank divisions from Teian area to south of Hukow-Matang area July 16th.

4. Several hundred Russian technical advisers with Chinese artillery and tanks in Changsha-Poyang Lake area July 16th

c. Chinese Artillery:

1. 25th Regiment of Artillery in Chengchow Jan. 26th;

2. 28th Regiment of Artillery en route to Chengchow Jan. 26th;

3. One brigade of two regiments of artillery and 9th Regiment Trench Artillery on Tsinpu Jan. 26th; en route Tsinpu on Jan. 26th; 4th and 14th Regiments of Artillery;

4. December/Artillery/ moves: To Wuhu, one regiment from Kweichow and 34th Regiment from Chengchow and 17th Regiment from Hankow plus one other. To Tsinpu R.R., one regiment from Hunan. To Pengpu, 7th Regiment from Hankow. To Tsinpu R.R. two regiments of 5th Group from Kweichow. 8th Regiment and 8th Brigade came to Hankow; mechanized artillery in reserve two regiments, one of 105 howitzers, one regiment of 150 howitzers at Changsha June 10th.

5. Not one shot fired by Chinese artillery at Matang June 28th.

6. 30 artillery regiments with total 380 field guns in Hankow area June 29th; 20th Artillery Regiment moving north from Changsha July 16th; 20th Artillery Regiment at Shaoyang Hunan (southwest of Changsha) Aug. 5th;

7. 6 bns. of 15 cm. guns & Howitzers are being emplaced at mouth of Kan R. & Wucheng area for defense against naval attacks on Nanchang Aug. 11th.

d. Airplanes, Chinese.

Colonel Chennault, U.S.A., Retired (Chief adviser on aviation to Chinese Army), reported at Nanchang pursuit instructor and also 200 Russian pilots, mechanics and large number of bombers and pursuits. Italians all gone. Russians not yet doing anything in air Dec. 25th; 10 American pilots and mechanics, Russians all Nanchang Dec. 28th; 50-60 Russian planes out of 200 total have arrived. Russians handle them. No Chinese pilots Dec. 28th; all Russian raid on Nanking and Wuhu. Claim got 25 Japanese planes not confirmed Jan. 28th; 83 planes came to Hankow by rail from Sian and Loyang during December; four of order of 25 Dewoitines ordered from France arrived Yunnan during Jan.; Vultee Squadron (suitable for attack, observation, and bombing lines of communications) to Chengtu April 6th; foreign legion disbanded. Formosa raided by Russians operating from south Kiangsi; 14th Bombing Squadron reorganized March 31st. All pilots now Chinese. American pilots to Yunnan as instructors. 14 French aviation instructors arrived Yunnan from May 28th, more expected. 8 French planes came in May; indications of large scale shipments on Hanoi-Yunnan R.R. June 7th;

Report from Mr. Day, Chief Engineer, Chinese aircraft factory at Shiuchow Jan. 14th:

> Chinese Curtis Hawk III and II with excellent pilots were completely outmaneuvered by Japanese pursuits on October 7th. The Japanese pursuits were low winged monoplanes with retractable landing gear, wings sharply

tapered, edges straight, span 40 feet, engine-large diameter radial, narrow fuselage. Speed appeared to be over 280 miles an hour and climb in excess of 3,000 feet per minute. Reported to be equipped with internal auxiliary fuel tank which is dropped before ship engages in combat.

Hankow Air Raid A pril 29th . 12 Henkel medium bombers, 24 Eye dash ninety sixty P.E. pursuits attacked Hanyang at 3:00 p.m. April 29th. They were met by 40 Chinese flying Soviet planes over city, later attacked by 25 Russians down river. Final check shows 10 Japanese bombers and 11 pursuit ships were shot down with a personnel loss totalling 61. Chinese lost 7 ships and two made forced landings. After separation from escort, Japanese bombers proved unable to protect themselves and 9 bombers were lost after separation while only one Chinese plane was downed during that time, a ratio of 9 to 1.

Only 3 bombers left in Hankow May 6th. Rest to Lanchow for new engines. Result Chinese got little help from their air arm at Hsuchow; Chinese criticize their Bellancas for too high landing speed and lack of maneuverability. Have 19; 20 of 36 British Goucester gladiators in Chinese air force damaged by faulty handling; 6 of new order Curtiss Hawk 75's arrived in Hankow May 6th; These are Col. Chennault's best hope; 300 Chinese aviators being trained; Generalissimo refused to grant wife's request to have Chou removed from control Chinese Air Force; 2 Martin bombers flew over Japan May 19th; 12 Russian bombers raided vicinity of Lodrone Islands sinking a Japanese destroyer, damaging a cruiser and setting fire to ammunition and oil dumps on San Chau and Bullock Horn Islands May 11th; 21 Japanese pursuits failed rendezvous 18 bombers N.W. Kiukiang for raid on Hankow May 31st. Pursuits came on alone looking for convoys met below city by 40 Sinos who shot down 12 losing two themselves.

Following report from Captain Dorn June 10th: 150 planes in Wuhan general area, 50 at Changsha and Nanchang, 15 German planes at Hengyang, Hunan, 20 French and probably 30 training planes at Yunnan. Reported 100 at three fields in Kansu and at Sian.

Following report from Captain Dorn June 15th: new air organization as follows: Chiang Kai-shek is Commander-in-Chief, T.V. Soong, Vice-Chairman, and Chien Ta-chun head of Aviation General Bureau. Under latter are four sections: General Affairs under P.H. Huang handles staff administration; air defense under Huang Chen-chiu controls anti-air, lookout system, instruction of people, etc. Technical matters under Huang Kuang-jui has factories, repairs, texts, foreign instructors. Operations under Chou Chih-jou, who is Commander of Air Force, controls all actual operations. Tactical organization of air fleet follows American plan. Training comes under both technical and operations departments

and this dual control makes for confusion. Chinese air officers say organization is top heavy and should be simplified. Advanced school at Chengtu is short of planes. Lanchow under Russians. Kunming primary has some American and some French instructors.

From Dorn June 17: French have sold 24 new Dewoitine pursuits No. 510, speed 400 km. per hour; 12 new Morane pursuits No. 405, speed 500 km. per hour. Both types V dash motor armed with twenty mm. gun firing through propeller shaft which is geared to motor piston. Fires high explosive shell with superinstantaneous fuse. Also 8 new Poty combined pursuits and light bombers No. 63, speed 450 km. per hour, manned by three men armed with two machine guns. 14 Dewoitines with 15 pilots and mechanics arrived Yunnanfu. 10 more on way. Aviators on personal contract.

80 bombers and 100 pursuit planes in Hankow area June 22nd.

Nanchang airdrome has 115 Russian and 60 Chinese pilots, 40 Russian mechanics, 120 Russian made pursuits and 12 bombers. Continued reports of more Russian planes arriving. High-powered anti-air light and sound equipment at Changsha but not much good without guns, Aug. 1st.

Large new air field at Liuyang, Hunan, (east of Changsha) Aug. 5th; British say 120 new foreign planes (half American) passed thru Hongkong between June 4th and Aug. 10th.

e. Motor Transport.

Stock at Hongkong, bought up by Central Government from Aug. 13th thru October. Part shipped by train and/or boat; rest to be driven in.

150	Ford
50	Chevrolet
50	Studebaker
30	International
10	GMC
20	various
310	

Ordered from abroad and now en route:

500	Dodge (1st shipment)
1052	,, (2nd shipment)
500	White (heavy duty)
300	Ford
50	Chevrolet
1000	Mercedes-Benz (German) (200 already arrived Hongkong)
3402	

f. Notes on Chinese Military Forces.

1. Fifty Chinese divisions were reported in Shanghai-Soochow area in fall of 1937, total effective combat strength 250,000.

d. Airplanes, Chinese. (cont'd)

The following is as estimate of airplanes now in China: American made: 25 Volti; 25 old Curtis-Hawks; 60 new Curtis-Hawks, Nos. 2 & 75, about half of the latter are assembled. 15 British. 25 new French, Dewoitines. 10 old German. About all of these are pursuits or can carry only small bombs. About 125 Russian pursuits and bombers are left from former sales. About 50 new Russian pursuits and bombers in past two months. 2 American Martin bombers. Total estimated at about 340. In addition there are about 100 training planes at Yunnanfu, Sianfu, Chungking and in Kansu, Aug. 12th;

Main Air Base being built up at Hengyang but Hankow and small fields still used as bases for Yangtze bombing. Of planes enumerated in above paragraph about 110 old or not assembled.

f. Notes on Chinese Military Forces (cont'd):

2. Total Nanking garrison Dec. 5th, 40,000 to 45,000 (Tang Sheng-chih ran away Dec. 10th).

3. On Jan. 15th it was reported that fifteen divisions were in the Hankow area and that thirteen divisions were in Changsha and Nanchang.

4. Total of twelve Kwangsi divisions in north Feb. 28th.

5. On March 2nd, it was reported that there were five Central Government divisions in Shansi.

   After fall of Taiyuan Nov. 7th, until middle of March, Chinese forces in Shansi numbered Reds 50,000, Central Government and Provincial troops, sixteen divisions or 110,000 men.

6. Thirty-one Chinese divisions training in reserve March 31st.

7. Chinese estimate of Chinese troops in the middle of March, 1938:

250,000	in Shansi (20 divs. E.of R.R., & 10 divs. W. of R.R., under Wei Li-huang)
100,000	between Tungkwan and Chengchow
180,000	in Hsuchow area
50,000	around Kaifeng
100,000	on Ping-Han R.R, south of Chengchow
100,000	around Hankow
100,000	Changsha & Nanchang
150,000	Wuhu to Hangchow
1,030,000	Total

8. Chinese have nine divisions in Anhwei area to stop Japanese move north of Hwai River April 11th.

9. 50,000 Chinese casualties at Hsuchow March 20th to May 5th.

10. 18th, 53rd, 55th, 57th, 77th, and 187th are among new divisions training in Hupeh June 10th.

11. Chinese Intelligence Office says 60 divs. north of Yangtze and within Tungpeh-Sinyang-Anhwei border defense lines. 10 divisions in Taihu-Tsienshan area. 8 divisions in Matang area, 30 divisions in Nanchang general area. Total 118 divisions with average strength of 7,000 each, July 4th.

12. Not counting Reds, 26 divisions in Shansi but arms and equipment poor July 6th.

f. Notes on Chinese Military Forces (cont'd).

13. Ten divisions constitute greater Wuhan defense garrison under Ch'en Ch'eng. In addition to these Chiang Kai-shek has fifty divisions stationed in Hupeh, July 8th.

14. Japanese claim Chinese casualties 500,000 compared to 36,000 Japanese casualties since war started, July 7th; Chinese estimate Chinese killed and wounded to date 800,000, July 13th.

15. Among divisions west of Poyang Lake between Kan River and Yangtze are 12 Central Government divisions. Ch'en Ch'eng says under his command for Wuhan defense are 75 to 80 divisions, July 14th.

16. French say Chinese have about 40 divs. with some motorized units secreted in Changsha, Weishan, and Lungshan area.

17. Two Chinese motorized divisions now in area both sides of Poyang Lake, July 17th.

18. 12 divisions in vicinity of Kiukiang, July 19th.

19. Known total Chinese divisions for defense of Greater Wuhan is 140 divisions at 7,000 per div., making a total of 980,000 men. Estimated an additional 35 divs. of 245,000 men in this area. 8 divs. and probably 7 more in Loyang-Chengchow area, July 28th.

20. Known Chinese divisions as follows:

Location	Divisions	Men
Tungpeh-Sinyang-Susung ..... including Macheng.	41	287,000
Wuhan City area	22	154,000
Changsha area	8	56,000 (prob. plus 10000)
River area south of Anking & north of E.W. line through Teian	45 + 2 mechanized	330,000
East of Poyang Lake & south of line through Teian	13	91,000(prob. plus 7000)
West of Poyang Lake & south of line through Teian	3	21,000(prob. plus 7000)
Fencheng south of Nanchang....	6	42,000
Total, July 28th	138	981,000

21. 30,000 Provincial troops and Pao-An -Tui at Shaoyang Hunan, (southwest of Changsha), Aug. 5th.

22. **Five transports filled with troops down river from Chungking Aug. 2;**

23. **An average of 1,000 Chinese wounded per day from Kiukiang front Aug. 12th.**

g. Miscellaneous references to prominent Chinese leaders, military and political, not listed in Army organization:

Ho Ying-ch'in, Minister of War of the National Government.

Ku Chu-tung, Director of Generalissimo's headquarters at Sian in January 1937 and Commander-in-Chief in the Shanghai-Soochow area summer and fall of 1937, in Anhwei Feb. 18th.

Chang Fa-kwei, commander in Pootung summer 1937, in Hangchow Dec. 19th and under Ch'en Ch'eng (Wuhan Garrison Commander) in charge of the defense of Hankow (First Line) June 2nd and 10th, in center of line June 13th (for east sector see Li Tsung-Jen, 5th Route Army, page 3); at Kiukiang June 22nd.

Chang Chih-chung, former head of Central Military Academy.

Ch'eng Ch'ien, Governor of Honan (see 1st War Zone page 1), in command of west sector, Hankow defense line. Headquarters at Nanyang, June 13th.

Mao Tze-tung, Red political leader, in Yenan, Shensi, Dec. 19th.

Commanding Generals of Hankow Defense System: Ch'eng Ch'ien - from Tungkwan to Kunghsien, T'ang En-po - Kunghsien thru Hsuchang to Kushih, Sun Lien-chung - from Nanyang thru Sinyang to east, Li Tsung-jen - from north of Huangchuan thru Shangch'eng and south, Chang Fa-kuei - along Hupeh border to river, Ch'en Ch'eng - from Wushengkwan thru Macheng to Kihsien on river, June 20th.

Ch'en Ch'eng's principal subordinates for Wuhan Defense: Hsueh Yueh, Chang Fa-kuei, and Sun Lien-chung. Hsueh Yueh commands largest part of defense troops. Sun Lien-chung, Tang En-po and Liu Ju-ming all in Greater Nanchang area, July 14th. 1st district west of Poyang Lake under Hsueh Yueh with hq. at Nanchang, July 19th.

Li Tsung-jen commands entire north defense sector from Tungpeh, Honan, to west of Tsienshan. Ch'en Ch'eng commands everything else from Wuchang hq. Chang Fa-kuei has sector from west of Tsienshan, east of Hupeh-Anhwei border, across river to Wucheng, Kiangsi, July 19th.

Li Tsung-jen now commands whole north sector to river area. Chang Fa-kuei with hq. at Juichang has area south of river and north bank only, July 24th.
Chang Fa-kuei has 10 divs.including Hsu Yuan-chuan's men stationed in front of Kiukiang Aug. 10th.

g. Miscellaneous references to prominent Chinese leaders, military and political, not listed in Army organization:

Ch'en Ch'eng himself commands 9th War Zone. T'ang En-po commands reserve area south of Nanchang, Aug. 1st.

Pai Tsung-hsi, Kwangsi chieftain in Anhwei Dec. 31st; at Hsuchow March 31st; rift noticeable between Generalissimo on one hand and Pai Tsung-hsi and Li Tsung-jen on the other over anti-Red, and anti-south politics of Kuomintang June 1st; P ai and Li apparently appeased so no present danger split in government June 10th; death of Liu H siang and appointment of Chang Chun as Governor of Szechwan gives Central Government better hold; thousands of Mohammedans enlisting because of Pai Tsung-hsi's influence June 14th; in Hunan training new troops July 30th.

Pai Tsung-hsi and Li Tsung Jen, their route after the fall of Hsuchow: Left Hsuchow May 17th via Sanpu, 10 miles south, in evening. On to Nan-Hsuchow (A.M. May 18th) then to Taoyuan, hq. of a Kwangsi div. (General Liao Lei) arriving on May 19th. On night of 19th march began, reached Machiatien on May 21st, went on to Fuyang (Taoyuan to Fuyang - 200 k.m. - 5 marches). At Fuyang party got motors to Hsinyang.

Yu Han-mou, Pacification Commissioner of Kwangtung.

Shen Hung-lieh, former Mayor of Tsingtao at Ichow as Governor of Shantung. Has Paoantui and Tsingtao marines.

Fu Tso-yi, former governor of Suiyuan Province.

Ma Chan-shan, commander of Chinese forces in Suiyuan.

Ch'en Ch'eng, Wuhan Garrison Commander, with Whampoa crowd blueshirts; trying to destroy communist clique who united with Wang Ching-wei gang June 13th.

Wang Ching-wei, President of Peoples Political Council.

Wang Chung-hui, Chinese Foreign Minister.

Kang Tze, Communist leader, in arrest but directing organization June 13th.

Chou En-lai, Communist leader at Hankow.

Chu Teh, Red leader in the Northwest.

Wang Ke-min)
Tang Erh-ho) leaders of Provisional Government of the Republic of China.

g. Miscellaneous references to prominent Chinese leaders, military and political, not listed in Army organization: (continued)

Han Teh-chin, former Chief of Staff to Ku Chu-tung, Chairman of Kiangsu Provincial Government.

* - Sun Lien-chung will remain in Sinyang area. Pai Chung-hsi is temporary commander North Defense line with Hq. at Sungfow, Hupeh, during illness of Li Tsung-jen. Ch'en Ch'eng believes Chinese should not fight for Wuhan. He is Commander-in-chief of all defenses. Wu Chi-wei commands prepared defense line thru Mahuiling. Yu Shih-tze commands main line just south of Tehan Aug. 19th.

h. Russian Technical Advisers.

Believed Russian technical advisers number several hundred, July 26th.

For and in the absence of the Military Attache:

EMS

David D. Barrett
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Major, Infantry
Assistant Military Attache

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